Cases 1-5: QATAR vs BAHRAIN, NORWAY vs DENMARK, AIR FRANCE vs SAKS, FISHERIES

JURISDICTION CASE (UK vs ICELAND), NAMIBIA CASE,

Cases 6-9: DANUBE DAM CASE (HUNGARY VS SLOVAKIA); BARCELONA

TRACTION, LIGHT ANDPOWER COMPANY, LIMITED CASE; REPARATION FOR
INJURIES SUFFERED IN THE SERVICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS; THE TINOCO
ARBITRATION;

Cases 10-11: MIGHELL vs SULTAN OF JOHORE; THE PINOCHET CASE; THE SCHOONER EXCHANGE vs
MACFADDON; DRALLE vs REPUBLIC OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA; US vs RUIZ; US vs REYES; Holy See vs Rosario
Jr; Indonesia vs Vinzon; US Diplomatic Consular Staff in Iran; Underhill vs Hernandez; Banco Nacional de
Cuba vs Sabbatino; Alfred Dunhill of London Inc vs Cuba; Kirkpatrick Co. v Environmental Tectonics
Corp.; Caire Claim (France v. Mexico); Home Missionary Society Claim (US v. Great Britain); Short v. Iran
(US v. Iran); Chorzow Factory Case (Germany v. Poland);

Cases 12-14: AMBROSINI, ET AL V URUGUAY; MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS; INTERHANDEL (SWITZERLAND V UNITED

STATES); SUMMARY OF RELEVANT ASPECTS OF CORFU CHANNEL CASE (MERITS); NICARAGUA VS UNITED STATES;

PIL Cases 10-14: UPRIGHT v. MERCURY; ISLAND OF LAS PALMAS ARBITRATION; ICMC v. CALLEJA; DFA
v. NLRC; JEFFREY LIANG (HUE FENG) v. PEOPLE;

Cases 15-17: PRIZE CASE; OPOSA VS. FACTORAN CASE DIGEST (G.R. NO. 101083, JULY 30, 1993); LAGUNA LAKE
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs COURT OF APPEALS; MMDA, et al. vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay; SOCIAL JUSTICE
SOCIETY VS. HON. LITO ATIENZA, JR. MAYOR OF MANILA G.R. NO. 156052 DIGEST; Sierra Club v. Morton; TANADA V.
ANGARA;
1 Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS [267 SCRA 408; G.R. No. 122156; 3 Feb 1997]
Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service InsuranceSystem (GSIS),
pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated
8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding
shares of respondent Manila HotelCorporation. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution
of the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitutionand submits
that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a
historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud
legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all
intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that
since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which
is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel
business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of
the national economy.

Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional
provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void.

Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to
the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to
play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture.
This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine
Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of
being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the
Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE
HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts
and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.

The Supreme Court directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the
51% shares of the MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching
bid of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.

According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11
of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive command which is complete in itself
and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized
that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in question.

The Manila Hotel had long been a landmark, therefore, making the 51% of the equity of said hotel to
fall within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it emprises the majority and controlling stock.
The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s cultural heritage will
fall on the hands of foreigners.

In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in question should be interpreted as
pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from
granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos. He also
argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad because the
former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS

G.R. NO. 122156. February 3, 1997
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE
ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

Facts:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the
eventual “strategic partner,” will provide management expertise or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per
share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to the declaration of
Renong Berhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price and sent a
manager’s check as bid security, which GSIS refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale may be consummated
with Renong Berhad, petitioner filed a petition before the Court.
Issues:

1. Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
2. Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
3. Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
4. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents in refusing the matching
bid of the petitioner.

Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

1. It is a self-executing provision.
1. Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed
written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those
found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected,
is self-executing.
2. A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination
and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a
constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing,
the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental
law.
3. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
It is per se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference
to qualified Filipinos, it means just that – qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our
Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right
enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take
their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. The Court agree.
1. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the
Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of
the Filipinos.
2. It also refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel
has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an
American hotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the
venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.
3. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the
equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority
and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel
and the land on which the hotel edifice stands.
3. It is not premature.
1. In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the
grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby
exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match
the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go
to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy
provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated
in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would
be to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
2. The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But
the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny.
These are given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign
jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies
or instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the
laws of the forum.
4. There was grave abuse of discretion.
1. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the
bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player,
and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences to the Filipino
people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather
remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the
habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
2. Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of
MHC and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not
 only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding
rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.

Hence, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL

CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE
HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to
issue the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

Philip Morris Inc v. CA

Facts:

Petitioners are foreign corporations organized under US laws not doing business
in the Philippines and registered owners of symbols ‘MARK VII,’ ‘MARK TEN,’
and ‘LARK’ used in their cigarette products. Petitioners moved to enjoin
respondent Fortune Tobacco from manufacturing and selling cigarettes bearing
the symbol ‘MARK’ asserting that it is identical or confusingly similar with their
trademarks. Petitioners relied on Section 21-A of the Trademark Law to bring
their suit and the Paris Convention to protect their trademarks. The court denied
the prayer for injunction stating that since petitioners are not doing business in
the Philippines, respondent’s cigarettes would not cause irreparable damage to
petitioner. CA granted the injunction but on a subsequent motion, dissolved the
writ.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioner’s mark may be afforded protection under said laws;
(2) Whether or not petitioner may be granted injunctive relief.

Ruling:

(1) NO. Yet, insofar as this discourse is concerned, there is no necessity to treat
the matter with an extensive response because adherence of the Philippines to
the 1965 international covenant due to pact sunt servanda had been acknowledged
in La Chemise. Given these confluence of existing laws amidst the cases involving
trademarks, there can be no disagreement to the guiding principle in commercial
law that foreign corporations not engaged in business in the Philippines may
maintain a cause of action for infringement primarily because of Section 21-A of
the Trademark Law when the legal standing to sue is alleged, which petitioners
have done in the case at hand.
Petitioners may have the capacity to sue for infringement irrespective of lack of
business activity in the Philippines on account of Section 21-A of the Trademark
Law but the question whether they have an exclusive right over their symbol as
to justify issuance of the controversial writ will depend on actual use of their
trademarks in the Philippines in line with Sections 2 and 2-A of the same law. It is
thus incongruous for petitioners to claim that when a foreign corporation not
licensed to do business in Philippines files a complaint for infringement, the entity
need not be actually using its trademark in commerce in the Philippines. Such a
foreign corporation may have the personality to file a suit for infringement but it
may not necessarily be entitled to protection due to absence of actual use of the
emblem in the local market.

(2) NO. More telling are the allegations of petitioners in their complaint as well as
in the very petition filed with this Court indicating that they are not doing business
in the Philippines, for these frank representations are inconsistent and
incongruent with any pretense of a right which can breached. Indeed, to be
entitled to an injunctive writ, petitioner must show that there exists a right to be
protected and that the facts against which injunction is directed are violative of
said right. On the economic repercussion of this case, we are extremely bothered
by the thought of having to participate in throwing into the streets Filipino workers
engaged in the manufacture and sale of private respondent’s “MARK” cigarettes
who might be retrenched and forced to join the ranks of the many unemployed
and unproductive as a result of the issuance of a simple writ of preliminary
injunction and this, during the pendency of the case before the trial court, not to
mention the diminution of tax revenues represented to be close to a quarter
million pesos annually. On the other hand, if the status quo is maintained, there
will be no damage that would be suffered by petitioners inasmuch as they are not
doing business in the Philippines. In view of the explicit representation of
petitioners in the complaint that they are not engaged in business in the
Philippines, it inevitably follows that no conceivable damage can be suffered by
them not to mention the foremost consideration heretofore discussed on the
absence of their “right” to be protected.

