Anda di halaman 1dari 9




c c
 ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc &)c%4#)*&0c     

 cc  ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc

c c 
c  c
c c

c c

cccccccccccccccccccccccccc ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc


 c c ! cc


c"#$"%&c'"c()*&"c"c+)c )c'*)),c
#-c+)c c,c"c*)c(*-c"c)*)&c

. ))*-/)0c 1"2cc

*%&))c3c %c %*&c


  Ê   Ê


c c
"4)&c ":c )),c c )**"*c ))*-/)0c 1"c c &"$)*);c *))c :+)c 4c "$)*c 95c



,&=%-c %,;)c "+cc+4%*c()*c+)c*%)&c,c"%ccc9668c


c c+&c#))c,c*)4&c+)c("&"c"c+)c,))&)c+c+&c'"%*c&%**),)*),c<%*&,'"c

+*"%;+c ,%)c (*"')&&c $""&c ,c &*%'%*c )**"*&c c ":)$)*c c "*,)*c "c &))>c +)c ),),c

*))c +&c '"%*c 4%&c +)*c +&c ""c c *4?&c );+c ,c #-c &()'c (()*')c #-c +)c



 Ê  Ê 

5c +)c)),c )*)-c)0c 1"c&c"c)*),c'"%&)c

9c +)c)),c )*)-c)0c 1"c&c"c&'+""),cc:c

8c +)c)),c )*)-c)0c 1"c(()*),c#)"*)c %,;)c "+cc+4%*c"c )()4#)*c9@+c


Ac %,;)c +4%*c &%44*-c ,&4&&),c )),B&c )"c "c )c &,)c ,c &4&&c +)c

"4(c,c %44"&c:+"%c*),;cc

Cc %,;)c+4%*c":),c+)c(*"&)'%"c"c(*"')),c:+"%c&:)*;c+)c)),?&c)"c

Dc %,;)c+4%*c"%,cc$"*c"c+)c )c#%c,,c"c(*"$,)cc''"%c"*c:%c#'>;c"*c


c c

 !"# "$%&'("#"%)&*"'!+c

The moving party has the burden of showing grounds fordisqualification. A party

challenging a judge on the basis of bias or prejudicebears the burden of overcoming the

heavy presumption of judicialimpartiality. Cain v Dep¶t of Corr, 451 Mich 470, 497

(1996), and In reForfeiture of $1,159,420, 194 Mich App 134, 151 (1992). One

whochallenges a judge on the basis of the constitutional right to an unbiased andimpartial

tribunal also bears a heavy burden. Cain, supra at 498±99 n 33.

Pursuant to MCR 2.003(B), ³[a] judge is disqualified when the judge cannotimpartially

hear a case.´ Michigan Court Rule 2.003(B) sets forth anon-exhaustive list of

circumstances in which a judge is disqualified, includinginstances when a judge is

personally biased or prejudiced against a party orattorney. MCR 2.003(B)(1).

Bias or prejudice is defined as an attitude or state of mind belying an aversionor hostility

of such a degree that a fair-minded person could not entirely set itaside when judging

certain persons or causes. Cain, supra at 495. Forpurposes of disqualification, a judge¶s

bias or prejudice must be actual andpersonal. Id. Unless the alleged bias or prejudice

displays such deep-seatedfavoritism or antagonism that a fair judgment would be

impossible, a judge¶sfavorable or unfavorable disposition must arise from facts or events

outsidethe current judicial proceeding. Id. at 495±96, 513. The mere fact that a

judgeconducted a prior proceeding against the defendant does not amount to proofof

disqualifying bias. People v White, 411 Mich 366, 386 (1981), and Peoplev Koss, 86 Mich

App 557, 560 (1978). A judge who sits as trier of fact andfinds the defendant guilty is not

automatically disqualified from acting as trierof fact at the defendant¶s retrial after

reversal on appeal. People v Upshaw,172 Mich App 386, 388±89 (1988). A judge who

presides over a pleaproceeding, during which the defendant provides a factual basis for a

c c
guiltyplea but then decides not to plead guilty, need not sua sponte disqualifyhimself or

herself from conducting the defendant¶s subsequent bench trial.People v Cocuzza, 413

Mich 78, 83 (1982).

