DANIEL RUSSELL BROWN A Look at Archetypal Criticism MUCH OF THE piFFIcULTY with myth criticism is with myth itself, for the term is far from stable in the minds and mouths of those who use “There is no doubt that Myth is one of the most muddled and abused concepts in our critical vocabulary. Jt has been defined as a lie, a popu lar delusion, at mystical fantasy, as primitive science, as a record of historical fact, 4 symbol Of philosophical truth, a reflection ‘of uncon- scious motivations, indeed, any unconscious as- sumption? Obviously, then, since the term myth varies so greatly, the attitudes of myth critics will too. To obviate the most per- nicious ambiguities, perhaps the term archetypal criticism should be used. One avoids the confusions and likewise the bad connotations that myth and mythical have attained in some minds—that is, that these concern nonsense and untruths, If archetypal criticism is to be condemned, let it at least be for what it actually is, not for what it is not. What it is has been well stated by Walter K. Gordon: “The basic contention of archetypal criticism is that literary ex- pression is an unconscious product of the collective experience of the entire species. As such, literature is therefore integrally related with man's cultural past.” 2 Maud Bodkin, probably the most famous expo- nent of this critical approach, has relied on Jung's formulations, although not slav- ishly, about the collective unconscious in Daniex Russet. Brown teaches in the Far East Division of the University of Maryland; he has published articles on John Steinbeck, Edward Al- bee, and Sinclair Lewis, mankind in order to discuss the powerful attraction of poetry—"the images are valued because they give—even though this function remains unrecognized—ex- pression to feelings that were secking a Tanguage to relieve their inner urgency.” + C. 8. Lewis has maintained that historical diffusion of stories is more important than these inherited primordial images, but the major point would seem to be that there are some motifs in literature that satisfy readers and listeners in quite dis- similar societies, no matter what the origin of the motifs. It is the task of archetypal criticism to excavate these mental symbols, idols, and temples in literature to see if important aspects have been overlooked. The task, however, is complicated by certain real and potential shortcomings in such a critical investigation. A very serious one is the danger of reductionism, or the insistence on the archetypal analysis as the only valid interpretation. As with any dogma, this one can quickly become un- bearable, There are times when the myths in a work of art are not especially relevant; other qualities ought to be stressed, like rhetoric or intellectual argument. The critic thus should watch himself carefully so that he does not attempt to mold every- thing into a myth at the cost of gross dis- tortion. If some archetypal critics have overindulged themselves in this sort of tyranny, they are not the first critics, nor the last, to do so. Furthermore, the whole approach ought not to be dismissed be- cause some fanatics have been extreme, Those possessed by devils do not neces- sarily speak with authority—or with truth.466 To judge the whole by the lunatic fringe is quite unfai bly misteadings, distortions, and over- simplications result and they are, of course, re- grettable, but they do not constitute the really ignificant feature of myth criticism. What does is that there should be so much responsible, iMuminating, and exciting criticism in a field whose boundaries, principles, and methods are just beginning to be explored Another trouble some readers find with archetypal critics is the seeming willing- ness to change the rules of the game as the game progresses. To put it bluntly, the critics leave in what fits and leave out what does not: If Morgan le Fay, or if anything else for that mat- ter, does not fit in with the myth and the arche- type, then it is denounced as a late addition or put down as an example of the poet’s failure to understand the myth involved, and so done away with as irrelevant to the proper study of the poem. Such a procedure is not scholarly, but it is understandable, since human beings like to see patterns and orderliness—even in places where they do not reside, Other forms of criticism do the same thing, ac- tually, when they marshall “evidence” to produce a loaded argument in favor of this or that interpretation—Chaucer as allegorist, Chaucer as Protestant, and so on, As a matter of fact, the arbitrariness of the archetypal critic may not be because of intentional deceit, as it may be with some critics, but rather because of the enormous confusion which exists in the material available for study. He cannot be excused for omitting relevant parts; yet he can be sympathized with in his errors, as long as he mentions the parts that he cannot un- derstand or that work against the pattern he sees. A grave mistake comes from word- ing conclusions more firmly than the find- ings warrant. The temptation is to go from possibilities to assurances without any more proof than the critic’s audacity. One must remember that assertion does not equal demonstration. But it really is not begging the question to state that the rules of archetypes are not the same as those of the logical mind. “Myth implies a prelogi- cal mentality that is not bound by the law DANIEL RUSSELL BROWN of contradiction but operates under the Jaw of participation....”7 Hence occa- sionally one finds a character possessing qualities that do not seem to belong to- gether, attitudes conflicting with each other, as in dreams. But the primary blame, frequently, should be placed on the material, not on the critical approach, the “intellectual disorder” of Jungian no- tions as Norman O. Brown calls it “You archetypal people are so vague! You don’t have any proof, real, scientific