Gonzales vs Hechanova 9 SCRA 230

GONZALES v. HECHANOVA
October 26, 2012 § Leave a comment

Then President Diosdado Macapagal entered into two executive agreements with

Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice without complying with the requisite of

securing a certification from the Nat’l Economic Council showing that there is a

shortage in cereals. Hence, Hechanova authorized the importation of 67000 tons of

rice from abroad to the detriment of our local planters. Gonzales, then president of the

Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales
averred that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”, because RA

3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration

or any other government agency.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements entered into

by Macapagal.

HELD: Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws

enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the

legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not

defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of laws, by indirectly

repealing the same through an executive agreement providing for the performance of

the very act prohibited by said laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a

statute, the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the

case at bar, Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to

are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements

not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of

separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in

our constitutional set up.

As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement may be

invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has

clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC may not be deprived “of its

jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of

error, as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of

inferior courts in “All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,

ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question”. In other words, our

Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the

fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

Itching vs Hernandez GR No. L-7995, May 31, 1957
G.R. No. L-7995 – 101 Phil. 1155 – Political Law – Constitutional
Law – Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the
Exercise of Police Power

Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to

take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) –
particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow
Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in
Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the
Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve
to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then
petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it
contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according
to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda).
He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here
in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he
should be given equal opportunity.

ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties

or generally accepted principles.

HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted

principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised
generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal
protection of the law clause “”does not demand absolute equality
amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced””; and, that the equal protection
clause “”is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all
persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making
a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who
do not.””

For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty

would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld
because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being
inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the
medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to
operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

Head Money Cases, Edye vs Robertson 112 US 580

Facts:

In 1882 the Congress passed an act providing that a duty of fifty cents should
be collected for each and every passenger who was not a citizen of the
United States, coming from a foreign port to any port within the United
States. Individuals and steamship companies brought suit against the
collector of customs at New York, Mr. WH Robertson, for the recovery of the
sums of money collected. The act was challenge on the grounds that it
violated numerous treaties of the US government with friendly nations.

Issue:

WON the act is void because of the conflict with the treaty.
Ruling:

A treaty is a compact between independent nations, which depends for its

enforcement upon the interest and honor of the governments that are
parties to a treaty. Treaties that regulate the mutual rights of citizens and
subjects of the contracting nations are in the same category as acts of
Congress. When these rights are of such a nature as to be enforced by a
court of justice, the court resorts to the treaty as it would to a statute.
However, a constitution gives a treaty no superiority over an act on
congress. In short, so far as a treaty made by the United States with any
foreign nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts
of this country, it is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its
enforcement, modification, or repeal.

Whitney vs Robertson 124 US 190

Brief Fact Summary. The claim which Whitney (P) brought before the
court was that a treaty between the U.S and the Dominican Republic
guaranteed that no higher duty would be assessed on goods from the
Dominican Republic than was assessed on goods from any other
country and that duties had been wrongfully assessed on his sugar
imports.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Where a treaty and an act of legislation

conflict, the one last in date will control.

Facts. The claim which Whitney (P) brought before the court was that
a treaty between the U.S and the Dominican Republic guaranteed that
no higher duty would be assessed on goods from the Dominican
Republic than was assessed on goods from any other country and
that duties had been wrongfully assessed on his sugar imports.

Issue. Where a treaty and an act of legislation conflict, will the one
last in date control?
Held. (Field, J.). Yes. The one with a later date will control where a treaty and an act of
legislation conflict. The act of congress under which the duties were collected was passed after
the treaty and therefore is controlling. Affirmed.

Discussion. A later inconsistent statute does not abrogate or repeal a

treaty. The treaty still exists as an international obligation although the
terms of the treaty may not be enforceable.
Black Letter Law: to view the black letter law, scroll down to
the LexisNexis Headnotes of this case.

