4.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Ordoñez vs. Vinarao, 239 SCRA 114, G.R. No. 117376 December 8, 1994

This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed directly before this Court in behalf of Oscar de Guzman y Enriquez, who
was tried and convicted by the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City — Branch 39 in G.R. No. 76742, "People of the
Philippines v. Oscar de Guzman y Enriquez," 188 SCRA 407, for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, alleging in
particular the fact that de Guzman wilfully and unlawfully sold two (2) sticks of marijuana.

Upon review by this Court, the trial court's decision sentencing de Guzman to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment plus
payment of P20,000 fine and costs was affirmed in toto and the appeal was dismissed with costs against accused-
appellant.

Under the provisions of Section 20, Republic Act No. 6425 as last amended by R.A. 7659, which became effective on
December 31, 1993, and as interpreted by this Court in the case of People v. Simon,1 if the quantity of the marijuana
involved is less than 250 grams, the imposable penalty, in the event that the conviction should be affirmed, shall be within
the range of prision correccional (from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years). Clearly, de Guzman is entitled to
benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law.

Petitioners allege that since de Guzman has been serving sentence since July 1984 or for more than ten (10) years now,
his continued detention in the National Penitentiary is a violation of his basic human rights and that, therefore, he should
be released from prison without further delay. In aid of judicial administration, petitioners further recommend that all
prisoners similarly situated be likewise released from prison.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty upon a verified petition setting forth:

1. that the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty;

2. the officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained;

3. the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; and

4. a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person (Section 3, Rule 102, Revised Rules of
Court).

It appearing that all the above requirements have been met and finding merit in the petition, the same is hereby
GRANTED. Let a writ of habeas corpus issue immediately.

The Director, New Bilibid Prisons, is commanded to forthwith execute the writ for de Guzman's discharge from
confinement unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause, to make due return of the writ, and to submit a
complete inventory of all other prisoners therein similarly situated within thirty days, to relieve them from further
confinement

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Bill of Rights; Statutes; Dangerous Drugs Act; R.A. 7659 given retroactive effect to benefit those already serving
sentence who are covered by its provisions reducing the penalties for certain acts under the Dangerous Drugs
Act.
 Same; Habeas Corpus; Requisites for the issuance of the writ; The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of
illegal confinement by which any person is deprived of his liberty.—The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty upon a verified petition setting
forth: 1. that the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; 2. the
officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained; 3. the place where he is imprisoned or
restrained of his liberty; and 4. a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person (Section 3, Rule
102, Revised Rules of Court).
 Same; Same; Director of New Bilibid Prisons ordered to submit a complete inventory of all other prisoners therein
similarly situated, to relieve them from further confinement.

Mangila vs. Pangilinan, 701 SCRA 355, G.R. No. 160739 July 17, 2013

FACTS: Seven criminal complaints charging petitioner Anita Mangila and four others with syndicated estafa in violation of
Article 315 of the RPC, in relation to PD No. 1689, and with violations of Section 7(b) of RA 8042 were filed in the MTCC
in Puerto Princesa City. he complaints arose from the recruiting and promising of employment by Mangila and the others
to the private complainants as overseas contract workers in Toronto, Canada, and from the collection of visa processing
fees, membership fees and on-line application the private complainants without lawful authority from the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). On the following day, Judge Pangilinan , Presiding Judge of the MTCC,
conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. After examining Miguel Aaron Palayon, one of the complainants,
Judge Pangilinan issued a warrant for the arrest of Mangila and her cohorts without bail. On the next day, the entire
records of the cases, including the warrant of arrest, were transmitted to the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City for
further proceedings and appropriate action in accordance with the prevailing rules. As a consequence, Mangila was
arrested and detained at the headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila of the NBI. Mangila filed in the Court of Appeals (CA) a
petition for habeas corpus to obtain her release from detention. The CA denied the petition for habeas corpus for its lack
of merit

ISSUE: Did the CA err in ruling that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy to obtain the release of Mangila from
detention?

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA’s finding. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus has been devised as a
speedy and effective remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of
error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error.
The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the
merits. Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem when instituted for the sole purpose
of having the person of restraint presented before the judge in order that the cause of his detention may be inquired into
and his statements final. The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person
who holds him in what is alleged to be the unlawful authority. Hence, the only parties before the court are the petitioner
(prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the only question to be resolved is whether the custodian
has authority to deprive the petitioner of his liberty. The writ may be denied if the petitioner fails to show facts that he is
entitled thereto ex merito justicias. The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention,
and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the
writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record. There is no
question that when the criminal complaints were lodged against Mangila and her cohorts on June 16, 2003,Judge
Pangilinan, as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, was empowered to conduct preliminary investigations involving "all
crimes cognizable by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions." His authority was expressly provided in
Section 2, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under Section 6(b) of Rule 112of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest during the preliminary investigation even
without awaiting its conclusion should he find after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and the
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers that a probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity
of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice.1âwphi1 In the context of
this rule, Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of arrest against Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA properly
denied Mangila’s petition for habeas corpus because she had been arrested and detained by virtue of the warrant issued
for her arrest by Judge Pangilinan, a judicial officer undeniably possessing the legal authority to do so. It is relevant to
point out at this juncture that the authority of the MTC and MTCC judges to conduct preliminary investigations was
removed only effective on October 3, 2005 pursuant to A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC. With Mangila’s arrest and ensuing detention
being by virtue of the order lawfully issued by Judge Pangilinan, the writ of habeas corpus was not an appropriate remedy
to relieve her from the restraint on her liberty. This is because the restraint, being lawful and pursuant to a court process,
could not be inquired into through habeas corpus. Her proper recourse was to bring the supposed irregularities attending
the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the issuance of the warrant for her arrest to the attention of the City
Prosecutor, who had been meanwhile given the most direct access to the entire records of the case, including the warrant
of arrest, following Judge Pangilinan’s transmittal of them to the City Prosecutor for appropriate action. We agree with the
CA, therefore, that the writ of habeas corpus could not be used as a substitute for another available remedy

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Constitutional Law; Habeas Corpus; The object of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the
detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to require the release of the detainee.—The object of the writ
of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of the detention, and, if the detention is found to be illegal, to
require the release of the detainee. Equally well-settled however, is that the writ will not issue where the person in
whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge with jurisdiction or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record.
 Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Warrants of Arrest; The investigating judge could issue a warrant of arrest
during the preliminary investigation even without awaiting its conclusion should he find after an examination in
writing and under oath of the complainant and the witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers that
a probable cause existed, and that there was a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice.— In the context of this rule, Judge Pangilinan issued the warrant of
arrest against Mangila and her cohorts. Consequently, the CA properly denied Mangila’s petition for habeas
corpus because she had been arrested and detained by virtue of the warrant issued for her arrest
 Same; Same; It was clear that under Section 5, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
resolution of the investigating judge was not final but was still subject to the review by the public prosecutor who
had the power to order the release of the detainee if no probable cause should be ultimately found against her.

5. WRIT OF AMPARO

Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo, 568 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008

FACTS:
Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that
they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August
13, 2007.
Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the
military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was
pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation
and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition.

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial
investigation reports as to the Manalos’ custody, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials
involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody. The Secretary
of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the decision
promulgated by the CA.

HELD:
In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the Manalos right to security.
xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has
been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by private
individuals or entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and protection
by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction,
detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be
abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable
through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained. (GR No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo, October 7, 2008)

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Writ of Amparo; Supreme Court; Words and Phrases; “Extralegal Killings” and “Enforced Disappearances,”
Defined; The promulgation of the Amparo Rule was an exercise for the first time of the Supreme Court’s
expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people’s constitutional rights, which made its maiden
appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime; The Amparo
Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances”;
“Extralegal killings” are “killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings,” while enforced disappearances” are “attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention
or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct
or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law.”—On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule “in light of the prevalence of
extralegal killing and enforced disappearances.” It was an exercise for the first time of the Court’s expanded
power to promulgate rules to protect our people’s constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the
1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime.
 Same; Words and Phrases; The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico and “Amparo” literally means “protection” in
Spanish.
 Same; Purposes of the Writ of Amparo; In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been
constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially committed in countries under military
juntas.
 Same; Same; Words and Phrases; In the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the “right to security” is
actually the “freedom from threat”—“freedom from fear” is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or
security is the actionable wrong.
 Same; The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.—In
blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from victims
of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

Castillo vs. Cruz, 605 SCRA 628, G.R. No. 182165 November 25, 2009

FACTS:
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of
land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor
Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects.

Several cases were filed by both parties to enforce their rights over the property. The pertinent case among the filed
cases was the issuance by the MTC an alias Writ of Demolition in favor of the Province. Respondents filed a motion for
TRO in the RTC, which was granted. However, the demolition was already implemented before the TRO issuance.

On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in
compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to “protect, secure and maintain
the possession of the property,” entered the property.

Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTC Order of Permanent
Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause
their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats.

Thus, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
ISSUE:
1) WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights; and,
2) WON Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal case already filed.

HELD:

On the 1st issue: Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the coverage of the writs is
limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security, and the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful
acts or omissions.

Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo teaches: “As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem
of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances.” Tapuz v. Del Rosario also teaches: “What it is not is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds.”

To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out
of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the
acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety
of petitioners’ entry into the property.

It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life,
liberty and security. Bare allegations of petitioners will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo.
No undue confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day
after their arrest.

