Indonesian Communist Policy and the Sixth Party Congress

Author(s): Justus M. van der Kroef

Source: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 3 (Sep., 1960), pp. 227-249
Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2752961 .
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 IndonesianCommunistPolicyand the
SixthPartyCongress
Justus
M. vanderKroef

TROM SEPTEMBER 7TH TO I4TH, i959 the Indonesian CommunistParty

1'(PKI) held its SixthNational Congress,and both the large size of the
congressionalmembershipas well as its deliberationsand decisionsmark
it as probablythemostimportant of thethreepartycongresses held sincethe
end of the World War II. Indeed thefactthatit was held at all is testimony
to the PKI's presentprominencein the country.The strictsupervisionover
carriedout bythearmy,as stipulatedbythedecree
all publicpoliticalactivity
of theArmyHigh Commandon July4, i959 and byPresidentialdecisionon
August i, i959, had at firstseemedlikelyto preventthecongressfrombeing
convened.Permissionto hold the congresson the scheduleddate of August
22, I959 was refusedby army authorities.Subsequently,however,Dipa
NusantaraAidit,Chairmanof the PKI's CentralCommittee,declaredthat
the Djakarta ArmyGarrisonCommand had not forbiddenthe holdingof
thecongressper se, but had onlyrequestedthatit be postponeduntilthesec-
ond week of Septemberon the grounds of "securityconnectedwith the
August17 celebrations" (Indonesia'snationalindependenceday) and because
of "anotherquestion,"not specified.'Certainit is thatAiditappealeddirectly
to Sukarno and the latterin his addressto the congress,intimatedthathe
had intervenedearlierwith the militaryon the party'sbehalf.2Aidit him-

1 IndonesianObserver(Djakarta), August 19, I959. The other"question"appearsto have

been thePKI's desireto throwsome of the meetingsof the congressopen to thegeneralpublic,
to publishthe deliberations and to have foreignCommunistguestsattendthe congresssessions.
In theopinionof Lt. Col. UmarWirahadikusumah, head of theDjakarta "War Administration"
(i.e. martiallaw) Council,theArmy'sban on publicpoliticalactivity whichcan "createpolitical
applicablehere.Subsequently
conflict"was held at firstto be particularly permissionwas given
forthe foreigngueststo attendand to releasebriefstatements of the congress'decisionsto the
press.
2 Sukarno declared: "Early last JulybrotherAidit asked me in the State Palace: 'Bung
Karno, thereis a ban on politicalactivitiesnow in force.Do you thinkthatthe Communist
Partyof Indonesiawill be allowed to stagea congressin the near future?'At thattimeI said
to BrotherAidit: 'Hold yourCongress'. . . And then,at the end of Julybeforethe ist August,
I called the MilitaryCommanderof Djakarta,Lieut. Col. Umar one morningto drinkmorning
coffeewith me and I said to him: 'LieutenantColonel Umar,some time afterAugustI, the
CommunistPartyof Indonesiawill be holdinga Congress.Make sure that the Congressruns
well, becausethe IndonesianRepublicis a democraticrepublic'."PresidenSukarno,"Jo sanak
1o kadang,malah jen mati aku sing kelangan,"BintangMerah (Djakarta), vol. I5 (Sept.-Oct.,
1959), p. 375. This issue of BintangMerah (the party'sprincipaljournal for the studyof
"Marxism-Leninism") is primarily devotedto the sixthcongress.

227
 PacificAffairs
self,in reviewing thehistory of thevariousnationalcongresses in PKI his-
tory,alludedto the factthatrestrictions imposedon the sixthcongress
"remindus of the unpleasant circumstances of formerdays"(i.e. in the
colonialera). Military vigilancecontinuedhowever: thecongress wasclosed
to thepublic,and themilitary toredownand confiscated variouscongress
postersputup bytheparty throughout Djakarta.4
Stagedunderfourprincipalslogans,5 and enlivened by the attendance
andremarks of"fraternaldelegatesofsevenbrother parties"(fromAustralia,
Bulgaria,Cuba,East Germany, Hungary, Italyand Poland) theCongress
endorseda new partyconstitution and program, as wellas some25 other
resolutionsand instructions to thenew CentralCommittee, rangingfrom
demandsforconfiscation ofcapitalandbusinesses belongingtopro-Kuomin-
tang Chinesein Indonesiaand forimplementing plansto liquidate"the
colonialeconomy," to resolutionsurgingthe"defeatofU. S. intervention in
Laos" and expressing hopeforthe"successfortheconvening of a summit
conference."" None of theseendorsements or resolutionswereparticularly
forsinceAiditbecametheunquestioned
surprising, leaderofthePKI at the
previous FifthNationalCongress(in MarchI954), partyregularity, disci-
plineand efficiency havebecomequiteconspicuous-anotablechangefrom
thefactionalism in theearlytwenties orthevirulent leadershipclashesin the
meetings of CentralCommittee Plenumsin thelateforties. Aidit'shandis
unmistakable in the new constitution of the partyapprovedat the sixth
congress,and a comparison ofthisdocument withtheconstitution accepted
at the fifthcongress, showsthe growinginfluence of his organizational
philosophy.
One isfirstofallstruck bythecontinuing emphasis intheI959 constitution
on theneedforsubordination to higherpartyorgans, and service
discipline,
of partymembers, on the regularizationof partyfunctions, and on the
increasedcontrolexercised by centralpartyorgansoverall lowerunits.7

3 D. N. Aidit,"The Successof the SixthNationalCongressof theC.P.I. is a MightyVictory

forDemocracy,"C.P.I. SixthNationalCongress.CongressIssue.Reviewof Indonesia(Djakarta,
September-October 1959), Supplement, p. io.
4IndonesianObserver, September9, 1959.
5 The sloganswere: "With the Communist Partyof Indonesiain the vanguardcontinuethe
people'sstrugglefora fullyindependent and democratic Indonesia,"'Improve the workof the
nationalfront,further isolatethe diehardforces,""Strengthen the anti-colonialand pro-peace
front"and "Continueto build a Partythroughout
international thecountrycloselyunitedwith
the masseswhich is consolidatedideologically, politicallyand organizationally."See the PKI
journalReviewofIndonesia,September-October 1959, p. 3.
6 JusufAdjitorop,"Kongresjang didukungRakjat," BintangMerah, vol. i5 (September-
October1959), pp. 373-374. Adjitoropis a secretary of the CentralCommitteeof the Party,a
candidatememberof thePolitburo, and a PKI parliamentary deputy.
7 The 1954 Constitution appearsin Kepartaiandan Parlementaria Indonesia (Kementerian
Penerangan, Djakarta,1954), pp. 492-512; the 1959 Constitution in Materialforthe Sixth
National Congressof the CommunistPartyof Indonesia (AgitpropDepartmentof the Central
Committee, CommunistPartyof Indonesia,Djakarta),pp. 107-137.