proof, of your contentions.” One's first Teaction is to agree completely with this attack. But when one begins to think of the empirical bias underlying the reprimand, one becomes less acquiescent. “So what?” might be a more appropriate response. Despite Fechner, Helmholtz, and Wundt, and the army of experimentalists since them, not every reality can always be recorded on a machine. That does not mean that collective images do not exist. In fact, Clyde Kluckhohn, the an- thropologist, says they exist crosscultur- ally, if in an unclear manner? No one wants to return to the days of believing in witches and goblins (we know they are there even though we can’t see them!). But perhaps Joseph Campbell is right in taking the offensive: “To criticize the method as unscientific is ridiculous, since objective scholarship, in this particular field, has shown itself helpless—and ab- solutely so; helpless by definition; for the materials are not optically measurable, but must, on the contrary, be experienced. 19 So, then, perhaps the fault is not in our starry notions, but in our science that it is an underling. However, maybe in the future the two fields will be able to work together to help illuminate each other. It is not necessary to carry the above argument too far. Although for some minds the irrational and the cloudy are preferable to reason, as a critical ap- proach, impressionism and woolliness are not very helpful. What is required is an acknowledgment of “a flowing-into-one- another and disappearing-into-one-another of distinctions” *™ without believing that non-logic is automatically superior toA Look at Archetypal Criticism logic. Nor is literature itself more expres- sive merely because it is confusing. What often remains unsaid in criti ing the archetypal critics (though it is hard to believe any criticism has been left un- said) is that, in addition to being vague, they are mystical. To Western brains, this immediately makes them suspect. A long period of conditioning has made us wary of anything that smacks of the mysterious or the occult, We have too many stereo- typed notions of Indian fakirs (read fakers) and snakes in baskets, too many images of nightclub mind readers to make us very susceptible to oriental modes of knowing. Thus when a critic begins dis- cussing the Nourishing Earth Mother, the Androgynous Godhead, or the Divine Cow, he instantaneously alienates most Westerners, even educated ones. They would prefer what they call straightfor- ward words, not all those “poetical” terms. It seems to them unmanly somehow for somebody to take seriously such un- familiar, fuzzy concepts. This attitude may indeed be changing at present, but today one can be certain of more snickers than acceptance. At times it prob- ably is best for archetypal critics to avoid such expressions if they truly want to in converts; a good critic must work within the prejudices of his readers, at least at the beginning. Once convinced, the readers will begin to see the justifica- tion for the terms and for the mystical thinking; they will realize the psychologi- cal reality of the human mind which is symbolized through them. Myths do possess truth and are not just funny de- scriptions of things. As David Bidney has remarked, “In this sense myth is real, just as every psychological experience is real to the subject.” 2 Of course it is accurate to maintain that tossing about unidentified expressions does little to clarify the meanings for the un- initiated, maybe even for the initiated; these expressions might even cover up an unwillingness to think through the con- cepts to see if they add up to more than mere self-indulgence in abstract and blub- bery notions. Philip Rahv has touched upon a point 467 that may have much validity. He sees modern ideas about myths as a kind of pseudoreligion: myths have “all sorts of intriguing suggestions of holiness and sacramental significance” while “circum- venting the all-too-definite and perhaps embarrassing demands of orthodoxy even while enjoying an emotional rapport with it.” In this way, the investigators of myths can have their cake and eat it too— a kind of vicarious participation in a reli gious life while watching themselves par- ticipate with the more “rational” part of the mind. While Rahy makes such crit- icism sound like a thing to be ridiculed, from another perspective it might be the best answer to the fact that most people are unable to live a life of pure reason, that is, providing they have reason to be- gin with. Freud wanted to put ego where id is, but Jung is probably more knowl edgeable about mankind's need to experi- ence the non-rational. Most men want to believe in something greater than them- selves, even if it is only a collective uncon- scious, a unity with other minds, If they discover the “rational” meaning of one myth, they will create new forms for it. Probably the approach of the archetypal critics is one of the best solutions for com- bining the various demands of human thinking—the analytical and the spiritual. ‘That -men nowadays are different from men of former ages should certainly not be the commonplace that it is. We have not passed beyond the myth-making pe- riod. The real and only difference is that today’s myths have newly named charac- ters and details. We simply do not recog- nize them as myths because we are living them. The psychological impulses inherent in husband-wife, child-parent_relation- ships, in sun, moon, and seasonal changes, in birth, growth, and death, and hopes for an afterlife are as much alive at present as they ever were. Moreover, each culture fashions minor myths to help the society cohere to achieve its goals. Ours is no dii- ferent. Many well-informed persons hate to think that they share any qualities with so-called primitive, or even illiterate, peo- ples; they like the illusion that their minds are quite differently constructed, that they