On the 2nd issue: Respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for
criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter
is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Writ of Amparo; Writ of Habeas Data; The coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty
and security; The writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.—The coverage of the
writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security. And the writs cover not only actual but also
threats of unlawful acts or omissions.

 Same; Same; To be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondent must meet the threshold requirement that
their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission.—To thus be
covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy
arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable
nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty and security, the Court
will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property.

 Same; Same; Absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing
restraint on their liberty and/or that there exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be
secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.—Although respondents’ release from
confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even an
allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat
or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot
be justified.

 Same; Same; Petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as
tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a property dispute.—It need not be underlined that
respondents’ petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as
tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a property dispute.

 Same; Same; Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by
respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data.—At all events,
respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for criminal
proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted
thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo
and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made available to the aggrieved party by
motion in the criminal proceedings.
 Razon, Jr. vs. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598, G.R. No. 182498 December 3, 2009

FACTS:

The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior Honorary Counselor for the
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong
(Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in
Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket
for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer
around. The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room
key with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latter’s Manila-based secretary who
did not know of Tagitis’ whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply wait.

On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of Muslim studies and Tagitis’
fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. On November 7, 2007,
Kunnong executed a sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis’ disappearance.

More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), Mary Jean Tagitis filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo (petition) with
the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P. Arcilla.The petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano,
Commanding General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen. Edgardo M.
Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-
Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-
Terror Task Force Comet.

Mary Jean said in her statement that she approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in Digos branch,
Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the military who could help them
find/locate the whereabouts of her husband. All of her efforts did not produce any positive results except the information
from persons in the military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed men.
According to reliable information she received, subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence operatives,
specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve
and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI.

She then filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and in Jolo, seeking their help to find
her husband, but was told of an intriguing tale by the police that her husband was not missing but was with another
woman having good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the refusal of the PNP to help and provide police
assistance in locating her missing husband

Heeding an advise of one police officer, she went to the different police headquarters namely Police Headquarters in
Cotabato City, Davao City, Zamboanga City and eventually in the National Headquarters in Camp Crame in Quezon City
but her efforts produced no positive results. These trips exhausted all of her resources which pressed her to ask for
financial help from friends and relatives

She has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under the circumstances, she has no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the release of her husband, Engr. MorcedTagitis, from the
illegal clutches of his captors, their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subject’s hum an
and constitutional rights, except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.

On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set the case for hearing on
January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours from service of the
writ.

In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied any involvement in or
knowledge of Tagitis’ alleged abduction. They argued that the allegations of the petition were incomplete and did not
constitute a cause of action against them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay
evidence. In addition, they all claimed that they exhausted all means, particularly taking pro-active measures to
investigate, search and locate Tagitis and to apprehend the persons responsible for his disappearance.

THE CA RULING

On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis was an "enforced
disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances. The CA held that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence world. It also
labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasim’s subsequent and belated retraction of his statement that the military, the police, or the
CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.

The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation" police theories painting the
disappearance as "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the law or any record of
overstepping the bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to him; no student of the IDB scholarship program ever
came forward to complain that he or she did not get his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis for the police theory
that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of his second wife," on the basis of the respondent’s testimony that
Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many wives under the Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at all when the
latter divorced his first wife in order to marry the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by the Abu
Sayyaf or by the ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis’ disappearance, since the respondent, the police and the
military noted that there was no acknowledgement of Tagitis’ abduction or demand for payment of ransom – the usual
modus operandi of these terrorist groups.

Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and his family, and directed the
CIDG Chief, Col. Jose VolpanePante, PNP Chief Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col.
AhironAjirim, and PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect the
life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same
time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen.
Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.

On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied the motion in its Resolution of
April 9, 2008.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.

RULING:

The disappearance of Engr. MorcedTagitis is classified as an enforced disappearance, thus the privilege of the Writ of
Amparo applies.

Under the UN Declaration enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of
liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of
the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of
the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law." Under this definition, the elements
that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold:

(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State;

(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the disappeared person;

(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.

There was no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct evidence at hand only shows that
Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and was never seen nor
heard of again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned – the petitioner, Tagitis’ colleagues and even the
police authorities – is that Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances and was never seen again.

A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others (in terms of the portions the
petitioners cite):

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any
report;(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party
and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Writs of Amparo; Nature; Words and Phrases; The Writ of Amparo—a protective remedy against violations or
threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security—does not deter-mine guilt nor pinpoint criminal
culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced
disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance; Responsibility
refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever
way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft,
among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the
proper courts; Accountability refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
 responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who
carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.

 the court’s directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the disappearance of
an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for
the disappearance; rather, it determines responsi-bility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance
for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility refers to the
extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action
or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts.
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who
carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved
and his liberty and security are restored.

 Same; Same; The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points
remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may
promulgate.—We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at the outset to stress that the unique situations
that call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to address these
situations, may not at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court actions and
proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The
Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve
through time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate.

 Same; Pleadings and Practice; While, as in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the
ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details, in an Amparo petition, however, this
requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of
uncertainty—the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who
actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information
may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance.
 Same; Same; Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition—that otherwise is not supported
by sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause of action—as a means to “fish” for evidence.

 Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Although the writ of amparo specifically covers “enforced disappearances,”
this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction; As the law now stands, extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts
undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised
Penal Code and special laws.

 Same; Same; Evidence; Burden of Proof; The characteristics of the Amparo Rule of being summary and the use
of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof
beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings)—reveal the clear intent of the framers to have the equivalent of
an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations; In these proceedings,
the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance and form requirements of a Writ of
Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the allegations by substantial evidence, and once a rebuttable
case has been proven, the respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of
diligence required

 Same; Same; Same; The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern
for constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective and timely remedies, using and profiting from local
and international experiences in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, as the situation may require—
the Court has no choice but to meet the evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances with the
flexibility that these difficulties demand.

Rodriguez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 660 SCRA 84, G.R. No. 191805 November 15, 2011

FACTS: This case involved two consolidated petitions assailing the April 12, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals
granting the writ of amparo and writ of habeas data by petitioner Noriel Rodriguez, who is a member of Alyansa Dagiti
MannalonIti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with KilusangMagbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).

Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the OplanBantayLaya, making its
members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Petitioner was then abducted, tortured and forced
to confess to being a member of the New People's Army (NPA). Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of
Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production
of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG.
Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, and five
others. The writs were granted but the CA dropped President Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any
case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency as part of her presidential immunity. Also, the prayer for the
issuance of a temporary protection order and inspection order was denied by the CA. The respondents filed a Motion for
Reconsideration on the decision of the CA but before such motion could be resolved petitioner filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration raising that the CA erred in not granting the interim relief for temporary protection order and in dropping
President Arroyo as party-respondent.

ISSUES: (1) WON the interim reliefs prayed for by petitioner may be granted even after the writs of amparo and habeas
data have been granted. (2) WON President Arroyo should be dropped as respondent because of her presidential
immunity. (3) WON the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases (4) WON the
rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or threatened by respondents

HELD:

1. The interim reliefs prayed for by the petitioner is only available before final judgment. Section 14 of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo clearly provides that interim reliefs may only be availed of upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final
judgment. Given that there has already been a final judgment in the given case, petitioner may no longer avail of the
interim relief of temporary protection order.

2. No, President Arroyo should not be dropped. There is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in
amparo and habeas data proceedings as courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the
enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing. As it was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President
does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter’s tenure; that courts should look with disfavor
upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a
right. Also, the Supreme Court (SC) reiterated that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the
president’s incumbency. Given these, former Pres. GMA cannot use presidential immunity to shield herself from judicial
scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the
abduction of Rodriguez.

3. Yes, As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the “responsibility of commanders for
crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international
wars or domestic conflict.” Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility
doctrine has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses. Precisely in the given case, the doctrine of
command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address
the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Nothing
precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain
responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

4. Yes, the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or threatened by respondents. The SC held that
there was no reason to depart from the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, the same being supported by substantial
evidence following the doctrine of totality of evidence in amparo cases which is to consider all the pieces of evidence
adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is
consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. The sworn affidavit of the petitioner and the medical examinations
conducted on him are sufficient evidence proving that the military personnel involved in the case indeed abducted
Rodriguez on September 6, 2009 and then detained and tortured him.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Writ of Amparo; The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief,
as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim
and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. - It is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. Rather, it serves
both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these offenses,
and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to
subsequent investigation and action.
 Writ of Amparo; Writ of Habeas Data; There is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in
amparo and habeas data proceedings.—It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative,
civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining
responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing.
 Same; Same; Amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance,
and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and
who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
 Same; Same; The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the right to life,
liberty and security may be caused by either an act or an omission of a public official. - responsibility may refer to
the participation of the respondents, by action or omission, in enforced disappearance.
 De Lima vs. Gatdula, 691 SCRA 226, G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013

FACTS

 In February 2012, respondent Atty. Magtanggol B. Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the RTC
Manila against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O.
Esmeralda of the National Bureau of Investigation.
 Respondent wanted petitioners to cease and desist from framing up Gatdula for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus
charges of Frustrated Murder against Gatdula in relation to the alleged ambush incident.
 RTC JUDGE PAMPILO: Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued summons and ordered
De Lima, et al. to file an Answer. He also set the case for hearing to determine whether a temporary protection order may be
issued.
 During that hearing, counsel for De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases
 RTC ORDER: Judge said that since no writ has been issued, return is not the required pleading but answer. The judge noted
that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined that the Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied
and thus required an Answer.
 Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case. Even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the
parties to file their respective memoranda within five (5) working days
 RTC DECISION: granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely:
temporary protection, production and inspection orders in relation to the evidence and reports involving an on-going
investigation of the attempted assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda.
 RTC denied herein petitioners’ MR.
 Petitioners thus came to the SC assailing the RTC "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 through a Petition for Review on
Certiorari (With Very Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction)
via Rule 45.