228
 IndonesianCommunistPolicyand theSixthPartyCongress
For example, article6, chapter II (whichin bothconstitutions dealwiththe
ofpartymembers)
responsibilities hasbeenmadeconsiderably longerin the
i959 constitution and nowincorporates additional exhortations to members
"to attendmeetings and coursesof theParty,to readand disseminate the
Partydaily. . .", "toholdhighCommunist morals," "tobe loyalandhonest
towardtheParty. . . notto concealor distort things as theyactually are. . .
to use Marxism-Leninism in the solution of concrete problems . . . seriously
topayheedtothedesires andvoiceofthemassesofthepeople... tooppose
allthings whichareharmful totheinterests ofthePartyandthepeople," and
so on. The continuing appealto an ideological purism, which has character-
izedtheAiditeraoftheparty, isevident from thedemandinthei959 constitu-
tionthatthemembers mustdiligently study"Marxism-Leninism," whereas
therelevant passagein theI954 constitution demandedreadingof "Marx,
Engels,Lenin,Stalinand the thought of Mao Tse-tung, alongwiththe
greatrevision ofMuso."ThoughAidithas beengenerally quitepragmatic,
especiallyin partytactics, theelimination ofthenamesofMuso,Mao,Stalin
and Engelsin thei959 clauseis indicative ofthemonolithic facadeof ideo-
logicalorthodoxy whichAidithas beenanxiousto preserve, and ofhiswell
advertised opposition to anything resembling revisionism (e.g. of theTito
variety)generally. The reasonforall thiswillbe dealtwithpresently. Article
7, chapterII in thenew i959 constitution has addeda clauseto theeffect
thata partymember may"defend hispointofviewifhe doesnotagreewith
a decision"of theparty, butcan onlydo this"sidebysidewithhavingto
carry outthisdecision unconditionally." It is truethatthespirit ofchapter X
of the I954 Constitution, whichis concerned withinternal discipline, has
beenpreserved in thei959 version, buttheimplications of partydiscipline
and responsibility of members aregenerally mademoreexplicit. The ques-
tionof expelledpartymembers wishingto re-enter has,nowthattheparty
reachedsuchprominence, becomeofmajorimportance, and a newclausein
thei959 Constitution (Art.8, lastparagraph)seeksto regularize theread-
mission procedure. Indeed,threenewarticles (20 to22) dealexclusively with
themannerand justification of expulsion of members, including members
oftheparty's CentralCommittee, andprovide forappealbymembers against
whomdisciplinary actionis takento higherpartylevels,including theCen-
tralCommittee.
The I954 Constitution (chapter VIII, articles 54-57) hadalready provided
for "ControlCommissions" at various levels, but the i959 Constitution (chap-
terVIIL, article6i) specifiestheir tasks in greater detail:"to regularly exam-
ine and arrange for questions of violation by members of the Party Consti-
tution,Partydisciplineand Communistmorals;to imposeor rescind
disciplinarymeasures againstPartymembers; and to arrange forcomplaints
and appealsmadebyPartymembers." Higher level Control Commissions,
including a CentralControlCommission (at present headed by PerisPar-
229
 PacificAffairs
dede,a strongsupporter ofAidit),mayexamineand rescinddecisionsoflower
levelcommissions. The i959 Constitution also providesfora new typeof reg-
ulatory agency-the so-called "VerificationCommissions"which are to
operateboth at the nationaland at the lower partylevels and are intended
"to controlPartyadministration, the accountsand the utilizationof Party
funds,thePartyinventory and productiveundertakings of the Party."They
are to be thefiscalarmof theParty,just as the ControlCommissionsare the
disciplinaryarm.8In accordancewithAidit'spolicyof effecting a close inte-
grationbetweenCommunistactivistsand the masses,the i959 Constitution
has expandedChapterVII of the I954 versionwhichdeals with"partyfrac-
tions in non-party organizations"so as to enjoin partyactivistsin various
representativebodiesthroughout thecountryto "preservecloseties"withthe
massesof the voters,to "give regularreports"to the voters,to "live simply
. . . be modestin theirrelationswith the people" and "always place the
Partyabovethemselves." An entirelynew chapteron "theparty'srelationship
withthe 'People'sYouth,"' notfoundin the I954 version,has been included
in the i959 Constitution. Referringspecificallyto the Pemuda Rakiat (Peo-
ple's Youth, the CommunistYouth front)the i959 Constitution directsall
partyorganizationsto pay close attentionto the work of thisbody and to
educateit in "Marxist-Leninist theory."It maybe notedthatPemuda Rakiat
is theonlyCommunistfrontorganizationspecifically mentionedin eitherof
theconstitutions.
Anotherrevisionin theconstitution concernstheparty'shierarchical struc-
ture.In line withnew designationsforunitsof local government now em-
ployedby theState,chapterIII, article25 ofthe i959 Constitution introduces
a new nomenclature of partyorganizationallevels:
a. For the whole of Indonesia,thereis the NationalPartyCongress,the
CentralCommittee (C.C.) and theNationalPartyConference.
b. Foreachfirst-levelSwatantraregion(autonomously governed region,)there
is a MajorDistrictPartyorganization, a Major DistrictPartyConference and a
MajorDistrictCommittee (M.D.C.).
c. For thecapitalof theRepublic(Jakarta),thereis a JakartaPartyorganiza-
tion,a Jakarta PartyConference Committee
and a Jakarta (J.C.) whosestatusis
thesameas thatoftheM.D.C.s.

are silenton the specificmannerin whichControlCommissionsare to

8 The constitutions
be formed.The 1954 Constitution leftthe establishmentof both the Centraland lower level
ControlCommissionsto the CentralCommitteeof the Party.ChapterVII, article6o of the
I959 Constitutionmerelyprovidesthatthe CentralCommittee, Major district-,Island-, Town
-. and Section-Committees, plenumsset up a ControlCommission."
"shall at theirrespective
Practiceseemsto be forthe Committees to nominatethe membership of the ControlCommis-
sions,and to have the respective conferencesapprovethe nomination. On the otherhand Verifi-
cationCommissions are to be electedby the NationalCongressand by the DistrictConferences
(i.e. Major DistrictConferences, and by the JakartaPartyConference).Other organizational
levelsof the party(such as Island and Subsecom)do not have Verification Commissions. Cen-
tralizedcontrolover partyfinancesthusappearsto have increasedwith the 1959 Constitution.

230
 IndonesianCommunistPolicyand theSixthPartyCongress
d. For eachislandor forseveralislandsas determined bytheC.C., thereis an
IslandPartyorganization or IslandsPartyorganization, an IslandPartyConfer-
enceor an IslandsPartyConference, and an IslandCommittee or an IslandsCom-
mittee(I.C.) whichis underthedirectleadership of theC.C. or theM.D.C.
e. For theExtraordinary Districtof Jogjakarta and fortownsdetermined by
theC.C. thereis a Jogjakarta DistrictPartyorganization and Town Partyorgan-
ization,a Jogjakarta DistrictPartyConference and a Town PartyConference, as
wellas a Jogjakarta DistrictCommittee (J.D.C.) and a Town Committee (T.C.)
directlyundertheleadership oftheM.D.C.
f. For second-level Swatantraregionsand regionsbelowthislevelas deter-
minedbytheC.C., thereis a PartySection, a SectionPartyConference and a Sec-
tionCommittee (Secom).
g. For third-level Swatantra regionsor Ketjamatanor districts belowtheket-
jamatanlevelas determined by theM.D.C. or theI.C., thereis a PartySubsec-
tion,a Subsection PartyConference and a Subsection Committee (Subsecom).
h. For factories, mines,villages,kampongs, roads,enterprises, offices,
schools,
highereducational institutions,thereis a PartyBranch,a Branchmeeting, and a
BranchCommittee (B.C.) or a MajorPartyBranch,a MajorBranchConference
and a MajorBranchCommittee (M.B.C.).
Branches aredividedintogroupswhichconsists ofat themostio persons who
workorliveneartoeachother.

Abolishedare theterms"province"and "regency"(kabupaten) and their

respective partyagencies(corresponding to first-level
and second-levelSwat-
antra regions),as are the municipaldesignations"kotabestr" (large city)
and "kota ketjit" (small city) (correspondingto second- and third-level
Swatantraregionsrespectively), which were used in the I954 constitution.
The specialdistrict of Jogjakarta
is namedin the i959 Constitution as having
its own organizationallevel,but it will be notedthatthislevelis below that
of theMajor Districtlevelheldbythecityof Djakarta.Of specialimportance
is the additionin the i959 Constitution of islandsor island-groupsas party
organizationallevels.This plane of hierarchy was lackingin the 1954 Con-
stitutionand its inclusionin the new constitutional versionprobablystems,
at leastin part,froma recognition of thepotencyof regionaland ethnicsen-
timentsin Indonesiatoday.Nevertheless, partydisciplineand subordination
are also stressed;forexample,chapterIII, article23 of the i959 versionpre-
scribesthat"lowerpartyorganizationsmustperiodicallygive reportsabout
theirworkto the organizationaboveit" and mustalso "requestinstructions"
about"questionswhichrequirethedecisionof a higherorganization."These
phrasesare absentin the corresponding clause of the I954 Constitution,
al-
thoughthatdocumentdid counsel (in article26) against"anarchistictend-
encies"such as "autonomismand ultra-democracy." Strictsupervisionover
all partypublicationsis enforcedand article32 of the i959 Constitution not
onlydemandsthatnewspapersand magazinespublishedby partyorganiza-

231
 PacificAffairs
tions"mustpopularisethe decisionsand the policiesof the centralorganiza-
but also that"thepublica-
tionsand the policiesof the centralorganization,"
tion of regionaldailies,magazinesor pamphletsmusthave the approvalof
thePartycommittee immediately above."Finally,as muchas a concessionto
the presenteconomicplightof theaverageIndonesianas a signof theparty's
presentstrength,the monthlymembership dues are now lowered;formerly,
dues of 0.50 Rupiahsper monthwere
to the 1954 Constitution
according
levied on all memberswithgrossearningsup to Rp. i5o a month,whereas
thenew Constitution providesforthesame dues forincomesup to Rp. 250 a
month.Those withmonthlyincomesrangingfromRp. 25i to 350 paid Rp. 2
monthly, but thenew constitution asks onlyRp. I, fromthosewithmonthly
earnings ranging fromRp.25i to500.
The ongoingstresson strictregularity in partyfunctionand on mem-
bershipdiscipline in the PKI constitutionis perhapsthe hallmarkof the
Aidit regimeand reflectshis riseto power theparty.There have been two
in
previousperiodsof intensePKI activity:
(i) theyearsT920-26, whenthe
newlyfoundedPKI furiously threwitselfin variousstrikeventures,sought
uneasy allianceswith the budding Indonesiannationalistmovement,and
then all but destroyeditselfby the badlyplannedand amateurishinsurrec-
tions of i926-i927; and (2) the 1945-48period,when the Communistsat-
temptedto capturecontrolof the IndonesianRevolutionagainstthe Dutch,
and whenthepartyagain almostcameto a disastrousend as a resultof itsill-
coordinatedand ineffectual uprisingin Madiun, East Java,in September
1948.The generalattitudeof Aidittowardboththeseperiodshas beenone of
unequivocalcriticismof the poorlyorganized,narrowlybased,and ideologi-
cally confusedcharacterof the partyat the time,the tendency(especially
evidentin the earlytwenties,accordingto Aidit) to make the partyinto a
kind of leftistsectof conspiratorsinsteadof a well disciplined,mass move-
as a powerleverforpersonalgain,lead-
ment,or to see it,opportunistically,
ing to "subjectivism" in Marxistdoctrinewhenconfronted withstrongpoliti-
cal opposition(e.g. in theperiodaftertheMadiun debacle).9
Consolidationof the party,rigidindoctrinationof membersby meansof
requiredtrainingcoursesand long apprenticeships, insistenceon subordina-
with the massesthrough
close integration
tion and discipline,self-criticism,
an ever wideningunitedfront-thesehave been the principalelements,ac-
cordingto Aidit, which were lacking in the previouseras of intensePKI
activity,elementswhichwere firstseriouslyemphasizedat the historicCen-
tralCommitteePlenum in Januaryi95i, fromwhichthe party'snew recov-
eryfromthe Madiun disastermay be traced.It is this"spiritof i95i" which

