US VS BARRIAS

FACTS: In 1904, Congress, through a law (Act No. 1136), authorized the Collector
of Customs to regulate the business of lighterage. Lighterage is a business
involving the shipping of goods by use of lighters or cascos (small ships/boats).
The said law also provides that the Collector may promulgate such rules to
implement Act No. 1136. Further, Act No. 1136 provides that in case a fine is to
be imposed, it should not exceed one hundred dollars. Pursuant to this, the
Collector promulgated Circular No. 397. Meanwhile, Aniceto Barrias was caught
navigating the Pasig River using a lighter which is manually powered by
bamboo poles (sagwan). Such is a violation of Circular No. 397 because under
said Circular, only steam powered ships should be allowed to navigate the Pasig
River. However, in the information against Barrias, it was alleged that the
imposable penalty against him should be a fine not exceeding P500.00 at the
discretion of the court – this was pursuant to Circular No. 397 which provides: For
the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall
be liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of
the court. Barrias now challenged the validity of such provision of the Circular as
it is entirely different from the penal provision of Act. No. 1136 which only
provided a penalty of not exceeding $100.00 (Note at that time the peso-dollar
exchange was more or less equal).

ISSUE: Whether or not the collector of customs is allowed to fix the penalty of law

HELD: No. The Commissioner cannot impose a different range of penalty

different from that specified by Congress. If the Collector is allowed to do so,
then in effect, it is as if he is being delegated the power to legislate penalties. It
would constitute an illegal delegation of legislative power. One of the settled
maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to
make laws cannot be delegated by that department to anybody or authority.
Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must
remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the
constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and
patriotism this high prerogative has been entrusted can not relieve itself of the
responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be
developed, nor can its substitutes the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism and of
any other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this
sovereign trust. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon
the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. The
Collector cannot exercise a power exclusively lodged in Congress. Hence,
Barrias should be penalized in accordance to the penalty being imposed by Act
No. 1136. In this case, the Supreme Court determined that the proper fine is
$25.00.

OPOSA VS FACTORAN

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al.,
representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by
their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr. who was being substituted by
Alcala, Secretary of DENR, to cancel existing timber license agreements in the
country and to stop issuance of new ones. It was claimed that the resultant
deforestation and damage to the environment violated their constitutional
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health (Sections 16 and 15,
Article II of the Constitution).

They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing,
or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in
its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources
property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the
relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited
by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and
asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that
the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of
contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a

specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is
provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on
one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right
carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies,
among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the
primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the
exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural
resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title
XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative
Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy
formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right
of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was
done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and
healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs
should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be

adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the
expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule
upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and
to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the
state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be
validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of

contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest
of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment
clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC
decision is SET ASIDE.

ABUEVA VS WOOD

FACTS:
The petitioners are member of the Independence Commission for more than six
months. They are actually a member of the Philippine Legislature. The petitioners
being a citizens and taxpayers are persons interested in knowing how the public
funds are expended. They alleged that as members of the Legislature they are
entrusted with the honest investment, disposition, and administration of the
public funds of the Government; that as members of the Independence
Commission they are legally obliged to prevent the funds of said Commission
from being squandered, and to prevent any investments and illicit expenses in
open contravention of the purposes of the law; that the petitioners have
verbally and by writing requested the respondents many times to exhibit to them
and to permit them to see and examine the vouchers and other documentary
proofs relating to the expenditures and payments made out of the funds
appropriated for the use of the Independence Commission. However,
respondent Paciano Dizon, as Acting Insular Auditor, under the control and
authority of the respondent Leonard Wood as Governor-General have denied
to permit the petitioners from examining said vouchers and documentary proofs
of the expenditures of the funds of said Independence Commission. The
Supreme Court by the petitioners issued a writ of mandamus compelling the
respondents to exhibit to the petitioners and to permit them to examine all the
vouchers and other documentary proofs in their possession, showing the
disbursements and expenditures made by them out of the funds of the
Independence Commission.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the judicial department of the Government has a jurisdiction or
authority to direct either or both of the other departments of the Government to
do or to perform any duty which pertains particularly to those departments of
the Government.

HELD:
NO. The Government of the United State in the Philippine Islands is divided under
its charter or constitution (the Organic Act) into three great, separate, distinct,
and independent departments; the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.
The duties of each department are well defined and limited to certain fields of
governmental operation. The executive and legislative departments of the
government are frequently called upon to deal with what are known as political
questions, with which the judicial department of the government has no
intervention. In all such questions, in the first instance the courts have uniformally
refused to intervene for the purpose of directing or controlling the actions of the
other departments. Such questions are many times reserved to those
departments in the organic law of the state.

The legislative department, being a coordinate and independent branch of the

government, its action within its own sphere cannot be revised or controlled by
mandamus by the judicial department, without a gross usurpation of power
upon the part of the latter. When the legislative department of the government
imposes upon its officers the performance of certain duties which are not
prohibited by the organic law of the land, the performance, the non-
performance, or the manner of the performance is under the direct control of
the legislature, and such officers are not subject to the direction of the courts.

In interference by the judicial department of the government with the workings

and operations of the committee of the legislative department would be
tantamount to an interference with the workings and operations of the
legislative department itself.