ISSUE: WON a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the proper remedy in the present case?

HELD:

 No. the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ of Amparo is not the judgment or final order contemplated under
Rule 45. Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this time.
 The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitioners could not be the judgment or final order that is appealable
under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. This is clear from the tenor of the dispositive portion of the "Decision"
which merely directs the issuance and service of the Writ of Amparo.
 The "Decision" is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that temporary protection, production and inspection
orders were given together with the decision. The temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim reliefs
that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is rendered.
 The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in the RTC
 First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading
for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of
the Court to provide a speedy remedy
 Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the Writ of Amparo], the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily insofar as it
is not inconsistent with the said rule. It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to
MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from
that, this Court limited the application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is
a special proceeding.
 second was the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return.
Without a Return, the issues could not have been properly joined.
 third irregularity: it required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al.
 The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself. "Accordingly this court GRANTS the
privilege of the writ and the interim reliefs prayed for by the petitioner."
 Court directed Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from his receipt of this Resolution whether
the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is proper on the basis of the petition and its attached affidavits.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy
to safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

 Same; Same; After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of Amparo or immediately dismiss the
case. Dismissal is proper if the petition and the supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioner’s right to life,
liberty or security is under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance of
the writ itself sets in motion presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner.—Due to the delicate and urgent
nature of these controversies, the procedure was devised to afford swift but decisive relief. It is initiated through a
petition to be filed in a Regional Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court. The
judge or justice then makes an “immediate” evaluation of the facts as alleged in the petition and the affidavits
submitted “with the attendant circumstances detailed.” After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ
of Amparo or immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper if the petition and the supporting affidavits do not
show that the petitioner’s right to life, liberty or security is under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful.
On the other hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in motion presumptive judicial protection for the petitioner.
 The court compels the respondents to appear before a court of law to show whether the grounds for more
permanent protection and interim reliefs are necessary.

 Same; Same; After the measures have served their purpose, the judgment will be satisfied. In Amparo cases, this
is when the threats to the petitioner’s life, liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated by the court that renders
the judgment

 Same; Same; Words and Phrases; A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party
seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.

 Same; Same; A memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.—The Return in
Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to
the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is
a final pleading usually required before the case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other
since these submissions have different functions in facilitating the suit.

 Same; Same; The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of
Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo.—The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the
Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence
presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents that will
mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner’s life, liberty or security. A judgment
which simply grants “the privilege of the writ” cannot be executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to
intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo
arise out of very real and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic
as “granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.”

Navia vs. Pardico, 673 SCRA 618, G.R. No. 184467 June 19, 2012

FACTS: A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M. Lapore.
The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico (Ben), who were
then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards
disembarking from the vehicle. One of them immediately asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong.
Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to the
security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps
in the subdivision. Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of
Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.

Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of
Amparobefore the RTC of Malolos City. A Writ of Amparo was accordingly issued and served on the
petitioners. The trial court issued the challenged Decision granting the petition. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.

Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that the writ of amparo is
available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the violation or threatened violation of the
aggrieved partys right to life, liberty and security are clear. Petitioners assert that in the case at bench, Virginia
miserably failed to establish all these. First, the petition is wanting on its face as it failed to state with some
degree of specificity the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners constituting a violation of or a threat
to Bens right to life, liberty and security. And second, it cannot be deduced from the evidence Virginia adduced
that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had a hand in his alleged disappearance. On the other hand, the entries
in the logbook which bear the signatures of Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof that petitioners released Ben on
March 31, 2008 at around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit that the trial court erred in issuing the writ and in
holding them responsible for Bens disappearance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of A Writ of Amparo is proper?

HELD: RTCs decision is reversed and set aside.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: writ of amparo

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief
“to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.”
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes every human beings inherent
right to life, while Article 9 thereof ordains that everyone has the right to liberty and security. The right to life
must be protected by law while the right to liberty and security cannot be impaired except on grounds provided
by and in accordance with law. This overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty and security
without due process of law is also embodied in our fundamental law.

The budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis when this Court defined enforced
disappearances. The Court in that case applied the generally accepted principles of international law and
adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances definition
of enforced disappearances, as “the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by
agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or
whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.”

From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements that
constitute it:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information on the
fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.

As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the
persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence
that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the indispensable element of government participation.

But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise
essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support
or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this
case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend
to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its agents,
officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginia’s amparo petition whether as responsible or
accountable persons.51 Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a
hand in Bens disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the
Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private
individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is
a private individual or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable
element. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City
and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has
been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. As
discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance
must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an
enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.

DISMISSED

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Constitutional Law; Writs of Amparo; Enforced Disappearances; A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on
the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal killings and enforced
 disappearances in the country.—A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was
promulgated to arrest the rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its
purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief “to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.”

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 defines enforced or
involuntary disappearances as follows: “Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons” means the
arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a
State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to
give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

 Same; Same; Same; Elements of Enforced Disappearances.—From the statutory definition of enforced
disappearance, thus, we can derive the following elements that constitute it: (a) that there be an arrest,
detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (c) that it be followed by
the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and, (d) that the intention for such refusal is
to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time

 Same; Same; Same; The petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the indispensable element of government participation.—It is now clear that for the protective
writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not
enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried
out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said
missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the indispensable element of government participation.

 Same; Same; Same; In an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise
essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization,
support or acquiescence of the government.

 Same; Same; Same; A writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if the
person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or
entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element.

Caram vs. Segui, 732 SCRA 86, G.R. No. 193652 August 5, 2014

FACTS: Petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with Marcelino and eventually became pregnant with
the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into
believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During
this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children in Parañaque City.

On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial Medical Center, Marikina
City. Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009, Christina
voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.

On November 27, 2009, the DSWD, a certificate was issued declaring Baby Julian as
“Legally Available for Adoption.” On February 5, 2010, Baby Julian was “matched” with Spouses Medina and
supervised trial custody was then commenced.

On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the DSWD asking
for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She also said she wanted her family back together.

On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Segui, sent a Memorandum to DSWD Assistant
Secretary Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian legally available for adoption had
attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary
Commitment which terminated her parental authority and effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State.

On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparobefore the RTC seeking to obtain
custody of Baby Julian from DSWD.
 ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority
and custody of a minor child.

HELD: The Court held that the availment of the remedy of writ of amparo is not proper as there was no
enforced disappearance in this case.

As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements
constituting “enforced disappearances” as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851 to wit:

1. That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;

2. That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;
3. That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate
or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparopetition; and,
4. That the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged
period of time.

The Court held that there was no enforced disappearance because the respondent DSWD officers never
concealed Baby Julian’s whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of the
DSWD’s Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she
filed her petition before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition that the respondent DSWD officers
presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing. There is therefore, no “enforced disappearance” as
used in the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.

Christina’s directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the latter up
for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the child for adoption,
clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and
contesting custody over him.

Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of
parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State,
the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Constitutional Law; Writs of Amparo; The Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of
“extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two
instances or to threats thereof. “Enforced disappearances” are “attended by the following characteristics: an
arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals
acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such
persons outside the protection of law.

 Same; Same; Enforced Disappearances; Words and Phrases; As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,”
the Supreme Court in Navia v. Pardico, 673 SCRA 618 (2012), enumerated the elements constituting “enforced
disappearances” as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851.

Saez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, 681 SCRA 678, G.R. No. 183533 September 25, 2012

DOCTRINE: Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP,
can be held liable for affront against the petitioner‟s rights to life, liberty and security as long as substantial evidence
exist to show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with knowledge of the violations, or had
failed to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary investigations required under the
rules. It cannot be overemphasized that Section 1 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data expressly
include in their coverage even threatened violations against a person‟s right to life, liberty or security. Further, threat
and intimidation that vitiate the free will – although not involving invasion of bodily integrity – nevertheless constitute a
violation of the right to security in the sense of “freedom from threat”.

FACTS: On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the Court a petition to be granted the privilege of the writs of amparo
and habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order, inspection of place and production of documents. In the
petition, he expressed his fear of being abducted and killed; hence, he sought that he be placed in a sanctuary appointed
by the Court. He likewise prayed for the military to cease from further conducting surveillance and monitoring of his
activities and for his name to be excluded from the order of battle and other government records connecting him to the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he
noticed that he was always being followed by a certain “Joel,” a former colleague at Bayan Muna. “Joel” pretended
peddling pandesal in the vicinity of the petitioner‟s store. Three days before the petitioner was apprehended, “Joel”
approached and informed him of his marital status and current job as a baker in Calapan, Mindoro Oriental. “Joel”
inquired if the petitioner was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the CA justices during the hearing if the
petitioner had gone home to Calapan after having filed the petition, he answered in the negative explaining that he was
afraid of Pvt. Osio who was always at the pier. CA denied the petition for WRIT OF AMPARO because fail to allege how
the supposed threat or violation of petitioner‟s [right to] life, liberty and security is committed. Neither is there any
narration of any circumstances attendant to said supposed violation or threat to violate petitioner‟s right to life, liberty
or security to warrant entitlement to the privilege of the writs prayed for. Application for WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is
likewise denied because allegations therein do not comply with the aforestated requirements of Section 6 [Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data] of the pertinent rule. The petition is bereft of any allegation stating with specific definiteness as to
how petitioner‟s right to privacy was violated or threatened to be violated. The court also dropped Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (then incumbent president) as a party respondent. The court issued a resolution affirming the decision of CA.
Hence, this peititon.

