SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS – CASES

NATURE OF SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

G.R. No. 109373 March 20, 1995

PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, PAULA S. PAUG, and its officers and
members, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VITALIANO N. NAÑAGAS II, as Liquidator of Pacific Banking
Corporation, respondents.

G.R. No. 112991 March 20, 1995

THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as Liquidator of the Pacific Banking
Corporation , petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, DEPUTY SHERIFF RAMON ENRIQUEZ and ANG ENG
JOO, ANG KEONG LAN and E.J ANG INT'L. LTD., represented by their Attorney-in-fact, GONZALO C. SY,
respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

These cases have been consolidated because the principal question involved is the same: whether a petition for
liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265, otherwise known as the Central Bank Act, is a special proceeding or an
ordinary civil action. The Fifth and the Fourteenth Divisions of the Court of Appeals reached opposite results on
this question and consequently applied different periods for appealing.

The facts are as follows:

I.

Proceedings in the CB and the RTC

On July 5, 1985, the Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under receivership by the Central Bank of the
Philippines pursuant to Resolution No. 699 of its Monetary Board. A few months later, it was placed under
liquidation1 and a Liquidator was appointed.2

On April 7, 1986, the Central Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch 31, a petition entitled
"Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Pacific Banking Corporation." 3 The petition was approved, after which
creditors filed their claims with the court.

On May 17, 1991, a new Liquidator, Vitaliano N. Nañagas,4 President of the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC), was appointed by the Central Bank.

On March 13, 1989 the Pacific Banking Corporation Employees Organization (Union for short), petitioner in G.R.
No. 109373, filed a complaint-in-intervention seeking payment of holiday pay, 13th month pay differential, salary
increase differential, Christmas bonus, and cash equivalent of Sick Leave Benefit due its members as employees of
PaBC. In its order dated September 13, 1991, the trial court ordered payment of the principal claims of the Union. 5

The Liquidator received a copy of the order on September 16, 1991. On October 16, 1991, he filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and Clarification of the order. In his order of December 6, 1991, the judge modified his September
13, 19916 but in effect denied the Liquidator's motion for reconsideration. This order was received by the
Liquidator on December 9, 1991. The following day, December 10, 1991, he filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion
for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal. On December 23, 1991, another Notice of Appeal was filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of Nañagas(LIQUIDATOR).

In his order of February 10, 1992, respondent judge disallowed the Liquidator's Notice of Appeal on the ground
that it was late, i.e., more than 15 days after receipt of the decision. The judge declared his September 13, 1991
order and subsequent orders to be final and executory and denied reconsideration. On March 27, 1992, he granted
the Union's Motion for issuance of a writ of Execution.

Ang Keong Lan and E.J. Ang Int'l., private respondents in G.R. No. 112991, likewise filed claims for the payment of
investment in the PaBC allegedly in the form of shares of stocks amounting to US$2,531,632.18. The shares of
stocks, consisting of 154,462 common shares, constituted 11% of the total subscribed capital stock of the PaBC.
They alleged that their claim constituted foreign exchange capital investment entitled to preference in payment
under the Foreign Investments Law.

In his order dated September 11, 1992, respondent judge of the RTC directed the Liquidator to pay private
respondents the total amount of their claim as preferred creditors. 7

The Liquidator received the order on September 16, 1992. On September 30, 1992 he moved for reconsideration,
but his motion was denied by the court on October 2, 1992. He received the order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration on October 5, 1992. On October 14, 1992 he filed a Notice of Appeal from the orders of
September 16, 1992 and October 2, 1992. As in the case of the Union, however, the judge ordered the Notice of
Appeal stricken off the record on the ground that it had been filed without authority of the Central Bank and
beyond 15 days. In his order of October 28, 1992, the judge directed the execution of his September 11, 1992
order granting the Stockholders/ Investors' claim.

II.

Proceedings in the Court of Appeals

The Liquidator filed separate Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to set
aside the orders of the trial court denying his appeal from the orders granting the claims of Union and of the
Stockholders/Investors. The two Divisions of the Court of Appeals, to which the cases were separately raffled,
rendered conflicting rulings.

In its decision of November 17, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27751 (now G.R. No. 09373) the Fifth Division8 held in the
case of the Union that the proceeding before the trial court was a special proceeding and, therefore, the period for
appealing from any decision or final order rendered therein is 30 days. Since the notice of appeal of the Liquidator
was filed on the 30th day of his receipt of the decision granting the Union's claims, the appeal was brought on
time. The Fifth Division, therefore, set aside the orders of the lower court and directed the latter to give due
course to the appeal of the Liquidator and set the Record on Appeal he had filed for hearing.

On the other hand, on December 16, 1993, the Fourteenth Division 9 ruled in CA-G.R. SP No. 29351 (now G.R. No.
112991) in the case of the Stockholders/Investors that a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action. Therefore,
the period for appealing from any decision or final order rendered therein is 15 days and that since the Liquidator's
appeal notice was filed on the 23rd day of his receipt of the order appealed from, deducting the period during
which his motion for reconsideration was pending, the notice of appeal was filed late. Accordingly, the Fourteenth
Division dismissed the Liquidator's petition.

III.

Present Proceedings

The Union and the Liquidator then separately filed petitions before this Court.

In G.R. No. 109373 the Union contends that:

1. The Court of Appeals acted without jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the suit.

2. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari filed by
Nañagas who was without any legal authority to file it.

3. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the case is a special proceeding governed by
Rules 72 to 109 of the Revised Rules of Court.

4. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in concluding that the notice of appeal filed by Nañagas
was filed on time.

5. The Court of Appeals erred seriously in declaring that the second notice of appeal filed on
December 23, 1991 by the Solicitor General is a superfluity.

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 112991 the Liquidator contends that:

1. The Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Pacific Banking Corporation s a Special
Proceeding case and/or one which allows multiple appeals, in which case the period of appeal is
30 days and not 15 days from receipt of the order/judgment appealed from.

2. Private respondents are not creditors of PaBC but are plain stockholders whose right to receive
payment as such would accrue only after all the creditors of the insolvent bank have been paid.

3. The claim of private respondents in the amount of US$22,531,632.18 is not in the nature of
foreign investment as it is understood in law.

4. The claim of private respondents has not been clearly established and proved.

5. The issuance of a writ of execution against the assets of PaBC was made with grave abuse of
discretion.

The petitions in these cases must be dismissed.

First. As stated in the beginning, the principal question in these cases is whether a petition for liquidation under
§29 of Rep. Act No. 265 is in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is, then the period of appeal is 30 days and the
party appealing must, in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal in order to
perfect his appeal. Otherwise, if a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action, the period of appeal is 15 days from
notice of the decision or final order appealed from.
BP Blg. 129 provides:

§39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or
decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment or decision appealed from: Provided, however, that in habeas
corpus cases the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment
appealed from.

No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire record shall be
transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of
the contents thereof.

This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases wherein multiple
appeals are allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of Court.

The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. 129 provides:

19. Period of Appeals. —

(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus cases and in the cases referred to in
paragraph (b) hereof, must be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment, order, resolution or award appealed from.

(b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules
of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of
appeals shall be thirty (30) days, a record on appeal being required.

The Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals held that the proceeding is an ordinary action similar to an action
for interpleader under Rule 63. 10 The Fourteenth Division stated:

The petition filed is akin to an interpleader under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court where there are
conflicting claimants or several claims upon the same subject matter, a person who claims no
interest thereon may file an action for interpleader to compel the claimants to "interplead" and
litigate their several claims among themselves. (Section I Rule 63).

An interpleader is in the category of a special civil action under Rule 62 which, like an ordinary
action, may be appealed only within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or order
appealed from. Under Rule 62, the preceding rules covering ordinary civil actions which are not
inconsistent with or may serve to supplement the provisions of the rule relating to such civil
actions are applicable to special civil actions. This embraces Rule 41 covering appeals from the
regional trial court to the Court of Appeals.

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, under Section 1 Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, an action is defined as "an ordinary suit in a
court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a
right or the prevention or redress of a wrong." On the other hand, Section 2 of the same Rule
states that "every other remedy including one to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact shall be by special proceeding."
 To our mind, from the aforequoted definitions of an action and a special proceeding, the petition
for assistance of the court in the liquidation of an asset of a bank is not "one to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact." Contrary to the submission of the petitioner, the
petition is not intended to establish the fact of insolvency of the bank. The insolvency of the bank
had already been previously determined by the Central Bank in accordance with Section 9 of the
CB Act before the petition was filed. All that needs to be done is to liquidate the assets of the
bank and thus the assistance of the respondent court is sought for that purpose.

It should be pointed out that this petition filed is not among the cases categorized as a special
proceeding under Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court, nor among the special proceedings
that may be appealed under Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules.

We disagree with the foregoing view of the Fourteenth Division. Rule 2 of the Rules of Court provide:

§1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which the party
prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of
a wrong.

§2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other remedy, including one to establish the status
or right of a party or a particular fact, shall be by special proceeding.

Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special proceeding, Chief Justice Moran
states:" 11

Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while special proceeding is the act
by which one seeks to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action
is distinguished from special proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by one
against another, while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact. Where
a party litigant seeks to recover property from another, his remedy is to file an action. Where his
purpose is to seek the appointment of a guardian for an insane, his remedy is a special
proceeding to establish the fact or status of insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship.

Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should be classified a special
proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right nor
the prevention or redress of a wrong against a party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a
party's wrongful act or omission nor state a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.

What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency so that its creditors may be
able to file their claims in the settlement of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the
petition only seeks a declaration of the corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only
seeks a declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant right of creditors and the order of
payment of their claims in the disposition of the corporation's assets.

Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation proceedings do not resemble petitions for
interpleader. For one, an action for interpleader involves claims on a subject matter against a person who has no
interest therein. 12 This is not the case in a liquidation proceeding where the Liquidator, as representative of the
corporation, takes charge of its assets and liabilities for the benefit of the creditors. 13 He is thus charged with
insuring that the assets of the corporation are paid only to rightful claimants and in the order of payment provided
by law.
Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of state of deceased persons under
Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a common purpose: the determination of all the assets and the
payment of all the debts and liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the
administrator or executor are both charged with the assets for the benefit of the claimants. In both instances, the
liability of the corporation and the estate is not disputed. The court's concern is with the declaration of creditors
and their rights and the determination of their order of payment.

Furthermore, as in the settlement of estates, multiple appeals are allowed in proceedings for liquidation of an
insolvent corporation. As the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals, quoting the Liquidator, correctly noted:

A liquidation proceeding is a single proceeding which consists of a number of cases properly

classified as "claims." It is basically a two-phased proceeding. The first phase is concerned with
the approval and disapproval of claims. Upon the approval of the petition seeking the assistance
of the proper court in the liquidation of a close entity, all money claims against the bank are
required to be filed with the liquidation court. This phase may end with the declaration by the
liquidation court that the claim is not proper or without basis. On the other hand, it may also end
with the liquidation court allowing the claim. In the latter case, the claim shall be classified
whether it is ordinary or preferred, and thereafter included Liquidator. In either case, the order
allowing or disallowing a particular claim is final order, and may be appealed by the party
aggrieved thereby.

The second phase involves the approval by the Court of the distribution plan prepared by the
duly appointed liquidator. The distribution plan specifies in detail the total amount available for
distribution to creditors whose claim were earlier allowed. The Order finally disposes of the issue
of how much property is available for disposal. Moreover, it ushers in the final phase of the
liquidation proceeding — payment of all allowed claims in accordance with the order of legal
priority and the approved distribution plan.

Verily, the import of the final character of an Order of allowance or disallowance of a particular
claim cannot be overemphasized. It is the operative fact that constitutes a liquidation proceeding
a "case where multiple appeals are allowed by law." The issuance of an Order which, by its
nature, affects only the particular claims involved, and which may assume finality if no appeal is
made therefrom, ipso factocreates a situation where multiple appeals are allowed.

A liquidation proceeding is commenced by the filing of a single petition by the Solicitor General
with a court of competent jurisdiction entitled, "Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of e.g.,
Pacific Banking Corporation. All claims against the insolvent are required to be filed with the
liquidation court. Although the claims are litigated in the same proceeding, the treatment is
individual. Each claim is heard separately. And the Order issued relative to a particular claim
applies only to said claim, leaving the other claims unaffected, as each claim is considered
separate and distinct from the others. Obviously, in the event that an appeal from an Order
allowing or disallowing a particular claim is made, only said claim is affected, leaving the others
to proceed with their ordinary course. In such case, the original records of the proceeding are not
elevated to the appellate court. They remain with the liquidation court. In lieu of the original
record, a record of appeal is instead required to be prepared and transmitted to the appellate
court.

Inevitably, multiple appeals are allowed in liquidation proceedings. Consequently, a record on

appeal is necessary in each and every appeal made. Hence, the period to appeal therefrom
should be thirty (30) days, a record on appeal being required. (Record pp. 162-164).
In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's notice of appeal was filed on time,
having been filed on the 23rd day of receipt of the order granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors.
However, the Liquidator did not file a record on appeal with the result that he failed to perfect his appeal. As
already stated a record on appeal is required under the Interim Rules and Guidelines in special proceedings and for
cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The reason for this is that the several claims are actually separate ones
and a decision or final order with respect to any claim can be appealed. Necessarily the original record on appeal
must remain in the trial court where other claims may still be pending.

Because of the Liquidator's failure to perfect his appeal, the order granting the claims of the
Stockholders/Investors became final. Consequently. the Fourteenth Division's decision dismissing the Liquidator's
Petition for Certiorari,Prohibition and Mandamus must be affirmed albeit for a different reason.

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union), we find that the Fifth Division correctly granted
the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari. Prohibition and Mandamus. As already noted, the Liquidator filed a notice
of appeal and a motion for extension to file a record on appeal on December 10, 1991, i.e., within 30 days of his
receipt of the order granting the Union's claim. Without waiting for the resolution of his motion for extension, he
filed on December 20, 1991 within the extension sought a record on appeal. Respondent judge thus erred in
disallowing the notice on appeal and denying the Liquidator's motion for extension to file a record on appeal.

The Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus and its decision should, therefore, be affirmed.

Second. In G.R. No. 109373, The Union claims that under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265, the court merely assists in
adjudicating the claims of creditors, preserves the assets of the institution, and implements the liquidation plan
approved by the Monetary Board and that, therefore, as representative of the Monetary Board, the Liquidator
cannot question the order of the court or appeal from it. It contends that since the Monetary Board had previously
admitted PaBC's liability to the laborers by in fact setting aside the amount of P112,234,292.44 for the payment of
their claims, there was nothing else for the Liquidator to do except to comply with the order of the court.

The Union's contention is untenable. In liquidation proceedings, the function of the trial court is not limited to
assisting in the implementation of the orders of the Monetary Board. Under the same section (§29) of the law
invoked by the Union, the court has authority to set aside the decision of the Monetary Board "if there is a
convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith." 14 As this Court held in Rural Bank of
Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals: 15

There is no question, that the action of the monetary Board in this regard may be subject to
judicial review. Thus, it has been held that the Court's may interfere with the Central Bank's
exercise of discretion in determining whether or not a distressed bank shall be supported or
liquidated. Discretion has its limits and has never been held to include arbitrariness,
discrimination or bad faith (Ramos v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 41 SCRA 567 [1971]).

In truth, the Liquidator is the representative not only of the Central Bank but also of the insolvent bank. Under
§§28A-29 of Rep. Act No. 265 he acts in behalf of the bank "personally or through counsel as he may retain, in all
actions or proceedings or against the corporation" and he has authority "to do whatever may be necessary for
these purposes." This authority includes the power to appeal from the decisions or final orders of the court which
he believes to be contrary to the interest of the bank.

Finally the Union contends that the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time to file the record on appeal
filed in behalf of the Central Bank was not filed by the office of the Solicitor General as counsel for the Central
Bank. This contention has no merit. On October 22, 1992, as Assistant Solicitor General Cecilio O. Estoesta
informed the trial court in March 27, 1992, the OSG had previously authorized lawyers of the PDIC to prepare and
sign pleadings in the case. 16 Conformably thereto the Notice of Appeal and the Motion for Additional Time to
submit Record on Appeal filed were jointly signed by Solicitor Reynaldo I. Saludares in behalf of the OSG and by
lawyers of the PDIC. 17

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 109373 and G.R. No 112991, the decisions appealed from are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 72

G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001

PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO – LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL
RESORIO – MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL
ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO, respondent..

BUENA, J.:

May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance annulment of title
with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on
questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?

Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision1 of public respondent
Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of which declares:

"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside
and another one entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in favor of
defendant-appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and
reinstate TCT No. 107443 without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court. No costs.

"So ordered."

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of
9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the death of
Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and
Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing
among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14
share while each of the six children received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was
cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the Six children.1âwphi1.nêt

Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real
Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the
land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name,
as covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two
separate lots where the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and
the second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually,
Graciano sold the first lot2 to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot. 3

On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the
land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 186059 4 was issued in the latter's
name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage,
as heirs.

In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein private
respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of
Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the
issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said
complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.

In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano in
20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner
further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to his children,
hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's
property.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996 holding:8

"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by
law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property was agreed upon
in the marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a judicial separation of property between
them, the spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;

"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited by law
under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;

"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be regarded as
an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision ratiocinating, inter alia:

"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond its
jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of
a deceased person. XXX

"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. What the
court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on
advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. XXX"

Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court and assails the appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law and the facts of the case."

We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise:

"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong.

"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary civil
actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.

"XXX
 "c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
fact."

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special
proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court
or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special
proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so
provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion." 9

Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:

"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and
prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and
that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted
and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without
summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A
special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for
particular relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon
notice."10

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action,
whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made
by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of
specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive
province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been
made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on
the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same
provision11contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings".

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to
render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner
Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our
mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of
Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of
advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:

"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must first settle the
estate in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo determined
the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the subject property owned by the
estate of the deceased to defendant-appellee without observing the proper proceedings provided (for) by
 the Rules of Court. From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action
cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is subject to specific
prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance
inheritance."12

In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs.
Borromeo13 and Mendoza vs. Teh14 that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court
(then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a
jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is procedural question involving a mode of
practice "which may be waived".15

Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the six children
of the decedent even assailed the authority of the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this
specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.

Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that although
generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all
heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction
by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to
decide the question of ownership.16

Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:

"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking appointment as
estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited
the exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court. 17 (emphasis supplied)

Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached,
it is necessary that certain steps be taken first.18 The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting
all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death;
then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime
of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a
donation had prejudiced the legitimes.19

A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that the trial
court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del
Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules and
hereby holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is
indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related matters
involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's estate.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and the
instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 73

G.R. No. L-47027 January 27, 1989

BEATRIZ DE ZUZUARREGUI VDA. DE REYES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PILAR IBAÑEZ VDA. DE ZUZUARREGUI, Administratrix, ANTONIO DE
ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI and PACITA JAVIER, respondents.

Basilio H. Toquero for petitioner.

Senen S. Ceniza for respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, We are asked to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on September 19, 1977 in CA-G.R. No. 53197-R 1 which affirmed the order of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, Quezon City dated March 26, 1973, issued in Special Proceedings Q-325, entitled
"Intestate Estate of Don Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr.". 2

Respondent administratrix, Pilar Ibañez Vda. de Zuzuarregui, is the surviving spouse of Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr.,
while petitioner Beatriz de Zuzuarregui Vda. de Reyes and the other heirs of said estate, namely, Antonio de
Zuzuarregui, Jr., Enrique de Zuzuarregui and Jose de Zuzuarregui, are the illegitimate children of the decedent. The
parties herein are the only heirs of the deceased whose estate was the subject of said settlement proceedings.
Petitioner was the daughter of the deceased by a mother different from that of his aforesaid three (3) sons, their
mother being Pacita Javier who was the niece of the herein respondent administratrix. 3

According to the project of partition dated June 17, 1958 and approved by the probate court, the respective shares
of said heirs in the real estate left by the deceased are as follows: Pilar Ibañez Vda. de Zuzuarregui, 12/16 thereof,
inclusive of 1/2 of said assets which pertains to her share in the conjugal partnership; Beatriz, 1/16; Antonio, Jr.,
1/16; Enrique, 1/16; and Jose, 1/16. 4

Among the real properties in the project of partition is a parcel of land covered by and described in Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 42643 located in Antipolo, Rizal. In said project of partition, its area is stated as 83,781
square meters, with an assessed value of P6,430.00. This statement of said area was repeated in said document
four time, 5 that is, in adjudicating the corresponding portions of said land to Pilar (12/15), Antonio, Jr. (1/15).
Enrique (1/15) and Jose (1/15). 6 The petitioner did not have a share in the aforesaid parcel of land because she
relinquished her right thereto "in lieu of her bigger share in Antipolo, Rizal, real estate property." 7

On January 29, 1973, the respondent administratrix and the other three distributees filed a motion to reopen
Special Proceedings No. Q-325 for the purpose of correcting an alleged typographical error in the description of
the parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643 since, according to them, the correct land area
is 803,781.51 square meters and not 83,781 square meters. 8 The heirs of Beatriz de Zuzuarregui Vda. de Reyes
filed their opposition to said motion. 9

The court a quo issued the contested order, with the following dispositive portion:

WHEREFORE,
 (1) Sp. Proceeding No. Q-325 entitled, The Intestate Estate of Don Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr. is
ordered opened for the purpose of correcting a clerical error in the description of the parcel of
land covered by T.C.T. No. 42643;

(2) The area of land covered by T.C.T. No. 42643 be corrected by cancelling 83,781 sq. meters
and changing it to 803,781.51 sq. meters to conform with the description of land area in T.C.T.
No. 42643;

(3) That said corrections be made as pages 3, 6, 9, 10, and 12 of the project of Partition. 10

As already stated, the affirmance of said order by the Court of Appeals eventuated in the elevation of the
controversy to Us under the present recourse.

It is well settled that even if a decision has become final, clerical errors or mistakes or omission plainly due to
inadvertence or negligence may be corrected or supplied even after the judgment has been entered. The
correction of a clerical error is an exception to the general rule that no amendment or correction may be made by
the court in its judgment once the latter had become final. 11 The court may make this amendment ex parte and,
for this purpose, it may resort to the pleadings filed by the parties, the court's findings of facts and its conclusions
of law as expressed in the body of the decision. 12

However, according to the petitioner, there was no such clerical error. While it is not disputed that the area
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643 is 803,781.15 square meters, the petitioner insists that "the area
intended by the heirs of Don Antonio de Zuzuarregui, Sr., in the Project of Partition as approved by the trial court is
the area of 83,781 sq. m. and not 803,781,51 sq. m. 13

She claims that she would not have relinquished her share in said parcel of land if the true area was not
fraudulently concealed from her at the time the project of partition was executed. 14 She further contends that the
fact that the description of the area as 83,781 square meters was repeated several times is sufficient evidence to
show that such was the area intended in the project of partition. 15

Such contentions are without merit. There is, therefore, no reason to disturb, much less to reverse, the factual
finding of the lower court that a typographical or clerical error was clearly committed by inadvertence in the
project of partition.

That a special proceeding for the settlement of an estate is filed and intended to settle the entire estate of the
deceased is obvious and elementary. It would be absurd for the heirs to intentionally excluded or leave a parcel of
land or a portion thereof undistributed or undivided because the proceeding is precisely designed to end the
community of interests in properties held by co-partners pro indiviso without designation or segregation of shares.

It is readily apparent from the project of partition that it was meant to be, as in fact it is, a full and complete
adjudication and partition of all properties of the estate, necessarily including the entire area of the land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643. Thus as perceptively posed by the queries of the respondents, if the
intention of the heirs was to make only a partial adjudication and distribution of the subject parcel of land, why is
it that they did not make any further disposition of the remaining balance of 720,000 square meters? What sound
reason would the heirs have in holding in suspense the distribution of the difference of 720,000 square meters? 16

Besides, petitioner suggests that she and the male heirs could not see eye to eye because they did not have a
common mother. 17 If so, this supposed antagonism would even be a compelling reason for the parties to insist on
the total partition of all the properties in the first instance, rather than for them to remain as co-owners for a long
time. As hereinbefore indicated, the project of partition is dated June 17, 1958, 18 while the motion to re-open the
proceedings was filed only on January 29, 1973.
If We were to indulge petitioner in her stand that the area of 803,781 square meters was typewritten in the
document as 83,781 square meters, not because of the typist's error in omitting the number "0" between the
numbers "8" and "3" in the first three digits but because the latter area of only 83,781 square meters was the one
intended for distribution, then the irresistible question would be how and why the parties arrived at that particular
latter figure. It will be observed that such a portion would constitute only 10.42336% of the total land area covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 42643. On top of this, the assumed area of 83,781 square meters has still to be
divided into fifteen (15) parts to arrive at the aliquot portions of 12/15 and 1/15 of the other heirs in this particular
property. Why would the parties deliberately create such an unlikely mathematical situation which would
complicate the actual physical segregation of the area supposed to be distributed?

It is, therefore, a logical and credible explanation that the omission of the zero between the figures "8" and "3"
converted "803,781" to "83,781", a product purely of clerical oversight. Petitioner has not offered any plausible
contrary explanation. Parenthetically, she had the assistance of legal counsel in the intestate proceedings and in
the preparation of the project of partition.19

Petitioner's lamentations of injustice in the partition are demonstrably unfounded. It will be observed that
according to her own computation, 20 she received her 1/16 share in the estate consisting of 279,803 square
meters of land, while her half brothers received on the average 154,975.11 square meters each. Even if the
supposed shares of the respondents in the remaining 720.000 square meters in the lot covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 42643 were to be added, the share of each brother would be only 202,975. 11 square
meters. There would not be a substantial difference in value since the petitioner received 190,000 square meters
of land located also in Antipolo, Rizal; while in Balara, Quezon City, she received more than her half brothers, that
is, 75,803 square meters as against their individual 74,309.70 square meters. It was only in Pasong Tamo where
she received slightly less, 14,000 square meters compared to Enrique's and Jose's 14,115 square meters each, but
more than Antonio, Jr.'s 13,621 square meters.

The ineluctable consequence of the foregoing considerations is that, both in law and equity, the court a quo and
the respondent court committed no error prejudicial to petitioner.

WHEREFORE, certiorari is DENIED and the decision of the respondent court is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 129242 January 16, 2001

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO ,petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME,
MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO,
AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA MANALO, respondents.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et. Al., seeking to annul the
Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 affirming the Orders 3 of the Regional Trial Court and the Resolution 4 which
denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts 5 are as follows:

Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He
was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo,
Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo,
Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.1âwphi1.nêt

At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in
the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at No. 19
Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at NO. 45 General Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.

On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo,
namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition 6 with the
respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio
Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.

On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on February 11, 1993
and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the said order upon the heirs named in the
petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.

On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order 'declaring the whole
world in default, except the government," and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners therein on March
16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners
(oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who were granted then (10)
days within which to file their opposition to the petition.

Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating in the filling of an
Omnibus Motion8 on July 23, 1993 seeking; (1) to set aside and reconsider the Order of the trial court dated July 9,
1993 which denied the motion for additional extension of time file opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing
their affirmative defenses as grounds for dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.

On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an order9 which resolved, thus:
 A. To admit the so-called Opposition filed by counsel for the oppositors on July 20, 1993, only for the
purpose of considering the merits thereof;

B. To deny the prayer of the oppositors for a preliminary hearing of their affirmative defenses as ground
for the dismissal of this proceeding, said affirmative defenses being irrelevant and immaterial to the
purpose and issue of the present proceeding;

C. To declare that this court has acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the oppositors;

D. To deny the motion of the oppositors for the inhibition of this Presiding Judge;

E. To set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in the intestate
estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo for hearing on September 9, 1993 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.

Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after the trial court in its Order 10 dated September 15, 1993. In their petition
for improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3)
the share of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest
efforts toward compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum shopping
was attached to the petition.

Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its
Resolution11promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of the said
resolution was likewise dismissed.12

The only issue raised by herein petitioners in the instant petition for review is whether or not the respondent
Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court which denied their motion
for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners
therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise involving members of the same family have been made
prior to the filling of the petition but that the same have failed.

Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil action involving
members of the same family. They point out that it contains certain averments, which, according to them, are
indicative of its adversarial nature, to wit:

X X X

Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO MANALO, since the death of his father, TROADIO MANALO,
had not made any settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the properties of the deceased father TROADIO
MANALO.

Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to manage and control the properties aforementioned,
without proper accounting, to his own benefit and advantage xxx.

X X X

Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is managing and controlling the estate of the deceased TROADIO
MANALO to his own advantage and to the damage and prejudice of the herein petitioners and their co-
heirs xxx.

X X X
 Par. 14. For the protection of their rights and interests, petitioners were compelled to bring this suit and
were forced to litigate and incur expenses and will continue to incur expenses of not less than,
P250,000.00 and engaged the services of herein counsel committing to pay P200,000.00 as and attorney's
fees plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court xxx. 13

Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the
Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the ground that a
condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with, that is, that the petitioners therein failed to
aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made
involving members of the same family prior to the filling of the petition pursuant to Article 222 14 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.

The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments 15 and
the character of the relief sought 16 in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful
srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC.
No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said
petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased
person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City
of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within he country
are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. 17 The
petition is SP.PROC No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative
list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition,
the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners
therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased father, Troadio
Manalo, to wit;

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed for of this Honorable Court:

a. That after due hearing, letters of administration be issued to petitioner ROMEO MANALO for the
administration of the estate of the deceased TROADIO MANALO upon the giving of a bond in such
reasonable sum that this Honorable Court may fix.

b. That after all the properties of the deceased TROADIO MANALO have been inventoried and expenses
and just debts, if any, have been paid and the legal heirs of the deceased fully determined, that the said
estate of TROADIO MANALO be settled and distributed among the legal heirs all in accordance with law.

c. That the litigation expenses of these proceedings in the amount of P250,000.00 and attorney's fees in
the amount of P300,000.00 plus honorarium of P2,500.00 per appearance in court in the hearing and trial
of this case and costs of suit be taxed solely against ANTONIO MANALO. 18

Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be typical of an
ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the said defect in the petition and
filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is actually an Answer containing
admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and
exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and costs 19 in an apparent effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil
action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis, Article 222 of civil
of the Civil Code.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for
the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as irrelevant and immaterial to the
said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a probate court, has limited and special
jurisdiction 20and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters and issues which may be properly threshed out
only in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as
well as the concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the
defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either thrown
out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem. 21 So it should be in the instant petition for
settlement of estate.

Herein petitioners argue that even if the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered as a special
proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-
visArticle 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground for the dismissal of the
same by virtue of ule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that the 'rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceedings.' Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so broad that it must necessarily
include special proceedings.

The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section
2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal
of the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is
clear enough. To wit:

Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should appear that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in
Article 2035(underscoring supplied).22

The above-quoted provision of the law is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term 'suit'
that it refers to an action by one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in which the
plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right,
whether at law or in equity. 23 A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues
another for the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.24 Besides, an excerpt form the
Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code Commission to make that legal
provision applicable only to civil actions which are essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family,
thus:

It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a litigation between members of the
same family. It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before litigation is
allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is know that lawsuit between close relatives generates
deeper bitterness than stranger.25

It must be emphasized that the oppositors (herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 for
any cause of action as in fact no defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for issuance of letters of
Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a special proceeding and, as
such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. 26 the
petitioners therein (private respondents herein) merely seek to establish the fat of death of their father and
subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the said deceased so that they can validly exercise their
right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and
special jurisdiction of the probate court.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the petition in the above-entitled case, is DENIED for lack of merit, Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-45262 July 23, 1990

RUPERTO REYES and REYNALDO C. SAN JUAN, in his capacity as Special Administrator, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, Judge of CFI, Pampanga (Branch VII), and URSULA D. PASCUAL, respondents.

G.R. No. L-45394 July 23, 1990

PEDRO DALUSONG, petitioner,

vs
HON. LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, JUDGE, BRANCH VII, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA, and URSULA D.
PASCUAL, respondents.

G.R. Nos. 73241-42 July 23, 1990

OFELIA D. PARUNGAO and ROSARIO DUNCIL, petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, (Third Civil Cases Division), BENJAMIN P. REYES and OSCAR
REYES, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The instant petitions have been consolidated as they arose from the same facts and involve similar issues. Dr.
Emilio Pascual died intestate and without issue on November 18,1972. He was survived by his sister, Ursula Pascual
and the children of his late sisters as follows: (1) Maria Pascual Reyes- Ruperto Reyes and Jose Reyes; (2) Ines
Pascual Reyes-Jose P. Reyes, Benito Reyes, and Manna Reyes Manalastas; (3) Josefa Pascual Reyes-Augusto Reyes
and Benjamin Reyes; and (4) Escolastica Pascual Dalusong (half- blood Pedro Dalusong.

On December 3, 1973, the heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M in the then Court of First
Instance of Pampanga for the administration of his estate. Atty. Marcela Macapagal, Clerk of Court of Branch VII
was appointed special administratrix. Macapagal was, however, replaced by Reynaldo San Juan.

On February 12, 1976, Ursula Pascual filed a motion to exclude some properties from the inventory of Pascual's
estate and to deliver the titles thereto to her. Ursula alleged that Dr. Pascual during his lifetime or on November 2,
1966 executed a "Donation Mortis Causa" in her favor covering properties which are included in the estate of Dr.
Pascual (subject of Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M) and therefore should be excluded from the inventory.

On August 1, 1976; the trial court issued an order excluding from the inventory of the estate the properties
donated to Ursula, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing discussion, let the properties listed in paragraph 2 of
the motion of February 12, 1976 filed by Ursula D. Pascual thru counsel be, as it is hereby
ordered, excluded from the inventory of the estate of the deceased Dr. Emilio D. Pascual,
without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. Special Administrator Reynaldo
San Juan is hereby ordered to return to Court the custody of the corresponding certificates of
titles of these properties, until the issue of ownership is finally determined in a separate action.
(G.R. No. 45262, pp. 23-24)
The Order is now the subject of G.R. Nos. 45262 and 45394. On January 5, 1977, we issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the trial court from enforcing the August 1, 1976 Order.

Among the properties included in the "donation mortis causa" in favor of Ursula was Lot 24, Block No. 15 of the
subdivision plan Psd-3231, located at 1109-1111 R. Papa St., Tondo, Manila as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 17854. The records show that on May 15, 1969, Emilio Pascual executed a deed of donation of real
property inter vivos over the abovementioned lot in Manila in favor of Ofelia D. Parungao, petitioner in G.R. Nos.
73241-42 a minor with her mother, Rosario Duncil, accepting the gift and donation for and in her behalf. When
Parungao reached the age of majority or on December 20, 1976, she tried to have the donation registered.
However, she found out that the certificate of title was missing from where it was supposed to be kept, prompting
her to file a petition for reconstitution of title with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The petition was granted
in October 1977. Parungao registered the deed of donation with the Register of Deeds of Manila who cancelled
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17854 and issued in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 129092 in the
name of Ofelia Parungao. She then filed a motion for exclusion in Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M.

In the meantime, on September 23, 1976, Ursula Pascual executed a deed of absolute sale over the Tondo
property in favor of Benjamin, Oscar, Jose and Emmanuel, all surnamed Reyes.

On May 2, 1978, Benjamin Reyes, private respondent in G.R. Nos. 73241-42 filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 129092, Register of Deeds of Manila and/or reconveyance of deed of title
against Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil, with the then Court of First Instance of Manila. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 115164.

In their answer with compulsory counterclaim Parungao and Duncil, denied Reyes' assertion of ownership over the
Tondo property. On November 6, 1978, Ofelia Parungao filed a complaint for recovery of possession over the
Tondo property against Benjamin Reyes and his nephew Oscar Reyes with the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 119359. In her complaint, Parungao also alleged that as early as 1973, the
defendants occupied two (2) doors of the apartment situated at the Tondo property by mere tolerance of the
previous owner, Dr. Emilio Pascual, and later by her until April 8, 1978 when she formally demanded that the
defendants vacate the premises. Parungao prayed that the defendants be evicted from the premises.

The two cases were consolidated. On June 3, 1982, the then Court of First Instance, Branch 8 rendered a joint
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: In Civil Case No. 115164 —

1) Declaring TCT No. 129092 in the name of Ofelia Parungao null and void; and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel said title and to restore, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 17854 in
the name of Emilio D. Pascual;

2) Ordering Ofelia D. Parungao to pay plaintiff Benjamin P. Reyes the sum of Two Thousand
(P2,000.00) Pesos, as and for attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of suit including all fees which
the Register of Deeds may prescribe for the full implementation of this decision. For lack of
merit, the counterclaim is dismissed.

In Civil Case No. 119359 —

1) Dismissing the complaint for want of merit; and

2) On the counterclaim, ordering Ofelia Parungao to pay defendant defendants the sum of Two
Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos as and for attorney's fees.'
Parungao appealed the decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court. The decision was, however, affirmed,
with costs against the appellant.

The Intermediate Appellate Court decision is now the subject matter in G.R. Nos. 73241-42.

On January 29, 1986, we issued a minute resolution denying the above petition for lack of merit. The resolution
became final and executory on March 10, 1986 and on this same day the entry of judgment was effected. The
entry of judgment was however set aside in the resolution dated January 19, 1987 on the ground that the January
29, 1986 resolution was not received by the petitioners' counsel of record. The petitioner was granted leave to file
a motion for reconsideration of the January 29, 1986 resolution.

The motion for reconsideration is now before us for resolution petition.

The issues raised in these petitions are two-fold: (1) In G.R. No. L-45394, petitioner Pedro Dalusong questions the
jurisdiction of the probate court to exclude the properties donated to Ursula Pascual in its Order dated August 1,
1976, and (2) In G.R. No. L-45262 and G.R. Nos. 73241-42 Ruperto Reyes, Reynaldo C. San Juan, in his capacity as
special administrator of the estate of Emilio Pascual (petitioner in G.R. No.
L- 45262), Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 7324142) question the appellate court's
finding that the "Donation Mortis Causa" executed by Emilio Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual was
actually a Donation Inter Vivos.

We first discuss the issue on jurisdiction. The questioned August 1, 1976 order of the then Court of First Instance of
Pampanga in S.P. Proc. No. 73-30-M categorically stated that the exclusion from the inventory of the estate of the
deceased Dr. Emilio D. Pascual was "without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action." The
provisional character of the exclusion of the contested properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within
the jurisdiction of the probate court. This was stressed in the case of Cuizon v. Ramolete (129 SCRA 495 [1984])
which we cited in the case of Morales v. Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch V (146 SCRA 373 [1986]):

It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or
intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well
and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the
probate court cannot do so (Mallari v. Mallari, 92 Phil. 694; Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501).i•t•c-
aüsl

Similarly, in Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, (91 SCRA 540) we held that for the
purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not
conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which
may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages
448449 and 473; Lachenal v. Salas,
L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).

On the second issue, it may be noted that the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the authenticity of the 1969
donation to Parungao because of its finding that the 1966 donation to Pascual was inter vivos. The petitioners do
not press the authenticity of the 1969 donation as their challenge centers on whether or not the 1966 donation
was inter vivos. However, the trial court has a lengthy discussion reflecting adversely on the authenticity of the
1969 donation to Parungao.
The petitioners assert that the 1966 donation was null and void since it was not executed with the formalities of a
will. Therefore, the petitioners in G.R. No. L-45262 insist that the donated properties should revert to the estate of
Emilio Pascual while the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73241-42 insist that the donation of real property inter vivos in
favor of Ofelia Parungao be given effect.

The subject deed of donation titled "DONATION MORTIS CAUSA" duly notarized by a certain Cornelio M. Sigua
states:

That Dr. Emilio D. Pascual, Filipino, single, of age and resident of Apalit, Pampanga, hereinafter
called the DONOR and Ursula D. Pascual, Filipino, single, also of age, resident of and with postal
address at Apalit, Pampanga, hereinafter called the DONEE, have agreed, as they do hereby
agree, to the following, to wit:

That the said DONOR, Dr. Emilio D. Pascual, for and in consideration of the love and affection
which he has and bears unto the said DONEE, as also for the personal services rendered by the
said DONEE to the said DONOR, does hereby by these presents voluntarily GIVE, GRANT, and
DONATE MORTIS CAUSA unto the said DONEE URSULA D. PASCUAL, her heirs and assigns, all of
my rights, title and interest, in and to the following parcels of land with all the improvements
thereon, situated in the Municipality of Apalit, Pampanga, and more particularly described and
Identified as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

(Enumerated herein are 41 parcels of land)

Also included in this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA are all personal properties of the DONOR in the
form of cash money or bank deposits and insurance in his favor, and his real properties situated
in other towns of Pampanga, such as San Simon, and in the province of Rizal, San Francisco del
Monte and in the City of Manila.

That the said donor has reserved for himself sufficient property to maintain him for life; and that
the said DONEE does hereby ACCEPT and RECEIVE this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA and further
does express his appreciation and gratefulness for the generosity of said DONOR; (Rollo of G.R.
No. L-45262, pp. 12-16)

xxx xxx xxx

Considering the provisions of the DONATION MORTIS CAUSA the appellate court ruled that the deed of donation
was actually a donation inter vivos although denominated as DONATION MORTIS CAUSA.

It is, now a settled rule that the title given to a deed of donation is not the determinative factor which makes the
donation "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" As early as the case of Laureta v. Manta, et al., (44 Phil. 668 [1928]) this
Court ruled that the dispositions in a deed of donation-whether "inter vivos" or "mortis causa" do not depend on
the title or term used in the deed of donation but on the provisions stated in such deed. This Court explained
in Concepcion v. Concepcion (91 Phil. 823 [1952]) —

...But, it is a rule consistently followed by the courts that it is the body of the document of
donation and the statements contained therein, and not the title that should be considered in
ascertaining the intention of the donor. Here, the donation is entitled and called donacion
onerosa mortis causa. From the body, however, we find that the donation was of a nature
remunerative rather than onerous. It was for past services rendered, services which may not be
 considered as a debt to be paid by the donee but services rendered to her freely and in goodwill.
The donation instead of being onerous or for a valuable consideration, as in payment of a legal
obligation, was more of remuneratory or compensatory nature, besides being partly motivated
by affection.

We should not give too much importance or significance to or be guided by the use of the phrase
'mortis causa in a donation and thereby to conclude that the donation is not one of inter vivos. In
the case of De Guzman et al. v. Ibea et al. (67 Phil. 633), this Court through Mr. Chief Justice
Avancena said that if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact
that the donor styles it mortis causa.

In the case of Laureta v. Mata, et al. (44 Phil. 668), the court held that the donation involved was
inter vivos. There, the donor Severa Magno y Laureta gave the properties involved as —

... a reward for the services which he is rendering me, and as a token of my affection toward him
and of the fact that he stands high in my estimation, I hereby donate 'mortis causa to said youth
all the properties described as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

I also declare that it is the condition of this donation that the donee cannot take possession of
the properties donated before the death of the donor, and in the event of her death the said
donee shall be under obligation to cause a mass to be held annually as a suffrage in behalf of my
sold, and also to defray the expenses of my burial and funerals.'

It will be observed that the present case and that of Laureta above cited are similar in that in
both cases the donation was being made as a reward for services rendered and being rendered,
and as a token of affection for the donee; the phrase 'mortis causa was used; the donee to take
possession of the property donated only after the death of the donor; the donee was under
obligation to defray the expenses incident to the celebration of the anniversary of the donor's
death, including church fees. The donation in both cases were duly accepted. In said case of
Laureta this Court held that the donation was in praesenti and not a gift in futuro.

In the later case of Bonsato et al. v. Court of appeals, et al. (95 Phil. 481 [1954]) this Court, distinguished the
characteristics of a donation inter vivos and "mortis causa" in this wise:

Did the late Domingo Bonsato, make donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in favor
of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should reveal any or all of the
following characteristics:

(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (fun or naked) and
control of the property while alive (Vidal v. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman v. Ibea 67 Phil., 633);

(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum;
but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautista v. Sabiniano, G.R. No. L- 4326, November 18,
1952);

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
These principles were repeated in the case of Castro v. Court of Appeals (27 SCRA 1076 [1969]), to wit:

Whether a donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends upon the nature of the disposition
made. 'Did the donor intend to transfer the ownership of the property donated upon the
execution of the donation? If this is so, as reflected from the provisions contained in the
donation, then it is inter vivos; otherwise, it is merely mortis causa, or made to take effect after
death.' (Howard v. Padilla and Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-7064 and L-7098, April 22, 1955.

Applying the above principles to the instant petitions, there is no doubt that the so-called DONATION MORTIS
CAUSA is really a donation inter vivos. The donation was executed by Dr. Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula
Pascual out of love and affection as well as a recognition of the personal services rendered by the donee to the
donor. The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to the donee was immediate and independent of
the death of the donor. The provision as regards the reservation of properties for the donor's subsistence in
relation to the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention of the donor to give naked
ownership of the properties to the donee immediately after the execution of the deed of donation.

With these findings we find no need to discuss the other arguments raised by the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows:

1) In G.R. Nos. 45262 and 45394 the petitions are DENIED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on January 5,
1977 is hereby LIFTED; and

2) In G.R. Nos. 73241-42, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED. This DENIAL is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 139587. November 22, 2000]

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED ISMAEL REYES, THE HEIRS OF OSCAR R.
REYES, petitioners, vs. CESAR R. REYES, respondent.

DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to annul the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 46761[1] which affirmed the Order[2] dated January 26, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96, Quezon City, in Special Proceeding No. 89-2519, a petition for issuance of letters of administration, and
the resolution dated July 28, 1999 denying their motion for reconsideration. [3]
Spouses Ismael Reyes and Felisa Revita Reyes are the registered owners of parcels of land situated in Arayat
Street, Cubao, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 4983 and 3598 (39303). The spouses have
seven children, namely: Oscar, Araceli, Herminia, Aurora, Emmanuel, Cesar and Rodrigo, all surnamed Reyes.
On April 18, 1973, Ismael Reyes died intestate. Prior to his death, Ismael Reyes was notified by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) of his income tax deficiency which arose out of his sale of a parcel land located in Tandang
Sora, Quezon City. For failure to settle his tax liability, the amount increased to about P172,724.40 and since no
payment was made by the heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes, the property covered by TCT No. 4983 was levied [4] sold
and eventually forfeited by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in favor of the government. [5]
Sometime in 1976, petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes availed of the BIRs tax amnesty and he was able to
redeem the property covered by TCT No. 4983[6] upon payment of the reduced tax liability in the amount of about
P18,000.[7]
On May 18, 1982, the Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City sent a notice to Felisa Revita Reyes informing
her that the Arayat properties will be sold at public auction on August 25, 1982 for her failure to settle the real estate
tax delinquency from 1974-1981.[8]
On December 15, 1986, petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes entered into an amnesty compromise agreement
with the City Treasurer and settled the accounts of Felisa R. Reyes. [9]
On May 10, 1989, private respondent Cesar Reyes, brother of Oscar Reyes, filed a petition for issuance of letters
of administration with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City praying for his appointment as administrator of the
estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes which estate included 50% of the Arayat properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983
and 3598.[10] Oscar Reyes filed his conditional opposition thereto on the ground that the Arayat properties do not
form part of the estate of the deceased as he (Oscar) had acquired the properties by redemption and or purchase. [11]
The probate court subsequently issued letters of administration in favor of Cesar Reyes where the latter was
ordered to submit a true and complete inventory of properties pertaining to the estate of the deceased and the
special powers of attorney executed by the other heirs who reside in the USA and that of Aurora Reyes-Dayot
conforming to his appointment as administrator.[12] Cesar Reyes filed an inventory of real and personal properties of
the deceased which included the Arayat properties with a total area of 1,009 sq. meters.[13] On the other hand, Oscar
Reyes filed his objection to the inventory reiterating that the Arayat properties had been forfeited in favor of the
government and he was the one who subsequently redeemed the same from the BIR using his own funds.[14]
A hearing on the inventory was scheduled where administrator Cesar Reyes was required to present evidence
to establish that the properties belong to the estate of Ismael Reyes and the oppositor to adduce evidence in support
of his objection to the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory. [15] After hearing the parties respective
arguments, the probate court issued its Order dated January 26, 1994, the dispositive portion of which reads: [16]
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the foregoing findings, the Court hereby modifies the inventory submitted by the
administrator and declares to belong to the estate of the late Ismael Reyes the following properties, to wit:

1. One half (1/2) of the agricultural land located in Montalban, Rizal containing an area of 31,054 square
meters, covered by TCT 72730 with an approximate value of P405,270.00;
2. One half (1/2) of two (2) adjoining residential lots located on Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City, with
total area of 1,009 square meters, more or less, covered by TCTs No. 4983 AND 3598 (39303), with an
approximate value of P3,027,000.00; but this determination is provisional in character and shall be
without prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought hereafter in the proper Court on the
issue of ownership of the properties; and,
3. The building constructed by and leased to Sonny Bernardo and all its rental income from the inception
of the lease, whether such income be in the possession of oppositor, in which case he is hereby
directed to account therefor, or if such income be still unpaid by Bernardo, in which case the
administrator should move to collect the same.

Consistent with the foregoing things, either of the administrator oppositor, or heir Felisa R. Reyes, in her personal
capacity as apparent co-owner of the Arayat Street properties, may commence the necessary proper action for
settling the issue of ownership of such properties in the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City and to inform the
Court of the commencement thereof by any of them as soon as possible.

The administrator is hereby directed to verify and check carefully on whether other properties, particularly the real
properties allegedly situated in Montalban, Rizal; in Marikina, Metro Manila (near Boys Town); and in Bulacan,
otherwise referred to as the Hi-Cement property truly pertained to the estate; to determine their present
condition and the status of their ownership; and to render a report thereon in writing within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this Order.

The motion demanding for accounting to be done by oppositor Oscar Reyes is hereby denied for being
unwarranted, except whatever incomes he might have received from Sonny Bernardo, which he is hereby directed
to turn over to the administrator within thirty (30) days from finality of this Order.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Oscar Reyes which was denied in an Order dated May 30, 1994. [17] He
then filed his appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, Oscar died and he was
substituted by his heirs, herein petitioners.
On May 6, 1999, the respondent Court issued its assailed decision which affirmed the probate courts order. It
ruled that the probate courts order categorically stated that the inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory
of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes is provisional in character and shall be without prejudice to the outcome
of any action to be brought hereafter in the proper court on the issue of ownership of the properties; that the
provisional character of the inclusion of the contested properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within
the jurisdiction of intestate court. It further stated that although the general rule that question of title to property
cannot be passed upon in the probate court admits of exceptions, i.e. if the claimant and all other parties having
legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court
for adjudication, such has no application in the instant case since petitioner-appellee and oppositor-appellant are
not the only parties with legal interest in the subject property as they are not the only heirs of the decedent; that it
was never shown that all parties interested in the subject property or all the heirs of the decedent consented to the
submission of the question of ownership to the intestate court.
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated July 28, 1999. Hence
this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the respondent Court erred (1) in ruling that the court a quo
correctly included one half (1/2) of the Arayat properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598 (39303) in the inventory
of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes (2) in upholding that the court a quo has no jurisdiction to determine the
issue of ownership.
Petitioners argue that a probate courts jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and
what shares are due them as regards the estate of a deceased person since the probate court has the power and
competence to determine whether a property should be excluded from the inventory of the estate or not, thus the
Court a quo committed a reversible error when it included the Arayat properties in the inventory of the estate of
Ismael Reyes despite the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner-oppositor Oscar Reyes proving his claim
of ownership. Petitioners contend that their claim of ownership over the Arayat properties as testified to by their
predecessor Oscar Reyes was based on two (2) grounds, to wit (1) his redemption of the Arayat properties and (2)
the abandonment of the properties by his co-heirs; that his act of redeeming the properties from the BIR in 1976
and therefter from the City Treasurer of Quezon City using his own funds have the effect of vesting ownership to
him.Petitioners claim that private respondent is already barred from claiming the Arayat properties since he only
filed this petition 16 years after the death of Ismael Reyes and after the prices of the real properties in Cubao have
already escalated tremendously.
We find no merit in this argument.
The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate
and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of administrators, executors,
guardians and trustees.[18] The question of ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter which the Probate Court
cannot resolve with finality.[19] Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should
not be included in the inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. [20]
We find that the respondent Court did not err in affirming the provisional inclusion of the subject properties to
the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes without prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought thereafter in
the proper court on the issue of ownership considering that the subject properties are still titled under the torrens
system in the names of spouses Ismael and Felisa Revita Reyes which under the law is endowed with incontestability
until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law.[21] The declaration of the provisional character of
the inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the
Probate Court.
Petitioners next claim that as an exception to the rule that the probate court is of limited jurisdiction, the court
has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased and they
submitted the question of title to the property, without prejudice to third persons. Petitioners allege that the parties
before the probate court were all the heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes and they were allowed to present evidence
proving ownership over the subject properties, thus private respondent cannot argue that he did not in any way
consent to the submission of the issue of ownership to the probate court as the records of this case is replete with
evidence that he presented evidence in an attempt to prove ownership of the subject properties.
We are not persuaded.
Settled is the rule that the Regional Trial Court acting as a probate court exercises but limited jurisdiction, thus
it has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely
to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or
impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons
are not thereby prejudiced.[22]
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the rule. It bears
stress that the purpose why the probate court allowed the introduction of evidence on ownership was for the sole
purpose of determining whether the subject properties should be included in the inventory which is within the
probate courts competence. Thus, when private respondent Cesar Reyes was appointed as administrator of the
properties in the courts Order dated July 26, 1989, he was ordered to submit a true inventory and appraisal of the
real and personal properties of the estate which may come into his possession or knowledge which private
respondent complied with. However, petitioner Oscar Reyes submitted his objection to the inventory on the ground
that it included the subject properties which had been forfeited in favor of the government on April 21, 1975 and
which he subsequently redeemed on August 19, 1976. The Court resolved the opposition as follows:

At the hearing today of the pending incidents, it was agreed that the said incidents could not be resolved without
introduction of evidence.

Accordingly, the hearing on the inventory of real and personal properties is hereby set on April 24, 1990 at 10:00
A.M. at which date and time the petitioner/administrator shall be required to present evidence to establish that
the properties stated in the inventory belong to the estate of Ismael Reyes. The oppositor shall thereafter adduce
his evidence in support of his objection to the inclusion of certain properties of the estates in the inventory.

Notably, the Probate Court stated, from the start of the hearing, that the hearing was for the merits of
accounting and inventory, thus it had jurisdiction to hear the opposition of Oscar Reyes to the inventory as well as
the respective evidence of the parties to determine for purposes of inventory alone if they should be included therein
or excluded therefrom. In fact, the probate court in its Order stated that for resolution is the matter of the inventory
of the estate, mainly to consider what properties should be included in the inventory and what should not be
included. There was nothing on record that both parties submitted the issue of ownership for its final
resolution. Thus the respondent Court did not err in ruling that the trial court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the
issue of ownership conclusively.
In fact, the probate court, aware of its limited jurisdiction declared that its determination of the ownership was
merely provisional and suggested that either the administrator or the widow Felisa Reyes may commence the proper
action in the Regional Trial Court. Moreover, the court admitted that it was not competent to pass upon the
ownership of the subject properties, thus:

Although the testimony of the oppositor should have greater persuasive value than that of the
petitioner/administrator, mainly because it agrees closely with the recitals of facts found in the several public
documents submitted as evidence in this case and is corroborated to the greatest extent by the fact that the
properties were, indeed, abandoned in his possession since 1975 until the present, his alleged ownership of the
Arayat Street properties cannot still be sustained in a manner which would warrant their exclusion from the
administrators inventory.

To begin with, there are portions in the records which show that the oppositor himself was somehow uncertain
about his rights on the properties and the basis therefor. During his cross-examination (tsn, Oct. 4, 1991), he gave
the following statements:

xx xx xx
(Atty. Habitan)
Q: And if we will add the other taxes you have paid, (you) are now claiming to be the owner of the Arayat property
because you have paid all these taxes?
A: The amounts I have paid and all the expenses I have and if I had not paid all these amounts the property in
question would have been lost, sir.
Q: So, in effect, you are now claiming ownership over the property, I want a categorical answer, Mr. Witness?
A: If I am going to sum up all these expenses, my share in the Hi-Cement property, my share in the Bulacan
property, the amount of the property in Cubao is small and also all my sufferings because of the property
in Cubao, this cannot be paid in terms of money, sir. (tsn, Oct. 4, 1991, pp. 10-12)

On re-direct examination (tsn, Sept. 18, 1992), he clarified his statements as follows:
 xx xx xx
(Atty, Javellana)
Q: Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, you were asked by the petitioners counsel whether because you had paid
the BIR P17,872.44 you are now claiming to be the owner of the property in Arayat Street to which you
answered no, will you explain your answer?
A: When I paid almost P18,000.00, it does not mean that I claim the property already; on the contrary, I have my
own reasons to claim it now on other conditions which are the following: number one, there was a levy
by the BIR on the property, it was forfeited due to delinquency of real estate taxes; number two, for
abandonment, when my mother, brother(s) and sisters left the property, they told me it is my problem and
I should take care of it. Number three, the disposition, my mother, my brothers and sisters sold the property
of my father, the Hi-Cement and the property in Visayas Street without giving my share. And another thing
I have to sell my own property, my own assets so that I can redeem from the BIR the Arayat property and
which I did with my personal funds, and number five, nobody helped me in my problems regarding those
properties, I was alone and so I felt that the property in Arayat is mine.
xx xx xx

(tsn, Sept. 18, 1992, pp. 2-3)

Notwithstanding his clarifying statements on redirect examination, the impression of the Court on the issue is not
entirely favorable to him. Apart from the absence of a specific document of transfer, the circumstances and factors
he gave may not suffice in and by themselves to convey or transfer title, for, at best, they may only be the basis of
such transfer. They may be considered as proof of the intention to dispose in his favor or as evidence of a set off
among the heirs, which seems to be what he has in mind. There might also be substance in his assertions about
the abandonment in his favor, which, if raised in the proper action, could constitute either prescription or laches. It
is hardly needed to stress, therefore, that more than these are required to predicate the exclusion of the
properties from the inventory.

Another obtrusive reality stands out to invite notice: the BIR levy was only made on the property covered in TCT
4983 and did not include the property covered in TCT 3598 (39303). This somehow detracts from the logic of the
oppositors assertion of ownership of the entire Arayat Street properties; even if his assertion is valid and true, it
can encompass, at most, only the property subject of the BIRs levy and declaration of forfeiture (i.e., TCT 4983),
not the property covered by TCT 3598 (39303).

These pronouncements should not by any means diminish or deprive the oppositor of whatever rights or
properties he believes or considers to be rightfully his. Although the circumstances and factors he has given to the
Court herein may have legal consequences that could have defeated opposing-claims and rendered oppositors
claim on the properties unassailable, this Courts competence to adjudicate thus in this proceedings is clearly non-
existent. In Baybayan vs. Aquino (149 SCRA 186), it was held that the question of ownership of a property alleged
to be part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.

This ruling then, cannot be a final adjudication on the present and existing legal ownership of the
properties.Whatever is declared herein ought not to preclude oppositor from prosecuting an ordinary action for
the purpose of having his claims or rights established over the properties. If he still cares hereafter to prosecute
such claim of ownership adversely to the estate and the apparent co-owner, his mother Felisa. As stated in Valera,
et al. vs. Judge Inserto, et al. (149 SCRA 533), this Court, acting as a probate court, exercises but limited
jurisdiction; accordingly, its determination that property should be included in the inventory or not is within its
probate jurisdiction, but such determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.
 xx xx xx

The aforecited findings clarify that there were several reasons for having the issue of ownership ventilated
elsewhere.Apart from the fact that only one-half of the two lots known as the Arayat property (i.e., the half that
could pertain to the estate) could be settled herein, there was the realization that the evidence adduced so far
(including that bearing on the oppositors basis for excluding from the estate the property) was inadequate or
otherwise inconclusive.

A practical way of looking at the problem is that this Court, sitting herein as an intestate court, does not consider
itself competent to rule on the ownership of the entire Arayat property.

Finally, anent private respondents allegation that the instant petition was filed one day late, hence should be
dismissed, we find the same to be devoid of merit. Petitioners received copy of the decision denying their motion
for reconsideration on August 13, 1999, thus they have until August 28, 1999 within which to file petition for review.
Petitioners filed their motion for extension on August 27, 1999 praying for 30 days extension from August 28, 1999
or until September 27, 1999 to file their petition which this Court granted. Petitioners filed their petition on
September 27, 1999, which is within the period given by the Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23102 April 24, 1967

CECILIO MENDOZA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and LUISA DE LA ROSA MENDOZA, respondents.

Guillermo B. Ilagan for petitioner.

George Y. Cadhit for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Cecilio Mendoza resorts to this Court for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in case CA-G.R. No.
30005-R, denying a writ of prohibition and injunction against the orders of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija refusing dismissal of Civil Case No. 3436 of that Court.1äwphï1.ñët

We glean from the record that Luisa de la Rosa Mendoza instituted Case No. 3436 against petitioner herein. In the
complaint, she averred that she was married to Cecilio Mendoza on 2 September 1953; that they lived together as
husband and wife until 14 July 1954, when the husband departed for the United States to further his studies and
practice his profession; that since then, defendant Mendoza "without justifiable cause or reason deliberately
abandoned and neglected plaintiff and despite repeated demands by plaintiff, defendant has failed and refused,
and still fails and refuses, to provide for the maintenance and support of plaintiff, who is allegel to be pregnant,
sickly and without any source of revenue, while defendant (now petitioner) is employed in a hospital in the United
States, earning an average of $200.00 a month, besides being a part-owner of lands in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija,
assessed at P32,330.00 in 1955.

In due course, defendant Cecilio Mendoza moved for dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and
improper venue. The motion having been denied, he filed an answer with counterclaim, putting in issue the
validity of his marriage to plaintiff (Brief, p. 13), and plaintiff (now respondent) Luisa de la Rosa duly replied.

On 3 July 1961 defendant filed a second motion to dismiss, this time predicated on the complaint's failure to state
a cause of action, because it contained no allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made
before the filing of the suit, and invoking the provisions of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. No.
386) that provides:

ART. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject
to the limitations in article 2035.

The Court of First Instance, having refused to entertain his second motion to dismiss, the defendant petitioned the
Court of Appeals for writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to stop the Court of First Instance from further
proceeding with the case. The Court of Appeals gave due course to his petition and issued the preliminary writ
prayed for; but, after hearing and consideration of the merits, it denied the writ of prohibition and dissolved the
injunction.

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Cecilio Mendoza then resorted to this Court, which gave due
course to his petition for review.

Petitioner argues that Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (jam. quot.) requires that before a suit
between members of the same family (in this case between husband and wife) is filed or maintained, it must
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, and the only way to make it so appear when
the suit is filed is by a proper averment to that effect in the complaint. Since the law forbids a suit being initiated
(filed) or maintained unless such efforts at compromise appear, the showing that efforts in question were made is
a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action. It follows that the failure of the complaint to plead
that plaintiff previously tried in earnest to reach a settlement out of court renders it assailable for lack of cause of
action and it may be so attacked at any stage of the case even on appeal.

While we agree that petitioner's position represents a correct statement of the general rule on the matter, we are
nevertheless constrained to hold that the Court of Appeals and the Court of First Instance committed no error in
refusing to dismiss the complaint, for on its face, the same involved a claim for future support that under Article
2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines can not be subject of a valid compromise, and is, therefore, outside the
sphere of application of Article 222 of the Code upon which petitioner relies. This appears from the last proviso of
said Article 222, already quoted. Even the answer below, in attacking the validity of the marriage of plaintiff-
respondent Luisa de la Rosa to defendant-petitioner Cecilio Mendoza, poses a non-compromisable issue.

ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:

(1) x x x;

(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;

(3) x x x;

(4) Future support.

Since no valid compromise is possible on these issues, a showing of previous efforts to compromise them would be
superfluous.

It may be that the complaint asks for both future support and support in arrears, as petitioner contends. But, the
possibility of compromise on the latter does not negate the existence of a valid cause of action for future support,
to which Article 222 can not apply.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals, sustaining that of the court of origin denying dismissal of the
complaint, is affirmed. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
 [G.R. No. 117417. September 21, 2000]

MILAGROS A. CORTES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MENANDRO A. RESELVA, respondents.

DECISION
BUENA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a reversal of the decision dated September 9, 1994 of the
Court of Appeals[1] in C.A.-G.R. SP. No. 33826;

"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and the assailed order of October 18, 1993,
issued by the respondent court in Special Proceeding No. 90-54955 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared NULL and
VOID. With costs against the private respondent."[2]

and the reinstatement of the order of the probate court, thus:

"WHEREFORE, Menandro Reselva and all those acting for or through him, is/are ordered to vacate forthwith the
house and lot of the estate situated in 173 Ilaw St., Balut, Tondo, Manila, and to deliver to the executrix Milagros
R. Cortes the possession thereof as well as the owner's duplicate certificate of the title thereof."[3]

The following facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are undisputed:

"Herein petitioner Menandro A. Reselva, private respondent (petitioner in this petition) Milagros R. Cortes, and
Florante Reselva are brothers and sister and children - heirs of the late spouses Teodoro T. Reselva and Lucrecia
Aguirre Reselva, who died on April 11, 1989 and May 13, 1987, respectively. During their lifetime, they acquired a
property particularly a house and lot consisting of 100 square meters, more or less, with address at 173 Ilaw St.,
Balut, Tondo, Manila. As can be gleaned from the records, Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva died ahead of Teodoro T.
Reselva. The latter executed a holographic will which was probated in this case on July 31, 1991, with Milagros R.
Cortes, as the appointed Executrix. After having been appointed and qualified as Executrix, she filed a motion
before respondent probate court praying that Menandro A. Reselva, the occupant of the property, be ordered to
vacate the property at No. 173 Ilaw St., Balut, Tondo, Manila and turn over to said Executrix the possession thereof
(Annex 'D'). This is the motion which the respondent court granted in the assailed order of October 18, 1993."[4]

In the Appellate Court, the Regional Trial Court's order was set aside for having been issued beyond the latter's
limited jurisdiction as a probate court.[5]
The long standing rule is that probate courts, or those in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate,
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and which are claimed to belong
to outside parties.[6] Stated otherwise, "claims for title to, or right of possession of, personal or real property, made
by the heirs themselves, by title adverse to that of the deceased, or made by third persons, cannot be entertained by
the (probate) court."[7]
In the present case, however, private respondent Menandro A. Reselva, who refused to vacate the house and
lot being eyed as part of the estate of the late Teodoro T. Reselva, cannot be considered an "outside party" for he is
one of the three compulsory heirs of the former. As such, he is very much involved in the settlement of Teodoro's
estate.[8]By way of exception to the above-mentioned rule, "when the parties are all heirs of the decedent, it is
optional upon them to submit to the probate court the question of title to property." [9] Here, the probate court is
competent to decide the question of ownership. More so, when the opposing parties belong to the poor stratum of
society and a separate action would be most expensive and inexpedient. [10]
 In addition, Menandro's claim is not at all adverse to, or in conflict with that of, the decedent since the former's
theory merely advances co-ownership with the latter.[11] In the same way, when the controversy is whether the
property in issue belongs to the conjugal partnership or exclusively to the decedent, the same is properly within the
jurisdiction of the probate court, which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine
the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among the heirs. [12]
More importantly, the case at bar falls squarely under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, thus:

"RULE 73

"SEC. 2. Where estate upon dissolution of marriage. - When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband
or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in
the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership
shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either."

Hence, in the 1991 case of Vita vs. Montanano we ruled:

"(I)t is not necessary to file a separate proceeding in court for the proper disposition of the estate of Isidra
Montanano. Under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, if both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership
shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either. In the present case, therefore, the conjugal
partnership of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita should be liquidated in the testate proceedings of the
latter."[13]

Consequently, this case before us should be returned to the probate court for the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of Teodoro and Lucrecia Reselva prior to the settlement of the estate of Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, without reinstating the assailed order of the trial court, the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals dated September 9, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33826 is hereby SET ASIDE and the case REMANDED to the court
of origin for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 74

G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989

VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC, respondents.

Benjamin J. Quitoriano for petitioner.

Linzag-Arcilla & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate without leaving any debts? May
the probate court appoint the surviving sister of the deceased as the administratrix of the estate of the deceased
instead of the surviving spouse? These are the main questions which need to be resolved in this case.

Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on January 3, 1983 at Bacoor,
Cavite without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria
Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private respondent.

On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite,
Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the
estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira. 1 In her verified petition, private respondent alleged the
following: that she and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left
no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left several properties, namely: death
benefits from the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees Savings
and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter
lot located at Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the spouse of the deceased (herein petitioner)
had been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the
deceased.

On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of private
respondent 2 alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the
alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to the said estate be issued in her
favor as the surviving spouse.

In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, appointed private respondent Rita Pereira Nagac
administratrix of the intestate estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by her in the amount of
Pl,000.00. The trial court ordered her to take custody of all the real and personal properties of the deceased and to
file an inventory thereof within three months after receipt of the order. 3

Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court affirmed the appointment of private respondent as administratrix in its decision dated December
15, 1987. 4
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the following issues: (1) Whether or not there
exists an estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration; (2) Whether or not a
judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no debts left by the decedent; and, (3) Who has
the better right to be appointed as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse Victoria
Bringas Pereira or the surviving sister Rita Pereira Nagac?

Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of
administration for the following reasons: firstly, the death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and the SSS belong
exclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary and in support of this claim she submitted letter-replies from these
institutions showing that she is the exclusive beneficiary of said death benefits; secondly, the savings deposits in
the name of her deceased husband with the PNB and the PCIB had been used to defray the funeral expenses as
supported by several receipts; and, finally, the only real property of the deceased has been extrajudicially settled
between the petitioner and the private respondent as the only surviving heirs of the deceased.

Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner to decide what properties form part of
the estate of the deceased and to appropriate them for herself. She points out that this function is vested in the
court in charge of the intestate proceedings.

Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not belong to the estate of the deceased on
the basis of her bare allegations as aforestated and a handful of documents. Inasmuch as this Court is not a trier of
facts, We cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion or non-exclusion of the property involved from the estate
of the deceased. 5

The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the administration proceedings are
pending. The trial court is in the best position to receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as
to the assets of the decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the
assets, if any. 6 The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in the inventory or
list of properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate
court. However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties. 7

Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of
administration, We nonetheless find the administration proceedings instituted by private respondent to be
unnecessary as contended by petitioner for the reasons herein below discussed.

The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially administered and the
competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case
the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein. 8 An exception to
this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74. 9 Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there
are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the
judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from instituting
administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good
reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves
as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do
so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. 10 It should be noted that recourse to an
administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not
resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be
burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. 11
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs,
whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and
costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such
case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings . 12

Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of a deceased when the
heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on the circumstances of each case.

In one case, 13 We said:

Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of
the hereditary estate but only in the manner of partition does section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of
Court apply and that in this case the parties are at loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary
estate because respondents succeeded in sequestering some assets of the intestate. The
argument is unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has indicated, questions as to what
property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the
partition proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one heir.

In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator is merely to avoid a
multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of
property, that same objective could be achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is not justified in
issuing letters of administration. 14 In still another case, We did not find so powerful a reason the argument that
the appointment of the husband, a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is
necessary in order for him to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased
mother, since he may just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in the intestate proceedings of the latter. 15

We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are only two surviving heirs, a wife of ten
months and a sister, both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased to be paid. What is at
once apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms. The only conceivable reason why private respondent
seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for
her own purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of
them fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial
administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not
appear to be substantial especially since the only real property left has been extrajudicially settled, to an
administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or
squandered. In most instances of a similar nature, 16 the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the
deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are
protected in any event.

We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration proceedings are pending was not
justified in issuing letters of administration, there being no good reason for burdening the estate of the deceased
Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.