9 See D. N. Aidit,A ShortHistoryof the Communist Partyof Indonesia(New Delhi, I955),

pp. 6-8, 29-30, and his "Djalan ke DemokrasiRakjat bagi Indonesia,"p. 253, in D. N. Aidit
PilihanTulisan(Djakarta,x959), vol. I.

232
 IndonesianCommunistPolicyand theSixthPartyCongress
Aiditaffirmed at theFifthCongress in March195410 and eulogizedagain
at thesixthcongress. Throughthedevelopment oftheMarxist-Leninist prin-
ciplesof partyorganization sincei95i, he declaredin September I959, "we
now possessa partybetterspreadout overthe entirecountry havinga
broadermasscharacter, and alreadymoreconsolidated in the ideological,
political andorganizational fields.""Consistent regularizationofparty func-
tions,coupledwithintense indoctrination, was preciselywhatAiditsuccess-
fullyurgedagainat theFifthCongress in hisspeechdenouncing so-called
"Tan Ling Djie-ism"'12and therecan be littlequestion, if one looksat the
scopeofPKI activities today,ofthesuccess ofhisapproach.
It is thishistoric background thatmustbe considered in assessing Aidit's
attitude toward"revisionist" theories in Communist ideology. On theone
hand,thenewPKI program approved at theSixthCongress asserts-echoing
Khruschev-that "everynationwilltakeitsownpathto Socialism basedon
thedevelopment ofthenationalsituation, andon thepolitical, economic and
culturalconditions."'13 On theotherhand,thesixthcongress, according to
Aidit'ssummary ofitsproceedings, "declared waragainstsubjectivism" and
condemned "thedisgusting practicesoftheTito cliqueof modernrevision-
ists."'4For Aiditthereis no contradiction between thesetwopositions. No
PKI theoretician hasmadesucha fetish as he hasofMarxism as a "science,"
as a singlesetof ideological toolsapplicable everywhere. But theenviron-
mentalfactors, Aidit has differ
stressed, from country to country, and this
results in tactical Yet,
differences. the Marxist and
dialectic itsLeninist ap-
plication (such as the discovery and application of the principle of polar
opposites of classand economic interests thehistoric
in society, dynamics of
"imperialism," thetechniques of "criticism and selfcriticism" in anypro-
gramof action,and of avoidanceof "deviations" whicheitherrestrict the
party's basetoonarrowly orelse"subjectivize" ideologyforthesakeofestab-
lishingalliancesat all costs)aretheoretical constantsforAidit,and hisfol-
lowers have echoed him in stressingthe universalityand scientific character

10 D. N. Aidit,"KembangkanPeriode 195II," pp. 274-277 in D. N. AiditPilihanTulisan,

op. cit. See also Aidit'sThe Road to People's Democracyfor Indonesia (Djakarta, I955), pp.
38-40.
"D. N. Aidit, "KembangkanSemangkatKongresNasional ke-VI PKII," BintangMerah,
vol.I5 (September-October 1959), p. 367.
12 See D. N. Aidit, "Tentang Tan Ling Djie-isme,"pp. 259-272 in D. N. Aidit Pilihan
Tulisan; op. cit.Tan Ling Djie, a militantSocialist,who in i948 proclaimedhis longtimeaffilia-
tion with the PKI, was one of the principalleadersof the radicalleftduringthe Indonesian
revolution, and especiallyduringthe aftermath of the Madiun debacle.Tan's cautionand ideo-
his hopes fora new rapprochement
logical flexibility, and his ineffective-
withthe nationalists,
ness in broadeningthe party'sbase, were all factorsin Aidit'sdenunciation of him. The Fifth
NationalCongressin March I954, officially condemned"Tan Ling Djie-ism."
13 Materialforthe SixthCongressof the Communist Partyof Indonesia,op. cit.,p. 97.
14D. N. Aidit,"KongresNasional Ke-VI PKI," BintangMerah,vol. I5 (September-October
1959), pp. 354, 357.

233
 PacificAfairs
of Marxism.'5This approachdoes allow, withinlimits,certainexpository
"interpretations" of the Marxisttheoryas applied to particularhistoricor
socioeconomicconditionsin variouscountriesof the world.Aidithas done
thishimselfin his analysisof Indonesianeventsand it is in thislightalso
thathe seestheworkof Stalinor Mao."6But thisis notto be interpreted as a
"revision"or "correction" of thehallowedMarxisttenets.What Aiditappears
to object to particularly which do not conformto the
are interpretations
Marxistfundamentals as he seesthem,or whichoffera non-Marxist analysis
or whichtend to underminethe "solidarityof the Socialist
of class conflict,
countriesof the world,"or which,simply,do not accord with the broad
policyobjectivesof Moscow or Peking.Titoismis regardedas being of this
character, and in the Indonesianspherethetheoriesof Tan Malaka, and to a
large extentalso thoseof Muso, the mostimportant IndonesianCommunist
theoretician in thehistoryof thepartybeforeAidit.
But Aidit's theoreticaldebt to Muso and Tan Malaka is greaterthan
Aiditis at presentwillingto admit.To Muso,forexample,thePKI owes the
introductionaround 1935 (and undoubtedlyin obedience to Comintern
directive)of the idea of the nationalfront,a sharprepudiationof the nar-
row,elite-conscious sectarianism thatcharacterized partyorganizationin the
twenties.Muso's attemptto directthe scatteredmembersof the Communist
underground and to promotetheinfiltration of CommunistsintoIndonesian
nationalistgroups such as the Gerindoin the largelyfailedas a
late thirties,
tacticof a "unitedfrontfromabove" at thistime,partlybecauseof the ex-
tensiverepressive policiesof the colonialgovernment. Still,the tacticwas to
have its influencein lateryears.Secondly,the Indonesianpartyin general,
and Aidit'stheoriesin particular, owe to Muso afterhis returnto Indonesia
in i948 the particularcombinationof Leninistand Stalinistdoctrineswhich
has come to be knownas "Maoism"-with its conceptof a preliminary stage
of the Communistrevolution,characterizedby collaborationof disparate
groups (includingthe peasantsand the bourgeoisie)and looking toward
"democratic"reformsand the abolitionof "feudal"survivalsbeforethe dic-

15 See e.g. Njoto,MarxismeSebagai l1mu(Djakarta,I959). Njoto is a memberof thePolit-

buro,SecondVice-Chairman of the party'sCentralCommitee,and a PKI parliamentary Deputy.
16 AlthoughMao is at presentin betterstandingin PKI theorythan Stalin,Aidit,in line
withthecriticism of Stalinthatinaugurated the Khruschevera,also denouncedStalinas "oppor-
tunistic."This arousedthe hostilityof the veteranPKI leaderAlimin,who aftera bitterwrangle
with Aidit,in whichhe accusedthe latterof followinga "class collaboration policy,"resigned
fromthe party,though"remaininga Communistat heart."On the Alimin-Aidit conflictsee
Harian Rakiat,July4, 1956. The presentPKI approachcontinuesto allow for a marriageof
religionwith Communism.As in the i920's, when some Islamickiaiihs(scholarsof the writ)
foundCommunistaffiliation not incompatible with theirreligiousfaith,the PKI has made it a
pointthata religiouscreedis not necessarily an obstacleto partymembership. See, forexample,
the addressof the PKI deputy(and kiaikh)K. H. AchmadDasuki Siradj in the now defunct
Constituent Assembly,TentangDasar Negara RepublikIndonesiaDadamKonstituante (1959?),
vol. 2, pp. 326-336.

