Introduction
The large number of suicides by farmers in various parts of the country is perhaps the most
distressing phenomenon observed in India over the last decade. These suicides, which reached
almost epidemic proportions in certain pockets of the country, were first picked up and reported
by an alert press around the late 1990s. India is an agrarian country with around 60% of its
people depending directly or indirectly upon agriculture. Farmer suicides account for 11.2% of
all suicides in India. Since 1995, more than 253,000 farmers have been reported to have
committed suicides in India, making this the largest wave of suicides in the world. In 2014, the
National Crime Records Bureau of India reported 5,650 farmer suicides. 1 The highest number of
farmer suicides were recorded in 2004 when 18,241 farmers committed suicide. The farmers
suicide rate in India has ranged between 1.4 to 1.8 per 100,000 total population, over a 10-year
period through 2005.2
Activists and scholars have offered a number of conflicting reasons for farmer suicides, such as
monsoon failure, high debt burdens, genetically modified crops, government policies, public
mental health, personal issues and family problems.3 There are also accusation of states fudging
the data on farmer suicides. The public concern that these reports led to forced some of the state
governments like Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra to set up enquiry commissions to
go into this phenomenon in the respective states. Moreover, the National Policy for Farmers
2007 also attempted to change this worrying facet of modern India.4
This project seeks to explore the statistics regarding farmer suicides in India, attempt to
understand its causes, and finally offer viable policy options to effectively and expeditiously
tackle with this problem.
1
National Crime Reports Bureau, ADSI Report Annual – 2014 Government of India, Page 242, Table 2.11
2
Gruère, G. & Sengupta, D. (2011), Bt cotton and farmer suicides in India: an evidence-based assessment, The
Journal of Development Studies, 47(2), pp 316–337.
3
Das, A. (2011), Farmers’ suicide in India: implications for public mental health, International Journal of Social
Psychiatry, 57(1), 21–29.
4
Schurman, R. (2013), Shadow space: suicides and the predicament of rural India, Journal of Peasant Studies, 40(3),
597–601.
2. History
In the 1990s India woke up to a spate of farmers’ suicides. One of the major reporters of these
suicides was the Rural Affairs Editor of The Hindu, P. Sainath. The first state where suicides
were reported was Maharashtra. Soon newspapers began to report similar occurrences from
Andhra Pradesh. 5 In the beginning it was believed that most of the suicides were happening
among the cotton growers, especially those from Vidarbha.6 A look at the figures given out by
the State Crime Records Bureau, however, was sufficient to indicate that it was not just the
cotton farmer but farmers as a professional category were suffering, irrespective of their holding
size.7 Moreover, it was not just the farmers from Vidarbha but all over Maharashtra who showed
a significantly high suicide rate.8 The government appointed a number of inquiries to look into
the causes of farmers suicide and farm related distress in general. Subsequently, then-Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh visited Vidarbha and promised a package of Rs.110 billion to be
spent by the government in Vidarbha. The families of farmers who had committed suicide were
also offered an ex gratia grant to the tune of Rs.100,000 by the government. Despite government
efforts at pumping in more money into the suicide belt the suicide epidemic among farmers
remained unabated through 2006-07.9 Traditionally support systems in the villages of India had
been provided by the government. However, due to a variety of reasons the government had
either withdrawn itself from its supportive role or plain simple misgovernance had allowed
10
facilities in the villages to wither away. The problems of the farmers were quite
comprehensive, and several causes have been forwarded to explain this phenomenon. They will
be discussed later in this project.
5
Tim Dyson (1991), "On the Demography of South Asian Famines: Part I", Population Studies, Volume 45, No. 1,
pp 5–25.
6
Ajit Ghose (1982), Food Supply and Starvation: A Study of Famines with Reference to the Indian Subcontinent,
Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 34, Issue 2, pp 368–389.
7
Ganapathi, M. N. and Venkoba Rao, A. (1966), A study of suicide in Madurai, Journal of Indian Medical
Association, vol. 46, pp 18-23.
8
Nandi et al (1979), Is suicide preventable by restricting the availiability of lethal agents? - A rural survey of West
Bengal, Indian Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 21, pp 251-255.
9
Hegde RS (1980), Suicide in rural community, Indian Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 22, pp 368–370.
10
Ratna Reddy (1993), New technology in agriculture and changing size-productivity relationships: a study of
Andhra Pradesh, Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 48(4), pp 633-648.
3. Statistics
To put matters into perspective, farmer suicide data from the National Crime Records Bureau
(NCRB) for all the Indian states between 1995 and 2010 will now be examined. Figure 1
presents an annual time series plot of the total number of farmer suicides reported in India
between 1995 and 2010 at the all-India level and for the top 8 and top 4 states.