With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue of who, as between the surviving spouse
Victoria Bringas Pereira and the sister Rita Pereira Nagac, should be preferred to be appointed as administratrix.

WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac are
hereby revoked and the administration proceeding dismissed without prejudice to the right of private respondent
to commence a new action for partition of the property left by Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 92436 July 26, 1991

MARIA VDA. DE REYES, EFREN REYES, ELVIRA REYES-TIMBOL, ERLINDA REYES-VALERIO, ERNESTO REYES,
ELIZABETH REYES, ALEX, RAFAEL II, EMELINA and EVELYN, all surnamed REYES, represented by their mother,
MARIA VDA. DE REYES, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES DALMACIO GARDIOLA and ROSARIO MARTILLANO respondents.

De Lara, De Lunas & Rosales for petitioners.

Santos, Pilapil & Associates for private respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Assailed before Us in this appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision of the respondent
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934, promulgated on 20 October 1989, 1 reversing the decision of 1 October
1986 of Branch 21 (Imus, Cavite) of the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region in Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-
83-17 entitled Maria vda. de Reyes, et al. vs. Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano, and Spouses
Ricardo M. Gardiola and Emelita Gardiola,2 and the resolution of 1 March 1990 denying the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

As culled from both decisions and the pleadings of the parties, the following facts have been preponderantly
established:

During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70 hectares, more or less, located at
Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He sought to bring said land under the operation of the Torrens System
of registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title having been issued to him. The
application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the administrator of his property.

In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs (Exh. "6"). In the subdivision plan, each
resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a specific heir. It appears therein that two lots, one of
which is Lot No. I A-14 (Exh. "6-A"), were allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per testimony of
Juan Poblete, the children thereafter secured tax declarations for their respective shares.

In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of title for the whole property
— OCT No. 255 — was issued. It was, however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-in-law of Marcelo Reyes, who was by
then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of this fact.

On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431 square meters, more or less, to
private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. "5"). According to the vendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot No. 1-A-
14 of the subdivision plan aforestated. The deed of sale, however, did not specifically mention Lot No. 1-A-14. The
vendee immediately took possession of the property and started paying the land taxes therein.

In 1945 or thereabouts, Juan Poblete "revalidated" the original Certificate of Title. As reconstituted, the new title
is OCT (0-4358) RO-255 (Exhs. "4" to "4-A").

On 21 October 1967, when the heirs of Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Exh.
"D") based on the aforestated subdivision plan (Exh. "6"), the lot that was intended for Rafael Reyes, Sr., who was
already deceased, was instead adjudicated to his only son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr. (the predecessor-in-interest of
the petitioners herein). Private respondent Rosario Martillano signed the deed in representation of her mother,
Marta Reyes, one of the children of Gavino Reyes.

As a result of the Extrajudicial Settlement, OCT RO-255 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, several transfer
certificates of title covering the subdivided lots were issued in the names of the respective adjudicatees. One of
them is TCT No. 27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr. covering Lot No. 1-A-14. The Transfer Certificates of Title
were, however, kept by one Candido Hebron. On 10 January 1969, some of the heirs of Gavino Reyes filed a case
of Annulment of Partition and Recovery of Possession before the Court of First Instance of Cavite City, which was
docketed therein as Civil Case No. 1267. One of the defendants in said case is herein private respondent Rosario
Martillano. The case was dismissed on 18 September 1969, but Candido Hebron was ordered by the trial court to
deliver to the heirs concerned all the transfer certificates of title in his possession. 3

After obtaining the Transfer Certificate of Title for Lot No. 1-A-14 from Hebron, pursuant to the aforesaid order in
Civil Case No. 1267, petitioners herein, as successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., filed on 14 March 1983 with
the Regional Trial Court the above-mentioned Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-17 against private respondents
(defendants therein) for recovery of possession or, in the alternative, for indemnification, accounting and
damages. They allege therein that after "having definitely discovered that they are the lawful owners of the
property," (Lot No. 1-A-14), they, "including Rafael Reyes, Jr., during his lifetime, made repeated demands to (sic)
defendants to surrender the possession of and vacate the parcel of land belonging to the former, but defendants
refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the said land to herein plaintiffs;" the last of the demands was
allegedly made on 8 October 1982. They further allege that they have been deprived by said defendants of the
rightful possession and enjoyment of the property since September 1969 — which coincides with the date of the
order in Civil Case No. 1267.4

In their answer, private respondents deny the material averments in the complaint and assert that they are the
owners of the lot in question, having bought the same from Rafael Reyes, Sr., that the issuance of TCT No. 27257 is
null and void, for such sale was known to Rafael Reyes, Jr.; that they have been in possession of the property and
have been paying the land taxes thereon; and that petitioners are barred by prescription and/or laches. 5

Petitioners amended their complaint on 21 March 1985 to implead as additional defendants the spouses Ricardo
M. Gardiola and Emerita Gardiola, on the basis of the following claims:

xxx xxx xxx

9. Meanwhile, during the presentation of the defendants spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario
Martillano's evidence the former testified that they mortgaged the subject land to the Rural Bank of
Carmona Inc. For their failure to redeem the mortgage the same was foreclosed by the bank.

10. However, within the period of one(1) year from such foreclosure the questioned land was redeemed
by the original defendants' son in the person of Ricardo M. Gardiola, who was knowledgeable/aware of
the pendency of the above captioned case. The corresponding redemption was effected through a deed
of conveyance, . . . .6

The prayer of the amended complaint now contains the alternative relief for indemnification for the reasonable
value of the property "in the event restitution of the property is no longer possible." 7

In its decision of 1 October 1986,8 the trial court concluded that petitioners' "title over the subject property is valid
and regular and thus they are entitled to its possession and enjoyment," and accordingly decided thus:
 WHEREFORE, the defendants or anyone acting for and in their behalf are hereby ordered to relinguish
possession or vacate the property in question which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257
in favor of the plaintiffs.

All other claims and/or counterclaims of the parties relative to this case are dismissed for lack of proper
substantiation.

The conclusion of the trial court is based on its finding that (a) there is no evidence that the heirs of Gavino Reyes
entered into any written agreement of partition in 1936 based on the subdivision plan; (b) there is no identity
between Lot No. 1-14-A and the land sold to private respondents by Rafael Reyes, Sr., or otherwise stated, the
description of the latter as indicated in the deed of sale (Exh. "5") does not tally with the description of the former;
and (c) moreover:

Granting, arguendo, that the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to the defendants covered the land in
question — Lot No. 1-A-14 — and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 was obtained by means of
fraud, the claim of the defendants over the said property is already barred. Action for reconveyance
prescribes in four (4) years from the discovery thereof. If there was fraud, the defendant could have
discovered the same in 1967 when the partition was made in as much as defendant Rosario Martillano
was a party to that partition. Let us grant further that the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
27257 to Rafael Reyes, Jr. created a constructive or implied trust in favor of the defendants, again, the
claim of the defendants is also barred. From 1967 to the filing of their answer (let us consider this as an
action for reconveyance) to this case sometime in July, 1983, a period of about sixteen (16) years had
already elapsed. Prescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust is ten
(10) years.

The trial court further held that the continued possession by private respondents, which it found to have started in
1943, did not ripen into ownership because at that time, the property was already registered, hence it cannot be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.9

Private respondents appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals which docketed the appeal as C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 11934. In its decision of 20 October 1989, the respondent Court of Appeals formulated the issues before it as
follows:

Whether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the property of the late Gavino Reyes consisting of
70 hectares was partitioned only in 1967 by his grandchildren after discovery of the existence of OCT No.
255 and that no actual partition was made in 1936 by the decedent's children.

II

Whether or not the lower court erred in concluding that the parcel of land sold by the appellees'
predecessor-in-interest, the late Rafael Reyes, Sr. to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was not the same parcel
of land under litigation.10

and resolved such issues, thus:

On the first issue, We believe that the lower court committed a reversible error when it declared that the
landed estate of the late Gavino Reyes was partitioned only in 1967 by the latter's grandchildren; and that
no actual partition was made in 1936 by the decedents' (sic) children. The evidence on record bears out
the existence of a subdivision plan (Exh. 6) which was not controverted nor denied by the appellees. In
like manner, the lower court itself recognized the fact that the property of the late Gavino Reyes
consisting of 70 hectares was surveyed and subdivided in 1936 as evidenced by the said subdivision plan
(Exh. 6). With the existence of a subdivision plan, and from the uncontroverted testimony of appellants'
witness, We can only infer that at least an oral partition, which under the law is valid and binding, was
entered into by the heirs of Gavino Reyes regarding his properties in 1936. As held in a long line of
decisions, extrajudicial partition can be done orally, and the same would be valid if freely entered into
(Belen v. Belen, 49 O.G. 997, March 1953). The reason for this is because a partition is not exactly a
conveyance for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other but rather a
confirmation by them of their ownership of the property. It must also be remembered that when Gavino
Reyes died on March 7, 1921, his property was admittedly not yet covered by a torrens title, as it was only
in 1941 when said properties were brought into the application of the torrens system. With this factual
milieu, it can also be concluded that his heirs have indeed settled, subdivided and partitioned Gavino
Reyes' landed estate without formal requirements of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court when a parcel of land is
covered by a torrens title. As told earlier, the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) undisputedly showed on its face
that the 70 hectares of land belonging to the late Gavino Reyes was subdivided and partitioned by his
children in 1936. On this score, the partition of the said property even without the formal requirements
under the rule is valid as held in the case of Hernandez vs. Andal, 78 Phil. 176, which states:

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, in the Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1943 (Exh. 5) executed by Rafael Reyes, Sr. in favor of
appellant Dalmacio Gardiola, the land sold therein was described as "na aking minana sa aking ama." This
alone would confirm the contention of the appellants that there was already an actual partition (at least
an oral partition) of the property of Gavino Reyes in 1936. As aforestated, the presence of the Subdivision
Plan (Exh. 6) is an (sic) evidence of such partition which appellees failed to controvert not to mention the
fact that the lower court itself recognized the existence of said plan, in the same manner that it concluded
that the property was already surveyed and actually subdivided in 1936 (page 3, pars. 3 and 4, Decision).

From the foregoing considerations it is evident that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Exh. D)
executed by the grandchildren of the late Gavino Reyes in 1967 is of no moment considering that the
property subject of the partition in the deed was already partitioned in 1936 by the children of Gavino
Reyes. It is for this reason that the lots supposedly inherited by the grandchildren named in the deed of
1967 were the same lots inherited and given to their respective fathers or mothers in 1936 while the land
was not yet covered by the torrens system. Hence, in the case of Rafael Reyes, Sr., the land inherited by
him was two (2) parcels of land known as Lots Nos. 1-A-3 and 1-A-14 described in the Subdivision plan of
1936 (Exh. 6), which were the same parcels of land allegedly inherited by Rafael Reyes, Jr. from Gavino
Reyes in representation of his father, pursuant to the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate for which
TCT No. 27257 was issued.

Coming to the second issue, the lower court likewise erred when it concluded that the parcel of land sold
by appellee's predecessor-in-interest to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was not the same parcel of land
under litigation. It must be pointed out that the identity of the parcel of land which the appellees sought
to recover from the appellants was never an issue in the lower court, because the litigants had already
conceded that the parcel identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was the same parcel of land
identified as Cadastral Lot No. 1228 and 1235 described in Tax Declaration No. 4766. Despite this
admission, however, the lower court declared that "as described in the deed of sale (Exh. 5), the land's
description does not tally with the description of Lot No. 1-A-14, the land in litigation." As correctly
pointed out by the appellants however, the discrepancy in the description was due to the fact that the
description of the land sold in the Deed of Sale was expressed in layman's language whereas the
description of Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was done in technical terms. This was so because, when
Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold the property in dispute to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola on December 3, 1943, the
only evidence of title to the land then available in so far as Rafael Reyes, Sr. was concerned was Tax
 Declaration No. 4766, because at that time, neither he nor appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was aware of the
existence of OCT No. 255 as in fact TCT No. 27257 was issued only in 1967. Consequently, the land subject
of the Deed of Sale was described by the vendor in the manner as described in Tax Declaration No. 4766.
However, the description of the land appearing in the Deed of Sale (Exh. 5) was exactly the same land
identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) of 1936. Accordingly, the assumption of the
lower court that "if the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. was the one now in litigation, he could have easily
indicated Lot No. 1-A-14" is bereft of merit under the foregoing circumstances. Interestingly enough, the
appellees never denied the identity of the subject lot during the hearing at the lower court. What they
were denying only was the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola which does not
hold true because of the document denominated as Deed of Sale (Exh. 5).11

It concluded that the trial court erred when it ordered the private respondents or anyone acting in their behalf to
relinquish the possession or vacate the property in question. It thus decreed:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment is ordered REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered
declaring appellants to be the lawful owners of the lot identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257. No
costs.12

Their motion to reconsider the above decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 1
March 1990,13 petitioners filed the instant petition on 6 April 1990 after having obtained an extension of time
within which to file it.

The petition does not implead original new defendants Ricardo Gardiola and Emelita Gardiola.

As ground for their plea for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners allege that said court has
decided questions of substance in a way not in accord with law or applicable jurisprudence when it held that "the
deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate (Exh. "D") executed by the grandchildren of the late Gavino Reyes in
1967 is of no moment considering that the property subject of the partition was already partitioned in 1936 by the
children of Gavino Reyes." In support thereof, they claim that (a) TCT No. 27257 covers two parcels of land; the lot
described in paragraph 1 thereof is owned by petitioners and that ownership was confirmed by this Court in G.R.
No. 79882, hence, the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the decision of the trial court; (b) private respondent
Rosario Martillano was a party to the extrajudicial settlement of estate which was duly registered in the Registry of
Deeds in 1967; said registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the
land and also constituted constructive notice to the whole world. The court cannot disregard the binding effect
thereof Finally, the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that private respondents are the lawful owners of the
lot in question "militates against the indefeasible and incontrovertible character of the torrens title," 14 and allows
reconveyance which is not tenable since the action therefor had already prescribed, as stated in the decision of the
trial court.

In the resolution of 7 May 1990, We required respondents to comment on the petition. But even before it could do
so, petitioner, without obtaining prior leave of the Court, filed on 29 May 1990 a so-called Supplemental
Arguments in Support of The Petition For Review On certiorari15 wherein they assert, among others, that: (a) the
findings of facts of respondent Court are contrary to those of the trial court and appear to be contradicted by the
evidence on record thus calling for the review by this Court; 16 (b) it also committed misapprehension of the facts in
this case and its findings are based on speculation, conjecture and surmises; (c) private respondents' attack on
petitioners' title is a collateral attack which is not allowed; even if it is allowed, the same had already prescribed
and is now barred.

It was only on 15 June 1990 that private respondents filed their Comment. 17 We required petitioners to reply
thereto, which they complied with on 8 August 1990. 18 A rejoinder was filed by private respondents on 29 August
1990.
We gave due course to the petition on 19 September 1990 and required the parties to submit simultaneously their
respective memoranda which they complied with.

Attached as Annex "A" to private respondent's Memorandum, which was filed on 10 December 1990, is the
Resolution of this Court (Third Division) of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811 entitled Spouses Artemio Durumpili
and Angustia Reyes vs. The Court of Appeals and Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano, which also
involves the property of Gavino Reyes, the partition thereof among his children in 1936, and the extrajudicial
settlement in 1967.

In said resolution, this Court held:

. . . The partition made in 1936, although oral, was valid. The requirement in Article 1358 of the Civil Code
that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real
rights over immovable property must appear in a public instrument is only for convenience and not for
validity or enforceability as between the parties themselves. [Thunga Hui vs. Que Bentec, 2 Phil. 561
(1903)] The subsequent execution by the heirs of the Extrajudicial Partition in 1967 did not alter the oral
partition as in fact the share pertaining to Angustia Reyes corresponded to that previously assigned to her
father. Considering that Angel Reyes sold this property to Basilio de Ocampo who, in turn, sold the same
to respondents, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the latter lawfully acquired the property and are
entitled to ownership and possession thereof.

In answer to the charge of private respondents that petitioners deliberately failed to cite this resolution, the latter,
in their reply-memorandum dated 15 March 1991 and filed three days thereafter, allege:

Our failure to mention the aforementioned resolution before this Honorable Court is not deliberate nor
with malice aforethought. The reason is that to date, we have not yet received any resolution to our
Motion For Leave of Court To Refer Case To The Honorable Supreme Court En Banc. Moreover, we
honestly feel that the resolution that will be issued therein will not be applicable to the case before this
Honorable Court's Second Division. It should be mentioned that in the Durumpili case before the Third
Division, the Court of Appeals relied on the alleged confirmation of the sale executed by Angustia Reyes,
while in the Reyes case before this Second Division, there was no sale that was executed by the
petitioners Reyes' predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr.

The foregoing claim is not supported by the rollo of G.R. No. 92811, which reveals the following: (a) On 18
September 1990, petitioners therein, represented by De Lara, De Lunas and Rosales, who are the lawyers of
petitioners in the instant case, filed a motion for the reconsideration of the resolution of 20 August 1990.19 b) This
motion was denied in the resolution of 1 October 1990. 20 c) On 17 November 1990, petitioners therein, through
the same lawyers, filed a Motion For Leave Of Court To Refer Case To The Honorable Supreme
Court En Banc And/Or Motion For Reconsideration21 wherein they specifically admit that said case and the instant
petition have "identity and/or similarity of the parties, the facts, the issues raised," even going to the extent of
"graphically" illustrating where such similarities lie.22 d) This motion was denied in the resolution of 28 November
1990. Copy thereof was furnished the attorneys for petitioners.23 e) Entry of judgment had already been made
therein and a copy thereof was sent to petitioner's counsel per Letter of Transmittal of the Deputy Court and Chief
of the Judicial Records Office dated 20 December 1990.

What comes out prominently from the disquisitions of the parties is this simple issue: whether or not respondent
Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial court.

We find none. The reversal of the trial court's decision is inevitable and unavoidable because the legal and factual
conclusions made by the trial court are unfounded and clearly erroneous. The Court of Appeals was not bound to
agree to such conclusions. The trial court erred in holding that: (a) there was no partition among the children of
Gavino Reyes in 1936 since there is no written evidence in support thereof; yet, it admits that there was a survey
and subdivision of the property and the adjudication of specific subdivision lots to each of the children of Gavino;
(b) the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondents is not identical to Lot No. 1-A-14, the lot specified for
and adjudicated to Rafael Reyes, Jr. in the partition agreement; and (c) if the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to
private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is indeed Lot No. 1-A-14 and that TCT No. T-27257 was obtained through
fraud, the remedy open to the vendee was an action for reconveyance, which should have been brought within
four (4) years from the discovery thereof in 1967 when the Extrajudicial Settlement was executed since private
respondent Rosario Martillano, wife of Dalmacio, was a party thereto.

The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936, although oral,
was valid and binding. There is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be
valid.24 In Hernandez vs. Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, held that
the requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of
creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not
executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors or the rights of
creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter
into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law. There is
nothing in said section from which it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the
validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.

Barcelona, et al. vs. Barcelona, et al., supra, provides the reason why oral partition is valid and why it is not
covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not
exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the
other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of
another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance.

Additionally, the validity of such oral partition in 1936 has been expressly sustained by this Court in the Resolution
of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811.25

But even if We are to assume arguendo that the oral partition executed in 1936 was not valid for some reason or
another, We would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon the death of Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs
automatically became co-owners of his 70-hectare parcel of land. The rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent.26 The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by
the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his share or interest in the property subject to the
condition that the portion disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-
ownership. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
he may even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But
the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

In Ramirez vs. Bautista,27 this Court held that every co-heir has the absolute ownership of his share in the
community property and may alienate, assign, or mortgage the same, except as to purely personal rights, but the
effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the partition of the
property.

In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is his share in the
estate of his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same property which was eventually adjudicated to his son
and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirs-petitioners herein-in the extrajudicial settlement of
1967.
In respect to the issue as to whether the property sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. is identical to Lot No. 1-14-A, the trial
court based its conclusion that it is not, on his observation that the description of the former does not tally with
that of the latter, moreover, if Rafael did intend to sell Lot No. 1-14-A, he should have specifically stated it in the
deed since at that time, the property had already been partitioned and said lot was adjudicated to him. In addition
to the contrary findings and conclusion of the respondent Court on this issue to which We fully agree, it is to be
stressed that Rafael had this property declared for taxation purposes and the tax declaration issued was made the
basis for the description of the property in the deed of sale. Upon the execution of the deed of sale, vendee —
herein private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola — immediately took possession of the property. This is the very same
property which is the subject matter of this case and which petitioners seek to recover from the private
respondents. The main evidence adduced for their claim of ownership and possession over it is TCT No. T-27257,
the certificate of title covering Lot No. 1-14-A. They therefore admit and concede that the property claimed by
private respondent, which was acquired by sale from Rafael Reyes, Sr., is none other than Lot No. 1-14-A.

The participation of private respondent Rosario Gardiola in the Extrajudicial Settlement did not place private
respondents in estoppel to question the issuance of TCT No. T-27257. As correctly maintained by private
respondents, she signed it in representation of her deceased mother, Marta Reyes, a daughter and an heir of
Gavino Reyes. She did not sign for and in behalf of her husband, Dalmacio Gardiola, vendee of the share of Rafael
Reyes, Sr.

The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr. in the estate of
Gavino.1âwphi1Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only
acquire that which Rafael, Jr. could transmit to them upon his death. The latter never became the owner of Lot No.
1-A-14 because it was sold by his father in 1943. The issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.,
in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is concerned, was clearly erroneous because he never became its owner. An extrajudicial
settlement does not create a light in favor of an heir. As this Court stated in the Barcelona case,28 it is but a
confirmation or ratification of title or right to property. Thus, since he never had any title or right to Lot No. 1-14-A,
the mere execution of the settlement did not improve his condition, and the subsequent registration of the deed
did not create any right or vest any title over the property in favor of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr.
The latter cannot give them what he never had before. Nemo dare potest quod non habet.

There is one more point that should be stressed here. Petitioners' immediate predecessor-in-interest, Rafael
Reyes, Jr., never took any action against private respondents from the time his father sold the lot to the latter.
Neither did petitioners bring any action to recover from private respondents the ownership and possession of the
lot from the time Rafael Reyes, Jr. died. As categorically admitted by petitioners in their complaint and amended
complaint, it was only in or about September 1969 when, after the delivery of TCT No. 27257 by Candido Hebron
to them, that they definitely discovered that they were the owners of the property in question. And yet, despite
full knowledge that private respondents were in actual physical possession of the property, it was only about
thirteen and one-half (13 1/2) years later that they decided to file an action for recovery of possession. As stated
earlier, the original complaint was filed in the trial court on 14 March 1983. There was then absolutely no basis for
the trial court to place the burden on private respondents to bring an action for reconveyance within four (4) years
from their discovery of the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.

The instant petition then is without merit.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the petition with costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-10474 February 28, 1958

BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA respondent.

Clodualdo P. Surio for petitioners.

Moises B. Ramos for respondents.

LABRADOR, J.:

Certiorari against decision of the Court of Appeals, Third Division, affirming with slight modification a judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring plaintiffs owners of one-half portion of four parcels of land
described in the complaint, with costs. The judgment was rendered in an action instituted by Felisa Sinopera,
administrative of the estate of Teodoro Tolete, to recover from defendants one-half share of the aforesaid parcels
of land, which, it is alleged belong to the deceased Teodoro Tolete.

According, to the facts found by the Court of Appeals, Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. He left for
parcels of land, lots Nos. 12006, 119967, 14352 and 12176 of the cadastral survey of San Manuel, Pangasinan He
left as heirs his widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and nieces, children of deceased brothers and
sisters. On July 25, 1946, without any judicial proceedings, his widow executed an affidavit stating that "the
deceased Teodoro Tolete left no children or respondent neither ascendants or acknowledged natural children
neither brother, sisters, nephews or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the legitimate wife of the deceased,
the one and only person to inherit the above properties" (Record on Appeal, p. 9). This affidavit was registered in
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On the same day, she executed a deed of sale of all the above
parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo for the sum of P10,000. This sale was also registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. On June 17, 1950, Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the said parcels of land to
Honorato Salacup for P50,000 and this sale was also registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan
(See Annexes "A", "B", "C", attached to the complaint).

In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the estate of Teodoro Tolete
(Special Proceeding No. 3694, Pangasinan), and having secured her appointment as administratrix, brought the
present action on June 20, 1950. Notice of lis pendens was filed in the Office of the Register of Deeds and said
notice was recorded on certificates of title covering the said properties on June 26, 1950. This notice, however,
was subsequent to the registration of the deed of sale, in favor of Honorato Salacup, which took place on June 17,
1950.

The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute the affidavit of adjudication and
that Honorato Salacup acquired no rights to the lands sold to him, and that neither had Benny Sampilo acquired
any right to the said properties. Sampilo and Salacup filed an amended answer alleging that the complaint states
no cause of action; that if such a cause exists the same is barred by the statute of limitations; that defendants are
innocent purchasers for value; and that the complaint is malicious, frivolous and spurious, intended to harass and
inconvenience the defendants.

After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment for the plaintiff, Felisa Sinopera, declaring that the
affidavit of adjudication Exhibit "A", the deed of sale Exhibit "B", and the deed of sale Exhibit "C", are all null and
void; declaring plaintiff owner of one-half portion of the four parcels of land in question, and finally declaring that
the usufructuary rights of Leoncia de Leon to said properties are terminated. The case was appealed to the Court
of Appeals. This court held that the annulment of the affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", by the trial court was
correct but that the annulment of the deeds Exhibits "B" and "C", insofar as one-half of the properties, conveyed is
concerned, and in adjudicating one-half of the same to the heirs of the deceased, is premature. Hence, it modified
the judgment, declaring that Exhibits "B" and "C" are null and void only insofar as the properties thereby conveyed
exceed the portion that the responds to Leoncia de Leon. Therefore, it ordered the defendants to deliver to the
plaintiff, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of Teodoro Tolete, for disposition according to the law, one-
half of the lands described in the complaint, but reserved to Honorato Salacup the right to claim and secure
adjudication in his favor of whatever portion of said properties may correspond to Leoncia de Leon and also his
right to bring an action for the damages that he may have suffered against Leoncia de Leon and Benny Sampilo.

Benny Sampilo and Honorato Salacup have appealed to this Court by certiorari and have assigned the following
errors in their brief:

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming that respondent Felisa Sinopera's right of action to recover her
and her co-heirs' participation to the lands in question had not prescribed at the time the action to
recover was filed.

II

The Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the petitioners are innocent purchasers for value.

III

The Court of Appeals erred in aiming the lower court's denial of petitioner's motion for new trial.

In support of the first assignment of error, it is argued that as the action was instituted almost four years after the
affidavit of adjudication, Exhibit "A", was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds Of Pangasinan, the right
of action of the administratrix has prescribed and lapsed because the same was not brought within the period of
two years as Prescribed in Section 4 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, and as decided in the cases of
McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211 and Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855 869.

Section 4 of Rule 74 provides, in part, as follows:

SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. — If it shall appear at any time within two years after the
settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two
sections of this rule, that an heir or other has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation of the such
heir or such other person may compel the settlement estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter
provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. . . .

Section 1, which is mentioned in Section 4, reads as follows:

SEC. 1. Extrajudcial settlement by agreement between the heirs. — If the decedent left no debts and the
heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties
may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they
may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to
himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be
presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within
two years after the death of the decedent.

It will be noted that the provision next above-quoted contains two parts, the first referring to a case in which there
are two or more heirs interested in the estate of a deceased person, and the second in which there is only one
heir. The section was taken from Section 596 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190, as amended by Act
No. 2331). Said Section 596 as amended, was as follows:

SEC. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal Proceedings. — Whenever all the heirs of a
person who died intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity and there are no debts due from the
estate, or all the debts have been paid the heirs may, by agreement duly executed in writing by all of
them, and not otherwise, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without
proceedings in court.

We notice two significant provisions in Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 74. In Section 1, it is required that if there are two
or more heirs, both or all of them should take part in the extrajudicial settlement. This requirement is made more
imperative in the old law (Section 596, Act No. 190) by the addition of the clause "and not otherwise." By the title
of Section 4, the "distributees and estate" are indicates the persons to answer for rights violated by the
extrajudicial settlement. On the other hand, it is also significant that no mention is made expressly of the effect of
the extrajudicial settlement on persons who did not take part therein or had no notice or knowledge thereof.
There cannot be any doubt that those who took part or had knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement are bound
thereby. As to them the law is clear that if they claim to have been in any manner deprived of their lawful right or
share in the estate by the extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or interest within the period of
two years, and both the distributes and estate would be liable to them for such rights or interest. Evidently, they
are the persons in accordance with the provision, may seek to remedy, the prejudice to their rights within the two-
year period. But as to those who did not take part in the settlement or had no notice of the death of the decedent
or of the settlement, there is no direct or express provision is unreasonable and unjust that they also be required
to assert their claims within the period of two years. To extend the effects of the settlement to them, to those who
did not take part or had no knowledge thereof, without any express legal provision to that effect, would be
violative of the fundamental right to due process of law. In the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, cited by the
appellants in this case, we held:

It will be noted that while the law (see. 754) provides that the order of distribution may be had upon the
application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, no provision is made
for notice, by publication or otherwise, of such application. The proceeding, therefore, is to all intents and
purposes ex parte. As will be seen our law is very vague and incomplete; and certainly it cannot be held
that a purely ex parte proceeding, had without notice by personal service or by publication, by which the
court undertakes to distribute the property of deceased persons, can be conclusive upon minor heirs who
are not represented therein.

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex

parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution would affect
third persons who had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or
affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication. We have examined the
two cases cited by appellants and there is no similarity at all between the circumstances on which the ruling
therein had been predicated and those of the case at bar.

Following the above-quoted decision of this Court in the case of Ramirez vs. Gmur, supra, we are of the opinion
and so hold that the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an
extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to
persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when
the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the
decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.
The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not all the heirs interested have participated in the
extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals having found that the decedent left aside from his widow, nephews
and nieces living at the time of his death.
The next contention of appellants is that plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations. The origin of the
Provision (Section 4, Rule 74), upon which this contention is predicated, which is Section 596 of Act No. 190, fails
to support the contention. In the first Place, there is nothing therein, or in its source which shows clearly a statute
of limitations and a bar of action against third person's. It is only a bar against the parties who had taken part in
the extrajudicial proceedings but not against third persons not Parties thereto. In the second place, the statute of
limitations is contained in a different chapter of Act No. 190, Chapter XL, and if Section 596 of the Act had been
meant to be a statute of limitations, it would naturally have been included in the chapter which defines the
statute.

But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it is still unavailing to the defendants. The action is one
based on fraud, as the widow of the deceased owner of the lands had declared in her affidavit of partition that the
deceased left no nephews or niece, or other heirs except herself. Plaintiff's right which is based on fraud and which
has a period of four years (Section 43, par. 3, Act no. 190; Article 1146, Civil Code), does not appear to have lapsed
the action was instituted. Judicial proceedings where instituted in March, 1950 and these proceedings must have
been instituted soon after the discovery of fraud. In any case, the defendants have the burden of proof as to their
claim of the statute of limitations, which is their defense, and they have not proved that when the action was
instituted, four years had already elapsed from the date that the interested parties had actual knowledge of the
fraud.

The second assignment of error, i.e., that the defendants-appellants are innocent purchasers for value was
rejected as unfounded by the court of Appeals. Said court said.

The claim that defendants-appellants did not have sufficient knowledge or notice of the claim of the heirs
of Teodoro Tolete, deceased, over the land in question does not find support in the evidence of record. As
regards defendant Benny Sampilo, it is an admitted fact that he is a nephew of Leoncia de Leon and he
had been living with the latter. Both Benny Sampilo and the heirs of the deceased who are claiming the
property are residents of San Manuel, Pangasinan. It is hard, therefore, to believe that Benny Sampilo did
not know the existence of said heirs, and that he was not aware that they were nephews and nieces,
children of the deceased brothers, of the deceased Teodoro Tolete. The fact furthermore that Benny
Sampilo accompanied his aunt Leoncia de Leon to Sison, Pangasinan, when the later saw Notary Public
Ladislao Villamil, who was the former's uncle, to have him prepare the affidavit of adjudication Exhibit
"A", and the deed of conveyance Exhibit "B" by which on the same date she conveyed to Sampilo all the
property which she had adjudicated to herself, both of which she acknowledged before said notary public,
coupled with the fact that there is no sufficient showing that the consideration for the conveyance of
P10,000 had in fact been paid, strengthens our belief that said Benny Sampilo knew that the deceased
Teodoro Tolete had other heirs who may claim the property, and that the immediate conveyance thereof
to him was a strategem concocted to defeat the former's rights. And as regards Honorato Salacup, while
the claim that no notice of lis pendens appeared annotated in the certificates of title issued to Benny
Sampilo when he acquired the property might be true, for he purchased the property on June 17, 1950,
and the notice of lis pendens was noted on said certificates of title on June 26, 1950, nevertheless, he
cannot claim that he was a purchaser in good faith for value of the property. It is well-settled rule in this
jurisdiction that a purchaser of registered lands who has knowledge of facts which should put him upon
inquiry and investigate as to the possible defects of the title of the vendor and fails to make such inquiry
and investigation cannot claim that he as a purchaser in good faith for value and he had acquired a valid
title thereto. Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37 Phil., 644; Dayao vs. Diaz, G.R. L-4106, May 29, 1952.

Finding no error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, we hereby affirm it in toto, with costs against the
petitioners. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-33261 September 30, 1987

LIWALUG AMEROL, MACATANTO AMEROL, TAIB AMEROL, DIBARATUN AMEROL, DIBARATUN, MATABALAO,
MINDALANO DIBARATUN, DIPUNDUGUN MORO, and MANUCAO MORO, petitioners,
vs.
MOLOK BAGUMBARAN, respondent.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the then Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur,
Branch III, Marawi City, in Civil Case No. 1354, entitled, "Molok Bagumbaran vs. Liwalug Amerol et al.," under
Republic Act No. 5400, "as only question of law is raised." 2

The only issue for resolution is the prescriptive period of an action for reconveyance of real property which has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered under the Torrens System in another's name. In other words, what is
the prescriptive period for the action to reconvey the title to real property arising from an implied or constructive
trust and, corrolarily reference. The petitioners herein, defendants in the trial court, assert that they have ten
years to bring the action, while the respondent, plaintiff in the court below, claims the prescriptive period is four
years. The trial court ruled tor the plaintiff, now respondent.

We reverse. We hold that the prescriptive period for such an action for reconveyance, as this case, is ten years.
The point of reference is, or the ten-year prescriptive period commences to run from, the. date of the issuance of
the certificate of title over the real property.

There is no issue as to the facts, this case having been elevated to this Court, as aforestated, on purely a question
of law. Be that as it may, in order to satisfy constitutional requirements as well as to place the question of law in
proper perspective, there is need to state the facts of the case. On this regard, the findings of the trial court would
best serve the stated purposes.

xxx xxx xxx

From the evidence submitted during the trial there is no dispute concerning the fact relative to
the Identity of the land in litigation. It is commonly known as Lot No. 524, Pls-126 and technically
described and bounded in the sketch (Exh. "7 "). This is the very tract of land alleged by the
plaintiff to have been forcibly entered into by the defendants and which plaintiff now w&s to
recover possession thereof. It has also been proven that the same lot was covered by two free
patent applications: — (l) that of defendant Liwalug Datomanong (erroneously surnamed
Amerol) which he filed on the 4th day of September, 1953, and (2) that of Molok Bagumbaran
which was filed on December 27, 1954. There is also no question regarding the fact that as to
these two free patent applications, that of plaintiff Molok Bagumbaran was given due course as a
result of which Free Patent No. V-19050 was issued on August 16,1955 by authority of the
President of the Philippines Ramon Magsaysay, by Jaime Ferrer, Undersecretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and duly registered with the office of the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Lanao (now Lanao del Sur) in the mm year whereupon Original Certificate of Title No.
P-466 was duly issued, owner's duplicate certificate having been furnished the herein plaintiff.

This court is also inclined to believe that defendant Liwalug Datomanong had never known of
plaintiff's free patent application on the land in question nor was he ever notified or participated
in the administrative proceedings relative to plaintiff's free patent application. In the meantime,
since the date he purchased the land from Mandal Tondo, said defendant has been and up to the
present in con. tinuous occupation and cultivation of the same. His co-defendants named in the
complaint are merely his tenants.

It is also incontrovertible fact that said defendant did not take appropriate action to annul the
patent and title of the plaintiff within one year from issuance thereof and that the first step
taken by him to contest said patent and title was a formal protest (Exh. "12", p. 408, Record)
dated April 24, 1964, filed before the Bureau of Lands after the lapse of Nine (9) long years from
the issuance of patent in favor of the plaintiff. The second step he took was his counterclaim
contained in his answer to the complaint in the above entitled case, which answer was filed with
this court on December 4, 1964. In said counterclaim, defendant reiterated his stand that
plaintiff secured patent on the land by means of deceit and fraud, wherefore, defendant prayed
that said title be annulled, or, alternatively, plaintiff be ordered to reconvey the said land to the
said defendant Liwalug Datomanong.

First question to be resolved is whether or not the plaintiff is guilty of fraud or misrepresentation
in securing the Free Patent No. V-19050 covering the land in question.

Upon a thorough examination of the evidence, proofs are sufficient to support defendant's
contention that plaintiff is guilty of fraud and misrepresentation. In the first place, proofs are
abundant tending to show that since 1952 when Mandal Tando transferred the land to said
defendant, the latter occupied, took possession thereof and cultivated the same continuously,
publicly, adversely against any claimant and in the concept of owner up to the present; that said
defendant had introduced considerable improvements such as coconut and coffee plantations
and other fruit trees besides his farm house, a mosque, cassava plantation and clearing and full
cultivation of the entire area. The fact of possession on the part of said defendant has been
attested to by competent and creditable witnesses like Mandal Tando who conveyed the land to
the defendant; Hadji Sirad Gomandang, the barrio captain of Montay, Malabang, Lanao del Sur,
Hadji Rasol Maruhom and Hadji Abdulcadir Pagayawan, both of Pialot, Malabang, Lanao del Sur
who are farmers and barrio-mates of said defendant; and also Disomnong Dimna Macabuat, an
employee in the office of the District Land Officer at Marawi City who had officially conducted
occular inspection and investigation of the premises in connection with the protest of said
defendant found thereon the above-mentioned improvements introduced by the said defendant.

What is more, on or before filing his free patent application, plaintiff knew that the land in
question which was covered by his free patent application was then actually occupied and
cultivated by defendant Liwalug Datomanong if not by Mandal Tando, the original occupant. Be it
remembered that Mandal Tando had transferred to defendant Liwalug Datomanong Twenty Four
(24) hectares, more than eleven hectares of which is (sic) outside the military reservation and
designated as Lot No. 524, Pls-126 and the rest which is in the southern portion lies within the
military reservation. Now, immediately adjacent thereto on the south is the land claimed and
occupied by the herein plaintiff also consisting of Twenty Four (24) hectares but wholly within
the military reservation. It appears that plaintiff declared this Twenty four hectares for the first
time on October 24, 1950 for taxation purposes (Tax Declaration No. 1529, Record) and stated in
said tax declaration (Exhs. "8" and "8-A," p. 414, Record) regarding the boundaries that the
adjacent owner on the north is Mandal Tando. In other words, plaintiff had expressly recognized
the fact that Mandal Tando is an adjacent land owner north of plaintiff's property. On February
19, 1951 herein plaintiff revised the above-stated tax declaration and secured another (Tax
Declaration No. 1794, Exh. "9" and "9-A," p. 413, Record) and still plaintiff stated therein that his
boundary land owner on the north is Hadji Abdul Gani. 3 [a.k.a.Liwalug Datomanong(Amerol)]. 4

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the aforequoted findings, very unequivocal to be sure, the trial court denied the counterclaim of
the defendants, now petitioners, for the affirmative relief of reconveyance on the ground of prescription. Said the
court:

xxx xxx xxx

The patent of the plaintiff having been registered back in 1955 and in contemplation of law
registration thereof is notice to the whole world and yet defendant exerted no effort whatsoever
either to annul the title or institute proceedings for reconveyance except in his counterclaim
contained in his answer to the complaint in this case at bar which answer and counter-claim was
filed on December 4, 1964, some nine long years from the date of registration of the patent,
defendant unfortunately lost his right to reconveyance within the period of four (4) years from
the date of registration of said patent. 5

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, the dispositive portion of the assailed decision stated:

xxx xxx xxx

PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: (1) declaring the herein plaintiff
the registered owner of Lot No. 524, Pls-126 and sustaining and respecting the validity of the
plaintiff's Original Certificate of Title No. P-466 covering the said land; (2) ordering the
defendants to vacate the premises of Lot No. 524; Pls-126 and deliver possession thereof to the
herein plaintiff under certain terms and conditions herein below stated; (3) denying and hereby
dismissing the counterclaim of the herein defendants and consequently the prayer to annul the
title and/or for reconveyance of the land to said defendant Liwalug Datomanong must Likewise
be denied; (4) that before plaintiff could take possession of said premises he must reimburse
defendant Liwalug Datomanong the total sum of Six Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty-Two Pesos
and Sixty-Two Centavos (P6,752.62) which he incurred for the necessary and useful expenses on
the land in question with the right of said defendant to retain possession of the premises if said
reimbursement be not completely made. No pronouncement as to costs. 6

xxx xxx xxx

Hence, this petition. 7

The petitioners in their Brief 8 assign the following two errors allegedly committed by the trial court:

I.

THE COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW TOTHE EFFECT THAT PETITIONERS RIGHT OF ACTION FOR
RECONVEYANCE FOR VIOLATION OF AN IMPLIED TRUST PRESCRIBED AFTER FOUR YEARS FROM THE REGISTRATION
OF THE PATENT OF RESPONDENT.

II.

THE COURT ERRED IN NOT REQUIRING THE INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE AS BASIS IN THE ASSESSMENT OF THE
FAIR MARKET VALUE OF THE IMPROVEMENT INTRODUCED ON THE LAND IN GOOD FAITH BY PETITIONERS
INSTEAD OF BASING SUCH ASSESSMENT UPON PURE AND SIMPLE GUESS WORKS AND WILD ESTIMATIONS.
The first assignment of error is well-taken as adverted to at the outset.

Indubitably, the act of respondent in misrepresenting that he was in actual possession and occupation of the
property in question, obtaining a patent and Original Certificate of Title No. P- 466 in his name, created an implied
trust in favor of the actual possessor of the said property. The Civil Code provides:

ARTICLE 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is by force
of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes.

In this case, the land in question was patented and titled in respondent's name by and through his false pretenses.
Molok Bagumbaran fraudulently misrepresented that he was the occupant and actual possessor of the land in
question when he was not because it was Liwalug Datomanong. Bagumbaran falsely pretended that there was no
prior applicant for a free patent over the land but there was — Liwalug Datomanong. By such fraudulent acts,
Molok Bagumbaran is deemed to hold the title of the property in trust and for the benefit of petitioner Liwalug
Datomanong. Notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued in the name of respondent, he,
even being already the registered owner under the Torrens system, may still be compelled under the law to
reconvey the subject property to Liwalug Datomanong. After all, the Torrens system was not designed to shield
and protect one who had committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith. Further, contrary
to the erroneous claim of the respondent, 9 reconveyance does not work to set aside and put under review anew
the findings of facts of the Bureau of Lands. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected
as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereof, which has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful and legal owner, 10 or to one
with a better right. That is what reconveyance is all about.

Yet, the right to seek reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust is not absolute. It is subject to
extinctive prescription. 11 Happily, both parties agree on this point. The seeming impediment however, is that
while the petitioners assert that the action prescribes in ten years, the respondent avers that it does in only four
years.

In support of his submission, the respondent invokes several cases. We have examined the invocations and find
them inapplicable. For instance, the case of Fabian vs. Fabian, 12 relied on by the respondent, does not square
with the present case. In Fabian, the party who prayed for reconveyance was not in actual possession and
occupation of the property. It was instead the party to whom title over the property had been issued who
occupied and possessed it. Further, the litigated property had been in the adverse possession of the registered
owner for well-nigh over twenty-nine big years, hence, reconveyance had been irretrievably lost.

Miguel vs. Court of Appeals, 13 is, likewise, inapplicable. In Miguel, the actual occupant and possessor of the
controverted parcel of land, after having been enticed by Leonor Reyes, an ambulatory notary public, with promise
of help, engaged and retained the services of the latter to facilitate the issuance of a patent for the said land in his
(Miguel's) favor. Thus, there existed between the parties a relationship very much akin to that of lawyer-client and
which is similarly fiduciary in character. But Reyes, inspite of his compensation of one-fifth of the yearly produce of
the property, still violated the trust reposed on him and instead worked for the issuance of the patent in the name
of his own wife. So, after the demise of Leonor Reyes, the property was fraudulently patented and titled in his
widow's favor. The reconveyance of the property was decreed by the Court based on "breach of fiduciary relations
and/or fraud." It was shown that the parties were legally bound to each other by a bond of fiduciary trust, a bond
lacking in the case at bar.

Finally, the case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals 14 can not be availed of because the period of prescription was
not there definitely and squarely settled. In fact, Ramirez underscores a vacillation between the four-year and the
ten-year rule. There it was stated that "an action for relief on the ground of fraud — to which class the remedy
prayed for by Paguia belong — scan only be brought within four years after accrual of the right of action, or from
the discovery of the fraud." If the decision just stayed pat on that statement, there would be merit in the
respondent's presentation. But Ramirez continues: "(I)ndepedently, however, of the alleged fraud on the part of
Ramirez, the right to demand a reconveyance prescribes after 10 years from accrual of the cause of action, June
22, 1944, the date of registration of the patent and of the issuance of OCT No. 282- A in his name." 15

Significantly, the three cases cited by the respondent to buttress his position and support the ruling of the trial
court have a common denominator, so to speak. The cause of action assailing the frauds committed and
impugning the Torrens titles issued in those cases, all accrued prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code. The
accrual of the cause of action in Fabian was in 1928, in Miguel, February, 1950, and in Ramirez, 1944. It must be
remembered that before August 30, 1950, the date of the effectivity of the new Civil Code, the old Code of Civil
Procedure (Act No. 190) governed prescription. It provided:

SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how limited-Civil actions other than for the recovery of real property
can only be brought within the following periods after the right of action accrues:

xxx xxx xxx

3. Within four years: x x x An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the right of action in
such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud;

xxx xxx xxx

In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of the
law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in
favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.

Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of
action accrues:

(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;

(3) Upon a judgment.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribed in ten years and
not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule.
Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. 16 The only discordant note, it
seems, is Balbin vs. Medalla, 17 which states that the prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four years.
However, this variance can be explained by the erroneous reliance on Gerona vs. de Guzman. 18 But in Gerona, the
fraud was discovered on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190, was applied, the new Civil Code not
coming into effect until August 30, 1950 as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at this juncture, that Article
1144 and Article 1456, are new provisions. They have no counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of
Civil Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period for an action for
reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false pretenses.
It is abundantly clear from all the foregoing that the action of petitioner Datomanong for reconveyance, in the
nature of a counterclaim interposed in his Answer, filed on December 4, 1964, to the complaint for recovery of
possession instituted by the respondent, has not yet prescribed. Between August 16, 1955, the date of reference,
being the date of the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title in the name of the respondent, and December 4,
1964, when the period of prescription was interrupted by the filing of the Answer cum Counterclaim, is less than
ten years.

The respondent also interposed as a deterrent to reconveyance the existence of a mortgage on the property. It is
claimed by the respondent that reconveyance would not be legally possible because the property under litigation
has already been mortgaged by him to the Development Bank of the Philippines. 19 This claim is untenable
otherwise the judgment for reconveyance could be negated at the will of the holder of the title. By the simple
expedient of constituting a mortgage or other encumbrance on the property, the remedy of reconveyance would
become illusory. In the instant case, the respondent being doubly in bad faith — for applying for and obtaining a
patent and the Original Certificate of Title therefor without being in possession of the land and for mortgaging it to
the Development Bank knowing that his Original Certificate of Title was issued under false pretenses — must alone
suffer the consequences.

Besides, given the undisputed facts, we cannot consider the mortgage contracted by the respondent in favor of the
Development Bank of the Philippines as valid and binding against petitioner Liwalug Datomanong. It would be
most unjust to saddle him, as owner of the land, with a mortgage lien not of his own making and from which he
derived no benefit whatsoever. The consequences of the void mortgage must be left between the mortgagor and
the mortgagee. In no small measure the Development Bank of the Philippines might even be faulted for not
making the requisite investigation on the possession of the land mortgaged.

Premises considered, we deemed it superfluous to rule on the second assignment of error raised by the
petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision dated June 3, 1970 of the then Court of First Instance of
Lanao del Sur in Civil Case No. 1354 is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered ORDERING the
respondent to RECONVEY Original Certificate of Title No. P-466 in favor of petitioner Liwalug Datomanong, free of
any encumbrance. Costs against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 155206. October 28, 2003]

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO M. SANTIAGO, substituted by his widow
ROSARIO ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE SANTIAGO, respondent.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] dated February 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 62309 and its Resolution dated September 5, 2002 denying its motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case, as culled from the assailed CA decision and that of the trial court, are as
follows:

Deceased spouses Jose C. Zulueta and Soledad Ramos obtained various loans from defendant GSIS for (the) period
September, 1956 to October, 1957 in the total amount of P3,117,000.00 secured by real estate mortgages over
parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 26105, 37177 and 50365. The Zuluetas failed to pay their loans to defendant
GSIS and the latter foreclosed the real estate mortgages dated September 25, 1956, March 6, 1957, April 4, 1957
and October 15, 1957.

On August 14, 1974, the mortgaged properties were sold at public auction by defendant GSIS submitting a bid
price of P5,229,927.84. Not all lots covered by the mortgaged titles, however, were sold. Ninety-one (91) lots were
expressly excluded from the auction since the lots were sufficient to pay for all the mortgage debts. A Certificate
of Sale (Annex F, Records, Vol. I, pp. 23-28) was issued by then Provincial Sheriff Nicanor D. Salaysay.

The Certificate of Sale dated August 14, 1974 had been annotated and inscribed in TCT Nos. 26105, 37177 and
50356, with the following notations: (T)he following lots which form part of this title (TCT No. 26105) are not
covered by the mortgage contract due to sale to third parties and donation to the government: 50-H-5-C-9-J-65-H-
8, 50-H-5-C-9J-M-7; 50-H-5-C-9-J-65-H-5; 1 lots Nos. 1 to 13, Block No. 1 -6,138 sq.m. 2. Lots Nos. 1 to 11, Block No.
2 4,660 sq.m. 3. Lot No. 15, Block No. 3 487 sq.m. 4. Lot No. 17, Block No. 4 263 sq.m. 5. Lot No. 1, Block No. 7 402
sq.m. 6. Road Lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, & 4 2,747 sq.m.

In another NOTE: The following lots in the Antonio Subdivision were already released by the GSIS and therefore are
not included in this sale, namely: LOT NO. 1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 13 (Old Plan) Block I; 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10 (Old Plan)
Block II; 3, 10, 12 and 13 (New Plan) Block I (Old Plan) Block III; 7, 14 and 20 (New Plan) Block III (Old Plan) Block V;
13 and 20 (New Plan) Block IV (Old Plan) Block VI; 1, 2, 3 and 10 (New Plan) Block V (Old Plan) Block VII; 1, 5, 8, 15,
26 and 27 (New Plan) Block VI (Old Plan) Block VIII; 7, 12 and 20 (New Plan) Block VII (Old Plan) Block II; 1, 4 and 6
(New Plan) Block VIII (Old Plan) Block X; 5 (New Plan) Block X (Old Plan) Block ZXII; 6 (New Plan) Block XI (Old Plan)
Block XII; 1, Block 9; 12 Block 1; 11 Block 2; 19 Block 1; 10 Block 6; 23 Block 3.

And the lots on ADDITIONAL EXCLUSION FROM PUBLIC SALE are LOTS NO. 6 Block 4; 2 Block 2; 5 Block 5; 1, 2 and 3
Block 11, 1, 2, 3 and 4 Block 10; 5 Block 11 (New); 1 Block 3; 5 Block 1; 15 Block 7; 11 Block 9; 13 Block 5; 12 Block
5; 3 Block 10; 6.

On November 25, 1975, an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership (Annex G, Records, Vol. I, pp. 29-31) was
executed by defendant GSIS over Zuluetas lots, including the lots, which as earlier stated, were already excluded
from the foreclosure.
On March 6, 1980, defendant GSIS sold the foreclosed properties to Yorkstown Development Corporation which
sale was disapproved by the Office of the President of the Philippines. The sold properties were returned to
defendant GSIS.

The Register of Deeds of Rizal cancelled the land titles issued to Yorkstown Development Corporation. On July 2,
1980, TCT No. 23552 was issued cancelling TCT No. 21926; TCT No. 23553 cancelled TCT No. 21925; and TCT No.
23554 cancelling TCT No. 21924, all in the name of defendant GSIS.

After defendant GSIS had re-acquired the properties sold to Yorkstown Development Corporation, it began
disposing the foreclosed lots including the excluded ones.

On April 7, 1990, representative Eduardo Santiago and then plaintiff Antonio Vic Zulueta executed an agreement
whereby Zulueta transferred all his rights and interests over the excluded lots. Plaintiff Eduardo Santiagos lawyer,
Atty. Wenceslao B. Trinidad, wrote a demand letter dated May 11, 1989 (Annex H, Records, Vol. I, pp. 32-33) to
defendant GSIS asking for the return of the eighty-one (81) excluded lots.[2]

On May 7, 1990, Antonio Vic Zulueta, represented by Eduardo M. Santiago, filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 71, a complaint for reconveyance of real estate against the GSIS. Spouses Alfeo and Nenita
Escasa, Manuel III and Sylvia G. Urbano, and Marciana P. Gonzales and the heirs of Mamerto Gonzales moved to be
included as intervenors and filed their respective answers in intervention. Subsequently, the petitioner, as defendant
therein, filed its answer alleging inter alia that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and/or laches and
that the complaint stated no cause of action. Subsequently, Zulueta was substituted by Santiago as the plaintiff in
the complaint a quo. Upon the death of Santiago on March 6, 1996, he was substituted by his widow, Rosario
Enriquez Vda. de Santiago, as the plaintiff.
After due trial, the RTC rendered judgment against the petitioner ordering it to reconvey to the respondent,
Rosario Enriquez Vda. de Santiago, in substitution of her deceased husband Eduardo, the seventy-eight lots excluded
from the foreclosure sale. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant:

1. Ordering defendant to reconvey to plaintiff the seventy-eight (78) lots released and excluded from the
foreclosure sale including the additional exclusion from the public sale, namely:

a. Lot Nos. 1, 6, 7, 8, 0, 10, 13, Block I (Old Plan).

b. Lot Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10, Block II (Old Plan).
c. Lot Nos. 3, 10, 12, and 13, Block I (New Plan), Block III (Old Plan),
d. Lot Nos. 7, 14 and 20, Block III (New Plan), Block V (Old Plan).
e. Lot Nos. 13 and 20, Block IV (New Plan), Block VI (Old Plan).
f. Lot Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 10, Block V (New Plan), Block VII (Old Plan).
g. Lot Nos. 1, 5, 8, 15, 26 and 27, Block VI (New Plan), Block VIII (Old Plan).
h. Lot Nos. 7 and 12, Block VII (New Plan), Block II (Old Plan).
i. Lot Nos. 1, 4 and 6, Block VIII (New Plan), Block X (Old Plan).
j. Lot 5, Block X (New Plan), Block XII (Old Plan).
k. Lot 6, Block XI (New Plan), Block XII (Old Plan).
l. Lots 2, 5, 12 and 15, Block I.
m. Lots 6, 9 and 11, Block 2.
n. Lots 1, 5, 6, 7, 16 and 23, Block 3.
o. Lot 6, Block 4.
p. Lots 5, 12, 13 and 24, Block 5.
q. Lots 10 and 16, Block 6.
r. Lots 6 and 15, Block 7.
 s. Lots 13, 24, 28 and 29, Block 8.
t. Lots 1, 11, 17 and 22, Block 9.
u. Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4, Block 10.
v. Lots 1, 2, 3 and 5 (New), Block 11.

2. Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, if the seventy-eight (78) excluded lots could not be reconveyed, the fair
market value of each of said lots.

3. Ordering the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to cancel the land titles covering the excluded lots in the name of
defendant or any of its successors-in-interest including all derivative titles therefrom and to issue new land titles in
plaintiffs name.

4. Ordering the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City to cancel the Notices of Lis Pendens inscribed in TCT No. PT-80342
under Entry No. PT-12267/T-23554; TCT No. 81812 under Entry No. PT-12267/T-23554; and TCT No. PT-84913
under Entry No. PT-12267/T-23554.

5. Costs of suit.[3]

The petitioner elevated the case to the CA which rendered the assailed decision affirming that of the RTC. The
dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision of December 17,
1997 of Branch 71 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City is hereby AFFIRMED.[4]

The petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the aforesaid decision but the same was denied in the assailed
CA Resolution of September 5, 2002.
The petitioner now comes to this Court alleging that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT A) PETITIONER WAS GUILTY OF BAD
FAITH WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT, THERE WAS NO SUFFICIENT GROUND TO SUPPORT SUCH CONCLUSION; AND
B) THERE WAS NO PRESCRIPTION IN THIS CASE.[5]

In its petition, the petitioner maintains that it did not act in bad faith when it erroneously included in its
certificate of sale, and subsequently consolidated the titles in its name over the seventy-eight lots (subject lots) that
were excluded from the foreclosure sale. There was no proof of bad faith nor could fraud or malice be attributed to
the petitioner when it erroneously caused the issuance of certificates of title over the subject lots despite the fact
that these were expressly excluded from the foreclosure sale.
The petitioner asserts that the action for reconveyance instituted by the respondent had already prescribed
after the lapse of ten years from November 25, 1975 when the petitioner consolidated its ownership over the subject
lots.According to the petitioner, an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
years from the time of its creation or upon the alleged fraudulent registration of the property. In this case, when the
action was instituted on May 7, 1990, more than fourteen years had already lapsed. Thus, the petitioner contends
that the same was already barred by prescription as well as laches.
The petitioner likewise takes exception to the holding of the trial court and the CA that it (the petitioner) failed
to apprise or return to the Zuluetas, the respondents predecessors-in-interest, the seventy-eight lots excluded from
the foreclosure sale because the petitioner had no such obligation under the pertinent loan and mortgage
agreement.
The petitioners arguments fail to persuade.
 At the outset, it bears emphasis that the jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is limited to reviewing only errors of law. This Court is not a trier of
facts. Case law has it that the findings of the trial court especially when affirmed by the CA are binding and conclusive
upon this Court. Although there are exceptions to the said rule, we find no reason to deviate therefrom. [6] By
assailing the findings of facts of the trial court as affirmed by the CA, that it acted in bad faith, the petitioner thereby
raised questions of facts in its petition.
Nonetheless, even if we indulged the petition and delved into the factual issues, we find the petition barren of
merit.
That the petitioner acted in bad faith in consolidating ownership and causing the issuance of titles in its name
over the subject lots, notwithstanding that these were expressly excluded from the foreclosure sale was the uniform
ruling of the trial court and appellate court. As declared by the CA:

The acts of defendant-appellant GSIS in concealing from the Zuluetas [the respondents predecessors-in-interest]
the existence of these lots, in failing to notify or apprise the spouses Zulueta about the excluded lots from the time
it consolidated its titles on their foreclosed properties in 1975, in failing to inform them when it entered into a
contract of sale of the foreclosed properties to Yorkstown Development Corporation in 1980 as well as when the
said sale was revoked by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos during the same year demonstrated a clear effort on
its part to defraud the spouses Zulueta and appropriate for itself the subject properties. Even if titles over the lots
had been issued in the name of the defendant-appellant, still it could not legally claim ownership and absolute
dominion over them because indefeasibility of title under the Torrens system does not attach to titles secured by
fraud or misrepresentation. The fraud committed by defendant-appellant in the form of concealment of the
existence of said lots and failure to return the same to the real owners after their exclusion from the foreclosure
sale made defendant-appellant holders in bad faith. It is well-settled that a holder in bad faith of a certificate of
title is not entitled to the protection of the law for the law cannot be used as a shield for fraud. [7]

The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the trial court and the CA. The petitioner is not an ordinary
mortgagee. It is a government financial institution and, like banks, is expected to exercise greater care and prudence
in its dealings, including those involving registered lands.[8] The Courts ruling in Rural Bank of Compostela v. CA[9] is
apropos:

Banks, indeed, should exercise more care and prudence in dealing even with registered lands, than private
individuals, for their business is one affected with public interest, keeping in trust money belonging to their
depositors, which they should guard against loss by not committing any act of negligence which amounts to lack of
good faith by which they would be denied the protective mantle of land registration statute, Act [No.] 496,
extended only to purchasers for value and in good faith, as well as to mortgagees of the same character and
description.[10]

Due diligence required of banks extend even to persons, or institutions like the petitioner, regularly engaged
in the business of lending money secured by real estate mortgages.[11]
In this case, the petitioner executed an affidavit in consolidating its ownership and causing the issuance of titles
in its name over the subject lots despite the fact that these were expressly excluded from the foreclosure sale. By so
doing, the petitioner acted in gross and evident bad faith. It cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the subject lots
were excluded from the sale at public auction. At the least, its act constituted gross negligence amounting to bad
faith. Further, as found by the CA, the petitioners acts of concealing the existence of these lots, its failure to return
them to the Zuluetas and even its attempt to sell them to a third party is proof of the petitioners intent to defraud
the Zuluetas and appropriate for itself the subject lots.
On the issue of prescription, generally, an action for reconveyance of real property based on fraud prescribes
in four years from the discovery of fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance of the
certificate of title over the property. Registration of real property is a constructive notice to all persons and, thus,
the four-year period shall be counted therefrom.[12] On the other hand, Article 1456 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the alleged
fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the certificate of title over the property.[13]
The petitioners defense of prescription is untenable. As held by the CA, the general rule that the discovery of
fraud is deemed to have taken place upon the registration of real property because it is considered a constructive
notice to all persons does not apply in this case. The CA correctly cited the cases of Adille v. Court of
Appeals[14] and Samonte v. Court of Appeals,[15] where this Court reckoned the prescriptive period for the filing of
the action for reconveyance based on implied trust from the actual discovery of fraud.
In ruling that the action had not yet prescribed despite the fact that more than ten years had lapsed between
the date of registration and the institution of the action for reconveyance, the Court in Adille ratiocinated:

It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been our
holding that the Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of
registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule
that registration operates as a universal notice of title.

For the same reason, we cannot dismiss private respondents claims commenced in 1974 over the estate registered
in 1955. While actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes in ten years, reckoned from the date of the
registration of the property, we, as we said, are not prepared to count the period from such a date in this case. We
note the petitioners sub rosa efforts to get hold of the property exclusively for himself beginning with his
fraudulent misrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit of extrajudicial settlement that he is the only heir and child
of his mother Feliza with the consequence that he was able to secure title in his name [alone]. Accordingly, we
hold that the right of the private respondents commenced from the time they actually discovered the petitioners
act of defraudation. According to the respondent Court of Appeals, they came to know [of it] apparently only
during the progress of the litigation. Hence, prescription is not a bar.[16]

The above ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Samonte. In this case, as established by the CA, the
respondent actually discovered the fraudulent act of the petitioner only in 1989:

... [T]he prescriptive period of the action is to be reckoned from the time plaintiff-appellee (then Eduardo M.
Santiago) had actually discovered the fraudulent act of defendant-appellant which was, as borne out by the
records, only in 1989. Plaintiff-appellee Eduardo M. Santiago categorically testified (TSN of July 11, 1995, pp. 14-
15) that he came to know that there were 91 excluded lots in Antonio Village which were foreclosed by the GSIS
and included in its consolidation of ownership in 1975 when, in 1989, he and Antonio Vic Zulueta discussed it and
he was given by Zulueta a special power of attorney to represent him to recover the subject properties from
GSIS. The complaint for reconveyance was filed barely a year from the discovery of the fraud. [17]

Following the Courts pronouncements in Adille and Samonte, the institution of the action for reconveyance in
the court a quo in 1990 was thus well within the prescriptive period. Having acted in bad faith in securing titles over
the subject lots, the petitioner is a holder in bad faith of certificates of title over the subject lots. The petitioner is
not entitled to the protection of the law for the law cannot be used as a shield for frauds. [18]
Contrary to its claim, the petitioner unarguably had the legal duty to return the subject lots to the Zuluetas. The
petitioners attempts to justify its omission by insisting that it had no such duty under the mortgage contract is
obviously clutching at straw. Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that every person who, through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated February 22, 2002 and
Resolution dated September 5, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62309 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO.Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 128254. January 16, 2004]

HEIRS OF POMPOSA SALUDARES represented by ISABEL DATOR, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE DATOR
and CARMEN CALIMUTAN, respondents.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

Assailed in the instant petition for review on certiorari is the July 31, 1996 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
reversing the August 27, 1992 decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, Branch 56, which in turn
dismissed private respondents petition for reconveyance on the ground of prescription of action.
At the core of the present controversy is a parcel of land, known as Lot 5793, measuring 8,916 square meters,
located at Mahabang Parang, Lucban, Quezon. The land formed part of the conjugal properties of spouses Juan Dator
and Pomposa Saludares, known as the Tanza estate.
Pomposa died on May 1, 1923, leaving herein petitioners, Enrica, Petra, Restituto, Amado, Delfina, Beata,
Vicenta and Isabel, all surnamed Dator, as her compulsory heirs (hereinafter referred to as Heirs).
On February 28, 1940, the Heirs and their father Juan executed a deed of extra-judicial partition of the share
of Pomposa in the Tanza estate. The settlement conferred the eastern half of the Tanza estate to Juan and the
western half to the Heirs.
Before the aforementioned partition, Juan was in possession of the entire Tanza estate. After the partition, the
Heirs took possession of their share and had the same tenanted by a certain Miguel Dahilig, husband of Petra, one
of the Heirs, who in turn managed the land in behalf of the other siblings. Juan, the father, remained in possession
of his half of the land until his death on April 6, 1940.
On December 13, 1976, Isabel Dator applied for a free patent over the entire Tanza estate, including Lot 5793,
in behalf of the Heirs. On May 26, 1977, after all the requirements were complied with, the Register of Deeds of
Quezon awarded Free Patent No. 4A-2-8976 and issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-23617 in the names
of the Heirs.
Sometime in 1988, the Heirs were informed by their tenant that private respondents cut some 50 coconut trees
located within the subject lot. Thus, the Heirs sent a letter,[3] dated July 26, 1988, to private respondents demanding
an explanation for their intrusion into their property and unauthorized felling of trees.
On August 25, 1988, private respondents retaliated by filing an action for reconveyance against petitioners,
docketed as civil case no. 88-121, in the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. Private respondents alleged in their
complaint that: (a) they were the owners in fee simple and possessors of Lot No. 5793; (b) they bought the land from
the successors-in-interest of Petra Dator, one of the heirs; (c) they were in possession of the subject land from 1966
to the present and (d) petitioner Isabel Dator obtained free patent OCT P-23617 over Lot 5793 in favor of the Heirs
by means of fraud and misrepresentation. Thus, private respondents prayed for the cancellation of OCT P-23617 and
the issuance of a new title in their names.
In their answer, the Heirs denied having sold any portion of the Tanza estate to anyone. They alleged that: (a)
they and their predecessors-in-interest had been and were still in actual, continuous, adverse and public possession
of the subject land in the concept of an owner since time immemorial and (b) title to Lot 5793 was issued in their
favor after faithful compliance with all the requirements necessary for the issuance of a free patent.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the action primarily on the ground of prescription of
action:
More telling is plaintiff Jose Dators admission that the adjacent lot which is 5794 is his and he was a cadastral
claimant, in fact, filed (sic) an application for free patent. By and large, if Jose Dator was personally claiming rights
on the property now denominated as Lot 5793, the Court is intrigued and cannot see its way clear why Jose Dator
did not file any protest in the application of the heirs of Pomposa Saludares, neither had Jose Dator filed any
petition for review within the time frame, instead it took them eleven (11) long years to question the validity.

The doctrine of stale demands or laches is even applicable in the case at bar. Laches means the failure or neglect
for an unreasonable length of time, to do that which by exercising diligence could or should have been done
earlier. (Marcelino versus Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94422, June 26, 1992)

xxx xxx xxx

The issues with respect to ownership have already been amply discussed which brings us to the issue as to
whether or not the action has prescribed and whether the original certificate of title in the name of the heirs of
Pomposa Saludares is already indefeasible.

The action for reconveyance at bar was filed on August 28, 1988 or more than eleven (11) years from the issuance
of the title, a fact plaintiffs cannot deny. They cannot claim ignorance that the defendants-heirs of Pomposa
Saludares are applying for a free patent of Lot No. 5793 because notices were sent.

xxx xxx xxx

In the absence of competent and positive evidence that the title of the defendants has been secured thru fraud
which in the case at bar is wanting and which would necessarily invalidate it, the presumption is it has been issued
regularly in the absence of actual fraud.

There being no positive evidence presented which would establish actual fraud in the issuance of Free Patent Title
No. P-23617 in the defendants name, their title deserves recognition.

In like manner, in an action for reconveyance after the lapse of one year from the date of the registration, actual
fraud in securing the title must be proved (J.N. Tuazon Co., Inc. versus Macalindog, G.R. No. L-15398, December 29,
1962, 6 SCRA 938).

The plaintiffs claim for reconveyance therefore cannot prosper.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiffs ordering the
dismissal of the case with costs against plaintiffs and declaring defendants, heirs of Pomposa Saludares, as the
rightful owners of the land.

The claim of defendants in the matter of attorneys fees and litigation expenses not having been proven by
concrete evidence, the Court opts not to award the same.

SO ORDERED.[4]

On appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court decision:

It is true that the Torrens title issued upon a free patent may not be cancelled after the lapse of ten years from the
date of its registration because the statute of limitations bars such cancellation. But this doctrine has long been
qualified thusly:
If the registered owner, be he the patentee or his successor-in-interest to whom the Free patent was transferred
or conveyed, knew that the parcel of land described in the patent and in the Torrens belonged to another who
together with his predecessors-in-interest were never in possession thereof, then the statute barring an action to
cancel a Torrens title issued upon a free patent does not apply and the true owner may bring an action to have the
ownership or title to the land judicially settled and the Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, without
ordering the cancellation of the Torrens title issued upon the patent, may direct the defendant, the registered
owner, to reconvey the parcel of land to the plaintiff who has been found to be the true owner thereof.(Vital vs.
Anore, et al., 90 Phil. 855, Underscoring ours.)

In this case, there is clear evidence to show that appellee Isabel had full knowledge that Lot 5793 had been sold to
her brother-in-law Miguel Dahilig and her sister Petra, that Lot 5793 no longer belonged to her and to the heirs she
claimed to represent. She was signatory to the deed of sale dated April 16, 1940 in favor of appellant. (Exh. I) With
this knowledge, there is reason to conclude that appellant Isabel misrepresented herself and the rest of the heirs
as owners entitled to the free patent.

WHEREFORE, all the above considered, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Reversing the August 27, 1992 decision of the court below;

2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Quezon Province to cancel OCT No. P-23617 in the name of the Heirs of
Pomposa Saludares and to issue another for the same property in the name of plaintiffs Jose Dator and Carmen
Calimutan;

3. Ordering appellees to pay appellants ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos for attorneys fees, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Aggrieved by the appellate court ruling, the Heirs filed the instant petition, assigning the following errors:

The Court of Appeals erred in tracing the history of the transactions involving the property way back to the year
1923 and render judgment based on its findings, considering that petitioners are the registered owners of the
property under a torrens certificate of title which is conclusive, incontrovertible and indefeasible.