234
 IndonesianCommunistPolicyand theSixthPartyCongress
tatorshipoftheproletariat canbe established.The firstunequivocal adoption
oftheMaoisttacticcameattheAugusti948 partyconference whichadopted
theDjalanBaru("New Road") resolution,17 andalthough theMadiuninsur-
rectionandMuso'sowndeathshortly prevented
thereafter immediate imple-
mentation oftheDjalan Baruapproach, theMaoistemphasis on theroleof
thepeasantry andon thetwostagerevolution (as theyappearforexamplein
Mao Tse-tung's wellknownpamphlet On New Democracy) weretobecome
dominant elements in PKI theory withtheadventofAidit,although Aidit
has repudiated theMaoistguerillatacticand otheraspectsof theChinese
Communist seizureofpoweras "notbeingapplicable" to Indonesia. He has
subsequently beencriticalofMusobecauseofthelatter's allegedbeliefin the
ofusingtheChineseCommunist
feasibility guerillatactics On
in Indonesia.
balance,however, it is doubtful ifMusoreallywantedtheMadiuninsurrec-
tion,thoughhe attempted to leaditafterithadbrokenout.To Tan Malaka
thePKI owesat leastsomething of thetechnique of organizing thefirst,
overt,and effective Communist nationalfront"fromabove"in Indonesia,
thePersatuan Perdjuangan duringtheIndonesianRevolution. Muso'sde-
in
mise theMadiuninsurrectioni948,andof Tan Malaka's deathearlyin
I949 lefta vacuumin thetactical approaches
and theoretical oftheextreme
filledin theperiod1950-I953. Bythetimethat
leftwhichAiditgradually
Aiditbecamesecretary-general of thepartyin I954, a flexibleand modified
Maoismhad becometheparty's basictheory, whileat thesametimeit had
becomepossibleto stressagain(as had happenedall duringtherevolution)
the"nationalCommunist" heresies ofTan Malaka,as wellas theallegedly
excessiveMaoismofMuso.
Aidit'stheoriestodaygivetheimpression ofthenecessityofkeepinginvio-
principles
latethepolitical-sociological ofMarx,Engels and Lenin,whilebe-
ingmorepragmatic in theirmanner ofapplicationto countries.
different To
quotehis report to theSixthPlenumof theparty's CentralCommittee in
March,i958: "We adapttheparty . .. withtheintentionthattherewillbe
no questionamongthe masseswhichis unanswered or unsolvedby the
party."18Reporting on the decisionsof the SixthNationalCongress, in
September thattheCongress
i959, he reiterated insistedon theimplementa-
tionof
twothingsat oneandthesametime,namely Partymembers
teaching tousetheMarx-
method
ist-Leninist in analyzing situation
thepolitical theclassforces,
andin appraising

17 The resolution wentthroughvariouseditionsand revisions,

the lastprobablybeingDjalan
Baru untukRepublikIndonesia(Djakarta, 1953). As a basic guide to partytacticsit was sup-
plantedby Aidit's"GeneralReporton thePoliticaland Organisational Situation"deliveredat the
FifthCongressof the partyin March1954 and publishedas "Djalan ke DemokrasiRakjatbagi
Indonesia" (pp. 207-257) in D. N. Aidit.PilihanTulisan,op. cit. A comparisonof the latter
reportwiththeDjalan Baru textshowsno majortheoretical differences.
18 Harian Rakjat(Djakarta), April3, 1958.

235
 Pacific Aflairs
and directing theinterestof thememberstowardinvestigatingand studyingthesocial
and economicsituation. MembersshouldknowMarxism-Leninism and knowthesitua-
tionso as to increasetheresultsof theirwork.'KnowingMarxism-Leninismand know-
ing thesituation'is thesloganof studyand thesloganof workof theIndonesianCom-
munists in theframework ofwagingwaragainstsubjectivism.19
An exampleof such an applicationof Marxistdialecticsand politicalso-
ciologyto a givensituationis Aidit'sstudy,IndonesianSocietyand theIndo-
nesianRevolution,a Marxistview of the development of nationalIndonesia.
In line withthe insistenceon ideologicalpurismand partydisciplinehas
come an emphasison techniquesforarousingdevotionto thepartyby means
of variouscampaignsamong the populace.These driveswere quite signifi-
cant,foraccordingto partyspokesmensome of them in factfinancedthe
Congress.20 Other driveswere moreparticularly designedforvariouspublic
serviceprojects.In preparationfor the Congress,partyactivistsorganized
variousVoluntaryWork Brigadeswhich constructed"3,249kilometresof
roads . . . 8o school buildings . . . 5,II9 public lavatories" and "succeeded . . .
in killing i86,698field mice."2' Party literaturewas widely disseminated
priorto the Congressand evenproletarian artwas notforgotten,foran exhi-
bitionof paintingswas held showingtheworkof "progressive" painterswho
had latelyacquirednew inspiration by "goingdown" amongthemassesand
thus,in Aidit'swords,were able to displaya "leap forward"in theirefforts
to attainin theirwork "two highs,"i.e. a "high level of ideology"and a
"high artisticlevel."22The new organizationaland ideologicalfocusin PKI
activityis well illustrated
by thisdetermination of the partyto capturethe
allegianceof Indonesianintellectuals,includingstudents,and to turnthem
intoa disciplinedvanguardof Communism.
In additionto acceptinga new constitution the SixthNational Congress

19 D. N. Aidit,"KongresNasionalKe-VI PKI," op. cit.,pp. 357-358.Italicsin original.

20 "Peasantsand othersympathizers" of the PKI collectedio quintalsof sugar,5 quintals
of coffee,30 kilos of tea, 234 kilos of saltedfish,more thana ton of vegetables, more than a
thousandcoconuts,morethan io quintalscassava,and 20,000 cigarettes "forcontribution to the
Congress."Otheritemsincludeda goat, a chicken,palm sugar,textiles,a "sacredkris" and a
"chairman'shammermade of elephant'stusks." JusufAdjitorop,"Kongres jang didukung
Rakjat,"op. cit., pp. 370-371.
21 D. N. Aidit,"KongresNasionalKe-VI PKI," op. cit.,p. 346.
22 Ibid., pp. 346-347. On the occasionof the openingof the exhibition of paintings,spon-
soredby the Communist League of People'sCulture(LEKRA), Njoto laid down thenew artistic
line, declaringthattherewere "Two ways in art: the people'sway and the nonpeople'sway."
That latteris characterized by "pessimism,defeatism,fatalism,decadency,"the formerby con-
fidencein the future.Review of Indonesia,September-October 1959, pp. 34-35. The Sixth
Plenumof the CentralCommittee, meetingfromMarch31 to April 3, I958, noted with ap-
proval that "large-scale"activitieshad recentlytakenplace underPKI aegis aimed at uniting
the ketoprak(folk-drama)artists,the ludruk (marionette play) artists,the rejog (folk-drama
of anotherform)artists,the dalang wajang (shadow-playartists)and othersthroughout Indo-
nesia, and thatvariousmodernartistsand writershad recentlyproducedwork which would
"enrichthe treasury of Indonesianculture."See Documentsof the SixthPlenumof the Central
Committeeof the CommunistPartyof Indonesia(Djakarta I958), pp. I22-123.

236
 Policyand theSixthPartyCongress
IndonesianCommutnist
also adopteda new partyprogram.A comparisonof the new 1959 program
withthe previousone adoptedin I954 does not revealany significant differ-
ences,but does indicateagain theparty'stendencytowardpragmaticadapta-
tionsdictatedby needsof themoment.23 "Imperialism"is stillsaid to menace
thecountry,but sincethe abrogationof theRound Table ConferenceAgree-
as the
had stressed
mentsof I949 withtheDutch,whichtheI954 program
principalsourceoftheimperialist threat,it is "Americanimperialism," which
"helpsthe Dutch imperialists in West Irian [West New Guinea] . . . with
the SEATO aggressivepact . . . and .. . is helpingthe counterrevolutionary
R.G.R.J.-Permestarebelsalso with arms"whichis singledout in the i959
programas the major danger."Survivalsof feudalism,"especiallyin the
agrarianeconomy,are stressedin both programsas major obstaclesto "na-
tionalliberationand democraticreforms" and the Indonesiangovernment in
both documents is accused of not doing enough for "nationalindustry and
trade."As to the basic objectiveof the party,thereis no changein the i959
program:" a government of the dictatorship of the people,"not "a dictator-
shipof theproletariat"is theaim,as it was in I954. This meansfirstof all an
allianceof manydisparategroups,frompeasants,to "nationalbourgeoisie"
led bythe"workingclass"againstthe"feudal"remnantsin thecountry(e.g.
imperialistlandlordsand foreignenterprises)in order to effectuatenot
"socialistreformsbut democraticreforms."Accordingly, extensivecollectiv-
ization of resourcesand re-structuring of societyunder the dictatorship of
the proletariatis postponeduntil the "feudal" and "imperialist"elements
havebeen overthrown.
Nevertheless,the turbulenteventsbetween1954 and ig5g,especiallythe
in the outlyingprovinces,have lefttheirmark on the new
dissatisfaction
i959 program. For now a "centralizedstructure of democracy"is demanded,
whichenvisionsa distribution of politicalpowerbetween"regionallegislative
assemblies"and "a strongcentralgovernment." The latter,however,is sub-
ject to "thePeople's Representative Assemblyelectedby the people."An en-
tirelynew clause has been added in the i959 programto take accountof the
risingpower of the armyin nationalpoliticssince I954 ("The Armyand
otherarmedforcesshouldnotbecomea meansforoppressingthepeoplebut
shouldbe the servantsof the people"), but it goes on to say that,in effect,
the politicalrolesand interests of membersof the armedforcesare "indeed
natural"in view of the armedforces'historyof resistanceagainstthe Dutch
and againstvarious"counter-revolutionary" rebellions.Although"Western
type,liberaldemocracy"is held to be unsuitedforIndonesia,stresscontinues
to be placed on the importanceof representative government in the attain-

28 Programme of the CommunistPartyof Indonesia(AgitpropDepartmentof the Commu-

nistPartyof Indonesia,Djakarta, 1954). The 8959 programappearsin Materialfor the Sixth
Congressof theCommunist Partyof Indonesia,op. cit.,pp. 87-l06.