Two patterns are visible in Figure 1. First, for the all-India numbers as much as for the top 8 and
top 4 states, there is an overall trend of increasing farmer suicides between 1995 and 2010. While
it is true, and a welcome development, that there is a break in the increasing trend line in the
mid-2000s, the overall figures in the late-2000s are way above the numbers in the mid-1990s. At
the all-India level, total farmer suicides reported in 1995 was below 11,000; in 2010, it was
hovering around 16,000.
Second, and more problematic, is the fact that the 4 states that account for about two-thirds of the
total farmer suicides in the country show a very mild decline since the mid-2000s. The trend line
for these 4 states have basically flattened out since the mid-2000s, highlighting the fact that the
states with the highest incidence of farmer suicides have not made much progress. This fact must
then temper the optimism, if any, arising from the decline in the all-India numbers since the mid-
2000s.
Figure 2 presents the time profile of farmer suicides in the 8 states that have consistently
witnessed the largest number of farmer suicides in India, accounting for about 66 percent of the
all-India total in 2010. In descending order of farmer suicides in 2010, the states are:
Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh (including Chhattisgarh), Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, West
Bengal, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. Two patterns are visible in Figure 2.
First, there is an overall trend of increasing farmer suicides in these 8 major states between 1995
and 2010. In 1995 and 1996, these 8 states together had reported a total of 8988 and 11715
farmer suicides respectively; in 2009 and 2010, the corresponding figures were 14431 and 13591
respectively. While the total for these 8 states has declined a little from the phenomenally high
numbers in the mid-2000s, the total remains much higher than what was reported in the mid-
1990s. Second, there is a clear division among these 8 states into two groups. The first group
consists of Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh. These 4 states are in
a league by themselves, reporting more than 2000 farmer suicides per year over the last two
years, and accounting for 62 percent of the total farmer suicides in the country between 1995 and
2010. Most alarmingly, the trend of farmer suicides within these 4 states, accounting for two-
thirds of all the farmer suicides in the country in 2010, is increasing over time. While
Maharashtra reported lower number of farmer suicides compared to the astronomical highs in the
mid-2000s, the others have continued their upward trend. Moreover, even Maharashtra reports
much higher suicides today compared to the mid-1990s. Hence, the overall trend in this group of
4 states is increasing over time.
The second group consists of West Bengal, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. In recent
years, these 4 states have accounted for about 20 percent of all the farmer suicides in the country
and have consistently reported between 500 and 1000 farmer suicides every year, with Uttar
Pradesh reporting the lowest figures. The trend among these 4 states, for the period between
1995 and 2010, is flat. These states have witnessed some declines since the early 2000s, but that
has only brought them to levels that they reported in the mid-1990s. Over the whole period since
1995, these states do not show any significant decline in the number of farmer suicides.
More than 253,000 farmers have been reported to have committed suicides between 1995 and
2010; the actual number is likely to be higher because of deficiencies in reporting suicides. Four
states account for about two-thirds of these suicides: Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh (including
Chhattisgarh), Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. Another four account for a fifth of all the
suicides: West Bengal, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh. Even though the all-India number
of farmer suicides have declined slightly since the mid-2000s, the 4 states that account for most
of the farmer suicides have not shown much decline.
4. Causes
To understand the macro-level linkages running from policy changes to the phenomenon of
farmer suicides, the causes of the same need to examined. Farmers are clearly suffering from
acute distress, and once cause behind this is unsustainable levels of indebtedness, mostly because
their incomes are systematically falling below their expenditures. Farmers are very vulnerable to
shocks. If there was a medical emergency in the household or if there was an important life event
like birth, marriage, death or if there was a crop failure due to weather shocks of growth of pests,
the household had to per force incur debt. This debt is in addition to the debt that the farmer
would already have incurred if he/she had decided to move into the cultivation of cash crops like
cotton.
However, as with any suicide, mono-causal explanations for farmers’ suicides would be totally
inadequate. And they cannot be explained purely in terms of behavioural patterns and personal,
psychological motivations; they have to be seen as social phenomena and one has to unearth the
underlying social causes. A contrary claim often made is that a number of farm suicides are not
attributable to agrarian crisis and are due to factors like unsustainable life styles of farmers,
alcoholism, large expenses on marriages, or due to some incurable diseases etc. These types of
explanations are seriously flawed since they do not view suicides as a social phenomenon. The
frequent attempts to use these ‘causes’ as explanatory factors underlying farmer suicides shift the
burden of explanation from the social context to individual suicide victim, and hence, in effect
end up blaming the victim, and they are hardly helpful in devising appropriate policy
interventions in dealing with the distressing phenomenon.