The Court of Appeals erred when it did not consider that the complaint filed by the private respondents for
reconveyance and cancellation of title before the trial court eleven (11) years after a torrens title over the property
was issued in the name of the petitioners (had) prescribed.[6]

Notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner may still be compelled to
reconvey the registered property to its true owner. The rationale for the rule is that reconveyance does not set aside
or re-subject to review the findings of fact of the Bureau of Lands. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of
registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title which
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another persons name, to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one
with a better right.[7]
Nevertheless, the right to seek reconveyance of registered property is not absolute because it is subject to
extinctive prescription. In Caro vs. Court of Appeals,[8] the prescriptive period of an action for reconveyance was
explained:

Under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art.
1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the
true owner. In this context, and vis--vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:

(1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.

xxx xxx xxx

An action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which
provides:

In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against
the parties to such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder of the decree of
registration on the original petition or application, x x x.

This provision should be read in conjunction with Article 1456 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered
a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and the title thereto in favor of the
true owner.Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil Code
with Article 1144(2) of the Civil Code, supra, the prescriptive period for the reconveyance of fraudulently
registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title.

There is but one instance when prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance, that is, when the
plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed.[9]
In a series of cases,[10] this Court permitted the filing of an action for reconveyance despite the lapse of ten
years and declared that said action, when based on fraud, is imprescriptible as long as the land has not passed to an
innocent purchaser for value. But in all those cases including Vital vs. Anore[11] on which the appellate court based
its assailed decision, the common factual backdrop was that the registered owners were never in possession of the
disputed property. Instead, it was the persons with the better right or the legal owners of the land who had always
been in possession of the same. Thus, the Court allowed the action for reconveyance to prosper in those cases
despite the lapse of more than ten years from the issuance of title to the land. The exception was based on the
theory that registration proceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the expense
of another.[12]
In the case at bar, however, it is the rule rather than the exception which should apply.
This Court does not normally review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals in a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. But when the findings of fact of the appellate court differ from those of the trial court,
the Court in the exercise of its power of review may inquire into the facts of a case.
The trial court declared the Heirs as having been in actual, open and continuous possession of the disputed
lot.On the other hand, the appellate court ruled that it was private respondents.
Private respondents presented documents purportedly showing a series of transactions which led to the
alleged transfer of ownership of Lot 5793 from the Heirs to them, namely: (1) a Kasulatan Ng Pagbibilihang
Lampasan, dated April 16, 1940, wherein the disputed lot was allegedly sold by the Heirs to their sibling Petra Dator
and her husband Miguel Dahilig; (2) an extra-judicial partition showing that, upon the death of Miguel, his heirs
Petra, Angel, Anatalia, Catalina, Felimon and Jacinto, inherited Lot 5793 and (3) two deeds of sale dated December
30, 1978 and March 15,1970 wherein Felimon and Jacinto, and later Catalina, sold their undivided shares in Lot 5793
to private respondents.
Other than the presentation of these documents, however, private respondents failed to prove that they were
in actual, open and continuous possession of Lot 5793.
On the other hand, Isabel Dator, who testified for the Heirs, vehemently denied having signed the Kasulatan
Ng Pagbibilihang Lampasan and pointed out the absence of the signatures of her other siblings Vicenta, Barcelisa
and Adoracion.
The Heirs likewise presented proof of payment of realty taxes from 1956 to 1974 in the names of their deceased
parents, and from 1975 to 1988 in their names.
More importantly, the Heirs convincingly established their open and continuous occupation of the entire Tanza
estate, including Lot 5793, through their tenant Miguel Dahilig. After Miguels death, he was succeeded by Marcelo
Saludares who testified during the trial that: (a) the farm was under the administration of Beata and Isabel Dator
who took over its management after Petra Dator died; (b) he had been consistently tending the land since 1947; (c)
he was the one who planted the various crops and trees thereon, except for some 100 coconut trees which he
explained were planted by other people in response to the Green Revolution project of then President Marcos.
Saludares identified each and every landmark and boundary of the subject lot. He also enumerated all the trees
planted on the subject lot and, when asked about the fruits of the land, he told the court that he shared the harvest
with the surviving Heirs.
In stark contrast, private respondents witness, farm worker Perpetuo Daya could not identify the boundaries
of the disputed property, its adjoining owners or recall the dates he worked and tilled the subject lot.
Specially noteworthy was the fact that the recorded cadastral claimant of Lot 5793, Angel Dahilig, testified that
he executed a waiver in favor of the Heirs because they were the true owners of the subject parcel of land.[13]
Furthermore, we note private respondent Jose Dators declaration that he was the cadastral claimant of and
free patent applicant for Lot 5794 which was adjacent to Lot 5793. This being the case, we find private respondents
inaction difficult to understand, considering that they were among those who received notices of petitioners free
patent application dated January 2, 1979 from the Bureau of Lands.[14]
If private respondents indeed owned Lot 5793, they should have filed an application for free patent for it just
as they did for Lot 5794, or at least opposed the Heirs application for free patent over Lot 5793, to protect their
interests.As a matter of fact, they were aware that the Heirs tenant, Marcelo Saludares, repeatedly harvested the
fruits of Lot 5793.
But even assuming that private respondents indeed validly acquired Lot 5793 in 1966 as they claimed, they
nevertheless slept on their right to secure title thereto. Their unexplained inaction for more than 11 years rendered
their demand for reconveyance stale. Vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura subverniunt. The law aids the vigilant,
not those who sleep on their rights. This legal precept finds perfect application in the case at bar.
Accordingly, we find that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in disregarding the ten-year
prescriptive period for the reconveyance of registered real property and in giving due course to said action despite
the lapse of more than 11 years from the issuance of title thereto, which was clearly barred by prescription.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals, dated July 31, 1996, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court, dated August 27, 1992, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 75

G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987

CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA
DIONGSON, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent. Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744
promulgated on August 30, 1985 (Rollo, p. 108) ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special Proceedings No,
591 ACEB and its Resolution issued on October 23, 1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents' (petitioners herein)
motion for reconsideration.

The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent Regional Trial Court of the Seventh
Judicial Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is hereby ordered to dismiss the petition in Special
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB No special pronouncement is made as to costs.

The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals,
(Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows:

On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition
for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters
testamentary, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. 29), on the premise that Nemesio Acain
died leaving a will in which petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita, Concepcion,
Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was
written in Bisaya (Rollo, p. 27) with a translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by petitioner without objection
raised by private respondents. The will contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the
appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of the testament. On the disposition of the
testator's property, the will provided:

THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands and money which I
earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be given by me to my brother SEGUNDO
ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu
City. In case my brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the money properties, lands, houses
there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute my share shall be given to me to his
children, namely: Anita, Constantino, Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all
surnamed Acain.

Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with
Constantino as the petitioner in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB

After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984 the oppositors (respondents herein
Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally adopted daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson Vda. de
Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been pretirited.
(Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the trial judge.

After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower court, respondents filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently
referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court by Resolution of the Court dated March 11, 1985 (Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).

Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents' petition and ordered the trial court to
dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB

His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this present petition for the review of
respondent Court's decision on December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6). Respondents' Comment was filed on June 6, 1986
(Rollo, p. 146).

On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 153). Respondents'
Memorandum was filed on September 22, 1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the Memorandum for petitioner was filed on
September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177).

Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):

(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction is not the proper remedy under the premises;

(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic validity of the
will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity thereof before it is
admitted to probate;

(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to probate. The preterition
mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code refers to preterition of "compulsory heirs in the
direct line," and does not apply to private respondents who are not compulsory heirs in the
direct line; their omission shall not annul the institution of heirs;

(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the law;

(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that suggests that mere institution
of a universal heir in the will would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance but there
is a definite distinct intention of the testator in the case at bar, explicitly expressed in his will.
This is what matters and should be in violable.

(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file the petition in Sp.
Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain and

(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore unconstitutional and
ineffectual.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have been pretirited.

Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:

 Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct
line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator,
shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are
not; inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall he effectual,
without prejudice to the right of representation.

Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they
are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar
as the widow is concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the
testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir,
there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil
code) however, the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption
by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39
of P.D. No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights
and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir of the
adopter. It cannot be denied that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and that both
adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not
expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.

Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire
inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora o donacion" Maniesa
as cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only provisions which do
not result in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and respected,
except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.

The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the
testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without
any other testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully
worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v.
Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased has
been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the "Institution of heirs
will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies
and devises must, as already stated above, be respected.

We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he
must have an interest iii the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a
claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one
who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967). Petitioner is not the
appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any
gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil Code). At the
outset, he appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person
called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of law. However, intestacy having resulted
from the preterition of respondent adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect not an
heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and Special
Proceedings No. 591 A-CEB must be dismissed.

As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when the questioned order is an oppressive
exercise of j judicial authority (People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, 117 SCRA
573 [1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587
[1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not available where the petitioner has
the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law (DD Comendador
Construction Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper remedies to correct a grave
abuse of discretion of the trial court in not dismissing a case where the dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda.
de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).

Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent Court, the general rule is
that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the
testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The
intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or
efficacy of the provisions of the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra;
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v. Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno
v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 206 [1985]).

The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not
powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will (Nepomuceno v.
Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of
absolute preteriton The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in question was a complete nullity
and dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court,
induced by practical considerations. The Court said:

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be
gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the
record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will
come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will.
Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations
that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question. After all there exists a justiciable controversy crying for
solution.

In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the petition by the surviving spouse was
grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings which was fully substantiated by the
evidence during the hearing held in connection with said motion. The Court upheld the probate court's order of
dismissal.

In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to dismiss the petition deals with the validity
of the provisions of the will. Respondent Judge allowed the probate of the will. The Court held that as on its face
the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner the respondent judge should have denied its probate outright.
Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be passed upon even before the
extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of
Appeals, supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra).

In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp. Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the
proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited
(Rollo, p. 158). It was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for the reason that "the grounds
for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial
on the merits of the case (Rollo, p. 32). A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on
February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to progress when on its
face the will appears to be intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal
heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited would have been an
exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could
have denied its probate outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions
before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra; Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The
remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents.

Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable, the defendants had the right to resort
to the more speedy, and adequate remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang v. Court
of Appeals, supra) and even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in
the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not
afford speedy and adequate relief. (Maninang Court of Appeals, supra).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and the questioned decision of respondent
Court of Appeals promulgated on August 30, 1985 and its Resolution dated October 23, 1985 are hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner and appellant,

vs.
FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and appellees.

Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant.

Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for oppositors and appellees.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers
and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.

On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will
allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed
that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.

On June 25, 1963, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the
deceased Rosario Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by
the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory
heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the
institution is void.

On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for probate and objection thereto, oppositors
moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition.

On September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss.1äwphï1.ñët

The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create
intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.

A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on appeal.

1. Right at the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the probate of a will. The
court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will. The
due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted upon, by the court. Said court at this
stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the
will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.1

A peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will
should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this comes
only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. 2 But petitioner and oppositors, in the
court below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is the will intrinsically a nullity?

We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the
contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if
the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of
the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the
practical considerations that induce us to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of
the provisions of the will in question.3 After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution.

2. Petitioner's sole assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion below that the will is a
complete nullity. This exacts from us a study of the disputed will and the applicable statute.

Reproduced hereunder is the will:

Nov. 17, 1951

I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of
property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved
sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this
seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.

(Sgd.) Illegible

T/ ROSARIO NUGUID

The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the Civil Code which, in part, provides:

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. ...

Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a reproduction of Article 814 of the Civil Code of
Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus —

Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the
execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the
legacies and betterments4 shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. ...

A comprehensive understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a necessity. On this point
Manresa comments:

La pretericion consiste en omitar al heredero en el testamento. O no se le nombra siquiera o aun

nombrandole como padre, hijo, etc., no se le instituya heredero ni se le deshereda expresamente ni se le
asigna parte alguna de los bienes, resultando privado de un modo tacito de su derecho a legitima.

Para que exista pretericion, con arreglo al articulo 814, basta que en el testamento omita el testador a
uno cualquiera de aquellos a quienes por su muerte corresponda la herencia forzosa.

Se necesita, pues, a) Que la omision se refiera a un heredero forzoso. b) Que la omision sea completa; que
el heredero forzoso nada reciba en el testamento.

It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the problem before us, to have
on hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul:

To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6
 The word "annul" as used in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of divorce decree upon
wife's remarriage means to reduce to nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no
effect; to nullify; to abolish. N.J.S.A. 2:50 — 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d 611,
614, 136 N..J Eq. 132.7

ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to
do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8

And now, back to the facts and the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or
illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz
Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly,
they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition.
Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracter absoluto a
este ordenamiento referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. 9 The one-sentence will here
institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein
provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.
Says Manresa:

En cuanto a la institucion de heredero, se anula. Lo que se anula deja de existir, en todo o en parte? No se
añade limitacion alguna, como en el articulo 851, en el que se expresa que se anulara la institucion de
heredero en cuanto prejudique a la legitima del deseheredado Debe, pues, entenderse que la anulacion
es completa o total, y que este articulo como especial en el caso que le motiva rige con preferencia al
817. 10

The same view is expressed by Sanchez Roman: —

La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por pretericion de uno, varios o

todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion intestada total o parcial. Sera total, cuando
el testador que comete la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes por titulo universal de
herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque asi lo exige la generalidad
del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el de que "anulara la
institucion de heredero." ... 11

Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the
universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the
nullification of such institution of universal heir — without any other testamentary disposition in the will —
amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no
leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the
statute. On this point, Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria annual del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a 1908",
which in our opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz:

... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de heredero, no
consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando
parezca, y en algun caso pudiera ser, mas o menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho
sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el acto no se ha realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal
base o supuesto, y consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado llamar a
los herederos forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de otra clase, cuando el testador no
hubiese distribudo todos sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto
que, en materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que
no basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las
condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion
arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese
 anulada con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi
fuese, sera esto razon para modificar la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus terminos
y a los principios que informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa en el terreno
del Derecho constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion, desvirtuando y
anulando por este procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere establecer. 12

3. We should not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding, "the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they
are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir
in a will — void because of preterition — would give the heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the
will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a testamentary disposition granting him bequests
or legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two
component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition annuls the institution of the heir "totalmente por
la pretericion"; but added (in reference to legacies and bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras
disposiciones que no se refieren a la institucion de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to
intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de
legado, mejora o donacion. 14

As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of petitioner as universal heir.
That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues.

4. Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition". 15From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar". This
argument fails to appreciate the distinction between pretention and disinheritance.

Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because
they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited." 16 Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in
the legitime for a cause authorized by law. " 17 In Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la legitima
constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se denomina pretericion." 18 Sanchez Roman
emphasizes the distinction by stating that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand,
is presumed to be "involuntaria". 19 Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be supported by a legal
cause specified in the will itself. 20

The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names
altogether. Said will rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs
suffer from preterition.

On top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance.
Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir". This annulment is in
toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In
ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution
of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case
of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the
disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive language, in commenting on the rights of the
preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus:
"Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22 el caso. 23

5. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes, but
that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the
extent of said legitimes. 24
This is best answered by a reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the Neri case heretofore
cited, viz:

But the theory is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children by the second
marriage should be treated as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but
merely reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the
Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and
betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 regarding total
or partial nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely meaningless and will never have any application
at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of inofficious
legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus,
instead of construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.

The destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of
heirs from legacies and betterments, and a general from a special provision. With reference to article 814,
which is the only provision material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the institution
of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterments. And they are
separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said article but
because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of property
that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special title. ... But
again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy. 25

The disputed order, we observe, declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in
turn merely nullifies "the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the
institution of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null.

Upon the view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby affirmed. No costs
allowed. So ordered.
G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994

SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND, respondents.

Miguel D. Larida for petitioners.

Montilla Law Office for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of

Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840, dated March 30, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads;

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision of November 19, 1988 of the trial court is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the petition for probate is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.

The earlier Decision was rendered by the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94, 2 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, and
the instrument submitted for probate is the holographic will of the late Annie Sand, who died on
November 25, 1982.

In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero, private respondent
Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr.,
and their children.

On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, for allowance of decedent's holographic will.
They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud
or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.

Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature
therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by
decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition
was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the disposition in the will of a house and lot located in
Cabadbaran, Agusan Del Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as
she was not its sole owner.

Notwithstanding the oppositions, the trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. It
found, inter alia:

Considering then that the probate proceedings herein must decide only the question of identity
of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, this probate court
finds no reason at all for the disallowance of the will for its failure to comply with the formalities
prescribed by law nor for lack of testamentary capacity of the testatrix.

For one, no evidence was presented to show that the will in question is different from the will
actually executed by the testatrix. The only objections raised by the oppositors . . . are that the
will was not written in the handwriting of the testatrix which properly refers to the question of
its due execution, and not to the question of identity of will. No other will was alleged to have
been executed by the testatrix other than the will herein presented. Hence, in the light of the
evidence adduced, the identity of the will presented for probate must be accepted, i.e., the will
submitted in Court must be deemed to be the will actually executed by the testatrix.

xxx xxx xxx

While the fact that it was entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix
has been disputed, the petitioners, however, have satisfactorily shown in Court that the
holographic will in question was indeed written entirely, dated and signed in the handwriting of
the testatrix. Three (3) witnesses who have convincingly shown knowledge of the handwriting of
the testatrix have been presented and have explicitly and categorically identified the handwriting
with which the holographic will in question was written to be the genuine handwriting and
signature of the testatrix. Given then the aforesaid evidence, the requirement of the law that the
holographic will be entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has been
complied with.

xxx xxx xxx

As to the question of the testamentary capacity of the testratix, (private respondent) Clemente
Sand himself has testified in Court that the testatrix was completely in her sound mind when he
visited her during her birthday celebration in 1981, at or around which time the holographic will
in question was executed by the testatrix. To be of sound mind, it is sufficient that the testatrix,
at the time of making the will, knew the value of the estate to be disposed of, the
proper object of her bounty, and the characterof the testamentary act . . . The will itself shows
that the testatrix even had detailed knowledge of the nature of her estate. She even identified
the lot number and square meters of the lots she had conveyed by will. The objects of her
bounty were likewise identified explicitly. And considering that she had even written a nursing
book which contained the law and jurisprudence on will and succession, there is more than
sufficient showing that she knows the character of the testamentary act.

In this wise, the question of identity of the will, its due execution and the testamentary capacity
of the testatrix has to be resolved in favor of the allowance of probate of the will submitted
herein.

Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the disallowance of herein
holographic will. While it was alleged that the said will was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person, the evidence
adduced have not shown any instance where improper pressure or influence was exerted on the
testatrix. (Private respondent) Clemente Sand has testified that the testatrix was still alert at the
time of the execution of the will, i.e., at or around the time of her birth anniversary celebration in
1981. It was also established that she is a very intelligent person and has a mind of her own. Her
independence of character and to some extent, her sense of superiority, which has been testified
to in Court, all show the unlikelihood of her being unduly influenced or improperly pressured to
make the aforesaid will. It must be noted that the undue influence or improper pressure in
question herein only refer to the making of a will and not as to the specific testamentary
provisions therein which is the proper subject of another proceeding. Hence, under the
circumstances, this Court cannot find convincing reason for the disallowance of the will herein.

Considering then that it is a well-established doctrine in the law on succession that in case of
doubt, testate succession should be preferred over intestate succession, and the fact that no
convincing grounds were presented and proven for the disallowance of the holographic will of
 the late Annie Sand, the aforesaid will submitted herein must be admitted to probate. 3 (Citations
omitted.)

On appeal, said Decision was reversed, and the petition for probate of decedent's will was dismissed. The Court of
Appeals found that, "the holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." 4 It held that the decedent
did not comply with Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, which read, as follows:

Art. 813: When a number of dispositions appearing in a holographic will are signed without being
dated, and the last disposition has a signature and date, such date validates the dispositions
preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions.

Art. 814: In case of insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic will, the testator
must authenticate the same by his full signature.

It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It
also found that the erasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.

Thus, this appeal which is impressed with merit.

Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court provides that will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:

(a) If not executed and attested as required by law;

(b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable to make a will, at the time of its
execution;

(c) If it was executed under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(d) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the
beneficiary, or of some other person for his benefit;

(e) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the
instrument should be his will at the time of fixing his signature thereto.

In the same vein, Article 839 of the New Civil Code reads:

Art. 839: The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases;

(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;

(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will,
at the time of its execution;

(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or
threats;

(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the
part of the beneficiary or of some other person;

(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

 (6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he
signed should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto.

These lists are exclusive; no other grounds can serve to disallow a will. 5 Thus, in a petition to admit a holographic
will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's
last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law;
(3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4)
whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent. 6

In the case at bench, respondent court held that the holographic will of Anne Sand was not executed in accordance
with the formalities prescribed by law. It held that Articles 813 and 814 of the New Civil Code, ante, were not
complied with, hence, it disallowed the probate of said will. This is erroneous.

We reiterate what we held in Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476, 479 (1919), that:

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain
these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is
not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when
an interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that
adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the
testator's last will, must be disregarded.

For purposes of probating non-holographic wills, these formal solemnities include the subscription, attestation,
and acknowledgment requirements under Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code.

In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be
totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, 7 as provided under Article 810 of the New Civil Code,
thus:

A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by
the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is
unquestionably handwritten by the testator.

A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions
contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions,
the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole
testament void.

Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions
of Article 814. In the case of Kalaw vs. Relova 132 SCRA 237 242 (1984), this Court held:

Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a
holographic Will have not been noted under his signature, . . . the Will is not thereby invalidated
as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.
Manresa gave an identical commentary when he said "la omission de la salvedad no anula el
 testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la sentencia de 4 de Abril de
1985." 8 (Citations omitted.)

Thus, unless the unauthenticated alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic
will or on testator's signature, 9 their presence does not invalidate the will itself. 10 The lack of authentication will
only result in disallowance of such changes.

It is also proper to note that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and dating of dispositions
appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which provides for the necessary conditions for the
validity of the holographic will (Article 810). The distinction can be traced to Articles 678 and 688 of the Spanish
Civil Code, from which the present provisions covering holographic wills are taken. They read as follows:

Art. 678: A will is called holographic when the testator writes it himself in the form and with the
requisites required in Article 688.

Art. 688: Holographic wills may be executed only by persons of full age.

In order that the will be valid it must be drawn on stamped paper corresponding to the year of its
execution, written in its entirety by the testator and signed by him, and must contain a
statement of the year, month and day of its execution.

If it should contain any erased, corrected, or interlined words, the testator must identify them
over his signature.

Foreigners may execute holographic wills in their own language.

This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810 of the
New Civil Code — and not those found in Articles 813 and 814 of the same Code — are essential to the probate of
a holographic will.

The Court of Appeals further held that decedent Annie Sand could not validly dispose of the house and lot located
in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, in its entirety. This is correct and must be affirmed.

As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will
sought to be probated. However, in exceptional instances, courts are not powerless to do what the situation
constrains them to do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. 11 In the case at bench, decedent herself
indubitably stated in her holographic will that the Cabadbaran property is in the name of her late father, John H.
Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conveyance of the same in its entirety). Thus, as correctly
held by respondent court, she cannot validly dispose of the whole property, which she shares with her father's
other heirs.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 22840,
dated March 30, 1992, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, except with respect to the invalidity of the disposition of the
entire house and lot in Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 94 in Sp. Proc. No. Q-37171, dated November 19, 1988, admitting to probate the holographic will of
decedent Annie Sand, is hereby REINSTATED, with the above qualification as regards the Cabadbaran property. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 80

G.R. No. 78590 June 20, 1988

PEDRO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ZOSIMO Z. ANGELES, RTC BRANCH 58, MAKATI, METRO, MANILA; DEPUTY SHERIFFS
JOSE B. FLORA and HONORIO SANTOS and ELAINE G. DE GUZMAN, respondents.

Bautista, Picazo, Cruz, Buyco and Tan for private respondent.

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Bautista, Picaso and Reyes, collaborating counsel for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

May a probate court act on and/or grant motions for the appointment of a special administrator, for the issuance
of a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased person, and for assistance to preserve the estate in a
petition for the settlement of the intestate estate even before the court has caused notice to be served upon all
interested parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court?

On May 5, 1987, private respondent Elaine G. de Guzman filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate
of Manolito de Guzman, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings .No. M-1436.

The petition alleges that: (1) on March 22,1987, Manolito de Guzman died in Makati, Metro Manila; (2) at the time
of his death, the decedent was a resident of Makati, Metro Manila; (3) decedent left personal and real properties
as part of his estate, listed in Annexes "A," "B," "C" and "D;" (4) the properties were acquired after the marriage of
the petitioner to the decedent and therefore are included in their conjugal partnership; (5) the estate of -the
decedent has a probable net value which may be provisionally assessed at P4,000,000.00 more or less; (6) the
possible creditors of the estate, who have accounts payable. and existing claims against the firm — C. SANTOS
Construction are listed in Annex "E;" (7) the compulsory heirs of the decedent are the as the surviving spouse and
their two (2) minor children namely: Charmane Rose de Guzman 11 years and Peter Brian de Guzman, 9 years old;
(8) after diligent search and inquiry to ascertain whether the decedent left a last will and testament, none has
been found and according to the best knowledge information and belief of the petitioner, Manolito de Guzman
died intestate; and (9) the petitioner as the survey surviving spouse of the decedent, is most qualified and entitled
to the grant of letters of administration.

On May 22, 1987, the private respondent filed a motion for writ of possession over five (5) — vehicles registered
under the name of Manolito de Guzman, alleged to be conjugal properties of the de Guzman's but which are at
present in the possession of the private respondent's father-in- law, herein petitioner Pedro de Guzman. The
motion stated that as co-owner and heir, the private respondent must have the possession of said vehicles in order
to preserve the assets of her late husband. On the same day, the lower court issued an order setting for hearing
the motion on May 27, 1987 directing the deputy sheriff to notify petitioner Pedro de Guzman at the expense of
the private respondent.

The scheduled May 27, 1987 hearing was postponed on motion of petitioner's counsel, Atty. Ricardo Fojas. The
petitioner was also given three (3) days from May 27, 1987 to give his comment on the motion for a writ of
possession. The hearing was reset to June 5, 1987 at 3:00 p.m.
On May 29, 1987, the petitioner's counsel filed a notice of appearance and an "Urgent Motion For Extension of
Time to File an Opposition and for Resetting of the Hearing."

The motion was granted and the petitioner was given five (5) days from receipt of the order within which to file his
opposition to the motion for a writ of possession. The hearing was reset to June 15, 1987 at 2:00 in the afternoon.

In the meantime, on May 28, 1987, the private respondent filed her "Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint Petitioner as
Special Administratrix of the Estate of Manolito de Guzman."

In an order dated May 28,1987, the aforesaid motion was set for hearing on June 5, 1987. In this same order, the
lower court directed that all parties in the case be notified. However, no notice of the order was given to the
petitioner.

In an order dated June 5, 1987, the lower court granted the private respondent's motion to be appointed as special
administratrix, to wit:

Finding the motion for appointment of special administratrix, on the ground alleged therein to be
well-founded, and finding further that it is to be the best interest of the Estate of Manolito de
Guzman that petitioner-movant Elaine G. de Guzman, be appointed as Special Administratrix in
this case, said motion is granted.

WHEREFORE, Elaine G. de Guzman, petitioner-movant, is hereby appointed as Special

Administratrix of the Estate of the deceased Manolito de Guzman, pending appointment of a
regular administrator. The bond for the said special administratrix is hereby fixed in the amount
of P200,000.00. (Rollo, p. 40)

On June 8, 1987, the lower court issued another order, to wit:

Acting on the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Assistance" filed by Petitioner-Special Administratrix
Elaine de Guzman for appointment of Deputy Sheriffs Honorio Santos and Jose B. Flora together
with some military men and/or policemen to assist her in preserving the estate of Manolito de
Guzman, the motion is granted and the Deputy Sheriffs Honorio Santos and Jose B. Flora are
hereby appointed for that purpose, provided that the subject matter of the motion for writ of
possession pending before this Court shall not be affected. (Rollo, p. 41)

Trouble ensued when the respondents tried to enforce the above order. The petitioner resisted when Deputy
Sheriffs Jose B. Flora and Honorio Santos tried to take the subject vehicles on the ground that they were his
personal properties. According to the petitioner, this resulted in a "near shoot-out between members of the
Makati Police, who were to maintain peace and order, and the CAPCOM soldiers who were ostensibly aiding
respondent sheriffs and Elaine G. de Guzman" and that "the timely arrival of Mayor Jejomar Binay of Makati
defused the very volatile situation which resulted in an agreement between the parties that the bulldozer, sought
to be taken, be temporarily placed in the custody of Mayor Binay, while the parties seek clarification of the order
from respondent Judge Zosimo Angeles the next day, June 9, 1981 at 10:30 a.m."

In the conference held before the respondent court attended by the counsels for both parties, the June 8, 1987
order was clarified to the effect that the order "must be merely to take and preserve assets admittedly belonging
to the estate, but not properties, the ownership of which is claimed by third persons."

The petitioner then filed a manifestation listing properties which he claimed to be his own.

Thereafter, the instant petition was filed to annul the lower court's orders dated June 5, 1987 and June 8, 1987.
In a resolution dated June 10, 1987, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent court from
enforcing the two questioned orders. In another resolution dated October 28, 1987, we gave due course to the
petition.

The petitioner contends that the June 5, 1987 order is a patent nullity, the respondent court not having acquired
jurisdiction to appoint a special administratrix because the petition for the settlement of the estate of Manolito de
Guzman was not yet set for hearing and published for three consecutive weeks, as mandated by the Rules of
Court. The petitioner also stresses that the appointment of a special administratrix constitutes an abuse of
discretion for having been made without giving petitioner and other parties an opportunity to oppose said
appointment.

Anent the June 8, 1987 order, the petitioner alleges that the immediate grant of the motion praying for the court's
assistance in the preservation of the estate of the deceased, "without notice to the petitioner Pedro de Guzman,
and its immediate implementation on the very same day by respondent Elaine G. de Guzman with the assistance of
respondents deputy sheriffs, at no other place but at the home of the petitioner Pedro de Guzman, are eloquent
proofs that all the antecedent events were intended solely to deprive petitioner de Guzman of his property
without due process of law." He also prays that the respondent Judge be disqualified from further continuing the
case.

As stated earlier, the pivotal issue in the instant petition hinges on whether or not a probate court may appoint a
special administratrix and issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of a decedent for the preservation of the
estate in a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the said deceased person even before the probate
court causes notice to be served upon all interested parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of
Court.

As early as March 18, 1937, in the case of Santos v. Castillo (64 Phil. 211) we ruled that before a court may acquire
jurisdiction over the case for the probate of a will and the administration of the properties left by a deceased
person, the application must allege the residence of the deceased and other indispensable facts or circumstances
and that the applicant is the executor named in the will or is the person who had custody of the will to be
probated.

In the instant case, there is no doubt that the respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the proceedings upon
the filing of a petition for the settlement of an intestate estate by the private respondent since the petition had
alleged all the jurisdictional facts, the residence of the deceased person, the possible heirs and creditors and the
probable value of the estate of the deceased Manolito de Guzman pursuant to Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

We must, however, differentiate between the jurisdiction of the probate court over the proceedings for the
administration of an estate and its jurisdiction over the persons who are interested in the settlement of the estate
of the deceased person. The court may also have jurisdiction over the "estate" of the deceased person but the
determination of the properties comprising that estate must follow established rules.

Section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Court to set time for hearing. — Notice thereof. — When a petition for letters of administration is
filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition,
and shall cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and
to any other persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in
sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76.
It is very clear from this provision that the probate court must cause notice through publication of the petition
after it receives the same. The purpose of this notice is to bring all the interested persons within the court's
jurisdiction so that the judgment therein becomes binding on all the world. (Manalo v. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938;
Moran, Comment on the Rules of Court Volume 3,1980 Edition) Where no notice as required by Section 3, Rule 79
of the Rules of Court has been given to persons believed to have an interest in the estate of the deceased person;
the proceeding for the settlement of the estate is void and should be annulled. The requirement as to notice is
essential to the validity of the proceeding in that no person may be deprived of his right to property without due
process of law. (Eusebio v. Valmores, 96 Phil. 163).

Verily, notice through publication of the petition for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person is
jurisdictional, the absence of which makes court orders affecting other persons, subsequent to the petition void
and subject to annulment. (See Eusebio v. Valmores, supra)

In the instant case, no notice as mandated by section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court was caused to be
given by the probate court before it acted on the motions of the private respondent to be appointed as special
administratrix, to issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased person in the widow's favor, and
to grant her motion for assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito de Guzman.

The "explanation" which we required of the respondent Judge for his apparent haste in issuing the questioned
orders, states:

xxx xxx xxx

10. In issuing the subject Orders, undersigned acted in the honest conviction that it would be to
the best interest of the estate without unduly prejudicing any interested party or third person.
Any delay in issuing the said Orders might have prejudiced the estate for the properties may be
lost, wasted or dissipated in the meantime. (Rollo, p. 86)

xxx xxx xxx

This explanation while seemingly plausible does not sufficiently explain the disregard of the Rule. If indeed, the
respondent court had the welfare of both the estate and the person who have interest in the estate, then it could
have caused notice to be given immediately as mandated by the Revised Rules of Court. All interested persons
including herein petitioner who is the biggest creditor of the estate listed in the Petition (P850,240.80) could have
participated in the proceedings especially so, because the respondent immediately filed a motion to have herself
appointed as administratrix. A special administrator has been defined as the "representative of decedent
appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator is
appointed." (Jones v. Minnesota Transfer R. Co. 1965 ed., at 106 cited in Fule v. Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 189).
The petitioner as creditor of the estate has a similar interest in the preservation of the estate as the private
respondent who happens to be the widow of deceased Manolito de Guzman. Hence, the necessity of notice as
mandated by the Rules of Court. It is not clear from the records exactly what emergency would have ensued if the
appointment of an administrator was deferred at least until the most interested parties were given notice of the
proposed action. No unavoidable delay in the appointment of a regular administrator is apparent from the
records.

As argued by the petitioner:

The position of special administrator, by the very nature of the powers granted thereby, is one of
trust and confidence. It is a fiduciary position and, therefore, requires a comprehensive
determination of the suitability of the applicant to such position. Hence, under Philippine
jurisprudence, it has been settled that the same fundamental and legal principles governing the
 choice of a regular administrator should be taken in choosing the special administrator
(Francisco, Vol. VB, page 46 citing the cases of Ozaeta v. Pecson, Ibid. and Roxas v. Pecson, Ibid.)

In order to fully and correctly ascertain the suitability of the applicant to the trust, a hearing is
obviously necessary wherein the applicant can prove his qualifications and at the same time
affording oppositors, given notice of such hearing and application, the opportunity to oppose or
contest such application.

The requirement of a hearing and the notification to all the known heirs and
other interested parties as to the date thereof is essential to the validity of the
proceeding for the appointment of an administrator "in order that no person
may be deprived of his right or property without due process of law" (Eusebio
v. Valmores, 97 Phil. 163). Moreover, a hearing is necessary in order to fully
determine the suitability of the applicant to the trust, by giving him the
opportunity to prove his qualifications and affording oppositors, if any, to
contest the said application. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 770;
emphasis supplied).

Since the position of special administrator is a very sensitive one which requires trust and
confidence, it is essential that the suitability of the applicant be ascertained in a hearing with due
notice to all oppositors who may object precisely to the applicant's suitability to the trust. (Rollo,
pp. 103-104)

If emergency situations threatening the dissipation of the assets of an estate justify a court's immediately taking
some kind of temporary action even without the required notice, no such emergency is shown in this case. The
need for the proper notice even for the appointment of a special administrator is apparent from the circumstances
of this case.

The respondent Judge himself explains that the order for the preservation of the estate was limited to properties
not claimed by third parties. If certain properties are already in the possession of the applicant for special
administratrix and are not claimed by other persons, we see no need to hurry up and take special action to
preserve those properties. As it is, the sheriffs took advantage of the questioned order to seize by force, properties
found in the residence of the petitioner which he vehemently claims are owned by him and not by the estate of
the deceased person.

The petitioner also asks that the respondent Judge be disqualified from continuing with the proceedings of the
case on the ground that he is partial to the private respondent.

In view of the fact that the respondent Judge in his "Explanation" requests that he be inhibited from further active
on the case, this issue has now become academic. We accept Judge Angeles" voluntary inhibition in line with our
ruling in Pimentel v. Salanga (21 SCRA 160). As we stated in Query of Executive Judge Estrella T. Estrada, Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan on the conflicting views of Regional Trial Court—Judges Manalo and Elisaga Re:
Criminal Case No. 4954 — M Administrative Matter No. 87-9-3918-RTC, October 26, 1987:

xxx xxx xxx

... A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made
of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a
litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he
should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the
people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the
 probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge
had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on the part of a judge
may be generated because of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his
counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should,
therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw from a
suit Where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that
case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned
to others involved thereon. On the result of his decisions to sit or not sit may depend to a great
extent that all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he
should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be
seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the
second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls
miscarriage of justice.

Considering the foregoing, we find no need to discuss the other issues raised in the petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 of
Makati are hereby set aside. The case is ordered remanded to the lower court for the hearing of the petition with
previous notice to all interested parties as required by law. In view of the voluntary inhibition of the respondent
Judge, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Makati is directed to re-raffle the case to another branch of
the court. The Temporary Restraining Order dated June 10, 1987 is made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 87
1) Rioterio vs. Court of Appeals – 419 SCRA 59 (2004)
RULE 89

Beltran vs. Donato – 32 Phil 66

 [G.R. No. L-1776. October 27, 1949.]

PAZ M. CEA and SEBASTIAN MOLL, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF THE DECEASED
GREGORIO NATIVIDAD, Respondents.

Cea, Blancaflor & Cea for the petitioners.

Delgado, Dizon & Flores for the respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; PROJECT OF PARTITION; SALE BY HEIR OR LEGATEE OF HIS SHARE IN COMMON
ESTATE BEFORE JUDICIAL APPROVAL OF PARTITION. — There is no provision of law which prohibits a co-heir from
selling to a stranger his share of an estate held in common before the partition of the property is approved by the
court.

2. ID.; JUDGMENT; WHERE SALE OF PROPERTY PENDING FINAL DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE, DECLARED VOID; "RES
JUDICATA." — A person sold a half interest in the property bequeathed to him by a deceased grandparent. The
trial court, in a decision, declares the sale void as a conveyance of property in custodia legis but not so as an
assignment of property by a legatee pending settlement of the estate of the deceased grantor, thereby leaving the
question of title to said property for future determination. In the administration proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased grandparent, the purchasers reassert their claim over such property, and the heirs,
invoking res judicata, pray that they be adjudged owners of the property. Held: Such judgment in the former case
does not preclude nor bar the purchasers, under the doctrine of res judicata, from reasserting their claim over the
property.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

The spouses Gregorio Natividad and Benedicta Villanueva, joint owners of a tract of land known as "Hacienda
Cabasay," situated in the municipality of Tigaon, Province of Camarines Sur, willed their respective half interests
therein to their grandson, Alfredo Natividad.

After the death of Gregorio Natividad his estate was placed under administration in special proceedings No. 3963
of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, and on October 8, 1928, notice of the proceedings was recorded in
the Office of the Register of Deeds of said province so that it might be publicly known that the properties left by
the deceased, including the Hacienda Cabasay, were under judicial administration. This notwithstanding, Alfredo
Natividad, by a deed executed on December 31, 1928, and recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds on
January 3, 1929, sold the hacienda to Gerardo Cea. On learning of the sale, the judicial administrator brought suit
to have it annuled, but the suit ended in a settlement with Alfredo Natividad ceding half of the hacienda to the
heirs of Gregorio Natividad. On September 8, 1931, Gerardo Cea, who does not appear to have been a party to the
said suit or settlement, sold the whole hacienda to Paz M. Cea, and on June 1, 1936, the latter in turn sold one-half
of it to Sebastian Moll. The following year, Paz M. Cea and Sebastian Moll initiated proceedings for the registration
in their name of their respective half interests in the hacienda, each filing a separate application for that purpose.
Opposed by the heirs as to the half interest which had come from Gregorio Natividad, the applications were,
nevertheless, granted by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. But the Court of Appeals modified the
decision by granting the applications only as to the half interest which came from Benedicta Villanueva and
denying the applications as to the other half, which came from Gregorio Natividad, on the ground that the
applicants had no registerable title thereto, this on the theory that the sale thereof by Alfredo Natividad without
judicial sanction was null and void for the reason that the property was in custodia legis. No appeal was taken from
this decision of the Court of Appeals.

On March 19, 1941, in the aforementioned proceedings for the administration of the estate of Gregorio Natividad,
two sons and seven grandchildren of the deceased petitioned the court that they be declared his heirs and that
one-half of the hacienda in question (i.e., the half interest which the deceased had devised to Alfredo Natividad)
be adjudicated to them as such heirs. Opposing the petition, Paz M. Cea and Sebastian Moll reasserted their claim
to the said half and asked that the same be adjudicated to them instead. The Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur, in its order of March 28, 1941, granted the petition of the heirs and denied the claim of the oppositors on the
ground that the Court of Appeals, in the registration cases above mentioned, had already pronounced the sale
made by Alfredo Natividad, which was the basis of oppositors’ title, to be null and void. The order having been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, Paz M. Cea and Sebastian Moll have appealed to this Supreme Court.

The question for determination is whether the decision of the Court of Appeals in the registration cases constitutes
res judicata for the purposes of the present case.

We are of the opinion that the question should be answered in the negative. The said decision does, indeed,
declare that the sale by Alfredo Natividad of the half interest bequeathed to him by the deceased Gregorio
Natividad was void as a conveyance of property in the custody of the law. But the decision does not declare the
said sale void as an assignment of Alfredo Natividad’s interest in the property as a legatee pending the settlement
of the estate. The decision leaves the question of title to the contested half of the hacienda for future
determination in connection with the final distribution of the estate of the deceased Gregorio Natividad. This is
obvious from the following portion of the decision:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Se arguye que, a tenor de lo preceptuado en el Codigo Civil sobre la materia, los bienes se transmiten a los
herederos o legatarios desde el momento mismo de la muerte del causante. Esto es cierto, pero cuando los bienes
de difuntos se hallan bajo administracion judicial, el heredero o legatario no hace suya legalmente la propiedad
sino despues de la adjudicacion hecha por el juzgado en virtud de la correspondiente orden. Antes de eso, lo unico,
en todo caso, de que puede disponer el heredero o legatario es su interes o derecho en la herencia, pero en
abstracto, sujeto a lae resultas de la testamentaria o del abintestato, segun cea el caso.

"De lo antedicho, se deduce que el unico derecho inscribible que tienen los solicitantes en estos dos expedientes
es en relacion con una mitad pro indiviso de los lotes cuyo registro solicitan, es decir, la mitad no cuestionada que
heredo Alfredo Natividad de Benedicta Villanueva. Respecto de la otra mitad, la perteneciente a la testamentaria
de Gregorio Natividad, ni los solicitantes, ni los opositores tienen ningun titulo inscribible bajo la ley del Registro de
la Propiedad, y la determinacion del titulo sobre dicha mitad pro indiviso tiene que dejarse, como por la presente
se deja, a las resultas de lo que el Tribunal correspondiente resolviere al disponer en difinitiva de como deben
distribuirse los bienes pertenecientes a la testamentaria de dicho Gregorio Natividad."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Court of Appeals could not have declared void the sale of Alfredo Natividad’s interest as an heir or legatee in
the estate of Gregorio Natividad as there is no provision of law which prohibits a coheir from selling to a stranger
his share of an estate held in common before the partition of the property is approved by the Court (Beltran Et. Al.,
v. Doriano Et. Al., 32 Phil. 66).

It results that the claim of Paz M. Cea and Sebastian Moll to the disputed half interest in the Hacienda Cabasay has
not been concluded by the decision of the Court of Appeals in the registration cases, so that the same may still be
asserted in the administration proceedings in opposition to the claim of the heirs of Gregorio Natividad.

In so far, therefore, as the decision of the Court of Appeals, which is the subject of the present appeal, holds that
its former decision in the registration cases constitutes a bar to the claim of the herein petitioners under the
doctrine of res judicata, the said decision is hereby revoked, as is also the order of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur dated March 28, 1941, in so far as it applies the same doctrine to the present controversy, and the
case is ordered remanded to the said Court of First Instance for the determination of the said controversy between
the petitioners and the respondents with respect to the ownership of the half interest in the Hacienda Cabasay
that is here in dispute. With costs against the respondent heirs.
RULE 90

G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990

CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, respondents.

Rex Suiza Castillon for petitioner.

Salas & Villareal for private respondent.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 09010
(Concordia Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 13207 for
partition, reconveyance of ownership and possession and damages, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant:

a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be divided into two (2) shares: one-
half for the plaintiff and one-half for defendant. From both shares shall be equally deducted the
expenses for the burial, mausoleum and related expenditures. Against the share of defendants
shall be charged the expenses for scholarship, awards, donations and the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Memorial Foundation;'

b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire estate property, including but not
limited to, specific items already mentioned in this decision and to render an accounting of the
property of the estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this judgment; one-half (1/2) of this
produce shall belong to plaintiff;

c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation; P10,000.00 for and as
attorney's fees plus costs.

SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)

This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war Filipino novel
"Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or
nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of
his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased
father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.

He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in December, 1916 to
Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.

Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa Fernandez), a teacher in
the Iloilo Provincial High School, brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24
titles) which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325, Record), but no
conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.

On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and
lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were
transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.

During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his
plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a
college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February 26,1977 without having set up the
foundation.

Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's properties.
Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother,
from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed
to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted by her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider
the Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:

4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately preceding paragraph [that
herein movant is also the relative of the deceased within the third degree, she being the younger
sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father of the decedent herein], because prior to the filing of
the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to
make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known each other due
to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far
away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)

Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of the
foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No.
2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an
amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of
the deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be
adjudicated to her (p. 115, Rollo).

After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was declared sole heir of
the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done for three reasons: (1) because the properties
of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the decedent's nearest relative on his
mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the foundation
would be facilitated.

On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr.
Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded
to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the
Securities and Exchange Commission on July 17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).

Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the
court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. On
October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of appealing the
denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980 (or one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional
Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana- Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery
of possession, ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva.

On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal and required
Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders,
Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had already been transferred to, and were in the possession
of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for reconsideration.

In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA GR CV No. 09010). On January 26,
1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court in
toto.Hence, this petition for review wherein she raised the following legal issues:

1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for
partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even
while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) were still pending in Branch 23 of the same
court;

2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 through
extrinsic fraud;

3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of Celedonia, his
relative within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited them; and

4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to place the same
in the Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and notwithstanding the fact that
conformably with said agreement, the Foundation has been formed and properties of the estate
have already been transferred to it.

I. The question of jurisdiction—

After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and recovery of her share of
the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said
estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and
approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and
terminating the proceedings (p. 31, Record).

It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that
brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the
administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine Commercial and Industrial
Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).

The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last paragraph of the order directed
the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate." The pertinent portions of the order are quoted
below:

2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss Celedonia Solivio as Sole Heir,
dated March 7, 1978], it appears from the record that despite the notices posted and the
publication of these proceedings as required by law, no other heirs came out to interpose any
 opposition to the instant proceeding. It further appears that herein Administratrix is the only
claimant-heir to the estate of the late Esteban Javellana who died on February 26, 1977.

During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978, it was established
that the late Esteban Javellana died single, without any known issue, and without any surviving
parents. His nearest relative is the herein Administratrix, an elder [sic] sister of his late mother
who reared him and with whom he had always been living with [sic] during his lifetime.

xxxxxxxxx

2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as the sole and legal
heir of the late Esteban S. Javellana, who died intestate on February 26, 1977 at La Paz, Iloilo
City.

The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this estate so that it
can be terminated. (pp, 14-16, Record)

In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now RTC, Branch
23), Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself
(Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her
in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of
Appeals for review on certiorari. However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one year later, a
separate action for the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate action was improperly
filed for it is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.

In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a
court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v.
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter
filed a separate action to annul a project of partition executed between her and her father in the proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of her mother:

The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of
all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The
finality of the approval of the project of The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to
make distribution, has power to determine the proportion or parts to which each distributed is
entitled. ... The power to determine the legality or illegality of the testamentary provision is
inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal distribution of the inheritance. ...
To hold that a separate and independent action is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to
the general tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further,
expensive, dilatory, and impractical. (Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388)

A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent is exclusively within
the range of the administratrix proceedings and can not properly be made an independent
action. (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)

A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. (Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil. 436)

partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA
1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the order
of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be
deemed closed and terminated Siguiong v. Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not final
 and conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share,
provided the prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The
better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share
through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of
the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an
independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a
decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle
properties long ago distributed and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol
v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines,
L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460-461; Emphasis supplied)

In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the settlement
of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil action in which they
claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a Chinese woman, hence, entitled
to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial
court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties
in question were paraphernal properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On
appeal to this Court, we ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is
improper, in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings No.
1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of
partition. (p. 378).

However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been closed and terminated for over three
years, the action for annulment of the project of partition was allowed to continue. Considering that in the instant
case, the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless, Concordia had lost her right to have herself
declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We have opted likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the
interest of justice.

The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting aside the probate proceedings in
Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir
of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring the administratrix,
Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate, were improper and officious, to say the least, for
these matters he within the exclusive competence of the probate court.

II. The question of extrinsic fraud—

Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings by extrinsic fraud employed by Celedonia?
It is noteworthy that extrinsic fraud was not alleged in Concordia's original complaint in Civil Case No. 13207. It was
only in her amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud was alleged for the first time.

Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act or conduct of the prevailing
party which prevented a fair submission of the controversy (Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714). A
fraud 'which prevents a party from having a trial or presenting all of his case to the court, or one
which operates upon matters pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but to the manner by which
such judgment was procured so much so that there was no fair submission of the controversy.
For instance, if through fraudulent machination by one [his adversary], a litigant was induced to
withdraw his defense or was prevented from presenting an available defense or cause of action
in the case wherein the judgment was obtained, such that the aggrieved party was deprived of
his day in court through no fault of his own, the equitable relief against such judgment may be
availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971). (cited in Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972
Ed. by Moreno; Varela v. Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil. 248)
 A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from
intrinsic fraud, which connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside
the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said
defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case. ... The overriding
consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from
having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and
goes into the jurisdiction of the court. (Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29;
Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318, 323)

The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following reasons:

1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to be filed by Celedonia. She
admitted in her complaint that she and Celedonia had agreed that the latter would "initiate the
necessary proceeding" and pay the taxes and obligations of the estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her
complaint alleged:

6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr.
at the lowest possible cost and the least effort, the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the
defendant shall initiate the necessary proceeding, cause the payment of taxes and other
obligations, and to do everything else required by law, and thereafter, secure the partition of the
estate between her and the plaintiff, [although Celedonia denied that they agreed to partition
the estate, for their agreement was to place the estate in a foundation.] (p. 2, Record; emphasis
supplied)

Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. She stayed away by choice. Besides,
she knew that the estate came exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and she had agreed with
Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the deceased had planned to do.

2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and place of hearing of
the petition is required to be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of
Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's original petition was published in the "Visayan
Tribune" on April 25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197, Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing of
her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for the settlement of the estate was, by order of the
court, published in "Bagong Kasanag" (New Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-
305, Record). The publication of the notice of the proceedings was constructive notice to the
whole world. Concordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the proceedings for she had
actual, as well as constructive notice of the same. As pointed out by the probate court in its order
of October 27, 1978:

... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about five months after Celedonia
Solivio was declared as the sole heir. ... .

Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly published as required by law,
despite which the present movant only came to court now, then she is guilty of laches for
sleeping on her alleged right. (p. 22, Record)

The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of a petition for relief from judgment
nor a motion for new trial.

The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:

 Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of probate court and proceeding
was in rem no subsequent errors or irregularities are available on collateral attack. (Bedwell v.
Dean 132 So. 20)

Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban within the third degree on his mother's
side was not false. Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest belief that because the properties of
Esteban had come from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's nearest surviving relative on his mother's side,
is the rightful heir to them. It would have been self-defeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she
stated in her petition that Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to so state did not constitute extrinsic fraud.

Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one's own claim
or defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of the judgment. (49 C.J.S.
489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First National Bank & Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman,
15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144, 1149)

It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's estate may be filed by any "interested
person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not preclude Concordia from filing
her own.

III. On the question of reserva troncal—

We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to reserva troncal and
that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal provision
of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:

ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came.

The persons involved in reserva troncal are:

1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)—the ascendant who inherits by
operation of law property from his descendants.

2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)—relatives
within the third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line
from which the property came.

3. The propositus—the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue,
making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956
Ed.)

Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an
ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the properties in question.
Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his
relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an
ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to
property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving
spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are Articles 1003
and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:

ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,
the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles.

ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, the
other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood.

Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:

Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within the third
degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate 'without
distinction of line or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood,' and
is entitled one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate. (p. 57, Rollo)

IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share—

However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation in honor of
his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate came), an agreement which she ratified and
confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed in Spl.
Proceeding No. 2540:

4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant
Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they
have closely known each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been visiting
each other's house which are not far away for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis
supplied)

she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in favor of
Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation"
which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his mother and to finance the education of
indigent but deserving students as well.

Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it is conclusive and no
evidence need be presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Granada v. Philippine
National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat, L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018;
People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20,
1988, 161 SCRA 347).

The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who, significantly, did not even testify in the case,
although she could have done so by deposition if she were supposedly indisposed to attend the trial. Only her
husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively participated in the trial. Her husband confirmed the
agreement between his wife and Celedonia, but he endeavored to dilute it by alleging that his wife did not intend
to give all, but only one-half, of her share to the foundation (p. 323, Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" was established and duly registered in
the Securities and Exchange Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the following principal purposes:

1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of scholarships for such deserving students
as the Board of Trustees of the Foundation may decide of at least one scholar each to study at
West Visayas State College, and the University of the Philippines in the Visayas both located in
Iloilo City.

2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St. Clements Redemptorist Community for
a deserving student who has the religious vocation to become a priest.

3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote the advancement and
enrichment of the various fields of educational endeavors, especially in literary arts. Scholarships
provided for by this foundation may be named after its benevolent benefactors as a token of
gratitude for their contributions.

4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community to determine community needs
and be able to alleviate partially or totally said needs.

5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the proper care of the Solivio-Javellana
mausoleum at Christ the King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the Javellana Memorial at the
West Visayas State College, as a token of appreciation for the contribution of the estate of the
late Esteban S. Javellana which has made this foundation possible. Also, in perpetuation of his
Roman Catholic beliefs and those of his mother, Gregorian masses or their equivalents will be
offered every February and October, and Requiem masses every February 25th and October llth,
their death anniversaries, as part of this provision.

6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions, endowments and financial aids or loans
from whatever source, to invest and reinvest the funds, collect the income thereof and pay or
apply only the income or such part thereof as shall be determined by the Trustees for such
endeavors as may be necessary to carry out the objectives of the Foundation.

7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease, mortgage, pledge, exchange, sell,
transfer, or otherwise, invest, trade, or deal, in any manner permitted by law, in real and
personal property of every kind and description or any interest herein.

8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or proper for the accomplishments of
any of the purposes herein enumerated or which shall at any time appear conducive to the
protection or benefit of the corporation, including the exercise of the powers, authorities and
attributes concerned upon the corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines in
general, and upon domestic corporation of like nature in particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)

As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:

The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3) of its eight Esteban Javellana
scholars graduated in 1986, one (1) from UPV graduated Cum Laude and two (2) from WVSU
graduated with honors; one was a Cum Laude and the other was a recipient of Lagos Lopez
award for teaching for being the most outstanding student teacher.
 The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso Barangay High School, the site of which
was donated by the Foundation. The School has been selected as the Pilot Barangay High School
for Region VI.

The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who would be ordained this year. He
studied at St. Francis Xavier Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The Foundation likewise is a
member of the Redemptorist Association that gives yearly donations to help poor students who
want to become Redemptorist priests or brothers. It gives yearly awards for Creative writing
known as the Esteban Javellana Award.

Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S. Javellana Multi-purpose Center at the
West Visayas State University for teachers' and students' use, and has likewise contributed to
religious civic and cultural fund-raising drives, amongst other's. (p. 10, Rollo)

Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor
her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are hereby
SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his
estate. However, comformably with the agreement between her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire
estate of the deceased should be conveyed to the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which both
the petitioner and the private respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal
number of trustees to constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same for the
purposes set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the probate court
an inventory and accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory to terminating the proceedings therein.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-26695 January 31, 1972

JUANITA LOPEZ GUILAS, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF PAMPANGA AND ALEJANDRO LOPEZ respondents .

Filemon Cajator for petitioner.

Eligio G. Lagman for respondent Alejandro Lopez.

MAKASIAR, J.:p

It appears from the records that Jacinta Limson de Lopez, of Guagua, Pampanga was married to Alejandro Lopez y
Siongco. They had no children.

On April 28, 1936, Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro as her sole heir and executor (pp. 20-
21, rec.).

In a Resolution dated October 26, 1953 in Sp. Proc. No. 894 entitled "En el Asunto de la Adopcion de la Menor
Juanita Lopez y Limson" (pp. 92-94, 103, rec.), herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, then single and now married to
Federico Guilas, was declared legally adopted daughter and legal heir of the spouses Jacinta and Alejandro. After
adopting legally herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, the testatrix Doña Jacinta did not execute another will or codicil
so as to include Juanita Lopez as one of her heirs.

In an order dated March 5, 1959 in Testate Proceedings No. 1426, the aforementioned will was admitted to
probate and the surviving husband, Alejandro Lopez y Siongco, was appointed executor without bond by the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga (Annexes "A" and "B", pp. 18-23, rec.). Accordingly, Alejandro took his oath of office
as executor (Annex "C", p. 24, rec.).

Nevertheless, in a project of partition dated March 19, 1960 executed by both Alejandro Lopez and Juanita Lopez
Guilas, the right of Juanita Lopez to inherit from Jacinta was recognized and Lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 (Jacinta's
paraphernal property), described and embraced in Original Certificate of Title No. 13092, both situated in Bacolor
Pampanga — Lot 3368 with an area of 68,141 square meters and Lot 3441 with an area of 163,231 square meters,
then assessed respectively at P3,070.00 and P5,800.00 (Annex "D", pp. 27-36, rec.) — were adjudicated to Juanita
Lopez-Guilas as her share free from all liens, encumbrances and charges, with the executor Alejandro Lopez,
binding himself to free the said two parcels from such liens, encumbrances and charges. The rest of the estate of
the deceased consisting of 28 other parcels of lands with a total assessed valuation of P69,020.00 and a combined
area of 743,924.67 square meters, as well as personal properties including a 1953 Buick car valued at P2,500.00
were allotted to Don Alejandro who assumed all the mortgage liens on the estate (Annex "D", pp. 25-37, rec.).

In an order dated April 23, 1960, the lower court approved the said project of partition and directed that the
records of the case be sent to the archives, upon payment of the estate and inheritance taxes (Annex "E", p. 38,
rec.). Upon ex-parte petition of the adjudicatees Alejandro Lopez and Juanita Lopez-Guilas dated August 25, 1961
(Annex "F", pp. 39-40, rec.), the lower court in an order dated August 28, 1961, approved the correction of clerical
errors appearing in the project of partition (Annex "G", p. 41, rec.).

On April 10, 1964, herein petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas filed a separate ordinary action to set aside and annul the
project of partition, which case was docketed as Civil Case 2539 entitled "Juanita Lopez-Guilas vs. Alejandro Lopez"
in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, on the ground of lesion, perpetration and fraud, and pray further that
Alejandro Lopez be ordered to submit a statement of accounts of all the crops and to deliver immediately to
Juanita lots nos. 3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre, which were allocated to her under the project of partition
(p. 132, rec.).

Meanwhile, in Testate Proceedings No. 1426, Juanita filed a petition dated July 20, 1964 praying that Alejandro
Lopez be directed to deliver to her the actual possession of said lots nos. 3368 and 3441 as well as the 1,216
caverns of palay that he collected from the ten (10) tenants or lessees of the said two lots (Annex "H", pp. 42-44,
rec.).

In his opposition dated August 5, 1964 to the said petition, Alejandro Lopez claims that, by virtue of the order
dated April 23, 1960 which approved the project of partition submitted by both Alejandro and Juanita and directed
that the records of the case be archived upon payment of the estate and inheritance taxes, and the order of
December 15, 1960 which "ordered closed and terminated the present case", the testate proceedings had already
been closed and terminated; and that he ceased as a consequence to be the executor of the estate of the
deceased; and that Juanita Lopez is guilty of laches and negligence in filing the petition of the delivery of her share
4 years after such closure of the estate, when she could have filed a petition for relief of judgment within sixty (60)
days from December 15, 1960 under Rule 38 of the old Rules of Court (Annex "I") citing A. Austria vs. Heirs of
Antonio Ventenilla, L-100808, Sept. 18, 1956 (pp. 45-48, rec.).

In her reply dated November 17, 1965 to said opposition, Juanita contends that the actual delivery and distribution
of the hereditary shares to the heirs, and not the order of the court declaring as closed and terminated the
proceedings, determines the termination of the probate proceedings (citing Intestate estate of the deceased
Mercedes Cano, Timbol vs. Cano, 59 O.G. No. 30, pp. 46-73, April 29, 1961, where it was ruled that "the probate
court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the taxes, and after the
remaining estate is delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same"); that the executor Alejandro is estopped
from opposing her petition because he was the one who prepared, filed and secured court approval of, the
aforesaid project of partition, which she seeks to be implemented; that she is not guilty of laches, because when
she filed on July 20, 1964, her petition for he delivery of her share allocated to her under the project of partition,
less than 3 years had elapsed from August 28, 1961 when the amended project of partition was approved, which is
within the 5-year period for the execution of judgment by motion (Annex "J", pp. 49-52, rec.).

In its order dated October 2, 1964, the lower court after a "pre-trial" stated that because the civil action for the
annulment of the project of partition was filed on April 13, 1964, before the filing on July 2, 1964 of the petition for
delivery of the shares of Juanita Lopez, "the parties have agreed to suspend action or resolution upon the said
petition for the delivery of shares until; after the civil action aforementioned has been finally settled and decided",
and forthwith set the civil action for annulment for trial on November 25, and December 2, 1964 (Annex "K", pp.
53-54, rec.).

On June 11, 1965, Juanita filed an amended complaint in Civil Case 2539 (pp. 78-110, rec.), where she
acknowledges the partial legality and validity of the project of partition insofar as the allocation in her favor of the
Lots Nos. 3368 and 3441, the delivery of which she is seeking (pp. 106-107, rec.).

In her motion dated November 17, 1965, Juanita sought the setting aside of the order dated October 2, 1964 on
the ground that while the said order considered her action for annulment of the project of partition as a prejudicial
question, her filing an amended complaint on June 11, 1965 in civil case No. 2539 wherein she admitted the partial
legality and validity of the project of partition with respect to the adjudication to her of the two lots as her share,
rendered said civil case No. 2539 no longer a prejudicial question to her petition of July 20, 1964 for the delivery of
her share (Annex "L", pp. 55-59, rec.).

Alejandro filed his opposition dated December 1, 1965 to the aforesaid motion of Juanita to set aside the order
dated October 2, 1964 (Annex "M", pp. 60-61, rec.), to which Juanita filed her rejoinder dated December 6, 1965
wherein she stated among others that pursuant to the project of partition, executor Alejandro secured the
cancellation of OCT. No. 13093 covering the two parcels of land adjudicated to her under the project of partition
and the issuance in his exclusive name on August 4, 1961 TCT No. 26638-R covering the said Lots Nos. 3368 and
3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre (Annex "N", pp. 62-71, rec.).

In an order dated April 27, 1966, the lower court denied Juanita's motion to set aside the order of October 2, 1964
on the ground that the parties themselves agreed to suspend resolution of her petition for the delivery of her
shares until after the civil action for annulment of the project of partition has been finally settled and decided
(Annex "O", p. 72, rec.).

Juanita filed a motion dated May 9, 1966 for the reconsideration of the order dated April 27, 1966 (Annex "P" pp.
73-77, rec.), to which Alejandro filed an opposition dated June 8, 1966 (Annex "Q", pp. 112-113, rec.).

Subsequently, Alejandro filed a motion dated July 25, 1966 praying that the palay deposited with Fericsons and
Ideal Rice Mill by the ten (10) tenants of the two parcels in question be delivered to him (Annex "R", pp. 114-116,
rec.),to which Juanita filed an opposition dated July 26, 1966 (Annex "S", pp. 117-121, rec.). In an order dated
September 8, 1966, the lower court denied the motion for reconsideration of the order dated April 27, 1966, and
directed Fericsons Inc. and the Ideal Rice Mills to deliver to Alejandro or his representative the 229 cavans and 46
kilos and 325 and 1/2 cavans and 23 kilos of palay respectively deposited with the said rice mills upon the filing by
Alejandro of a bond in the amount of P12,000.00 duly approved by the court (Annex "T", pp. 122-127, rec.). Hence,
this petition for certiorari and mandamus.

The position of petitioner Juanita Lopez-Guilas should be sustained and the writs prayed for granted.

The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and
the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project
of partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol vs. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L-
15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong vs. Tecson, 89 Phil., pp. 28-30). As long as the order of the distribution of the estate
has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated Siguiong vs.
Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing
an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil.,
137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a
proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or
administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be
tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate on intestate court
already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89
Phil., 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra.; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic
vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).

Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as worded, which secures for the heirs or legatees the
right to "demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person
having the same in his possession", re-states the aforecited doctrines.

The case of Austria vs. Heirs of Ventenilla (99 Phil. 1068) does not control the present controversy; because the
motion filed therein for the removal of the administratrix and the appointment of a new administrator in her place
was rejected by the court on the ground of laches as it was filed after the lapse of about 38 years from October 5,
1910 when the court issued an order settling and deciding the issues raised by the motion (L-10018, September 19,
1956, 99 Phil., 1069-1070). In the case at bar, the motion filed by petitioner for the delivery of her share was filed
on July 20, 1964, which is just more than 3 years from August 28, 1961 when the amended project of partition was
approve and within 5 years from April 23, 1960 when the original project of partition was approved. Clearly, her
right to claim the two lots allocated to her under the project of partition had not yet expired. And in the light of
Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 and the jurisprudence above cited, the order dated
December 15, 1960 of the probate court closing and terminating the probate case did not legally terminate the
testate proceedings, for her share under the project of partition has not been delivered to her.

While it is true that the order dated October 2, 1964 by agreement of the parties suspended resolution of her
petition for the delivery of her shares until after the decision in the civil action for the annulment of the project of
partition (Civil Case 2539) she filed on April 10, 1964; the said order lost its validity and efficacy when the herein
petitioner filed on June 11, 1965 an amended complaint in said Civil Case 2539 wherein she recognized the partial
legality and validity of the said project of partition insofar as the allocation in her favor of lots Nos. 3368 and 3441
in the delivery of which she has been insisting all along (pp. 106-107, rec.).

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Granting the writs prayed for;

2. Setting aside the orders of the respondent court dated October 2, 1964 and April 27, 1966, as null and void; and,
without prejudice to the continuance of Civil Case No. 2539, which, by reason of this decision, involves no longer
Lots 3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre, .

3. Directing.

(a) the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to cancel TCT No. 26638-R covering the aforesaid lots Nos.
3368 and 3441 of the Bacolor Cadastre and to issue anew Transfer Certificate of Title covering
the said two lots in the name of herein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas; and

(b) the respondent Alejandro Lopez

(1) to deliver to herein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas the possession of lots Nos. 3368 and 3441;

(2) to deliver and/or pay to herein, petitioner all the rents, crops or income collected by him from
said lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 from April 23, 1960 until the possession of the two aforementioned
lots is actually delivered to her, or their value based on the current market price; and

(3) to pay the costs.

So ordered.
G.R. No. L-53546 June 25, 1992

THE HEIRS OF THE LATE JESUS FRAN and CARMEN MEJIA RODRIGUEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BERNARDO LL. SALAS, CONCEPCION MEJIA ESPINA and MARIA MEJIA GANDIONGCO, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction, to annul and set aside, for having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the following Orders of the respondent Judge in Special Proceedings
No. 3309-R of Branch VIII of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cebu entitled "In The
Matter of the Petition for Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo:"

1. The Order of 26 February 1980 setting for hearing private respondents' Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration 1 which was filed six (6) years, ten (10) months and eighteen (18) days after the
probate judgment was rendered and six (6) years and twenty-one (21) days after the testate
proceedings was declared closed and terminated; and

2. The Order of 2 June 1980 finding the signature of the testatrix in the last will and testament to
be a forgery and (a) declaring the testatrix as having died intestate; (b) declaring the
testamentary dispositions in said last will and testament as null and void; (c) setting aside the
order dated 10 September 1973 declaring the testate proceedings closed and terminated; (d)
revoking the appointment of Jesus Fran as executor while appointing respondent Concepcion M.
Espina as administratrix; and (e) ordering the conversion of the proceedings to one of
intestacy. 2 This Order effectively annulled and set aside the probate judgment of 13 November
1972.

Petitioners would also have this Court nullify all other actions of respondent Judge in said Sp. Proc. No.
3309-R; restore the status quo therein prior to the issuance of the foregoing orders; and permanently
enjoin respondent Judge from reopening said proceedings.

The following facts are not controverted:

Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo, a widow, died on 10 July 1972 in Cebu City with neither descendants nor ascendants;
she left real and personal properties located in Cebu City, Ormoc City and Puerto Bello, Merida, Leyte. Earlier, on
23 April 1972, she executed a last will and testament 3 wherein she bequeathed to her collateral relatives
(brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces) all her properties, and designated Rosario Tan or, upon the latter's death,
Jesus Fran, as executor to serve without bond. Instrumental witnesses to the will were Nazario Pacquiao, Alcio
Demerre and Primo Miro.

On 15 July 1972, Jesus Fran filed a petition with the Court of First instance of Cebu for the probate of Remedios'
last will and testament. 4 The case was raffled to the original Branch VIII thereof which was then presided over by
Judge Antonio D. Cinco. The petition alleged that Rosario Tan is not physically well and, therefore, will not be
assuming the position of administratrix. Tan signed a waiver in favor of Jesus Fran on the third page of the said
petition. The probate court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 18 September 1972. Meanwhile, on
31 July 1972, the court appointed petitioner Jesus Fran as special administrator.
On 10 August 1972, the private respondents, who are sisters of the deceased, filed a manifestation 5 alleging that
they needed time to study the petition because some heirs who are entitled to receive their respective shares
have been intentionally omitted therein, and praying that they be given ample time to file their opposition, after
which the hearing be reset to another date.

Private respondents did not file any opposition. Instead, they filed on 18 September 1972 a "Withdrawal of
Opposition to the Allowance of Probate (sic) of the Will" wherein they expressly manifested, with their "full
knowledge and consent that . . . they have no objection of (sic) the allowance of the . . . will of the late Remedios
Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo," and that they have "no objection to the issuance of letters testamentary in favor of
petitioner, Dr. Jesus Fran." 6

No other party filed an opposition. The petition thus became uncontested.

During the initial hearing, petitioner Fran introduced the requisite evidence to establish the jurisdictional facts.

Upon a determination that the court had duly acquired jurisdiction over the uncontested petition for probate,
Judge Cinco issued in open court an order directing counsel for petitioner to present evidence proving the
authenticity and due execution of the will before the Clerk of Court who was, accordingly, so authorized to receive
the same.

The reception of evidence by the Clerk of Court immediately followed. Petitioner Fran's first witness was Atty.
Nazario R. Pacquiao, one at the subscribing witnesses to the will. The original of the will, marked as Exhibit "F", and
its English translation, marked as Exhibit "F-Translation", were submitted to the Clerk of Court. 7 Petitioner Fran
was the second and also the last witness. He enumerated the names of the surviving heirs of the deceased.