237
 PacificAflairs
mentof "People's Democracy,"and the i959 program,unlikethe I954 ver-
sion,specifically
enjoinsCommuniststo be alwaysvigilant"so thatthe reac-
tionariesare unable to obstructthe people'swishesto achievefundamental
social changesby peacefulmeans,by parliamentary means."
The last phrase,it may be noted,reflects a favoriterecentPKI line: (i)
the need to preservethe rightto popular representation in government
againstthreatsof "militarydictatorship,"and (2) oppositionto the perpetua-
tionof a stateof emergency(i.e. martiallaw) promulgated bymeansof vari-
ous executivedecreesinsteadof by actionof parliament.24 Most recently
this
line has been expressedin termsof dissatisfaction with the parliamentap-
pointedby Sukarno on March 23, i96o, aftera crisisbetweenhimselfand
parliamentoverthebudget.Aidithas made it plain thathe favorsan elected,
not an appointed,parliament,not least because the PKI would get more
membersthatway.25But in the faceof so much domesticinstability during
thepastfewyearsthePKI appearsto havecometo acceptat leastsomemodi-
ficationof its I954 demand that theremust be a "handing over" of "all
powerto the people" and a guaranteeof "inviolability of personand domi-
cile,"togetherwithfreedomof religion,pressand speech.The i959 program
merelyasks that"the broadestpossibledemocraticliberties"be givento the
peopleand the specificationof certainfreedoms, such as thoseof speechand
press,has been eliminatedin favorof a clause onlyaskingfor"equal rights
forall citizens."
Finally,two otherdifferences betweenthe 1954and i959 programsshould
be mentioned.One is the greateremphasison the West Irian issue,the other
is the additionalimportanceattachedto variousculturalmattersin the i959
version.The I954 programhad only demandedthe "maintenance"of West
New Guinea as Indonesianterritory and the withdrawalof the Dutch. The
i959 program,reflecting additionalIndonesian failuresto get the United
Nationsto supportIndonesia'sclaimto the territory, speaksof "intensifying
the struggleforthe liberationof West Irian,"includingthe organizationof
"all forms"of "resistanceagainstthe Dutch occupationof West Irian."The
continuedmilitancy of thePKI on thisproblem,whichat one timeexpressed
itselfin criticismofthegovernment fornotbringingtheWest Irian question
to the United Nations again,26has on occasionembarrassedthe Indonesian
government. Yet thepresentideologicalorientationof theparty,withitsem-

24 See the New Year's Messageof the Politburoof the PKI, "ConsolidateUnityto Defend

Democracyand Struggleforan Improvement in the LivingConditionsof the People,"Review

of Indonesia,November-December i959, Supplement, p. 2; and D. N. Aidit,"The Successof
the Sixth National Congressof the C.P.I. is a MightyVictoryfor Democracy,"op. cit., pp.
I3-I4.
25AntaraDaily News Bulletin,April5, i960, p. 2.
26Harian Rakiat, August iI and 13, i959, and Review of Indonesia,August i959, pp.
12-I3.

238
 IndonesianCommunist
Policyand theSixthPartyCongress
phasison the"imperialist" threatas theprincipal problemconfronting the
country,27 forcesit to continuestressing theIrianissue,sinceDutchcontrol
overWest New Guinea is amongthe party'smostfrequently adduced
"proofs" of thepresent DutchAmericanconspiracy againsttheIndonesian
Republic.
In linewiththeearliermentioned increase in attention paidbytheparty
toartists,intellectuals,
anduniversity students, thei959 program hasaddeda
wholenew sectionon "For CulturalProgress," including demandsforthe
abolitionof "colonialeducation" and theinstitution of "scientific people's
nationaleducation," prohibitionof "imperialist subversive activitiesin cul-
turalaffairs,"28lowering oftheentertainment tax,better workopportunities
for"Indonesian experts,"establishment of buildings and otherfacilities for
"meetings of artists,"
and assistance to "sportactivities of thepeopleand
especially oftheyouth." Compared to thelonedemandin theI9,54 program
forcompulsory freeeducation forall children up to theage of twelve, the
"cultural progress" sectionoftheI959 version showsthegreatemphasis now
placedon indoctrination and organization of all aspectsof lifeand of all
associations ofpeople.The policyofelite-minded sectarianism, orofconspira-
torialalliancesand coupsof an earlierday,appearsto be de-emphasized.29
Viewingtheorganizational implementation ofPKI theory underAidit,one
is struck bytherelative "openness" ofpartyactivity, i.e.itstacticsofworking
aboveground,widelypublicizing itsprogram, and extending its ideology
and organizational structureto all population groups.
As has becomestandard procedure in partydeliberations at virtually all
levelsin theAiditera,theSixthNationalCongress alsoreviewed and rein-
forced certainbasicPKI positions in domestic Indonesian affairs.80
The Con-
gressaffirmed
the necessityof a gotongroyong(mutual assistance)cabinet,
meaning bythistheinclusion ofCommunists Sucha cabinet,
in thecabinet.
as Aidithad declaredearlier,
wouldbe "theforemost oftheunity
reflection

27 See, e.g. D. N. Aidit, "KibarkanTinggi Pandji-Pandji'Tanah UntukPetani' dan Rebut

KemenanganSatu Demi Satu," BintangMerah,vol. i5 (April-May,1959), pp. 2i6-217.

28 The partyhas shown especialsolicitude in "protecting"Indonesianyouthfromthe "cul-
tural imperialism"of America (e.g. allegedlyundesirablefilms,dances,etc.). See, e.g. B. 0.
Hutapea, "Memperingati Dua Hari Persatuandan KepahlawananPemudaIndonesia28 Oktober
dan Io November,"BintangMerah,vol. 15 (November-December 1959), pp. 444-450. Hutapea
is an editorof BintangMerah.
29 Thus the partypresumably has foresworn the use of the coup d'&tat."Coup d'&at is the
path of people who have lost all hope . . . whereasthe CommunistPartyof Indonesiahas
boundlessconfidence in the people as the sourceof all strength. . . Hence if you want to find
coup-ists,don't look for them withinthe CommunistPartyof Indonesia...." D. N. Aidit,
"The Successof the SixthNationalCongressof the C.P.I. is a MightyVictoryforDemocracy,"
op. Ci., pp. IO-II.
80Referencesto Sixth National Congressdecisionsin the next two paragraphsare taken
fromD. N. Aidit,"KongresNasionalKe-VI PKI," op. cit.,pp. 345-362.

239
 PacificAffairs
ofall anti-imperialist forces in ourcountry."'3'Butthesixthcongress, though
declaring theCommunist participation in thegovernment wouldbe "a sign
thatall democratic andpatriotic groupsaredeeplyawareofthegravity ofthe
situation" also cautionedthat"of course"PKI participation in a cabinet
shouldnotbe lookeduponas "infallible medicine," forsolution ofIndonesia's
illswoulddependon "thecomposition of thegovernment as a whole,"and
withCommunists in a minority in thegovernment therecould,ofcourse, be
no guarantee. And,like otherpartypronouncements, the decisions of the
sixthcongress also tendto drawa carefuldistinction betweensupport for
Sukarno(whohasneverbeencriticized directlybythepartysincetheAidit
era) andfortherestoftheexecutive armofthegovernment (whichhasfelt
thePKIs opendisapproval fromtimeto time).Indeed,although Sukarno,
since his July 5, 1959 decree reestablishingthe Constitution of 1945 in the
country, is concurrently acting as premier and has named his own ministers
(again excluding PKI members), Aidithas warnedthatit is incorrect to
blameSukarnoforthe failure thus farto form a true gotong royong cabinet
thatincludesCommunists;32 though"cowards" havethusfarprevented the
formation ofa gotongroyong government there is "no power that can pre-
venttheformation in thefuture ofthecabinetthatthepeopleyearnfor."33
In the meantime the sixthcongress unequivocally affirmed thegeneral
conceptof "guideddemocracy," theso-calledPoliticalManifesto ofAugust
17, 195934 delivered by Sukarno-which is the ideological rationale of the
present schemeof"guideddemocracy"-although ithasrecently beencritical
ofthebasicpoliciesofthepresent cabinetled bySukarnowithDjuandaas
his"FirstMinister." The PKI, the sixthcongress reiterated,willsupport the
progressive policyofthepresent cabinet, it
criticize when it wavers, but will,
if necessary, notopposethecabinetas suchbutonly"thoseministers whose
policiesareharmful tothepeople."
A final,familiar domestic issueon whichthecongress deliberated was
Indonesia's economic crisis.Stagnation ofproduction, accompanied byan in-
flationwhich"grewrampant" in thepastyear(according to thelatestBank
Indonesia report), theholdofthe"international capitalistdivision oflabor"
whichprevents Indonesiafromdeveloping itsproductive potentials, andthe