ISSUE: 1) Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in dismissing the petition and dropping Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo as a party respondent.

2) Whether or not the CA committed gross abuse of discretion when it failed to conclude from the evidence offered by
the petitioner the fact that by being placed in the order of battle list, threats and violations to the latter‟s life, liberty
and security were actually committed by the respondents

HELD: 1) No. The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the burden of proving by substantial evidence his
allegations against the President to make the latter liable for either acts or omissions violative of rights against life,
liberty and security. In the instant case, the petitioner merely included the President‟s name as a party respondent
without any attempt at all to show the latter‟s actual involvement in, or knowledge of the alleged violations. Further,
prior to the filing of the petition, there was no request or demand for any investigation that was brought to the
President‟s attention. Thus, while the President cannot be completely dropped as a respondent in a petition for the
privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data merely on the basis of the presidential immunity from suit, the
petitioner in this case failed to establish accountability of the President, as commander-in-chief, under the doctrine of
command responsibility.

2) No. The Court notes that the petition for issuance of the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data is sufficient
as to its contents. However, they are mere allegations, which the Court cannot accept “hook, line and sinker”, so to
speak, and whether substantial evidence exist to warrant the granting of the petition is a different matter altogether. In
this case, the petition was mainly anchored on the alleged threats against his life, liberty and security by reason of his
inclusion in the military‟s order of battle, the surveillance and monitoring activities made on him, and the intimidation
exerted upon him to compel him to be a military asset. While as stated earlier, mere threats fall within the mantle of
protection of the writs of amparo and habeas data, in the petitioner‟s case, the restraints and threats allegedly made
allegations lack corroborations, are not supported by independent and credible evidence, and thus stand on nebulous
grounds.

(Details of the petitioner‟s claim and respective reasons why it was not considered sufficient:)

-it was claimed that “Joel” once inquired from the petitioner if the latter was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. By itself,
such claim cannot establish with certainty that the petitioner was being monitored.

- The petitioner insisted that he was brought against his will and was asked to stay by the respondents in places under
the latter‟s control. The respondents, on the other hand, averred that it was the petitioner who voluntarily offered his
service to be a military asset, but was rejected as the former still doubted his motives and affiliations.

- inclusion in the “order of battle” - it was categorically denied by respondent Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Jr. who stated that
he “does not have knowledge about any Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) „order of battle‟ which allegedly lists the
petitioner as a member of the CPP.”

- Moreover, the evidence showed that the petitioner‟s mobility was never curtailed. From the time he was allegedly
brought to Batangas in August of 2007 until the time he sought the assistance of KARAPATAN- ST, there was no restraint
upon the petitioner to go home, as in fact, he went home to Mindoro on several instances.
E-SCRA Syllabus

 Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; Writ of Habeas Data; Despite the lack of certain contents, which the Rules on
the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data generally require, for as long as their absence under exceptional
circumstances can be reasonably justified, a petition should not be susceptible to outright dismissal.―Although
the exact locations and the custodians of the documents were not identified, this does not render the petition
insufficient. Section 6(d) of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is clear that the requirement of specificity arises
only when the exact locations and identities of the custodians are known. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated
with the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. Thus, despite the lack of certain
contents, which the Rules on the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data generally require, for as long as their
absence under exceptional circumstances can be reasonably justified, a petition should not be susceptible to
outright dismissal.

 Same; Same; Same; Section 19 of both the Rules on the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is explicit that
questions of fact and law can be raised before the Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. As a
rule then, the Court is not bound by the factual findings made by the appellate court which rendered the judgment
in a petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data.

Salcedo vs. Bollozos, 623 SCRA 27, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2236 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3083-RTJ.)
July 5, 2010

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Judges; Writ of Amparo; Had the respondent judge read Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo more
closely, he would have realized that the writ, in its present form, only applies to “extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof,” not to concerns that are purely property and commercial in nature.—We
agree with the complainant that the respondent judge erred in issuing the Writ of Amparo in Tanmalack’s favor.
Had he read Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo more closely, the respondent judge would have realized
that the writ, in its present form, only applies to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
thereof.” The present case involves concerns that are purely property and commercial in nature—concerns that
we have previously ruled are not covered by the Writ of Amparo.

 Same; Administrative Complaints; Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or
deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned—errors committed by a judge in the exercise
of his adjudicative functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings, but should instead be
assailed through judicial remedies

 Same; Gross Ignorance of the Law; A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes
gross ignorance of the law.—The more significant issue in this case is the complainant’s charge of gross
ignorance of the law against the respondent judge. A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules
constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with
laws and procedural rules. They must know the law and apply it properly in good faith. They are likewise expected
to keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence. For, a judge who is plainly ignorant of the law taints the noble office
and great privilege vested in him. We find that the respondent judge’s error does not rise to the level of gross
ignorance of the law that is defined by jurisprudence. We take judicial notice of the fact that at the time he issued
the Writ of Amparo on January 23, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been effective for barely three
months (The Rule on the Writ of Amparo became effective on October 24, 2007). At that time, the respondent
judge cannot be said to have been fully educated and informed on the novel aspects of the Writ of Amparo.
Simply stated, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo at that time cannot be said to be a simple, elementary, and well-
known rule that its patent disregard would constitute gross ignorance of the law.

 Same; Same; Under Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge must be “the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence.”

Ladaga vs. Mapagu, 685 SCRA 322, G.R. No. 189691 November 13, 2012

Facts:

Petitioners share the common circumstance of having their names included in what is alleged to be a
JCICC “AGILA” 3rd Quarter 2007 Order of Battle Validation Result of the Philippine Army's 10th
Infantry Division (10th ID). They perceive that by the inclusion of their names in the said Order of Battle (OB
List), they become easy targets of unexplained disappearances or extralegal killings – a real threat to their
life, liberty and security.

ATTY. LILIBETH O. LADAGA (Atty. Ladaga), first came to know of the existence of the OB List
from an undisclosed source on May 21, 2009. In the OB List, it was reflected that the ULTIMATE GOAL is to
TRY TO OUST PGMA ON 30 NOV 2007.
 On the other hand, Atty. Angela Librado-Trinidad (Atty. Librado-Trinidad), delivered a privileged
speech before the members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to demand the removal of her name from said OB
List. The Commission on Human Rights, for its part, announced the conduct of its own investigation into the
matter.
According to Atty. Librado-Trinidad, in the course of the performance of her dutites and functions, she
has not committed any act against national security that would justify the inclusion of her name in the said OB
List. She said that sometime in May 2008, two suspicious-looking men tailed her vehicle. Also, on June 23,
2008 three men tried to barge into their house
Meanwhile, Atty. Carlos Isagani T. Zarate was informed that he was also included on the OB List. In his
petition, he alleged that the inclusion of his name in the said OB List was due to his advocacies as a public
interest or human rights lawyer.
The Petitioners assert that the OB List is really a military hit-list as allegedly shown by the fact that
there have already been three victims of extrajudicial killing whose violent deaths can be linked directly to the
OB List.
On June 16, 2009 filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo. The RTC
subsequently issued separate Writs of Amparo, directing the respondents to file a verified written return.
In the return of the respondents, they denied authorship of the OB List, and alleged that petitioners
failed to show that they were responsible for the alleged threats.
After submission of the parties’ respective Position Papers, the RTC issued Orders finding no
substantial evidence to show that the perceived threat to petitioners’ life, liberty and security was attributable to
the unlawful act or omission of the respondents. The privilege of the Writ was therefore denied.

Issues: WON the totality of evidence satisfies the degree of proof required under the Writ of Amparo.

Held:
No, the evidence does not satisfy degree of proof for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The Writ of
Amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-making powers in response to the alarming rise in
the number of cases of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings. It is an extraordinary remedy
intended to address violations of, or threats to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that, being a remedy of
extraordinary character, is not one to issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds but only upon reasonable
certainty. Justifying allegations must support the issuance of the writ, on the following matters:
1. The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
2. The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or
omission;
3. The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent and how such threat or violation is committed
with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
4. The investigation conducted specifying the names, personal circumstances and addresses of the
investigating authority or individuals;
5. Actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission;
6. The relief prayed for.
Under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, the parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence,
and if the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the
writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate

Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Petitioners sought to prove that the inclusion of their names in the OB List
presented a real threat to their security by attributing the violent deaths of the other known activists to the
inclusion of their names or the names of their militant organizations in the subject OB List. However, the
existence of the OB List could not be directly associated with the menacing behaviour of suspicious men or the
violent deaths of certain personalities.
 The Petitioners cannot assert that the inclusion of their names in the OB List is as real a threat as that
which brought ultimate harm to the other victims without corroborative evidence from which it can be
presumed that the suspicious deaths of these three people were in fact, on account of their militant affiliations.