On 13 November 1972, the probate court rendered a decision admitting to probate the will of the testatrix,
Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo, and appointing petitioner Fran as executor thereof. 8 The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the last will and
testament of the deceased Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo marked as Exhibit F as admitted to
probate. Dr. Jesus Fran is hereby appointed as executor of the will. Let letters testamentary be
issued in favor of Dr. Jesus Fran. The special administrator's bond put up by Dr. Jesus Fran as
special administrator duly approved by this Court shall serve and be considered as the executor's
bond considering that the special administrator and executor are one and the same person.

The requisite notice to creditors was issued, but despite the expiration of the period therein fixed, no claim was
presented against the estate.

On 4 January 1973, petitioner Fran filed an Inventory of the Estate; 9 copies thereof were furnished each of the
private respondents.

Subsequently, a Project of Partition based on the dispositions made in the will and signed by all the devisees and
legatees, with the exception of Luis Fran, Remedios C. Mejia and respondent Concepcion M. Espina, was submitted
by the executor for the court's approval. 10 Said legatees and devisees submitted certifications wherein they admit
receipt of a copy of the Project of Partition together with the notice of hearing, and state that they had no
objection to its approval. 11

The notice of hearing referred to in these certifications is the 6 August 1973 notice issued by the Clerk of Court
setting the hearing on the Project of Partition for 29 August 1973. 12
After the hearing on the Project of Partition, the court issued its Order of 10 September 1973 13 approving the
same, declaring the parties therein as the only heirs entitled to the estate of Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo,
directing the administrator to deliver to the said parties their respective shares and decreeing the proceedings
closed. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, the signers (sic) to the project of partition are declared the only, heirs entitled to
the estate; the project of partition submitted is ordered approved and the administrator is
ordered to deliver to each one of them their respective aliquot parts as distributed in the said
project of partition. It is understood that if there are expenses incurred or to be incurred as
expenses of partition, Section 3 of Rule 90 shall be followed.

Let this proceedings be now declared closed.

SO ORDERED.

Thereafter, the aforesaid Branch VIII of the Court of First Instance of Cebu was converted to a Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court. On November 1978, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 1439, Branch XVII (Davao City)
of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided over by herein respondent Judge, was officially transferred to Cebu
City and renumbered as Branch VIII.

On 1 October 1979, private respondents filed with the new Branch VIII an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of
the probate judgment of 13 November 1972 and the Order of partition of 10 September 1973, in said motion, they
ask the court to declare the proceedings still open and admit their opposition to the allowance of the
will, 14 which they filed on 1 October 1979. They allege that: (a) they were not furnished with a copy of the will; (b)
the will is a forgery; (c) they were not notified of any resolution or order on their manifestation requesting time
within which to file their opposition, or of the order authorizing the clerk of court to receive the evidence for the
petitioner, or of the order closing the proceedings; (d) the reception of evidence by the clerk of court was void per
the ruling in Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete; 15 (e) the project of partition contains no notice of hearing and they were
not notified thereof; (f) the petitioner signed the project of partition as administrator and not as executor, thereby
proving that the decedent died intestate; (g) the petitioner did not submit any accounting as required by law; and
(h) the petitioner never distributed the estate to the devisees and legatees.

In a detailed opposition 16 to the above Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Fran refuted all the
protestations of private respondents. Among other reasons, he stresses therein that: (a) private respondents are in
estoppel to question the will because they filed their Withdrawal Of Opposition To The Allowance of Will which
states that after thoroughly studying the petition, to which was attached a copy of the English translation of the
will, they have no objection to its allowance; the order directing the clerk of court to receive the evidence was
dictated in open court in the presence of private respondents; private respondent Maria M. Gandiongco signed the
Project of Partition and private respondent Concepcion M. Espina submitted a certification stating therein that she
received the notice of hearing therefor and has no objection to its approval; (b) except for some properties, either
covered by a usufruct under the will or agreed upon by the parties to be held in common by reason of its special
circumstance, there was an actual distribution of the estate in accordance with the Project of Partition; insofar as
private respondents are concerned, they not only received their respective shares, they even purchased the shares
of the other devisees. To top it all, private respondents' children, namely Rodrigo M. Gandiongco, Jr. and Victor
Espina, mortgaged their respective shares in favor of a bank

Notwithstanding petitioners' objections, respondent Judge issued on 26 February 1980 an Order setting for
hearing the said Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration on 8 April 1980 so that "the witnesses and the exhibits (may
be) properly ventilated." 17
On 25 March 1980, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Omnibus and to Reconsider the 26 February 1980
Order setting it for hearing on 17 April 1980, 18 but the respondent Judge prematurely denied it for lack of merit in
his Order of 31 March 1980. 19

Consequently, on 8 April 1980, the instant petition was filed challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court in taking
cognizance of the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration considering that the probate judgment and the order
approving the Project of Partition and terminating the proceedings had long become final and had in fact been
executed. Private respondents had long lost their right to appeal therefrom. The Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration cannot likewise be treated as a petition for relief from judgment for under Rule 38 of the Revised
Rules of Court, the same must be filed within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice of the judgment/order and
within six (6) months from the date of said judgment. Therefore, this remedy can no longer be availed of.

On 8 April 1980, the date the instant petition was filed, respondent Judge proceeded with the hearing of the
Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration. He received the testimonies of private respondents and one Romeo O.
Varena, an alleged handwriting expert from the Philippine Constabulary, who averred that the signature of the
testatrix on the will is a forgery. The respondent Judge likewise issued an Order on the same date stating that
unless he received a restraining order from this Court within twenty (20) days therefrom, he will reopen Sp. Proc.
No. 3309-R.

On 14 April 1980, petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition asking this Court to restrain respondent Judge from
reopening the case. 20

In their voluminous Comments and Opposition to the petition and Supplemental Petition, 21 private respondents
not only amplify in great detail the grounds raised in their Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, they also squarely
raise for the first time the following issues.

(a) The probate court never acquired jurisdiction over the case since petitioner Jesus Fran failed
to submit to the court the original of the will.

(b) They were deprived of the opportunity to examine the will as petitioner Jesus Fran did not
attach it to the petition; what was attached was only the English translation of the will.

(c) Even assuming that the probate judge could validly delegate the reception of evidence to the
Clerk of Court, the proceeding before the latter would still be void as he failed to take an oath of
office before entering upon his duties as commissioner and failed to render a report on the
matters submitted to him.

(d) Respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco was defrauded into (sic) signing the Project of
Partition and respondent Concepcion M. Espina, her certification, when they were misled by
petitioner Fran into believing that the Agreement of Petition to be submitted to the court is the
Extra Judicial Partition they signed on 7 May 1973.

(e) Petitioner Fran is guilty of fraud in urdervaluing the estate of the late Remedios M. Vda. de
Tiosejo by reporting properties worth only P400,000.00 when in truth and in fact the estate has
an aggregate value of P2,094,333.00.

In the Resolution dated 2 June 1980, We issued a restraining order enjoining respondent Judge from reopening Sp.
Proc. No. 3309-R. 22

However, on the same date, before the restraining order was served on him; respondent Judge issued the
impugned order declaring the testamentary dispositions of the will void, finding the signature of the late Remedios
M. Vda. de Tiosejo to be a forgery, decreeing the reopening of Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R and converting the same into
an intestate proceeding. 23

Hence, on 6 June 1980, petitioners filed their Second Supplemental Petition 24 asking this Court to declare as null
and void the Order of 2 June 1980 and, pending such declaration, to restrain respondent Judge from enforcing the
same. Private respondents filed their Comment and Opposition to the Second Supplemental Petition on 9 July
1980.

Thereafter, as mandated in the resolution of 30 June 1980, 25 this Court gave due course to this case and required
the parties to file their respective Memoranda, which private respondents complied with on 16 August
1980; 26 petitioners filed theirs on 27 August 1980. 27 Consequently, the parties continued to file several
pleadings reiterating substantially the same allegations and arguments earlier submitted to this Court.

On 22 March 1984, counsel for petitioners filed a manifestation informing this Court of the death of petitioner
Fran on 29 February 1984 and enumerating therein his surviving heirs. On 2 April 1984, this Court resolved to have
said heirs substitute him in this case.

Over a year later, respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco filed an affidavit, 28 sworn to before the acting Clerk
of Court of the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City, disclosing the following material facts: (a) she signed the Omnibus
Motion for Reconsideration dated 1 October 1979 without knowing or reading the contents thereof; (b) she saw
the will of the late Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo written in the Cebuano dialect after the same was executed by the
latter; the said will bearing the authentic signature of Remedios was the very one presented to the probate court
by petitioner's counsel; (c) she received the notice of hearing of the petition for probate and because she was
convinced that the signature of the testatrix was genuine, she, together with Concepcion M. Espina, withdrew her
opposition; (d) she received her share of the estate of the late Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo which was distributed
in accordance with the provisions of the latter's will; and (e) she did not authorize Atty. Numeriano Estenzo or
other lawyers to present a motion to this Court after 25 February 1981 when Estenzo withdrew as counsel for
private respondents. She then asks this Court to consider as withdrawn her Opposition to the Allowance of the
Will, her participation in the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and her Opposition to this petition.

Due to this development, We required private respondent Concepcion M. Espina to comment on the affidavit of
private respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco.

On 17 August 1985, private respondents filed a joint manifestation 29 wherein they claim that Maria M. Vda. de
Gandiongco does not remember, executing the affidavit. A few weeks before the affidavit was filed, particularly on
17 June 1985, Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco was confined in the hospital; she could not recall having signed,
during this period, any affidavit or recognized her sisters and other relatives.

On 19 September 1985, respondent Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco, through special counsel, filed a
Manifestation/Motion with a second Affidavit attached thereto30 confessing that she signed the Joint
Manifestation dated 16 August 1985 "without knowing or being informed of its contents, and only upon Mrs.
Concepcion Espina's request." She reiterated her desire to withdraw from the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration filed in Sp. Proc. No, 3309-R as well as from the instant petition.

Despite the valiant attempt of private respondent Concepcion M. Espina to influence and control the action of
Maria Gandiongco, there is nothing in the records that would cast any doubt on the irrevocability of the latter's
decision to withdraw her participation in the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition to this case.
That decision, however, is not a ground for dropping her as a private respondent as the respondent Judge had
already issued the abovementioned Order of 2 June 1980.

The petition and the supplemental petitions are impressed with merit.
We do not hesitate to rule that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when he granted the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and thereafter set aside the probate
judgment of 13 November 1972 in Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, declared the subject will of the testatrix a forgery, nullified
the testamentary dispositions therein and ordered the conversion of the testate proceedings into one of intestacy.

It is not disputed that private respondents filed on the day of the initial hearing of the petition their "Withdrawal
of Opposition To Allowance of Probate (sic) Will" wherein they unequivocally state that they have no objection to
the allowance of the will. For all legal intents and purposes, they became proponents of the same.

After the probate court rendered its decision on 13 November 1972, and there having been no claim presented
despite publication of notice to creditors, petitioner Fran submitted a Project of Partition which private respondent
Maria M. Vda. de Gandiongco voluntarily signed and to which private respondent Espina expressed her conformity
through a certification filed with the probate court. Assuming for the sake of argument that private respondents
did not receive a formal notice of the decision as they claim in their Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, these
acts nevertheless constitute indubitable proof of their prior actual knowledge of the same. A formal notice would
have been an idle ceremony. In testate proceedings, a decision logically precedes the project of partition, which is
normally an implementation of the will and is among the last operative acts to terminate the proceedings. If
private respondents did not have actual knowledge of the decision, they should have desisted from performing the
above acts and instead demanded from petitioner Fran the fulfillment of his alleged promise to show them the
will. The same conclusion refutes and defeats the plea that they were not notified of the order authorizing the
Clerk of Court to receive the evidence and that the Clerk of Court did not notify them of the date of the reception
of evidence. Besides, such plea must fail because private respondents were present when the court dictated the
said order.

Neither do We give any weight to the contention that the reception of evidence by the Clerk of Court is null and
void per the doctrine laid, down in Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete. 31 In the first place, Lim Tanhu was decided on 29
August 1975, nearly four (4) years after the probate court authorized the Clerk of Court to receive the evidence for
the petitioner in this case. A month prior to Lim Tanhu, or on 30 July 1975, this Court, in Laluan vs.
Malpaya, 32 recognized and upheld the practice of delegating the reception of evidence to Clerks of Court. Thus:

No provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a court from authorizing its clerk of
court to receive the evidence of a party litigant. After all, the reception of evidence by the clerk
of court constitutes but a ministerial task — the taking down of the testimony of the witnesses
and the marking of the pieces of documentary evidence, if any, adduced by the party present.
This task of receiving evidence precludes, on the part of the clerk of court the exercise of judicial
discretion usually called for when the other party who is present objects to questions
propounded and to the admission of the documentary evidence proffered. 33 More importantly,
the duty to render judgment on the merits of the case still rests with the judge who is obliged to
personally and directly prepare the decision based upon the evidence reported. 34

But where the proceedings before the clerk of court and the concomitant result thereof, i.e., the
judgment rendered by the court based on the evidence presented in such limited proceedings,
prejudice the substantial rights of the aggrieved party, then there exists, sufficient justification to
grant the latter complete opportunity to thresh out his case in court. 35

Monserrate vs. Court of Appeals, 36 decided on 29 September 1989, reiterated this rule. Lim Tanhu then cannot be
used as authority to nullify the order of the probate court authorizing the Clerk of Court to receive the evidence for
the rule is settled that "when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on
the faith thereof." 37 It may also be emphasized in this connection that Lim Tanhu did not live long; it was
subsequently overruled in Gochangco vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, 38 wherein this Court, en
banc, through Justice, now Chief Justice, Andres R. Narvasa, in reference to what the trial court termed as "the
doctrinal rule laid down in the recent case of Lim Tan Hu (sic) vs. Ramolete," ruled:

Now, that declaration does not reflect long observed and established judicial practice with
respect to default cases. It is not quite consistent, too, with the several explicitly authorized
instances under the Rules where the function of receiving evidence and even of making
recommendatory findings of facts on the basis thereof may be delegated to commissioners,
inclusive of the Clerk of Court. These instances are set out in Rule 33, . . . ; Rule 67 and 69, . . . ;
Rule 86, . . . ; Rule 136, . . . . In all these instances, the competence of the clerk of court is
assumed. Indeed, there would seem, to be sure, nothing intrinsically wrong in allowing
presentation of evidence ex partebefore a Clerk of Court. Such a procedure certainly does not
foreclose relief to the party adversely affected who, for valid cause and upon appropriate and
seasonable application, may bring about the undoing thereof or the elimination of prejudice
thereby caused to him; and it is, after all, the Court itself which is duty bound and has the
ultimate responsibility to pass upon the evidence received in this manner, discarding in the
process such proofs as are incompetent and then declare what facts have thereby been
established. In considering and analyzing the evidence preparatory to rendition of judgment on
the merits, it may not unreasonably be assumed that any serious error in the ex-
parte presentation of evidence, prejudicial to any absent party, will be detected and duly
remedied by the Court, and/or may always, in any event, be drawn to its attention by any
interested party.

xxx xxx xxx

It was therefore error for the Court a quo to have declared the judgment by default to be fatally
flawed by the fact that the plaintiff's evidence had been received not by the Judge himself but by
the clerk of court.

The alternative claim that the proceedings before the Clerk of Court were likewise void because said official did not
take an oath is likewise untenable. The Clerk of Court acted as such when he performed the delegated task of
receiving evidence. It was not necessary for him to take an oath for that purpose; he was bound by his oath of
office as a Clerk of Court. Private respondents are obviously of the impression that by the delegation of the
reception of evidence to the Clerk of Court, the latter became a commissioner as defined under Rule 33 of the
Rules of Court entitled Trial by Commissioner. This is not correct; as this Court said in Laluan:

The provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules of Court invoked by both parties properly relate to the
reference by a court of any or all of the issues in a case to a person so commissioned to act or
report thereon. These provisions explicitly spell out the rules governing the conduct of the court,
the commissioner, and the parties before, during, and after the reference proceedings.
Compliance with these rules of conduct becomes imperative only when the court formally orders
a reference of the case to a commissioner. Strictly speaking then, the provisions of Rule 33 find
no application to the case at bar where the court a quo merely directed the clerk of court to take
down the testimony of the witnesses presented and to mark the documentary evidence
proferred on a date previously set for hearing.

Belatedly realizing the absence of substance of the above grounds, private respondents now claim in their
Comments to the Petition and the Supplemental Petition that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the
petition because only the English translation of the will — and not a copy of the same — was attached to the
petition; the will was not even submitted to the court for their examination within twenty (20) days after the death
of the testatrix; and that there was fraud in the procurement of the probate judgment principally because they
were not given any chance to examine the signature of the testatrix and were misled into signing the withdrawal of
their opposition on the assurance of petitioner Fran and their sister, Rosario M. Tan, that the will would be shown
to them during the trial. These two grounds easily serve as the bases for the postulation that the decision is null
and void and so, therefore, their omnibus motion became all the more timely and proper.

The contentions do not impress this Court.

In Santos vs. Castillo 39 and Salazar vs. Court of First Instance of Laguna, 40 decided six (6) months apart in 1937,
this Court already ruled that it is not necessary that the original of the will be attached to the petition. In the first,
it ruled: "The original of said document [the will] must be presented or sufficient reasons given to justify the
nonpresentation of said original and the acceptance of the copy or duplicate thereof." 41 In the second case, this
Court was more emphatic in holding that:

The law is silent as to the specific manner of bringing the jurisdictional allegations before the
court, but practice and jurisprudence have established that they should be made in the form of
an application and filed with the original of the will attached thereto. It has been the practice in
some courts to permit attachment of a mere copy of the will to the application, without
prejudice to producing the original thereof at the hearing or when the court so requires. This
precaution has been adopted by some attorneys to forestall its disappearance, which has taken
place in certain cases. 42

That the annexing of the original will to the petition is not a jurisdictional requirement is clearly evident in Section
1, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which allows the filing of a petition for probate by the person named therein
regardless of whether or not he is in possession of the will, or the same is lost or destroyed. The section reads in
full as follows:

Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in
a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the
testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in
his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

In the instant case, a copy of the original will and its English translation were attached to the petition as Annex "A"
and Annex "A-1", respectively, and made integral parts of the same. It is to be presumed that upon the filing of the
petition the Clerk of Court, or his duly authorized subordinate, examined the petition and found that the annexes
mentioned were in fact attached thereto. If they were not, the petition cannot be said to have been properly
presented and the Clerk of Court would not have accepted it for docketing. Under Section 6, Rule 136 of the Rules
of Court, the Clerk of Court shall receive and file all pleadings and other papers properly presented, endorsing on
each such paper the time when it was filed. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
militates against private respondents' claim that Annex "A" of the petition was not in fact attached thereto.

The certification of the Assistant Clerk of Court issued on 8 April

1980, 43 or SIX (6) months after the filing of the motion for reconsideration, to the effect that as per examination
of the records of Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, "the copy of the Will mentioned in the petition as Annex "A" is not found to
be attached as of this date in the said petition; only the English Translation of said Will is attached thereof (sic) as
Annex "A-1" does not even save the day for private respondents. It is not conclusive because it fails to state the
fact that as hereafter shown, the pages of the records which correspond to the four (4) pages of Annex "A" were
missing or were detached therefrom. As emphatically asserted by the petitioners in their Reply to the Comments
of private respondents, 44 duly supported by a certification of the former Clerk of Court of the original Branch VIII
of the court below, 45 and which private respondents merely generally denied in their motion for reconsideration
with comments and opposition to consolidated reply, 46 the four-page xerox copy of will, marked as Annex "A" of
the petition, became, as properly marked by the personnel of the original Branch VIII of the court below upon the
filing of the petition, pages 5, 6, 7 and 8 while the translation thereof, marked as Annex "A-1", became pages 9, 10,
11 and 12 of the records. The markings were done in long hand. The records of the case were thereafter sent to
the Clerk of Court, 14th Judicial District, Cebu City on 9 February 1978. These records, now in the possession of the
respondent Judge, show that said pages 5, 6, 7 and 8 in long are missing. As a consequence thereof, petitioners
filed with the Executive Judge of the court below an administrative complaint.

It is not likewise disputed that the original of the will was submitted in evidence and marked as Exhibit "F". It forms
part of the records of the special proceedings — a fact which private respondents admit in their Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration, thus:

9. That an examination of the alleged will of our deceased sister has revealed that the signatures
at the left hand margin of Exhibit "F", are written by (sic) different person than the signature
appearing at the bottom of said alleged will . . . 47

The availability of the will since 18 September 1972 for their examination renders completely baseless the private
respondents' claim of fraud on petitioner Fran's part in securing the withdrawal of their opposition to the probate
of the will. If indeed such withdrawal was conditioned upon Fran's promise that the private respondents would be
shown the will during the trial, why weren't the appropriate steps taken by the latter to confront Fran about this
promise before certifications of conformity to the project of partition were filed?

Granting for the sake of argument that the non-fulfillment of said promise constitutes fraud, such fraud is not of
the kind which provides sufficient justification for a motion for reconsideration or a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 37 and Rule 38, respectively, of the Rules of Court, or even a separate action for annulment
of judgment. It is settled that for fraud to be invested with, sufficiency, it must be extrinsic or collateral to the
matters involved in the issues raised during the trial which resulted in such judgment. 48

In Our jurisdiction, the following courses of action are open to an aggrieved party to set aside or attack the validity
of a final judgment:

(1) Petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court which must be filed within sixty (60)
days after learning of the decision, but not more than six (6) months after such decision is
entered;

(2) By direct action, via a special civil action for certiorari, or by collateral attack, assuming that
the decision is void for want of jurisdiction;

(3) By an independent civil action under Article 1114 of the Civil Code, assuming that the decision
was obtained through fraud and Rule 38 can not be applied. 49

It is not difficult to see that private respondents had lost their right to file a petition for relief from judgment, it
appearing that their omnibus motion for reconsideration was filed exactly six (6) years, ten (10) months and
twenty-two (22) days after the rendition of the decision, and six (6) years, one (1) month and thirteen (13) days
after the court issued the order approving the Project of Partition, to which they voluntarily expressed their
conformity through their respective certifications, and closing the testate proceedings.

Private respondents did not avail of the other two (2) modes of attack.

The probate judgment of 13 November 1972, long final and undisturbed by any attempt to unsettle it, had
inevitably passed beyond the reach of the court below to annul or set the same aside, by mere motion, on the
ground that the will is a forgery. Settled is the rule that the decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due
execution of the will and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in
any separate or independent action or proceeding. 50 We wish also to advert to the related doctrine which holds
that final judgments are entitled to respect and should not be disturbed; otherwise, there would be a wavering of
trust in the courts. 51 In Lee Bun Ting vs. Aligaen, 52 this Court had the occasion to state the rationale of this
doctrine, thus:

Reasons of public policy, judicial orderliness, economy and judicial time and the interests of
litigants, as well as the peace and order of society, all require that stability be accorded the
solemn and final judgments of the courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction.

This is so even if the decision is incorrect 53 or, in criminal cases, the penalty imposed is erroneous. 54

Equally baseless and unmeritorious is private respondents' contention that the order approving the Project of
Partition and closing the proceedings is null and void because the Project of Partition did not contain a notice of
hearing and that they were not notified of the hearing thereon. In truth, in her own certification 55 dated 5
September 1973, private respondent Concepcion M. Espina admitted that she "received a copy of the Project of
Partition and the Notice of Hearing in the above-entitled proceeding, and that she has no objection to the approval
of the said Project of Partition." The notice of hearing she referred to is the Notice of Hearing For Approval of
Project of Partition issued on 6 August 1973 by the Clerk of Court. 56Private respondent Espina was lying through
her teeth when she claimed otherwise.

The non-distribution of the estate, which is vigorously denied by the petitioners, is not a ground for the re-opening
of the testate proceedings. A seasonable motion for execution should have been filed. In De Jesus vs.
Daza, 57 this Court ruled that if the executor or administrator has possession of the share to be delivered, the
probate court would have jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to order him to transfer that possession
to the person entitled thereto. This is authorized under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. However, if no
motion for execution is filed within the reglementary period, a separate action for the recovery of the shares
would be in order. As We see it, the attack of 10 September 1973 on the Order was just a clever ploy to give
asemblance of strength and substance to the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration by depicting therein a probate
court committing a series of fatal, substantive and procedural blunders, which We find to be imaginary, if not
deliberately fabricated.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition and supplemental petitions are GRANTED. The Order of respondent Judge of 2
June 1980 and all other orders issued by him in Sp. Proc. No. 3309-R, as well as all other proceedings had therein in
connection with or in relation to the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

The restraining order issued on 2 June 1980 is hereby made PERMANENT.

Costs against private respondent Concepcion M. Espina.

G.R. No. L-56340 June 24, 1983

SPOUSES ALVARO PASTOR, JR. and MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN Y. REYES, JUDGE OF BRANCH I, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU and
LEWELLYN BARLITO QUEMADA, respondents.

Pelaez, Pelaez, & Pelaez Law Office for petitioners.

Ceniza, Rama & Associates for private respondents.

PLANA, J.:

I. FACTS:

This is a case of hereditary succession.

Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City on June 5, 1966, survived by his Spanish wife
Sofia Bossio (who also died on October 21, 1966), their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and
Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, not natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada
QUEMADA PASTOR, JR. is a Philippine citizen, having been naturalized in 1936. SOFIA is a Spanish subject.
QUEMADA is a Filipino by his mother's citizenship.

On November 13, 1970, QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of
PASTOR, SR. with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I (PROBATE COURT), docketed as SP No. 3128-R. The
will contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA consisting of 30% of PASTOR, SR.'s
42% share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (ATLAS) of some mining
claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu.

On November 21, 1970, the PROBATE COURT, upon motion of QUEMADA and after an ex parte hearing, appointed
him special administrator of the entire estate of PASTOR, SR., whether or not covered or affected by the
holographic will. He assumed office as such on December 4, 1970 after filing a bond of P 5,000.00.

On December 7, 1970, QUEMADA as special administrator, instituted against PASTOR, JR. and his wife an action for
reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which included the properties subject of the legacy and which
were in the names of the spouses PASTOR, JR. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor, who claimed to be the
owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance. The action, docketed as Civil Case No. 274-R, was filed
with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IX.

On February 2, 1971, PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA filed their opposition to the petition for probate and the
order appointing QUEMADA as special administrator.

On December 5, 1972, the PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing the will to probate. Appealed to the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 52961- R, the order was affirmed in a decision dated May 9, 1977. On petition for review,
the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-46645 dismissed the petition in a minute resolution dated November 1, 1977 and
remanded the same to the PROBATE COURT after denying reconsideration on January 11, 1978.

For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE COURT, QUEMADA filed pleading after pleading asking for
payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties subject of said legacy. PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA opposed these
pleadings on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu Court of First
Instance. All pleadings remained unacted upon by the PROBATE COURT.

On March 5, 1980, the PROBATE COURT set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will for March 25, 1980, but
upon objection of PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA on the e ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was
held on March 25. Instead, the PROBATE COURT required the parties to submit their respective position papers as
to how much inheritance QUEMADA was entitled to receive under the wig. Pursuant thereto, PASTOR. JR. and
SOFIA submitted their Memorandum of authorities dated April 10, which in effect showed that determination of
how much QUEMADA should receive was still premature. QUEMADA submitted his Position paper dated April 20,
1980. ATLAS, upon order of the Court, submitted a sworn statement of royalties paid to the Pastor Group of tsn
from June 1966 (when Pastor, Sr. died) to February 1980. The statement revealed that of the mining claims being
operated by ATLAS, 60% pertained to the Pastor Group distributed as follows:

1. A. Pastor, Jr. ...................................40.5%

2. E. Pelaez, Sr. ...................................15.0%

3. B. Quemada .......................................4.5%

On August 20, 1980, while the reconveyance suit was still being litigated in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, the PROBATE COURT issued the now assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question
of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to QUEMADA was not
inofficious. [There was absolutely no statement or claim in the Order that the Probate Order of December 5, 1972
had previously resolved the issue of ownership of the mining rights of royalties thereon, nor the intrinsic validity of
the holographic will.]

The order of August 20, 1980 found that as per the holographic will and a written acknowledgment of PASTOR, JR.
dated June 17, 1962, of the above 60% interest in the mining claims belonging to the Pastor Group, 42% belonged
to PASTOR, SR. and only 33% belonged to PASTOR, JR. The remaining 25% belonged to E. Pelaez, also of the Pastor
Group. The PROBATE COURT thus directed ATLAS to remit directly to QUEMADA the 42% royalties due decedent's
estate, of which QUEMADA was authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee and to deposit 25% with a
reputable banking institution for payment of the estate taxes and other obligations of the estate. The 33% share of
PASTOR, JR. and/or his assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of QUEMADA from
the time of PASTOR, SR.'s death, which amounted to over two million pesos.

The order being "immediately executory", QUEMADA succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment
on September 4, 1980, and in serving the same on ATLAS on the same day. Notified of the Order on September 6,
1980, the oppositors sought reconsideration thereof on the same date primarily on the ground that the PROBATE
COURT gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the question of ownership of the royalties and ordered the
payment of QUEMADA's legacy after prematurely passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will. In the meantime,
the PROBATE COURT ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due PASTOR, JR. and/or his assignees until
after resolution of oppositors' motion for reconsideration.

Before the Motion for Reconsideration could be resolved, however, PASTOR, JR., this time joined by his wife Ma.
ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer
for writ of preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. No. SP- 11373-R). They assailed the Order dated August 20, 1980 and the
writ of execution and garnishment issued pursuant thereto. The petition was denied on November 18, 1980 on the
grounds (1) that its filing was premature because the Motion for Reconsideration of the questioned Order was still
pending determination by the PROBATE COURT; and (2) that although "the rule that a motion for reconsideration
is prerequisite for an action for certiorari is never an absolute rule," the Order assailed is "legally valid. "
On December 9, 1980, PASTOR, JR. and his wife moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeal's decision of
November 18, 1980, calling the attention of the appellate court to another order of the Probate Court dated
November 11, 1980 (i.e., while their petition for certiorari was pending decision in the appellate court), by which
the oppositors' motion for reconsideration of the Probate Court's Order of August 20, 1980 was denied. [The
November 11 Order declared that the questions of intrinsic validity of the will and of ownership over the mining
claims (not the royalties alone) had been finally adjudicated by the final and executory Order of December 5, 1972,
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, thereby rendering moot and academic the suit for
reconveyance then pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch IX. It clarified that only the 33% share of
PASTOR, JR. in the royalties (less than 7.5% share which he had assigned to QUEMADA before PASTOR, SR. died)
was to be garnished and that as regards PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share, what was ordered was just the transfer of its
possession to the custody of the PROBATE COURT through the special administrator. Further, the Order granted
QUEMADA 6% interest on his unpaid legacy from August 1980 until fully paid.] Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals
denied reconsideration.

Hence, this Petition for Review by certiorari with prayer for a writ of pre y injunction, assailing the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated November 18, 1980 as well as the orders of the Probate Court dated August 20, 1980,
November 11, 1980 and December 17, 1980, Med by petitioners on March 26, 1981, followed by a Supplemental
Petition with Urgent Prayer for Restraining Order.

In April 1981, the Court (First Division) issued a writ of preliminary injunction, the lifting of which was denied in the
Resolution of the same Division dated October 18, 1982, although the bond of petitioners was increased from
P50,000.00 to P100,000.00.

Between December 21, 1981 and October 12, 1982, private respondent filed seven successive motions for early
resolution. Five of these motions expressly prayed for the resolution of the question as to whether or not the
petition should be given due course.

On October 18, 1982, the Court (First Division) adopted a resolution stating that "the petition in fact and in effect
was given due course when this case was heard on the merits on September 7, (should be October 21, 1981) and
concise memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments on the merits of the case were filed by the parties
pursuant to the resolution of October 21, 1981 . . . " and denied in a resolution dated December 13, 1982, private
respondent's "Omnibus motion to set aside resolution dated October 18, 1982 and to submit the matter of due
course to the present membership of the Division; and to reassign the case to another ponente."

Upon Motion for Reconsideration of the October 18, 1982 and December 13, 1982 Resolutions, the Court en banc
resolved to CONFIRM the questioned resolutions insofar as hey resolved that the petition in fact and in effect had
been given due course.

II. ISSUES:

Assailed by the petitioners in these proceedings is the validity of the Order of execution and garnishment dated
August 20, 1980 as well as the Orders subsequently issued allegedly to implement the Probate Order of December
5, 1972, to wit: the Order of November 11, 1980 declaring that the Probate Order of 1972 indeed resolved the
issues of ownership and intrinsic validity of the will, and reiterating the Order of Execution dated August 20, 1980;
and the Order of December 17, 1980 reducing to P2,251,516.74 the amount payable to QUEMADA representing
the royalties he should have received from the death of PASTOR, SR. in 1966 up to February 1980.

The Probate Order itself, insofar as it merely allowed the holographic will in probate, is not questioned. But
petitioners denounce the Probate Court for having acted beyond its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
when it issued the assailed Orders. Their argument runs this way: Before the provisions of the holographic win can
be implemented, the questions of ownership of the mining properties and the intrinsic validity of the holographic
will must first be resolved with finality. Now, contrary to the position taken by the Probate Court in 1980 — i.e.,
almost eight years after the probate of the will in 1972 — the Probate Order did not resolve the two said issues.
Therefore, the Probate Order could not have resolved and actually did not decide QUEMADA's entitlement to the
legacy. This being so, the Orders for the payment of the legacy in alleged implementation of the Probate Order of
1972 are unwarranted for lack of basis.

Closely related to the foregoing is the issue raised by QUEMADA The Probate Order of 1972 having become final
and executory, how can its implementation (payment of legacy) be restrained? Of course, the question assumes
that QUEMADA's entitlement to the legacy was finally adjudged in the Probate Order.

On the merits, therefore, the basic issue is whether the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 resolved with finality
the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity. A negative finding will necessarily render moot and academic the
other issues raised by the parties, such as the jurisdiction of the Probate Court to conclusively resolve title to
property, and the constitutionality and repercussions of a ruling that the mining properties in dispute, although in
the name of PASTOR, JR. and his wife, really belonged to the decedent despite the latter's constitutional
disqualification as an alien.

On the procedural aspect, placed in issue is the propriety of certiorari as a means to assail the validity of the order
of execution and the implementing writ.

III. DISCUSSION:

1. Issue of Ownership —

(a) In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of
the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.) As a rule, the question of ownership is an
extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate
Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the
final decision in a separate action to resolve title. [3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court (1980 ed.), p. 458;
Valero Vda. de Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 540.]

(b) The rule is that execution of a judgment must conform to that decreed in the dispositive part of the decision.
(Philippine-American Insurance Co. vs. Honorable Flores, 97 SCRA 811.) However, in case of ambiguity or
uncertainty, the body of the decision may be scanned for guidance in construing the judgment. (Heirs of Presto vs.
Galang, 78 SCRA 534; Fabular vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 329; Robles vs. Timario. 107 Phil. 809.)

The Order sought to be executed by the assailed Order of execution is the Probate Order of December 5, 1972
which allegedly resolved the question of ownership of the disputed mining properties. The said Probate Order
enumerated the issues before the Probate Court, thus:

Unmistakably, there are three aspects in these proceedings: (1) the probate of the holographic
will (2) the intestate estate aspect; and (3) the administration proceedings for the purported
estate of the decedent in the Philippines.

In its broad and total perspective the whole proceedings are being impugned by the oppositors
on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., that the fact of the decedent's residence and existence of
properties in the Philippines have not been established.
 Specifically placed in issue with respect to the probate proceedings are: (a) whether or not the
holographic will (Exhibit "J") has lost its efficacy as the last will and testament upon the death of
Alvaro Pastor, Sr. on June 5, 1966, in Cebu City, Philippines; (b) Whether or not the said will has
been executed with all the formalities required by law; and (c) Did the late presentation of the
holographic will affect the validity of the same?

Issues In the Administration Proceedings are as follows: (1) Was the ex- parte appointment of the
petitioner as special administrator valid and proper? (2) Is there any indispensable necessity for
the estate of the decedent to be placed under administration? (3) Whether or not petition is
qualified to be a special administrator of the estate; and (4) Whether or not the properties listed
in the inventory (submitted by the special administrator but not approved by the Probate Court)
are to be excluded.

Then came what purports to be the dispositive portion:

Upon the foregoing premises, this Court rules on and resolves some of the problems and issues
presented in these proceedings, as follows:

(a) The Court has acquired jurisdiction over the probate proceedings as it hereby allows and
approves the so-called holographic will of testator Alvaro Pastor, Sr., executed on July 31, 1961
with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. Let, therefore, a certificate of its allowance be
prepared by the Branch Clerk of this Court to be signed by this Presiding Judge, and attested by
the seal of the Court, and thereafter attached to the will, and the will and certificate filed and
recorded by the clerk. Let attested copies of the will and of the certificate of allowance thereof
be sent to Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation, Goodrich Bldg., Cebu City, and
the Register of Deeds of Cebu or of Toledo City, as the case may be, for recording.

(b) There was a delay in the granting of the letters testamentary or of administration for as a
matter of fact, no regular executor and/or administrator has been appointed up to this time and
- the appointment of a special administrator was, and still is, justified under the circumstances to
take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased in the Philippines (particularly in Cebu)
until the problems causing the delay are decided and the regular executor and/or administrator
appointed.

(c) There is a necessity and propriety of a special administrator and later on an executor and/or
administrator in these proceedings, in spite of this Court's declaration that the oppositors are the
forced heirs and the petitioner is merely vested with the character of a voluntary heir to the
extent of the bounty given to him (under) the will insofar as the same will not prejudice the
legitimes of the oppositorfor the following reasons:

1. To submit a complete inventory of the estate of the

decedent-testator Alvaro Pastor, Sr.

2. To administer and to continue to put to prolific utilization

of the properties of the decedent;

3. To keep and maintain the houses and other structures and

belonging to the estate, since the forced heirs are residing in
Spain, and prepare them for delivery to the heirs in good
 order after partition and when directed by the Court, but only
after the payment of estate and inheritance taxes;

(d) Subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and
personal properties in Civil Case No. 274-T before Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed, unless, however, it is duly
proven by the oppositors that debts of the decedent have already been paid, that there had been
an extrajudicial partition or summary one between the forced heirs, that the legacy to be given
and delivered to the petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator, that
the respective shares of the forced heirs have been fairly apportioned, distributed and delivered
to the two forced heirs of Alvaro Pastor, Sr., after deducting the property willed to the petitioner,
and the estate and inheritance taxes have already been paid to the Government thru the Bureau
of Internal Revenue.

The suitability and propriety of allowing petitioner to remain as special administrator or

administrator of the other properties of the estate of the decedent, which properties are not
directly or indirectly affected by the provisions of the holographic will (such as bank deposits,
land in Mactan etc.), will be resolved in another order as separate incident, considering that this
order should have been properly issued solely as a resolution on the issue of whether or not to
allow and approve the aforestated will. (Emphasis supplied.)

Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is
manifest therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the
win, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the
holographic win "with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law." It declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must
proceed " subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal
properties in Civil Case 274-T before Branch IX of the CFI of Cebu." [Parenthetically, although the statement refers
only to the "intestate" aspect, it defies understanding how ownership by the estate of some properties could be
deemed finally resolved for purposes of testate administration, but not so for intestate purposes. Can the estate be
the owner of a property for testate but not for intestate purposes?] Then again, the Probate Order (while indeed it
does not direct the implementation of the legacy) conditionally stated that the intestate administration aspect
must proceed "unless . . . it is proven . . . that the legacy to be given and delivered to the petitioner does not
exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator," which clearly implies that the issue of impairment of legitime
(an aspect of intrinsic validity) was in fact not resolved. Finally, the Probate Order did not rule on the propriety of
allowing QUEMADA to remain as special administrator of estate properties not covered by the holographic will,
"considering that this (Probate) Order should have been properly issued solely as a resolution on the issue of
whether or not to allow and approve the aforestated will. "

(c) That the Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the estate
inventory was appropriate, considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the
reconveyance suit that was still pending in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.

(d) What, therefore, the Court of Appeals and, in effect, the Supreme Court affirmed en toto when they reviewed
the Probable Order were only the matters properly adjudged in the said Order.

(e) In an attempt to justify the issuance of the Order of execution dated August 20, 1980, the Probate Court in its
Order of November 11, 1980 explained that the basis for its conclusion that the question of ownership had been
formally resolved by the Probate Order of 1972 are the findings in the latter Order that (1) during the lifetime of
the decedent, he was receiving royalties from ATLAS; (2) he had resided in the Philippines since pre-war days and
was engaged in the mine prospecting business since 1937 particularly in the City of Toledo; and (3) PASTOR, JR.
was only acting as dummy for his father because the latter was a Spaniard.
Based on the premises laid, the conclusion is obviously far-fetched.

(f) It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with
finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion,
the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed the special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.

2. Issue of Intrinsic Validity of the Holographic Will -

(a) When PASTOR, SR. died in 1966, he was survived by his wife, aside from his two legitimate children and one
illegitimate son. There is therefore a need to liquidate the conjugal partnership and set apart the share of PASTOR,
SR.'s wife in the conjugal partnership preparatory to the administration and liquidation of the estate of PASTOR,
SR. which will include, among others, the determination of the extent of the statutory usufructuary right of his wife
until her death. * When the disputed Probate order was issued on December 5, 1972, there had been no
liquidation of the community properties of PASTOR, SR. and his wife.

(b) So, also, as of the same date, there had been no prior definitive determination of the assets of the estate of
PASTOR, SR. There was an inventory of his properties presumably prepared by the special administrator, but it
does not appear that it was ever the subject of a hearing or that it was judicially approved. The reconveyance or
recovery of properties allegedly owned but not in the name of PASTOR, SR. was still being litigated in another
court.

(c) There was no appropriate determination, much less payment, of the debts of the decedent and his estate.
Indeed, it was only in the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 where the Probate Court ordered that-

... a notice be issued and published pursuant to the provisions of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court,
requiring all persons having money claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the
Branch Clerk of this Court."

(d) Nor had the estate tax been determined and paid, or at least provided for, as of December 5, 1972.

(e) The net assets of the estate not having been determined, the legitime of the forced heirs in concrete figures
could not be ascertained.

(f) All the foregoing deficiencies considered, it was not possible to determine whether the legacy of QUEMADA - a
fixed share in a specific property rather than an aliquot part of the entire net estate of the deceased - would
produce an impairment of the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

(g) Finally, there actually was no determination of the intrinsic validity of the will in other respects. It was obviously
for this reason that as late as March 5, 1980 - more than 7 years after the Probate Order was issued the Probate
Court scheduled on March 25, 1980 a hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will.

3. Propriety of certiorari —

Private respondent challenges the propriety of certiorari as a means to assail the validity of the disputed Order of
execution. He contends that the error, if any, is one of judgment, not jurisdiction, and properly correctible only by
appeal, not certiorari.

Under the circumstances of the case at bar, the challenge must be rejected. Grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction is much too evident in the actuations of the probate court to be overlooked or condoned.
(a) Without a final, authoritative adjudication of the issue as to what properties compose the estate of PASTOR, SR.
in the face of conflicting claims made by heirs and a non-heir (MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR) involving
properties not in the name of the decedent, and in the absence of a resolution on the intrinsic validity of the will
here in question, there was no basis for the Probate Court to hold in its Probate Order of 1972, which it did not,
that private respondent is entitled to the payment of the questioned legacy. Therefore, the Order of Execution of
August 20, 1980 and the subsequent implementing orders for the payment of QUEMADA's legacy, in alleged
implementation of the dispositive part of the Probate Order of December 5, 1972, must fall for lack of basis.

(b) The ordered payment of legacy would be violative of the rule requiring prior liquidation of the estate of the
deceased, i.e., the determination of the assets of the estate and payment of all debts and expenses, before
apportionment and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. (Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, 7
SCRA 367.)

(c) Neither has the estate tax been paid on the estate of PASTOR, SR. Payment therefore of the legacy to
QUEMADA would collide with the provision of the National Internal Revenue Code requiring payment of estate tax
before delivery to any beneficiary of his distributive share of the estate (Section 107 [c])

(d) The assailed order of execution was unauthorized, having been issued purportedly under Rule 88, Section 6 of
the Rules of Court which reads:

Sec. 6. Court to fix contributive shares where devisees, legatees, or heirs have been in
possession. — Where devisees, legatees, or heirs have entered into possession of portions of the
estate before the debts and expenses have been settled and paid and have become liable to
contribute for the payment of such debts and expenses, the court having jurisdiction of the
estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities,
and order how much and in what manner each person shall contribute, and may issue execution
as circumstances require.

The above provision clearly authorizes execution to enforce payment of debts of estate. A legacy is not a debt of
the estate; indeed, legatees are among those against whom execution is authorized to be issued.

... there is merit in the petitioners' contention that the probate court generally cannot issue a
writ of execution. It is not supposed to issue a writ of execution because its orders usually refer
to the adjudication of claims against the estate which the executor or administrator may satisfy
without the necessity of resorting to a writ of execution. The probate court, as such, does not
render any judgment enforceable by execution.

The circumstances that the Rules of Court expressly specifies that the probate court may issue
execution (a) to satisfy (debts of the estate out of) the contributive shares of devisees, legatees
and heirs in possession of the decedent's assets (Sec. 6. Rule 88), (b) to enforce payment of the
expenses of partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90), and (c) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited for
examination in probate proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 142) may mean, under the rule of inclusion
unius est exclusion alterius, that those are the only instances when it can issue a writ of
execution. (Vda. de Valera vs. Ofilada, 59 SCRA 96, 108.)

(d) It is within a court's competence to order the execution of a final judgment; but to order the execution of a
final order (which is not even meant to be executed) by reading into it terms that are not there and in utter
disregard of existing rules and law, is manifest grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.
Consequently, the rule that certiorari may not be invoked to defeat the right of a prevailing party to the execution
of a valid and final judgment, is inapplicable. For when an order of execution is issued with grave abuse of
discretion or is at variance with the judgment sought to be enforced (PVTA vs. Honorable Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172),
certiorari will lie to abate the order of execution.

(e) Aside from the propriety of resorting to certiorari to assail an order of execution which varies the terms of the
judgment sought to be executed or does not find support in the dispositive part of the latter, there are
circumstances in the instant case which justify the remedy applied for.

Petitioner MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, wife of PASTOR, JR., is the holder in her own right of three mining
claims which are one of the objects of conflicting claims of ownership. She is not an heir of PASTOR, SR. and was
not a party to the probate proceedings. Therefore, she could not appeal from the Order of execution issued by the
Probate Court. On the other hand, after the issuance of the execution order, the urgency of the relief she and her
co-petitioner husband seek in the petition for certiorari states against requiring her to go through the cumbersome
procedure of asking for leave to intervene in the probate proceedings to enable her, if leave is granted, to appeal
from the challenged order of execution which has ordered the immediate transfer and/or garnishment of the
royalties derived from mineral properties of which she is the duly registered owner and/or grantee together with
her husband. She could not have intervened before the issuance of the assailed orders because she had no valid
ground to intervene. The matter of ownership over the properties subject of the execution was then still being
litigated in another court in a reconveyance suit filed by the special administrator of the estate of PASTOR, SR.

Likewise, at the time petitioner PASTOR, JR. Med the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, appeal was
not available to him since his motion for reconsideration of the execution order was still pending resolution by the
Probate Court. But in the face of actual garnishment of their major source of income, petitioners could no longer
wait for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration. They needed prompt relief from the injurious effects of
the execution order. Under the circumstances, recourse to certiorari was the feasible remedy.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. SP-11373-R is reversed. The Order of execution
issued by the probate Court dated August 20, 1980, as well as all the Orders issued subsequent thereto in alleged
implementation of the Probate Order dated December 5, 1972, particularly the Orders dated November 11, 1980
and December 17, 1980, are hereby set aside; and this case is remanded to the appropriate Regional Trial Court for
proper proceedings, subject to the judgment to be rendered in Civil Case No. 274-R.

SO ORDERED.
RULES 92-97

G.R. No. L-23096 April 27, 1972

MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, petitioners,

vs.
ROSARIO, ALFREDO, MARIANO, PACIFICO, ONOFRE, TEOFILO, LOLOY and TRINIDAD, all surnamed
LORENZO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-23376 April 27, 1972

DIONISIO, PERFECTO, MARIA REBECCA, ASUNCION, MAURO, and, LOURDES, all surnamed LORENZO, petitioners,
vs.
MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE LEON, respondents.

Salonga, Ordonez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for petitioners.

Estanistao A. Fernandez for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:p

The point to be resolved in these two petitions for the review of a decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
dated April 30, 1964 is the extent of the rights acquired by the vendees, the spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de
Leon1 arising from a sale of a parcel of land, four (4) hectares more or less, situated in Malaking Kahoy, Parañaque,
Rizal. The vendor, Bienvenida de la Isla, was the widow of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and guardian of their
children, Dionisio, Perfecto, Maria Rebeeca, Asuncion, Mauro and Lourdes, 2 who thereafter challenged the validity
of such a transaction. It was their contention that notwithstanding an order authorizing the sale from the probate
court on June 2, 1953, it could be, impugned as they were not informed of such a move. Moreover, the
guardianship proceeding, instituted on December 7, 1950, was heard without the two elder children, Dionisio and
Perfecto Lorenzo being notified although they were then more than 14 years of age. The heirs of Silvestra Ferrer,
who originally owned one-fourth of the property in question,3 intervened in such action. In the lower court
decision, they were adjudged co-owners of the aforesaid one-fourth portion of the property, the sale by the widow
being considered null and void insofar as they were concerned. The rights of the Children of Leoncio Lorenzo and
Bienvenida de la Isla to one-half of the three-fourths appertaining to such spouses were likewise accorded
recognition.

The matter was then elevated to the respondent Court of Appeals by the spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de
Leon. Respondent Court in its decision, now subject of this review, declared valid the deed of sale executed by the
mother Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the spouses Nery and de Leon as to the whole three-fourths, without
prejudice however to the children demanding from their mother their participation in the amount paid for the sale
of such property. It thus ignored the grave jurisdictional defects that attended the challenged orders, starting with
the two elder children not being notified of the petition for guardianship, even if they were already above 14, as
pointed out and stressed in their petition for review. There is need then for the exercise of the corrective power of
this Court. The original decision of the lower court has much more to recommend it. Thereby, the rights of the
children are fully respected. With a restoration in full of what was decided by the lower court, there is a
corresponding modification of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. So we decide.

The antecedents of the case were set forth in the appealed decision thus: "After hearing the evidence, the lower
court handed down decision on June 24, 1961, finding that in the guardianship proceedings, the court acquired no
jurisdiction over the persons of the minors who were not notified of the petition, at least 2 of them being over 14
years of age; that as the inventory submitted by the guardian stated that the minors had no real estate, the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the real property of the minors and could not have validly authorized its sale, and
the total absence of the requisite notice necessarily rendered the order of sale, ... null and void, and the
defendant, Martin S. Nery, a lawyer, could not be considered a purchaser in good faith of the one-half portion of
the land belonging to the minors; ... that as Silvestra Ferrer, one of the sisters of Florentino Ferrer, did not sign the
deed of sale ... upon her death in 1952, her 1/4 portion of the land passed to her nearest relatives, the third-party
plaintiffs who are children of her sister, Tomasa Ferrer, whose action had not prescribed 'because from the death
of Silvestra Ferrer in 1952 up to the filing of the third-party complaint on September 3, 1958, barely six yeaxs had
elapsed'; and that the remaining 3/4 of the land in question was the conjugal property of Leoncio Lorenzo and his
wife, Bienvenida de la Isla, 1/2 of which, upon the demise of Leoncio, corresponding to Bienvenida and the other
half to their children, the herein plaintiffs, in equal shares."4

Why respondent Court reached the decision it did on appeal was explained this way: "It is unquestioned that the
property in question formerly belonged to Florentino Ferrer and his three sisters, Agueda, Tomasa and Silvestra,
and brother, Meliton. When, after the death of Florentino, that is, on December 6, 1943, the document
denominated 'Bilihan Ganap Nang Lupang-Bukid', ... was executed in favor of Leoncio F. Lorenzo, one of the
children of Agueda and married to Bienvenida de la Isla, by said Agueda, Tomasa and the children of Meliton,
already deceased, said Leoncio merely acquired the participation of said sellers, equivalent to 3/4 undivided part
of said land, and became a co-owner to that extent with Silvestra who did not execute said document and,
therefore,did not sell her 1/4 undivided portion of the said land, which 1/4 undivided portion passed, upon her
demise in 1952, to her nearest relatives who are the third-party plaintiffs Rosario, Alfredo, Mariano, Pacifica,
Onofre, Teofilo, Loloy and Trinidad all surnamed Lorenzo, the children of her deceased sister, Tomasa. Bienvenida
de la Isla, then the wife of said Leoncio F. Lorenzo, knew of this purchase made by her deceased husband, and she
had no right to mortgage the whole land which, for taxation purposes was declared in her husband's name,
without the consent of aforenamed successors-in-interest of Silvestra Ferrer, much less sell the same afterwards to
the defendant spouses, Martin S. Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon, even if authorized by the guardianship court, said
authority having been granted upon her misrepresentation, contained in her petition of May 26, 1953, that her
minor children, the plaintiff's herein, were the owners in common of 1/2 portion of the land in question, the other
1/2 pertaining to her. However, inasmuch as the said minor plaintiffs were really the owners in common of 1/2 of
3/4 undivided part of the said land, and the other 1/2, to their mother and guardian, the orders of the
guardianship court authorizing the guardian to sell the real property of the minors, and approving the deed of sale
executed in accordance with said authority must be construed as referring to the correct real property of the said
minors."5

Hence its dispositive portion provided as follows: "[Wherefore], the appealed judgment is hereby modified by
declaring that the deed of sale ..., executed by Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the defendants valid only insofar as
the undivided 3/4 portion of the land in question is concerned, as to which portion, the defendants are declared
owners, and that the third-party plaintiffs, Rosario, Alfredo, Mariano, Pacifica, Onofre, Teofilo, Loloy and Trinidad,
all surnamed Lorenzo, are declared owners in common of the remaining undivided 1/4 portion of the said land. In
all other respects, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed. No Costs."6

The spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon and the children of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and the vendor,
Bienvenida de la Isla, not being satisfied with the above decision instituted the petitions for review. As noted at the
outset, the failure of respondent Court of Appeals to give due weight to the grave jurisdictional defect that tainted
the guardianship proceeding resulted in its judgment suffering the corrosion of substantial legal error. The rights of
the children of Leoncio Lorenzo as upheld by the lower court must, to repeat, be maintained. In that sense, the
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is subject to modification. Insofar however as it affirmed the lower
court decision sustaining the claim of the heirs of Silvestra Ferrer, 7 it is free from any infirmity.

1. What is indisputable in the light of the controlling legal doctrines is that it was the lower court and not the
respondent Court of Appeals that yielded obeisance to the applicable procedural rule. It is worded thus: "When a
petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for hearing the same,
and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition residing in the
province, including the minor if above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself, and may direct other general or
special notice thereof to be given."8 The late Chief Justice Moran was quite explicit as to its jurisdictional character.
These are his words: "Service of the notice upon the minor if above 14 years of age or upon the incompetent, is
jurisdictional. Without such notice, the court acquires no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian." 9

The case cited by him in support of such view is Yangco v. Court of First Instance, 10 a 1915 decision. As was therein
made clear: "There is no need for interpretation or construction of the word in the case before us. Its meaning is
so clear that interpretation and construction are unnecessary. Our simple duty is to leave untouched the meaning
with which the English language has endowed the word; and that is the meaning which the ordinary reader would
accord to it on reading a sentence in which it was found. Where language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge
words so as to give them the color of a particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful.
That which has caused so much confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to understand
and know what the law is with respect to a given matter, is in considerable measure the unwarranted interference
by judicial tribunals with the English language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting out words here and
inserting them there, making them fit personal ideas of what the legislature ought to have done or what parties
should have agreed upon, giving them meanings which they do not ordinarily have, cutting, trimming, fitting,
changing and coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to advise their clients as to the meaning of a given
statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court for its 'interpretation and construction.' " 11

Respondent Court of Appeals cannot therefore be sustained in its assumption that the probate court could have
authorized the sale in question. The jurisdictional infirmity was too patent to be overcome. It was the lower court
that acted correctly. There is the more reason for deciding as we do considering that the rights of minors are
involved. It is a distinctive feature of our law, one that is quite commendable, that whenever their welfare may be
affected, its solicitude is made manifest. The rights of young are not to be ignored. Precisely their stage of
immaturity calls for every procedural principle being observed before their interest in property to which they have
a claim could be adversely affected. It does not matter that their guardian is their mother. As far back as 1811,
in Salunga v. Evangelista, 12 Chief Justice Arellano took note that even a mother could have an "interest opposed
to that of her children." 13 That may not have been the precise situation in this case, but certainly from the facts as
found by the Court of Appeals, the Lorenzo children would have been better protected if they were notified as is
required by law. If there is any occasion then why there should be a strict insistence on rule having the impress of a
jurisdictional requirement, this is it.

Moreover, where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of protecting the
rights of persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other
parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have the political community to look
after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth
in an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme
power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in the legislature, and has no affinity to
those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of the
people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficent function, and often necessary
to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect
themselves." 14

2. Much less could the decision arrived at both by the lower court and respondent Court of Appeals as to the heirs
of Silvestra Ferrer 15 being entitled to
one-fourth of the property in question be set aside. At no time had the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo ever denied that
he was holding such property in the capacity of trustee for them. At the time then that the settlement of his estate
was pending in the probate court, his widow, Bienvenida de la Isla, the vendor, could not assert any other right,
except that traceable to her late husband. Respondent Court of Appeals did note that petitioner Martin S. Nery is a
lawyer. As a member of the bar, he could not have been unaware that his vendor could not sell to him more than
she rightfully could dispose of. It is much too late in the day to depart from the well-settled principle as to a trustee
being incapable of acquiring interest opposed to that of his principal. So it was announced in Severino v.
Severino. 16 That is in conformity with an overmastering requirement of equity and conscience. He should thus be
held to the strictest degree of acccountability. The law would lay itself open to well-deserved criticism if a principle
other than the above were followed. The Nery spouses ought to be aware that it would be unthinkable to deny its
authoritative force whenever called for.

The spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon would demonstrate its inapplicability by the two principal errors
assigned, namely, that Silvestra Ferrer did sell her share of the property as far back as 1943 and that even if it were
not so, the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and thereafter his widow, Bienvenida de la Isla did assert rights of ownership
therein. It is obvious that on the face of such alleged errors that they are essentially factual. We are thus precluded
from inquiring into their veracity as on such a matter what was decided by respondent Court of Appeals is binding
on us. Moreover, as to the alleged prescription, the issue was resolved satisfactorily by the lower court in this
fashion: "The action of said children of Tomasa Ferrer has not as yet prescribed because from the death of Silvestra
Ferrer in 1952 up to the filing of the third-party complaint on September 3, 1958, barely six years had elapsed.
Moreover, there is no clear and satisfactory evidence that Leoncio Lorenzo and his successors-in-interest had been
in continuous, adverse, and open possession, and under claim of ownership, of the one-fourth portion
corresponding to Silvestra Ferrer as to acquire same by acquisitive prescription." 17 Consequently, it was
appropriate for the Court of Appeals to affirm the judgment of the lower court insofar as it recognized the rights of
the heir of Silvestra Ferrer to one-fourth of the land sold.

WHEREFORE, premises considered with the modification as above set forth that Dionisio, Perfecto, Maria Rebecca,
Asuncion, Mauro and Lourdes, all surnamed Lorenzo, children of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and Bienvenida de
la Isla are adjudged co-owners to the extent of one-half of the three-fourths of the property in question, as was
decreed by the lower court, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. With costs against Martin
Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon.
 EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-10886. April 18, 1958.]

LEONCIA E. STO. DOMINGO, ETC., ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. URBANA STO. DOMINGO, ET AL., Defendants-
Appellees.

Jose S. Sarte for Appellants.

Carlos, Laurea, Ferrando & Padilla and Gil R. Carlos and Ciriaco López, Jr., for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. JUDGMENT; WHEN ACTION IS BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT. — Where a case involves the same parties and the
same issues as those involved and raised in the first case, it is barred by a prior judgment.

2. GUARDIAN AND WARD; AUTHORITY OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM to BIND MINOR AS TO LATTER’S ESTATE. —
Ordinarily, a guardian ad litem has no authority to act or bind a minor in any transaction with regard to his estate,
but he can however do so with the approval of the court.

DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is an appeal from an order issued by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan dismissing the complaint filed by
plaintiffs against defendants.

Raymundo Sto. Domingo contracted two marriages, the first with Juana Dilag out of which Urbana was born, and
the second with Pilar Evangelista, the same having produced Leoncia as the only issue. Raymundo Sto. Domingo
died on May 1, 1935. Days before his death, he executed a deed of donation of his properties in favor of his
daughter Urbana in the first marriage which was accepted and the properties were placed in the possession of the
donee. When Raymundo died, the heirs surviving him were Urbana Sto. Domingo, daughter in the first marriage,
Leoncia Sto. Domingo, daughter in the second, and his widow Pilar Evangelista, mother of the latter. On March 10,
1936, Urbana Sto. Domingo sold the properties donated to her by her deceased father to one Deogracias Matias.
The deed of sale was duly registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan who subsequently issued in
favor of the vendee the corresponding certificate of title.

Subsequent to the sale above referred to, there followed a series of litigations involving the annulment of the deed
of donation and of the deed of sale. The first was Civil Case No. 5315 instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan by Pilar Evangelista, the widow, in her behalf and as guardian ad litem of her minor daughter Leoncia Sto.
Domingo against Urbana Sto. Domingo and Deogracias Matias wherein they alleged that the donation as well as
the sale of the properties of the deceased were fictitious and therefore null and void. The complaint was filed on
August 28, 1936. Defendants therein interposed a demurrer which was overruled. After issues were joined by the
filing of their answer, the case was amicably settled. the parties filing a motion asking for the dismissal of the case.
As a result of such settlement, plaintiffs received the sum of P1,000.00 by way of compromise. The settlement was
approved by the court and the case was dismissed.

After the lapse of twenty-two months, or to be exact, on October 7, 1938, the same widow, who in the meantime
married one Aquilino Robes, in her own behalf and as guardian ad litem of her minor child Leoncia, again
instituted, another action in the same court praying for the identical relief concerning the annulment of the
donation and sale of the properties involved in the first case against the same defendants. The latter answered
interposing the same defenses. This case was again dismissed on petition of plaintiffs who were not ready to go to
trial but without prejudice to reviving the case if they so desired.

In the meantime, intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the late Raymundo Sto. Domingo were
instituted and one Severino Alberto was appointed administrator of the estate. This administrator on February 22,
1954 filed a complaint against the same defendants for the annulment of the same deed of donation and sale
based on the same ground that they were executed through fraud and without consideration. Defendants moved
to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of legal capacity to sue on the part of the plaintiff. The motion was
sustained and the case was dismissed.

And now comes the present case which was instituted by the same widow in her personal capacity and as guardian
ad litem of her daughter Leoncia against the same defendants seeking the annulment of the same deed of
donation and sale based on the same grounds of fraud and lack of consideration. This time defendants filed a
motion to dismiss based on the grounds, among others, that (1) the cause of action has already prescribed and (2)
that the cause of action is already barred by a prior judgment. The court found this motion well founded and
dismissed the complaint. Plaintiffs took the present appeal to the Court of Appeals which was certified to us on the
ground that only questions of law are involved.

The appeal must be dismissed. It appears that prior to the present case there were three others that were
instituted, two by the same plaintiff herein, and one by the judicial administrator of the Estate of the late
Raymundo Sto. Domingo. The first case was instituted on August 28, 1936 by Pilar Evangelista, widow of the
deceased, in her own behalf and as guardian ad litem of her minor daughter Leoncia Sto. Domingo, which was
amicably settled and the settlement was duly approved by the court. To the motion submitted to the court by the
parties praying for its dismissal, there was attached an affidavit signed by the widow wherein she acknowledged
having voluntarily entered into an amicable settlement of the case, and in this settlement she acted not only in her
personal capacity but as guardian ad litem of her minor daughter. It also appears that she agreed to the settlement
after receiving the sum of P1,000.00 by way of compromise. The order approving the settlement become final for
lack of appeal on the part of either party. As a matter of fact, the second was filed by the same plaintiffs twenty-
two months thereafter and the same was also dismissed. Considering that the present case involves the same
parties and the same issues as those involved and raised in the first case, the conclusion is inescapable that the
present case is already barred by a prior judgment.

The fact that one of the party-litigants is a minor is of no moment, for she had been represented right along by her
guardian ad litem. This is recognized by our Rules of Court which provide that "A minor . . . may sue or be sued
through his guardian, or if he has none, through a guardian ad litem appointed by the court" (Section 5, Rule 3). It
cannot also be contended that because the minor was merely represented by a guardian ad litem, said guardian
cannot bind the minor with regard to the amicable settlement. The rule is well settled that "If . . . the compromise
was considered and sanctioned by the court and was rendered on testimony in addition to the admission or
confession of the guardian ad litem, the judgment will not afterward be set aside where there was no fraud in its
procurement" (43 C.J.S., 344; Italics supplied). Ordinarily, it is true, a guardian ad litem has no authority to act or
bind a minor in any transaction with regard to his estate, but he can however do so with the approval of the court.
This is what was done in the present case:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Ordinarily his (referring to the guardian ad litem’s) authority is recognized only for certain specific purposes, and
it is restricted to matters connected with the litigation at hand; he has no authority to act in any other matters and
he cannot otherwise bind the infant or his estate; and it has been held that he cannot bind the infant by anything
that he may do, except with the consent of the court." (43 C.J.S., 299)
Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
RULES 99 to 100 – Repealed (Guardianship/Adoption) Rule on Adoption per AM 02-6-02-SC)

G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as "DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM"), respondent.

VITUG, J.:

The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than complete without children. The realization could have
likely prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to take into their care Isabelita's nephew Jose
Melvin Sibulo and to bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin enjoyed the warmth, love
and support of the couple who treated the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom fancied on
legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972,
an order granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense than before the feeling of affection of the
spouses for Melvin. In keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City changed the name "Jose Melvin
Sibulo" to "Jose Melvin Lahom."

A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition
to rescind the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition,
she averred —

"7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses, respondent refused to change his
surname from Sibulo to Lahom, to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the latter
died, and even before his death he had made known his desire to revoke respondent's adoption, but was
prevented by petitioner's supplication, however with his further request upon petitioner to give to charity
whatever properties or interest may pertain to respondent in the future.

xxx xxx xxx

"10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the utter disregard of the feelings of herein
petitioner, and his records with the Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as Jose Melvin
M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present, and in all his dealings and activities in connection
with his practice of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.

xxx xxx xxx

"13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this city with only her household helps to
attend to her, has yearned for the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained
indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year.

"14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of petitioner in Manila became more
frequent in view of a leg ailment, and those were the times when petitioner would need most the care
and support from a love one, but respondent all the more remained callous and utterly indifferent
towards petitioner which is not expected of a son.

"15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioner's nephews and nieces whenever they
would find time to visit her, respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their desire for some
material benefits from petitioner.
 "16. That in view of respondent's insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable
relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all
respondent's only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of
herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for
partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards respondent, rendering
the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has
been negated for which reason there is no more basis for its existence, hence this petition for
revocation,"1

Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the
Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a
decree of adoption.

Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:

"SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. — Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the
Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the
adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated
physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on
the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with
parental obligations.

"Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter(s).
However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code."
(emphasis supplied)

Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition, contending principally (a) that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in view of the aforequoted provisions
of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No. 8552 should not
retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then
Article 3482 of the Civil Code and Article 1923 of the Family Code.

In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:

"On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit, Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers
jurisdiction to this Court, having been designated Family Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC.

"On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, is
whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the Court could render a valid judgment in accordance with
the prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs. Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365).

"Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an adoption
earlier granted under the Family Code. Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed there is lack of
cause of action.

"Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired under the provisions of the Family
Code should be respected. Assuming for the sake of argument, that petitioner is entitled to rescind the
adoption of respondent granted on May 5, 1972, said right should have been exercised within the period
allowed by the Rules. From the averments in the petition, it appears clear that the legal grounds for the
petition have been discovered and known to petitioner for more than five (5) years, prior to the filing of
 the instant petition on December 1, 1999, hence, the action if any, had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule
100 Revised Rules of Court)

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is ordered dismissed." 4

Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, petitioner raises the following
questions; viz:

1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972, still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after
the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?

2. In the affirmative, has the adopter's action prescribed?

A brief background on the law and its origins could provide some insights on the subject. In ancient times, the
Romans undertook adoption to assure male heirs in the family. 5 The continuity of the adopter's family was the
primary purpose of adoption and all matters relating to it basically focused on the rights of the adopter. There was
hardly any mention about the rights of the adopted. 6 Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and England, in an effort
to preserve inheritance within the family, neither allowed nor recognized adoption. 7 It was only much later when
adoption was given an impetus in law and still later when the welfare of the child became a paramount
concern.8Spain itself which previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented and accepted the Roman law
concept of adoption which, subsequently, was to find its way to the archipelago. The Americans came and
introduced their own ideas on adoption which, unlike most countries in Europe, made the interests of the child an
overriding consideration.9 In the early part of the century just passed, the rights of children invited universal
attention; the Geneva Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948,10followed by the United Nations Declarations of the Rights of the Child, 11 were written instruments that
would also protect and safeguard the rights of adopted children. The Civil Code of the Philippines 12 of 1950 on
adoption, later modified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code13 and then by the Family Code of the
Philippines,14 gave immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the adopted. In 1989, the United Nations
initiated the Convention of the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State Party to the Convention, accepted the
principle that adoption was impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent was
geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and privileges for the adopted. Most
importantly, it affirmed the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new family but also in the society
as well. The new law withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the adopted
child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by adoption.

Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not adversely affect her right to annul the adoption
decree, nor deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested under the Civil Code and
the Family Code, the laws then in force.

The concept of "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process 15 that expresses
a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action;16 it
includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from new
obligations created after the right has become vested. 17 Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment
is a present interest,18 absolute, unconditional, and perfect19 or fixed and irrefutable.

In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,20 a petition to adopt Jason Condat was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February
1988 when the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603) allowed an adoption to be sought
by either spouse or both of them. After the trial court had rendered its decision and while the case was still
pending on appeal, the Family Code of the Philippines (Executive Order No. 209), mandating joint adoption by the
husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued that the case should be dismissed for having been filed
by Mrs. Bobiles alone and without being joined by the husband. The Court concluded that the jurisdiction of the
court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The petition to adopt
Jason, having been filed with the court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to
file the petition, without being joined by her husband, according to the Court had become vested. In Republic vs.
Miller,21spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller, both aliens, sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On 29 July 1988, the
couple filed a petition to formalize Michael's adoption having theretofore been taken into their care. At the time
the action was commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree of adoption and while on
appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Family Code was enacted into law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying aliens
from adopting Filipino children. The Republic then prayed for the withdrawal of the adoption decree. In discarding
the argument posed by the Republic, the Supreme Court ruled that the controversy should be resolved in the light
of the law governing at the time the petition was filed.

It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of
adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law,22 had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter
under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier
pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been
initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued.

Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five-year
bar rule under Rule 10023 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption
decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could
not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has
no vested right in statutory privileges.24 While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right," the
privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. 25 It is a
privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare
of the child.26 Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the
adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State.27 Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be
taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.28

While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption
decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the
bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in
the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties
of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his
legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his
estate.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992

MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO, REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and

JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO
SAYSON AND DORIBEL SAYSON, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit from their alleged parents
and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right, asserting if for themselves to the exclusion of all others.