As for the vulnerability of the region, it is a backward region with a low level of development of
productive forces in agriculture and industry. The region is highly water stressed with a low
degree of irrigation and with scanty, uncertain rainfall. As with such semi-arid regions, the soil
quality here is poor – and worsening – and varies a great deal across space. It is also a region
with a diversified cropping pattern with coarse cereals accounting for a large proportion of the
cropped area – but this is a type of diversification which is dictated by poor agrarian conditions
rather than by agricultural modernization. The cash crops in the region – like cotton - are largely
cultivated under poor agronomic conditions, with low levels of irrigation. This type of diversity –
dictated by backwardness and adversity – hardly makes for any stability; if anything, it adds to
instability and vulnerability.
Financial sector reforms also struck down the policy of branch expansion to rural areas in the
mid-1990s. The result has been along expected lines: rural branches of commercial banks has
declined from 51.2% in March 1996 to 45.7% in March 2005. Data also shows that the share of
agricultural credit cornered by farm sizes of more than 5 acres has increased.
4.4. Growth of private agents in areas like credit and seed supply
The space vacated by the state was taken up by private agents particularly in areas like credit,
supply of seeds and fertilizers, extension services (like advice and help on crops to be grown,
digging of bore wells etc.), marketing of crops etc. These agents, often combining all these
multiple roles were mostly from the urban centres in the region and, with next to no regulation of
their operations, their relationship with farmers was essentially a predatory one exploiting the
latter’s vulnerability during the period of crisis.
4.6.1. Yield (crop output per unit of land of most crops has stagnated
This stagnation is the direct result of the increasing pressure on cultivable land: the total area
under cultivation has declined while the number of operational holding have increased, implying
that each operational holding is now much smaller than in the early 1960s. Between 1960-61 and
2003, the total number of operational holdings increased from 50.77 million to 101.27 million.
During the same period, the total operated area declined from 133.46 million hectares to 107.65
million hectares. Thus average operated area declined from 2.63 hectares to 1.06 hectares. On
top of this is the fragmentation of each holding into multiple plots. Thus, the declining size of
operational holding, along with continued fragmentation, has meant smaller production units in
terms of land area. This constrains the ability to use improved technologies of production, and
has been one of the main reasons behind the stagnation of yield growth.
Cotton is the quintessential crop that lies entwined with the wave of farmer suicides. Production
of cotton requires large capital outlays, large in comparison to typical earnings of farmer
households. Seeds need to be bought from the market every year (because of restrictions put in
place by the MNCs selling the seeds); large quantities of fertilizers and pesticides are also
needed (whose prices are increasing because of reduction of subsidies). Cotton cultivation is very
water intensive. Since, during this same period, provision of irrigation was being systematically
reduced, farmers had to make investments in bore well (tube well) technology to secure the
supply of ground water. This involved substantial outlays, most of the time a sum that was far
beyond the reach of the average farmer. Taken together, these factors implied increasing costs of
cotton cultivation.
Most of the time, these costs could only be met with credit. The credit was provided by the same
agency that sold the seeds, the fertilizer and the pesticide, along with the knowledge that was
required to carry out the cultivation. With such interlinked markets, there was a serious conflict
of interest in the sense that the agency would almost always “advise” farmers to use much more
than the optimal quantity of inputs.
There are many flaws in that as well. First, let us consider the payment of compensation.
According to the guidelines framed by the government, a family will be eligible only if the
farmer who committed suicide owing to inability to repay the loan has borrowed it from a bank
or a credit institution recognized by the government will be eligible. It is well known that
suicides are caused more by the inability to repay loans to private moneylenders rather than to
banks. Over half the number of claims have been rejected on grounds of ineligibility. The ground
realities seem to have been ignored.11
Another issue that requires careful scrutiny is the Crop Insurance Scheme, intended to take care
of cases of crop failure and provide genuine relief to the affected farmers. The scheme seems to
be facing hurdles. The General Insurance Corporation rejected several claims as fraudulent.
The issue of farmers’ suicide cannot be looked in isolation, but from the broader perspective of
the agriculture scenario in the country. According to a study on suicides of farmers in Karnataka
and Andhra Pradesh, a trend is seen towards food crops making way for commercial crops in
most of the areas where suicides have occurred. This involves purchase of wider range of inputs
with ready cash. Most of the suicides are by small and marginal farmers who fall into the trap of
private moneylenders. If the crop is good, the price of the produce goes down, and they do not
reap the benefit. If it fails, they become indebted. If the crop fails continuously, they become
more indebted forcing the farmers to commit suicide. It is time to adopt policies, which are
realistic and aimed at short term as well as long term solutions. In the first place, strategies must
be devised to enable the small and marginal farmers to have greater access to institutional credit
and discourage them from the shylocks tempting them with informal credit. Farmers need to be
educated to adopt proper crop-mix. There is a need for shift in the mindset from a commodity-
centered approach to an entirely new cropping or farming system based on integrated natural
resource management. We need to develop a comprehensive policy taking into account all the
related aspects – agrarian reforms, rural credit system, agricultural insurance, crop changes,
employment opportunities and the role of Panchayat Raj Institutions. There is a need for the total