The Petitioners therefore were not able to prove by substantial evidence that there was an actual threat to their
rights to life, liberty and security. The mere inclusion of their names in the OB List is not sufficient enough
evidence for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Same; Same; Freedom from Fear; A person’s right to security is, in one sense, “freedom from fear” and that any
threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is an actionable wrong.―In the case of Secretary of National Defense
v. Manalo, 568 SCRA 1 (2008), the Court ruled that a person’s right to security is, in one sense, “freedom from
fear” and that any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is an actionable wrong. The term “any threat,”
however, cannot be taken to mean every conceivable threat in the mind that may cause one to fear for his life,
liberty or security. The Court explicated therein that “[f]ear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a
cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people
react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of
their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus.” Certainly, given the uniqueness of
individual psychological mindsets, perceptions of what is fearful will necessarily vary from one person to another.

 Same; Same; Same; Only actual threats, as may be established from all the facts and circumstances of the case,
can qualify as a violation that may be addressed under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.―The alleged threat to
herein petitioners’ rights to life, liberty and security must be actual, and not merely one of supposition or with the
likelihood of happening. And, when the evidence adduced establishes the threat to be existent, as opposed to a
potential one, then, it goes without saying that the threshold requirement of substantial evidence in amparo
proceedings has also been met. Thus, in the words of Justice Brion, in the context of the Amparo rule, only actual
threats, as may be established from all the facts and circumstances of the case, can qualify as a violation that
may be addressed under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

 Same; Same; Extraordinary Diligence; An amparo petitioner’s failure to establish by substantial evidence the
involvement of government forces in the alleged violation of rights is never a hindrance for the Court to order the
conduct of further investigation where it appears that the government did not observe extraordinary diligence in
the performance of its duty to investigate the complained abduction and torture or enforced
disappearance.―Emphasizing the extraordinary character of the amparo remedy, the Court ruled in the cases of
Roxas and Razon, Jr. that an amparo petitioner’s failure to establish by substantial evidence the involvement of
government forces in the alleged violation of rights is never a hindrance for the Court to order the conduct of
further investigation where it appears that the government did not observe extraordinary diligence in the
performance of its duty to investigate the complained abduction and torture or enforced disappearance. The Court
directed further investigation in the case of Roxas because the modest efforts of police investigators were
effectively putting petitioner’s right to security in danger with the delay in identifying and apprehending her
abductors. In Razon, Jr., the Court found it necessary to explicitly order the military and police officials to pursue
with extraordinary diligence the investigation into the abduction and disappearance of a known activist because
not only did the police investigators conduct an incomplete and one-sided investigation but they blamed their
ineffectiveness to the reluctance and unwillingness of the relatives to cooperate with the authorities. In both of
these cases, the incidents of abduction and torture were undisputed and they provided the evidentiary support for
the finding that the right to security was violated and the necessity for further investigation into such violation.

6. R.A. No. 10353 – An Act Defining and Penalizing Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance.

7. R.A. 9745 – An Act Penalizing Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or
Punishment and Prescribing Penalties.

8. WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

Gamboa vs. Chan, 677 SCRA 385, G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012

FACTS: Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of
surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a Private Army Group (PAG).
Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the
Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition
for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for the issuance of writ of habeas data is proper when the right to privacy is invoked
as opposed to the state’s interest in preserving the right to life, liberty or security.

RULING: NO.
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and
to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It
must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right
to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

In this case, the Court ruled that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list
of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police
surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in
relation to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity,
which she failed to overcome. [T]he state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private
life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a
lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom
from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of
freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.—The right to privacy, as an
inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional right. The concept of liberty
would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a unique individual
whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.

 Same; Same; The right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from
intrusion or constraint.—Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be
protected from intrusion or constraint.
 Same; Writ of Habeas Data; The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed
to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to
provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy.—The writ of habeas
data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to
the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the
writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right
to life, liberty or security on the other.

 Same; Private Armies; The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other
armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.

Vivares vs. St. Theresa's College, 737 SCRA 92, G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014

PREFATORY:

The individual’s desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally powerful desire. Thus each
individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the
desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the environmental conditions and social norms set
by the society in which he lives. – Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)

FACTS: Julia and Julienne, both minors, were graduating high school students at St. Theresa’s College (STC), Cebu City.
Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and
Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures
were then uploaded by Angela on her Facebook profile.

At STC, Mylene Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from her students that some
seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then
asked her students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia and Julienne, among
others.

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her
photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a
 bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that showvirtually the entirety of their
black brassieres.

Also, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the identified students’
photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.

Investigation ensued. Then Julia, Julienne and other students involved were barred from joining the
commencement exercises.

Petitioners, who are the respective parents of the minors, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data. RTC
dismissed the petition for habeas data on the following grounds:

1. Petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the
preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
2. The photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some
way.
3. STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s
policies and rules on discipline.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or
security of the minors involved in this case. (Is there a right to informational privacy in online social network activities of its
users?)

HELD: (Note that you can skip the preliminary discussions and check the ruling at the latter part)

Nature of Writ of Habeas Data

It is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks
to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is
being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, among
others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as “a procedure designed to safeguard individual
freedom from abuse in the information age.”

Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements

1. The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy

2. An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim (proven by at least substantial
evidence)

Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person.

The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances

The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically
the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of respondents. Clearly then,
the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.

Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information

Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities
engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or
her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.

To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or take
part in something.” It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What
matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved
party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business,
and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will
not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.

As such, the writ of habeas data may be issued against a school like STC.
 Right to informational privacy

Right to informational privacy is the right of individuals to control information about themselves. Several
commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, “in
this Social Networking environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some
theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking.” So the underlying question now is: Up to what extent is the right
to privacy protected in OSNs?

Facebook Privacy Tools

To address concerns about privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with different privacy tools
designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W, the South
Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to “customize their privacy settings,” but did so with this caveat:
“Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings
are not foolproof.”

For instance, a Facebook user can regulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images (photos), posted on his or her
personal bulletin or “wall,” except for the user’s profile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:

1. Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
2. Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
3. Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
4. Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and
5. Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of
his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s point of view. In other
words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their
choice as to “when and to what extent to disclose facts about themselves – and to put others in the position of
receiving such confidences.”

LONE ISSUE:

NONE. The Supreme Court held that STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy as the subject digital
photos were viewable either by the minors’ Facebook friends, or by the public at large.

Without any evidence to corroborate the minors’ statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and
without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at
best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are the minors’
Facebook “friends,” showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special
means to be able to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, and that it is
reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by
the public at large.

Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in question
were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the
photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy.

US v. Gines-Perez: A person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all
privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where the Defendant did not employ
protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.

United States v. Maxwell: The more open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect.
Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent
loses any semblance of privacy.

The Honorable Supreme Court continued and held that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no
assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content.
The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a
person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the
post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.” Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with
visibility set at “Friends Only” cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be “very private,” contrary to
petitioners’ argument.

No privacy invasion by STC; fault lies with the friends of minors

Respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends
who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any
unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate access to
the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors
nor their parents imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.

Different scenario of setting is set on “Me Only” or “Custom”

Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the “Me Only”
privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the “Custom”
setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post, instead
of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Constitutional Law; Habeas Data Rule (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC); Writ of Habeas Data; The writ of habeas
data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

 Same; Same; Same; The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least
by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended.—In developing
the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, among
others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as “a procedure designed to
safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.” The writ, however, will not issue on
the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person. Availment of the writ
requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other. Thus, the existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended.

 Same; Same; Same; Informational Privacy; The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an
independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational
privacy.—Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a
variance of habeas data situations, would not have been made. Habeas data, to stress, was designed
“to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.” As such, it is erroneous to limit its
applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only.

 Same; Same; Same; Nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be
available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and
collecting of data.

 Same; Same; Same; Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials
and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the
aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family.

 Same; Same; Same; The Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that would allow
a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible violations of the
right to privacy.

 Same; Same; Same; Online Social Networks; The purpose of an Online Social Networks (OSN) is
precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected to other members of the same or
different social media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others,
depending on the services provided by the site.

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Informational Privacy; Before one can have an expectation of
privacy in his or her Online Social Networks (OSN) activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this
case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.—Before one can have an
expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the
children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of
measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in
cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy
 tools is the manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational
privacy.

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it
can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any
proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph.

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail that
is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no
assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source
of the content

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be
more precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if
indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution.

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence
in their online dealings and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights

Castillo vs. Cruz, 605 SCRA 628 (supra)

9. WRIT OF KALIKASAN

Agham Partylist vs. LNL Archipelagic Minerals Inc., G.R. No. 201918, June 13, 2012 (can’t find online)