The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.

Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno
died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on
March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of
Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.

On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed
a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as
Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo
and Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents' lawful descendants.

On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the accounting and partition
of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children. This was docketed
as Civil Case No. 1042 in the Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they
raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents'
estate by right of representation.

Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of practically the same evidence.

Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,

1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the
decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth
certificate dated February 27, 1967. 3 Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and
Rafaela by right of representation.

In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Sañez dismissed Civil Case No. 1030, holding that the
defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the aforementioned evidence,
excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in their estate.

Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its own decision dated
February 28, 1989, 5 the respondent court disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042 (CA-G.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that
 Delia and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the deceased
spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of the respondent court is sought
on the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the petitioners and misapplied the pertinent law and
jurisprudence when it declared the private respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.

The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because Doribel had already
been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel
disqualified her parents from adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among
those who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural
children by legal fiction."

Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and
Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested in a petition for guardianship of the child that she
was her natural mother. 6

The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul the adoption of Delia and
Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a legitimate daughter at the time but in the same
breath try to demolish this argument by denying that Doribel was born to the couple.

On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the decree of adoption, years
after it became final and executory. That was way back in 1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners were proper
parties, what they should have done was seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of
Doribel that disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact, they should
have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued. They did not, although Mauricio claimed he had
personal knowledge of such birth.

As the respondent court correctly observed:

When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days before the issuance of the
Order of Adoption, the petitioners could have notified the court about the fact of birth of
DORIBEL and perhaps withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition for
the revocation or rescission of the adoption (although the birth of a child is not one of those
provided by law for the revocation or rescission of an adoption). The court is of the considered
opinion that the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid, outstanding and
binding to the present, the same not having been revoked or rescinded.

Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial judge cannot be faulted for
granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that the adopting parents were not disqualified.

A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot
be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue.

The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts exists, whether erroneous
or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases
where the validity of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts were
proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:

Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption,
Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:

An adoption order implies the finding of the necessary facts and the burden of
proof is on the party attacking it; it cannot be considered void merely because
the fact needed to show statutory compliance is obscure. While a judicial
determination of some particular fact, such as the abandonment of his next of
kin to the adoption, may be essential to the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the
order of adoption, this does not make it essential to the jurisdictional validity of
the decree that the fact be determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in
accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect the jurisdiction, and the
determination must stand until reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be
collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the status of adopted children
would always be uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same at all
investigations, and might be regarded with different effect by different
tribunals, and the adoption might be held by one court to have been valid,
while another court would hold it to have been of no avail. (Emphasis
supplied.)

On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the respondent
court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed
means of recognition under Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the
petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation and may be refuted by
contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.

Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was understandbly suspect,
coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition for
the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the
lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of
Appeals, 11where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be sustained in the absence of
strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."

Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings for that
purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party.

The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this purely evidential
character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child born
in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties, and within the
period limited by law.

The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in
another action for a different purpose. . . . 12 (Emphasis supplied.)

In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the
deceased couple, conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code:
 Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other ascendants,
without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from different marriages.

An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in the same manner as a
legitimate child.

The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children and grandchildren before
it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his
purposes in acquiring properties is to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a
provision for their continued care even after he is gone from this earth.

Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent provisions of the Civil Code:

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative
is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which
the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one who the
person represented would have succeeded.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead,
survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation.

There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela,
Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents.
Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he
survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children. 13

But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the grandparents were
total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same
right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption
is between only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either
party. 14

In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children and Doribel as the
legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to
share the estate of their parents with the petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that
only Doribel has the right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the other
private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with
costs against the petitioners.
A.M. No. P-08-2549 June 18, 2010

ANONYMOUS, Complainant,
vs.
EMMA BALDONADO CURAMEN, Court Interpreter I, Municipal Trial Court, Rizal, Nueva Ecija, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is an administrative case against Emma Baldonado Curamen, Court Interpreter I in the Municipal Trial Court of
Rizal in Nueva Ecija, for dishonesty and falsification of a public document.

The Facts

On 6 March 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an anonymous complaint1 charging
respondent with falsification of a public document and simulation of birth. The complaint alleged that respondent
registered the birth of a child supposedly named Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen in the local civil registry of Rizal,
Nueva Ecija. Complainant submitted the child’s purported birth certificate2 to show respondent misrepresented
that she was the child’s biological mother and her husband, Ricardo Curamen, was the biological father.
Complainant claimed respondent was, in fact, the child’s maternal grandmother. Complainant submitted the
child’s original birth certificate3 to show that the child’s real name was Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino and that her
parents were spouses Olga Mae Baldonado Curamen Aquino and Jun Aquino. According to complainant,
respondent included the child as additional dependent in her income tax declaration.

In his Report,4 Executive Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 24) of Cabanatuan City
verified that Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino and Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen were the same child. Judge Caspillo
confirmed that the child was, in fact, respondent’s granddaughter. The child’s real mother, Olga, was one of
respondent’s children. On 27 November 2005, Olga gave birth to a child named Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino. The
fact of birth was registered in the Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija under Registry No. 2005-15495.
The birth certificate indicated that the child’s parents were Olga Mae Baldonado Curamen and Jun Aquino.

Judge Caspillo verified that on 31 March 2006, respondent executed an affidavit for delayed registration of the
alleged birth of her child. Respondent claimed that her supposed child, Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen, was born on
30 November 2005. Respondent’s application was given due course and the supposed birth of Rica Mae Baldonado
Curamen was registered in the Civil Registry of Rizal, Nueva Ecija under Registry No. 2006-507. This second birth
certificate of the child indicated that the child’s parents were respondent and her husband.

In her Comment,5 respondent admitted that the real parents of the child were spouses Olga Mae Baldonado
Curamen and Jun Aquino. Respondent claimed that the child’s parents, being unemployed, were unable to support
themselves let alone their child. She asserted that the child’s parents actually depended on her and her husband
for support. According to respondent, it was the child’s parents themselves who proposed to register the birth of
the child anew. Respondent insisted she had no intention to conceal the true identity of the child. Respondent
justified her act as an example of a common practice among Filipinos to extend help to family members. As to the
alleged falsification of her income tax return, respondent denied listing the child as additional dependent.

The OCA’s Report and Recommendation

As to the alleged falsification of the child’s birth certificate, the OCA, in its Report and Recommendation, 6 found
respondent guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. According to the OCA, respondent’s act
created a negative impression in the minds of the public that court officials could violate the law with impunity. As
for the alleged falsification of respondent’s income tax return, the OCA found no evidence that respondent
claimed the child as additional dependent. The OCA recommended that respondent be suspended from the service
for six months and one day, thus:

Respectfully submitted for the consideration of this Honorable Court are our recommendations that:

1. this administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;

2. respondent Emma Baldonado Curamen, Court Interpreter I, Municipal Trial Court, Rizal, Nueva Ecija, be
found GUILTY of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and be SUSPENDED FROM THE
SERVICE for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day, the same to take effect immediately upon receipt
by the respondent of the Court’s decision;

3. Ms. Carmelita N. Ericta, Administrator and Civil Registrar General, National Census Statistics Office, be
FURNISHED a copy of the Court’s decision, the Certificate of Live Birth of Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen,
and the Affidavit for Delayed Registration of Birth executed by the respondent so that appropriate
amendments relative to the true circumstances of the birth of one "Rinea Mae Curamen Aquino" can be
effected; and

4. the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija be FURNISHED with a copy of the Court’s decision on this
administrative matter for appropriate action.7

The Court’s Ruling

As to the alleged falsification of respondent’s income tax return, we find no evidence on record showing that
respondent listed the child as additional dependent. Respondent presented a certification 8 issued by the Municipal
Social Welfare and Development Office of Rizal, Nueva Ecija as well as her income tax returns for taxable years
2005 and 2006 to prove that the only dependent she claimed was her 90-year old father, Rafael Baldonado.
Against this, complainant has nothing but bare allegations. Whoever alleges a fact must prove that fact by
convincing evidence.9 Complainant failed on this score.

With respect to the alleged falsification of the child’s birth certificate, we find respondent guilty of dishonesty and
falsification of a public document. A birth certificate, being a public document, serves as prima facie evidence of
filiation.10 The making of a false statement therein constitutes dishonesty and falsification of a public document.

Respondent cannot escape liability by claiming that she did not have any intention to conceal the identity of the
child nor cause the loss of any trace as to the child’s true filiation to the child’s prejudice. When public documents
are falsified, the intent to injure a third person need not be present because the principal thing punished is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth the document proclaims. 11

Respondent’s justification for her act – that the true parents of the child are unable to support the child as they are
fully dependent on respondent for their own support – is an affront to common sense. It taxes one’s imagination
how concealment of the child’s true parents, through falsification of the child’s birth certificate, will make it easier
for respondent to support the child. Respondent can very well continue supporting the child as her own, as is the
practice in Filipino families, without having to tamper with the child’s birth certificate.

Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement on any material fact in securing one’s examination,
appointment, or registration.12 Dishonesty is a serious offense which reflects a person’s character and exposes the
moral decay which virtually destroys honor, virtue, and integrity.13 It is a malevolent act that has no place in the
judiciary, as no other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness from an
employee than a position in the judiciary.141avvphi1

No doubt, court officials occupy an exalted position in society. They enjoy authoritative influence, which leaves the
innocent public unlikely to raise any objection. Unfortunately, this is also the reason why they have more
opportunities to commit dishonest acts. But dishonesty has no place in the judiciary and the Court will not hesitate
to remove from among its ranks those found to be dishonest.

Under Section 52, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other
Pertinent Civil Service Laws, dishonesty and falsification of a public document are considered grave offenses
punishable by dismissal for the first offense.

Dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of the performance of official
duties.15 If a government officer is dishonest, even if the conduct is not connected with the official function, it
affects the discipline and morale of the service.16 The government cannot tolerate in its service a dishonest
employee, even if official duties are performed well. Respondent cannot separate her private life as a registrant of
the child’s false birth certificate from her public life as a court official. She is subject to discipline the moment she
commits a dishonest act, whether in her private life or in her public life.

However, the extreme penalty of dismissal is not automatically imposed, especially where mitigating
circumstances exist. Although under the schedule of penalties adopted by the Civil Service, dishonesty and
falsification of a public document are classified as grave offenses punishable by dismissal, the fact that this is
respondent’s first offense may be considered a mitigating circumstance in her favor. The law requires that the
mitigating circumstance must first be pleaded by the proper party. 17 But in the interest of substantial justice, we
may appreciate the mitigating circumstance in the imposition of penalty, even if not raised by respondent. 18

We thus impose on respondent the penalty next lower in degree, which is suspension for six months and one day
without pay with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.

WHEREFORE, respondent Emma Baldonado Curamen, Court Interpreter I in the Municipal Trial Court of Rizal in
Nueva Ecija, is found GUILTY of dishonesty and falsification of a public document and SUSPENDED for six (6)
months and one (1) day without pay with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija for appropriate action, including
the possible filing of a special proceeding for the cancellation of the Certificate of Live Birth of Rica Mae Baldonado
Curamen as well as the Affidavit for Delayed Registration of Birth executed by respondent.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-96-1362 July 18, 1997

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT, Field Office No. 1, San Fernando, La Union, represented
by CORAZON M. LAYUG, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ANTONIO M. BELEN, Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, Lingayen, Pangasinan, and ELMA P. VEDAÑA, Social
Welfare Officer II, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Lingayen, Pangasinan, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

In this administrative complaint initiated by Corazon M. Layug, Social Welfare Officer IV of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Field Office No. 1 stationed in San Fernando, La Union, respondent
Judge Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is charged with rendering
an erroneous decree of adoption in violation of Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as "The
Child and Youth Welfare Code," and the corresponding Supreme Court circular thereon, namely, Circular No. 12
dated October 2, 1986.

Respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan is charged with disregarding the provisions of the same Circular No. 12 of this Court in connection with
the aforementioned special proceeding.

As appears from the records, the spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo-Soriano, both of whom are
naturalized American citizens, filed a verified petition for adoption of their niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea,
which was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 5830 of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, and
assigned to Branch 38 thereof. In due time, respondent Judge Belen granted the petition in a decision dated June
25, 1992, after finding that petitioner spouses were highly qualified to adopt the child as their own.

Among other evidence adduced before him, respondent Judge based his decree primarily on the "findings and
recommendation of the DSWD that the adopting parents on the one hand and the adoptee on the other hand
have already developed love and emotional attachment and parenting rules have been demonstrated to the
minor." On these considerations, respondent judge decided and proceeded to dispense with trial custody. Said
DSWD findings and recommendations, as respondent judge asserted in his judgment, are contained in the
"Adoptive Home Study Report" and "Child Study Report" prepared by the local office of the DSWD through
respondent Elma P. Vedaña.1

However, when the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea sought to obtain the requisite travel clearance from the DSWD in
order to join her adoptive parents in the United States, the department uncovered what it considered as an
anomalous adoption decree regarding said minor. It turned out that the DSWD did not have any record in its files
regarding the adoption and that there was never any order from respondent judge for the DSWD to conduct a
"Home and Child Study Report" in the case. Furthermore, there was no directive from respondent judge for the
social welfare officer of the lower court to coordinate with the DSWD on the matter of the required reports for
said minor's adoption

As the adoption never passed through the DSWD, it filed the present administrative complaint against respondent
judge charging him with violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 which requires, inter alia, that petitions
for adoption shall be granted only after the DSWD has conducted and submitted a case study of the adoptee, the
natural parents and the adoptive parents. It was also alleged by the DSWD that respondent Elma P. Vedaña had
asked for an undisclosed amount of money from the adopting parents in order to expedite the adoption case with
the DSWD. 2
In its 1st Indorsement dated April 19, 1996, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of this Court required
respondent to comment on the letter-complaint of the DSWD. Respondent judge, in compliance therewith,
claimed that he directed respondent Vedaña to conduct the home and case study, and thereafter submit the
required reports thereon, precisely because the same are among her duties under the Manual for Clerks of Court.
Since these functions were so provided to be performed by her, there was no need for him to order said
respondent social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD as he assumed that it was routine procedure for
her to do so. In addition, respondent judge contends that, except only for direct coordination with the DSWD in
the preparation of said reports, no approval from the DSWD is necessary for the home and case study reports and
it need not be furnished therewith. Finally, he says that he based his adoption decree not only on the
recommendations of respondent Vedaña but also upon all the other evidence submitted in the adoption
proceeding. 3

In the Informal Preliminary Inquiry report dated August 16, 1996 and addressed by way of a memorandum to the
Office of the Chief Justice, the OCA recommended that respondent judge be administratively punished for violating
Circular No. 12 of this Court, dated October 2, 1986, and Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603. Respondent
Elma P Vedaña, on the other hand, was asked to explain her failure to coordinate with the DSWD regional office in
the preparation of the pertinent reports and to comment on the allegation that she asked for money from the
adopting parents.

In her comment, respondent Vedaña pointed out that there never was any directive from respondent judge for her
to coordinate with the DSWD concerning the adoption in question. She was only ordered to conduct the case study
and submit her report thereon to the court at least one week before the initial hearing of the case, as was also the
practice in the other Regional Trial Courts. She flatly denied that she ever asked for money from the prospective
adoptive parents of the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea. 4

On November 27, 1996, this Court resolved to refer the administrative matter against the two respondents to the
OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, the said office reiterated the fact that respondent
judge definitely rendered the adoption decree in derogation of the provisions of Article 33 of Presidential Decree
No. 603 and of Circular No. 12 of this Court. Additionally, while the act of corruption attributed to her was not
proved, respondent Vedaña, on her part, likewise failed to comply with the requirement in Circular No. 12 that she
should have coordinated with the DSWD in connection with the preparation of the home and case study reports.

Indeed, Article 33 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code provides in no uncertain terms that:

No petition for adoption shall be granted unless the Department of Social Welfare, or the Social Work and
Counselling Division, in case of Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, has made a case study of the child
to be adopted, his natural parents as well as the prospective adopting parents, and has submitted its
report and recommendations on the matter to the court hearing such petition. The Department of Social
Welfare shall intervene on behalf of the child if it finds, after such case study, that the petition should be
denied.

Circular No. 12, as a complementary measure, was issued by this Court precisely to obviate the mishandling of
adoption cases by judges, particularly in respect to the aforementioned case study to be conducted in accordance
with Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 by the DSWD itself and involving the child to be adopted, its natural
parents, and the adopting parents. It definitively directs Regional Trial Courts hearing adoption cases:

(1) to NOTIFY the Ministry of Social Services and Development, thru its local agency, of the filing of
adoption cases or the pendency thereof with respect to those cases already filed;

(2) to strictly COMPLY with the requirement in Article 33 of the aforesaid decree . . .
 xxx xxx xxx

The Staff Assistant V. (Social Worker) of the Regional Trial Courts, if any, shall coordinate with the Ministry
of Social Services and Development representatives in the preparation and submittal of such case study. .
..

The error on the part of both respondent judge and social worker is thus all too evident. Pursuant to Circular No.
12, the proper course that respondent judge should have taken was to notify the DSWD at the outset about the
commencement of Special Proceeding No. 5830 so that the corresponding case study could have been accordingly
conducted by said department which undoubtedly has the necessary competence, more than that possessed by
the court social welfare officer, to make the proper recommendation. Moreover, respondent judge should never
have merely presumed that it was routinary for the social welfare officer to coordinate with the DSWD regarding
the adoption proceedings. It was his duty to exercise caution and to see to it that such coordination was observed
in the adoption proceedings, together with all the other requirements of the law.

By respondent's failure to do so, he may well have wittingly or unwittingly placed in jeopardy the welfare and
future of the child whose adoption was under consideration. Adoption, after all, is in a large measure a legal device
by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate child like Zhedell Bernardo Ibea in this case. Treading on
equally sensitive legal terrain, the social welfare officer concerned, respondent Elma P. Vedaña, arrogated unto
herself a matter that pertained exclusively to the DSWD, her task being to coordinate with the DSWD in the
preparation and submission of the relevant case study reports, and not to make the same and recommend by
herself the facts on which the court was to act.

The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a magistrate should be the embodiment of, among other desirable
characteristics, judicial competence. 5 It need not be stressed here that among the prime duties to which a judge of
the law must ever be faithful is that of being abreast with the law and jurisprudence, since, as has so often been
advanced, the administration of justice requires the continuous study of law and jurisprudence. 6 Respondent
judge has obviously not been able to achieve the level of this expectation.

In like manner, respondent Elma P. Vedaña has imprudently acted beyond the bounds and strictures of her duties
as a Social Welfare Officer II of the Regional Trial Court. As an employee of court of justice, she should have been
well aware not only of the scope of her duties and responsibilities but that she should have likewise been familiar
with current laws, rules and regulations pertinent to her position as such social welfare officer. By her misfeasance,
she has compromised the prescribed process in the administration of justice in proceedings such as the one under
consideration.

We are, however, persuaded that respondent judge acted in good faith when he stated in his decision that the
DSWD submitted the required reports to his court through respondent Vedaña, presumably in the belief that it
was standard procedure for the Social Welfare Officer II of a Regional Trial Court to do so in coordination with the
DSWD. We also agree with the findings of the OCA that there is no evidence whatsoever that respondent Vedaña
sought to obtain any amount from the adopting parents. In fact, this is belied by the affidavit of the child's natural
mother, Loreta Ibea. We are, therefore, inclined to adopt a liberal view on the charges against respondents.

ACCORDINGLY, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely by this Court, respondent Judge Antonio M. Belen of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of
Lingayen, Pangasinan is hereby CENSURED for violating Article 33 of Presidential Decree No. 603 and Circular No.
12 of this Court; and respondent Elma P. Vedaña, Social Welfare Officer II of the Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, is REPRIMANDED for violating Circular No. 12.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 168992-93 May 21, 2009

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM,

MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM,

MONINA P. LIM, Petitioner.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision1 dated
15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos.
1258 and 1259, which dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and
Michael Jude P. Lim.

The Facts

The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo
Lim (Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were entrusted to them by a certain
Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to
make it appear that they were the children’s parents. The children 2 were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and
Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She
was born on 15 March 1977.3 Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His date of
birth is 1 August 1983.4

The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the children to exclusive
schools. They used the surname "Lim" in all their school records and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November
1998, Lim died. On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.

Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty5 given under Republic Act No.
85526(RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed
separate petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case Nos.
1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and
already married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.

Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent. 7 Michael
also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent. 8 Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise
executed an Affidavit of Consent9 for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.

In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Michelle was
considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown. 10 The DSWD issued
a similar Certification for Michael.11
 The Ruling of the Trial Court

On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that since
petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her new husband. The trial court
ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and
Article 185 of the Family Code.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the motion was denied in the Order dated 16 June
2005. In denying the motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of the exceptions under
Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioner’s argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was
untenable because, under the law, there are additional requirements, such as residency and certification of his
qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party in this case, must comply.

As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint exercise
of parental authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising parental
authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain obligations
and responsibilities.

Hence, the present petition.

Issue

Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of whether or not petitioner, who has remarried,
can singly adopt.

The Court’s Ruling

Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it is the duty of the court and the
State to protect the paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted. Petitioner argues that the legal
maxim "dura lex sed lex" is not applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental authority is not
necessary in this case since, at the time the petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married,
while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not anymore necessary since they have been
emancipated having attained the age of majority.

We deny the petition.

Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife

It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed
the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the
trial court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7, Article III of
RA 8552 reads:

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:

(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral
character, has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and psychologically
capable of caring for children, at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee, and who is in a position
to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. The requirement of
sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be waived when the
adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee’s parent;
 (b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That
his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been living
in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption
and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered, that he/she has been certified by
his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government agency that he/she has the legal
capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government allows the adoptee to enter his/her
country as his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided, further, That the requirements on residency and
certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt in his/her country may be waived for the following:

(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity; or

(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or

(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses; or

(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and clearance of
his/her financial accountabilities.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however, That
the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.

In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, joint
parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)

The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband and the wife
is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the
spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.12

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption
were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining
her husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be
adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the
illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There
are certain requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set
forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic
of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the
filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4)
he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as
the latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived
pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity of petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.

Effects of Adoption

Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore necessary since the children have been
emancipated having reached the age of majority. This is untenable.

Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the
development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.13 The father and the mother shall
jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. 14 Even the remarriage of the
surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person
to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.15

It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation — that is, when he attains the age of majority or 18
years of age16 — emancipation terminates parental authority over the person and property of the child, who shall
then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.17 However, parental authority is merely just one of the
effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA 8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:

ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION

SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter, all legal ties
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the
adopter(s).

SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents
and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters
born to them without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support
in keeping with the means of the family.

SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights
of succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s)
had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.

Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee,
except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the
adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent
and child, including but not limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; and
(ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and compulsory heirs of each other. 18 Therefore, even if
emancipation terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a legitimate child of the adopter with
all the rights19 of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the mother; (2) to receive
support from their parents; and (3) to be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely, the
adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the benefits to which biological parents are
entitled20 such as support21 and successional rights.22
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of
the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family, as well as to allow
childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the
adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained
to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 23 But, as we have ruled in Republic v.
Vergara:24

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of the
children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said
purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it
is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a
position to affirm the trial court’s decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot
be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law
on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses’ petition for adoption. (Emphasis
supplied)1avvphi1.zw+

Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions
with her husband. We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner.

Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events would show that joint adoption could no longer be
possible because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior
Court.

We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It
is not equivalent to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a judicial decree for the
dissolution of the marriage between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the case, joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is required. We reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption is mandatory.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her
middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.

The facts are undisputed.

On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition1 to adopt his minor illegitimate
child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26,
1994;2that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and
surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s
middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed
to "Catindig," his surname.

On March 23, 2001,3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:

"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of any opposition to
the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification
provided for by law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and educate the
child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the petitioner’s care and custody of the child since
her birth up to the present constitute more than enough compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of
Presidential Decree No. 603.

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and
for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the
Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.

Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court.

Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record purposes.

SO ORDERED."4

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration 5 praying that Stephanie should
be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.

On May 28, 2001,6 the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or
jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother
as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.

Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of adoption
because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one
adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the
middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the
adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the
middle name "Garcia" (her mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of
"Garcia" as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be
permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons:

First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother because under Article
189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and
needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be
maintained.

Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle
name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.

Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This
custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed
that "the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second
name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother."7

We find merit in the petition.

Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law –

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known and called in the
community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or combination of words by which a
person is distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the
convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.8 It is both of personal as
well as public interest that every person must have a name.

The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The
given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other
individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which
the child is entitled is fixed by law.9

Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of surname 10 of an
individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a
married woman or a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:

"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx

Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of
the father.

Art. 370. A married woman may use:

(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or

(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or

(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as ‘Mrs.’

Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name
and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may
choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:

(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.

Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed
before the legal separation.

Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with
Article 370.

Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such additional
name or surname as will avoid confusion.

Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word ‘Junior’ can
be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:

(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,

(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.

x x x"

Law Is Silent As To The Use Of

Middle Name –

As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 11 of
the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children
To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may use.

The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is
identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the
mother’s surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code
merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family
Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:

"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of
the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;

x x x"

However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that
drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname of the child’s mother as his
middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members
approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of
the father, thus

"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the wife of the surname and that of the
child because the father’s surname indicates the family to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on
the use of the father’s surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the surname of the
mother.

Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the mother, how will his name be
written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it should be mandatory that the child
uses the surname of the father and permissive in the case of the surname of the mother.

Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point is covered by the present Article 364, which reads:

Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.

Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the person himself precisely because of
this misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso Ponce Enrile’s correct surname is Ponce since
the mother’s surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez David’s family name is
Gutierrez and his mother’s surname is David but they all call him Justice David.

Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the effect that it shall be mandatory on
the child to use the surname of the father but he may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a
middle name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since
in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so that the details can be
covered in the appropriate chapter.

xxx

Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that the surname of the
father should always be last because there are so many traditions like the American tradition where they like to
use their second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese wherein they even
include the Clan name.

xxx

Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use of Surnames, they should say
that initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second
name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way.
The Committee approved the suggestion."12 (Emphasis supplied)

In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname of the
adopters."13 Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right
and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.14

The Underlying Intent of

Adoption Is In Favor of the

Adopted Child –

Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the
rights accorded to a legitimate child.15 It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. 16 The modern trend is to consider
adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows
the child with a legitimate status.17 This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to
the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is
impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted
child.18 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the "Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,"19 secures these rights
and privileges for the adopted.20

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents
and purposes pursuant to Article 18921 of the Family Code and Section 1722 Article V of RA 8552.23

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided
by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her
father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code
and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s surname (Garcia) as her
middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section
1824, Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological
parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.

Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house built by petitioner for
them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely
attached to both her mother and father. She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy
family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only sustain her
continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her illegitimacy.

Liberal Construction of

Adoption Statutes In Favor Of

Adoption –

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of adoption.25 The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration,26 hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law.27

Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:

"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail."

This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and
justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice
which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law." 28

Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use,
as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie
should be allowed to use her mother’s surname "GARCIA" as her middle name.

Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of adoption.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164948 June 27, 2006

DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City,
Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition for Adoption of the petitioner herein.

The Antecedents

On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino
parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition 3 for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was
born on August 31, 1986;4 Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987;5 and Eugene Dizon Ramos who
was born on August 5, 1989.6 The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother, and
Amelia Ramos.

Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990, 7 the children were left to
their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there
and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel
Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being
financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November
23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent8 to the adoption;
she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are
already married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam,
USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend
time with the minors; her children gave their written consent 9 to the adoption of the minors. Petitioner’s brother,
Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors
while in petitioner’s custody.

Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in her favor, as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court that after publication and hearing, judgment be
rendered allowing the adoption of the minor children Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon
Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that the minor children’s name follow the family name of petitioner.

Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises. 10

On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to conduct a
case study as mandated by Article 34 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and to submit a report thereon
not later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the petition. 11 The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) entered its appearance12 but deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its behalf.13 Since her
petition was unopposed, petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex parte. 14

The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the
written consent executed by her and her siblings.15 The petitioner marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent
purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and notarized
by a notary public in Guam, USA, as proof of said consent.16

On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD, Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a
Child Study Report, with the following recommendation:

In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene all surnamed Ramos, eligible for
adoption because of the following reasons:

1. Minors’ surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily consented to their adoption by the paternal aunt,
Diwata Landingin this is in view of her inability to provide the parental care, guidance and support they
need. An Affidavit of Consent was executed by the mother which is hereto attached.

2. The three minors subject for adoption have also expressed their willingness to be adopted and joins the
petitioners in Guam, USA in the future. A joint Affidavit of consent is hereto attached. The minors
developed close attachment to the petitioners and they regarded her as second parent.

3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary guardian who has also family to look after. As
young adolescents they really need parental love, care, guidance and support to ensure their protection
and well being.

In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and
Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial custody is hereby further
recommended to be dispensed with considering that they are close relatives and that close attachments was
already developed between the petitioner and the 3 minors.17

Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows:

The mother of minors came home together with her son John Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is to
enable her appear for the personal interview concerning the adoption of her children.

The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was conceived after the death of their
paternal grandmother and guardian. The paternal relatives including the petitioner who attended the wake of their
mother were very much concerned about the well-being of the three minors. While preparing for their adoption,
they have asked a cousin who has a family to stay with minors and act as their temporary guardian.

The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her
children, she voluntarily consented. She realized that her children need parental love, guidance and support which
she could not provide as she already has a second family & residing in Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her
children have been supporting her children up to the present and truly care for them, she believes her children will
be in good hands. She also finds petitioners in a better position to provide a secured and bright future to her
children.18

However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia
Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia
assents to the adoption.

On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for adoption, rendered a decision granting said
petition. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon
Ramos be freed from all legal obligations obedience and maintenance from their natural parents and that they be
declared for all legal intents and purposes the children of Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with
considering that parent-children relationship has long been established between the children and the adoptive
parents. Let the surnames of the children be changed from "Dizon-Ramos" to "Ramos-Landingin."

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect the corresponding
changes/amendment in the birth certificates of the above-mentioned minors.

SO ORDERED.19

The OSG appealed20 the decision to the Court of Appeals on December 2, 2002. In its brief 21 for the oppositor-
appellant, the OSG raised the following arguments:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE
PROPOSED ADOPTEES’ BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN
CONSENT OF THE PETITIONER’S CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO
ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES.

On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision22 reversing the ruling of the RTC. It held that petitioner failed to
adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the children’s natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit
of consent of the petitioner’s children could not also be admitted in evidence as the same was executed in Guam,
USA and was not authenticated or acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and although petitioner has a
job, she was not stable enough to support the children. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated November 25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.23

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 24 on May 21, 2004, which the CA denied in its Resolution dated
August 12, 2004.25

Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari26 on September 7, 2004, assigning the following
errors:

1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE
AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
 2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLEE IS NOT
FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE THREE CHILDREN. 27

The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt
the minors without the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit
of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopter’s children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c)
whether or not petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as stated in Malkinson v. Agrava, 28 that
adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or
orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to
allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person
of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should thus
be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. 29

However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court also ruled that the liberality with which this Court treats matters
leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges
of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and
interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective. The Court’s position
should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and
jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests
of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child.31

Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:

Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right
to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby
required:

(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;

(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and
adoptee, if any;

(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if living with said
adopter and the latter’s souse, if any;

(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental
relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best
interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. 32
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption.
Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental
rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit
the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the
Philippines with her son, John Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and Pagbilao was
able to interview her, it is incredible that the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent
to the adoption of her minor children. Neither did the petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in
support of the petition.

Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother is no longer necessary because
when Amelia’s husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came back. The children were then left to the
guidance and care of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal relatives, including petitioner, who provided for
the children’s financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively abandoned the children.
Petitioner further contends that it was by twist of fate that after 12 years, when the petition for adoption was
pending with the RTC that Amelia and her child by her second marriage were on vacation in the Philippines.
Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her, and during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the social
worker that she conformed to the adoption of her three children by the petitioner.

Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was
already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be
obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the
biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent
of their legal guardian.

Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is a conduct which
evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties.33 The term means neglect and refusal to perform the filial
and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial
affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child.34

Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such an
abandonment.35 To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed
at the time of adoption.36

In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia
Ramos had abandoned her children. Petitioner’s testimony on that matter follows:

Q Where is the mother of these three children now?

A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir.

Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an instance where she communicated with the family?

A None, sir.

Q How about with her children?

A None, sir.

Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?

A I do not know, sir.

Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?

A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with another man.

Q From whom did you learn that?

A From others who came from Italy, sir.

Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her second marriage?

A Yes, sir, she got two kids.37

Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:

Q Where is your mother now?

A In Italy, sir.

Q When did your mother left for Italy?

A After my father died, sir.

Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990?

A Two years old, sir.

Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother communicate with you?

A No, sir.38

However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also stated the following:

IV. Background of the Case:

xxxx

Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under the care and custody of their maternal
grandmother. However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an uncle, cousin of their deceased father now serves as their
guardian. The petitioner, together with her children and other relatives abroad have been supporting the minor
children financially, even during the time that they were still living with their natural parents. Their mother also
sends financial support but very minimal.39

xxxx

V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for Adoption:

xxxx
As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger siblings. She helps them in their lessons, works
and has fun with them. She also encourages openness on their problems and concerns and provides petty
counseling. In serious problems she already consult (sic) her mother and petitioner-aunt.40

xxxx

In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein minors, Amelia recalled that they had a happy and
comfortable life. After the death of her husband, her in-laws which include the petitioner had continued providing
support for them. However being ashamed of just depending on the support of her husband’s relatives, she
decided to work abroad. Her parents are also in need of financial help as they are undergoing maintenance
medication. Her parents mortgaged their farm land which she used in going to Italy and worked as domestic
helper.

When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3 children to the care & custody of her mother-in-law
who returned home for good, however she died on November 2000.

While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from Tarlac. They became live-in partners since 1995 and
have a son John Mario who is now 2 years old. The three of them are considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed
that Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of his marriage and his wife is amenable to it. He is providing his
legitimate family regular support.

Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000-P15,000 a month through her parents who share
minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The petitioner and other paternal relatives are
continuously providing support for most of the needs & education of minors up to present. 41

Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or to permanently sever their
mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even while
abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the children to her now
deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious personal
problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to the children, though in minimal amounts as
compared to what her affluent in-laws provide.

Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors herein will have the effect of severing all legal
ties between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the same shall then be vested on the
adopter.42 It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount
consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children. More proof has
to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and that the latter will not miss her guidance
and counsel if they are given to an adopting parent.43 Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes
precedence in adoption.

Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is
necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for
which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight. Mere
identification of documents and the markings thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary weight on
documents unless formally offered.44

Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed
by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of petitioner’s
children45 was notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same
way as a document notarized in this country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103,46 which states:

Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign country shall be considered
authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are made in accordance with the following requirements:

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, chargé
d affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the
country or place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer duly authorized by law of the
country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.

(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or
document is known to him, and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the
same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep
a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In case the acknowledgment is made before a notary public
or an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary public
or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an ambassador, minister, secretary of
legation, chargé de affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines,
acting within the country or place to which he is accredited. The officer making the authentication shall
certify under his official seal that the person who took the acknowledgment was at the time duly
authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly exercising the functions of the office by virtue of
which he assumed to act, and that as such he had authority under the law to take acknowledgment of
instruments or documents in the place where the acknowledgment was taken, and that his signature and
seal, if any, are genuine.

As the alleged written consent of petitioner’s legitimate children did not comply with the afore-cited law, the same
can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone
who saw the document executed or written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the makers.47

Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her
legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.

In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not stable enough to support the children and is
only relying on the financial backing, support and commitment of her children and her siblings. 48 Petitioner
contradicts this by claiming that she is financially capable as she has worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a
house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and siblings
have likewise committed themselves to provide financial backing should the need arise. The OSG, again in its
comment, banks on the statement in the Home Study Report that "petitioner has limited income." Accordingly, it
appears that she will rely on the financial backing of her children and siblings in order to support the minor
adoptees. The law, however, states that it is the adopter who should be in a position to provide support in keeping
with the means of the family.

Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that the financial capacity of
prospective parents should also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to support the would-be
adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the family.

According to the Adoption Home Study Report49 forwarded by the Department of Public Health & Social Services of
the Government of Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer supporting her legitimate children, as the latter are
already adults, have individual lives and families. At the time of the filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years
old, employed on a part-time basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a month.
Petitioner’s main intention in adopting the children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at
Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the
limited income might be a hindrance to the adoption proceedings.

Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial
aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age. While
petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing of her children and siblings, the OSG is correct in
stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation
between the former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor support petitioner’s allegation that
her siblings and her children are financially able and that they are willing to support the minors herein. The Court,
therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.

While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for her nieces and nephew, there are
legal infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA. In any case, petitioner is not prevented from
filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 117209 February 9, 1996

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City and
SPOUSES VAN MUNSON y NAVARRO and REGINA MUNSON y ANDRADE, respondents.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

Indeed, what's in a name, as the Bard of Avon has written, since a rose by any other name would smell as sweet?

This could well be the theme of the present appeal by certiorari which challenges, on pure questions of law, the
order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City, dated September 13, 1994 1 in JDRC Case No. 2964. Said
court is faulted for having approved the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously
granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the
surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.

The facts are undisputed. On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and
Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a p petition 2 to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran, duly alleging therein
the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to
be adoptive parents, as well as the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed
minor was sought. In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first name or said
minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was baptized in keeping with religious
tradition and by which he has been called by his adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he
arrived at private respondents' residence. 3

At the hearing on April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same
petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated May 3, 1995, 4 petitioner reiterated its objection to the joinder
of the petition for adoption and the petitions for change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these
petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.

After considering the evidence and arguments of the contending parties, the trial court ruled in favor of herein
private respondents in this wise:

WHEREFORE, minor child Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran is freed from all legal obligations of obedience and
maintenance with respect to his natural parents, and for all legal intents and purposes shall be known as
Aaron Joseph Munson y Andrade, the legally adopted child of Van Munson and Regina Munson effective
upon the filing of the petition on March 10, 1994. As soon as the decree of adoption becomes final and
executory, it shall be recorded in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro Manila pursuant to
Section 8, Rule 99 and Section 6, Rule 103, respectively, of the Rules of Court, and shall be annotated in
the record of birth of the adopted child, which in this case is in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, where the child
was born. Likewise, send a copy of this Order to the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila, for its
appropriate action consisten(t) herewith. 5

At this juncture, it should be noted that no challenge has been raised by petitioner regarding the fitness of herein
private respondents to be adopting parents nor the validity of the decree of adoption rendered in their favor. The
records show that the latter have commendably established their qualifications under the law to be
adopters, 6 and have amply complied with the procedural requirements for the petition for adoption, 7 with the
findings of the trial court being recited thus:
 To comply with the jurisdictional requirements, the Order of this Court dated March 16, 1994 setting this
petition for hearing (Exh. "A") was published in the March 31, April 6 and 13, 1994 issues of the Manila
Chronicle, a newspaper of general circulation (Exhs. "B" to "E" and submarkings). . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioners apart from being financially able, have no criminal nor derogatory record (Exhs. "K" to "V");
and are physically fit to be the adoptive parents of the minor child Kevin (Exh. "W"). Their qualification to
become the adoptive parents of Kevin Earl finds support also in the Social Case Study Report prepared by
the DSWD through Social Worker Luz Angela Sonido, the pertinent portion of which reads:

"Mr. and Mrs. Munson are very religious, responsible, mature and friendly individuals. They are
found physically healthy; mentally fit, spiritually and financially capable to adopt Kevin Earl
Moran aka Aaron Joseph.

"Mr. and Mrs. Munson have provided AJ with all his needs. They unselfishly share their time, love
and attention to him. They are ready and willing to continuously provide him a happy and secure
home life.

"Aaron Joseph, on the other hand, is growing normally under the care of the Munsons. He had
comfortably settled in his new environment. His stay with the Munsons during the six months
trial custody period has resulted to a close bond with Mr. and Mrs. Munson and vice-versa.

"We highly recommend to the Honorable Court that the adoption of Kevin Earl Moran aka Aaron
Joseph by Mr. and Mrs. Van Munson be legalized." 8

It has been said all too often enough that the factual findings of the lower court, when sufficiently buttressed by
legal and evidential support, are accorded high respect and are binding and conclusive upon this
Court. 9 Accordingly, we fully uphold the propriety of that portion of the order of the court below granting the
petition, for adoption.

The only legal issues that need to be resolved may then be synthesized mainly as follows. (1) whether or not the
court a quo erred in granting the prayer for the change of the registered proper or given name of the minor
adoptee embodied in the petition for adoption; and (2) whether or not there was lawful ground for the change of
name.

I. It is the position of petitioner that respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he additionally granted the
prayer for the change of the given or proper name of the adoptee in a petition for adoption.

Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which,
in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by
distinct sets of law and rules. In order to be entitled to both reliefs, namely, a decree of adoption and an authority
to change the giver or proper name of the adoptee, the respective proceedings for each must be instituted
separately, and the substantive and procedural requirements therefor under Articles 183 to 193 of the Family
Code in relation to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code in relation
to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name, must correspondingly be complied with. 10

A perusal of the records, according to petitioner, shows that only the laws and rules on adoption have been
observed, but not those for a petition for change of name. 11 Petitioner further contends that what the law allows
is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a
natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper
name, and since this would involve a substantial change of one's legal name, a petition for change of name under
Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being
conformably satisfied. 12

Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name
predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity
of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no
prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but
related causes of action in a single petition. Further, the conditions for permissive joinder of causes of action, i.e.,
jurisdiction of the court, proper venue and joinder of parties, have been met. 13

Corollarily, petitioner insists on strict adherence to the rule regarding change of name in view of the natural
interest of the State in maintaining a system of identification of its citizens and in the orderly administration of
justice. 14 Private respondents argue otherwise and invoke a liberal construction and application of the Rules, the
welfare and interest of the adoptee being the primordial concern that should be addressed in the instant
proceeding. 15

On this score, the trial court adopted a liberal stance in holding that -

Furthermore, the change of name of the child from Kevin Earl Bartolome to Aaron Joseph should not be
treated strictly, it appearing that no rights have been prejudiced by said change of name. The strict and
meticulous observation of the requisites set forth by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court is indubitably for the
purpose of preventing fraud, ensuring that neither State nor any third person should be prejudiced by the
grant of the petition for change of name under said rule, to a petitioner of discernment.

The first name sought to be changed belongs to an infant barely over a year old. Kevin Earl has not
exercised full civil rights nor engaged in any contractual obligations. Neither can he nor petitioners on his
behalf, be deemed to have any immoral, criminal or illicit purpose for seeking said cha(n)ge of name. It
stands to reason that there is no way that the state or any person may be so prejudiced by the action for
change of Kevin Earl's first name. In fact, to obviate any possible doubts on the intent of petitioners, the
prayer for change of name was caused to be published together with the petition for adoption. 16

Art. 189 of the Family Code enumerates in no uncertain terms the legal effects of adoption:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including
the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;

(2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the
adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and

(3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.

Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon
issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee's surname to follow that of the adopter which is
the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of
the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.

However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it
was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the
adopter a license to change the adoptee's registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof,
premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a
mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a
petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.

The name of the adoptee as recorded in the civil register should be used in the adoption proceedings in order to
vest the court with jurisdiction to hear and determine the same, 17 and shall continue to be so used until the court
orders otherwise. Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a substantial
change in one's official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a judicial order. The purpose of the
statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change,
and in keeping with the object of the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make its
decree recording such change. 18

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a
change in one's name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and
procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.

Under Rule 103, a petition for change of name shall be filed in the regional trial court of the province where the
person desiring to change his name resides. It shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his name to be
changed or by some other person in his behalf and shall state that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of
the province where the petition is filed for at least three years prior to such filing, the cause for which the change
of name is sought, and the name asked for. An order for the date and place of hearing shall be made and
published, with the Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city prosecutor appearing for the Government at
such hearing. It is only upon satisfactory proof of the veracity of the allegations in the petition and the
reasonableness of the causes for the change of name that the court may adjudge that the name be changed as
prayed for in the petition, and shall furnish a copy of said judgment to the civil registrar of the municipality
concerned who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.

A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is
indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. 19 It is an independent and discrete
special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of
any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to
denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.

The Solicitor General correctly points out the glaring defects of the subject petition insofar as it seeks the change
of name of the adoptee, 20 all of which taken together cannot but lead to the conclusion that there was no petition
sufficient in form and substance for change of name as would rightfully deserve an order therefor. It would be
procedurally erroneous to employ a petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of the
corresponding petition for the latter relief at law.

Neither can the allowance of the subject petition, by any stretch of imagination and liberality, be justified under
the rule allowing permissive joinder of causes of action. Moreover, the reliance by private respondents on the
pronouncements in Briz vs. Brit, et al. 21 and Peyer vs. Martinez, et al. 22 is misplaced. A restatement of the rule and
jurisprudence on joinder of causes of action would, therefore, appear to be called for.

By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action, is meant the uniting of two or more
demands or rights of action in one action; the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. 23 It is
the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the
same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinct demands,
controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition. 24
As can easily be inferred from the above definitions, a party is generally not required to join in one suit several
distinct causes of action. The joinder of separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not
mandatory in the absence of a contrary statutory provision, even though the causes of action arose from the same
factual setting and might under applicable joinder rules be joined. 25 Modern statutes and rules governing joinders
are intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the efficient administration of justice wherever this
may be done without prejudice to the rights of the litigants. To achieve these ends, they are liberally construed. 26

While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present
Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not
violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same
contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and
character.

The objectives of the rule or provision are to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the same parties and subject
matter are to be dealt with by effecting in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy and
litigation between the parties involving one subject matter, and to expedite the disposition of litigation at
minimum cost. The provision should be construed so as to avoid such multiplicity, where possible, without
prejudice to the rights of the litigants. Being of a remedial nature, the provision should be liberally construed, to
the end that related controversies between the same parties may be adjudicated at one time; and it should be
made effectual as far as practicable, 27 with the end in view of promoting the efficient administration of justice. 28

The statutory intent behind the provisions on joinder of causes of action is to encourage joinder of actions which
could reasonably be said to involve kindred rights and wrongs, although the courts have not succeeded in giving a
standard definition of the terms used or in developing a rule of universal application. The dominant idea is to
permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where there is some substantial unity between
them. 29 While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there should nevertheless
be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of law and fact involved, subject always to the
restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties. Unlimited joinder is not authorized. 30

Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it to the correlative rules on
jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties 31 and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented, effectively
disallows unlimited joinder. 32

Turning now to the present petition, while it is true that there is no express prohibition against the joinder of a
petition for adoption and for change of name, we do not believe that there is any relation between these two
petitions, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any common question of fact or
law, which conjointly would warrant their joinder. In short, these petitions do not rightly meet the underlying test
of conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under our Rules.

As keenly observed and correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General -

A petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance
and purpose, are different from each other. Each action is individually governed by particular sets of laws
and rules. These two proceedings involve disparate issues. In a petition for adoption, the court is called
upon to evaluate the proposed adopter's fitness and qualifications to bring up and educate the adoptee
properly (Prasnick vs. Republic, 99 Phil. 665). On the other hand, in a petition for change of name, no
family relations are created or affected for what is looked into is the propriety and reasonableness of the
grounds supporting the proposed change of name (Yu vs. Republic, 17 SCRA 253).

xxx xxx xxx

 . . . Hence, the individual merits of each issue must be separately assessed and determined for neither
action is dependent on the other. 33

The rule on permissive joinder of: causes of action is clear. Joinder may be allowed only if the actions
show a commonality of relationship and conform to the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties
(Section 5, Rule 2, Rules of Court).

These conditions are wanting in the instant case. As already pointed out in our Petition (pp. 9-10), an
action for adoption and an action for change of name are, in nature and purpose, not related to each
other and do not arise out of the same relation between the parties. While what is cogent in an adoption
proceeding is the proposed adopter's fitness and qualifications to adopt, a petition for change of first
name may only prosper upon proof of reasonable and compelling grounds supporting the change
requested. Fitness to adopt is not determinative of the sufficiency of reasons justifying a change of name.
And similarly, a change of first name cannot be justified in view of a finding that the proposed adopter
was found fit to adopt. There is just no way that the two actions can connect and find a common ground,
thus the joinder would be improper.

In contending that adoption and change of name may be similarly sought in one petition, private
respondents rely upon Peyer vs. Martinez and Briz vs. Briz (p. 4, Comment)

We however submit that these citations are non sequitur. In both cases, the fact of intimacy and
relatedness of the issues is so pronounced. In Peyer, an application to pronounce the husband an
absentee is obviously intertwined with the action to transfer the management of conjugal assets to the
wife. In Briz, an action for declaration of heirship was deemed a clear condition precedent to an action to
recover the land subject of partition and distribution proceeding. However, the commonality of
relationship which stands out in both cases does not characterize the present action for adoption and
change of name. Thus the rulings in Peyer and Briz find no place in the case at bar.

Besides, it is interesting to note that although a joinder of the two actions was, in Briz, declared feasible,
the Supreme Court did not indorse an automatic joinder and instead remanded the matter for further
proceedings, granting leave to amend the pleadings and implead additional parties-defendants for a
complete determination of the controversy (Briz vs. Briz, 43 Phil. 763, 770). Such cautionary stance all the
more emphasizes that although joinders are generally accepted, they are not allowed where the
conditions are not satisfactorily met. 34

It furthermore cannot be said that the proposed joinder in this instance will make for a complete determination of
all matters pertaining to the coetaneous grant of adoption and change of name of the adoptee in one petition. As
already stated, the subject petition was grossly insufficient in form and substance with respect to the prayer for
change of name of the adoptee. The policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits which underscores the rule on
permissive joinder of causes of action is addressed to suits that are intimately related and also present interwoven
and dependent issues which can be most expeditiously and comprehensively settled by having just one judicial
proceeding, but not to suits or actions whose subject matters or corresponding reliefs are unrelated or diverse
such that they are best taken up individually.

In Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 35 the Court clarified the rule on permissive joinder of causes of action:

The rule is clearly permissive. It does not constitute an obligatory rule, as there is no positive provision of
law or any rule of jurisprudence which compels a party to join all his causes of action and bring them at
one and the same time. Under the present rules, the provision is still that the plaintiff may, and not that
he must, unite several causes of action although they may be included in one of the classes specified. This,
therefore, leaves it to the plaintiff's option whether the causes of action shall be joined in the same action,
 and no unfavorable inference may be drawn from his failure or refusal to do so. He may always file
another action based on the remaining cause or causes of action within the prescriptive period therefor.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The situation presented in this case does not warrant exception from the Rules under the policy of liberal
construction thereof in general, and for change of name in particular, as proposed by private respondents and
adopted by respondent judge. Liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in situations wherein there may be
some excusable formal deficiency or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of
the proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules. Utter disregard of the
Rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.

The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike would at times encounter in
procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice requires correct observance of indispensable technicalities precisely
designed to ensure its proper dispensation. 36 It has long been recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of
Court is indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial
business. 37

Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be ignored at will to suit the convenience
of a party. Adjective law is important in ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the
orderly and speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to hamper litigants or complicate
litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under which a suitor may be heard in the correct form and manner
and at the prescribed time in a peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge. 38

It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome rationale in the orderly
administration of justice. Justice has to be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness,
caprice, or whimsicality. 39 We have been cautioned and reminded in Limpot vs. CA, et al. that: 40

Rules of procedure are intended to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of
substantive rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings. It is a mistake to propose that substantive law
and adjective law are contradictory to each other or, as has often been suggested, that enforcement of
procedural rules should never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the
litigants. This is not exactly true; the concept is much misunderstood. As a matter of fact, the policy of the
courts is to give both kinds of law, as complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the
dispute between the parties. Observance of both substantive rights is equally guaranteed by due process,
whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . (T)hey are required to be followed except only when for the most persuasive of reasons they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in
not complying with the procedure prescribed. . . . While it is true that a litigation is not a game of
technicalities, this does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at random to the
prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their just resolution. Justice
eschews anarchy.

Only exceptionally in very extreme circumstances, when a rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and
becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy such that rigid application thereof frustrates rather than promotes
substantial justice, will technicalities deserve scant consideration from the court. In such situations, the courts are
empowered, even obligated, to suspend the operation of the rules. 41
We do not perceive any injustice that can possibly be visited upon private respondents by following the
reglementary procedure for the change in the proper or given name that they seek for their adopted child. We are
hard put to descry the indispensability of a change of the first name of the adoptee to his welfare and benefit. Nor
is the said change of such urgency that would justify an exemption from or a relaxation of the Rules. It is the State
that stands to be prejudiced by a wanton disregard of Rule 103 in this case, considering its natural interest in the
methodical administration of justice and in the efficacious maintenance of a system of identification of its citizens.

The danger wrought by non-observance of the Rules is that the violation of or failure to comply with the procedure
prescribed by law prevents the proper determination of the questions raised by the parties with respect to the
merits of the case and makes it necessary to decide, in the first place, such questions as relate to the form of the
action. The rules and procedure laid down for the trial court and the adjudication of cases are matters of public
policy. 42 They are matters of public order and interest which can in no wise be changed or regulated by
agreements between or stipulations by parties to an action for their singular convenience. 43

In Garcia vs. Republic, 44 we are reminded of the definiteness in the application of the Rules and the importance of
seeking relief under the appropriate proceeding:

. . . The procedure set by law should be delimited. One should not confuse or misapply one procedure for
another lest we create confusion in the application of the proper remedy.

Respondent judge's unmindful disregard of procedural tenets aimed at achieving stability of procedure is to be
deplored. He exceeded his prerogatives by granting the prayer for change of name, his order being unsupported by
both statutory and case law. The novel but unwarranted manner in which he adjudicated this case may be
characterized as a regrettable abdication of the duty to uphold the teachings of remedial law and jurisprudence.

II. Petitioner avers that it was error for the lower court to grant the petition for change of name without citing or
proving any lawful ground. Indeed, the only justification advanced for the change of name was the fact of the
adoptee's baptism under the name Aaron Joseph and by which he has been known since he came to live with
private respondents. 45

Private respondents, through a rather stilted ratiocination, assert that upon the grant of adoption, the subject
minor adoptee ipso facto assumed a new identification and designation, that is, Aaron Joseph which was the name
given to him during the baptismal rites. Allowing the change of his first name as prayed for in the petition, so they
claim, merely confirms the designation by which he is known and called in the community in which he lives. This
largely echoes the opinion of the lower court that naming the child Aaron Joseph was symbolic of naming him at
birth, and that they, as adoptive parents, have as much right as the natural parents to freely select the first name
of their adopted child. 46

The lower court was sympathetic to herein private respondents and ruled on this point in this manner:

As adoptive parents, petitioner like other parents may freely select the first name given to his/her child as
it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is fixed by law. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose than for identification
purposes in a birth certificate by a woman who had all intentions of giving him away. The naming of the
minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon the grant of their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming
the minor at birth. 47
We cannot fathom any legal or jurisprudential basis for this attenuated ruling of respondent judge and must thus
set it aside.

It is necessary to reiterate in this discussion that a person's name is a word or combination of words by which he is
known and identified, and distinguished from others, for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him,
or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal as well as public interest that every person must have a
name. The name of an individual has two parts: the given or proper name and the surname or family name. The
giver or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other
individuals. The surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued
from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which
the child is entitled is fixed by law. 48

By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person's birth must be entered in the civil register. The official name of a person
is that given him in the civil register. That is his name in the eyes of the law. 49 And once the name of a person is
officially entered in the civil register, Article 376 of the same Code seals that identity with its precise mandate: no
person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This statutory restriction is premised on the
interest of the State in names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. 50

By reason thereof, the only way that the name of person can be changed legally is through a petition for change of
name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. 51 For purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376
of the Civil Code and correlatively implemented by Rule 103, the only name that may be changed is the true or
official name recorded in the civil register. As earlier mentioned, a petition for change of name being a
proceeding in rem, impressed as it is with public interest, strict compliance with all the requisites therefor in order
to vest the court with jurisdiction is essential, and failure therein renders the proceedings a nullity. 52

It must likewise be stressed once again that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the
sound discretion of the court which has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a change of name and
to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown. Before a person can be authorized to change his name, that
is, his true or official name or that which appears in his birth certificate or is entered in the civil register, he must
show proper and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may justify such change. 53

Jurisprudence has recognized, inter alia, the following grounds as being sufficient to warrant a change of name: (a)
when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one
has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e)
when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudice to anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest. 54

Contrarily, a petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was baptized by another name, under
which he has been known and which he used, has been denied inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not
sanctioned. 55 For, in truth, baptism is not a condition sine qua non to a change of name. 56 Neither does the fact
that the petitioner has been using a different name and has become known by it constitute proper and reasonable
cause to legally authorize a change of name. 57 A name given to a person in the church records or elsewhere or by
which be is known in the community - when at variance with that entered in the civil register - is unofficial and
cannot be recognized as his real name. 58

The instant petition does not sufficiently persuade us to depart from such rulings of long accepted wisdom and
applicability. The only grounds offered to justify the change of name prayed for was that the adopted child had
been baptized as Aaron Joseph in keeping with the religious faith of private respondents and that it was the name
by which he had been called and known by his family, relatives and friends from, the time he came to live with
private respondents. 59 Apart from suffusing their pleadings with sanctimonious entreaties for compassion, none of
the justified grounds for a change of name has been alleged or established by private respondents. The legal bases
chosen by them to bolster their cause have long been struck down as unavailing for their present purposes. For, to
allow the adoptee herein to use his baptismal name, instead of his name registered in the civil register, would be
to countenance or permit that which has always been frowned upon. 60

The earlier quoted posturing of respondent judge, as expressed in his assailed order that -

(a)s adoptive parents, petitioners like other parents may freely select the first name given to his/her child
as it is only the surname to which the child is entitled that is fixed by law. . . .

The given name of the minor was Kevin Earl, a name given for no other purpose than for identification
purposes in a birth certificate by a woman who had all the intentions of giving him away. The naming of
the minor as Aaron Joseph by petitioners upon grant of their petition for adoption is symbolic of naming
the minor at birth.

and supposedly based on the authority of Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra, painfully
misapplies the ruling therein enunciated.

The factual backdrop of said case is not at all analogous to that of the case at bar. In the Wong case, therein
petitioner Maximo Wong sought the change of his surname which he acquired by virtue of the decree of adoption
granted in favor of spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong. Upon reaching the age of majority, he filed a
petition in court to change his surname from Wong to Alcala, which was his surname prior to the adoption. He
adduced proof that the use of the surname Wong caused him embarrassment and isolation from friends and
relatives in view of a suggested Chinese ancestry when in reality he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community, thereby hampering his business and social life, and that his surviving adoptive mother consented to
the change of name sought. This Court granted the petition and regarded the change of the surname as a mere
incident in, rather than the object of, the adoption.

It should be noted that in said case the change of surname, not the given name, and the legal consequences
thereof in view of the adoption were at issue. That it was sought in a petition duly and precisely filed for that
purpose with ample proof of the lawful grounds therefor only serves to reinforce the imperative necessity of
seeking relief under and through the legally prescribed procedures.

Here, the Solicitor General meritoriously explained that:

Respondent Judge failed to distinguish between a situation wherein a child is being named for the first
time by his natural parent, as against one wherein, a child is previously conferred a first name by his
natural parent, and such name is subsequently sought to be disregarded and changed by the adoptive
parents. In the first case, there is no dispute that natural parents have the right to freely select and give
the child's first name for every person, including juridical persons, must have a name (Tolentino, A.,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, Vo. I, 1987 edition, page 721). In the second case,
however, as in the case at bar, private respondents, in their capacities as adopters, cannot claim a right to
name the minor adoptee after such right to name the child had already been exercised by the natural
parent. Adopting parents have not been conferred such right by law, hence, the right assertes by private
respondents herein remains but illusory. Renaming the adoptee cannot be claimed as a right. It is merely
a privilege necessitating judicial consent upon compelling grounds. 61

The liberality with which this Court treats matters leading up to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent
purposes of adoption and ensures to the adopted child the rights and privileges arising therefrom, ever mindful
that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, 62 should be understood
in its proper context. It should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted to extend to inferences beyond the
contemplation of law and jurisprudence.

The practically unrestricted freedom of the natural parent to select the proper or given name of the child
presupposes that no other name for it has theretofore been entered in the civil register. Once such name is
registered, regardless of the reasons for such choice and even if it be solely for the purpose of identification, the
same constitutes the official name. This effectively authenticates the identity of the person and must remain
unaltered save when, for the most compelling reasons shown in an appropriate proceeding, its change may merit
judicial approval.

While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected under the law, the
so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence of adoption, even
for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and consequently cannot be favorably
considered. To repeat, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption and to follow that of
the adopter does not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given name. Furthermore, factual realities and
legal consequences, rather than sentimentality and symbolisms, are what are of concern to the Court.

Finally, it is understood that this decision does not entirely foreclose and is without prejudice to, private
respondents' privilege to legally change the proper or given name of their adopted child, provided that the same is
exercised, this time, via a proper petition for change of name. Of course, the grant thereof is conditioned on strict
compliance with all jurisdictional requirements and satisfactory proof of the compelling reasons advanced
therefor.

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the assailed order of respondent judge is hereby MODIFIED. The legally
adopted child of private respondents shall henceforth be officially known as Kevin Earl Munson y Andrade unless a
change thereof is hereafter effected in accordance with law. In all other respects, the order is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 98

[ G.R. No. 46390, September 30, 1939 ]

TESTATE ESTATE OF PETRONA FRANCISCO, DECEASED. CASIMIRO TIANGCO AND MARIA TIANGCO, FIDUCIARIES
AND APPELLANTS, VS. PROCESO FRANCISCO, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE.

DECISION

LAUREL, J.:

Petrona Francisco provided in her last will that the income derived from the one-half portion of her fishpond in the
barrio of Gasak, Navotas, Rizal, shall be devoted to the celebration of the "Flores de Mayo" in Malabon, Rizal, and
for other religious activities mentioned in the will. Upon probate of the will the Court of First Instance of Rizal
appointed Casimiro Tiangco as trustee. Shortly afterwards, on March 16, 1922, Maria Tiangco was also appointed
cotrustee to act with Casimiro Tiangco in supervising the affairs of the trust. The records of the case disclose that
from the beginning the submission of annual reports to the court was very irregular. When the accounts for the
year 1935 were submitted, Proceso Francisco, the herein oppositor-appellee, filed an opposition. Meanwhile, the
court appointed the clerk of court as commissioner to make a detailed examination of the accounts already
submitted, and declared its order of January 30, 1937, approving the said accounts over the objection of Proceso
Francisco, of no legal force and effect. The trustees entered an opposition to this decree. Upon the other hand, the
oppositor-appellee, on March 22, 1937, requested for the temporary substitution of the trustees. The report for.
the year 1936 having been filed on April 13, 1937, an order for the joint hearing of the two annual accounts, was
issued. Again, Proceso Francisco made several objections to the accounts for the year 1936 with reference to
certain items. In the meantime, the clerk of court submitted his report. On April 26, 1938, the court issued the
following order requiring the resignation of the trustees within ten days, and appointed Father L. R. Arcaira as
temporary trustee:
"It appearing from the evidence submitted by the commissioner, regarding the account of the trustees, that the
said trustees have not faithfully discharged their duties and that their continuance in office would cause further
prejudice to the estate under trusteeship, they are hereby given ten days within which to submit their resignation.
It is understood that action on the resignation will be taken by the court upon the filing and settlement of their
account to be submitted by the trustees pursuant to the order of this court dated April 20, 1938. In the meantime,
the parish priest of Malabon, Father L. A. Arcaira is hereby appointed temporarily trustee to take immediate
possession of the property under trust and manage the same until regular trustee is duly appointed. So ordered.

"Pasig, Rizal, Philippines, April 26, 1938.

"SIXTO DE LA COSTA
"Judge"
Appellants assign various errors, the principal bearing on the power of the lower court to require the resignation of
the trustees and the legal sufficiency o£ the above-questioned order for this purpose.

The will of the deceased, Petrona Francisco, created a continuing trust, but no particular persons were named as
beneficiaries. The appellants themselves did not have anything to do with the trust until their appointment by the
lower court, and they were so commissioned not because of any beneficial interest they had in the estate but
because their selection was approved by the lower court in the belief that they would faithfully perform their
obligations. The same court found later that they "have not faithfully discharged their duties and that their
continuance in office would cause further prejudice to the estate under trusteeship," and we cannot, on appeal,
override the action of the lower court by reversing its finding, and indirectly sanction the violation of an
unquestioned and legally existing trust.

It is also contended that the order appealed from does not contain a finding of facts, as required by section 133 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, and for this reason, the order is ineffectual. We find that the order read in conjunction
with the report of the clerk of court as commissioner, exhibits a finding upon all the evidence presented during the
trial, and is sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law. (Aringo vs. Arena, 14 Phil., 263, 266.)

The appellants likewise contend that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
resignation of the trustees-appellants. The power to appoint a trustee is discretionary with the court before whom
application is made, and this court will decline to interfere except in cases of clear abuse. Thereafter, upon proper
showing that the interests of justice would be adequately served with the removal of the incumbent trustees, it is
likewise within its discretion to do so (section 587, Code of Civil Procedure) f and this court will refuse to interfere
in the absence of a showing of grave abuse or whimsical and capricious exercise of that discretion.

The order appealed from is confirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
RULE 101

G.R. No. L-33281 March 31, 1930

CHIN AH FOO (alias CHAN FOO WOO) and YEE SHEE (alias YEE SUI YENG), widow of Chin Ah Kim,petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO CONCEPCION, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and LEE VOO, respondents.

Harvey and O'Brien for petitioners.

Lazaro Pormarejo for respondent Lee Voo.
J. A. Wolfson for respondent judge.

MALCOLM, J.:

The question for decision in this certiorari proceeding concerns the power of a Judge of First Instance, who has in
effect acquitted a man charged with murder on the plea of insanity, and who has ordered the confinement of the
insane person in an asylum, subsequently to permit the insane person to leave the asylum without the
acquiescence of the Director of Health. Otherwise stated, the factor determinative of the question has to do with
the effect, if any, of section 1048 of the Administrative Code on article 8 of the Penal Code.

On November 15, 1927, one Chan Sam (alias Chin Ah Woo), was charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila
with the murder of Chin Ah Kim. Thereafter, the trial judge rendered judgment declaring the accused not
responsible for the crime, and dismissing the case, but requiring the reclusion of the accused for treatment in San
Lazaro Hospital, in accordance with article 8 of the Penal Code, with the admonition that the accused be not
permitted to leave the said institution without first obtaining the permission of the court. In compliance with this
order, Chan Sam was confined for approximately two years in San Lazaro Hospital. During this period, efforts to
obtain his release were made induced by the desire of his wife and father-in-law to have him proceed to
Hongkong. Opposition to the allowance of the motions came from the wife and children of the murdered man,
who contended that Chan Sam was still insane, and that he had made threats that if he ever obtained his liberty he
would kill the wife and the children of the deceased and probably other members of his own family who were
living in Hongkong. These various legal proceedings culminated in Doctors Domingo and De los Angeles being
delegated to examine and certify the mental condition of Chan Sam, which they did. After this report had been
submitted, counsel for the oppositors challenged the jurisdiction of the court. However, the respondent judge
sustained the court's right to make an order in the premises and allowed Chan Sam to leave the San Lazaro
Hospital to be turned over to the attorney-in-fact of his wife so that he might be taken to Hongkong to join his wife
in that city.

Article 8 of the Penal Code, pursuant to which the trial judge purported to act in issuing his order of release,
provides that among those exempt from criminal liability are:

1. An imbecile or lunatic, unless the latter has acted during the lucid interval.

When the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which the law defines as a grave felony, the court shall
order his confinement in one of the asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be
permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.

Section 1048 of the Administrative Code, which, it is argued, has superseded or supplemented article 8 of the
Penal Code, provides as to the discharge of a patient from custody from a hospital for the insane the following:

When in the opinion of the Director of Health any patient in any Government hospital or other place for
the insane is temporarily or permanently cured, or may be released without danger, he may discharge
 such patient, and shall notify the Judge of the Court of First Instance who ordered the commitment, in
case the patient is confined by order of the court.

An examination of article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code discloses that the permission of the court who orders
the confinement of one accused of a grave felony in an insane asylum is a prerequisite for obtaining release from
the institution. The respondent judge has based his action in this case on this provision of the law. On the other
hand, section 1048 of the Administrative Code grants to the Director of Health authority to say when a patient may
be discharged from an insane asylum. There is no pretense that the Director of Health has exercised his authority
in this case, or that the head of the Philippine Health Service has been asked to express his opinion.

Contrasting the two provisions of Philippine law which have been mentioned, it is self-evident that for section
1048 of the Administrative Code to prevail exclusively it would be necessary to find an implied repeal of a portion
of article 8 of the Penal Code. But it is a well-known rule of statutory construction that when there is no express
repeal none is presumed to be intended. The most reasonable supposition is that when the Legislature placed the
provision, from which section 1048 of the Administrative Code was derived, on the statute books, it did so without
any consideration as to the effect of the new law on article 8 of the Penal Code. It is likewise a canon of statutory
construction that when two portions of the law can be construed so that both can stand together, this should be
done. In this respect, we believe that the authority of the courts can be sustained in cases where the courts take
action, while the authority of the Director of Health can be sustained in other cases not falling within the
jurisdiction of the courts. This latter construction is reinforced by that portion of section 1048 of the Administrative
Code which requires the Director of Health to notify the Judge of First Instance who ordered the commitment, in
case the patients is confined by order of the court.

In 1916, the Director of Health raised this same question. He then took the view that section 7 of Act No. 2122,
now incorporated in the Administrative Code as section 1048, applied to all cases of confinement of persons
adjudged to be insane in any Government hospital or other places for the insane, and that the entire discretion as
to the sanity of any patient whatever was vested by this section exclusively in the Director of Health. The Attorney-
General, who at that time was Honorable Ramon Avanceña, ruled against the Director of Health, saying that "the
Legislature could not have intended to vest in the Director of Health the power to release, without proper judicial
authority, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum pursuant to the provisions of article 8 of the
Penal Code."

In at least two cases, United States vs. Guendia ([1917], 37 Phil., 337), and People vs. Bascos ([1922], 44 Phil., 204),
this court has relied on article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code. The judgments in the cited cases concluded with
this order: "The defendant shall be kept in confinement in the San Lazaro Hospital, or such other hospital for the
insane as the Director of Health may direct, and shall not be permitted to depart therefrom without the prior
approval of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo (Pangasinan)."