31 D. N. Aidit,"UniteForwardAlong the Path of Guided Democracyforthe ioo% Imple-

mentationof the PresidentSukarnoConcept,"(p. II) in Documents.SeventhPlenumof the
CentralCommitteeof the Communist Partyof Indonesia,Jakarta, NovemberI9-2i, I958 (Re-
viewofIndonesia,no. i2, I958, Supplement).
32 D. N. Aidit,"Back to the 1945 Constitution fora Changein Policiesand Living Condi-
tions,"p. 6, in EighthPlenumof the CentralCommittee of the Communist Partyof Indonesia.
PoliticalReportand Resolution,Djakarta,August6-7, 1959 (Review of Indonesia,no. 9-1o,
5959,Supplement).
38Ibid.,p. 8.
"4 See Sukarno,Manifesto Politk R. 1. (Djakarta,DepartemenPeneranganR. I., i959).
85 Bank Indonesia,Reportforthe Year 1958-1959 (Djakarta,I959), p. II.

240
 IndonesianCommunistPolicyand theSixthPartyCongress
persistenceof "feudalsurvivals" werenamedas principal impediments. To
alleviatetheseproblemsthe congress, not surprisingly,recommended a
strengthening of relations"withthe Socialistcountries whereeconomic
crisesareunknown," implementation of"progressivemeasures" in theagrar-
and a strengthening
ian field,36 of statecontrol overtheeconomy enabling
thegovernment to takea more commanding in
position the direction ofthe
nationalproduction process.
In thefieldofforeign policythecongress expresseditselfon threemajor
issues(theriseof anti-colonialnationalism in theworld,themerits ofa so-
called"neutralist"foreign policy,and theriseofJapan);passedresolutions
demanding theliberation ofvariousrevolutionary figures;andfinally, heard
froma numberof "brother delegates" fromotherpartsoftheworld.As to
resurgent nationalism in former colonialeras,thecongress did notregard
thisas a "separate movement" butas a partof thegeneralSocialistic and
awakening
anti-imperialistic in theworld.It criticizedthosewhoadvocated
a policyofnon-alignment between the"growing progressive forcesand the
disintegratingforcesof imperialism." Those who favorsucha policy,the
congress asserted,do notrealizethat"anypolicyhostileto theSovietUnion
and theSocialistcamphas beenprovento benefit imperialism." In fact,it
wascharged, Indonesia'spolicy"is one-sidelyinclinedtowardtheWest"and
in orderforthecountry to complete its"national"and "democratic" revolu-
tionandatthesametimecontribute tothesafeguarding ofworldpeace,new
strength mustbe soughtin "cooperation in varioussphereswiththeSocialist
countriesformutualbenefit." In thisconnection toothecongress, as reported
by Aidit,expressed "antipathy and indignation" overthefactthat"ruling
circlesin Japan"havedeclinedto followa peacefuland democratic foreign
policy.It was allegedthatthepolicyof the "Japanese monopolists," now
aidedby"theU. S. imperialists," is thesameas beforeWorldWar II, and
evidence ofthiswas seenin thehostileattitude oftheJapanese government
towardthePeople'sRepublicofChina.37 It maybe notedthatJapanis well
on itswayto becoming theblacksheepof Asia,so faras thePKI is con-
cerned;in a recentissueof thejournalBintangMerahtheJapanese Com-
munistleaderSenzoNosaka,excoriated thenefarious influence of "Ameri-
can imperialism" in hiscountry.38 The remilitarizationofJapan,instigated
bythe"monopolists represented byPrimeMinister Kishi"had beensingled
outforcondemnation as earlyas theSeventhPlenumof thePKI's Central

86 For these agrarianmeasuressee JustusM. van der Kroef,"AgrarianReformand the

IndonesianCommunistParty,"Far EasternSurvey,vol. 29, (Januaryi960), pp. 5-I3.
37 References "Kon-
to congressdecisionsin thisparagraphare takenfromAidit'ssummary,
gresNasionalKe-VI PKI," op. cit., p. 355.
38 Sanzo Nosaka,"ioo Tahun HarilahirSen Katajama,"BintangMerah,vol. 15 (November-
DecemberI959) pp. 434-436.

241
 PacificAfairs
Committeein November I958,39 and since then partypublicationshave
becomeevenshriller in theircriticismofJapan.
It is to be notedthatnone of thespeakersat theSixthNationalCongress,
and none of the documentspublishedby the congress,referredto Indo-
nesia'scurrentdifficulties withthe People's Republicof China overthe bar-
ringof ChinesetradersfromIndonesianruralareas,fromcertaincitiesand
evenfromwholedistricts. Though thebitterexchangesbetweenPekingand
Djakarta in thepastyearhave arousedmuchof thenation,thePKI has been
ratherrestrained in itscommentson thisissue.In May i959, forexample,the
partytook the line thatthe decisionto bar the Chinesewas solelythe doing
of Trade MinisterRachmatMuljosimeno-a typicalillustration of thePKI's
policyof not attackingthe government as such on an issue, but onlya pre-
sumablyresponsibleminister.When thisproved ineffective (because it was
well known thatSukarno also favoredthe ban), the party contented itself
with insistingon preservingSino-Indonesianfriendship, questioning the
economicusefulnessof the ban, and allegingthat the action fanned alien
"chauvinismand racialism"in Indonesia,therebyaidingU. S. imperialists in
theirold policyof "let Asians beat Asians."40By the time that the sixth
congresswas held an uneasylull had set in, and the steadyexodus of the
Chinese was removingmuch of the problemand its embarassment to the
party.
To demonstrate its "high spiritof internationalism" the sixthcongress
adopted a number of demanding
resolutions, the release of the Greek Com-
munistManolis Glezos, condemning the "murder" of a Communist Iranian
labor leader,demandingfreedomfor the Lebanese Communist Fajarollah
Helou, supporting "thestruggleof theheroicpeopleof Algeria,"demanding
freedomfor the "peace partisans"in Egypt and Syria who have been im-
prisonedby the government of the U.A.R., protesting the Salazar regimein
Portugaland urgingtheliberationof thePortugueseMarxistAlvaroCunhal.
But perhapstheclimaxof this"spiritof internationalism" came witha series
of communiquessigned by Aidit and variousvisitingCommunistleaders
fromsevenforeigncountriesat thecongress.Some of these(such as theone
signedby theAustraliandelegateMorrisHughes,CentralCommitteemem-
ber of the AustralianCommunistParty) offeredlittleof interest:SEATO
and the new Japanare condemned,Australian"workingclass" supportfor
the Indonesianclaim on West Irian,is affirmed, and so on.4' Anotherone

39"Resolutionon Solidarityagainstthe Remilitarization of Japan,"SeventhPlenumof the

C.C. of theC.P.I.," Reviewof Indonesia,no. i, i959 (unpagedsupplement).
40 See the remarksof PKI parliamentarian deputyOei Hay Djun in Review of Indonesia,
June-July, I959, pp. 33, and the PKI's Politburostatement on the occasionof the ioth anni-
versaryof the Pekingregimein Reviewof Indonesia,September-October I959, p. 5-6.
41 Exchangeof OpinionsBetweenthe Representatives of the CommunistPartyof Indonesia
and ForeignFraternalDelegationsduringthe SixthNationalCongressof the Communist Party
of Indonesia,p. 3 in Reviewof Indonesia,September-October I959, Supplement.