LNL ARCHIPELAGO MINERALS v. AGHAM PARTY LIST, GR No. 209165, 2016-04-12 (different case)
Facts:
Petitioner LNL Archipelago Minerals, Inc. (LAMI) is the operator of a mining claim located in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. LAMI's mining area
is covered by Mineral Production Sharing Agreement[3] No. 268-2008-III dated 26 August 2008 by virtue of an Operating
Agreement[4] dated 5 June 2007 with Filipinas Mining Corporation.
LAMI embarked on a project to build a private, non-commercial port in Brgy. Bolitoc, Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
A port is a vital infrastructure to the operations of a mining company to ship out ores and other minerals extracted from the mines
and make the venture economically feasible.
LAMI secured the following permits and compliance certificates for the port project:
The Zambales Alliance, a group of other mining companies operating in Sta. Cruz, Zambales which do not have their own port,
namely Eramen Minerals, Inc.; Zambales Diversified Metals Corporation; Zambales Chromite Mining Corporation, Inc.; BenguetCorp
Nickel Mines, Inc., supported the port project of LAMI and issued Letters[11] of Intent to use the port facilities of LAMI upon
completion.
The Bolitoc community - the barangay, its officials and residents -gave several endorsements[12] supporting the project. Even the
Sangguniang Bayan of Sta. Cruz gave its consent to the construction of the port.
LAMI stated that Mayor Marty unduly favored some mining companies in the municipality and allegedly refused to issue business
and mayor's permits and to receive payment of occupation fees from other mining companies despite the necessary national
permits and licenses secured by the other mining companies.
On 24 April 2012, Mayor Marty issued an order[14] directing LAMI to refrain from continuing with its clearing works and directed the
Sta. Cruz Municipal Police Chief Generico Binan to implement his order.
Thereafter, Rep. Dan Fernandez, a member of the Committee on Ecology of the House of Representatives, passed House Resolution
No. 117 (HR 117) entitled "Resolution Directing the Committee on Ecology to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the
Implementation of Republic Act No. 7942, Otherwise Known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, Particularly on the Adverse Effects
of Mining on the Environment."
The DENR PENRO team found that LAMI violated some of its conditions under the ECC. Accordingly, a Notice of Violation (NOV)
dated 1 June 2012 was issued against LAMI for violation of certain conditions of the ECC with a cease and desist order from further
constructing and developing until such time that the ECC conditions were fully complied.
On 8 June 2012, a technical conference was held where LAMI presented its reply to the NOV. The DENR-EMB R3 ascertained that
LAMI's violations of the four conditions of its ECC constitute minor violations since they only pertain to non-submission of
documents.
However, the leveling of the elevated portion of the area was a major violation.
On 11 June 2012, LAMI wrote a letter[17] to the DENR-EMB R3 regarding the commitments agreed upon during the technical
conference. LAMI signified compliance with the conditions of DENR-EMB R3.
The composite team found that LAMI's activities in its property would not result to any environmental damage to its surrounding
communities.
Thereafter, the DENR-EMB R3 lifted the cease and desist order after LAMI was found to have complied with the requirements.
Meanwhile, earlier, or on 6 June 2012, respondent Agham Party List (Agham), through its President, former Representative Angelo
B. Palmones (Rep. Palmones), filed a Petition[21] for the issuance of a Writ[22] of Kalikasan against LAMI, DENR, PPA, and the
Zambales Police Provincial Office (ZPPO).
In a Decision[37] dated 23 November 2012, the Court of Appeals decided the case in favor of petitioner. The appellate court found
that the government, through the CENRO, authorized LAMI to cut trees and LAMI strictly followed the proper guidelines stated in
the permit.
Agham filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of Appeals.
In an Amended Decision dated 13 September 2013, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside its original Decision dated 23
November 2012.
Issues:
The issues for our resolution are (1) whether LAMI violated the environmental laws as alleged by Agham, and (2) whether LAMI
flattened any mountain and caused environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Ruling:
The Writ of Kalikasan, categorized as a special civil action and conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy,[43] covers environmental
damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
In the present case, Agham, in its Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan, cited two laws which LAMI allegedly violated: (1) Section 68 of the
Revised Forestry Code, as amended; and (2) Sections 57 and 69 of the Philippine Mining Act.
In the present case, LAMI was given a Tree Cutting Permit[45] by the CENRO dated 17 April 2012
Since LAMI strictly followed the permit issued by the CENRO and even passed the evaluation conducted after the issuance of the
permit, then clearly LAMI had the authority to cut trees and did not violate Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
In the present case, the allegation by Agham that two laws - the Revised Forestry Code, as amended, and the Philippine Mining Act -
were violated by LAMI was not adequately substantiated by Agham. Even the facts submitted by Agham to establish environmental
damage were mere general allegations.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Amended Decision dated 13 September 2013 of the Court of
Appeals and REINSTATE AND AFFIRM the original Decision dated 23 November 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00012
which DENIED the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan.
Principles:
Writ of Kalikasan which is under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.[42] Section 1, Rule 7, Part III of the said Rules
provides:Section 1. Nature of the writ. - The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law,
people's organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government
agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
The following requisites must be present to avail of this remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.
Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code, as amended, states:Sec. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products Without License. Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or
timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens,
they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land without any authorization; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under existing forest laws and regulations.

E-SCRA Syllabus
  Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Writ of Kalikasan; Environmental Law; Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases; The present case involves the extraordinary remedy of a Writ of Kalikasan which is under the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases.—The present case involves the extraordinary remedy of a Writ of Kalikasan
which is under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. Section 1, Rule 7, Part III of the said Rules
provides: Section 1. Nature of the writ.—The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity
authorized by law, people’s organization, nongovernmental organization, or any public interest group accred ited
by or registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the
life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

 Same; Same; Same; The Writ of Kalikasan, categorized as a special civil action and conceptualized as an
extraordinary remedy, covers environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two (2) or more cities or provinces.—The Writ of Kalikasan, categorized as a special civil
action and conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, covers environmental damage of such magnitude that will
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. The writ is available against
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity. The following requisites
must be present to avail of this remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or private individual or entity; and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will
lead to an environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in
two or more cities or provinces.

 Same; Same; Same; Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases; The Rules are clear that in a Writ of Kalikasan
petitioner has the burden to prove the (1) environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be
violated; (2) act or omission complained of; and (3) the environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice
the life, health or property of inhabitants in two (2) or more cities or provinces.—The Rules are clear that in a Writ
of Kalikasan petitioner has the burden to prove the (1) environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened
to be violated; (2) act or omission complained of; and (3) the environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. Even the Annotation to the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases states that the magnitude of environmental damage is a condition
sine qua non in a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan and must be contained in the verified petition.

 Same; Same; Same; It is well-settled that a party claiming the privilege for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan has
to show that a law, rule or regulation was violated or would be violated.

Philippine Earth Justice Center, Inc., et al. vs. SEC. of DENR, et al., G.R. No. 197754

[G.R. No. 197754 : September 06, 2011]

PHILIPPINE EARTH JUSTICE CENTER, INC., ET AL. VS. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, ET AL.

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated SEPTEMBER 6, 2011, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 197754 (Philippine Earth Justice Center, Inc., et al. vs. Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, et al.). - The Court Resolved to

(a) NOTE the Return of the Writ dated August 26, 2011 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for the public
respondents in compliance with the resolution of August 16, 2011;

(b) NOTE the Return dated August 29, 2011 filed by counsel for respondent Chamber of Mines in compliance with the
resolution of August 16, 2011;

(c) NOTE the Manifestation dated September 1, 2011 filed by counsel for respondent Chamber of Mines relative to the
filing and service by registered mail of its Return; and

(d) NOTE and GRANT the Manifestation and Motion dated September 2, 2011 filed by the OSG for the public
respondents relative to the above-mentioned Return of the Writ, praying that the documentary evidence marked as
Annexes "6-GGG" to "6-RRRR" be attached to, and incorporated with, the said Return.

The Court further Resolved to REFER this case to the COURT OF APPEALS for further proceeding in accordance with
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases."

Sereno, J., on leave.

Reyes, J., on official leave.

Very truly yours,

 (Sgd.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL
Clerk of Court

Hernandez vs. Placer Dome, Inc., G.R. No. 195482, June 21, 2011

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 195482 : June 21, 2011]

ELIZA M. HERNANDEZ, ET AL. V. PLACER DOME, INC.

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated JUNE 21, 2011, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 195482 (ELIZA M. HERNANDEZ, ET AL. v. PLACER DOME, INC.)

RESOLUTION

In the Resolution dated 8 March 2011, the Court granted petitioners' prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan and for
the service of said writ as well as the summons issued in the case, by their counsel and representative, Civic Action
Group Ltd./APS International, Ltd. In the same resolution, the Court likewise ordered respondents Placer Dome, Inc. (PDI)
and Barrick Gold Corporation (BGC) to make a verified return of the same writ and referred the case to the Court of
Appeals (CA) for hearing, reception of evidence and rendition of judgment. On 29 March 2011, the Court additionally
issued a resolution granting petitioners' motion for the inclusion of AI Legal Service & Training Ltd. and Select Document
Services among those authorized to serve summons on respondents, on the ground that Civic Action Group Ltd./APS
International, Ltd. had limited their services to the United States of America.

Subsequent to its filing of a 29 March 2011 Urgent Motion to Suspend Filing of Return, BGC filed a 31 March 2011 Urgent
Motion for Ruling on Jurisdiction, questioning the constitutionality of Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases (AMC No. 09-6-8-SC) as well as the validity of the issuance and service of summons in the case. On 4 April 2011,
BGC also filed a Return Ad Cautelam, accompanied by a Manifestation dated 4 April 2011, undertaking to submit within a
reasonable time the authenticated copies of the sworn statements attached to said Return in view of time constraints. On
12 April 2011, the Court issued a Resolution noting the foregoing motions and incidents and requiring petitioners to file
their comment to BGC's Urgent Motion for Ruling on Jurisdiction.

On 12 April 2011, petitioners also filed an Urgent Motion of even date, seeking leave to serve summons upon
respondents through any of in the means provided under Section 12, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. As amended by A.M.
No. 11-3-6-SC which was issued on 15 March 2011, said provision allows service of summons through any of the
following means to a foreign private juridical entity not registered in the Philippines or without a resident agent, viz.: (a) by
personal service coursed through the appropriate court in the foreign country with the assistance of the Department of
Foreign Affairs; (b) by publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the country where the defendant may be
found and by serving a copy of the summons and the court order by registered mail at the last known address of the
defendant; (c) by facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could generate proof of service; and, (d) by such other
means as the court may in its discretion direct.