Due to differences in statutory provisions, the American authorities on the question are not very helpful. However,
one case has been found where the facts were practically identical with the ones before us, where the law is much
the same as Philippine Law, and where the procedure which should be followed was outlined by the Supreme
Court of the State of Washington. We refer to the case of State vs. Snell ([1908], 49 Wash., 177). In the decision in
the cited case, the court, speaking through Justice Rudkin, said:

On the 7th day of July, 1906, the relator, Chester Thompson, killed George Meade Emory in the City of
Seattle, and by reason thereof was informed against in the superior court of King county for the crime of
murder. A plea of not guilty was interposed, and the place of trial was changed to the superior court of
Pierce county. The relator was tried in the latter court before the respondent as presiding judge, and the
jury be returned a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. On the 3rd day of May, 1907, the respondent
entered an order reciting that the relator was then insane; that he had been acquitted of the crime of
murder by reason of insanity; that his discharge or going at large would be manifestly dangerous to the
peace and safety of the community; and committed him to the county jail of Pierce county. It was further
 ordered that, on the 12th day of June, 1907, the relator should be taken from the county jail of Pierce
county and transferred to the state penitentiary at Walla Walla, to be there confined in the ward set apart
for the confinement, custody, and keeping of the criminal insane until the further order of the court and
until discharge therefrom by due process of law. The relator was committed to the county jail and
thereafter transferred to the insane ward of the penitentiary in obedience to this order, and is now
confined in the latter institution. On the 19th day of February, 1908, he applied to the physician in charge
of the criminal insane at the state penitentiary for an examination of his mental condition and fitness to
be at large, as provided in section 6 of the act of February 21, 1907, entitled, "An act relating to the
criminal insane, their trial, commitment, and custody." Laws of 1907, page 33. After such examination, the
physician certified to the warden of the penitentiary that he had reasonable cause to believe that the
relator had become sane since his commitment, and was a safe person to be at large. The warden
thereupon granted the relator permission to present a petition to the court that committed him, setting
up the facts leading to his commitment, and that he had become sane and mentally responsible, and in
such condition that he is a safe person to be at large, and praying for his discharge from custody. A
petition in due form was thereupon presented to the respondent judge, after service thereof upon the
prosecuting attorney of Pierce county, but the respondent refused to set the matter down for hearing or
to entertain jurisdiction of the proceeding,. . . . Application was there-upon made to this court for a writ
of mandamus, requiring the respondent to set the petition down for hearing, and the case is now before
us on the return to the alternative writ.

xxx xxx xxx

We are of opinion, therefore, that the procedure adopted by the relator is in conformity with the law, and
the writ will issues as prayed.

The foregoing is our understanding of the law on the subject. The following represents our deductions and
conclusions. Article 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by section 1048 of the Administrative
Code. Article 8 of the Penal Code and section 1048 of the Administrative Code can be construed so that both can
stand together. Considering article 8 of the Penal Code as in force and construing this article and section 1048 of
the Administrative Code, we think that the Attorney-General was right in expressing the opinion that the Director
of Health was without power to release, without proper judicial authority, any person confined by order of the
court in an asylum pursuant to the provisions of article 8 of the Penal Code. We think also that the converse
proposition is equally tenable, and is that any person confined by order of the court in an asylum in accordance
with article 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody in an insane asylum until the views of the
Director of Health have been ascertained as to whether or not the person is temporarily or permanently cured or
may be released without danger. In other words, the powers of the courts and the Director of Health are
complementary each with the other. As a practical observation, it may further be said that it is well to adopt all
reasonable precautions to ascertain if a person confined in an asylum as insane should be permitted to leave the
asylum, and this can best be accomplished through the joint efforts of the courts and the Director of Health in
proper cases.

Various defenses were interposed by the respondents to the petition, but we have not been impressed with any of
them except the ones which go to the merits. After thorough discussion, our view is that while the respondent
Judge acted patiently and cautiously in the matters which came before him, yet he exceeded his authority when he
issued his orders of December 26, 1929, and March 17, 1930, without first having before him the opinion of the
Director of Health.

The writ prayed for will issue and the temporary restraining order will be made permanent, without costs.
RULE 102
FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 118644. July 7, 1995.]

DIRECTOR EPIMACO A. VELASCO, as Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), NATIONAL BUREAU
OPERATIONS GROUP (SOG), SPECIAL INVESTIGATORS III FLOR L. RESURRECCION and ANTONIO M. ERUM, JR.,
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, FELICIANO S. CUYAG, for and in behalf
of LAWRENCE A. LARKINS, Respondents.

The Solicitor General, for Petitioners.

Sanchez, Rosales, Sanidad, Mercado & Abaya Law Firm for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS; WHO MAY FILE. — The private
respondent has the personality to institute on behalf of her common-law spouse, Lawrence Larkins, the habeas
corpus aspect of the petition, as she falls within the purview of the term "some person" under Section 3, Rule 102
of the Rules of Court, which means any person who has a legally justified interest in the freedom of the person
whose liberty is restrained or who shows some authorization to make the application.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERALLY WILL NOT BE GRANTED WHEN THERE IS AN ADEQUATE REMEDY BY WRIT OF ERROR OR
APPEAL OR BY WRIT OF CERTIORARI; EXCEPTION. — Only Larkins could institute a petition for certiorari to set aside
the order denying his motions for bail and for the dismissal of the complaint against him. It does not, however,
follow that if certiorari is available to Larkins, an application for a writ of habeas corpus will absolutely be barred.
While ordinarily, the writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when there is an adequate remedy by writ of error
or appeal or by writ of certiorari it may, nevertheless, be available in exceptional cases, for the writ should not be
considered subservient to procedure limitations which glorify form over substance. It must be kept in mind that
although the question most often considered in both habeas corpus and certiorari proceedings is whether an
inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, the former involves a collateral attack on the judgment and reaches the
body but not the record," while the latter assails directly the judgment and "reaches the record but not the
body."cralaw virtua1aw library

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MAY NOT BE GRANTED EVEN IF THE DETENTION IS AT ITS INCEPTION ILLEGAL IF BY REASON OF
SOME SUPERVENING EVENT SUCH DETENTION IS NO LONGER ILLEGAL AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE
APPLICATION. — The Court of Appeals granted the writ of habeas corpus because it found that the warrantless
arrest of Larkins for the crime of rape "did not meet the legal requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court." It could have in mind Section 5 thereof on lawful warrantless arrest. Even if the arrest of a person is illegal,
supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his
detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is
at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4
of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Among such supervening events is the
issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person. Another is the filing of a complaint
or information for the offense for which the accused is detained, as in the instant case. By then, the restraint of
liberty is already by virtue of the complaint or information and, therefore, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer
available. Section 4 of Rule 102 reads in part as follows: "Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with . . . an offense in the Philippines."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MAY NOT BE GRANTED IN CASE COURT ACQUIRES JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE
DEFENDANT BY FILING OF MOTION FOR BAIL. — It may also be said that by filing his motion for bail, Larkins
admitted that he was under the custody of the court and voluntarily submitted his person to its jurisdiction. In De
Asis v. Romero, this Court stated: De Asis could have, right after his arrest, objected to the regularity of the
issuance of the warrant of arrest in question. Instead he not only filed a petition for bail with the lower court,
thereby accepting the court’s jurisdiction over his person, but he also pleaded, on arraignment, to the information
filed against him. (Italics supplied) The filing of a petition or motion for bail in cases where no bail is recommended
has the same legal import and effect as the posting of bail in cases where bail is recommended. It is settled that
the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the
court. In the case of Carrington v. Peterson, this Court declared: When a defendant in a criminal case is brought
before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his
body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court’ s jurisdiction over his person at the
very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits,
he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown v. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn. 534)

5. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WARRANTLESS ARREST; ARRESTING OFFICERS MUST COMPLY WITH ALL
PROCEDURES TO SAFEGUARD THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED. — Even as we
thus decide in favor of the petitioners, we are, nevertheless, disturbed by certain incidents relative to the
warrantless arrest of Larkins. Firstly, assuming that it was lawful, the facts before us disclose that the arresting
officers failed to strictly comply with (1) the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court requiring
that the person lawfully arrested without a warrant shall forthwith be delivered to the nearest police station or jail
and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112; and (2) Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, providing that he be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within thirty-six hours, the
crime with which Larkins was charged being punishable by an afflictive penalty. Although the arrest was made in
Makati where there is a police station and a municipal (now city) jail, Larkins was brought to the NBI Detention Cell
at Taft Avenue, Manila, and though the complaint of the offended party was executed on 23 November 1994, it
was not until 2 December 1994 that the said complaint was actually filed in court. Unless satisfactorily explained,
the non-compliance by the arresting officers with the said provisions merits nothing but disapproval from the
Court. In the performance of their duty and in their commendable pursuit to stamp out crimes and bring criminals
to the bar of justice, law enforcement authorities should make no shortcuts, but must comply with all procedures
to safeguard the constitutional and statutory rights of accused persons. The rule of law must always be upheld.

6. ID.; ID.; BAIL; ORDER TO GRANT OR REFUSE THE MOTION MUST CONTAIN A SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE FOR
THE PROSECUTION FOLLOWED BY ITS CONCLUSION WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG. — We
note that the trial court did not conduct a hearing of the urgent motion for bail, as required under Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court. The grant or denial of bail must be based upon the court’s determination as to whether
or not the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion may only be exercised after evidence is submitted at the
hearing conducted for that purpose. The court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong; otherwise,
the order would be defective and voidable. In fact, even if the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition
to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain the
strength of the State’s evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail. It was thus incumbent upon the trial
court to receive the evidence for the prosecution on the urgent motion for bail. For this procedural shortcoming,
Larkins should also be partly blamed. He did not press for a hearing after the scheduled hearing on 5 December
1994 was cancelled because, as he claimed, the presiding Judge was out of the country.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is lost in antiquity, 1 was devised and exists as a speedy
and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. 2 More specially, its vital purposes are to obtain immediate relief from illegal confinement, to
liberate those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause, and to deliver them from unlawful custody. It is
then essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which a person is detained. 3

Under our Constitution, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus cannot be suspended except in cases of invasion
or rebellion when the public safety requires it. 4 Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, it extends,
except as otherwise provided by law, to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
It is not available, however, under the instances enumerated in Section 4 of the Rule which reads:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment,
or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines. or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

In this petition for review, the petitioners want us to set aside and reverse the decision of 1 February 1995 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36273, 5 a petition for habeas corpus and certiorari with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, ordering the herein petitioners to immediately release Lawrence A. Larkins from their
custody and declaring moot the alternative relief of certiorari.

The antecedent facts of the case as culled from the challenged decision and the pleadings of the parties are neither
complicated nor disputed.

On 16 September 1993, a warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Manuel Padolina of Branch 162 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro Manila, against accused Lawrence Larkins in Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-92 for
violations of B.P. Blg. 22.

On 20 November 1994, a certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) a complaint-affidavit accusing Larkins of the crime of rape allegedly committed against her on 19 November
1994 at 2:00 a.m. in Victoria Valley Subdivision, Valley Golf, Antipolo, Rizal. 6

Acting on the basis of the complaint of Alinea, petitioners Special Investigators Flor. L. Resurreccion and Antonio
M. Erum, Jr. proceeded to the office of Larkins in Makati, Metro Manila, on 21 November 1994 and arrested the
latter, who was thereupon positively identified by Alinea as her rapist. 7 Larkins was then detained at the
Detention Cell of the NBI, Taft Avenue, Manila.

On 22 November 1994, Larkins posted his bail of P4,000.00 in Criminal Case Nos. 101189-92. Judge Padolina
forthwith issued an order recalling and setting aside the warrant of arrest issued on 16 September 1993 and
directing the Jail Warden of the NBI Detention Cell to release Larkins from confinement "unless otherwise detained
for some other cause."cralaw virtua1aw library

Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum refused to release Larkins because he was still detained for another
cause, specifically for the crime of rape for which he could be held for inquest.

On 23 November 1994, a complaint against Larkins for rape was executed by Alinea. 8 It contains a certification by
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ma. Paz Reyes Yson that it is "filed pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, the accused not having opted to avail if his right to preliminary
investigation and not having executed a waiver pursuant to Article 125 of the RPC . . . ." The complaint was filed
with the RTC of Antipolo on 2 December 1994, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 94-11794, and assigned to
Branch 71 of the court, presided by Judge Felix S. Caballes.

On 2 December 1994, Larkins, through his counsel Mauricio C. Ulep, filed an Urgent Motion for Bail 9 wherein he
alleged, inter alia, that the evidence of guilt against him for rape is not strong, as he had no carnal knowledge of
the complainant and the medical report indicates that her hymen was neither lacerated nor ruptured; that he is
entitled as a matter of right to bail; and that he has no intention of going out of the country or hiding away from
the law.

On 6 December 1994, Larkins, through his new counsel, Atty. Theodore O. Te, filed in Criminal Case No. 94-11794
an Urgent Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release, 10 principally based on
the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest. This motion met vigorous opposition from the private complainant.
11

In the order of 5 January 1995, 12 the trial court denied the aforesaid motions, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

After a careful appreciation of the arguments of the prosecution and the defense, the Court finds no legal or valid
grounds to dismiss the complaint or release the accused, or to grant him bail. The filing of this case against the
accused, which is [a] very serious offense, justifies the grant of the motion of the prosecution for the issuance of a
hold departure order.

WHEREFORE, the motions of the accused are hereby denied for lack of merit, and as prayed for by the prosecution
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed to include the name of the accused, Lawrence A.
Larkins, in its hold order departure list until further order from this Court.

Unable to accept the ruling, Larkin’s common-law wife, Felicitas S. Cuyag, filed before the Court of Appeals a
petition for habeas corpus with certiorari. Impleaded as respondents were the herein petitioners and Judge Felix S.
Caballes.

Subsequently, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution 13 ordering the respondents therein to appear and produce
Lawrence A. Larkins before the court on 31 January 1995 at 10:30 a.m. and to show cause why Larkins’ liberty is
being restrained.

On the said date, Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum appeared and produced Larkins at the hearing. Atty.
Orlando Dizon of the NBI acted as their counsel. 14 The Office of the Solicitor General representing the People of
the Philippines made no appearance. 15 Neither did Judge Caballes, for he had not received a copy of the
resolution. On the other hand, the petitioner therein, Felicitas S. Cuyag, appeared with her counsel, who
manifested that should the court order the release of Larkins the alternative prayer for certiorari would be
deemed abandoned. 16

After hearing the arguments of the parties, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged decision, holding
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

From the arguments presented by the parties, we resolve to order the immediate release of Larkins from his
present confinement on the ground that the complaint presented to the NBI by complainant Desiree Alinea on the
basis of which Larkins was detained without a warrant of arrest for rape did not meet the legal requirements
provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

Furthermore, on the day the detention of Larkins commenced, i.e., immediately after the NBI was served with the
Order of the Pasig RTC for his release on bail in connection with the BP 22 cases, no other criminal complaint or
information had been filed or pending in any court. It was only sometime between November 25, 1994 (when filing
of the complaint was approved by the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor) and November 29, 1994 (the date appearing on
the Urgent Motion for Bail filed by Larkin’s former counsel, said Atty. Ulep) that the complaint for rape was filed
with the Antipolo RTC.
The petitioners insist that the respondent court erred in granting the petition for habeas corpus because Larkins
had already been charged with the crime of rape and the trial court had denied his application for bail. They
further claim that the warrantless arrest in this case is valid for it was made under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court.

On the other hand, the private respondent contends that habeas corpus is rendered unavailing not by the mere
filing of an information, but by the issuance of a warrant of arrest or warrant of commitment, which are the only
two processes recognized by law to justify deprivation of liberty, and the order of Judge Caballes of 5 January 1995
denying the petition for bail does not qualify as such. She asserts that the petitioners have miscomprehended
Paredes v. Sandiganbayan 17 because that case did not rule that the writ is no longer available after an
information (or criminal complaint for rape as in this case) is filed against the person detained; what it stated is
that the writ of habeas corpus will not issue when the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so.’She submits that the
controlling doctrine is that enunciated in Ilagan v. Ponce Enrile, 18 adverted to in Sanchez v. Demetriou, 19 that"
[t]he filing of charges, and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained
will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect."cralaw
virtua1aw library

We find for the petitioners.

But, before we take up the substantive merits of this petition, we shall first delve into propriety of the petition
for habeas corpus and certiorari filed by private respondent Cuyag with the Court of Appeals.

Concededly, the private respondent has the personality to institute on behalf of her common- law spouse,
Lawrence Larkins, the habeas corpus aspect of the petition, as she falls within the purview of the term "some
person" under Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, which means any person who has a legally justified
interest in the freedom of the person whose liberty is restrained or who shows some authorization to make the
application. 20 She is not, however, the real party in interest in the certiorariaspect of the petition. Only Larkins
could institute a petition for certiorari to set aside the order denying his motions for bail and for the dismissal of
the complaint against him.

It does not, however, follow that if certiorari is available to Larkins, an application for a writ of habeas corpus will
absolutely be barred. While ordinarily, the writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when there is an adequate
remedy by writ of error or appeal or by writ of certiorari, it may, nevertheless, be available in exceptional cases, for
the writ should not be considered subservient to procedural limitations which glorify form over substance. 21 It
must be kept in mind that although the question most often considered in both habeas
corpus and certiorari proceedings is whether an inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, the former involves a
collateral attack on the judgment and "reaches the body but not the record," while the latter assails directly the
judgment and "reaches the record but not the body." 22

And now on the merits of the petition.

The Court of Appeals granted the writ of habeas corpus because it found that the warrantless arrest of Larkins for
the crime of rape "did not meet the legal requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of Court." It could
have in mind Section 5 thereof on lawful warrantless arrest.

Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may be bar his release or discharge from custody. What
is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ
of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events,
such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the
application. Among such supervening events in the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the
detained person. Thus, in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila, 23 this Court held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[W]e hold that petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless
they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of justice. (Emphasis supplied)

Another is the filing of a complaint of information for the offense for which the accused is detained, as in the
instant case. By then, the restraint of liberty is already by virtue of the complaint or information and, therefore,
the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available Section 4 of Rule 102 reads in part as follows: "Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with . . . an offense in the Philippines."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Thus, in Matsura v. Director of Prisons, 24 where petitioners Macario Herce and Celso Almadovar claimed to have
been illegally detained for more than one year without any complaint or information filed against them, this Court
denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, for at the time they filed the petition they had already been
charged with the crime of treason and confined by reason thereof. Harvey v. Defensor Santiago 25 reiterates
Matsura.

In Cruz v. Montoya, 26 this Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for having become academic because
the information for estafa against the party whose liberty was allegedly illegally restrained had already been filed
and a warrant for his arrest had been issued, and whatever illegality might have originally infected his detention
had been cured.

In Umil v. Ramos 27 this Court, applying the last sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102, held that the writ of habeas
corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court.
Thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, Criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts
against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court of judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or
make the order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.
Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sec. 4. . . . Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted
of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering from imprisonment under lawful judgment. 28 (Emphasis
supplied)

It may also be said that by filing his motion for bail, Larkins admitted that he was under the custody of the court
and voluntarily submitted his person to its jurisdiction. In De Asis v. Romero, 29 this Court stated:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

De Asis could have, right after his arrest, objected to the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest in
question. Instead he not only filed a petition for bail with the lower court, thereby accepting the court’s
jurisdiction over his person, but he also pleaded, on arraignment, to the information filed against him. (Emphasis
supplied)

The filing of a petition or motion for bail in cases where no bail is recommended has the same legal import and
effect as the posting of bail in cases where bail is recommended. It is settled that the giving or posting of bail by
the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. In the case of Carrington v.
Peterson, 30 this Court declared:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or
otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question
of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint
or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex
rel. John Brown v. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)

In United States v. Grant, 31 this Court held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Conceding again that the warrant issued in this case was avoid for the reason that no probable cause was found by
the court before issuing it, the defendant waived all his rights to object to the same by appearing and giving bond.

While it may be true that on 6 December 1994, or four days after the filing of the Urgent Motion for Bail, Larkins,
thru a new counsel, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release
based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest, the said motion was a mere afterthought which came too
later in the day. By then, the trial court had firmly acquired jurisdiction over his person.

Moreover, the trial court’s order of 5 January 1995 denying the urgent motion for bail was an unequivocal
assertion of its authority to keep in custody the person of Larkins. This order comes under the purview of the word
order under the first sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102 reading: "If it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer . . . by virtue of [an] order of a court of record and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to . . . make the order, the writ shall not be allowed. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

The foregoing renders untenable the private respondent’s claim that it is the rule in Ilagan v. Enrile 32 which must
govern, that the writ may not be allowed only where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by the court or judge, and that there are only two recognized processes
which justify deprivation of liberty, viz., (1) commitment order and (2) warrant of arrest. The contention is not only
a deliberate misreading of Section 4 of Rule 102 limiting its application to the first part of the first sentence and
disregarding the rest, but is also an undue and unwarranted restriction of the term process. A commitment order
and a warrant of arrest are but species of judicial process.

In Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, 33 this court stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Invariably a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of
law; also, the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings, or all writs warrants, summonses and
orders of courts of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise held to include a writ, summons or order issued in a
judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or enforce the
judgment, or a writ, warrant, mandate or other process issuing from a court of justice.

In Macondray & Co., v. Bernabe, 34 this court quoted Corpus Juris’ definition of the term "process," to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

As a legal term, process is a generic word of very comprehensive signification and many meanings. In its broadest
sense, it is equivalent to, or synonymous with ‘proceedings’ or procedure and embraces all the steps and
proceedings in a cause from its commencement to its conclusion. Sometimes term is also broadly defined as the
means whereby a court compels a compliance with its demands. (50 C.J. 441)

We thus rule that the order of 5 January 1995 of the trial court also qualifies as a process within the meaning of
Section 4 of Rule 102.

Hence, even granting that Larkins was illegally arrested, still the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will not
prosper because his detention has become legal by virtue of the filing before the trial court of the complaint
against him and by the issuance of the 5 January 1995 order.

Even as we thus decide in favor of the petitioners, we are, nevertheless, disturbed by certain incidents relative to
the warrantless arrest of Larkins. Firstly, assuming that it was lawful, the facts before us disclose that the arresting
officers failed to strictly comply with (1) the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court requiring
that the person lawfully arrested without a warrant shall forthwith be delivered to the nearest police station or jail
and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112; and (2) Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, providing that he be delivered to the proper judicial authorities within thirty-six hours, the
crime with which Larkins was charged being punishable by an affective penalty. Although the arrest was made in
Makati where there is a police station and a municipal (now city) jail, Larkins was brought to the NBI Detention Cell
at Taft Avenue, Manila, and though the complaint of the offended party was executed on 23 November 1994, it
was not until 2 December 1994 that the said complaint was actually filed in court.

Unless satisfactorily explained, the non-compliance by the arresting officers with the said provisions merits by the
arresting officers with the said provisions merits nothing but disapproval from the Court. In the performance of
their duty and in their commendable pursuit to stamp out crimes and bring criminals to the bar of justice, law
enforcement authorities should make no shortcuts, but must comply with all procedures to safeguard the
constitutional and statutory rights of accused persons. The rule of law must always be upheld. What this Court said
in Beltran v. Garcia 35 needs to be repeated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

It certainly does not speak well of officialdom, whether civilian or military, if a person deprived of his liberty had to
go to court before his rights are respected. The good name of the administration is jeopardized, without any fault
on its part, by such inefficiency or inattention to duty. Every precaution should taken against its repetition.
Otherwise, the parties responsible for this state of affairs would justly lay themselves open to the accusation that
the greatest danger to constitutional rights comes from public officials, men of zeal, concededly well-meaning, but
without sufficient understanding of the implication of the rule of law.

We also note that the trial court did not conduct a hearing of the urgent motion for bail, as required under Section
5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. The grant or denial of bail must be based upon the court’s determination as to
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion may only be exercised after evidence is submitted at
the hearing conducted for that purpose. 36 The court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of
the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong;
otherwise, the order would be defective and voidable. 37 In fact, even if the prosecutor refuses to adduce
evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as
would ascertain the strength of the State’s evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail. 38 It was thus
incumbent upon the trial court to receive the evidence for the prosecution on the urgent motion for bail. For this
procedural shortcoming, Larkins should also be partly blamed. He did not press for a hearing after the scheduled
hearing on 5 December 1994 was cancelled because, as he claimed, the presiding Judge was out of the country. 39

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals of 1 February 1995 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 36273 is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Alinpoos vs. Court of Appeals – 106 SCRA 159
G.R. No. L-63345 January 30, 1986

EFREN C. MONCUPA, petitioner,

vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, FABIAN C. VER, GALILEO KINTANAR, FERNANDO GOROSPE, AND JOSE
CASTRO, respondents.

Lorenzo M. Tanada, Jose W. Diokno and Joker Arroyo for petitioner,

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

As early as 1919, in the leading case of Villavicencio v. Lukban (39 Phil. 778, 790), this Court ruled:

A prime specification of al application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. ...

This latitudinarian scope of the writ of habeas-corpus has, in law, remained undiminished up to the present. The
respondents' contention that the petition has become moot and academic must necessarily be denied. Efren C.
Moncupa may have been released from his detention cell. The restraints attached to his temporary release,
however, preclude freedom of action and under the Villavicencio v. Lukban rule warrant this Court's inquiry into
the nature of his involuntary restraint and our relieving him of such restraints as may be illegal.

Petitioner Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on April 22, 1982 at about 10:50 P.M., at the
corner of D. Street and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Moncupa D. Tuazon was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago
Bantay, Quezon City where he was detained. On April 23, 1982, on the allegation that he was a National
Democratic Front (NDF) staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against him and eight
(8) other persons.

After two separate investigations, conducted first, by Lieutenant Colonel Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Chief of Task Force
Makabansa Investigation Group and second, by Investigating Fiscal Amado Costales of Quezon City, it was
ascertained that the petitioner was not a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators
recommended the prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of
subversive documents under Presidential Decree No. 33.

Consequently, two separate informations were filed against the petitioner, one, for illegal possession of firearms
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other for violation of P.D. 33 before the City Court of Quezon
City. Against the other accused, however, the cases filed were for violation of P.D. 885 as amended. Significantly,
the petitioner was excluded from the charge under the Revised Anti-Subversion Law. During the pendency of this
petition, it is significant that his arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued. And yet, the
petitioner's motions for bail were denied by the lower court.

Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition.

The respondents, in their return of the writ justified the validity of petitioner's detention on the ground that the
privilege of the writ had been suspended as to the petitioner. However, on August 30, 1983, the respondents filed
a motion to dismiss stating that on May 11, 1983, the petitioner was temporarily released from detention on
orders of the Minister temporary of National Defense with the approval of the President. The respondents stated.
"Since the petitioner is free and no longer under the custody of the respondents, the present petition for habeas
corpus may be deemed moot and academic as in similar cases.

The issue to be resolved is whether or not the instant petition has become moot and academic in view of the
petitioner's temporary release.

It is to be noted that attached to the petitioner's temporary release are restrictions imposed on him. These are:

1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets the approval of respondents for any
travel outside Metro Manila.

2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is also required in case petitioner wants
to change his place of residence.

3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not "participate in any interview conducted
by any local or foreign mass media representatives nor give any press release or information that is inimical to the
interest of national security."

4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their representatives.

The petitioner argues that although admittedly his temporary release is an improvement upon his actual
detention, the restrictions imposed by the respondents constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his
freedom.

The petitioner stresses that his temporary release did not render the instant petitioner moot and academic but
that "it merely shifted the inquiry from the legality of his actual detention to the legality of the conditions imposed
by the respondents."

We agree with the petitioner.

The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner
constitute restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the
petitioner. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.

In Villavicencio v. Lukban, the women who had been illegally seized and transported against their will to Davao
were no longer under any official restraint. Unlike petitioner Moncupa, they were free to change their domicile
without asking for official permission. Indeed, some of them managed to return to Manila. Yet, the Court
condemned the involuntary restraints caused by the official action, fined the Mayor of Manila and expressed the
hope that its "decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and to protect
individual liberty from Megal encroachment."

In the light of the above ruling, the present petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and academic. Other
precedents for such a conclusion are not wanting.

The decision in Caunca v. Salazar (82 Phil. 851) states:

An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or

maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical
force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the
deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to
 another, from to choose one's residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral
compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of the will. If the
actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is
entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illigally deprived of
liberty by deprived or physical coercion.

In Tibo v. The Provincial Commander (85 SCRA 564), this Court ruled:

Although the release in the custody of the Deputy Minister did not signify that petitioners could
once again enjoy their full freedom, the application could have been dismissed, as it could be
withdrawn by the parties themselves. That is a purely voluntary act. When the hearing was held
on September 7, 1978, it turned out that counsel for petitioner Bonifacio V. Tupaz could have
academic in a hasty manner when he set forth the above allegations in his manifestation of
August 30, 1978, for Attorney Jose C. Espinas, who appeared for petitioners, while conceding
that there was such a release from confinement, also alleged that it was conditioned on their
restricting their activities as labor union leaders to the premises of the Trade Unions of the
Philippines and ABSOLUTE Services, presumably in Macaraig as well as the Ministry of labor. As
the voting was to take place in the business firm in Bataan, the acts set would nullify whatever
efforts they could have exerted. To that extent, and with the prohibition against their going to
Bataan, the restraint on liberty was undeniable. If so, the moot and academic character of the
petition was far from clear.

More recently, we had occasion to rule squarely on whether or not a temporary release from detention renders
the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. As in this case of Moncupa, the petitioners in Toyoto, et
al v. Hon. Fidel Ramos, et al, G.R. No. 69270, October 15, 1985, were temporarily released from detention. The
respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus on the ground that the petitioners had been
temporarily released and their case had, therefore, become moot and academic. The petitioners insisted,
however, that their case may be considered moot and academic only "if their release would be permanent." In
ruling for the petitioners, we said:

Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on the
liberty of the petitioners is lifted either temporarily or permanently. We have so held in a
number of cases. But the instant case presents a different situation. The question to be resolved
is whether the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after a court of
competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An affirmative answer is the one
suggested by the respondents because the release of the petitioners being merely 'temporary' it
follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their acquittal by a court of competent
jurisdiction. We hold that such a reservation is repugnant to the government of laws and not of
men principle. Under this principle the moment a person is acquitted on a criminal charge he can
no longer be detained or re-arrested for the same offense. This concept is so basic and
elementary that it needs no elaboration.

In effect the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic
must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or
more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not
merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the
light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still
avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.

The respondents have failed to show why the writ may not issue and why the restraints on the petitioner's
freedom of movement should not be lifted.
WHEREFORE, the PETITION is GRANTED. The conditions attached to the temporary release of the petitioner are
declared null and void. The temporary release of the petitioner is declared ABSOLUTE. No costs,

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO, JR., RAMON MITRA, JR.,
FRANCISCO RODRIGO, AND NAPOLEON RAMA, petitioners,
vs.
HON JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35538 September 17, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOAQUIN P. ROCES, TEODORO M. LOCSIN, SR.,
ROLANDO FADUL, ROSALINA GALANG, GO ENG GUAN, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, RENATO CONSTANTINO, AND LUIS
R. MAURICIO, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; THE CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, et al., respondents.

G.R. No. L-35539 September 17, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF JOSE W. DIOKNO, CARMEN I. DIOKNO, *1 petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; ROMEO ESPINO, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES. respondents.

G.R. No. L-35540 September 17, 1974

MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, NAPOLEON G. RAMA, AND JOSE MARI VELEZ, petitioners,

vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; HON. FRANCISCO TATAD, PRESS SECRETARY;
AND GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35547 September 17, 1974 *2

ENRIQUE VOLTAIRE GARCIA II, petitioner,

vs.
BRIG. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY; GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35556 September 17, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VERONICA L. YUYITUNG AND TAN CHIN
HIAN, petitioners,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED
FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35567 September 17, 1974

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF AMANDO DORONILA JUAN L. MERCADO, HERNANDO
L. ABAYA, ERNESTO GRANADA, LUIS D. BELTRAN, TAN CHIN HIAN, BREN GUIAO, RUBEN CUSIPAG, ROBERTO
ORDOÑEZ, MANUEL ALMARIO AND WILLIE BAUN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LIEUT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35571 September 17, 1974. *3

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF BREN Z. GUIAO, TERESITA M. GUIAO, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; LT. GEN. ROMEO ESPINO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES: AND BRIG. GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-35573 September 17, 1974

ERNESTO RONDON, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY; AND MAJOR RODULFO MIANA, respondents.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p

These cases are all petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioners having been arrested and detained by the military
by virtue of the President's Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972.

At the outset a word of clarification is in order. This is not the decision of the Court in the sense that a decision
represents a consensus of the required majority of its members not only on the judgment itself but also on the
rationalization of the issues and the conclusions arrived at. On the final result the vote is practically unanimous;
this is a statement of my individual opinion as well as a summary of the voting on the major issues. Why no
particular Justice has been designated to write just one opinion for the entire Court will presently be explained.

At one point during our deliberations on these cases it was suggested that as Chief Justice I should write that
opinion. The impracticability of the suggestion shortly became apparent for a number of reasons, only two of
which need be mentioned. First, the discussions, as they began to touch on particular issues, revealed a lack of
agreement among the Justices as to whether some of those issues should be taken up although it was not
necessary to do so, they being merely convenient for the purpose of ventilating vexing questions of public interest,
or whether the decision should be limited to those issues which are really material and decisive in these cases.
Similarly, there was no agreement as to the manner the issues should be treated and developed. The same
destination would be reached, so to speak, but through different routes and by means of different vehicles of
approach. The writing of separate opinions by individual Justices was thus unavoidable, and understandably so for
still another reason, namely, that although little overt reference to it was made at the time, the future verdict of
history was very much a factor in the thinking of the members, no other case of such transcendental significance to
the life of the nation having before confronted this Court. Second — and this to me was the insuperable obstacle
— I was and am of the opinion, which was shared by six other Justices 1 at the time the question was voted upon,
that petitioner Jose W. Diokno's motion of December 28, 1973 to withdraw his petition (G.R. No. L-35539) should
be granted, and therefore I was in no position to set down the ruling of the Court on each of the arguments raised
by him, except indirectly, insofar as they had been raised likewise in the other cases.
It should be explained at this point that when the Court voted on Diokno's motion to withdraw his petition he was
still under detention without charges, and continued to remain so up to the time the separate opinions of the
individual Justices were put in final form preparatory to their promulgation on September 12, which was the last
day of Justice Zaldivars tenure in the Court.2 Before they could be promulgated, however, a major development
supervened: petitioner Diokno was released by the President in the morning of September 11, 1974. In view
thereof all the members of this Court except Justice Castro agreed to dismiss Diokno's petition on the ground that
it had become moot, with those who originally voted to grant the motion for withdrawal citing said motion as an
additional ground for such dismissal.

The petitioners in the other cases, except Benigno Aquino, Jr. (G.R. No. L-35546), either have been permitted to
withdraw their petitions or have been released from detention subject to certain restrictions.3 In the case of
Aquino, formal charges of murder, subversion and illegal possession of firearms were lodged against him with a
Military Commission on August 11, 1973; and on the following August 23 he challenged the jurisdiction of said
Commission as well as his continued detention by virtue of those charges in a petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed in this Court (G.R. No.
L-37364). The question came up as to whether or not Aquino's petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed on
the ground that the case as to him should more appropriately be resolved in this new petition. Of the twelve
Justices, however, eight voted against such dismissal and chose to consider the case on the merits. 4

On Diokno's motion to withdraw his petition I voted in favor of granting it for two reasons. In the first place such
withdrawal would not emasculate the decisive and fundamental issues of public interest that demanded to be
resolved, for they were also raised in the other cases which still remained pending. Secondly, since it was this
petitioner's personal liberty that was at stake, I believed he had the right to renounce the application for habeas
corpus he initiated. Even if that right were not absolute I still would respect his choice to remove the case from this
Court's cognizance, regardless of the fact that I disagreed with many of his reasons for so doing. I could not escape
a sense of irony in this Court's turning down the plea to withdraw on the ground, so he alleges among others, that
this is no longer the Court to which he originally applied for relief because its members have taken new oaths of
office under the 1973 Constitution, and then ruling adversely to him on the merits of his petition.

It is true that some of the statements in the motion are an affront to the dignity of this Court and therefore should
not be allowed to pass unanswered. Any answer, however, would not be foreclosed by allowing the withdrawal.
For my part, since most of those statements are of a subjective character, being matters of personal belief and
opinion, I see no point in refuting them in these cases. Indeed my impression is that they were beamed less at this
Court than at the world outside and designed to make political capital of his personal situation, as the publicity
given to them by some segments of the foreign press and by local underground propaganda news sheets
subsequently confirmed. It was in fact from that perspective that I deemed it proper to respond in kind, that is,
from a non-judicial forum, in an address I delivered on February 19, 1974 before the LAWASIA, the Philippine Bar
Association and the Philippine Lawyers' Association. Justice Teehankee, it may be stated, is of the opinion that a
simple majority of seven votes out of twelve is legally sufficient to make the withdrawal of Diokno's petition
effective, on the theory that the requirement of a majority of eight votes applies only to a decision on the merits.

In any event, as it turned out, after petitioner Diokno was released by the President on September 11 all the
members of this Court except Justice Castro were agreed that his petition had become moot and therefore should
no longer be considered on the merits. This notwithstanding, some of the opinions of the individual members,
particularly Justices Castro and Teehankee, should be taken in the time setting in which they were prepared, that
is, before the order for the release of Diokno was issued.

The Cases.

The events which form the background of these nine petitions are related, either briefly or in great detail, in the
separate opinions filed by the individual Justices. The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General
Order No. 2 of the President (September 22, 1972), "for being participants or for having given aid and comfort in
the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force ..."

General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the powers he assumed by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1081 (September 21, 1972) placing the entire country under martial law. The portions of the
proclamation immediately in point read as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the

powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby
place the entire Philippines as defined in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law
and, in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms
of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all
the laws and decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction.

In addition, I do hereby order that all persons presently detained, as well as all others who may
hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes
and offenses committed in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith, for crimes against national security and the law of nations, crimes against
public order, crimes involving usurpation of authority, rank, title and improper use of names,
uniforms and insignia, crimes committed by public officers, and for such other crimes as will be
enumerated in orders that I shall subsequently promulgate, as well as crimes as a consequence
of any violation of any decree, order or regulation promulgated by me personally or promulgated
upon my direction shall be kept under detention until otherwise ordered released by me or by
my duly designated representative.

The provision of the 1935 Constitution referred to in the proclamation reads: "the President shall be commander-
in-chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection,
or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law."

1. The first major issue raised by the parties is whether this Court may inquire into the validity of Proclamation No.
1081. Stated more concretely, is the existence of conditions claimed to justify the exercise of the power to declare
martial law subject to judicial inquiry? Is the question political or justiciable in character?

Justices Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino hold that the question is political and therefore its
determination is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. The reasons are given at length in the separate opinions
they have respectively signed. Justice Fernandez adds that as a member of the Convention that drafted the 1973
Constitution he believes that "the Convention put an imprimatur on the proposition that the validity of a martial
law proclamation and its continuation is political and non-justiciable in character."

Justice Barredo, on the other hand, believes that political questions are not per se beyond the Court's jurisdiction,
the judicial power vested in it by the Constitution being plenary and all-embracing, but that as a matter of policy
implicit in the Constitution itself the Court should abstain from interfering with the Executive's Proclamation,
dealing as it does with national security, for which the responsibility is vested by the charter in him alone. But the
Court should act, Justice Barredo opines, when its abstention from acting would result in manifest and palpable
transgression of the Constitution proven by facts of judicial notice, no reception of evidence being contemplated
for purposes of such judicial action.

It may be noted that the postulate of non-justiciability as discussed in those opinions involves disparate methods
of approach. Justice Esguerra maintains that the findings of the President on the existence of the grounds for the
declaration of martial law are final and conclusive upon the Courts. He disagrees vehemently with the ruling
in Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, December 11, 1971, and advocates a return to Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil. 87
(1905), and Montenegro vs. Castañeda, 91 Phil. 882 (1952). Justice Barredo, for his part, holds that Lansang need
not be overturned, indeed does not control in these cases. He draws a distinction between the power of the
President to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, which was the issue in Lansang, and his power to
proclaim martial law, calling attention to the fact that while the Bill of Rights prohibits suspension of the privilege
except in the instances specified therein, it places no such prohibition or qualification with respect to the
declaration of martial law.

Justice Antonio, with whom Justices Makasiar, Fernandez and Aquino concur, finds that there is no dispute as to
the existence of a state of rebellion in the country, and on that premise emphasizes the factor of necessity for the
exercise by the President of his power under the Constitution to declare martial law, holding that the decision as to
whether or not there is such necessity is wholly confided to him and therefore is not subject to judicial inquiry, his
responsibility being directly to the people.

Arrayed on the side of justiciability are Justices Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Muñoz Palma. They hold that the
constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation may be inquired into by the Court, and would thus apply the
principle laid down in Lansang although that case refers to the power of the President to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. The recognition of justiciability accorded to the question in Lansang, it should be
emphasized, is there expressly distinguished from the power of judicial review in ordinary civil or criminal cases,
and is limited to ascertaining "merely whether he (the President) has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act." The test is not
whether the President's decision is correct but whether, in suspending the writ, he did or did not act arbitrarily.
Applying this test, the finding by the Justices just mentioned is that there was no arbitrariness in the President's
proclamation of martial law pursuant to the 1935 Constitution; and I concur with them in that finding. The factual
bases for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, particularly in regard to the existence of a
state of rebellion in the country, had not disappeared, indeed had been exacerbated, as events shortly before said
proclamation clearly demonstrated. On this Point the Court is practically unanimous; Justice Teehankee merely
refrained from discussing it.

Insofar as my own opinion is concerned the cleavage in the Court on the issue of justiciability is of not much more
than academic interest for purposes of arriving at a judgment. I am not unduly exercised by Americas decisions on
the subject written in another age and political clime, or by theories of foreign authors in political science. The
present state of martial law in the Philippines is peculiarly Filipino and fits into no traditional patterns or judicial
precedents.

In the first place I am convinced (as are the other Justices), without need of receiving evidence as in an ordinary
adversary court proceeding, that a state of rebellion existed in the country when Proclamation No. 1081 was
issued. It was a matter of contemporary history within the cognizance not only of the courts but of all observant
people residing here at the time. Many of the facts and events recited in detail in the different "Whereases" of the
proclamation are of common knowledge. The state of rebellion continues up to the present. The argument that
while armed hostilities go on in several provinces in Mindanao there are none in other regions except in isolated
pockets in Luzon, and that therefore there is no need to maintain martial law all over the country, ignores the
sophisticated nature and ramifications of rebellion in a modern setting. It does not consist simply of armed clashes
between organized and identifiable groups on fields of their own choosing. It includes subversion of the most
subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is no actual fighting. Underground
propaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors disseminated in whispers; recruitment of armed and
ideological adherents, raising of funds, procurement of arms and material, fifth-column activities including
sabotage and intelligence — all these are part of the rebellion which by their nature are usually conducted far from
the battle fronts. They cannot be counteracted effectively unless recognized and dealt with in that context.

Secondly, my view, which coincides with that of other members of the Court as stated in their opinions, is that the
question of validity of Proclamation No. 1081 has been foreclosed by the transitory provision of the 1973
Constitution [Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2)] that "all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated,
issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land and shall remain valid, legal,
binding and effective even after ... the ratification of this Constitution ..." To be sure, there is an attempt in these
cases to resuscitate the issue of the effectivity of the new Constitution. All that, however, is behind us now. The
question has been laid to rest by our decision in Javellana vs. Executive Secretary (L-36142, 50 SCRA 30, March 31,
1973), and of course by the existing political realities both in the conduct of national affairs and in our relations
with other countries.

On the effect of the transitory provision Justice Muñoz Palma withholds her assent to any sweeping statement that
the same in effect validated, in the constitutional sense, all "such proclamations, decrees, instructions, and acts
promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President." All that she concedes is that the transitory provision
merely gives them "the imprimatur of a law but not of a constitutional mandate," and as such therefore "are
subject to judicial review when proper under the Constitution.

Finally, the political-or-justiciable question controversy indeed, any inquiry by this Court in the present cases into
the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law — has become moot and
purposeless as a consequence of the general referendum of July 27-28, 1973. The question propounded to the
voters was: "Under the (1973) Constitution, the President, if he so desires, can continue in office beyond 1973. Do
you want President Marcos to continue beyond 1973 and finish the reforms he initiated under Martial Law?" The
overwhelming majority of those who cast their ballots, including citizens between 15 and 18 years, voted
affirmatively on the proposal. The question was thereby removed from the area of presidential power under the
Constitution and transferred to the seat of sovereignty itself. Whatever may be the nature of the exercise of that
power by the President in the beginning — whether or not purely political and therefore non-justiciable — this
Court is precluded from applying its judicial yardstick to the act of the sovereign.

2. With respect to the petitioners who have been released from detention but have not withdrawn their petitions
because they are still subject to certain restrictions,5 the ruling of the Court is that the petitions should be
dismissed. The power to detain persons even without charges for acts related to the situation which justifies the
proclamation of martial law, such as the existence of a state of rebellion, necessarily implies the power (subject, in
the opinion of the Justices who consider Lansang applicable, to the same test of arbitrariness laid down therein), to
impose upon the released detainees conditions or restrictions which are germane to and necessary to carry out
the purposes of the proclamation. Justice Fernando, however, "is for easing the restrictions on the right to travel of
petitioner Rodrigo" and others similarly situated and so to this extent dissents from the ruling of the majority;
while Justice Teehankee believes that those restrictions do not constitute deprivation of physical liberty within the
meaning of the constitutional provision on the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

It need only be added that, to my mind, implicit in a state of martial law is the suspension of the said privilege with
respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation, which is to
suppress invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or to safeguard public safety against imminent danger thereof. The
preservation of society and national survival take precedence. On this particular point, that is, that the
proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to, the
Court is practically unanimous. Justice Fernando, however, says that to him that is still an open question; and
Justice Muñoz Palma qualifiedly dissents from the majority in her separate opinion, but for the reasons she
discusses therein votes for the dismissal of the petitions.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING AND FOR THE REASONS STATED BY THE MEMBERS OF THE COURT IN THEIR
SEPARATE OPINIONS, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED DISMISSING ALL THE PETITIONS, EXCEPT THOSE WHICH
HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY WITHDRAWN BY THE RESPECTIVE PETITIONERS WITH THE APPROVAL OF THIS COURT, AS
HEREINABOVE MENTIONED. NO COSTS.

Makasiar, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Prefatory Note

(written on September 12, 1974)

My separate opinion below in the nine cases at bar was handed to Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal on Monday,
September 9, 1974, for promulgation (together with the individual opinions of the Chief Justice and the other
Justices) on September 12 (today) as agreed upon by the Court.

On September 11 the petitioner Jose W. Diokno was released from military custody. The implications of this
supervening event were lengthily discussed by the Court in its deliberations in the afternoon. Eleven members
thereafter voted to dismiss Diokno's petition as being "moot and academic;" I cast the lone dissenting vote.
Although perhaps in the strictest technical sense that accords with conventional legal wisdom, the petition has
become "moot" because Diokno has been freed from physical confinement, I am nonetheless persuaded that the
grave issues of law he has posed and the highly insulting and derogatory imputations made by him against the
Court and its members constitute an inescapable residue of questions of transcendental dimension to the entire
nation and its destiny and to the future of the Court — questions that cannot and should not be allowed to remain
unresolved and unanswered.

I have thus not found it needful nor even advisable to recast my separate opinion or change a word of it.

I invite the reader to assess my 38-page separate opinion which immediately follows, in the light of the foregoing
context and factual setting.

FRED RUIZ CASTRO

Associate Justice.

SEPARATE OPINION
(written before Sept. 9, 1974)
L-35539, L-35546, L-35538, L-35540, L-35567, L-35556,
L-35571, L-35573, and L-35547

(I did not include the separate opinions)

G.R. No. L-117376 December 8, 1994

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF OSCAR DE GUZMAN, CHAIRMAN SEDFREY A.
ORDOÑEZ, DIRECTOR EMMANUEL C. NERI AND THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, petitioners,
vs.
DIRECTOR VICENTE VINARAO, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed directly before this Court in behalf of Oscar de Guzman y
Enriquez, who was tried and convicted by the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City — Branch 39 in G.R. No. 76742,
"People of the Philippines v. Oscar de Guzman y Enriquez," 188 SCRA 407, for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, alleging in particular the fact that de Guzman wilfully and unlawfully sold two (2) sticks of marijuana.

Upon review by this Court, the trial court's decision sentencing de Guzman to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment plus payment of P20,000 fine and costs was affirmed in toto and the appeal was dismissed with
costs against accused-appellant.

Under the provisions of Section 20, Republic Act No. 6425 as last amended by R.A. 7659, which became effective
on December 31, 1993, and as interpreted by this Court in the case of People v. Simon,1 if the quantity of the
marijuana involved is less than 250 grams, the imposable penalty, in the event that the conviction should be
affirmed, shall be within the range of prision correccional (from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years).
Clearly, de Guzman is entitled to benefit from the reduction of penalty introduced by the new law.

Petitioners allege that since de Guzman has been serving sentence since July 1984 or for more than ten (10) years
now, his continued detention in the National Penitentiary is a violation of his basic human rights and that,
therefore, he should be released from prison without further delay. In aid of judicial administration, petitioners
further recommend that all prisoners similarly situated be likewise released from prison.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty upon a verified petition setting forth:

1. that the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his
liberty;

2. the officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or restrained;

3. the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; and

4. a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person (Section 3, Rule 102, Revised
Rules of Court).

It appearing that all the above requirements have been met and finding merit in the petition, the same is hereby
GRANTED. Let a writ of habeas corpus issue immediately.

The Director, New Bilibid Prisons, is commanded to forthwith execute the writ for de Guzman's discharge from
confinement unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause, to make due return of the writ, and to
submit a complete inventory of all other prisoners therein similarly situated within thirty days, to relieve them
from further confinement. With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 125901. March 8, 2001]

EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R. TIJING, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and
ANGELITA DIAMANTE, respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 6, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP No. 39056, reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court in a petition for habeas corpus of Edgardo Tijing, Jr., allegedly the child of
petitioners.
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on
April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner
Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry
job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also
left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child
while Bienvenida was doing laundry.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith
proceeded to Angelitas house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there. Angelitas maid told Bienvenida that her
employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelitas house after three
days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay
chairman and also to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance.
Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her spouse would react to the
disappearance of their youngest child and this made her problem even more serious. As fate would have it,
Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and together, this time, they looked for their missing son in other
places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.
Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the
common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida lost no
time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four
years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez,
was already named John Thomas Lopez.[1] She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her
demand to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order to recover their
son. To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin
Lopez. The first witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27,
1989 at her clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported her testimony with her clinical records.[2] The second witness,
Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly fathered John Thomas
Lopez as the latter was sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident and bumped his private part against the edge
of a banca causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity. Benjamin further declared
that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and Angelita were not
blessed with children.[3]
For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that at age 42, she gave
birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She
added, though, that she has two other children with her real husband, Angel Sanchez. [4] She said the birth of John
Thomas was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on August
4, 1989.
On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not have
children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. [5] The trial court also held that the minor and
Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity.Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are
one and the same person who is the natural child of petitioners.The trial court decreed:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition for Habeas Corpus, as
such, respondent Angelita Diamante is ordered to immediately release from her personal custody minor John
Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over and/or surrender his person to petitioners, Spouses Edgardo A. Tijing and
Bienvenida R. Tijing, immediately upon receipt hereof.

Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, is hereby commanded to implement the decision of this Court by
assisting herein petitioners in the recovery of the person of their minor son, Edgardo Tijing Jr., the same person as
John Thomas D. Lopez.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Angelita seasonably filed her notice of appeal.[7] Nonetheless, on August 3, 1994, the sheriff implemented the
order of the trial court by taking custody of the minor. In his report, the sheriff stated that Angelita peacefully
surrendered the minor and he turned over the custody of said child to petitioner Edgardo Tijing.[8]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate
court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In its view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida
was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the minor. It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring
that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person,[9] and disposed of the case, thus:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court dated March 10, 1995 is hereby REVERSED, and a
new one entered dismissing the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 94-71606, and directing the custody of the minor John
Thomas Lopez to be returned to respondent Angelita Diamante, said minor having been under the care of said
respondent at the time of the filing of the petition herein.

SO ORDERED.[10]

Petitioners sought reconsideration of the abovequoted decision which was denied. Hence, the instant petition
alleging:
I

THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE
PETITIONERS ACTION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS MERELY SECONDARY TO THE QUESTION OF FILIATION THAT
THE PETITIONERS HAD LIKEWISE PROVEN.

II

THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS AND DIRECTING THAT THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR
JOHN THOMAS LOPEZ WHO WAS PROVEN TO THE SAME MINOR AS EDGARDO R. TIJING, JR., BE RETURNED
TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.[11]

In our view, the crucial issues for resolution are the following:
 (1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy?
(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person and is the
son of petitioners?
We shall discuss the two issues together since they are closely related.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto.[12] Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the
latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving
minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability
of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child. [13] It
must be stressed too that in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to
the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person.
In this case, the minors identity is crucial in determining the propriety of the writ sought. Thus, it must be
resolved first whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to be her son, is the same minor named John
Thomas Lopez, whom Angelita insists to be her offspring. We must first determine who between Bienvenida and
Angelita is the minors biological mother. Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially
thought of to be distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and the same. [14]Petitioners must
convincingly establish that the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is made is the person upon whom
they have rightful custody. If there is doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ
is made, petitioners cannot invoke with certainty their right of custody over the said minor.
True, it is not the function of this Court to examine and evaluate the probative value of all evidence presented
to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order. [15] But since the
conclusions of the Court of Appeals contradict those of the trial court, this Court may scrutinize the evidence on the
record to determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to
establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips, she admitted that after
the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas
Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974.Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she
offered no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who
allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical records, log book or discharge order from the
clinic were ever submitted.
Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer capable of siring a
son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the accident and that Tomas
admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria
Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private
respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.
Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead
of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the alleged birth of the child. Under the law, the attending
physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the
physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil
registrar within thirty days after the birth.[16] Significantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and
private respondent were legally married on October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even
private respondent had admitted she is a common-law wife.[17] This false entry puts to doubt the other data in said
birth certificate.
Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two
had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged
parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. [18] Needless to stress, the trial courts conclusion
should be given high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and
petitioner concerned.
Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenidas giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her
clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records consisting of a log book, discharge order and the
signatures of petitioners.
All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ
of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and
scientific ways available.Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test [19] for identification
and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is
based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from
the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. [20] Of course,
being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. [21] Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that
courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject
said result is to deny progress.[22] Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would
be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182497 June 29, 2010

NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 37, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO
RAZON, JR., DIRECTOR GEARY BARIAS, PSSUPT. CO YEE M. CO, JR. and POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR AGAPITO
QUIMSON, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 651 of the Rules of Court assailing the Order dated 25 April
2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 37, in Special Proceeding No. 08-119132 which denied the
petition for Habeas Corpus filed by herein Petitioner Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan in behalf of her husband Police
Officer 1 Basser B. Ampatuan2 (PO1 Ampatuan).

Petitioner alleged in her petition that her husband PO1 Ampatuan was assigned at Sultan Kudarat Municipal Police
Station. On 14 April 2008, he was asked by his Chief of Police to report to the Provincial Director of Shariff
Kabunsuan, Superintendent Esmael Pua Ali (Supt. Ali). The latter brought PO1 Ampatuan to Superintendent Piang
Adam, Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maguindanao. PO1 Ampatuan was directed to
stay at the Police Provincial Office of Maguindanao without being informed of the cause of his restraint. The next
day, 15 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to the General Santos City Airport and was made to board a
Philippine Airlines plane bound for Manila. Upon landing at the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was
turned over to policemen of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by Police Director Geary Barias and
General Roberto Rosales. A press briefing was then conducted where it was announced that PO1 Ampatuan was
arrested for the killing of two Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Officials. He was then detained at the Police Jail
in United Nations Avenue, Manila. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato Gonzaga
of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the Law
Department of the COMELEC. On 20 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was turned-over to the Regional Headquarters
Support Group in Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City.3

Petitioner continues that on 21 April 2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva ordered the release for further
investigation of PO1 Ampatuan.4 The Order was approved by the City Prosecutor of Manila. But Police Senior
Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson refused to release PO1 Ampatuan.

This prompted Petitioner to file the petition for writ of habeas corpus in the RTC of Manila, Branch 37.5

Private respondents had another version of the antecedent facts. They narrated that at around 7:08 o’clock in the
evening of 10 November 2007, a sixty-four-year-old man, later identified as Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the
COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila.
Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District (MPD) Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male
perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for
proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s Office.

On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Atty. Clarence V. Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation
Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder)
and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.

On even date, a charge sheet for Grave Misconduct was executed against PO1 Ampatuan, the accusatory portion
of which reads:
 CHARGE SHEET

THE UNDERSIGNED NOMINAL COMPLAINANT hereby charges above-named respondent of the administrative
offense of Grave Misconduct (murder) pursuant to Section 52 of R.A. 8551 6 in relation to NAPOLCOM
Memorandum Circular 93-024, committed as follows:

That on or about 7:08 in the evening of November 10, 2007, in M.H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil St., Ermita, Manila,
above-named respondent while being an active member of the PNP and within the jurisdiction of this office,
armed with a cal .45 pistol, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, shot Atty.
Alioden D. Dalaig, Jr., COMELEC official on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
gunshot wounds which directly cause (sic) his death.

Acts contrary to the existing PNP Laws rules and Regulations.7

Also, through a Memorandum dated 18 April 2008, Police Director General Avelino I. Razon, Jr. directed the
Regional Director of the National Capital Regional Police Office (NCRPO) to place PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive
custody, thus:

1. Reference: Memo from that Office dated April 15, 2008 re Arrest of PO1 Busser Ampatuan, suspect in
the killing of Atty. Alioden Dalaig and Atty. Wynee Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers.

2. This pertains to the power of the Chief, PNP embodied in Section 52 of RA 8551, to place police
personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed against him
or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel.

3. In this connection, you are hereby directed to place PO1 Busser Ampatuan, suspect in the killing of Atty.
Alioden Dalaig and Atty. Wynee Asdala, both COMELEC Legal Officers, under your restrictive custody.

4. For strict compliance.8

On 19 April 2008, through a Memorandum Request dated 18 April 2008, respondent Police Director Geary L. Barias
requested for the creation of the Summary Hearing Board to hear the case of PO1 Ampatuan.9

On 20 April 2008, Special Order No. 921 was issued by Police Director Edgardo E. Acuña, placing PO1 Ampatuan
under restrictive custody of the Regional Director, NCRPO, effective 19 April 2008. Said Special Order No. 921,
reads:

Restrictive Custody

PO1 Basser B. Ampatuan 128677, is placed under restrictive custody of the Regional Director, NCRPO effective
April 19, 2008. (Reference: Memorandum from CPNP dated 18 April 2008).

BY COMMAND OF POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL RAZON:10

Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be
set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for other
charges/legal grounds.11
Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is the wife
of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22 April
2008. The petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 08-119132 and was raffled to Branch 37.

On 24 April 2008, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, respondent Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig
ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1
Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1
Ampatuan.12

On 25 April 2008, the RTC resolved the Petition in its Order which reads:

Essentially, counsels for petitioner insists that PO1 Basser Ampatuan is being illegally detained by the respondents
despite the order of release of Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva dated April 21, 2008. They further claim that
as of April 23, 2008, no administrative case was filed against PO1 Ampatuan.

Respondents, while admitting that to date no criminal case was filed against PO1 Ampatuan, assert that the latter
is under restrictive custody since he is facing an administrative case for grave misconduct. They submitted to this
Court the Pre-charge Evaluation Report and Charge Sheet. Further, in support of their position, respondents cited
the case of SPO2 Manalo, et al. v. Hon. Calderon, G.R. No. 178920 claiming that habeas corpus will not lie for a PNP
personnel under restrictive custody. They claim that this is authorized under Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551
authorizing the Chief of PNP to place the PNP personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency of
administrative case for grave misconduct.

Petitioner countered that the administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan was ante-dated to make it appear
that there was such a case filed before April 23, 2008.

The function of habeas corpus is to determine the legality of one’s detention, meaning, if there is sufficient cause
for deprivation or confinement and if there is none to discharge him at once. For habeas corpus to issue, the
restraint of liberty must be in the nature of illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom which must be actual
and effective, not nominal or moral.

Granting arguendo that the administrative case was ante-dated, the Court cannot simply ignore the filing of an
administrative case filed against PO1 Ampatuan. It cannot be denied that the PNP has its own administrative
disciplinary mechanism and as clearly pointed out by the respondents, the Chief PNP is authorized to place PO1
Ampatuan under restrictive custody pursuant to Section 52, Par. 4 of R.A. 8551.

The filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this Court has no
authority to order the release of the subject police officer.

Lastly, anent the contention of the petitioner that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the
administrative case moot and academic, the same could not be accepted by this Court.1avvph!1 It must be
stressed that the resignation has not been acted (sic) by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that the
administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED. 13

Distressed, petitioner is now before this Court via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
question the validity of the RTC Order dated 25 April 2008. The issues are:
 I. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE
ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND
THEREFORE, ILLEGAL;

II. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT CONCEDED THE AUTHORITY OF
RESPONDENT AVELINO RAZON, JR. UNDER SEC. 52, PAR. 4, R.A. 8551 TO PLACE AMPATUAN UNDER
RESTRICTIVE CUSTODY FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS;

III. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT SHIRKED FROM ITS JUDICIAL
DUTY TO ORDER THE RELEASE OF PO1 AMPATUAN FROM THE CUSTODY OF RESPONDENTS MAMANG
PULIS.14

Essentially, a writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty.15

Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Court sets forth the procedure to be followed in the issuance of the writ. The Rule
provides:

RULE 102
HABEAS CORPUS

SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends. – Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or
by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

SEC 2. Who may grant the writ. – The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, or any member
thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized
by law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may be made returnable before
the court or any member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and decision
on the merits. It may also be granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day and at any time,
and returnable before himself, enforceable only within his judicial district.

xxxx

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. – If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment,
or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ
cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing
of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason
of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the
time of the filing of the application.16

Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned without
sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial
process or a valid judgment.17
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally
deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is
restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.18 Fundamentally, in order to justify the
grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action.19

In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally
held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not
merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy
and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient.20

In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is
being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed
only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be
granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.21

While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on
the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom
the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that
a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the
respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the
petition should be dismissed.22

Petitioner contends that when PO1 Ampatuan was placed under the custody of respondents on 20 April 2008,
there was yet no administrative case filed against him. When the release order of Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson
Salva was served upon respondents on 21 April 2008, there was still no administrative case filed against PO1
Ampatuan. She also argues that the arrest on 14 April 2008 of PO1 Ampatuan in Shariff Kabunsuan was illegal
because there was no warrant of arrest issued by any judicial authority against him.

On the other hand, respondents, in their Comment23 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that the trial
court correctly denied the subject petition. Respondents maintain that while the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila had recommended that PO1 Ampatuan be released from custody, said recommendation was made only
insofar as the criminal action for murder that was filed with the prosecution office is concerned and is without
prejudice to other legal grounds for which he may be held under custody. In the instant case, PO1 Ampatuan is
also facing administrative charges for Grave Misconduct. They cited the case of Manalo v. Calderon,24 where this
Court held that a petition for habeas corpus will be given due course only if it shows that petitioner is being
detained or restrained of his liberty unlawfully, but a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or
whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint
of liberty.25

The Solicitor General is correct.

In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the
Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as
the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police
force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said law enumerates
the disciplinary actions, including restrictive custody that may be imposed by duly designated supervisors and
equivalent officers of the PNP as a matter of internal discipline. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 8551
reads:

Sec. 52 – x x x.

xxxx

4. The Chief of the PNP shall have the power to impose the disciplinary punishment of dismissal from the service;
suspension or forfeiture of salary; or any combination thereof for a period not exceeding one hundred eighty (180)
days. Provided, further, That the Chief of the PNP shall have the authority to place police personnel under
restrictive custody during the pendency of a grave administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of a
criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel. [Emphasis ours].

Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for his
continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts
of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. 26

Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual
nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary
measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for. 27

Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuan’s restrictive custody is the administrative case filed against him, his remedy is
within such administrative process.

We likewise note that PO1 Ampatuan has been under restrictive custody since 19 April 2008. To date, the
administrative case against him should have already been resolved and the issue of his restrictive custody should
have been rendered moot and academic, in accordance with Section 55 of Republic Act No. 8551, which provides:

SEC. 55. Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. – Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in
form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6)
years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office for a period not
exceeding ninety (90) days from arraignment: Provided, however, That if it can be shown by evidence that the
accused is harassing the complainant and/or witnesses, the court may order the preventive suspension of the
accused PNP member even if the charge is punishable by a penalty lower than six (6) years and one (1) day:
Provided, further, That the preventive suspension shall not be more than ninety (90) days except if the delay in the
disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petitions of the respondent: Provided, finally, That such
preventive suspension may be sooner lifted by the court in the exigency of the service upon recommendation of
the Chief, PNP. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days
from arraignment of the accused. (Emphasis supplied.)

Having conceded that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, we have to dismiss the
petition.

In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the issuance of the writ
prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that the latter is
unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 151876 June 21, 2005

SUSAN GO and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,

vs.
FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Administrative Circular 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular 13-2001, merely establishes a rule of
preference in imposing penalties for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), the "Bouncing Checks Law."
When the circumstances of both the offense and the offender indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without
taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone -- instead of imprisonment -- is the preferred penalty. As the
Circular requires a review of the factual circumstances of a given case, it applies only to pending or future
litigations. It is not a penal law; hence, it does not have retroactive effect. Neither may it be used to modify final
judgments of conviction.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the October 10, 2001 2 and the
October 11, 20013 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Branch 5), Baguio City.4 The October 10, 2001 Order
released Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba from confinement and required him to pay a fine of ₱100,000 in lieu of
imprisonment. The October 11, 2001 Order disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, [in] applying the doctrine as held in the above-entitled cases in this case, the instant petition for
Habeas Corpus should be, as it is hereby, GRANTED. The Baguio City Jail Warden is hereby ordered to
IMMEDIATELY RELEASE the petitioner from confinement unless he is being held for some other lawful cause other
than by virtue of the Sentence Mittimus dated September 28, 2001 issued by CESAR S. VIDUYA, Clerk of Court,
MTC 4, Baguio City. Further, the petitioner is required to pay a fine in the amount of ₱100,000.00 in lieu of his
imprisonment, in addition to the civil aspect of the Joint Judgment rendered by MTC 4 dated July 16, 1999." 5

The Facts

The pertinent facts are not disputed. Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Petitioner Susan Go thirteen (13)
checks which, when presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due dates, were dishonored
for the reason "account closed."6 Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 227 under
separate Complaints filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Baguio City.8 After a joint trial, the
MTCC (Branch 4) rendered a Decision on July 16, 1999, convicting the accused in the 13 cases. The dispositive
portion reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, this Court finds the evidence of the prosecution to have
established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged and imposes upon the
accused the penalty of 3 months imprisonment for each count (13 counts) and to indemnify the offended party the
amount of One Million Two Hundred Ninety Five Thousand Pesos (₱1,295,000.00) with legal interest per annum
commencing from 1996 after the checks were dishonored by reason ‘ACCOUNT CLOSED’ on December 13, 1995, to
pay attorney’s fees of ₱15,000.00 and to pay the costs."9

The appeal of Dimagiba was raffled to Branch 4 of the RTC in Baguio City.10 On May 23, 2000, the RTC denied the
appeal and sustained his conviction.11 There being no further appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the RTC issued
on February 1, 2001, a Certificate of Finality of the Decision. 12
Thus, on February 14, 2001, the MTCC issued an Order directing the arrest of Dimagiba for the service of his
sentence as a result of his conviction. The trial court also issued a Writ of Execution to enforce his civil liability.13

On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC Order. He prayed for the recall of
the Order of Arrest and the modification of the final Decision, arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of
imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him.14 The arguments raised in that Motion were reiterated in a
Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution filed on February 28, 2001. 15

In an Order dated August 22, 2001, the MTCC denied the Motion for Reconsideration and directed the issuance of
a Warrant of Arrest against Dimagiba.16 On September 28, 2001, he was arrested and imprisoned for the service of
his sentence.

On October 9, 2001, he filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Petition 17 for a writ of habeas corpus. The case was
raffled to Branch 5, which scheduled the hearing for October 10, 2001. Copies of the Order were served on
respondent’s counsels and the city warden.18

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Right after hearing the case on October 10, 2001, the RTC issued an Order directing the immediate release of
Dimagiba from confinement and requiring him to pay a fine of ₱100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. However, the civil
aspect of the July 16, 1999 MTCC Decision was not touched upon.19 A subsequent Order, explaining in greater
detail the basis of the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, was issued on October 11, 2001. 20

In justifying its modification of the MTCC Decision, the RTC invoked Vaca v. Court of Appeals21 and Supreme Court
Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000,22 which allegedly required the imposition of a fine only instead of
imprisonment also for BP 22 violations, if the accused was not a recidivist or a habitual delinquent. The RTC held
that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba. 23 It further noted that (1) he was a first-time
offender and an employer of at least 200 workers who would be displaced as a result of his imprisonment; and (2)
the civil liability had already been satisfied through the levy of his properties. 24

On October 22, 2001, Petitioner Go filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Orders dated October 10 and 11,
2001.25 That Motion was denied on January 18, 2002.26

Hence, this Petition filed directly with this Court on pure questions of law. 27

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for this Court’s consideration:

"1. [The RTC] Judge was utterly devoid of jurisdiction in amending a final and conclusive decision of the
Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4, dated July 16, 1999, in nullifying the Sentence Mittimus, dated September
28, 2001, issued by x x x [the] Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4, Baguio City, and in ordering the release of
[Dimagiba] from confinement in jail for the service of his sentence under the said final and conclusive
judgment;

"2. Assuming only for the sake of argument that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, the Petition for
Habeas Corpus is utterly devoid of merit as [Dimagiba was] not entitled to the beneficent policy
enunciated in the Eduardo Vaca and Rosa Lim cases and reiterated in the Supreme Court Circular No. 12-
2000; x x x
 "3. Granting for the sake of argument that [Dimagiba was] entitled to the beneficent policy enunciated in
the Eduardo Vaca and Rosa Lim cases and reiterated in the Supreme Court Circular No. 12-2000, the
minimum fine that should be imposed on [Dimagiba] is one million and two hundred ninety five thousand
pesos (₱1,295,000.00) up to double the said amount or (₱2,590,000), not just the measly amount of
₱100,000; and

"4. [The RTC] judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
hearing and deciding [Dimagiba’s] Petition for Habeas Corpus without notice and without affording
procedural due process to the People of the Philippines through the Office of [the] City Prosecutor of
Baguio City or the Office of the Solicitor General."28

In the main, the case revolves around the question of whether the Petition for habeas corpus was validly granted.
Hence, the Court will discuss the four issues as they intertwine with this main question. 29

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Main Issue:

Propriety of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which individuals are deprived
of liberty.30 It was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint; or, more
specifically, to obtain immediate relief for those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without
sufficient cause and thus deliver them from unlawful custody.31 It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the
circumstances under which a person is detained.32

The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid
judgment.33 However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial
proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence;
or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.34

In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was anchored on the ruling in Vaca and on SC-AC No.
12-2000, which allegedly prescribed the imposition of a fine, not imprisonment, for convictions under BP 22.
Respondent sought the retroactive effect of those rulings, thereby effectively challenging the penalty imposed on
him for being excessive. From his allegations, the Petition appeared sufficient in form to support the issuance of
the writ.

However, it appears that respondent has previously sought the modification of his sentence in a Motion for
Reconsideration35 of the MTCC’s Execution Order and in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of
Execution.36 Both were denied by the MTCC on the ground that it had no power or authority to amend a judgment
issued by the RTC.

In his Petition for habeas corpus, respondent raised the same arguments that he had invoked in the said Motions.
We believe that his resort to this extraordinary remedy was a procedural infirmity. The remedy should have been
an appeal of the MTCC Order denying his Motions, in which he should have prayed that the execution of the
judgment be stayed. But he effectively misused the action he had chosen, obviously with the intent of finding a
favorable court. His Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already
become final and executory. Such an action deplorably amounted to forum shopping. Respondent should have
resorted to the proper, available remedy instead of instituting a different action in another forum.

The Court also finds his arguments for his release insubstantial to support the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus.