Whitney v. Robertson
124 U.S. 190, 8 S. Ct. 456 (1888)

RULE:

If there is conflict between the stipulations of a treaty and the requirements of a law, the latter must
control. A treaty is primarily a contract between two or more independent nations, and is so
regarded by writers on public law. For the infraction of its provisions a remedy must be sought by the
injured party through reclamations upon the other. When the stipulations are not self-executing they
can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them into effect, and such legislation is as much
subject to modification and repeal by Congress as legislation upon any other subject. If the treaty
contains stipulations which are self-executing, that is, require no legislation to make them operative,
to that extent they have the force and effect of a legislative enactment. Congress may modify such
provisions, so far as they bind the United States, or supersede them altogether. By the Constitution
a treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an act of legislation. Both
are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given
to either over the other.

FACTS:

Merchants, who imported sugars from San Domingo into the United States, alleged that they should
not have had to pay duties on their imported products because the sugars were similar to goods
imported from the Hawaiian Islands, which were exempt from duties.

ISSUE:

Did the treaty with the Dominican Republic preclude defendant from exacting collections?

ANSWER:

No.

CONCLUSION:
The court held that the treaty between the United States and the Dominican Republic did not provide
for any concessions of special privileges, which exempted the imported sugar from duties, and the
Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment in favor of the collector of the port. The court held that the
treaty did not cover concessions like those made to the Hawaiian Islands for a valuable
consideration. The treaty imposed an obligation upon both countries to avoid hostile legislation that
would discriminate against one country's goods in favor of goods of like character imported from any
other country. However, the treaties were not intended to interfere with special arrangements with
other countries founded upon a concession of special privileges.

Qatar vs Bahrain, 1994 ICJ Report

1. Qatar and Bahrain have been seeking out measures to settle their dispute (relating to
sovereignty over the Hawar islands, sovereign rights over the shoals of Dibal and
Qit'atJaradah, and the delimitation of the maritime areas of the two States)
2. In January 1987, Bahrain and Qatar adopted the Saudi proposals (letters sent to the Amirs of
Bahrain and Qatar by the King of Saudi, Saudi Arabia being the mediator of the dispute)
3. Included in the Saudi proposals was that the disputed matters shall be referred to the ICJ for
a final and binding decision
4. In 1988, Bahrain transmitted to Qatar a text, called the Bahrain formula, which provides
that the parties request the ICJ to decide their dispute
5. In 1990, during the annual meeting of the Co-operation Council of Arab States of the Gulf,
Qatar made it known that it accepted the Bahrain formula.
6. Qatar’s acceptance was recorded in the Minutes of the meeting. Included in the minutes is
the agreement that Qatar and Bahrain shall continue the mediation with the help of Saudi
7. The mediation did not yield any results; hence, on July 8, 1991, Qatar instituted proceedings
before the ICJ against Bahrain.
8. Qatar’s basis for ICJ’s jurisdiction was the agreements made in 1987 and 1990.
9. Bahrain contends that the ICJ does not have jurisdiction because the exchange of letters in
1987 and the minutes of the meeting in 1990 are not legally binding instruments.
10. Furthermore, Bahrain says that it never intended to conclude in an agreement in signing the
Minutes.
11. Issue: WON the ICJ has jurisdiction over the dispute
12. Yes. The ICJ has acquired jurisdiction.
13. That the parties have agreed that the exchanges of letters of December 1987 constitute an
international agreement with binding force in their mutual relations.
14. That the 1990 Minutes are not a simple record of a meeting; they enumerate the
commitments to which the Parties have consented. They thus create rights and obligations
in international law for the Parties. They constitute an international agreement.
15. The ICJ then said that it does not find it necessary to consider the intentions of the parties in
signing the 1990 Minutes.
16. Therefore, the exchanges of letters in 1987, and the document headed "Minutes" are
international agreements creating rights and obligations for the Parties; that by the terms of
those agreements the Parties have undertaken to submit to the Court the whole of the
dispute between them.