On 18 April 2011, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Compliance dated 15 April 2011, submitting the affidavit executed
by Brian Nolan of the Civic Action Group Ltd./APS International, Ltd. attesting to the 25 March 2011 service of summons
on BGC. Without prejudice to the Urgent Motion for Ruling on Jurisdiction it earlier filed, BGC in turn filed
a Submission dated 19 April 2011, proffering the original authenticated copies of the affidavits executed by Debra Bilous
and James Donald Robertson and reiterating its commitment to submit within a reasonable time the authenticated copies
of the other affidavits attached to its Return Ad Cautelam. On 6 May 2011, Sycip Salazar Hernandez and Gatmaitan,
BGC's counsel of record, filed a Manifestation dated 5 May 2011 stating, among other matters, that they have been
served with copies of petitioners' Notice of Deposition, Interrogatories and Motion for Production of Inspection of
Documents (Discovery Papers) intended for their client, in connection with the proceedings pending before the CA as CA-
G.R. SP No. 00001; that being for the limited purpose of raising constitutional and jurisdictional issues, their special
appearance is not of such nature as would authorize them to receive said Discovery Papers for and in behalf of BCG.

On 12 May 2011, petitioners filed their Manifestation with Reiterated Motion dated 11 May 2011, alleging that they have
received a copy of the 3 May 2011 Manifestation and Motion filed before the CA by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) on behalf of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), praying that petitioners be directed to manifest whether
they have already caused the service of summons upon PDI and, if not, to coordinate with the OSG with respect to the
mode of service as well as the manner of payment thereof; that although it had been served with copies of their petition
and its annexes by registered mail, PDI has yet to be served with summons; and, that while they are willing to coordinate
with the OSG regarding the mode and manner of payment for the service of summons to PDI, the Court has yet to resolve
their motions for the inclusion of AI Legal Service & Training Ltd. and Select Document Services among those authorized
to serve summons on respondents and for the service of summons in accordance with Section 12, Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court, as amended.
On 17 May 2011, BGC filed a Clarificatory Manifestation dated 16 May 2011, alleging that it received the Resolution
dated 4 May 2011 issued by the CA's First Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 00001, the decretal portion of which states:

"ACTING on the pending incidents, We hereby resolve as follows:

1) In order to attain a judicious determination of the Urgent Motion for Ruling on Jurisdiction, the petitioners are
DIRECTED to submit their COMMENT within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. Perforce, Our resolution on
petitioners' Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents is held in abeyance;

2) Petitioners are ORDERED to manifest whether or not respondent Placer Dome has been served with Summons and if
none had been served yet, to coordinate with the DTI, through the OSG, for the implementation thereof.

SO ORDERED."

BGC calls the attention of the Court to the fact, among other matters, that the foregoing resolution is in conflict with our
resolution dated 12 April 2011 which required petitioners to file their comment to its Urgent Motion for Ruling on
Jurisdiction; and, that consequently, there is a need to clarify which court exercises jurisdiction over the case in order to
shed light to the procedural paths available to the parties. Subsequent to its filing of a Submission dated 18 May 2011
submitting the original of the authenticated affidavit of Geoffrey Marlow, BGC filed a Manifestation dated 6 June 2011
reiterating the need for said clarification, in view of petitioners' filing on 2 June 2011 of their Opposition to its Urgent
Motion for Ruling on Jurisdiction.

Pursuant to Section 3, Rule VII of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, petitions for the Writ of
Kalikasan "shall be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals." It was in consonance
with this provision that, on 8 March 2011, the Court issued the Resolution which, after granting the Writ of
Kalikasan sought by petitioners, referred the case to the CA for hearing, reception of evidence and rendition of judgment.
Considering said referral of the case to the CA, its re-docketing of the petition as CA-G.R. SP No. 00001 and its conduct
of proceedings relative thereto, it is imperative that the various motions and incidents filed by the parties, together with the
entire records of the case, be likewise referred to said Court in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and in the
interest of the orderly and expeditious conduct of the proceedings in the case. With respect to petitioners' Manifestation
with Reiterated Motion dated 11 May 2011, attention is, however, called to the fact that the motion for the inclusion of AI
Legal Service & Training Ltd. and Select Document Servicesamong those authorized to serve summons on respondents
had already been granted in the Court's 29 March 2011 Resolution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the records of the case are REFERRED to the CA, for appropriate action on the
various motions and incidents filed by the parties."

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL

Clerk of Court

10. ANTI-WIRE TAPPING ACT

Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, 248 SCRA 590, G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the private
respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile
and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy.”

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages. The transcript on
which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was
illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.”

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.

The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence the instant petition.

Issue: W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation

Held: Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations
of Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any
private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction
as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter
(will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s conclusion that in enacting
R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or
communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual
made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense
under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
“Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as
well as its communication to a third person should be professed.”
Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private
conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity. The word communicate
comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in
a conversation, or signifies the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a
common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)”
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of “meanings or
thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and
private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase
“private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were
interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200); Statutory Construction; Legislative intent is determined principally from the
language of a statute.—First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or
would lead to an injustice.

 Same; Same; Even a person privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without
the knowledge of the latter will qualify as a violator under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.—Section 1 of R.A. 4200 clearly
and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to
secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the
private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier “any.” Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
“even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.

 Same; Same; Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.—The unambiguity of the express
words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record,
therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those
privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

 Same; Criminal Procedure; The mere allegation that an individual made a secret reco rding of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of RA 4200

 Same; Words and Phrases; The contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200
does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of
absurdity.—Finally, petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does
not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of
absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.” In its
ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies
the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)” These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal,
written or expressive communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally—
 charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s
office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication” are, furthermore,
put to rest by the fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were interchangeably used by Senator
Tanada in his Explanatory Note to the bill.

Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 112, No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

Facts: Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant’s residence
discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal
of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone
call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise
him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a
telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty minutes later,
complainant called again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered ‘Yes’. Complainant
then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money.

Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department of
Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the
Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. When he received the money at the
Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the
withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for
robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant’s consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200, which prompted
petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification hence the present petition for certiorari.

Issue: W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or arrangement” under Rep. Act No. 4200

Held: No. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for the purpose of secretly
overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap
or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices
enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a
telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Criminal Law: Evidence; Words and Phrases; Statutory Construction: Wiretapping Law: The pkrase
“any other device or arrangement” in R.A, 4200 known as Anti-Wire Tapping Law does not cover an
extension line.—The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “deviee or arrangement” for
the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either
a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in
order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be placed in
the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No.
4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone line. The
telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to deterrniiss the true intent of the
legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and
isoiated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in ftxing the meaning of
any of its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The phrase “device or arrangement” in the Anti-Wire Tapping Law
should be interpreted to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature used to tap, intercept or
record a telephone conversation, not an extension line.—Hence, the phrase “device or arrangement” in
Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to
comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be
tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or
presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature,
they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a
telephone conversation.

 Same; Same; Same; Same, Same; A person calling another by phone may safely presume that the
other may have an extension line and runs the risk of being heard by a 3rd party.
  Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Framers of R.A. 4200 were more concemed with penalizing the act
of recording a telephone conversation than merely listening thereto. ‘

 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Mere act of listening to a telephone conversation in an extension
line is not punished by AntiWiretappingLaw.

Alejano vs. Cabuay, 468 SCRA 188, G.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005
(read RA 7438 -Rights Of Person Arrested, Detained Or Under Custodial Investigation)

Facts: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior officers, entered and took
control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments (“Oakwood”). The soldiers disarmed the security officers of Oakwood
and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The junior officers publicly renounced their support for the
administration and called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several cabinet members. Around
7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with
government emissaries. The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then
returned to their barracks. Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the Major Service
Commanders to turn over custody of ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took place while
military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers’ involvement in the Oakwood incident. Government
prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat with the RTC against the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident. the
CA rendered its decision ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP
Detention Center, to uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing Operations Procedure No.
0263-04. The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his commitment made in court regarding visiting hours
and the detainees’ right to exercise for two hours a day. The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading
of Trillanes’ letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this does not justify the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not amount to illegal restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas corpus
proceedings.

Issue: Whether the opening, inspection and reading of the letter of the detainees is an infringement of a citizen’s privacy
rights.

Held: No, the SC do not agree with the CA that the opening and reading of the detainees’ letters violated the detainees’
right to privacy of communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The inspection of the folded letters is a valid
measure as it serves the same purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband. The letters
alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers.
The petitioner who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely acting as the detainees’
personal courier and not as their counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters
were not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center
could read the letters. If the letters are marked confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the
detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection in the presence of the detainees.
The right to privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful
detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a
diminished expectation of privacy rights. The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300
soldiers in committing coup d’etat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua. The junior officers are not ordinary
detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a civilian building in the heart of the
financial district of the country. As members of the military armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of War.
Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must
give the military custodian a wider range of deference in implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The
military custodian is in a better position to know the security risks involved in detaining the junior officers, together with the
suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the appropriate regulations depend largely on the security risks
involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.

E-SCRA Syllabus

 Habeas Corpus; In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court is a
preliminary step in the hearing of the petition as the respondent must produce the person and explain
the cause of his detention but such order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the
substantive matters covered by the remedy.—In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an
individual before the court is a preliminary step in the hearing of the petition. The respondent must
produce the person and explain the cause of his detention. However, this order is not a ruling on the
propriety of the remedy or on the substantive matters covered by the remedy. Thus, the Court’s order to
the Court of Appeals to conduct a factual hearing was not an affirmation of the propriety of the remedy
of habeas corpus. For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus necessarily
includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds the alleged cause of the
detention unlawful, then it should issue the writ and release the detainees. In the present case, after
hearing the case, the Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively
 participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are estopped from claiming that the
appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits of their petition.