Preference in the Application of Penalties for Violation of BP 22

The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not
more than one year; (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, a fine that shall in no case
exceed ₱200,000; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court. 37

SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-2001,38 established a rule of preference in imposing the above
penalties.39 When the circumstances of the case clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint
of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred penalty. 40 The determination of
the circumstances that warrant the imposition of a fine rests upon the trial judge only. 41 Should the judge deem
that imprisonment is appropriate, such penalty may be imposed. 42

SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment. The competence to amend the law
belongs to the legislature, not to this Court.43

Inapplicability of SC-AC No. 12-2000

Petitioners argue that respondent is not entitled to the benevolent policy enunciated in SC-AC No. 12-2000,
because he is not a "first time offender."44 This circumstance is, however, not the sole factor in determining
whether he deserves the preferred penalty of fine alone. The penalty to be imposed depends on the peculiar
circumstances of each case.45 It is the trial court’s discretion to impose any penalty within the confines of the law.
SC-AC No. 13-2001 explains thus:

"x x x. Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal
provisions of BP 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good
faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as
the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the
imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. x x x.

It is, therefore, understood that:

xxxxxxxxx

"2. The Judges concerned, may in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar
circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of
justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work
violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;"

The Court notes that the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus relied mainly on the alleged retroactivity of SC-AC No.
12-2000, which supposedly favored BP 22 offenders. 46 On this point, Dimagiba contended that his imprisonment
was violative of his right to equal protection of the laws, since only a fine would be imposed on others similarly
situated.47

The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied retroactively if favorable to the accused. This
principle, embodied in the Revised Penal Code,48 has been expanded in certain instances to cover special laws. 49
The issue of retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000 was settled in De Joya v. Jail Warden of Batangas City,50 which we
quote:

"Petitioner's reliance of our ruling in Ordoñez v. Vinarao that a convicted person is entitled to benefit from the
reduction of penalty introduced by the new law, citing People v. Simon, is misplaced. Thus, her plea that as
provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin.
Circular No. 13-2001 should benefit her has no basis.

"First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not
applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already
terminated by final judgment.

"Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays
down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P.
Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the courts to
take into account not only the purpose of the law but also the circumstances of the accused -- whether he acted in
good faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence -- and such other circumstance which the trial
court or the appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed." 51

Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, it serves only as a guideline for the trial courts. Thus, it
is addressed to the judges, who are directed to consider the factual circumstances of each case prior to imposing
the appropriate penalty. In other words, the Administrative Circular does not confer any new right in favor of the
accused, much less those convicted by final judgment.

The competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the court rendering the decision against the
accused.52That decision is subject only to appeal on grounds of errors of fact or law, or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Another trial court may not encroach upon this authority. Indeed, SC-
AC No. 12-2000 necessarily requires a review of all factual circumstances of each case. Such a review can no longer
be done if the judgment has become final and executory.

In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge of all relevant circumstances from which
respondent’s conviction and sentence were based. The penalty imposed was well within the confines of the law.
Upon appeal, the conviction was sustained by RTC-Branch 4 of Baguio City. Eventually, the Decision attained
finality. Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment in the guise of granting a
writ of habeas corpus.

The doctrine of equal protection of laws53 does not apply for the same reasons as those on retroactivity. Foremost
of these reasons is that the Circular is not a law that deletes the penalty of imprisonment. As explained earlier, it is
merely a rule of preference as to which penalty should be imposed under the peculiar circumstances of a case. At
any rate, this matter deserves scant consideration, because respondent failed to raise any substantial argument to
support his contention.54

Modification of Final Judgment Not Warranted

The Court is not unmindful of So v. Court of Appeals,55 in which the final judgment of conviction for violation of BP
22 was modified by the deletion of the sentence of imprisonment and the imposition of a fine. That case
proceeded from an "Urgent Manifestation of an Extraordinary Supervening Event,"56 not from an unmeritorious
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as in the present case. The Court exercised in that case its authority to
suspend or to modify the execution of a final judgment when warranted or made imperative by the higher interest
of justice or by supervening events.57 The supervening event in that case was the petitioner’s urgent need for
coronary rehabilitation for at least one year under the direct supervision of a coronary care therapist;
imprisonment would have been equivalent to a death sentence. 58

The peculiar circumstances of So do not obtain in the present case. Respondent’s supposed "unhealthy physical
condition due to a triple by-pass operation, and aggravated by hypertension," cited by the RTC in its October 10,
2001 Order,59 is totally bereft of substantial proof. The Court notes that respondent did not make any such
allegation in his Petition for habeas corpus. Neither did he mention his physical state in his Memorandum and
Comment submitted to this Court.

Respondent seeks the retroactive application of SC-AC No. 12-2000 in his favor on the basis alone of the alleged
settlement of his civil liability.60 Citing Griffith v. Court of Appeals,61 he theorizes that answering for a criminal
offense is no longer justified after the settlement of the debt.

Respondent, however, misreads Griffith. The Court held in that case that convicting the accused who, two years
prior to the filing of the BP 22 cases, had already paid his debt (from which the checks originated) was contrary to
the basic principles of fairness and justice.62 Obviously, that situation is not attendant here.

The civil liability in the present case was satisfied through the levy and sale of the properties of respondent only
after the criminal case had been terminated with his conviction.63 Apparently, he had sufficient properties that
could have been used to settle his liabilities prior to his conviction. Indeed, such an early settlement would have
been an indication that he was in good faith, a circumstance that could have been favorably considered in
determining his appropriate penalty.

At any rate, civil liability differs from criminal liability. 64 What is punished in the latter is not the failure to pay the
obligation, but the issuance of checks that subsequently bounced or were dishonored for insufficiency or lack of
funds.65 The Court reiterates the reasons why the issuance of worthless checks is criminalized:

"The practice is prohibited by law because of its deleterious effects on public interest. The effects of the increase
of worthless checks transcend the private interest of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches
the interest of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also
an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation multiplied a
thousand-fold can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually
hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but
an offense against public order."66

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders NULLIFIED. Respondent’s Petition for habeas corpus
is hereby DENIED. Let this case be REMANDED to MTCC of Baguio City for the re-arrest of respondent and the
completion of his sentence.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167569 September 4, 2009

CARLOS T. GO, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 167570

JIMMY T. GO, Petitioner,

vs.
LUIS T. RAMOS, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 171946

HON. ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., in his capacity as the Commissioner of the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION; ATTY.
FAISAL HUSSIN and ANSARI M. MACAAYAN, in their capacity as Intelligence Officers of the BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, Petitioners,
vs.
JIMMY T. GO a.k.a. JAIME T. GAISANO, Respondent.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us are three petitions. G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 are petitions for review on certiorari to set aside the
October 25, 2004 Decision1 and February 16, 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143 that
affirmed the Decision3 dated January 6, 2004 and Order4 dated May 3, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City, Branch 167 in SCA No. 2218 upholding the preparation and filing of deportation charges against Jimmy
T. Go, the corresponding Charge Sheet5 dated July 3, 2001, and the deportation proceedings thereunder
conducted.

On the other hand, G.R. No. 171946, also a petition for review on certiorari, seeks to set aside the December 8,
2005 Decision6 and March 13, 2006 Resolution7 of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 88277.

Considering that the three cases arose from the same factual milieu, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos.
167570 and 167569 with G.R. No. 171946 per Resolution8 dated February 26, 2007.

These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit9 for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is
an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy’s
personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the
birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s
citizenship as "FChinese." Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents,
Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos
appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He also averred that in September 1989 or
thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with
the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the
Department of Foreign Affairs.

Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit,10 averring that the complaint for deportation initiated by
Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. Jimmy
maintained that there is no truth to the allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he is a natural-born Filipino.
Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine
citizenship in accordance with Article IV, Section 1, paragraph 411 of the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act
No. 62512 (Com. Act No. 625), as evidenced by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance on July 11, 1950 and having
executed an Affidavit of Election of Philippine citizenship on July 12, 1950. Although the said oath and affidavit
were registered only on September 11, 1956, the reason behind such late registration was sufficiently explained in
an affidavit. Jimmy added that he had even voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections. 13 He denied that his father
arrived in the Philippines as an undocumented alien, alleging that his father has no record of arrival in this country
as alleged in the complaint-affidavit precisely because his father was born and raised in the Philippines, and in fact,
speaks fluent Ilonggo and Tagalog.14

With regard to the erroneous entry in his birth certificate that he is "FChinese," he maintained that such was not of
his own doing, but may be attributed to the employees of the Local Civil Registrar’s Office who might have relied
on his Chinese-sounding surname when making the said entry. He asserted that the said office has control over his
birth certificate; thus, if his father’s citizenship appears to be handwritten, it may have been changed when the
employees of that office realized that his father has already taken his oath as a Filipino. 15 As regards the entry in
his siblings’ certificates of birth, particularly Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr., that their father is Chinese, Jimmy averred
that the entry was erroneous because it was made without prior consultation with his father. 16

In a Resolution17 dated February 14, 2001, Associate Commissioner Linda L. Malenab-Hornilla dismissed the
complaint for deportation against Jimmy. Associate Commissioner Hornilla affirmed the findings of the National
Bureau of Investigation tasked to investigate the case that Jimmy’s father elected Filipino citizenship in accordance
with the provisions of the 1935 Philippine Constitution. By operation of law, therefore, the citizenship of Carlos
was transmitted to Jimmy, making him a Filipino as well.

On March 8, 2001,18 the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said dismissal, holding that Carlos’ election of
Philippine citizenship was made out of time. Finding Jimmy’s claim to Philippine citizenship in serious doubt by
reason of his father’s questionable election thereof, the Board directed the preparation and filing of the
appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy.

On July 3, 2001, the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy, charging him of violating Section
37(a)(9)19 in relation to Section 45(c)20 of Com. Act No. 613, otherwise known as The Philippine Immigration Act of
1940,21 as amended, committed as follows:

xxxx

1. That Respondent was born on October 25, 1952 in Iloilo City, as evidenced by a copy of his birth
certificate wherein his citizenship was recorded as "Chinese";

2. That Respondent through some stealth machinations was able to subsequently cover up his true and
actual citizenship as Chinese and illegally acquired a Philippine Passport under the name JAIME T.
GAISANO, with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, in violation of the above-cited
provisions of the Immigration Act[;]
 3. That [R]espondent being an alien, has formally and officially represent[ed] and introduce[d] himself as a
citizen of the Philippines, for fraudulent purposes and in order to evade any requirements of the
immigration laws, also in violation of said law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.22

On November 9, 2001, Carlos and Jimmy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition23 with application for
injunctive reliefs before the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 167, docketed as SCA No. 2218, seeking to annul and set
aside the March 8, 2001 Resolution of the Board of Commissioners, the Charge Sheet, and the proceedings had
therein. In essence, they challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with the deportation proceedings.

In the interim, the Board issued a Decision24 dated April 17, 2002, in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117, ordering the
apprehension and deportation of Jimmy. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Board of Commissioners hereby Orders the apprehension of respondent
JIMMY T. GO @ JAIME T. GAISANO and that he be then deported to CHINA of which he is a citizen, without
prejudice, however, to the continuation of any and all criminal and other proceedings that are pending in court or
before the prosecution arm of the Philippine Government, if any. And that upon expulsion, he is thereby ordered
barred from entry into the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.25

In view of the said Decision, Carlos and Jimmy filed on June 13, 2002 a supplemental petition for certiorari and
prohibition26 before the trial court and reiterated their application for injunctive reliefs. The trial court issued a
writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction pending litigation on the main issue, enjoining the Bureau from enforcing
the April 17, 2002 Decision.27 Later, however, the trial court dissolved the writ in a Decision 28 dated January 6,
2004 as a consequence of the dismissal of the petition.

Carlos and Jimmy moved for reconsideration. But their motion was likewise denied. 29

Following the dismissal of the petition in SCA No. 2218, the Board issued a warrant of deportation 30 which led to
the apprehension of Jimmy. Jimmy commenced a petition for habeas corpus, but the same was eventually
dismissed by reason of his provisional release on bail.31

Carlos and Jimmy then questioned the Decision in SCA No. 2218 as well as the Resolution denying their motion for
reconsideration by way of a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85143.
They imputed grave abuse of discretion by the trial court for passing upon their citizenship, claiming that what
they asked for in their petition was merely the nullification of the March 8, 2001 Resolution and the charge sheet.

The appellate tribunal dismissed the petition.32 It did not find merit in their argument that the issue of citizenship
should proceed only before the proper court in an independent action, and that neither the Bureau nor the Board
has jurisdiction over individuals who were born in the Philippines and have exercised the rights of Filipino citizens.
The appellate tribunal also rejected their claim that they enjoy the presumption of being Filipino citizens.

The Court of Appeals held that the Board has the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against
an alleged alien, and in the process, determine their citizenship.

The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the principle of jus soli was never extended to the Philippines;
hence, could not be made a ground to one’s claim of Philippine citizenship. Like the trial court, the appellate
tribunal found that Carlos failed to elect Philippine citizenship within the reasonable period of three years upon
reaching the age of majority. Furthermore, it held that the belated submission to the local civil registry of the
affidavit of election and oath of allegiance in September 1956 was defective because the affidavit of election was
executed after the oath of allegiance, and the delay of several years before their filing with the proper office was
not satisfactorily explained.

The course of action taken by the trial court was also approved by the appellate tribunal. The Court of Appeals
stated that the trial court necessarily had to rule on the substantial and legal bases warranting the deportation
proceeding in order to determine whether the Board acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion. Moreover, the appellate court found that due process was properly observed in the proceedings
before the Board, contrary to the claim of Jimmy.

Unfazed with the said ruling, they moved for reconsideration. Their motion having been denied,33 Carlos and
Jimmy each filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court, respectively docketed as G.R. Nos. 167569
and 167570.

Meanwhile, in view of the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 85143, Bureau of Immigration Commissioner Alipio F.
Fernandez, Jr. issued Warrant of Deportation No. AFF-04-00334 dated November 16, 2004 to carry out the April 17,
2002 Decision in BSI-D.C. No. ADD-01-117. This resulted in the apprehension and detention of Jimmy at the Bureau
of Immigration Bicutan Detention Center, pending his deportation to China. 35

On account of his detention, Jimmy once again filed a petition for habeas corpus36 before the RTC of Pasig City,
Branch 167, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 11507 assailing his apprehension and detention despite the pendency of his
appeal and his release on recognizance.

In an Order37 dated December 6, 2004, the trial court dismissed the said petition ruling that the remedy of habeas
corpus cannot be availed of to obtain an order of release once a deportation order has already been issued by the
Bureau. Jimmy moved for reconsideration of the Order, but this was also denied by the trial court in an
Order38dated December 28, 2004.

Jimmy assailed the Orders of the trial court in a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the appellate court,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. 88277. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and enjoined the deportation of Jimmy
until the issue of his citizenship is settled with finality by the court. The Court of Appeals held as follows:

xxxx

…the issuance of a warrant to arrest and deport the petitioner without any proof whatsoever of his violation of the
bail conditions [that he was previously granted] is arbitrary, inequitable and unjust, for the policies governing the
grant of his bail should likewise apply in the cancellation of the said bail. Although a deportation proceeding does
not partake of the nature of a criminal action, yet considering that it is such a harsh and extraordinary
administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person who all his life has always lived in the
Philippines, where he has established his family and business interests, one who appears to be not completely
devoid of any claim to Filipino citizenship, being the son of a Filipina, whose father is alleged to also have elected
to be a Filipino, the constitutional right of such person to due process cannot be peremptorily dismissed or ignored
altogether, and indeed should not be denied. If it later turns out that the petitioner is a Filipino after all, then the
overly eager Immigration authorities would have expelled and relegated to statelessness one who might in fact be
a Filipino by blood.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition with reference to the Warrant of Deportation issued by the BID
is hereby GRANTED. The Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, through Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr.,
Atty. Faizal Hussin and Ansari Maca Ayan, and any of their deputized agents, are ENJOINED from deporting
petitioner Jimmy T. Go, a.k.a. Jaime T. Gaisano, until the issue of petitioner’s citizenship is finally settled by the
courts of justice.

SO ORDERED.39

Their motion for reconsideration40 having been denied on March 13, 2006, Hon. Alipio Fernandez, in his capacity as
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration, and Atty. Faisal Hussin and Ansari M. Macaayan, in their capacity
as Intelligence Officers of the Bureau of Immigration, are before this Court as petitioners in G.R. No. 171946.

The parties have raised the following grounds for their respective petitions:

G.R. No. 167569

I.

THE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION (B.I.D.) ARE NULL AND VOID
FOR ITS FAILURE TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THE PERSON OF PETITIONER CARLOS GO, SR.

II.

… GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE HEREIN PETITIONER CARLOS GO SR.’S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, A
FULL BLOWN TRIAL UNDER THE MORE RIGID RULES OF EVIDENCE PRESCRIBED IN COURT PROCEEDINGS SHOULD
HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AND NOT THROUGH MERE "SUMMARY
PROCEEDINGS" SUCH AS THE ONE HAD BEFORE THE B.I.D. AS WELL AS IN THE COURT A QUO.

III.

A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS NOT REQUIRED TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP.

IV.

ASSUMING CARLOS GO, SR. STILL NEEDS TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP, HE HAD COMPLIED WITH ALL THE
REQUIREMENTS OF COM. ACT NO. 625.

V.

PETITIONER CARLOS GO, SR. ENJOYS THE "PRESUMPTION OF CITIZENSHIP."

VI.

RESPONDENT’S "CAUSE OF ACTION" HAD LONG PRESCRIBED.41

G.R. No. 167570

I.

THE PROCEEDINGS HAD BEFORE THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION (B.I.D.) ARE NULL AND VOID
FOR ITS FAILURE TO IMPLEAD AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THE PERSON OF PETITIONER’S FATHER, CARLOS GO,
SR.
 II.

THE DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE B.I.D. ARE NULL AND VOID FOR ITS FAILURE TO OBSERVE DUE
PROCESS.

III.

THE B.I.D.’S CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER JIMMY T. GO HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED.

IV.

… GIVEN THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE HEREIN PETITIONER’S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, A FULL BLOWN
TRIAL UNDER THE MORE RIGID RULES OF EVIDENCE PRESCRIBED IN COURT PROCEEDINGS SHOULD HAVE BEEN
CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AND NOT THROUGH MERE "SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS"
SUCH AS THE ONE HAD BEFORE THE B.I.D.42

G.R. No. 171946

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN ENJOINING RESPONDENT’S DEPORTATION.43

Succinctly stated, the issues for our resolution are: (a) whether the cause of action of the Bureau against Carlos
and Jimmy had prescribed; (b) whether the deportation proceedings are null and void for failure to implead Carlos
as an indispensable party therein; (c) whether the evidence adduced by Carlos and Jimmy to prove their claim to
Philippine citizenship is substantial and sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction from continuing with the
deportation proceedings in order to give way to a formal judicial action to pass upon the issue of alienage; (d)
whether due process was properly observed in the proceedings before the Board; and (e) whether the petition for
habeas corpus should be dismissed.

The arguments raised by Carlos and Jimmy in their respective petitions are merely a rehash of the arguments they
adduced before the appellate tribunal and the trial court. Once again, they raised the same argument of
prescription. As to Carlos, it is his position that being recognized by the government to have acquired Philippine
citizenship, evidenced by the Certificate of Election issued to him on September 11, 1956, his citizenship could no
longer be questioned at this late date. As for Jimmy, he contends that the Board’s cause of action to deport him
has prescribed for the simple reason that his arrest was not made within five (5) years from the time the cause of
action arose, which according to him commenced in 1989 when he was alleged to have illegally acquired a
Philippine passport.

In any event, they argue that the deportation proceeding should be nullified altogether for failure to implead
Carlos as an indispensable party therein. Jimmy posits that the deportation case against him was made to depend
upon the citizenship of his father, Carlos, in that the Board found justification to order his deportation by declaring
that his father is a Chinese citizen even though the latter was never made a party in the deportation proceedings.
They argue that the Board could not simply strip Carlos of his citizenship just so they could question the citizenship
of Jimmy. To do so without affording Carlos the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove his claim to Philippine
citizenship would be the height of injustice. For failing to accord him the requisite due process, the whole
proceeding should perforce be stuck down.

While they concede that the Board has jurisdiction to hear cases against an alleged alien, they insist that judicial
intervention may be resorted to when the claim to citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds
to believe that the claim is correct, like in this case. Their claim to Philippine citizenship, they said, is clearly shown
by the fact that they were born, had been raised and had lived in this country all their lives; they speak fluent
Tagalog and Ilonggo; they engage in businesses reserved solely for Filipinos; they exercise their right to suffrage;
they enjoy the rights and privileges accorded only to citizens; and they have no record of any Alien Certificate of
Registration. More importantly, they contend that they were validly issued Philippine passports. They further posit
that the judicial intervention required is not merely a judicial review of the proceedings below, but a full-blown,
adversarial, trial-type proceedings where the rules of evidence are strictly observed.

Considering that his citizenship affects that of his son, Carlos opted to present controverting arguments to sustain
his claim to Philippine citizenship, notwithstanding the fact that according to him, he was never impleaded in the
deportation proceedings.

Carlos takes exception to the ruling of the appellate court that the doctrine of jus soli failed to accord him
Philippine citizenship for the reason that the same was never extended to the Philippines. He insists that if his
Philippine citizenship is not recognized by said doctrine, it is nonetheless recognized by the laws enforced prior to
the 1935 Constitution, particularly the Philippine Bill of 190244 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916
(Jones Law of 1916).45

According to Carlos, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law of 1916 deemed all inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands as well as their children born after the passage of said laws to be citizens of the Philippines. Because his
father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the Jones Law of 1916, he (Carlos)
undoubtedly acquired his father’s citizenship. Article IV, first paragraph, of the 1935 Constitution therefore applies
to him. Said constitutional provision reads:

ARTICLE IV. Citizenship

SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

xxxx

Even assuming that his father remained as a Chinese, Carlos also claims that he followed the citizenship of his
Filipina mother, being an illegitimate son, and that he even validly elected Philippine citizenship when he complied
with all the requirements of Com. Act No. 625. He submits that what is being disputed is not whether he complied
with Com. Act No. 625, but rather, the timeliness of his compliance. He stresses that the 3-year compliance period
following the interpretation given by Cuenco v. Secretary of Justice46 to Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935
Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 when election must be made, is not an inflexible rule. He reasoned that the
same decision held that such period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned
has always considered himself a Filipino, like in his case.47

We deny the appeal of Carlos and Jimmy for lack of merit.

Carlos and Jimmy’s claim that the cause of action of the Bureau has prescribed is untenable. Cases involving issues
on citizenship are sui generis. Once the citizenship of an individual is put into question, it necessarily has to be
threshed out and decided upon. In the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 48 we said that decisions
declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person’s future status with finality. This is
because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter, lose his citizenship under any of the modes
recognized by law for the purpose.49 Indeed, if the issue of one’s citizenship, after it has been passed upon by the
courts, leaves it still open to future adjudication, then there is more reason why the government should not be
precluded from questioning one’s claim to Philippine citizenship, especially so when the same has never been
threshed out by any tribunal.

Jimmy’s invocation of prescription also does not persuade us. Section 37 (b) of Com. Act No. 613 states:
Section 37. …

xxxx

(b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of this section at any time after entry, but shall
not be effected under any other clause unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years
after the cause of deportation arises….

xxxx

As shown in the Charge Sheet, Jimmy was charged for violation of Section 37(a)(9), 50 in relation to Section 45(e)51of
Com. Act No. 613. From the foregoing provision, his deportation may be effected only if his arrest is made within 5
years from the time the cause for deportation arose. The court a quo is correct when it ruled that the 5-year
period should be counted only from July 18, 2000, the time when Luis filed his complaint for deportation. It is the
legal possibility of bringing the action which determines the starting point for the computation of the period of
prescription.52 Additionally, Section 2 of Act No. 3326, 53 as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription
Shall Begin to Run," provides:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.

xxxx

The counting could not logically start in 1989 when his passport was issued because the government was unaware
that he was not a Filipino citizen. Had the government been aware at such time that he was not a Filipino citizen or
there were certain anomalies attending his application for such passport, it would have denied his application.

As to the issue of whether Carlos is an indispensable party, we reiterate that an indispensable party is a party in
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiff or
defendant.54 To be indispensable, a person must first be a real party in interest, that is, one who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 55 Carlos clearly is not
an indispensable party as he does not stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit. What is sought
is the deportation of Jimmy on the ground that he is an alien. Hence, the principal issue that will be decided on is
the propriety of his deportation. To recall, Jimmy claims that he is a Filipino under Section 1(3), 56 Article IV of the
1935 Constitution because Carlos, his father, is allegedly a citizen.57 Since his citizenship hinges on that of his
father’s, it becomes necessary to pass upon the citizenship of the latter. However, whatever will be the findings as
to Carlos’ citizenship will in no way prejudice him.

Citizenship proceedings, as aforestated, are a class of its own, in that, unlike other cases, res judicata does not
obtain as a matter of course. In a long line of decisions, this Court said that every time the citizenship of a person is
material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata; hence, it has to be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.58 Res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship
only if the following concur:

1. a person’s citizenship must be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;

2. the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof; and
 3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by this Court.59

In the event that the citizenship of Carlos will be questioned, or his deportation sought, the same has to be
ascertained once again as the decision which will be rendered hereinafter shall have no preclusive effect upon his
citizenship. As neither injury nor benefit will redound upon Carlos, he cannot be said to be an indispensable party
in this case.

There can be no question that the Board has the authority to hear and determine the deportation case against a
deportee and in the process determine also the question of citizenship raised by him. 60 However, this Court,
following American jurisprudence, laid down the exception to the primary jurisdiction enjoyed by the deportation
board in the case of Chua Hiong v. Deportation Board 61 wherein we stressed that judicial determination is
permitted in cases when the courts themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of
citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct.62 Moreover,
when the evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should
also be recognized and the courts shall promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. 63

While we are mindful that resort to the courts may be had, the same should be allowed only in the sound
discretion of a competent court in proper proceedings.64 After all, the Board’s jurisdiction is not divested by the
mere claim of citizenship.65 Moreover, a deportee who claims to be a citizen and not therefore subject to
deportation has the right to have his citizenship reviewed by the courts, after the deportation proceedings. 66 The
decision of the Board on the question is, of course, not final but subject to review by the courts.671avvphi1

After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the appellate court was not convinced that the same was sufficient to
oust the Board of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings considering that what were
presented particularly the birth certificates of Jimmy, as well as those of his siblings, Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr.
indicate that they are Chinese citizens. Furthermore, like the Board, it found the election of Carlos of Philippine
citizenship, which was offered as additional proof of his claim, irregular as it was not made on time.

We find no cogent reason to overturn the above findings of the appellate tribunal. The question of whether
substantial evidence had been presented to allow immediate recourse to the regular courts is a question of fact
which is beyond this Court’s power of review for it is not a trier of facts. 68 None of the exceptions69 in which this
Court may resolve factual issues has been shown to exist in this case. Even if we evaluate their arguments and the
evidence they presented once again, the same conclusion will still be reached.

One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos’ claim to Philippine citizenship is the doctrine of jus soli, or the
doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth. To recall, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled
that the doctrine of jus soli was never extended to the Philippines. We agree. The doctrine of jus soli was for a time
the prevailing rule in the acquisition of one’s citizenship.70 However, the Supreme Court abandoned the principle
of jus soli in the case of Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor.71 Since then, said doctrine only benefited those who were
individually declared to be citizens of the Philippines by a final court decision on the mistaken application of jus
soli.72

Neither will the Philippine Bill of 190273 nor the Jones Law of 191674 make Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His
bare claim that his father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the said laws,
without any supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice.

It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are
under the parental authority of the mother and follow her nationality.75 Moreover, we have also ruled that an
illegitimate child of a Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to
citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. 76 However, it is our considered view that
absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established rule
could not be applied to him.

As to the question of whether the election of Philippine citizenship conferred on Carlos Filipino citizenship, we find
that the appellate court correctly found that it did not.

Com. Act No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the
procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1
thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention
"in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer
oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement
with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines." 77

However, the 1935 Constitution and Com. Act No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of
Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon
reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching 21 years. In the opinions of the
then Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was
resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In
these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of
the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made within a
"reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean
that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.78

It is true that we said that the 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be extended as when the
person has always regarded himself as a Filipino. Be that as it may, it is our considered view that not a single
circumstance was sufficiently shown meriting the extension of the 3-year period. The fact that Carlos exercised his
right of suffrage in 1952 and 1955 does not demonstrate such belief, considering that the acts were done after he
elected Philippine citizenship. On the other hand, the mere fact that he was able to vote does not validate his
irregular election of Philippine citizenship. At most, his registration as a voter indicates his desire to exercise a right
appertaining exclusively to Filipino citizens but does not alter his real citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is
determined by blood (jus sanguinis). The exercise of the rights and privileges granted only to Filipinos is not
conclusive proof of citizenship, because a person may misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the
rights and privileges of citizens of this country.79

It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really
a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the state.80

As Carlos and Jimmy neither showed conclusive proof of their citizenship nor presented substantial proof of the
same, we have no choice but to sustain the Board’s jurisdiction over the deportation proceedings. This is not to say
that we are ruling that they are not Filipinos, for that is not what we are called upon to do. This Court necessarily
has to pass upon the issue of citizenship only to determine whether the proceedings may be enjoined in order to
give way to a judicial determination of the same. And we are of the opinion that said proceedings should not be
enjoined.

In our considered view, the allegation of Jimmy that due process was not observed in the deportation proceedings
must likewise fail.

Deportation proceedings are administrative in character, summary in nature, and need not be conducted strictly in
accordance with the rules of ordinary court proceedings.81 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to
be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to
seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.82 As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be
heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are sufficiently met.83 Although Jimmy was not
furnished with a copy of the subject Resolution and Charge Sheet as alleged by him, the trial court found that he
was given ample opportunity to explain his side and present controverting evidence, thus:

x x x It must be stressed that after receiving the Order dated September 11, 2001 signed by BSI Chief Ronaldo P.
Ledesma on October 4, 2001, petitioner Jimmy T. Go admitted that when his representative went to the B.I.D. to
inquire about the said Order, the latter chanced upon the Resolution dated February 14, 2001 and March 8, 2001
as well as the Charge Sheet dated July 3, 2001. Hence on October 5, 2001, he filed a "Motion for Extension of Time
to File Memorandum" and as such, was allowed by Ronaldo P. Ledesma an extension of ten (10) days to submit his
required memorandum. x x x84

This circumstance satisfies the demands of administrative due process.

As regards the petition in G.R. No. 171946, petitioners contend that the appellate tribunal erred in enjoining
Jimmy’s deportation.85

Petitioners question the remedy availed of by Jimmy. They argue that the existence of the remedy of an ordinary
appeal proscribes the filing of the petition for certiorari as was done in this case. They point out that the appeal
period in habeas corpus cases is only 48 hours, compared to a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court which is 60 days. This clearly shows that an ordinary appeal is the more plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
hence, it must be the one availed of.86 Since the decision of the trial court was not properly appealed, the same
may be said to have attained finality, and may no longer be disturbed. 87

They maintain that the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus by the trial court was proper. A petition for
habeas corpus has for its purpose only the determination of whether or not there is a lawful ground for Jimmy’s
apprehension and continued detention. They urge that the decision of the Board dated April 17, 2002 that ordered
Jimmy’s deportation has already attained finality by reason of the belated appeal taken by Jimmy from the said
decision on April 2, 2004 before the Office of the President, or after almost two years from the time the decision
was rendered. Said decision of the Board, they insist, is the lawful ground that sanctions Jimmy’s apprehension and
detention.88

Petitioners in G.R. No. 171946 also argue that Jimmy cannot rely on the bail on recognizance he was previously
granted to question his subsequent apprehension and detention. Under the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940,
the power to grant bail can only be exercised while the alien is still under investigation, and not when the order of
deportation had already been issued by the Board.89 Hence, the bail granted was irregular as it has no legal basis.
Furthermore, they said the petition for habeas corpus necessarily has to be dismissed because the same is no
longer proper once the applicant thereof has been charged before the Board, which is the case with
Jimmy.90Nonetheless, they claim that the habeas corpus case is rendered moot and academic as Jimmy is no longer
being detained.91

On the other hand, Jimmy counters that the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is the most appropriate,
speedy and adequate remedy in spite of the availability of ordinary appeal considering that what is involved in this
case is his cherished liberty. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the petitioners in ordering his arrest and
detention, he argues, all the more justifies the avails of the extraordinary writ. 92 Contrary to the petitioners’ stand,
Jimmy argues that the April 17, 2002 Decision of the Board has not attained finality owing to the availability of
various remedies, one of which is an appeal, and in fact is actually void because it was rendered without due
process.93 He also insists that the bail issued to him is valid and effective until the final determination of his
citizenship before the proper courts.94 Moreover, he maintains that the petition for habeas corpus was proper
since its object is to inquire into the legality of one’s detention, and if found illegal, to order the release of the
detainee.95As in his petition in G.R. No. 167570, Jimmy also contends that the proceedings before the Board is void
for failure to implead therein his father, and that he should have been given a full blown trial before a regular
court where he can prove his citizenship.96

Considering the arguments and contentions of the parties, we find the petition in G.R. No. 171946 meritorious.a1f

We have held in a litany of cases that the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The writ of certiorari does not lie where an appeal may be taken or where another adequate remedy is available
for the correction of the error.97

The petitioners correctly argue that appeal should have been the remedy availed of as it is more plain, speedy and
adequate. The 48-hour appeal period demonstrates the adequacy of such remedy in that no unnecessary time will
be wasted before the decision will be re-evaluated.

A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If
it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person’s detention as of, at the
earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception
illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 98 of Rule 102,
be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.99

Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest
duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been
charged before any court. The term "court" in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies
authorized to order the person’s confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of
Immigration.100 Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an
alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the
Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus
proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.101

Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending his deportation,
coupled by this Court’s pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the
deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. This being so, we find it
unnecessary to touch on the other arguments advanced by respondents regarding the same subject.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 167569 and 167570 are DENIED. The Decision dated October 25, 2004 and
Resolution dated February 16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85143 are AFFIRMED. The petition in
G.R. No. 171946 is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated December 8, 2005 and Resolution dated March 13, 2006
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88277 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The December 6, 2004 and
December 28, 2004 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167 are hereby REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158802 November 17, 2004

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa
City)
JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a two-fold relief: First, that respondent
Director of Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of petitioner Reynaldo de Villa; and second, that
petitioner be granted a new trial.1 These reliefs are sought on the basis of purportedly exculpatory evidence,
gathered after performing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on samples allegedly collected from the petitioner
and a child born to the victim of the rape.

By final judgment dated February 1, 2001, in People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo de Villa,2 we found petitioner
guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza, his niece by affinity; sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusión
perpetua; and ordered him to pay the offended party civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of the suit, and
support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child born of the rape. Petitioner is currently serving his
sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.

As summarized in our Decision dated February 1, 2001, Aileen Mendoza charged petitioner Reynaldo de Villa with
rape in an information dated January 9, 1995, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. When arraigned on
January 26, 1995, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty."3

During the trial, the prosecution established that sometime in the third week of April 1994, at about 10:00 in the
morning, Aileen Mendoza woke up in her family's rented room in Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila, to find petitioner on
top of her. Aileen was then aged 12 years and ten months. She was unable to shout for help because petitioner
covered her mouth with a pillow and threatened to kill her. Aileen could not do anything but cry. Petitioner
succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina. After making thrusting motions with his body, petitioner
ejaculated. This encounter allegedly resulted in Aileen's pregnancy, which was noticed by her mother, Leonila
Mendoza, sometime in November 1994. When confronted by her mother, Aileen revealed that petitioner raped
her. Aileen's parents then brought her to the Pasig Police Station, where they lodged a criminal complaint against
petitioner.4

Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, who examined Aileen, confirmed that she was eight months pregnant and found in her
hymen healed lacerations at the 5:00 and 8:00 positions. On December 19, 1994, Aileen gave birth to a baby girl
whom she named Leahlyn Mendoza.5

In his defense, petitioner alleged that, at the time of the alleged rape, he was already 67 years old. Old age and
sickness had rendered him incapable of having an erection. He further averred that Aileen's family had been
holding a grudge against him, which accounted for the criminal charges. Finally, he interposed the defense of alibi,
claiming that at the time of the incident, he was in his hometown of San Luis, Batangas. 6

The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, and sentenced him
to death, to indemnify the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs of the suit and to support the child,
Leahlyn Mendoza.7

On automatic review,8 we found that the date of birth of Aileen's child was medically consistent with the time of
the rape. Since it was never alleged that Aileen gave birth to a full-term nine-month old baby, we gave credence to
the prosecution's contention that she prematurely gave birth to an eight-month old baby by normal
delivery.9 Thus, we affirmed petitioner's conviction for rape, in a Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that he is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusión perpetua and ordered to pay the offended party P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; costs of the suit and to provide support for the child Leahlyn
Corales Mendoza.

SO ORDERED.10

Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, we are once more faced with the question of Reynaldo de
Villa's guilt or innocence.

Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He alleges that during the trial of the case, he
was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the
victim's child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was only informed during the pendency of the automatic review of
petitioner's case that DNA testing could resolve the issue of paternity. 11 This information was apparently furnished
by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-Death Penalty Task Force, which took over as counsel for
petitioner.

Thus, petitioner's brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood type test and DNA test in order to
determine the paternity of the child allegedly conceived as a result of the rape. 12 This relief was implicitly denied in
our Decision of February 21, 2001.

On March 16, 2001, Reynaldo de Villa filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision, wherein he once
more prayed that DNA tests be conducted.13 The Motion was denied with finality in a Resolution dated November
20, 2001.14 Hence, the Decision became final and executory on January 16, 2002. 15

Petitioner-relator was undaunted by these challenges. Having been informed that DNA tests required a sample
that could be extracted from saliva, petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a
classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup. 16 Leahlyn readily agreed and did so.
Billy Joe took the sample home and gave it to the petitioner-relator, who immediately labeled the cup as
"Container A."

Petitioner-relator then gathered samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa. These samples were placed
in separate containers with distinguishing labels and temporarily stored in a refrigerator prior to transport to the
DNA Analysis Laboratory at the National Science Research Institute (NSRI).17 During transport, the containers
containing the saliva samples were kept on ice.

Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those
given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The identities of the
donors of the samples, save for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA Analysis
Laboratory.18

After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March 21, 2003, which showed that Reynaldo
de Villa could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match
between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioner's sample and those of any of the other samples, including
Leahlyn's.19

Hence, in the instant petition for habeas corpus, petitioner argues as follows:

DNA ANALYSIS ON PATERNITY SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY THAT PETITIONER DE VILLA IS NOT THE FATHER OF
LEAHLYN MENDOZA; HIS CONVICTION FOR RAPE, BASED ON THE FACT THAT LEAHLYN WAS SIRED AS A
RESULT OF THE ALLEGED RAPE, CANNOT STAND AND MUST BE SET ASIDE.20

xxx xxx xxx

A NEW TRIAL TO CONSIDER NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE IS PROPER AND MAY BE ORDERED BY THIS
COURT IN VIEW OF THE RESULTS OF THE DNA TESTS CONDUCTED.21

Considering that the issues are inter-twined, they shall be discussed together.

In brief, petitioner relies upon the DNA evidence gathered subsequent to the trial in order to re-litigate the factual
issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza. Petitioner alleges that this issue is crucial, considering that his
conviction in 2001 was based on the factual finding that he sired the said child. Since this paternity is now
conclusively disproved, he argues that the 2001 conviction must be overturned.

In essence, petitioner invokes the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus to collaterally attack the 2001 Decision. The
ancillary remedy of a motion for new trial is resorted to solely to allow the presentation of what is alleged to be
newly-discovered evidence. This Court is thus tasked to determine, first, the propriety of the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus to release an individual already convicted and serving sentence by virtue of a final and executory
judgment; and second, the propriety of granting a new trial under the same factual scenario.

The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus has long been a haven of relief for those seeking liberty from any
unwarranted denial of freedom of movement. Very broadly, the writ applies "to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which a person has been deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person has
been withheld from the person entitled thereto". 22 Issuance of the writ necessitates that a person be illegally
deprived of his liberty. In the celebrated case of Villavicencio v. Lukban, 23 we stated that "[a]ny restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient."24

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally
deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual's liberty is
restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Concomitant to this principle, the writ of
habeas corpus cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal which,
having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the
conduct of the proceedings.

Thus, notwithstanding its historic function as the great writ of liberty, the writ of habeas corpus has very limited
availability as a post-conviction remedy. In the recent case of Feria v. Court of Appeals, 25 we ruled that review of a
judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in very specific
instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence;
or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. 26

In this instance, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to assail a final judgment of conviction, without,
however, providing a legal ground on which to anchor his petition. In fine, petitioner alleges neither the
deprivation of a constitutional right, the absence of jurisdiction of the court imposing the sentence, or that an
excessive penalty has been imposed upon him.

In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order to seek the review of findings of fact long passed
upon with finality. This relief is far outside the scope of habeas corpus proceedings. In the early case of Abriol v.
Homeres,27 for example, this Court stated the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, and
should not be thus used. The writ of habeas corpus, whereas permitting a collateral challenge of the jurisdiction of
the court or tribunal issuing the process or judgment by which an individual is deprived of his liberty, cannot be
distorted by extending the inquiry to mere errors of trial courts acting squarely within their jurisdiction. 28 The
reason for this is explained very simply in the case of Velasco v. Court of Appeals:29 a habeas corpus petition
reaches the body, but not the record of the case. 30 A record must be allowed to remain extant, and cannot be
revised, modified, altered or amended by the simple expedient of resort to habeas corpus proceedings.

Clearly, mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction over
the case and the person of the defendant, are not correctible in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus; if at all, these errors must be corrected on certiorari or on appeal, in the form and manner prescribed by
law.31 In the past, this Court has disallowed the review of a court's appreciation of the evidence in a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, as this is not the function of said writ. 32 A survey of our decisions in habeas
corpus cases demonstrates that, in general, the writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ which furnishes an
extraordinary remedy; it may thus be invoked only under extraordinary circumstances. 33 We have been categorical
in our pronouncements that the writ of habeas corpus is not to be used as a substitute for another, more proper
remedy. Resort to the writ of habeas corpus is available only in the limited instances when a judgment is rendered
by a court or tribunal devoid of jurisdiction. If, for instance, it can be demonstrated that there was a deprivation of
a constitutional right, the writ can be granted even after an individual has been meted a sentence by final
judgment.

Thus, in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals,34 the writ of habeas corpus was held to be available where an
accused was deprived of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. A defect so pronounced as the denial of
an accused's constitutional rights results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction, and therefore invalidates the trial
and the consequent conviction of the accused. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral
attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus.35 Later, in Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of
Prisons,36 this Court ruled that, once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that
rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the
legality of the detention.37 Although in Feria v. Court of Appeals38 this Court was inclined to allow the presentation
of new evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, this was an exceptional situation. In that
case, we laid down the general rule, which states that the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent
rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. Where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it
sets forth a process which, on its face, shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on
petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process.39

In the recent case of Calvan v. Court of Appeals,40 we summarized the scope of review allowable in a petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. We ruled that the writ of habeas corpus, although not designed to
interrupt the orderly administration of justice, can be invoked by the attendance of a special circumstance that
requires immediate action. In such situations, the inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus would be addressed, not to
errors committed by a court within its jurisdiction, but to the question of whether the proceeding or judgment
under which a person has been restrained is a complete nullity. The probe may thus proceed to check on the
power and authority, itself an equivalent test of jurisdiction, of the court or the judge to render the order that so
serves as the basis of imprisonment or detention.41 It is the nullity of an assailed judgment of conviction which
makes it susceptible to collateral attack through the filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus.

Upon a perusal of the records not merely of this case but of People v. de Villa, we find that the remedy of the writ
of habeas corpus is unavailing.

First, the denial of a constitutional right has not been alleged by petitioner. As such, this Court is hard-pressed to
find legal basis on which to anchor the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. Much as this Court sympathizes with
petitioner's plea, a careful scrutiny of the records does not reveal any constitutional right of which the petitioner
was unduly deprived.

We are aware that other jurisdictions have seen fit to grant the writ of habeas corpus in order to test claims that a
defendant was denied effective aid of counsel.42 In this instance, we note that the record is replete with errors
committed by counsel, and it can be alleged that the petitioner was, at trial, denied the effective aid of counsel.
The United States Supreme Court requires a defendant alleging incompetent counsel to show that the attorney's
performance was deficient under a reasonable standard, and additionally to show that the outcome of the trial
would have been different with competent counsel.43 The purpose of the right to effective assistance of counsel is
to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial. 44

The U.S. Supreme Court asserts that in judging any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, one must examine
whether counsel's conduct undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process to such an extent that
the trial did not produce a fair and just result.45 The proper measure of attorney performance is "reasonable"
under the prevailing professional norms, and the defendant must show that the representation received fell below
the objective standard of reasonableness.46 For the petition to succeed, the strong presumption that the counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range or reasonable professional assistance must be overcome. 47

In the case at bar, it appears that in the middle of the appeal, the petitioner's counsel of record, a certain Atty.
Alfonso G. Salvador, suddenly and inexplicably withdrew his appearance as counsel, giving the sole explanation
that he was "leaving for the United States for an indefinite period of time by virtue of a petition filed in his
favor."48 In the face of this abandonment, petitioner made an impassioned plea that his lawyer be prevented from
this withdrawal in a handwritten "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition of Counsel's Withdrawal of
Appearance with Leave of Court" received by this Court on September 14, 1999. 49 Petitioner alleged that his
counsel's withdrawal is an "untimely and heartbreaking event", considering that he had placed "all [his] trust and
confidence on [his counsel's] unquestionable integrity and dignity."50

While we are sympathetic to petitioner's plight, we do not, however, find that there was such negligence
committed by his earlier counsel so as to amount to a denial of a constitutional right. There is likewise no showing
that the proceedings were tainted with any other jurisdictional defect.

In fine, we find that petitioner invokes the remedy of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to seek a re-
examination of the records of People v. de Villa, without asserting any legal grounds therefor. For all intents and
purposes, petitioner seeks a reevaluation of the evidentiary basis for his conviction. We are being asked to
reexamine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence in this case, not on its own, but in light of the new DNA
evidence that the petitioner seeks to present to this Court. This relief is outside the scope of a habeas corpus
petition. The petition for habeas corpus must, therefore, fail.

Coupled with the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner seeks a new trial to re-litigate the
issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza.
It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendoza's paternity is not central to the issue of petitioner's guilt or
innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely different question, separate and distinct from the
question of the father of her child. Recently, in the case of People v. Alberio,51 we ruled that the fact or not of the
victim's pregnancy and resultant childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy
is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the victim bore was fathered by the
purported rapist, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment in determining an individual's guilt.

In the instant case, however, we note that the grant of child support to Leahlyn Mendoza indicates that our
Decision was based, at least in small measure, on the victim's claim that the petitioner fathered her child. This
claim was given credence by the trial court, and, as a finding of fact, was affirmed by this Court on automatic
review.

The fact of the child's paternity is now in issue, centrally relevant to the civil award of child support. It is only
tangentially related to the issue of petitioner's guilt. However, if it can be conclusively determined that the
petitioner did not sire Leahlyn Mendoza, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt, and allow the acquittal of
the petitioner on this basis.

Be that as it may, it appears that the petitioner once more relies upon erroneous legal grounds in resorting to the
remedy of a motion for new trial. A motion for new trial, under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is
available only for a limited period of time, and for very limited grounds. Under Section 1, Rule 121, of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for new trial may be filed at any time before a judgment of conviction
becomes final, that is, within fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or notice. Upon finality of the judgment,
therefore, a motion for new trial is no longer an available remedy. Section 2 of Rule 121 enumerates the grounds
for a new trial:

SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial.—The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:

(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been
committed during the trial;

(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably
change the judgment.

In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of purportedly "newly-discovered evidence", i.e., the
DNA test subsequently conducted, allegedly excluding petitioner from the child purportedly fathered as a result of
the rape.

The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has long attained
finality, and entry of judgment was made as far back as January 16, 2002. Moreover, upon an examination of the
evidence presented by the petitioner, we do not find that the DNA evidence falls within the statutory or
jurisprudential definition of "newly- discovered evidence".

A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are
met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that that, if admitted, it would probably
change the judgment.52 It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the
evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. 53
In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial, we nonetheless find that it
does not meet the criteria for "newly-discovered evidence" that would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving
paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence.

Petitioner-relator's claim that he was "unaware" of the existence of DNA testing until the trial was concluded
carries no weight with this Court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either
on the part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner's counsel. In either instance, however, this negligence is
binding upon petitioner. It is a settled rule that a party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he himself
was guilty of neglect.54 A client is bound by the acts of his counsel, including the latter's mistakes and
negligence.55 It is likewise settled that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects
of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or to a mistaken mode of
procedure.56

Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by petitioner and his counsel, we are
not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, even if it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction
could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendoza's testimony and positive identification as its bases. 57 The Solicitor
General reiterates, and correctly so, that the pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of
rape.58 Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be
discharged. Although petitioner claims that conviction was based solely on a finding of paternity of the child
Leahlyn, this is not the case. Our conviction was based on the clear and convincing testimonial evidence of the
victim, which, given credence by the trial court, was affirmed on appeal.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for habeas corpus and new trial is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
IN THE MATTER OF THE G.R. No. 167193
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
Present:

PUNO,* J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,**
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
ENGR. ASHRAF KUNTING,
Petitioner. Promulgated:

April 19, 2006

x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ x

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing Police Chief
Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan and General Robert Delfin,[1] Philippine National Police (PNP) Intelligence Chief,
to bring petitioner AshrafKunting before this Court and show cause why he is illegally detained.

The antecedents are as follows:

On October 19, 2001, petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Internal
Security Act. On June 12, 2003, the Royal Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, turned over Kunting to
thePNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Isabela City, Basilan, Branch 2, Ninth Judicial Region. Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for
Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention with the RTC under separate Amended Informations, docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 3674-1187, 3537-1129, 3608-1164, and 3611-1165.

Petitioner was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-IG at Camp Crame for booking
and custodial investigation.

In a letter dated July 3, 2003, Atty. Guillermo G. Danipog, Jr., Police Superintendent and Chief of the Legal
Affairs Division, PNP-IG, informed the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC that Kunting was already in the custody of
the PNP-IG. Atty. Danipog requested for Kuntings temporary detention at the PNP-
IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City due to the high security risks involved and prayed for the issuance of a corresponding
commitment order.
 In a letter dated July 9, 2003, Emilio F. Enriquez, Acting Clerk of Court of the RTC, replied to the request of
Atty. Danipog, thus:

xxx

The undersigned referred the matter to Hon. Danilo M. Bucoy, Presiding Judge of this
Court, who issued the Alias Warrant of Arrest in the herein mentioned case (Criminal Case No.
3674-1187) and per his instruction, accused As[h]rafKunting y Barreto [may be] temporarily
detained thereat by virtue of the Alias Warrant of Arrest issued in this case, however considering
that the accused is a high security risk, he should be brought to Isabela, Basilan as soon as the
necessary security escort can be provided for his transfer, where the proper commitment order
can be issued as the herein mentioned case is about to be submitted by the prosecution.

Thank you ever so much for your usual cooperation extended to the Court.[2]

On September 15, 2003, the RTC issued an Order directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs
Division, PNP-IG, to immediately turn over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for
Reinvestigation.

On November 5, 2003, PNP-IG Director Arturo C. Lomibao wrote a letter to Chief State
Prosecutor JovencitoR. Zuo, Department of Justice (DOJ), requesting for representation and a motion to be filed for
the transfer of the venue of the trial from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City, for the following reasons: (1) Several
intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG stating that utmost effort will be exerted by the
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover the custody of Kunting from the PNP considering his importance to the ASG; and
(2) there is a big possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if he will be detained in Basilan due to
inadequate security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity to the area of operation of the ASG.
On August 13, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision against petitioners co-accused in the consolidated Criminal
Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165, finding 17 of the accused, who were tried, guilty of
the crime/s charged.

On February 11, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying Kuntings Motion to Set Case for Preliminary
Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned over Kunting. The trial court reiterated its Order dated September 15,
2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to turn over Kunting to the court.
In a letter dated February 22, 2005, Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan reiterated the request
to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo to facilitate the transfer of the venue of the trial of Kuntings case, citing
the same grounds in the previous letter. He added that if Kunting had been transferred to Isabela City, Basilan, he
could have been one of the escapees in a jail break that occurred on April 10, 2004 as suspected ASG members were
able to go scot-free.

On March 15, 2005, Police Inspector Amado L. Barbasa, Jr., OIC, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, filed with the
RTC a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Order dated February 11, 2005, citing, among other grounds, the
existence of a pending motion for the transfer of the venue of the trial of Criminal Case No. 3537-1129
against Kunting, which was allegedly filed by the DOJ before this Court. Police Inspector Barbasa prayed that the
Order of the RTC dated February 11, 2005, directing the turnover of Kunting to the court, be suspended until the
motion for the transfer of venue is resolved.

On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. Kuntingstated that he has been restrained of his liberty since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-IG led by Police Chief
Superintendent Ismael Rafanan and assisted by PNP Intelligence Chief, General Robert Delfin. He alleged that he was
never informed of the charges filed against him until he requested his family to research in Zamboanga City. It was
discovered in the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan that his name appeared in the list of accused who allegedly participated
in the kidnapping incident which occurred on June 2, 2001 in Lamitan, Basilan.

Kunting asserted that he never participated in the kidnapping incident, so he promptly filed an Urgent
Motion for Reinvestigation on

September 8, 2003. He was aware that the PNP-IG requested Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo for
representation to file a motion with this Court for the transfer of venue of his case
from Isabela City, Basilan to PasigCity. Having no further information on the status of his case, he filed a Motion to
Set Case for Preliminary Investigation on January 26, 2005. He stated that since no action was taken by the trial court
or the DOJ, he filed this petition to put an end to his illegal detention classified in the records as for safekeeping
purposes only.

The main issue is whether the petition for habeas corpus can prosper.

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to all case of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into
the cause of detention of a person,[3] and if found illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee.[4] If, however,
the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.[5]

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed:
 SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in
this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense
in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. [6]

In this case, Kuntings detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was arrested by the
PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His
temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial court.

Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention in
Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-1187, and 3611-1165. In accordance with the last sentence of
Section 4 above, the writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been charged with a
criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals[7] holds that once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may
no longer question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Nevertheless, this Court notes that the RTC in its Order dated February 11, 2005 reiterated its Order dated
September 15, 2003, directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG,
Camp Crame,Quezon City, to turn over Kunting to the court. TThe trial court has been waiting for two years for the
PNP-IG to turn over the person of Kunting for the trial of his case. The PNP-IG has delayed the turn over because it
is waiting for the DOJ to request for the transfer of venue of the trial of the case
from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. In the absence of evidence that the DOJ has indeed filed a motion for the
transfer of venue, In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General stated that the PNP-IG is presently awaiting the
resolution of the Motion for Transfer of Venue it requested from the DOJ. In this regard, t the Police Chief
Superintendent is, therefore, directed to take positive steps towards action on said motion.comply with the Order
of the trial court, dated February 11, 2005, to turn over the body of petitioner Kunting to the trial court..

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170924 July 4, 2007

In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of CEZARI GONZALES and JULIUS MESA
ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO, petitioner,
vs.
Gen. EFREN ABU, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and all persons acting in his stead and
under his authority, and GEN. ERNESTO DE LEON, in his capacity as the Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine
Navy, and all persons acting in his stead and under his authority, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 which dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus filed by petitioner Roberto Rafael
Pulido (Pulido) in behalf of Cezari Gonzales and Julius Mesa, and imposed on petitioner the penalty of censure, and
its Resolution2 dated 6 January 2006 denying his motion for reconsideration.

The facts are not disputed.

At around one o’clock in the morning of 27 July 2003, three hundred twenty-one (321) junior officers and enlisted
personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) entered and took over the premises of the Oakwood
Premiere Luxury Apartments (Oakwood) located at the Glorietta Complex, Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They
disarmed the security guards of said establishment and planted explosives in its immediate surroundings.

The soldiers publicly announced that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances against the administration of
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (President Arroyo). They declared their withdrawal of support from the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP – President Arroyo – and demanded her resignation and that of the members of
her cabinet and top officers of both the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

At about one o’clock in the afternoon, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring the country to be
under a "state of rebellion." Consequently, she issued General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and the PNP to carry
out all reasonable measures, giving due regard to constitutional rights, to suppress and quell the "rebellion."

After a series of negotiations between the soldiers and the government negotiators, the former agreed to return
to barracks, thus ending the occupation of Oakwood.

Among those involved in the occupation of Oakwood were Cezari Gonzales and Julius Mesa, both enlisted
personnel of the Philippine Navy. It is in their behalf that the Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed before the Court
of Appeals.

On 2 August 2003, then AFP Chief of Staff Narciso L. Abaya issued a directive3 to all Major Service Commanders
and to the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) regarding the Custody of
Military Personnel Involved in the 27 July 2003 Mutiny. On the strength thereof, Gonzales and Mesa were taken
into custody by their Service Commander.

Gonzales and Mesa were not charged before a court martial with violation of the Articles of War. They were,
however, among the soldiers charged before Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, with the
crime of Coup D’etat as defined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code. Said case entitled, "People v. Capt.
Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al." was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. On 18 November 2003, a Commitment
Order was issued by the RTC committing custody of the persons of Gonzales and Mesa to the Commanding Officer
of Fort San Felipe Naval Base, Cavite City.4

On 8 December 2003, Gonzales and Mesa were discharged 5 from military service.

On 16 December 2003, per order of the RTC, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 was consolidated with Criminal Case No.
03-2678 entitled, "People v. Ramon B. Cardenas" pending before Branch 148 of the RTC of Makati City, on the
ground that the cases are founded on the same facts and/or formed part of a series of offenses of similar
character.6

In a Manifestation and Motion dated 3 March 2004, Commodore Normando Naval, Commander of Naval Base
Cavite, asked the Makati RTC, Branch 148, to relieve him of his duty as custodian of Gonzales and Mesa and that
the latter be transferred to the Makati City Jail.7 In an Order dated 29 April 2004, the RTC relieved him of his duty
but ordered the transfer of Gonzales and Mesa from the Naval Base Cavite in Sangley Point, Cavite City, to the
Philippine Marine Brigade Headquarters, Philippine Marine, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the
custody of the Commander of the Marine Brigade of the Philippine Marines, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig, Metro Manila. 8

In an Order dated 8 July 2004, the RTC resolved the petitions for bail filed by the accused-soldiers. It admitted
Gonzales and Mesa, and twenty-five other co-accused to bail pegging the amount thereof at P100,000.00 each.9

On 19 July 2004, both Gonzales and Mesa posted bail.10 On 20 July 2004, the RTC issued orders directing the
Commanding Officer of Philippine Marine Corps, Fort Bonifacio, Makati City, to release Gonzales and Mesa from
his custody.11 Despite said orders and their service to the marines, Gonzales and Mesa were not released.

On 21 July 2004, the People of the Philippines moved for partial reconsideration 12 of the order granting bail. Prior
to the resolution of said motion, Jovencito R. Zuño, Chief State Prosecutor, advised Brig. Gen. Manuel F. Llena,
Judge Advocate General, to defer action on the provisional release of Gonzales and Mesa "until the Motion for
Reconsideration shall have been resolved and attained finality."13 On 26 October 2004, the RTC denied the motion
for partial reconsideration.

With the denial of the Motion for Partial Reconsideration, the People filed with the Court of Appeals on 4 February
2005 a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with urgent prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, asking for the nullification and setting aside of the
orders dated 8 July 2004 and 26 October 2004 of Judge Oscar B. Pimentel for having been issued without
jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Petition for Certiorari
was raffled to the Seventh Division and was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88440 entitled, "People of the Philippines
v. Hon. Oscar B. Pimentel, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 148." The Court of
Appeals (Seventh Division) did not issue a TRO and/or preliminary injunction.

Since Gonzales and Mesa continued to be in detention, a Petition for Habeas Corpus14 was filed by petitioner
Pulido on their behalf on 22 July 2005. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 and raffled to the Third
Division. In support thereof, it was argued that since Gonzales and Mesa are no longer subject to Military Law as
they had been discharged from the service on 8 December 2003, and since they are not charged before a court
martial, the military authorities have no jurisdiction to detain them, and there is no legal ground to detain them
further because a court order for their release had already been issued.

On 10 August 2005, the Court of Appeals (3rd Division) issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus directing respondents Gen.
Efren Abu, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and all persons acting in his stead and under his
authority, and Gen. Ernesto de Leon, Flag Officer in Command of the Philippine Navy, and all persons acting in his
stead and under his authority, to produce the bodies of Gonzales and Mesa before the Court and to appear and
show the cause and validity of their detention.15
On 18 August 2005, a return of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was made.16 Respondents prayed that the Petition
for Habeas Corpus be dismissed primarily on two grounds: (1) the continued detention of Gonzales and Mesa is
justified because of the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari questioning the order dated 8 July 2004 of the RTC
granting bail to Gonzales and Mesa before the 7th Division of the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
88440; and (2) petitioner is guilty of forum shopping because of his failure to state in the petition that the order
granting bail has been elevated to the Court of Appeals and pending before its 7 th Division.

On 9 September 2005, the Court of Appeals (7th Division) rendered its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 88440 dismissing
the petition that questioned the propriety of the granting of bail to Gonzales, Mesa, and twenty-five of their co-
accused.17

On 12 September 2005, the Court of Appeals (3rd Division) dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus for violation of
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. It ratiocinated:

A reading of the parties’ submissions reveals a threshold issue – the charge of forum shopping and the
related falsity in the certification supporting the petition. We must initially resolve these issues because a
finding that the petitioner violated Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court can lead to the outright
dismissal of the present petition. x x x

xxxx

The records show that the present petition contained the following certificate of non-forum shopping:

"I, ROBERTO RAFAEL PULIDO, with office address at Unit 1601, 16th Floor 139 Corporate Center
Valero Street, Makati City, after having been duly sworn in accordance with law, do hereby state
that:

1. I am the petitioner in the above-captioned case;

2. I have read the Petition and caused it to be prepared. All the contents thereof are true to my
own personal knowledge and the record;

3. I have not heretofore commenced any action or proceeding involving the same issues, in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency and to the best of my
knowledge, no action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
any other tribunal or agency; except for the related cases of "Eugene Gonzales et al. vs. Gen.
Narciso Abaya, et al., G.R. No. 164007 and "Humabono Adaza et al., vs. Gen. Pedro Cabuay et al.,
G.R. No. 160792, both awaiting the resolution of the Supreme Court.

5. (sic, should be 4) If I should learn of any similar action or proceeding filed or is pending in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I undertake to report such
fact within five (5) days therefrom to this Court.

The present petition and its accompanying certification likewise show that the petitioner never
mentioned the pendency before the Seventh Division of this Court of the certiorari case, SP 88440, for the
annulment of the lower court’s order granting the soldiers-accused’s petition for bail, when this same
lower court order is cited as basis for the immediate release of Gonzales and Mesa in the present petition.
All that the certification mentioned were the related cases pending before the Honorable Supreme Court.
Neither did the petitioner comply with his undertaking under his certification to inform this Court within
five (5) days of the pendency of any similar action or proceeding filed or is pending in the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, as in fact the certiorari case was already pending
with this Court when the present petition was filed. The certiorari case was only brought to our attention
after the respondents filed their Return of the Writ.

To be sure, the petitioner, who is also the counsel for the accused Gonzales and Mesa in the criminal case
before Branch 148 RTC Makati City and who represents Gonzales and Mesa as private respondents in CA-
G.R. SP No. 88440, cannot feign ignorance of the pendency of the certiorari case. Why he deliberately
kept the pendency of the certiorari case hidden from us, has not been sufficiently explained. We have no
doubt, however, that his deliberate act of withholding information on a material fact directly required to
be disclosed by the Rules of Court cannot but have legal consequences.

The primary basis of the present petition is the bail granted to and posted by Gonzales and Mesa. This is
very clear from the petitioner’s argument that "The continued detention of the enlisted personnel
constitutes violation of the lawful orders of the civilian court." He cited in support of this argument the
grant and the posting of the bail, and the issuance of the release orders by the lower court. He did not
disclose, however, what subsequently happened to the order granting bail. He deliberately omitted in his
narration the fact that the People moved to reconsider this order. Thus, he gave the impression that the
order granting bail immediately became enforceable and that Gonzales’ and Mesa’s continued detention
is illegal because their constitutional rights to bail, which have received judicial imprimatur, were
continuously being violated by the respondents.

The petitioner next omitted the fact that after the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the order
granting bail, the People filed the certiorari case before this Court, seeking to annul the lower court’s
order. While we are aware of the rule that – the mere pendency of a petition for certiorari will not prevent
the implementation of the assailed order unless the court where the petition was filed issues either a
temporary restraining order or a writ or preliminary injunction – the filing of a petition for habeas corpus
while the order granting bail is being questioned on a petition for certiorari raises issues beyond the
immediate execution of the lower court’s bail and release orders. They raise questions on the propriety of
filing the habeas corpus petition to seek the release of persons under detention, at the same time that a
petition regarding their continued detention and release are pending. Apparently, the petitioner wanted
to avoid these questions, prompting him to actively conceal the subsequent motion for reconsideration of
the bail order and the petition for certiorari directly questioning this same order. In short, the petitioner
conveniently omitted in his narration of facts the material factual antecedents detrimental to his cause;
he chose to narrate only the factual antecedents favorable to his cause.

That the present petition has direct and intimate links with the certiorari case is beyond doubt as they
involve two sides of the same coin. The certiorari case filed by the People seeks to prevent the release of
Gonzales and Mesa by annulling the lower court’s grant of bail. The present petition, on the other hand,
was filed in behalf of Gonzales and Mesa to secure their immediate release because the order granting
bail is already executory. In effect, the petitioner seeks to implement through a petition for habeas corpus
the provisional release from detention that the lower court has ordered. The question this immediately
raises is: can this be done through a petition for habeas corpus when the validity of the grant of bail and
the release under bail are live questions before another Division of this Court?

We believe and so hold that his cannot and should not be done as this is precisely the reason why the rule
against forum shopping has been put in place. The remedies sought being two sides of the same coin (i.e.,
the release of Gonzales and Mesa), they cannot be secured through separately-filed cases where issues of
jurisdiction may arise and whose rulings may conflict with one another. To be sure, we clearly heard the
petitioner say that there can be no conflict because the effectiveness of our ruling in this petition will
depend on the nature and tenor of the ruling in the certiorari case; there is no basis for a release on
habeas corpus if this same Court will rule in the certiorari case that the grant of bail is improper. For this
very same reason, we should not entertain the present petition as the matter before us is already before
another co-equal body whose ruling will be finally determinative of the issue of Gonzales’ and Mesa’s
 release. The Decision of the Seventh Division of this Court, heretofore footnoted, ordering the release on
bail of Gonzales and Mesa drives home this point.

To be strictly accurate, the issues of detention and immediate release that are now before the two
Divisions of this Court are likewise properly within the jurisdiction of the lower court who has original
jurisdiction over the criminal case and who has issued the order granting bail in the exercise of this
jurisdiction. If indeed there is a question relating to the immediate release of Gonzales and Mesa
pursuant to the lower court’s order pending the determination of the certiorari issues, such question
should be brought before the lower court as the tribunal that has ordered the release, or before the
Seventh Division of this Court in the exercise of its supervisory powers over the lower court. The Decision
recently promulgated by the Seventh Division of this Court ordering the release on bail of the soldiers-
accused effectively demonstrates this point.

The inter-relationships among the criminal case below, the certiorari case and the present petition, as
well as among the courts where these cases are pending, show beyond doubt that the petitioner
committed forum shopping in the strict sense of that term i.e., the attempt by a party, after an adverse
opinion in one forum, to seek a favorable opinion in another forum other that through an appeal or
certiorari. The "adverse" aspect for the petitioner, while not an opinion, is no less adverse as he has failed
to secure the release of Gonzales and Mesa before the lower court and before this Court in the certiorari
case (as of the time of the filing of the present petition); thus, he came to us in the present petition. That
the Seventh Division of this Court has ordered the release on bail of the soldiers-accused, thus rendering
the present petition moot and academic after the finality of the 7 th Division Decision, plainly
demonstrates this legal reality.18

The Court further imposed on petitioner the penalty of censure for the aforesaid violation. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the petition for violation of and pursuant to
Section 5 Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner, Atty. Roberto Rafael Pulido, is hereby CENSURED for
these violations. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Honorable Supreme Court, to be attached to
the petitioner’s record as a member of the Bar, as a RECORD OF CENSURE that may be referred to and
considered in any future similar act.19

On 5 September 2005, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 20 which the Court of Appeals (Special Former
Third Division) denied in its resolution21 dated 6 January 2006.

Petitioner is now before us raising the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING.

A. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
NATURE OF THE ACTION AND LIMITED ITSELF TO THE ISSUE OF FORUM SHOPPING.

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN IMPOSING UPON

PETITIONER THE PENALTY OF CENSURE.

C. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT PASSING UPON THE
EXISTENCE OR ABSENCE OF VALID GROUNDS TO DETAIN JULIUS MESA AND CEZARI GONZALES.
Petitioner prays that the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals be reversed and set aside, and an
order be issued ordering respondents to immediately release Gonzales and Mesa. He further prays that the
censure against him be also reversed and set aside.

Before respondents could comment on the petition, petitioner filed, with leave of court, a Motion to Withdraw the
Prayer for the Immediate Release of Julius Mesa and Cezari Gonzales. 22 Petitioner informed the Court that the
Commanding General of the Philippine Marines had ordered the release of Gonzales and Mesa and surrendered
their persons to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 148. Thus, Mesa and Gonzales are now enjoying temporary liberty
by virtue of the release orders dated 20 July 2004 issued by the RTC. Petitioner asks that the prayer for the
immediate release of Gonzales and Mesa be dismissed but asks that the other prayers in the petition be granted.

In its comment, the Solicitor General stressed that the habeas corpus petition has been rendered moot and
academic by reason of the release of Mesa and Gonzales from detention and, in the absence of an actual case or
controversy, it is impractical to consider and resolve issues involving the validity or legality of their detention,
including the alleged refusal of the Court of Appeals to resolve said issues.

When the release of the persons in whose behalf the application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed is effected,
the Petition for the issuance of the writ becomes moot and academic. 23 With the release of both Mesa and
Gonzales, the Petition for Habeas Corpus has, indeed, been rendered moot. Courts of justice constituted to pass
upon substantial rights will not consider questions where no actual interests are involved. Thus, the well-settled
rule that courts will not determine a moot question. Where the issues have become moot and academic, there
ceases to be any justiciable controversy, thus rendering the resolution of the same of no practical value.24 This
Court will therefore abstain from expressing its opinion in a case where no legal relief is needed or called for. 25

The only remaining issues to be resolved are: (1) Is petitioner guilty of forum shopping? (2) Should petitioner be
penalized when he failed to inform the 3rd Division of the Court of Appeals of the pendency of the Petition
for Certiorari filed by respondents before the 7th Division of the same court which asked for the annulment of the
RTC’s order granting Gonzales and Mesa’s petition for bail?

To support his contention that there was no forum shopping, petitioner asserts that the issues in the petitions
for certiorari and habeas corpus are not similar/identical. As to his non-disclosure of respondents’ filing of the
motion for reconsideration and the Petition for Certiorari, petitioner claims that the same has no legal relevance to
the Petition for Habeas Corpus because at the time he filed said petition, the order granting bail subsisted and has
not been reversed or modified; and no TRO or injunction has been issued that would affect the efficacy or validity
of the order granting the bail and the order directing the release of Mesa and Gonzales.

For filing a Petition for Habeas Corpus despite the pendency of the Petition for Certiorari that questioned the
validity of the order granting bail, which order is precisely the very basis of the Petition for Habeas Corpus,
petitioner is guilty of forum shopping.