242
 IndonesianCommunistPolicyand theSixthPartyCongress
(signedbyJerzy Albrecht, CentralCommittee member ofthePolishUnited
Workers' Party)is noteworthy onlyin thelightoftheparticular positionof
theCommunist partyin certain IronCurtaincountries. Thus,in viewofthe
peculiaritiesofGomulka's regimein Poland,it is perhapsofinterest to read
Albrecht's statementthat"bothour partiesare connected by thecommon
ideasof Marxism-Leninism, bothpartiesguardthe purityof the Marxist
ideology againstrevisionistas wellas dogmatic deviations."'Another com-
muniquesignedbytheHungarianrepresentative (Pal Ilku,CentralCom-
mitteememberof theHungarianSocialistWorkers' Party)is of notepri-
marilyas a reflectionoftheinsistence on "Socialistcampsolidarity" which
has beenone of Aidit'smaintenets:thePKI, thecommunique "ex-
states,
presseditsboundless appreciation to theHungarianSocialist Workers'Party
forthe heroicand brilliantly successful way in whichit led the working
classand working peopleofHungaryin theirstruggle to crushthecounter-
revolution thatbrokeoutin October, i956;" theHungarian party,thecom-
muniquewenton,thussucceeded the"criminal
in frustrating attemptmade
by world imperialism led by the American imperialiststo drag Hungary
awayfromtheSocialistcamp."43
ButfromthepointofviewofPKI theory themostinteresting communi-
que6byfarwastheonesignedbyAiditand "Comrade" UrsinioRojas,Cen-
tralCommittee member ofthePeople'sSocialist PartyofCuba.The follow-
ingexcerpt fromthiscommunique seemsparticularly relevant:

The victorious revolutionin Cuba underthe leadershipof Fidel Castro. . . provides

important lessonsand experiencesforthe Indonesianpeople.Cuba's experiences show
thatin thepresentinternational it is not impossible
situation, fora smallislandnation
even thoughit is geographicallyisolatedand close to the centerof worldimperialism,
to win a revolution, to overthrow a reactionary tyrannical militarypower thatbows
down in servitudeto U. S. imperialism and thatis helpedby the imperialists,and to
establisha national,democraticand independent government ...
These experiences are extremelyimportant forIndonesiabecauseIndonesiais continu-
allybeingsubjectedto attacksand threatsfromtheimperialists.
The policybeingpursuedby theFidel CastroGovernment in Cuba-reorganizingthe
entireStateapparatuson an extensive scalewiththehelpof thewholepeoplebymeans
of completelystampingout militaristic elementsand eradicatingthe government
apparatuswhich has been utilizedby the imperialists, and replacingall this with a
democraticapparatusthatservesthe peopleand the entirenation-is a policywhich
setsa good examplefor Indonesia.The policyof returning to the I945 Constitution
so as to continuewithand win victory forthe August1945 Revolutionindeedcannot
be successfullyimplemented withoutgettingrid of moribundand reactionary norms

42 Ibid., p.
T5. Aidit at firstclassifiedGomulka as an "Americanimperialist"
agent (The
Road to People'sDemocracyforIndonesia,op. cit.,p. I7) along withTito, Raik and Slansky.
In the revisedversionof The Road (which appearsin D. N. AiditPilihanTulisan,op. cit.,vol.
I, pp. 207-257) allreference toGomulka, Rajk,et al. hasbeendeleted.
43 Ibid.,p. 12.

243
 PacificAffairs
overhauling
and completely the Stateapparatusto bringit intolinewithand servethe
of theIndonesianrevolution.
aimsand interests v . .44

These statementsare usefulin placing the PKI's principalaims under

Aidit in somethingof a world perspective. As indicatedearlier,the PKI's
programdemandsthe establishment of a government of the nationalunited
frontwhich is not a "dictatorship of the proletariat"but a governmentof
the"nationalunitedpeople,"whosetask it is not to carryout "socialist,"but
"democratic"reforms. Land reform, protectionof domesticnationalindustry
and trade,curtailment of foreignmonopoly, eliminationof "feudal"survivals
in the socio-economy, especiallyin land tenure-theseare the major objec-
tivesof a government of "the dictatorshipof the people,"preparatory, one
presumes,to thethoroughcollectivization and industrializationto be carried
out under a "dictatorship of the proletariat."The "good example" which
Cuba underCastrosetsforIndonesia,accordingto Aidit,is in facttheexam-
ple of a Communist-supported government of "the dictatorshipof the peo-
ple" bringingabout "democraticreforms"withinthe contextof a national
front.
It is thisanalogywiththe Cuban situationwhichalso givesreliefto the
PKI's unabashedsympathiesfor Sukarno,sympathieswhich the President
carefully reciprocatedduringhis addressbeforetheSixthNationalCongress.
This address,in whichSukarnodeclared"I have been verypleasedwiththe
CommunistParty of Indonesia especiallyduring the recentperiod . . .
because the C.P.I. clearlystatesthat it is indispensableto have national
unity,"reiterated his favoritemystiquesof "ongoingrevolution," of gotong
royong,of Socialism,of "historicalmaterialism"and of "religiousfeelings"
whichat thisstageof the revolutioncan "definitely" be "revolutionary pro-
gressive."45 In shortSukarno,who reiterated his supportforCommunistsin
the cabineton this occasion," is the ideal symbolof the presentnational
frontapproachin its phase of "democraticreform."In some ways he is to
the PKI what Castroappearsto be to the People's SocialistPartyof Cuba.
In his concludingremarksto thesixthcongressAiditpainteda pictureof
unprecedented growthforthe party:duringthe IndonesianRevolutionthe
partyhad had no morethan ioooo members,he had earlierdeclared,47 and
at thetimeof the fifthcongress there were onlyi65,206, of whom 70opercent
werecandidatemembers.But at thetimeof thesixthcongressthe I.5 million
markhad been reachedwith"membersand candidatemembersin approxi-
matelyequal proportion."The percentageof memberswould have been

44 ibid.,p. 7.
45 Sukarno,"Jo sanak jo kadang,malah jen mati aku sing kelangan,"op. cit.,p. 377 and
passim.
46 Ibid., p. 377-
47 D. N. Aidit,"Pembangunan OrganisasiPenting,Tapi Lebih PentingLagi Pembangunan
Ideologi!",BintangMerah,vol. IS (JuneI959), P. 237.

244
 IndonesianCommunist
Policyand theSixthPartyCongress
evengreater, Aiditstated,hadit notbeenfornegligence ofsomeparty com-
mittees whichfailedto promote members in timewhileunrest in somedis-
trictsalso retarded promotions. About17 percent of thePKI membership
nowconsists ofwomen.Stressing againthenecessity ofworking amongthe
peasants, of buildingthepartyalsoon theislandsbeyondJava("expanding
thepartymeansin thefirst placedeveloping thetiesof thepartywiththe
peopleofall nationalitiesthroughout thecountry"), andofmaintaining close
liaisonwiththemasses("expanding membership canonlybe considered cor-
rectifitis obtained in thefirst
placethrough massactions"), Aiditpromised
theimplementation ofa SecondThreeYearPlan (theFirstThreeYearPlan
hadbeenadoptedat theplenumoftheCentralCommittee in July, i956), to
deepenthepartylineto "builda bolshevized partyspreadthroughout the
country of a broadmass character, fullyconsolidated in the ideological,
politicalandorganizational field."48
ThoughthedetailsofthisSecondThree
YearPlan havenotas yetbeenrevealed in partypublications,someindica-
tionof future partypolicyhas recently beengivenin variousstatements by
Aiditandin party editorials.
In thefirst placethePKI intendsto continue to depictitselfas a genu-
inelyIndonesian movement, witha program notrigidly boundto Marxist-
Leninistideology butaddressed to therealitiesof theIndonesian situation.
When he returned fromthe SovietUnion,in April i95,9, afterhaving
attended the2ist party congressoftheSovietUnionas a "fraternal delegate",
Aiditstressed theindependence of theIndonesian Communists fromMos-
cow.As a partyperiodical reported hisremarks at thetime:
The imperialistsare trying to spreadtheslanderthattheSovietUnionleadsall other
Communist parties.This is absolutely
untrue,Aiditdeclared.But apartfromthis,there
may stillbe IndonesianCommunists who considerthatit is rightforthe SovietParty
to give leadership
to otherparties.These membersare mistakenand mustbe corrected,
he declared.IndonesianCommunists muststandon theirown two feetand on Indo-
nesiansoil as theyhave basically,alwaysdone ever since the IndonesianCommunist
Partywas firstfounded.49
Whileconceding thattheestablishmentof socalled"communes" in Red
Chinawas "mostsuitable
fortheChinesepeoplein theirtaskof . . . going
forwardto Communism," Aiditwas alsoat painsto indicate
thatIndonesia
shouldnotemulate
theCommune system:
If anyoneasksme ... whetherPeople'sCommunesareneededin Indonesia,I would
reply:WhattheIndonesianpeasantsneed todayis notPeople'sCommunesbutconfisca-
tion of the landlords'land and its distribution
among the peasantsas theirprivate
property.50

48Data and quotationsin thisparagraphfromD. N. Aidit,"KongresNasionalKe-VI PKI,"

OP.tit.,PP. 356-36o.
49 Reviewof Indonesia,
April-May1959, p. Io.
50 Ibid., pp. I0- I.