 Same; The remedy of habeas corpus is not proper remedy to address the detainees’ complaint against
the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center—the purpose of the writ is to determine
whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty.

 Same; Case law has expanded the writ’s application to circumstances where there is deprivation of a
person’s constitutional rights.—Case law has expanded the writ’s application to circumstances where
there is deprivation of a person’s constitutional rights. The writ is available where a person continues to
be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due
process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are also unnecessary, and where a
deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. However, a mere allegation of a
violation of one’s constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will extend the scope of the writ only if
any of the following circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting
in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an
excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess. Whatever situation the
petitioner invokes, the threshold remains high. The violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to
void the entire proceedings.

 Same; Pre-Trial Detainees; Republic Act No. 7438; Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional
rights upon confinement but the fact the detainees are confined makes their rights more limited than
those of the public; RA 7438 expressly recognizes the power of the detention officer to adopt and
implement reasonable measures to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape.—Pre-trial
detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement. However, the fact that the
detainees are confined makes their rights more limited than those of the public. RA 7438, which
specifies the rights of detainees and the duties of detention officers, expressly recognizes the power of
the detention officer to adopt and implement reasonable measures to secure the safety of the detainee
and prevent his escape.

 Same; Same; The regulations must be reasonably connected to the government’s objective of securing
the safety and preventing the escape of the detainee.

 Same; Same; Right to Counsel; While the detainee’s lawyer may not visit the detainees any time they
want, the fact the detainees still have face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly
shows that there is no impairment of detainees’ right to counsel.—In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph
of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the standard to make regulations in detention centers allowable:
“such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the detainee’s safety and prevent his
escape.” In the present case, the visiting hours accorded to the lawyers of the detainees are reasonably
connected to the legitimate purpose of securing the safety and preventing the escape of all detainees.
While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that the detainees still have
face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily basis clearly shows that there is no impairment of
detainees’ right to counsel. Petitioners as counsels could visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00
p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00 p.m. The visiting hours are regular business hours, the same hours
when lawyers normally entertain clients in their law offices. Clearly, the visiting hours pass the standard
of reasonableness. Moreover, in urgent cases, petitioners could always seek permission from the
ISAFP officials to confer with their clients beyond the visiting hours. The scheduled visiting hours
provide reasonable access to the detainees, giving petitioners sufficient time to confer with the
detainees. The detainees’ right to counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the
hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission, petitioners were given time to confer with
the detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves admit. Thus, at no point were the detainees denied
their right to counsel.

 Same; Same; Penalties; The fact that the restrictions inherent in detention intrudes into the detainees’
desire to live comfortably does not convert those restrictions to punishment. Petitioners further argue
that the bars separating the detainees from their visitors and the boarding of the iron grills in their cells
with plywood amount to unusual and excessive punishment. This argument fails to impress us.
 Same; Same; Punishments; Words and Phrases; An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that
action causes the inmate to suffer harm or “disability,” and (2) the purpose of the action is to punish the
inmate.—An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action causes the inmate to suffer some
harm or “disability,” and (2) the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate. Punishment also requires
that the harm or disability be significantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of
confinement.

 Same; Same; Same; Punishment cannot be inferred from the separation of the detainees from their
visitors by the iron bars, which is merely a limitation on contact visits—the iron bars prevent direct
physical contact but still allow the detainees to have visual, verbal, non-verbal and limited physical
contact with their visitors.
  Same; Same; Privacy of Communications and Correspondence; While letters containing confidential
communication between detainees and their lawyers enjoy a limited protection in that prison officials
can open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not read the contents thereof without violating
the inmates’ right to correspondence, letters that are not of that nature could be read by prison officials.

 Same; Same; Same; That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizen’s
privacy rights is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but not to persons who are
detained or imprisoned—by the very fact of their detention, pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners
have a diminished expectation of privacy of rights.
 Same; Same; Same; Since appropriate regulations depend largely on security risks involved, deferment
in the present case to regulations adopted by military custodian in absence of patent arbitrariness
should be made.—The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300 soldiers
in committing coup d’etat, a crime punishable with reclusion perpetua. The junior officers are not
ordinary detainees but visible leaders of the Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a civilian
building in the heart of the financial district of the country. As members of the military armed forces, the
detainees are subject to the Articles of War. Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-
risk persons from the Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider
range of deference in implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center. The military
custodian is in a better position to know the security risks involved in detaining the junior officers,
together with the suspected Abu Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the appropriate regulations depend
largely on the security risks involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by the military
custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.

 Same; Same; Same; Habeas Corpus; The ruling in this case does not foreclose the right of the
detainees and convicted prisoners from petitioning the courts for redress of grievances; Habeas corpus
is not the proper mode to question conditions of confinement—the writ of habeas corpus will not lie if
what is challenged is the fact or duration of confinement.

Republic Act No. 7438 April 27, 1992

AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS THE
DUTIES OF THE ARRESTING, DETAINING AND INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::

Section 1. Statement of Policy. – It is the policy of the Senate to value the dignity of every human being and guarantee full respect for human rights.

Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation; Duties of Public Officers.–

(a) Any person arrested detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.

(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone acting under his order or his place, who arrests, detains or investigates any person for the
commission of an offense shall inform the latter, in a language known to and understood by him, of his rights to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, who shall at all times be allowed to confer privately with the person
arrested, detained or under custodial investigation. If such person cannot afford the services of his own counsel, he must be provided with a
competent and independent counsel by the investigating officer.lawphi1Ÿ

(c) The custodial investigation report shall be reduced to writing by the investigating officer, provided that before such report is signed, or
thumbmarked if the person arrested or detained does not know how to read and write, it shall be read and adequately explained to him by his
counsel or by the assisting counsel provided by the investigating officer in the language or dialect known to such arrested or detained person,
otherwise, such investigation report shall be null and void and of no effect whatsoever.

(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such
person in the presence of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers
and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by
him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.

(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial
investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of
no effect.

(f) Any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall be allowed visits by or conferences with any member of his
immediate family, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his
counsel, or by any national non-governmental organization duly accredited by the Commission on Human Rights of by any international non-
governmental organization duly accredited by the Office of the President. The person's "immediate family" shall include his or her spouse,
fiancé or fiancée, parent or child, brother or sister, grandparent or grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, and guardian or ward.

As used in this Act, "custodial investigation" shall include the practice of issuing an "invitation" to a person who is investigated in connection with an
offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation of law.

Section 3. Assisting Counsel. – Assisting counsel is any lawyer, except those directly affected by the case, those charged with conducting preliminary
investigation or those charged with the prosecution of crimes.

The assisting counsel other than the government lawyers shall be entitled to the following fees;
 (a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos (P150.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with light felonies;lawphi1©alf

(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos (P250.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with less grave or grave felonies;

(c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos (P350.00) if the suspected person is chargeable with a capital offense.

The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid by the city or municipality where the custodial investigation is conducted, provided that if the
municipality of city cannot pay such fee, the province comprising such municipality or city shall pay the fee: Provided, That the Municipal or
City Treasurer must certify that no funds are available to pay the fees of assisting counsel before the province pays said fees.

In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be conducted and the suspected person can only be detained by the investigating officer in
accordance with the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

Section 4. Penalty Clause. – (a) Any arresting public officer or employee, or any investigating officer, who fails to inform any person arrested, detained
or under custodial investigation of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, shall suffer a
fine of Six thousand pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both. The
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification shall also be imposed upon the investigating officer who has been previously convicted of a similar offense.

The same penalties shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee, or anyone acting upon orders of such investigating officer or in his
place, who fails to provide a competent and independent counsel to a person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense if the latter cannot afford the services of his own counsel.

(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister chosen by him or by any member of his immediate family or by his
counsel, from visiting and conferring privately with him, or from examining and treating him, or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any
hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four (4) years nor more than six (6)
years, and a fine of four thousand pesos (P4,000.00).

The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such
reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent his escape.

Bratnicki vs. Vopper, 532 US 514

Facts of the case

An unidentified person intercepted and recorded a phone call between the chief union negotiator and the union president
(the petitioners) during collective-bargaining negotiations involving a teachers' union and the local school board. After a
teacher-favorable proposal was accepted, a radio commentator played a tape of the intercepted conversation. Petitioners
filed suit under both federal and state wiretapping laws, alleging that an unknown person using an electronic device had
surreptitiously intercepted their telephone conversation. Rejecting a First Amendment protection defense, the District
Court concluded, in part, that the statutes were content-neutral laws of general applicability containing "no indicia of prior
restraint or the chilling of free speech." Ultimately, the Court of Appeals found the statutes invalid because they deterred
significantly more speech than necessary to protect the private interests at stake.’

Question
Does the First Amendment provide protection to speech that discloses the contents of an illegally intercepted
communication?

Conclusion
Yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held that the First Amendment protects the
disclosure of illegally intercepted communications by parties who did not participate in the illegal interception. "In this
case, privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance," wrote
Justice Stevens. "[A] stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about
a matter of public concern." Noting that the negotiations were a matter of public interest, Justice Stevens wrote that the
"debate may be more mundane than the Communist rhetoric that inspired Justice Brandeis' classic opinion in Whitney v.
California, but it is no less worthy of constitutional protection."