11
A. Ravindra, “Born in Debt, Die in Debt,” The New Indian Express (Bangalore), 19 October 2003.
revitalization and revamping of the farm sector and rural financial institutions to ensure average
per cent age of sustainable growth per annum for the sector; otherwise the ambitious target of
eight per cent growth rate per annum during tenth plan (2002-2007) would remain a dream.
Given the various long-term ramifications of the urgent problem of farmer suicides, swift and
holistic policy changes are imperative. These must, of course, be accompanied by civil society
action for societal change. The government cannot wait on its hands for social change, which is
by nature slow and painstaking. At the same time, governmental policy changes alone will not
provide the silver bullet. In order to provide a realistic timeline for progressive, holistic, and
lasting change, the following recommendations are divided into immediate, medium, and long-
term action. However, the urgency of the issue of farmer suicides—apparent in the increasing
incidence and the various repercussions on agrarian society—dictates that the longer-term
recommendations should not be perceived as simply aspirational. All of the below need to be
part of a concerted effort on all levels and are envisioned to be implemented in a five-year
timeframe.
5.1.2. Informal money-lenders should be regulated in a way that does not eradicate their
business.
While the money-lender is an integral part of agriculture and cannot be eradicated without
risking a credit vacuum in these villages, both the Center and State governments can impose
regulations on money-lenders similar to the previous British legislation that limited the interest
rate, instituted a ceiling on payback amounts, protected against land alienation, and shielded
farmers’ primary assets. Also, Debt Conciliation Boards may be set up as dispute resolution
mechanisms in situations where loans have been given at exorbitant interest rates and have no
prospect of repayment.
There is a demand for credit, but the supply side of rural financial market is not responding due
to some constraints. Enabling the formation of an information bureau will help formal
institutions to judge credit worthiness of an individual. When moneylenders operate in a village,
they take the help of a prominent person of the village to gather information on credit worthiness
of an individual and at times also use their influence to recover loans. In return, they pay him a
commission.
5.1.4. Pension fund and crop insurance should be created for farmers.
The farmer’s problem is rooted in his exposure to risk – yield as well as price shocks. Insurance
schemes may be devised to mitigate these. This can be done in three possible ways. Credit
insurance can look into the credit default. A fund with contribution from the creditor, the debtor
and the Government may be created for this. Appropriate mechanisms to look into its modus
operandi should be devised. Crop insurance will be linked with yield risk. Implementation of this
should be village and if possible plot of land specific. Theft of crop and loss due to fire or other
calamities should be taken into consideration while administering this. The earlier mentioned
information bureau could also help in this endeavour. Income insurance will address the poor
returns, particularly for marginal and small farmers and also tenants. The poor returns could be
because of poor prices, low yields or high transaction costs arising out of low quantity of
produce.
A comprehensive Agricultural Insurance Scheme should be launched. Specific attention should
be given to cover cash crops – like cotton, sugarcane and edible oils. Such measures would
provide a security net for farmers in the case of serious loss due to environmental factors.
Otherwise, losses of one bad crop year accumulate quickly and create the desperate situations
that might prompt suicide.
Excessive use of fertilizer and pesticides and mono-cropping can affect the fertility of land.
Appropriate land management techniques should be devised. This should complement the efforts
in improving water management. The MEGS and RIDF can be used for this.
Reporters usually get their information from government officials. The latter too have an
important role in shaping the report that media presents to the public. Officials should refrain
from a ‘no comment’ response; should avoid dictating how the suicide should be reported and
help by giving accurate and responsible responses to the reporters’ queries. There is a case for
coordination between the administration and the media.
Minimizing error
While administering any compensation there can be two possible errors: (1) not giving
compensation to a deserving case and (2) providing compensation to an undeserving case. Both
errors should be minimized, but their nature is such that minimizing one might increase the error
of the other. While striking a balance, decisions should be taken to minimize the former error,
which we consider to be more serious.
Quick processing
The time taken for scrutiny and receipt of compensation should be streamlined and minimised.
An appropriate routine may be designed for this. For instance, the last Monday of every month
can be allotted for this and decision taken through a single window. Once decision is taken it
should be conveyed electronically or by fax to the districts and there should be standing order for
the district administration to proceed immediately.