Norway vs Denmark 1933 PCIJ

On international agreements

1. There is a dispute between Denmark and Norway on sovereignty over Eastern Greenland.
2. During negotiations, Denmark wanted to obtain Norway’s agreement to do nothing to
obstruct the Danish plans with Greenland.
3. On July 22, 1919, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway replied: “I told the Danish
Minister today that the Norwegian Government would not make any difficulty in the
settlement of this question.” (called the Ihlen Declaration; Foreign Minister Nils Claus Ihlen)
4. Issue: WON this statement constitutes an international agreement
5. Yes. The Court considers it beyond all dispute that a reply of thisnature given by theMinister
for Foreign Affairs on behalf of hisGovernment in response to a request by thediplomatic
representative of a foreign power, in regard to a question falling within hisprovince, is
binding upon the countryto which the Minister belongs.

On the legal status of Eastern Greenland

1. On July 10th, 1931, the Norwegian Government published a proclamation declaring its
occupation in certain territories in Eastern Greenland, that it is terra nullius
2. Denmark argued that the Norwegian occupation of part of the East coast of Greenland is
invalid because it has already claimed and exercised sovereign rights over Greenland as a
whole for a long time and has obtained thereby a valid title to sovereignty.
3. Denmark’s argument is based on the Palmas Island decision of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration that there is a title "founded on the peaceful and continuous display of State
authority over the island".
4. In order to render the Norwegian occupation invalid, Denmark must have exercised
sovereignty over the territory on July I0th, 1931.
5. Issue: To which territory does Greenland belong?
6. Denmark. It has succeeded in establishing her contention that at the critical date, on July
10th, 1931, she possessed a valid title to the sovereignty over all Greenland.
7. A claim to sovereignty based not upon some particular act or title but merely upon
continued display of authority, involves two elements: the intention and will to act as
sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of such authority.
8. The extent to which the sovereignty is also claimed by some other Power must also be taken
into account. The tribunal has had to decide which of the two is the stronger.
9. The Court holds that, as a result of the separation of Norway and Denmark and culminating
in Article 9 of the Convention of September 1st, 1819, Norway has recognized Danish
sovereignty over the whole of Greenland and consequently cannot proceed to the
occupation of any part thereof.
10. The Ihlen Declaration was used by Denmark as a ground that Norway has recognized
Danish title over the territory. The court rejected this ground.
11. However the court concluded that Norway’s attitude in making the declaration had the
ability of making a bilateral agreement.
12. In accepting these bilateral and multilateral agreements as binding, Norway reaffirmed that
it recognizes Danish sovereignty; thereby debarring herself from contesting such, and, in
consequence, from proceeding to occupy any part of Greenland.
13. Furthermore, the Court has regarded that Denmark displayed authority over the territory
even before July 10, 1931 sufficient to confer valid title to sovereignty.
Nuclear Test Cases: Autralia vs France, New Zealand
vs France, 1974 ICJ Rep
Brief Fact Summary. Australia and New Zealand (P) requested France (D) to put an
halt to atmospheric nuclear test in the South Pacific.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Declaration made through unilateral acts may have the
effect of creating legal obligations.

Facts. A series of nuclear tests was completed by France (D) in the

South Pacific. This action made Australia and New Zealand (P) to
apply to the I.C.J. demanding that France (D) cease testing
immediately. Before the case could be completed, France (D)
announced it had completed the test and did not plan any further test.
So France (D) moved for the dismissal of the application.

Issue. May declaration made through unilateral act

Held. Yes. Declaration made through unilateral acts may have the
effect of creating legal obligations. In this case, the statement made by
the President of France must be held to constitute an engagement of
the State in regard to the circumstances and intention with which they
were made. Therefore, these statement made by the France (D) are
relevant and legally binding. Application was dismissed.
Discussion. The unilateral statements made by French authorities
were first relayed to the government of Australia. There was no need
for the statements to be directed to any particular state for it to have
legal effect. The general nature and characteristics of the statements
alone were relevant for evaluation of their legal implications.

Case Concerning Section 301-310 of the Trade Act

of 1974 (EU vs USA 1999)