Motions for disqualification may also be based on an alleged violation of thedue-process

requirement that a decision maker be unbiased and impartial.Cain, supra at 497±98, and

Crampton v Dep¶t of State, 395 Mich 347, 350(1975). It is only in the most extreme cases

that a judge will be disqualifiedfor bias or prejudice on due-process grounds. Cain, supra

at 497±98.Examples of instances in which the probability of actual bias may be too highto

be constitutionally tolerable, and in which a judge may therefore bedisqualified

notwithstanding the absence of a showing of actual bias, includesituations where a judge:

1) has a pecuniary interest; 2) has been insulted,slandered and vilified by a party; 3) has

revealed deep prejudice against thedefendant¶s profession and has recently been a losing

party in a civil rightslawsuit filed by the defendant; or 4) might have prejudged the case

because ofprior participation in the case as one who personally conducted the

initialinvestigation, amassed evidence, and filed and prosecuted the charges, or asone who

made the initial decision which is under review. Crampton, supra at351±55, and Cain,

supra at 497±502, 514. Due process is violated when full-time law enforcement officials,

charged with responsibility for arrest andprosecution of law violators, sit as adjudicators

in law enforcement disputesbetween citizens and police officers. Crampton, supra at 356±

58.MCR 2.003(C)(1) states as follows:³(1) Time for Filing. To avoid delaying trial

andinconveniencing the witnesses, a motion to disqualify mustbe filed within 14 days after

the moving party discovers theground for disqualification. If the discovery is made

within14 days of the trial date, the motion must be madeforthwith. If a motion is not timely

filed, untimeliness,including delay in waiving jury trial, is a factor in decidingwhether the

motion should be granted.´

c c
The 14-day deadlines for filing a motion to disqualify are mandatory. Cain,supra at 493,

and Dean & Longhofer, Michigan Court Rules Practice (4th ed),§2003.8, p 55 (the 14-day

deadlines in the subrule are mandatory, and the³untimeliness´ in the third sentence refers

to time requirements other thanthose stated in the first two sentences of the subrule).

³Whenever a challengedjudge has denied a disqualification motion and a request for a

hearing beforeanother judge comes after a trial or hearing has started[,] the challenged

judgeshould have the option of proceeding with the trial or hearing unless a chiefjudge or

a higher court orders that the trial or hearing be interrupted or delayedso that the

disqualification motion may be considered by another judge beforethe trial or hearing is

concluded.´ People v McDonald, 97 Mich App 425, 433(1980), vacated on other grounds

411 Mich 870 (1981). See also In reContempt of Steingold (In re Smith), 244 Mich App

153, 160±61 (2000) (thejuvenile court referee did not err in denying defense counsel¶s oral

motion fordisqualification on the first day of trial, but the referee did err by not

referringthe matter to the chief judge as required under MCR 2.003(C)(3)).

The motion must be accompanied by an affidavit and must include all knowngrounds for

disqualification. MCR 2.003(C)(2). The challenged judge decidesthe motion and, if the

motion is denied and a party so requests, the challengedjudge must refer the motion to the

chief judge (if the court has more than onejudge) or to a judge appointed by the state court

administrator (if the court hasonly one judge or where the challenged judge is the chief