245
 PacificAffairs
More than a yearlaterAidit was stillreiterating the independentpolicy
of thePKI. At a reception, commemorating the4othanniversary of theparty
on May 23, i960, he declaredthatthe partywas stilltryinghard to "adapt
Marxism-Leninism to thespecificconditionsin Indonesia,to findIndonesian
ways to practiceMarxism-Leninism." In this processof adaptation,he said,
the partywas fullybehindPresidentSukarno,pointingout thatSukarno's
antecedents in thelowerJavanesearistocracy, did notpreventthepartyfrom
acceptinghis leadership:"A personwho plays a leading role in a socialist
society,"Aidit stated,"may originatefroma non-proletarian class but who
has acceptedthe proletarianideologyand consistently recognizesthe leader-
shipof theproletarian class."',
But while Sukarno'soft-repeated programof "socialisma la Indonesia"
may be gristto the PKI's mill,Aidit has also oftenacknowledgedthe "van-
guard" role of the "Soviet Communists"in bringingdown the "fortress of
capitalism,"and the secondcharacteristic of the PKI's policyat presentis its
distinctlyLeninist approachto the Indonesiansocio-economy of today.It
may be recalledthat prior to I905 Lenin advocated what he called the
"bourgeois"revolutionin Russia stressingsecretelections,civil libertiesand
social legislationand warned againstemphasizingthe long range Socialist
objectivesof his movement.52 There is a remarkablecorollaryin Aidit's
policyat present,withinthecontextof the theoryof the "two stage"revolu-
tion. In an addressbeforethe fellow-traveling i9t45 GenerationGroup (in
March i960) Aidit flatlydeclaredthata personcould not possiblytalk seri-
ously now about "building a socialistsocietyin Indonesia" because the
countrywas stillin the firststage (the "nationaldemocraticstage") of the
revolutiondirectedagainstimperialismand feudalism.While the second,or
socialist,stageof therevolutionnaturallyflowsfromthe first, it is necessary,
he argued,to distinguish carefully betweenthetwo. Each stage"has itsown
task,"and in this firststage Aidit was carefulto emphasizethe important
role of the bourgeoisie:"Thus at the firststageor the nationaldemocratic
stageof the revolutionwe mustnot only not be hostiletowardsthe private
businessmenbut the governmentshould in fact withinlimitshelp them.
They mustbe called upon to play an activepartin the economiclifeof our
country."Carefulsupervision overthe nationaldemocratic phaseof the revo-
lutionand a strengthening of the statesectorof the economywould prevent
capitalismfromgettingout of hand; thatis whyit is also essentialto "guar-
antee" democraticrights. . . forthe democraticpartiesand organizations
and thereshould be a People's LegislativeBody (parliament) electedby
democraticmeans."53

55AntaraDaily News Bulletin,JuneI, i960, p. 5.

52See AlfredG. Meyer,Leninism(Cambridge,Mass.,1957), p. 117.
53Harian Rakjat,March i8, i960.

246
 IndonesianCommunistPolicyand theSixthPartyCongress
The policyhereadvocated byAidithad foundevenmorecogentexpres-
in thepartynewspaper
siona littleearlierin an editorial HarianRakjat,in
whichtheviewofmanygroupsin Indonesiatodaythatsocialism shouldbe
establishednowin Indonesiawas excoriated. Evenrightwinggroups, it de-
clared,areadvocating socialismwhileat thesametimeurgingfurther influx
ofprivate foreigncapital,so that"thequestionarises, aretheynotsupporting
'Socialismwithimperialist capital'?."The PKI, according to theeditorial,
doesnotholdthatsocialism is possiblenow,butnon-Communists "fordema-
gogicreasons"do. The Communists are"beingrealistic andrejectdemagog-
uery,and are in factdefending capitalism, not capitalism in general,but
onlynationalcapitalism." Communists havepointedout,that"thesolution
at the presenttimeis not socialism, but a system referredto as People's
Democracy, a system in which national capitalism is protectedand favored in
the interests of overall national economic development" against foreign
(especiallyDutch)capitalinterests in thecountry.54
SkillfullythePKI seeksitsjustification forthe"twostage"doctrine not
in Leninbut in Sukarno,especially in Sukarno's"Political Manifesto." In
thisdocument Sukarnohadmentioned twotypesofobjectives forhisnation
-short-term aimswhichconsist ofmeeting thebasicneedsofthepeoplein
foodand security butalsoofcontinuing the"struggle againstimperialism,"
and long-term aimswhichincludea justand prosperous society,peaceand
"the elimination of imperialism everywhere." The latterpresumably also
includestheestablishment of"socialism a la Indonesia" inthecountry. In his
address
earlier totheI945 Generation GroupAiditspecifically andrepeatedly
referredtothe"Political Manifesto" as substantiating the"twostage"revolu-
tion,thusin effectinterpreting Sukarnoin Leninist terms:55
The PoliticalManifestoclearlystatesthatthe characterof our revolutionnow is
nationaland democratic. It is nationalin characterbecauseit is aimed at liquidating
imperialism, in character
and in all fields,and it is democratic becauseit is aimed at
liquidatingthe vestigesof feudalismbecause it is againstmilitarydictatorship and
dictatorship.
personal
thefuture
Concerning or theperspectives Manifesto
thePolitical
ofourrevolution
statesthatit is "socialisma la Indonesia"or an Indonesiansocialistsociety.
In brief,our revolution has two stages.The firststageor theshorttermstruggleis:
to completein its entirety the AugustRevolution[i.e. the revolutionof I945 against
the Dutch] which is nationaland democraticin character, whichmeans completely
liquidatingimperialism and feudalismin our country. As regardsthe latter,thatis the
liquidationof feudalism, carryout landreform.
thisis onlypossibleifwe seriously
The secondstageof our long termstruggleis: to build a socialistsocietyon Indo-
nesiansoil. A socialistsociety,and I thinkit is truetoo of a "socialista la Indonesia
society"is a societywithoutthe exploitation of man by man, a just society,and one
which,as successesare achievedin the buildingof a Socialistsociety,will gradually
becomea prosperous society.

54Ibid., Januaryi2, i960.

55Ibid., Marchi 8, i960.

247
 PacificAffairs
But Aidit's adoptionof a Leninist"two stage" tacticat presentand his
findingsupportforit in Sukarnoalso createsdifficulties. In urgingsupport
forhis "bourgeois" revolutionary stageLenin had stressed the importanceof
politicallibertyand parliamentary government. Aidit has done likewisebut
therebyhas brought his party into repeated conflictwith the presentscheme
of "guided democracy"with its abridgement of parliamentary power,vastly
increasedexecutiveauthority, martial law controls over all public life,and
thusin effect broughtthepartyintoconflict withPresidentSukarnohimself.
Thus, on March 7, i960, two days afterSukarnohad suspendedparliament
becauseof itsresistance to thegovernment's budget,Aidit senta telegramto
Sukarno,in whichhe declaredthat"everypatriotwho upholdsbasic demo-
craticprinciplesveryseriouslyregretsthe actionstaken"to suspendparlia-
ment,and thatCommunistsregardedthisas an "event. . . whichseriously
endangersdemocraticlife in our country."56 Aidit has announcedsupport
forthe new gotongroyong(mutual aid) parliamentformedby Sukarnoon
March 29, i96o, but has stressedthat he would preferan elected,rather
than a Sukarnoappointedparliament, not least becausehe is confident that
in an electionthe PKI would get more members.57 The party,throughits
daily,has opposedthe presentstateof martiallaw as inimicalto "the build-
ing of nationalforces"(as a resultof martiallaw Harian Rakiat was sus-
pended) and it has criticizedtheextensivecensorshippowersof themilitary.
On July8 thePKI issuedperhapsitssharpestcriticism of theGovernment to
date,declaringthatthe cabinethad failedto carryout its programof pro-
viding the people with basic necessities, to establishsecurityand to regain
West New Guinea. By thismovethe Partyapparently hopedto bringabout
a cabinetshake-up,includingthe incorporation of Communistsin the Gov-
ernment.Government spokesmen, includingForeignMinisterSubandrioand
Defence MinisterNasution, struckback: Harian Rakiat and the fellow-
travellingpaper Bintang Timur were again suspended,pamphletscontain-
ing the Party'scriticism of the Government were declaredillegaland confis-
cated, and PKI economic expert and Politburo memberSakirman was
arrestedbriefly. As usual, Sukarnocame to the Party'said, when in an ad-
dresson July25, i96o he declaredthattheIndonesianpeoplehad no cause to
fearthe PKI and thatsome of its views were sharedby him. Though it is
clear that in its July8 statementthe Party overplayedits hand (similar
criticism of the Djuanda regimehas,however,been voicedrepeatedlyin the

56ReviewofIndonesia,April,i960, p. 9.
57 AntaraDaily News Bulletin,April5, i960, p. 2. On March29, i960, Sukarnoannounced
a listof 26i membersof the new parliament, to which (on JuneI7, I960) he added 22 more,
in deferenceto anti-Communist demandsthatthe PKI was too powerful.Of the presenttotal
of 283 members130 belong to parties,the remainderto socalled functionalgroups (armed
women,youth,clerics,etc.) The PKI has 30 regularpartymembersin the
forces,intelligentsia,
new parliament, and sym-
but it can counton the supportof at least25 to 30 fellowtravellers
pathizersamongthe functional grouprepresentatives.

248
 IndonesianCommunistPolicyand theSixthPartyCongress
pastfewmonths in thenon-communist press),theincidentshouldnothave
beentakenas a portentofa riftwithSukarno,orevenas a signthatthePKI
willbecomean avowedopposition group.On thecontrary, "guideddemoc-
racy"withthecontinuing stagnationof theIndonesian economy68 affords
thePartyfurtheropportunityforgrowth.
University
ofBridgeport,
June1960

58 Cf. J. M. van der Kroef,"Indonesia'sEconomicDilemma," Far EasternSurvey,vol. 29

(April I960), pp. 49-63.

249