judge) for de novodecision. MCR 2.003(C)(3).1


‘ Monograph 6, Pretrial Motions Third Edition

c c
c+&c'&)c+)c)),c )*)-c)0c 1"c+&c'+"&)c"c&,c%(c"*c+&c*;+&c,c



*"4c+)c')("c"c+)c),c )&c+)c*4)*&c,c+)c<%,'*-c%,)*&"",c+c4)c

:)*)c .),":),c #-c +)*c '*)"*2c ')*c (*")'"&c ,c +)c "&%"c :&c ,*:c %(c "c "c


+"&)c(*")'"&cc%*+)*c'&)&c'*),c)1'-c :+c+"&)c4"&c:)*)c c"*,)*c"c#))*c


"c &",-c +)&)c %,4)c (*")'"&c +)c "%,)*&c '+"&)c c ,$)*&*c &-&)4c "c




5c +)c"(("&;c(*-cc+&c'&)c+)c,)),c+,cc,%-c"c()*"*4c

9c +)c"(("&;c(*-c,,c"c4))c+c,%-c

8c +)c"(("&;c(*-c'%&),cc*'%#)c+*4c&"4)4)&c'),ccorpus delicti.c

c&"4)c'&)&cc))4)c>":c&cmens reac 4%&c&"c#)c&+":c"c(*"$)c+c+)*)c:&c

)c%+)*c)1),;c+)ccorpus delictic*;%4)c

"*%)-c "*c +)c 'E)&c "c **)c +)c <%,'*-c ,c &c "')*&c +$)c )1(),),c +)c

(*"')&&c ,c "c ";)*c )),c "c 4))c &%'+c *"%#)&"4)c #%*,)&c c -c "'&c &4(-c +,c "%c

'>)&c "c ("'c *$)&c ,c ()"()c +)-c +$)c '+*')*E),c &c ,&&),&c "c #*;c c &),-c

4")*-c ":c "*c &c '")*&c c +)&)c *"%#),c )'""4'c 4)&c c +"%,c c ,)),c "&+-c


&"c +)c (*"&)'%"c )),c "c #)c #%*,)),c :+c +)c %"*%)c &>c "c *)(-;c "c -c

"-;c ""&c "*c )"&c ),c "c #)+c "c +)c )),c #)'%&)c +)c '&)c &c c "*;")c

c c
'"'%&"c ,c "")c :c *),c +)4c -:-c c +&c &c +)c :-c "c +;&c c %,;)c +4%*?&c


+)c(*"&)'%"cc %,;)c+4%*?&c'"%*c+&c"c#%*,)c"c#)*Gc+&c"c'&)c"c4))cc +)c

+)c (*"&)'%"c &()>&c c &c *);*,),c &c ;"&()c ,)&()c )$,)')c ,c &%)&c "c +)c '"**-cc

%&')c'"c#)c+,c c %,;)c+4%*?&c'"%*c,c c:&c "c+,c c+&c'&)cc %,;)c+4%*c


%*+)*4"*)c %,;)c+4%*c+)*,c"*4c+)c'"4(;c(*-c:+"c,4),c"c'"44;c


%,;)c+4%*c"">c+)c(*"&)'%"*cc')c $%)c*);*,;c c&%)c,)&()cc*))*)')c"c

+c $)*-c &4)c &%)c c +)c )),?&c )"c :+'+c :"%,c +$)c '"*,'),c +)c

(*"&)'%"&c &)4)c c ":)$)*c %,;)c +4%*c '"%,c "c +$)c >":c +c +)c &%)c :&c


%*+)*4"*)c c 4%&c #)c &&%4),c +c %,;)c +4%*c %,)*&,&c c :&c ,c '&)c :c c

+&c4)*c,c>):c)1'-c:+c+)c:&c,";cScrews et al. v. US., 325 U.S. 91 (1945),cc+)c


c +)c"%,;c+)*&c'(),c'"**%("cc+)-c+,c'),c,$)*&)&c*"4c+)c*%)c"c
)"*;)cc+)c:&c*)c#&),c"c+c(*'()Gc+)c(*'()&c"c'+)'>&c,c#')&cc +)c
+)&)c :&c *)c ;"*),c '"**%("c #"%,&c c +)-c 4%&c #)c ,+)*),c "c inpara materiac ")c

c +)c ,)),c #))$)&c +c %,;)c +4%*c +&c &+":c #&c ,c +&c #&c &c c "*c

c %*)c"c)"*')c+)c:c,")&c"c'+;)cccLousville & N.R.R. v U.S., 282 U.S. 740,


c c

 ,c +)c ,)),c 4"$)&c +)c "%*c "c ;*c +)c 4""c "*c ,&=%'"c "*c "c

,&4&&c +)c '"c :+c (*)<%,')c c c +)c "%*c ,))&c +&c 4""c +)c ,)),c 4"$)&c +)c




1111111111111111111111      %/Ê%- !!



%!&"# "$%&567789


Accused in Pro Per

At Arms Length

Restricted jurisdiction

By special visitation - ³ special appearance´

To challenge jurisdiction of the Court


c c





Ê c c
c ccc c
c ccc c c

  cÊ   ccccc

c c