It has been held that forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in
one forum, of seeking another (and possibly favorable) opinion in another forum (other than by appeal or the
special civil action of certiorari), or the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same
cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. Thus, it has been held
that there is forum shopping — (1) when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable
decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; OR (2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme
Court, a party files a motion before the Court of Appeals, since in such a case, he deliberately splits appeals in the
hope that even in one case in which a particular allowable remedy sought for is dismissed, another case (offering a
similar remedy) would still be open; OR (3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another
court after failing to obtain the same from the original court.26
The Court has laid down the yardstick to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, as
where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other. Stated differently, there must be between the two cases: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.27

As lucidly explained by the Court of Appeals, the ultimate relief sought by petitioner in both
the certiorari and habeas corpus cases is the release of Gonzales and Mesa. Petitioner should not have filed the
Petition for Habeas Corpusbecause the relief he is seeking therein is the same relief he is asking for in the certiorari
case. Moreover, the main issue in both cases boils down to whether Gonzales and Mesa should be released on
bail. Because of the presence of the elements of litis pendentia -- parties, reliefs and issue are substantially the
same/similar in the two cases; and any decision in the certiorari case will be binding on the habeas corpus case –
petitioner is thus guilty of forum shopping.

For his failure to inform the Court of Appeals of the pendency of the certiorari case, petitioner clearly violated his
obligation to disclose within five days the pendency of the same or a similar action or claim as mandated in Section
5(c), Rule 728 of the Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90546 dated 12
September 2005 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162734 August 29, 2006

MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES, ORLANDO B. SALIENTES, and ROSARIO C. SALIENTES, Petitioners,
vs.
LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO SABUNDAYO, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 203,
MUNTINLUPA CITY, Respondents

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

The instant petition assails the Decision 1dated November 10, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
75680, which dismissed the petition for certiorari against the orders of the Regional Trial Court in Special
Proceedings No. 03-004. Likewise assailed is the Court of Appeals’ Resolution 2dated March 19, 2004 denying
reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of the
minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonette’s parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes
and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private respondent suggested to his wife that they transfer to
their own house, but Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was
prevented from seeing his son.

Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas
Corpus and Custody, 3 docketed as Special Proceedings No. 03-004 before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa
City. On January 23, 2003, the trial court issued the following order:

Upon verified Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by Petitioners, the Respondents Marie Antonette Abigail C.
Salientes, Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes are hereby directed to produce and bring before this Court
the body of minor Lorenzo Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla on January 31, 2003 at 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon and
to show cause why the said child should not be discharged from restraint.

Let this Writ be served by the Sheriff or any authorized representative of this Court, who is directed to immediately
make a return.

SO ORDERED. 4

Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the court denied.

Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed on
November 10, 2003. The appellate court affirmed the February 24, 2003 Order of the trial court holding that its
January 23, 2003 Order did not award the custody of the 2-year-old child to any one but was simply the standard
order issued for the production of restrained persons. The appellate court held that the trial court was still about
to conduct a full inquiry, in a summary proceeding, on the cause of the minor’s detention and the matter of his
custody. The Court of Appeals ruled thus:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 5
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied on March 19, 2004.

Hence, petitioners interposed this appeal by certiorari anchored on the following grounds:

1. The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion, amounting
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing an order for the petitioner-mother to first show cause why her own
three-year old child in her custody should not be discharged from a so-called "restraint" despite no evidence at all
of restraint and no evidence of compelling reasons of maternal unfitness to deprive the petitioner-mother of her
minor son of tender years. The assailed orders, resolutions and decisions of the lower court and the Court of
Appeals are clearly void;

2. The Court of Appeals erred in not pronouncing that the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in issuing
a writ of habeas corpus which clearly is not warranted considering that there is no unlawful restraint by the
mother and considering further that the law presumes the fitness of the mother, thereby negating any notion of
such mother illegally restraining or confining her very own son of tender years. The petition is not even sufficient in
substance to warrant the writ. The assailed orders are clearly void.

3. Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, the "Sombong vs. CA" case supports rather than negates the position
of the petitioners.

4. Contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, summary proceeding does violence to the tender-years-rule

5. The Court of Appeals failed to consider that the private respondent failed to present prima facie proof of any
compelling reason of the unfitness of the petitioner-mother;

6. The Court of Appeals failed to see that the New Rules on Custody SUFFICES AS REMEDY. 6

Plainly put, the issue is: Did the Court of Appeals err when it dismissed the petition for certiorari against the trial
court’s orders dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003?

Petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article 213 7 of the Family Code, which provides that no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. They maintain that herein respondent Loran had the burden of showing any compelling reason but
failed to present even a prima facie proof thereof.

Petitioners posit that even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy for private
respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is
unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. They insist there was no
illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own mother. There was no need for the mother to show cause
and explain the custody of her very own child.

Private respondent counters that petitioners’ argument based on Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to the
second part of his petition regarding the custody of his son. It does not address the first part, which pertains to his
right as the father to see his son. He asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who
restrains the minor’s right to see his father and vice versa. He avers that the instant petition is merely filed for
delay, for had petitioners really intended to bring the child before the court in accordance with the new rules on
custody of minors, they would have done so on the dates specified in the January 23, 2003 and the February 24,
2003 orders of the trial court.

Private respondent maintains that, under the law, he and petitioner Marie Antonette have shared custody and
parental authority over their son. He alleges that at times when petitioner Marie Antonette is out of the country as
required of her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have custody of their son and not
the maternal grandparents.

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the assailed January 23, 2003 Order of the trial court did not
grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and
explain why they are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent to the trial
court’s full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending before it.

Under Rule 41, Section 1 8 of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable but the aggrieved party
may file an appropriate special action under Rule 65. The aggrieved party must show that the court gravely abused
its discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon petitioners to show that
the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order.

Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled
thereto. 9Under Article 211 10 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint
parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de
facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to
one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondent’s
cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. 11 Hence, the remedy
of habeas corpus is available to him.

In a petition for habeas corpus, the child’s welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare
Code12 unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his
welfare shall be the paramount consideration. 13

Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed
petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why private respondent is prevented from seeing his child.
This is in line with the directive in Section 9 14 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC 15 that within fifteen days after the filing of the
answer or the expiration of the period to file answer, the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent
(herein petitioners) to present the minor before the court. This was exactly what the court did.

Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline
for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private
respondent’s petition for custody. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the
said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.

In sum, the trial court did not err in issuing the orders dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003. Hence, the
Court of Appeals properly dismissed the petition for certiorari against the said orders of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decisiondated November 10, 2003 and the Resolutiondated March 19,
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75680 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190108 October 19, 2010

DAVID E. SO, on behalf of his daughter MARIA ELENA SO GUISANDE, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ESTEBAN A. TACLA, JR., Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 208; and DR. BERNARDO A.
VICENTE, National Center for Mental Health, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 190473

HON. ESTEBAN A. TACLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Mandaluyong City, Branch 208; and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DAVID E. SO, on behalf of his daughter MARIA ELENA SO GUISANDE, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions:

(1) A petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo against Judge Esteban A. Tacla, Jr. (Judge Tacla)
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 208, Mandaluyong City, and Dr. Bernardo A. Vicente (Dr. Vicente)
of the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH), docketed as G.R. No. 190108; and

(2) G.R. No. 190473, which is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente of the NCMH, assailing
the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered in open court on December 3, 2009, in the case
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 00039.

The antecedents are:

Petitioner David E. So (So) in G.R. No. 190108 filed the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo on
behalf of his daughter, Ma. Elena So Guisande (Guisande), accused of Qualified Theft in the criminal case pending
before Judge Tacla. Petitioner So alleged, among others, that Guisande was under a life-threatening situation while
confined at the NCMH, the government hospital ordered by the RTC Mandaluyong City to ascertain the actual
psychological state of Guisande, who was being charged with a non-bailable offense.

Prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings before the RTC, Guisande was committed by So for psychiatric
treatment and care at the Makati Medical Center (MMC). Thus, the return of the warrant for the arrest of
Guisande, issued by Judge Tacla, stated that the former was confined at MMC for Bipolar Mood Disorder and that
she was "not ready for discharge," as certified by her personal psychiatrist, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Tan.

Acting on the prosecution’s Urgent Motion to Refer Accused’s Illness to a Government Hospital, Judge Tacla
ordered Guisande’s referral to the NCMH for an independent forensic assessment of Guisande’s mental health to
determine if she would be able to stand arraignment and undergo trial for Qualified Theft.

Subsequently, Judge Tacla, upon motion of the NCMH, ordered that accused Guisande be physically brought to the
NCMH, with NCMH Chief Dr. Vicente to have temporary legal custody of the accused, and thereafter, Judge Tacla
would issue the corresponding order of confinement of Guisande in a regular jail facility upon the NCMH’s
determination that she was ready for trial.

Accused Guisande was confined at the NCMH Payward, Pavilion 6-I-E, instead of Pavilion 35, Forensic Psychiatric
Section, where female court case patients are usually confined at the NCMH. In connection therewith, Dr. Vicente
issued a special Memorandum on November 9, 2009, reiterating existing hospital policies on the handling of court
case patients undergoing evaluation procedures to foreclose any possibility of malingering 2 on the patient’s part,
specifically patients accused of a non-bailable crime.

Eventually, claiming "life-threatening" circumstances surrounding her confinement at the NCMH which supposedly
worsened her mental condition and violated her constitutional rights against solitary detention and assistance of
counsel, accused Guisande and her father simultaneously, albeit separately, filed a Motion for Relief from Solitary
Confinement before the RTC Mandaluyong City, and the present petition in G.R. No. 190108 for the issuance of the
writs of habeas corpus and amparo.

On the Motion for Relief filed with RTC Mandaluyong City, Judge Tacla issued the following Order:

The Court rules to Grant accused’s [Guisande’s] motion subject to the condition that only the accused’s counsel
and the accused’ physician on her hypothyroid condition are allowed to visit the accused in coordination with the
respective psychiatrist/doctor of the NCMH taking charge of the psychiatric examination upon accused. 3

On the petition for habeas corpus and amparo, this Court issued a Resolution on November 24, 2009, to wit:

G.R. No. 190108 (David E. So, in Behalf of his Daughter Maria Elena So Guisande vs. Hon. Esteban A. Tacla, Jr.,
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong, Branch 208, Dr. Bernardo A. Vicente, National Center for Mental Health). –
Acting on the Petition for Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo, the Court Resolved to

(a) ISSUE a JOINT WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND AMPARO;

(b) REFER the petition to the Court of Appeals, Manila, for (i) IMMEDIATE RAFFLE among the Members of
the said Court; (ii) HEARING on December 3, 2009, Thursday, at 10:00 a.m.; and (iii) DECISION within ten
(10) days after its submission for decision; and

(c) ORDER the respondents to make a verified RETURN of the Joint Writ of Habeas Corpus and Amparo
before the Court of Appeals, Manila, on December 1, 2009, and to COMMENT on the petition before said
date.4

As directed by this Court, Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente appeared before the CA on December 1, 2009 and, in the
afternoon, filed their Consolidated Return of the Writ.

On December 3, 2009, the NCMH submitted its Evaluation Report to the RTC Mandaluyong City:

ASSESSMENT AND REMARKS:

Review of the history and clinical reports from Makati Medical Center revealed that Ma. Elena So-Guisande was
diagnosed and managed as Bipolar I Disorder. On the other hand, based on a series of mental status examinations
and observations at our center, she is found not manifesting signs and symptoms of psychosis at the present time.
Neither a manic episode nor a severe depressive episode was manifested during her confinement at our center,
despite voluntarily not taking her medication is. Although she is complaining of mood symptoms, these are not
severe enough to impair her fitness to stand trial.
Ms. Guisande does have sufficient understanding of the nature and objective of the court proceedings and the
possible consequences of her cases. She is likewise capable of communicating with her counsels.

She is therefore deemed COMPETENT to stand the rigors of court trial. (Emphasis supplied.)

On even date, pursuant to the directive of this Court, the CA’s Special Seventeenth Division held a hearing.
Thereafter, Justice Normandie B. Pizarro (Justice Pizarro), to whom the petition was raffled, disposed, in this wise:

JUSTICE PIZARRO:

The essence of the deliberation this morning is on the proceedings that obtained pursuant to the September 22,
2009 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 208, Mandaluyong City. The parties heard the arguments of the
Petitioner on the right of the subject patient, Ma. Elena, to avail of extended medical treatment citing the
Constitution and the Geneva Convention on Human Rights.

In the course of the proceedings this morning, Judge Tacla, Jr., informed this Court that the NCMH submitted to
him a report consisting of eight (8) pages at about 8:46 this morning. The parties, specifically the petitioner, were
shown the said report. Afterwards, Judge Tacla’s opinion on the matter was heard and he did not interpose any
objection thereto. The Accused, subject of this case, Ma. Elena So-Guisande, may now be discharged from the
custody of the NCMH and is considered fit for the rigors of trial. The parties were heard on the matter and all of
them were in accord with the dispositive portion of the aforesaid report.

After a prolonged discussion on the matter, and without objection on the part of the parties, as the Accused
should now proceed to trial in accordance with law, and at the same time recognizing the right of the Accused to
avail of further medication, this Court decrees the following set up that should cover this proceedings: The trial of
this case shall resume and the arraignment at the Court a quo shall push through as originally scheduled on
February 2, 2010. To balance the situation, the right to seek medical treatment of the subject is hereby recognized
by all and the patient shall be confined at the St. Clare’s Medical Center, 1838 Dian St., Palanan, Makati City, her
hospital of choice, under the headship of Dr. Yat, subject to the twenty-four (24) hour custodial control of the NBI.

xxxx

JUSTICE PIZARRO:

Dr. Yat is directed to submit, again by agreement of the parties, a periodic report every fifteen days to the RTC,
Branch 208, for its evaluation. The first report shall be submitted on or before December 18, 2009.

In this regard, the Director Nestor M. Mantaring of NBI is politely DIRECTED to cause the transfer from NCMH to
the St. Clare’s Medical Center of the subject Accused, Ma. Elena So-Guisande, and to provide two (2) or three (3)
security personnel to the Accused after making the proper coordination with the RTC, Branch 208. Director
Mantaring is to submit a one (1) page compliance on the matter within three (3) days from receipt of this
Resolution – furnishing Judge Tacla, Jr. a copy thereof.

xxxx

It is understood that the case pending before RTC, Branch 208, involves a non-bailable offense where normally the
Accused should have been confined in jail. But considering the peculiarities of this case, the parties have all agreed
to the set up as provided in this Order. It is also understood by the parties that henceforth the control of the trial
proceedings as well as the control over the custody of the accused/patient shall be in the hands of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 208, Mandaluyong City.
STATE SOL. DE VERA:

Your honor, the Hospital fees to be settled before the transfer, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PIZARRO:

As committed in open-Court, Atty. Carpio shall insure the settlement of the fees for the confinement of
Accused/patient at the NCMH, as a pre-condition for her release therefrom.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considering considered, this petition for Habeas Corpus and Amparo is considered
CLOSE and TERMINATED. All parties are notified in open court of this Order.

xxxx

JUSTICE PIZARRO:

Let copies of this Order be furnished the RTC, Br. 208, Mandaluyong City, the Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation as well as the Supreme Court, and all the parties.

SO ORDERED.5

Hence, the petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 190473, filed by the OSG, which was
consolidated with G.R. No. 190108.

During the pendency of these consolidated cases, various events occurred which ultimately led to the incident
before this Court, i.e., a Manifestation and Motion 6 dated March 11, 2010, filed by the OSG on behalf of public
respondents, Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente, to wit:

1. On February 4, 2010, acting on the City Prosecutor’s January 25, 2010 Motion to Withdraw Information, public
respondent Judge ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No. MC019-12281. Hence, their Urgent Prayer for
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) before this Honorable Court has been rendered moot and
academic. A copy of the February 4, 2010 Order dismissing Criminal Case No. MC019-12281 is attached herewith
as Annex "A."

2. Furthermore, in view of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. MC019-12281 from which the Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus and Writ of Amparo (docketed before the Supreme Court as G.R. No. 190108 and Court of Appeals
as CA-G.R. SP No. 00039) and the Petition for Review (docketed as G.R. No. 190473) stemmed from, these cases
and pending incidents thereon should be dismissed for having been rendered moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Writ of Amparo (docketed
before the Supreme Court as G.R. No. 190108 and Court of Appeals as CA-G.R. SP No. 00039) and the Petition for
Review (docketed as G.R. No. 190473) and all other pending incidents thereon be DISMISSED for having been
rendered moot and academic.

Petitioner So filed a Comment7 refuting the OSG’s motion to dismiss G.R. Nos. 190108 and 190473. Through
counsel, and using strong words, he vehemently opposed the dismissal of the petitions because they had filed
criminal complaints and an administrative case against respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente, as well as the
NCMH and an attending doctor thereat, for purported violations of accused Guisande’s rights during her
confinement at the NCMH. Adding to the flurry of cases, petitioner So filed a Verified Petition to cite Judge Tacla
and Dr. Vicente in contempt before the CA for their supposed submission of an altered and falsified document,
which was attached to, and formed an integral part of, their Consolidated Return of the Writ.
Posthaste, and even without us requiring the OSG to file one, it filed a Motion to Admit Reply8 with its Reply9 to
the Comment of petitioner So attached thereto. The OSG clarified and denied outright petitioner So’s allegation in
the Comment that the criminal case for Qualified Theft against accused Guisande was a prevarication and
concoction of private complainant10 and that Judge Tacla had conspired to falsely accuse petitioner So’s daughter,
Guisande. In all, the OSG reiterated that GR. Nos. 190108 and 190473 had been rendered moot and academic with
the dismissal of the criminal case for Qualified Theft against Guisande.

Significantly, on August 25, 2010, the OSG filed another Manifestation and Motion 11 informing this Court of the
following:

(1) Resolution dated June 7, 2010 issued by Assistant City Prosecutor Teresa D. Escobar-Pilares (Assistant City
Prosecutor Escobar-Pilares), dismissing the charge of petitioner So against Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente and their
counsels for Falsification under Article 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, docketed as I.S. No. XV-07-INV-10B-
01371, for insufficiency of evidence;12 and

(2) Resolution dated July 27, 2010 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 00039, where petitioner So’s verified petition for
contempt was dismissed for lack of merit, and where the CA ordered the petition for habeas corpus/writ of
amparo closed and terminated.13

Likewise, the OSG reiterated its motion to dismiss the instant consolidated petitions.

We completely agree with the OSG. Accordingly, we deny the petitions in G.R. Nos. 190108 and 190473 for having
been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal of Criminal Case No. MC09-12281 for Qualified Theft pending
before the RTC Mandaluyong City.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the petition for the writs of habeas corpus and amparo was based on the
criminal case for Qualified Theft against petitioner So’s daughter, Guisande. To recall, petitioner So claimed that
the conditions and circumstances of his daughter’s, accused Guisande’s, confinement at the NCMH was "life
threatening"; although Guisande was accused of a non-bailable offense, the NCMH could not adequately treat
Guisande’s mental condition. Thus, to balance the conflicting right of an accused to medical treatment and the
right of the prosecution to subject to court processes an accused charged with a non-bailable offense, the CA
directed the transfer of Guisande from the NCMH to St. Clare’s Medical Center, while noting that because of the
peculiarities of this case, there was a deviation from the regular course of procedure, since accused Guisande
should have been confined in jail because she was charged with a non-bailable offense.

Notably, nowhere in the transcript of the CA hearing on December 3, 2009, nor in the Order recited in open court
by Justice Pizarro, is there an affirmation of petitioner So’s claim that the confinement of accused Guisande at the
NCMH was illegal. Neither were the respective acts performed by respondents Judge Tacla and Dr. Vicente in
ascertaining the mental condition of accused Guisande to withstand trial declared unlawful. On the contrary, the
NCMH, a well-reputed government forensic facility, albeit not held in high regard by petitioner So’s and accused
Guisande’s family, had assessed Guisande fit for trial.

The Rules on the Writs of Habeas Corpus and Amparo are clear; the act or omission or the threatened act or
omission complained of - confinement and custody for habeas corpus and violations of, or threat to violate, a
person’s life, liberty, and security for amparo cases - should be illegal or unlawful.

Rule 102 of the Rules of Court on Habeas Corpus provides:

Sec. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. – Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus
shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo states:

Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Our decisions on the propriety of the issuance of these writs reiterate the foregoing rules. In Lourdes D. Rubrico,
Jean Rubrico Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon,
P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Maj. Darwin Sy a.k.a Darwin Reyes, Jimmy Santana, Ruben Alfaro, Capt. Angelo
Cuaresma, a certain Jonathan, P/Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, Arsenio C. Gomez, and Office of the Ombudsman, 14 we
qualified:

The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life, liberty, and
security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an extraordinary writ
conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-legal killings and enforced
disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted judiciously, lest the ideal sought by
the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than
the desire to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations. 15

In the recent Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan v. Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig, RTC, Manila, Branch 37, Director General
Avelino Razon, Jr., Director Geary Barias, PSSupt. Co Yee M. Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito
Quimson,16 we intoned:

The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally
deprived of his freedom of movement or place under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is
restrainted via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the
grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action.

In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally
held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not
merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy
and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. xxx The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner
of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.

In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is
being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed
only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be
granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.

While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on
the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom
the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that
a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the
respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant of the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the
petition should be dismissed.17
In the cases at bar, the question before the CA was correctly limited to which hospital, the NCMH or a medical
facility of accused’s own choosing, accused Guisande should be referred for treatment of a supposed mental
condition.18 In addition, we note that it was procedurally proper for the RTC to ask the NCMH for a separate
opinion on accused’s mental fitness to be arraigned and stand trial. Be that as it may, the CA allowed the transfer
of accused to St. Clare’s Medical Center under the custody of Dr. Rene Yat, who was required periodically to report
on his evaluation, every fifteen (15) days, to the RTC Mandaluyong City, although in the same breath, the CA also
ordered the continuation of the arraignment and trial of the accused for Qualified Theft before the same trial
court. In other words, Guisande remained in custody of the law to answer for the non-bailable criminal charge
against her, and was simply allowed to pursue medical treatment in the hospital and from a doctor of her
choice.1avvphi1

Certainly, with the dismissal of the non-bailable case against accused Guisande, she is no longer under peril to be
confined in a jail facility, much less at the NCMH. Effectively, accused Guisande’s person, and treatment of any
medical and mental malady she may or may not have, can no longer be subjected to the lawful processes of the
RTC Mandaluyong City. In short, the cases have now been rendered moot and academic which, in the often cited
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,19 is defined as "one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."

Finally, the Resolutions of the CA and Assistant City Prosecutor Escobar-Pilares, unmistakably foreclose the
justiciability of the petitions before this Court.

In CA-G.R. SP No. 00039, the CA said:

We are also not swayed by [David So’s] argument that [petitioners] advanced lies to this Court when they stated in
their petition that Elena was facing two (2) non-bailable offenses. During the hearing on the petition for habeas
corpus/writ of amparo, the counsel for [David So] stated that Elena was facing only one (1) non-bailable offense to
which [petitioners] did not anymore object. Besides, the number of non-bailable offenses is not even material in
the instant case for habeas corpus/writ of amparo as the only issue to be determined here was whether or not
Elena’s confinement at NCMH was lawful.

Finally, the issue in the verified petition, of whether [petitioners] were in contempt of court, is rendered moot and
academic considering that this Court had already rendered its open court Order on December 8, 2009, which was
favorable to [David So], and it was only later that the latter raised the issue of contempt.

Finding no merit in [David So’s] verified petition for contempt against [Judge Tacla, Dr. Vicente and the NCMH],
and there being no other objections made by the parties against Our March 17, 2010 Resolution, the instant
petition for habeas corpus/writ of amparo is declared CLOSED and TERMINATED.

SO ORDERED.20

In XV-07-INV-10B-01371 for Falsification under Articles 171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code, the Assistant City
Prosecutor made the following findings:

x x x [T]he undersigned finds no probable cause that respondents committed the charges filed against them.

Examination of the Contract of Confinement which was claimed to have been falsified reveals that it was merely a
photocopy. The supposed full photocopy of the original copy of the subject contract did not contain any alteration
(change) or intercalation (insertion) that could have changed its meaning or that could have made it speak of
something false. The contents of the contract depicting that [Guisande’s] yaya (Ms. Galleto) was indeed confined
at the NCMH as claimed by respondents to accompany [Guisande], [So’s] daughter who was confined thereat
remained the same. Respondents explained that they were unaware of the inadvertent partial reproduction of the
document and supported the same with an affidavit of good faith executed by an NCMH clerk explaining why it
was only partially reproduced.

Likewise, respondents’ statement that [Guisande] is "facing non-bailable offenses" is not absolutely false.
Respondents satisfactorily explained that at the time of the filing of their pleading, they believed in good faith that
she was facing more than one non-bailable offenses (sic) as she was charged with Qualified Theft before the
Mandaluyong City RTC, Branch 208 and Syndicated Estafa before the San Juan Prosecutor’s office. While it may be
true that [Guisande] has only one (1) non-bailable offense pending in court, respondents proved with their
evidence that she had others pending at the time in other forum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that the charges for Falsification under Articles
171 and 172 of the Revised Penal Code filed against all respondents namely: (1) Judge Esteban A. Tacla, Jr., (2) Dr.
Bernardino A. Vicente, (3) ASG General Magtanggol M. Castro, SSS Diana H. Castañeda-de Vera, SS Charina A. Soria
and AS Jefferson C. Secillano, be DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence. 21

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisition, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 190108 and 190473 for the Writs of
Habeas Corpus and Amparo, and review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are DENIED for being
moot and academic. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169482 January 29, 2008

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS OF EUFEMIA E. RODRIGUEZ, filed by EDGARDO E.
VELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and TERESITA R. PABELLO, respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This is a petition for review1 of the resolutions2 dated February 2, 2005 and September 2, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 88180 denying the petition for habeas corpus of Eufemia E. Rodriguez, filed by
petitioner Edgardo Veluz, as well as his motion for reconsideration, respectively.

Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor state of mental health and
deteriorating cognitive abilities.4 She was living with petitioner, her nephew, since 2000. He acted as her guardian.

In the morning of January 11, 2005, respondents Luisa R. Villanueva and Teresita R. Pabello took Eufemia from
petitioner Veluz’ house. He made repeated demands for the return of Eufemia but these proved futile. Claiming
that respondents were restraining Eufemia of her liberty, he filed a petition for habeas corpus5 in the Court of
Appeals on January 13, 2005.

The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing proof that respondents (the legally
adopted children of Eufemia) were unlawfully restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed to establish his
legal right to the custody of Eufemia as he was not her legal guardian. Thus, in a resolution dated February 2,
2005,6 the Court of Appeals denied his petition.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was also denied.7 Hence, this petition.

Petitioner claims that, in determining whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should issue, a court should limit
itself to determining whether or not a person is unlawfully being deprived of liberty. There is no need to consider
legal custody or custodial rights. The writ of habeas corpus is available not only if the rightful custody of a person is
being withheld from the person entitled thereto but also if the person who disappears or is illegally being detained
is of legal age and is not under guardianship. Thus, a writ of habeas corpus can cover persons who are not under
the legal custody of another. According to petitioner, as long as it is alleged that a person is being illegally deprived
of liberty, the writ of habeas corpus may issue so that his physical body may be brought before the court that will
determine whether or not there is in fact an unlawful deprivation of liberty.

In their comment, respondents state that they are the legally adopted daughters of Eufemia and her deceased
spouse, Maximo Rodriguez. Prior to their adoption, respondent Luisa was Eufemia’s half-sister8 while respondent
Teresita was Eufemia’s niece and petitioner’s sister.9

Respondents point out that it was petitioner and his family who were staying with Eufemia, not the other way
around as petitioner claimed. Eufemia paid for the rent of the house, the utilities and other household needs.

Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner was appointed as the "encargado" or administrator of the properties of Eufemia
as well as those left by the deceased Maximo. As such, he took charge of collecting payments from tenants and
transacted business with third persons for and in behalf of Eufemia and the respondents who were the only
compulsory heirs of the late Maximo.
In the latter part of 2002, Eufemia and the respondents demanded an inventory and return of the properties
entrusted to petitioner. These demands were unheeded. Hence, Eufemia and the respondents were compelled to
file a complaint for estafa against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Consequently, and by
reason of their mother’s deteriorating health, respondents decided to take custody of Eufemia on January 11,
2005. The latter willingly went with them. In view of all this, petitioner failed to prove either his right to the
custody of Eufemia or the illegality of respondents’ action.

We rule for the respondents.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the one entitled thereto. 10 It is
issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal custody over
another person.11 Thus, it contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person’s liberty either through illegal
confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of the custody of any person from someone entitled to such
custody.

In this case, the issue is not whether the custody of Eufemia is being rightfully withheld from petitioner but
whether Eufemia is being restrained of her liberty. Significantly, although petitioner admits that he did not have
legal custody of Eufemia, he nonetheless insists that respondents themselves have no right to her custody. Thus,
for him, the issue of legal custody is irrelevant. What is important is Eufemia’s personal freedom.

Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the
nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. 12

In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person
is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and
effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. "The writ of habeas corpus was
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the
best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ
of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is
sufficient."13 (emphasis supplied)

In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being
restrained of his liberty.14 If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only
where such restraint exists.15 If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be
granted and the petitioner discharged.16 Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused.

While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on
the filing of the petition.17 Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom
the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ.18 It is only if the court is satisfied
that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted.19 If the
respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the
petition should be dismissed.20

In this case, the Court of Appeals made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her liberty. It
found that she was not:
 There is no proof that Eufemia is being detained and restrained of her liberty by respondents. Nothing
on record reveals that she was forcibly taken by respondents. On the contrary, respondents, being
Eufemia’s adopted children, are taking care of her. 21 (emphasis supplied)

The Court finds no cogent or compelling reason to disturb this finding. 22

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1698 June 23, 2005

DANTE VICENTE, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE JOSE S. MAJADUCON, respondent.

RESOLUTION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

In a letter-complaint dated July 21, 2000, addressed to then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, Dante
Vicente charged respondent Judge Jose S. Majaducon of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City,
Branch 23, with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and manifest partiality, praying that he be
administratively disciplined and terminated from the service.

The instant administrative complaint stemmed from a series of criminal cases involving a certain Evelyn Te of
General Santos City. The factual and procedural antecedents leading to the instant administrative case is
summarized in this Court’s Resolution of February 19, 2001, in G.R. Nos. 145715-18 entitled, People of the
Philippines vs. Evelyn Te, pertinent portions of which read as follows:

In a joint decision dated May 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City, found Evelyn Te
guilty on four counts of violation of B. P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, and sentenced her
to two (2) months of imprisonment on each count. The decision became final and executory after this Court had
denied Te’s petition for review from the affirmance of the trial court’s decision by the Court of Appeals.

On March 11, 2000, Te sought clarification from the trial court whether she should serve her sentences
successively or simultaneously. In an order, dated May 25, 2000, the trial court clarified that she should serve her
sentences successively, but ‘for humanitarian reason’ and in accordance with Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code, it
held that ‘instead of serving imprisonment of EIGHT months, the prisoner EVELYN TE should serve only six
months.’

On June 2, 2000, Te filed a motion for reconsideration, which she prayed be also considered as a petition for
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. Citing Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 656 (1998), in which the sentence
of imprisonment of a party found guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was reduced to a fine equal to double the
amount of the check involved, Te prayed that her sentence be similarly modified and that she be immediately
released from detention. In a supplemental motion, Te argued that she had been denied equal protection of the
law because the trial judge in another case involving multiple counts of robbery directed the accused to
simultaneously serve his sentences.

On June 20, 2000, the trial court denied Te’s petition for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on the ground that
Te was detained by virtue of a final judgment.

On June 22, 2000, Te filed an omnibus motion praying for her release on the ground that she had been in jail since
March 15, 2000 and had fully served the three months minimum of her total sentence under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. In the alternative, Te prayed for release on recognizance.

On June 23, 2000, Te moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s order of June 20, 2000, alleging that the finality
of the joint decision against her did not bar her application for the writ of habeas corpus. She prayed that pending
determination as to whether the Vaca ruling applied to her, she also be allowed to post bail pursuant to Rule 102,
§14.
On July 5, 2000, the trial court allowed Te to post bail in the amount of one million pesos, holding that it would
order her release upon the approval of her bail bond and thereafter certify the proceedings to the Court as the
latter has concurrent jurisdiction over proceedings for habeas corpus.

On July 7, 2000, the trial court approved Te’s bail bonds in the reduced amount of ₱500,000.00 and ordered her
release. The trial court also directed its clerk of court to certify the proceedings to the Court.

On July 11, 2000, Assistant City Prosecutor Marie Ellengred L. Baliguiat moved for reconsideration of the trial
court’s resolution of July 5, 2000.

On July 18, 2000, Te filed a notice of appeal from the order, dated June 20, 2000, and the resolution, dated July 5,
2000, of the trial court.

On July 31, 2000, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration of the Assistant City Prosecutor. It also
denied due course to Te’s notice of appeal on the ground that there was no necessity for the appeal to the Court
of Appeals because it had already ordered that the whole records be forwarded to this Court pursuant to Rule 102,
§14.1

In the present case, complainant, who claims to be the station manager of Radyo Bombo, General Santos City,
alleges that while Te was in prison, respondent judge allowed her to be released and confined at a local hospital in
the guise that she was suffering from certain illnesses. Complainant further alleges that respondent judge
approved Te’s application for bail as part of habeas corpus proceedings even though no petition for habeas
corpus in favor of Te was filed and docketed. As a result of respondent judge’s order allowing the provisional
liberty of Te, the local media in General Santos City made an uproar and criticized respondent judge for his action
on the said case. In retaliation, respondent judge cited for indirect contempt a group of mediamen who published
a critical article against him. Complainant contends that respondent judge will not hesitate to use his clout and
power to stifle criticism and dissent. In addition, complainant alleges that in a separate case, respondent judge
allowed the release of the accused without the posting of the necessary bail. On the basis of the above allegations,
complainant prays that respondent judge be investigated and if warranted, be terminated and removed from
service.2

In his Comment, dated October 17, 2000, respondent judge submitted the following contentions which we quote
verbatim:

1. The certified records of the above-mentioned cases against Evelyn Te were forwarded to the Supreme
Court on August 5, 2000, upon the order of undersigned by the Branch Clerk of Court for review of our
questioned Order (attached as ANNEX ‘1’ of letter Complaint);

2. On June 2, 2000, Evelyn Te’s counsel filed not only a motion for reconsideration denying our previous
order denying her motion for release from detention but also a petition for Habeas Corpus in the same
cases;

3. In the exercise of sound discretion and after hearing the comment of the public prosecutor, we issued
the questioned Order, which is self-explanatory;

4. We believed then that we had the discretion to allow her to be released on bail, based on Sec. 14, Rule
102 of the Revised Rules of Court;

5. We were thinking then that in such a dilemma, whether or not to release her on bail, it was a better
judgment to release her from bail on a writ of habeas corpus, because, Evelyn Te might be right in her
contention that she is considered to have served her sentences simultaneously. If we denied her petition
for Habeas Corpus, and on appeal, she could get a favorable decision from the Supreme Court, surely, she
could return and charge us with a graver offense of ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion. She
could even file other cases against us under the Revised Penal Code, such as rendering an unjust order, or
under the Civil Code for moral damages in millions of pesos;

6. To obviate such a possible move on Te’s part, we opted to allow her release on bail through the writ
of habeas corpus proceedings. Anyway, the Supreme Court has the last say on that matter;

7. Therefore, we are of the view that the letter complaint of Mr. Dante Vicente is legally premature as it
concerned cases which are still sub judice;

8. Besides, we are of the opinion that Mr. Vicente has no personality as a third party to charge us with
anything as he has not shown any damage that he could have suffered because of our Order;

9. We are convinced that Mr. Vicente is trying to pre-empt our move to charge his radio station for libel or
cite the announcer for indirect contempt of Court when his radio station and announcer had been reviling
and attacking us for many days on the air for having allowed Evelyn Te to be treated and confined in a
hospital upon recommendation of a government doctor and for having allowed her release from
imprisonment on bail; a certified Xerox copy of the letter of the Regional Director of the Department of
Transportation and Communication (National Telecommunications Commission) dated August 9, 2000, in
reply to our request for copies of the broadcast tapes, is attached herewith as ANNEX "1";

10. As to the charge that we are stifling criticism by the print and broadcast media, we are of the view
that if media has the privilege to criticize the Courts and the Judges, we have also the right to charge them
for indirect contempt of Court and libel, because there are laws regarding this matter. The article of a
certain Joseph Jubelag is now a subject of an indirect contempt charge before us, which we are about to
resolve;

11. Regarding our Order in Criminal Case No. 14072 in the case of ‘People vs. Jhoyche Gersonin-Palma’,
RTC Br. 36, it was done with sound discretion on our part because it was already 6:30 in the evening and
the offices were closed and being a Friday, the accused would be detained for two days and three nights,
unless we accepted and approved the bail bond. Besides, the law requires judges to approve bail even
during the holidays. Immediately, on Monday, the money in the amount of ₱6,000.00 was deposited with
the Clerk of Court as shown in the official receipt (ANNEX ‘6’ of letter complaint);

12. Regarding our competence, honesty and integrity, modesty aside, as a judge for the last thirteen years
in General Santos City, the records of the Municipal Trial Court and RTC, Branches 23 and 22 (being a
pairing judge of the latter court since October last year) show that most of our decisions appealed to the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have been sustained or affirmed;

13. As to our reputation in the community, let other members of the media and a member of the
Philippine Bar speak about it. We are enclosing herewith a Xerox copy of a news clipping of Philippine
Daily Inquirer, July 8, 2000 issue (attached herewith as ANNEX ‘2’), about how we tried and decided the
celebrated case of Peoplevs. Castracion, et. al. when the Supreme Court assigned us to hear the evidence
of the defense and decide the case. We did our work in that case as best we could as we have done in all
cases being tried and decided by us, mindful of our duty to do our work with faithful diligence, honesty,
and integrity. We do not expect praises from others as we do not also wish to be criticized or attacked by
Radio Bombo station in General Santos City especially by its manager, Mr. Dante Vicente, without basis or
competent proof and evidence. Atty. Rogelio Garcia, who vouched for our honesty, competence and
integrity is a former assemblyman of South Cotabato and General Santos City, and an ex-Assistant
Minister of Labor. He has known us in the community for almost twenty five years;
 14. Complainant Dante Vicente is just a newcomer to General Santos and he and his radio station have a
bad and notorious reputation of attacking the character and good name of some people here as shown by
cases for libel filed in our courts.3

In its Report dated March 11, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) confirmed that Criminal Cases Nos.
9456-9460 were indeed certified by respondent to this Court. 4 However, this Court in its Resolution of February 19,
2001 in G.R. Nos. 145715-18, resolved to return the records of the consolidated cases to the RTC of General Santos
City, Branch 23, and to order the said court to give due course to Evelyn Te’s notice of appeal from the Order
denying her petition for habeas corpus and from the Order requiring her to post bail in the amount of one million
pesos for her release from detention. This Court made the following pronouncements:

Rule 102, §14 provides:

When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted, and when let to bail. – If it appears that the prisoner was lawfully
committed, and is plainly and specifically charged in the warrant of commitment with an offense punishable by
death, he shall not be released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully imprisoned or restrained on a charge of
having committed an offense not so punishable, he may be recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to bail in
the discretion of the court or judge. If he be admitted to bail, he shall forthwith file a bond in such sum as the court
or judge deems reasonable, considering the circumstances of the prisoner and the nature of the offense charged,
conditioned for his appearance before the court where the offense is properly cognizable to abide its order or
judgment; and the court or judge shall certify the proceedings, together with the bond, forthwith to the proper
court. If such bond is not so filed, the prisoner shall be recommitted to confinement.

The foregoing provision, however, applies to cases where the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is restrained
by virtue of a criminal charge against him, not where, as here, he is serving sentence by reason of a final judgment.
Indeed, Rule 102, §4 disallows issuance of the writ where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is
‘suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.’

The certification of a case under Rule 102, §14, moreover, refers to cases where the habeas corpus court finds that
the applicant is charged with the noncapital offense in another court. Thus, the certification of this case to this
Court is clearly erroneous.5

On the basis of the above-quoted Resolution and the provisions of Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, the
OCA, in its Report in the present case, found respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
recommended that he be fined in the amount of ₱20,000.00.6

The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA except for the recommended penalty.

Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear in prohibiting the grant of bail after conviction by final
judgment and after the convict has started to serve sentence. It provides:

SEC. 24. No bail after final judgment; exception. – An accused shall not be allowed bail after the judgment has
become final, unless he has applied for probation before commencing to serve sentence, the penalty and the
offense being within the purview of the Probation Law. In case the accused has applied for probation, he may be
allowed temporary liberty under his bail, but if no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court
may allow his release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the community. In no case shall
bail be allowed after the accused has commenced to serve sentence. (Emphasis supplied)

The only exception to the above-cited provision of the Rules of Court is when the convict has applied for probation
before he commences to serve sentence, provided the penalty and the offense are within the purview of the
Probation Law.
In the case of Evelyn Te, the judgment finding her guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on four counts and imposing
upon her the penalty of imprisonment for two months on each count has already become final and executory. She
did not apply for probation. At the time respondent judge granted her bail she was already serving her sentence.

From the foregoing, it is evident that Te is not entitled to bail. Respondent judge contends that under Section 14,
Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, he has the discretion to allow Te to be released on bail. However, the Court
reiterates its pronouncement in its Resolution of February 19, 2001 in G.R. Nos. 145715-18 that Section 14, Rule
102 of the Rules of Court applies only to cases where the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is restrained by
virtue of a criminal charge against him and not in an instance, as in the case involved in the present controversy,
where the applicant is serving sentence by reason of a final judgment.

The Court agrees with the observation of the OCA that respondent judge’s ignorance or disregard of the provisions
of Section 24, Rule 114 and Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court is tantamount to gross ignorance of the law
and procedure. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules.7 It is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled
authoritative doctrines.8 He should strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he
be the personification of justice and the Rule of Law.9 When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his
office to simply apply it; anything less than that would be gross ignorance of the law.10

In the present case, considering that the granting of bail is common in the litigation of criminal cases before trial
courts, we are not impressed with the explanation of respondent judge in granting bail to Te. Respondent judge
contends that he was caught in a dilemma whether or not to grant bail in favor of Te. However, he thought that it
would be better for him to release Te on bail rather than deny her application; for if such denial is later found out
by the appellate courts to be erroneous, Te could charge him with gross ignorance of the law and abuse of
discretion, or hold him liable for rendering an unjust order or for damages. Hence, to obviate such possible move
on Te’s part, he simply allowed her to be released on bail and relieved himself of any burden brought about by the
case of Te by certifying the same to this Court contending that, "[a]nyway, the Supreme Court has the last say on
(the) matter."

The Court finds respondent’s reasoning shallow and unjustified. He cannot simply shirk responsibility by
conveniently passing the buck, so to speak, to this Court on the pretext that we have the final say on the matter.
This is hardly the kind of trait expected of a judge. Rule 3.02, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that
in every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan
interests, public opinion or fear of criticism. In Dimatulac vs. Villon,11 we held that:

The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the
discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice." He must view himself as a priest for the
administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest "in the
performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy," the judge must render service with impartiality
commensurate with public trust and confidence reposed in him. 12

In the present case, respondent judge fell short of the above-cited ideals expected of a magistrate.

Complainant’s allegation that no petition for habeas corpus was filed does not hold water. As borne by the
records, the Certification issued by one Atty. Elmer D. Lastimosa, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
General Santos City, shows that Evelyn Te’s petition for habeas corpus was incorporated in the pleadings she filed
in Criminal Cases Nos. 9456-9460, although no docket fees and other charges were paid.13 There is no showing that
respondent should be held administratively liable for the non-payment of docket and other lawful fees. At any
rate, the matter may be considered in the appeal taken by Te, as earlier adverted to in G.R. Nos. 145715-18.
Complainant further claims that on several occasions, respondent judge allowed Te to be released and confined at
a local hospital on account of false illnesses. However, the Court does not find sufficient evidence to prove this
charge. On the contrary, records on hand show that the confinement of Te in the hospital is recommended by a
panel of government doctors and that such confinement is made without the objection of the public
prosecutor.14Hence, the Court finds respondent judge’s act of allowing the temporary confinement of Te in the
hospital as justified. The Court agrees with the observation of the OCA that in the absence of contradictory
evidence, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty should be upheld in favor of
respondent judge.15

The Court likewise finds no sufficient evidence to find respondent judge guilty of the charge that he uses his clout
and power to stifle criticism and dissent. In the present case, the Court finds nothing irregular or arbitrary in his act
of requiring a number of journalists to show cause why they should not be cited for indirect contempt. Freedom of
speech and of expression, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is not absolute. 16 Freedom of expression needs on
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests such as
the maintenance of the integrity of courts and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. 17 In the instant
case, the Court finds nothing whimsical or despotic in respondent judge’s act of issuing the subject show-cause
order. Instead, respondent is merely exercising his right to protect his honor and, more importantly, the integrity
of the court which he represents.

As to the issue that respondent judge allowed the release of an accused in Criminal Case No. 14072,
entitled People vs. Jhoyce Gersonin-Palma, without the required bail bond being posted, it is not within the
jurisdiction of this Court to resolve the same on the basis of the OCA Report as it is already the subject of a
separate administrative case against respondent.18

Having found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law, as discussed earlier, the Court now determines the
proper imposable penalty. Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, classifies gross ignorance of
the law or procedure as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of the same Rule, the imposable penalties, in case
the respondent is found culpable of a serious charge, range from a fine of not less than ₱20,000.00 but not more
than ₱40,000.00 to dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, except accrued leaves, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office
including government-owned or controlled corporations.

However, on February 24, 2002, respondent retired upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of
70.19Considering that respondent can no longer be dismissed or suspended, the Court is left with no recourse but
to impose the penalty of fine.

Further, it is noted that on July 8, 2002, the Third Division of this Court, in Administrative Matter No.10874-Ret.,
concerning the compulsory retirement of respondent, resolved to release his retirement benefits but set aside
₱100,000.00 thereof in view of several administrative cases still pending against him. 20

In the administrative complaints filed against respondent, two cases have, so far, resulted in his being fined.
In Chan vs. Majaducon,21 respondent was found guilty of violating among others, Rules 1.01 and 2.01 and Canon 2
of the Code of Judicial conduct and was meted the penalty of fine in the amount of ₱10,000.00. In the more recent
case of Alconera vs. Majaducon,22 respondent was found guilty of gross ignorance of procedure and was fined
₱40,000.00. In view of the foregoing, it is proper to impose the maximum fine of ₱40,000.00 to be deducted from
the ₱100,000.00 set aside from respondent’s retirement benefits in A.M. No. 10874-Ret.

WHEREFORE, respondent judge is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law or procedure. He is ordered to pay a
FINE of ₱40,000.00 to be deducted from the ₱100,000.00 set aside from his retirement benefits in A.M. No. 10874-
Ret.
SO ORDERED.
Cases on Writ of Amparo (AM No. 07-9-12-SC) and Writ of Habeas Data (AM No. 08-1-16-SC)

G.R. No. 189155 September 7, 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF
MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME VERZOSA,
LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN. RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY
GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated 26 August 2009 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA — a petition that was commenced jointly under the Rules on the Writ of
Amparo (Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its decision, the Court of Appeals extended to the
petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data but denied the latter’s prayers
for an inspection order, production order and return of specified personal belongings. The fallo of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby grants Petitioner the privilege of the Writ
of Amparo and Habeas Data.

Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or causing the distribution to the public of any
records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to Petitioner’s Melissa C. Roxas, and/or
Melissa Roxas; alleged ties to the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to the complained incident. Petitioner’s prayers
for an inspection order, production order and for the return of the specified personal belongings are denied for
lack of merit. Although there is no evidence that Respondents are responsible for the abduction, detention or
torture of the Petitioner, said Respondents pursuant to their legally mandated duties are, nonetheless, ordered to
continue/complete the investigation of this incident with the end in view of prosecuting those who are
responsible. Respondents are also ordered to provide protection to the Petitioner and her family while in the
Philippines against any and all forms of harassment, intimidation and coercion as may be relevant to the grant of
these reliefs.3

We begin with the petitioner’s allegations.

Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent.4 While in the United States, petitioner enrolled in an exposure
program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of
which she is a member.5 During the course of her immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and towns of
Central Luzon and, in April of 2009, she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac6 in conducting an initial
health survey in La Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission.7

In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand Pesos (₱15,000.00)
in cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD,8 wristwatch,
sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.9

After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo (Carabeo) and John
Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo (Mr. Paolo)
in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.10 At around 1:30 in the afternoon, however, petitioner,
her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of someone banging at the front door and a voice
demanding that they open up.11

Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered petitioner and her
companions to lie on the ground face down.12 The armed men were all in civilian clothes and, with the exception of
their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their faces.13

Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up on her and tied her hands. 14 At
this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc, already blindfolded and taped at
their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout her name.15 Against her vigorous resistance, the
armed men dragged petitioner towards the van—bruising her arms, legs and knees.16 Once inside the van, but
before she can be blindfolded, petitioner was able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside
her.17 The van then sped away.

After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped.18 Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered to alight.19 After
she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New
People’s Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated from her companions and was escorted to a room that she
believed was a jail cell from the sound of its metal doors.20 From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the
noise of planes taking off and landing and some construction bustle.21 She inferred that she was taken to the
military camp of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.22

What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture. 23 The thrust of the interrogations
was to convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to "the fold." 24 The torture, on
the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating the petitioner. 25

Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds even in her sleep. 26 Petitioner
was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during which she became acquainted
with a woman named "Rose" who bathed her.27 There were also a few times when she cheated her blindfold and
was able to peek at her surroundings.28

Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of her interrogators
who introduced themselves to her as "Dex," "James" and "RC." 29 "RC" even told petitioner that those who tortured
her came from the "Special Operations Group," and that she was abducted because her name is included in the
"Order of Battle."30

On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncle’s house in Quezon City. 31 Before being
released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a SIM32 card, a slip of paper containing an
e-mail address with password,33 a plastic bag containing biscuits and books,34 the handcuffs used on her, a blouse
and a pair of shoes.35 Petitioner was also sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or
something untoward will happen to her and her family.36

Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone given to her. 37 Out
of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of her family, petitioner threw away
the cellular phone with a SIM card.

Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing government files or
records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for the Writs of Amparo and Habeas
Data before this Court on 1 June 2009. 38 Petitioner impleaded public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of
the military and police hierarchy as respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who were behind her
abduction and torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC."39
The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined from harming or even approaching
petitioner and her family; (2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of detention areas in the 7th Infantry
Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents be ordered to produce documents relating to any
report on the case of petitioner including, but not limited to, intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th
Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or
branch/es prior to, during and subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the
records of the respondents any document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa Roxas or any name
which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner her journal, digital camera with
memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD, wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope,
medicines and her ₱15,000.00 cash.40

In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the case to the Court of Appeals
for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action.41 The Resolution also directed the respondents to file
their verified written return.42

On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the Writs43 on behalf of the public
officials impleaded as respondents.

We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents.

The public respondents label petitioner’s alleged abduction and torture as "stage managed." 44 In support of their
accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained in the Special
Report45 of the La Paz Police Station. In the Special Report, Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the purported
abduction, petitioner and her companions instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the house. 46 From this
statement, the public respondents drew the distinct possibility that, except for those already inside Mr. Paolo’s
house, nobody else has any way of knowing where petitioner and her companions were at the time they were
supposedly abducted.47 This can only mean, the public respondents concluded, that if ever there was any
"abduction" it must necessarily have been planned by, or done with the consent of, the petitioner and her
companions themselves.48

Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate49 of the petitioner, as actually belying her claims that she was
subjected to serious torture for five (5) days. The public respondents noted that while the petitioner alleges that
she was choked and boxed by her abductors—inflictions that could have easily produced remarkable bruises—her
Medical Certificate only shows abrasions in her wrists and knee caps. 50

For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very authenticity of petitioner’s alleged
abduction and torture, more so any military or police involvement therein. Hence, public respondents conclude
that the claims of abduction and torture was no more than a charade fabricated by the petitioner to put the
government in bad light, and at the same time, bring great media mileage to her and the group that she
represents.51

Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public respondents insist on the
dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the following grounds: (a) as against respondent
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in particular, because of her immunity from suit, 52 and (b) as against all of the
public respondents, in general, in view of the absence of any specific allegation in the petition that they had
participated in, or at least authorized, the commission of such atrocities. 53

Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to ascertain the truth behind the
allegations of the petitioner.54 In both the police and military arms of the government machinery, inquiries were
set-up in the following manner:
 Police Action

Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30 o’clock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009,
when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel came to the La Paz Municipal Police Station to report the presence of
heavily armed men somewhere in Barangay Kapanikian.55 Acting on the report, the police station launched an
initial investigation.56

The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, who informed the investigators of an
abduction incident involving three (3) persons—later identified as petitioner Melissa Roxas, Juanito Carabeo and
John Edward Jandoc—who were all staying in his house.57 Mr. Paolo disclosed that the abduction occurred around
1:30 o’clock in the afternoon, and was perpetrated by about eight (8) heavily armed men who forced their way
inside his house.58Other witnesses to the abduction also confirmed that the armed men used a dark blue van with
an unknown plate number and two (2) Honda XRM motorcycles with no plate numbers. 59

At 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a Flash Message to the different police
stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort to track and locate the van and motorcycles of the suspects.
Unfortunately, the effort yielded negative results.60

On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in a Special Report 61 that was transmitted to
the Tarlac Police Provincial Office, headed by public respondent P/S Supt. Rudy Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public
respondent Supt. Lacadin, in turn, informed the Regional Police Office of Region 3 about the abduction.62 Follow-
up investigations were, at the same time, pursued.63

On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of the Regional Police Office for
Region 3, caused the creation of Special Investigation Task Group—CAROJAN (Task Group CAROJAN) to conduct an
in-depth investigation on the abduction of the petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc. 64

Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of background examinations on the victims of the
purported abduction, in order to reveal the motive behind the abduction and, ultimately, the identity of the
perpetrators.65 Task Group CAROJAN also maintained liaisons with Karapatan and the Alliance for Advancement of
People’s Rights—organizations trusted by petitioner—in the hopes of obtaining the latter’s participation in the
ongoing investigations.66 Unfortunately, the letters sent by the investigators requesting for the availability of the
petitioner for inquiries were left unheeded.67

The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN had been detailed in the reports 68 that it
submitted to public respondent General Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of the Philippine National Police. However,
as of their latest report dated 29 June 2009, Task Group CAROJAN is still unable to make a definitive finding as to
the true identity and affiliation of the abductors—a fact that task group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the
petitioner, or any of her fellow victims, to cooperate in their investigative efforts. 69

Military Action

Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, first came to know about the alleged
abduction and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of this Court directing him and the other
respondents to file their return.70 Immediately thereafter, he issued a Memorandum Directive71 addressed to the
Chief of Staff of the AFP, ordering the latter, among others, to conduct an inquiry to determine the validity of the
accusation of military involvement in the abduction.72

Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent General Victor S. Ibrado, the AFP Chief of Staff,
sent an AFP Radio Message73 addressed to public respondent Lieutenant General Delfin N. Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit),
the Commanding General of the Army, relaying the order to cause an investigation on the abduction of the
petitioner.74

For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public respondent Lt. Gen. Bangit
instructed public respondent Major General Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen. Villanueva), the Commander of the 7th
Infantry Division of the Army based in Fort Magsaysay, to set in motion an investigation regarding the possible
involvement of any personnel assigned at the camp in the purported abduction of the petitioner. 75 In turn, public
respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped the Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of the 7th Infantry Division, to
conduct the investigation.76

On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division released an Investigation Report77 detailing the results of its
inquiry. In substance, the report described petitioner’s allegations as "opinionated" and thereby cleared the
military from any involvement in her alleged abduction and torture. 78

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision,79 the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the petitioner’s version that she was
indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for five (5) straight days. The appellate court noted the sincerity
and resolve by which the petitioner affirmed the contents of her affidavits in open court, and was thereby
convinced that the latter was telling the truth.80

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the public respondents that the abduction of
the petitioner was "stage managed," as it is merely based on an unfounded speculation that only the latter and her
companions knew where they were staying at the time they were forcibly taken. 81 The Court of Appeals further
stressed that the Medical Certificate of the petitioner can only affirm the existence of a true abduction, as its
findings are reflective of the very injuries the latter claims to have sustained during her harrowing ordeal,
particularly when she was handcuffed and then dragged by her abductors onto their van. 82

The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the security of the petitioner, as
manifested in the attempts of "RC" to contact and monitor her, even after she was released. 83 This threat,
according to the Court of Appeals, is all the more compounded by the failure of the police authorities to identify
the material perpetrators who are still at large.84 Thus, the appellate court extended to the petitioner the privilege
of the writ of amparo by directing the public respondents to afford protection to the former, as well as continuing,
under the norm of extraordinary diligence, their existing investigations involving the abduction.85

The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy of the petitioner,
noting the existence of "records of investigations" that concerns the petitioner as a suspected member of the CPP-
NPA.86The appellate court derived the existence of such records from a photograph and video file presented in a
press conference by party-list representatives Jovito Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which
allegedly show the petitioner participating in rebel exercises. Representative Alcover also revealed that the
photograph and video came from a female CPP-NPA member who wanted out of the organization. According to
the Court of Appeals, the proliferation of the photograph and video, as well as any form of media, insinuating that
petitioner is part of the CPP-NPA does not only constitute a violation of the right to privacy of the petitioner but
also puts further strain on her already volatile security.87 To this end, the appellate court granted the privilege of
the writ of habeas data mandating the public respondents to refrain from distributing to the public any records, in
whatever form, relative to petitioner’s alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and
torture.88

The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that the military or any other
person acting under the acquiescence of the government, were responsible for the abduction and torture of the
petitioner.89 The appellate court stressed that, judging by her own statements, the petitioner merely "believed"
that the military was behind her abduction.90 Thus, the Court of Appeals absolved the public respondents from any
complicity in the abduction and torture of petitioner.91 The petition was likewise dismissed as against public
respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her immunity from suit.92

Accordingly, the petitioner’s prayers for the return of her personal belongings were denied. 93 Petitioner’s prayers
for an inspection order and production order also met the same fate. 94

Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.

AMPARO

A.

Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public respondents from any
responsibility in her abduction and torture.95 Corollary to this, petitioner also finds fault on the part of Court of
Appeals in denying her prayer for the return of her personal belongings. 96

Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried out, as well as the sounds of
construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in detention, as these were detailed in her two affidavits
and affirmed by her in open court, are already sufficient evidence to prove government involvement. 97

Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility to implicate the
high-ranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded as respondents in her amparo petition. 98 Thus,
petitioner seeks from this Court a pronouncement holding the respondents as complicit in her abduction and
torture, as well as liable for the return of her belongings.99

Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings

It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility as the
justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The
doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account,
cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.100

The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,101 which was the first to examine command responsibility in the context of an
amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability. Rubrico notes that: 102

The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and
armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its simplest terms, means the "responsibility
of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to
their control in international wars or domestic conflict."103 In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form
of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command
responsibility,104foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities
committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated,
command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made
responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators105 (as
opposed to crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the orginal, underscoring supplied)

Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly
invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious
reason lies in the nature of the writ itself:
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial
measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific violations or threats of
violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.106 While the principal objective of its proceedings is
the initial determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had
transpired—the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may
be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law. 107 The rationale underpinning this peculiar
nature of an amparo writ has been, in turn, clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of National
Defense v. Manalo:108

x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial
evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or
administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.109(Emphasis supplied)

It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo
proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the
complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case,
commanders may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the ground
of their responsibility, or at least accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis, 110 the distinct, but interrelated concepts of
responsibility and accountability were given special and unique significations in relation to an amparo proceeding,
to wit:

x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies
this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the
responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that
should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level
of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the
enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge,
the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.

Responsibility of Public Respondents

At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in impleading the public
respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part, based on her assumption that they, in one way
or the other, had condoned her abduction and torture. 111

To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents who were behind her
ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the circumstances surrounding her abduction and torture—i.e., the
forcible taking in broad daylight; use of vehicles with no license plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting
interrogations to elicit communist inclinations; and the infliction of physical abuse—which, according to her, is
consistent with the way enforced disappearances are being practiced by the military or other state forces.112

Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort Magsaysay—a conclusion that she
was able to infer from the travel time required to reach the place where she was actually detained, and also from
the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes she heard while thereat. 113

We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not inspire reasonable
conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that she was detained at Fort Magsaysay.
First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction with those surrounding
previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily, carry sufficient weight to prove that the
government orchestrated such abduction. We opine that insofar as the present case is concerned, the perceived
similarity cannot stand as substantial evidence of the involvement of the government.

In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as evidence of military
involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of other pieces of evidence that has the
potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when
obtainable, must be preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the
former indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators. An amparo
court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise clearly and directly ascertain.

In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits, 114 the cartographic
sketches115of several of her abductors whose faces she managed to see. To the mind of this Court, these
cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the greatest certainty as to the true identity and
affiliation of petitioner’s abductors. Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not been realized in view of
the fact that the faces described in such sketches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be that of
any military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be part of either the military or
the police chain of command.

Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not adequately established by her
mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she was detained and by the sounds that she heard
while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, We are not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the
petitioner as accurate on its face—not only because they were made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in
view of the fact that she was a mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort Magsaysay and the
travel time required to reach it is in itself doubtful.116 With nothing else but obscure observations to support it,
petitioner’s claim that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.

In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors were actually affiliated,
whether formally or informally, with the military or the police organizations. Neither does the evidence at hand
prove that petitioner was indeed taken to the military camp Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These
evidentiary gaps, in turn, make it virtually impossible to determine whether the abduction and torture of the
petitioner was in fact committed with the acquiescence of the public respondents. On account of this insufficiency
in evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made.

Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings

This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal belongings.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by reason of the failure of the latter
to prove that the public respondents were involved in her abduction and torture.117 We agree with the conclusion
of the Court of Appeals, but not entirely with the reason used to support it. To the mind of this Court, the prayer of
the petitioner for the return of her belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence
to hold public respondents responsible for the abduction of the petitioner.

In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioner is
already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a substantial relief that can only
be granted once the liability of the public respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As
already discussed above, matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding. 118
But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that a person’s
right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property rights—which are
no longer protected by the writ of amparo.119 Section 1 of the Amparo Rule,120 which defines the scope and extent
of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights.

B.

The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her prayer for an inspection of the
detention areas of Fort Magsaysay.121

Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in petitioner’s ordeal, this
Court finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying an inspection of the military camp at Fort
Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court that a contrary stance would be equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing
expedition," which was never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection
order.122 Contrary to the explicit position123 espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule does not allow a "fishing
expedition" for evidence.

An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an
amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision.124 A basic requirement before an amparo
court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the
allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be inspected
be identified with clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order that
the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown
above, petitioner failed to do.

Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make out a prima facie case
that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An inspection
order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.

HABEAS DATA

As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ of habeas data, by
enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in
whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or
pertinently related to her abduction and torture." Though not raised as an issue in this appeal, this Court is
constrained to pass upon and review this particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in order to rectify, what appears
to Us, an error infecting the grant.

For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in granting the privilege of the writ of
habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant portion 125 of its decision:

Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports and reports on the investigations
conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually expunged from the records.
Petitioner claimed to be included in the Government’s Order of Battle under Oplan Bantay Laya which listed
political opponents against whom false criminal charges were filed based on made up and perjured information.

Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-army general Jovito Palaparan,
Bantay party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy party-list held a press
conference where they revealed that they received an information from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of
the organization, that Petitioner was a communist rebel. Alcover claimed that said information reached them thru
a letter with photo of Petitioner holding firearms at an NPA training camp and a video CD of the training exercises.
Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioner’s denial that she was the person in said video, there were records of other
investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her right to privacy. Without a doubt, reports of
such nature have reasonable connections, one way or another, to petitioner’s abduction where she claimed she
had been subjected to cruelties and dehumanizing acts which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of
her alleged membership in the CPP-NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be continuously made available
to the public, Petitioner’s security and privacy will certainly be in danger of being violated or transgressed by
persons who have strong sentiments or aversion against members of this group. The unregulated dissemination of
said unverified video CD or reports of Petitioner’s alleged ties with the CPP-NPA indiscriminately made available
for public consumption without evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly violates Petitioner’s right to
privacy which must be protected by this Court. We, thus, deem it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis supplied).

The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the
right to informational privacy of individuals. 126 The writ operates to protect a person’s right to control information
regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means
in order to achieve unlawful ends.

Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the showing,
at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security
of the victim.127 This, in the case at bench, the petitioner failed to do.

The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no evidence on record that
shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act
ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to
privacy of the petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports about the petitioner’s ties with
the CPP-NPA, was not adequately proven—considering that the origin of such records were virtually unexplained
and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court from the video and photograph released by
Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the
public respondents had access to such video or photograph.

In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the public respondents from
"distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar
papers" relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The
public respondents cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first place, it was not
proven to have.

Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually responsible for the abduction
and torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of the
petitioner’s right to privacy becomes farfetched, and premature.

For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the privilege of the writ of
habeas data.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE

Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency to impute any form of
responsibility on the part of the public respondents, revealed two important things that can guide Us to a proper
disposition of this case. One, that further investigation with the use of extraordinary diligence must be made in
order to identify the perpetrators behind the abduction and torture of the petitioner; and two, that the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its Constitutional mandate to "investigate all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of
human rights,"128must be tapped in order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids.

Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken

Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to adduce substantial
evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in her abduction and torture, may be attributed to the
incomplete and one-sided investigations conducted by the government itself. This "awkward" situation, wherein
the very persons alleged to be involved in an enforced disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the same time,
the very ones tasked by law to investigate the matter, is a unique characteristic of these proceedings and is the
main source of the "evidentiary difficulties" faced by any petitioner in any amparo case. 129

Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguard—requiring the "respondent who
is a public official or employee" to prove that no less than "extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws,
rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty."130 Thus, unless and until any of the public
respondents is able to show to the satisfaction of the amparo court that extraordinary diligence has been observed
in their investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite the prevailing scarcity of evidence
to that effect.

With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule, was not fully observed in
the conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at bar.

A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows modest effort on the part of the
police investigators to identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To be sure, said reports are replete with
background checks on the victims of the abduction, but are, at the same time, comparatively silent as to other
concrete steps the investigators have been taking to ascertain the authors of the crime. Although conducting a
background investigation on the victims is a logical first step in exposing the motive behind the abduction—its
necessity is clearly outweighed by the need to identify the perpetrators, especially in light of the fact that the
petitioner, who was no longer in captivity, already came up with allegations about the motive of her captors.

Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on the cooperation or non-cooperation
of the petitioner—who, they claim, was less than enthusiastic in participating in their investigative efforts.131 While
it may be conceded that the participation of the petitioner would have facilitated the progress of Task Group
CAROJAN’s investigation, this Court believes that the former’s reticence to cooperate is hardly an excuse for Task
Group CAROJAN not to explore other means or avenues from which they could obtain relevant leads. 132 Indeed,
while the allegations of government complicity by the petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate
evidence before a court of law—they are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads that must be
pursued and verified, if only to comply with the high standard of diligence required by the Amparo Rule in the
conduct of investigations.

Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJAN’s reports still failed to explain why it never
considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolo—who, along with the victims, is a central witness to the
abduction. The reports of Task Group CAROJAN is silent in any attempt to obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic
sketch of the abductors or, at the very least, of the one who, by petitioner’s account, was not wearing any
mask.1avvphi1

The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the sketches included in petitioner’s
offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the direction of, and first submitted to, the CHR
pursuant to the latter’s independent investigation on the abduction and torture of the petitioner. 133 But as
mentioned earlier, the CHR sketches remain to be unidentified as of this date.
In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that further investigation under the norm of
extraordinary diligence should be undertaken. This Court simply cannot write finis to this case, on the basis of an
incomplete investigation conducted by the police and the military. In a very real sense, the right to security of the
petitioner is continuously put in jeopardy because of the deficient investigation that directly contributes to the
delay in bringing the real perpetrators before the bar of justice.

To add teeth to the appellate court’s directive, however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary to shift the primary task
of conducting further investigations on the abduction and torture of the petitioner upon the CHR. 134 We note that
the CHR, unlike the police or the military, seems to enjoy the trust and confidence of the petitioner—as evidenced
by her attendance and participation in the hearings already conducted by the commission. 135 Certainly, it would be
reasonable to assume from such cooperation that the investigations of the CHR have advanced, or at the very
least, bears the most promise of advancing farther, in terms of locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is
thus, vital for a final resolution of this petition. From this perspective, We also deem it just and appropriate to
relegate the task of affording interim protection to the petitioner, also to the CHR.

Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as follows—

1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding the
abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of extraordinary
diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the
cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any
other leads relevant to petitioner’s abduction and torture.

2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor, and the
incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation of
the CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of
the petitioner’s abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution
and existing laws.

3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the Court of
Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations and their
recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90)
days from receipt of this decision.

4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from receipt of
this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding recommendations; and to (b)
provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until
such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court.

Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring compliance
with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports or recommendations, there
would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents responsible or, at least, accountable.
After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit its own report with recommendation to this
Court for final action. The Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish
its tasks under this decision.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a decision:

1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for the return of her personal belongings;
 2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort
Magsaysay.

3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however, to any modification
that this Court may make on the basis of the investigation reports and recommendations submitted to it
under this decision.

4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as follows—

a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked with conducting
further investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the
Commission on Human Rights shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue
to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches
submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads
relevant to petitioner’s abduction and torture.

b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, and the
incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his successor, to extend
assistance to the ongoing investigation of the Commission on Human Rights, including but not
limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel records circa the time of the petitioner’s
abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with the Constitution and
existing laws.

c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, to
furnish to this Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the
reports of its investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of
the records of this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.

d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the Court of Appeals
within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and
its corresponding recommendations; and (b) to provide or continue to provide protection to the
petitioner during her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be
determined by this Court.

5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following purposes:

a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the CHR;

b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the CHR, the
abduction and torture of the petitioner was committed by persons acting under any of the public
respondents; and on the basis of this determination—

c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and recommendation
of the Commission on Human Rights—its own report, which shall include a recommendation
either for the DISMISSAL of the petition as against the public respondents who were found not
responsible and/or accountable, or for the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE
ALLOWED BY THE AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against those
found responsible and/or accountable.

Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to answer for any
responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their incumbencies.
Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA that are
not contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioners,
vs.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the world behind secret walls, they are
not separated from the constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that
covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a
writ of Amparo filed before this Court.

This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 19 1 of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo, seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision promulgated
by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo,
petitioners, versus The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines,
respondents."

This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)2 filed before
this Court by herein respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein petitioners (therein
respondents) and/or their officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights.
Therein petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner,
Inspection and Access Orders, and all other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5) 3 of the 1987
Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered
the Secretary of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their agents,
representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein
petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and other
basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution.5

While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007.
Forthwith, therein petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition
as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed
that: (1) the petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 266 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the
Court issue the writ commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within the period provided by law
and containing the specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by
the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court,
after hearing, render judgment as required in Sec. 18 7 of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable
reliefs.8

On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule
and further resolved, viz:

WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file with the CA (Court
of Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working days from service of the writ. We REMAND the
petition to the CA and designate the Division of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the
summary hearing on the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the petition in accordance
with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein
respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:

ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.

The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby REQUIRED:

1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this decision all
official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case,
except those already on file herein;

2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days from notice of this decision.

3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any
treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include
a list of medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February
14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice of this decision.

The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent AFP Chief of
Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the latter's authority to be express and made apparent on the face of
the sworn compliance with this directive.

SO ORDERED.10

Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents:

Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006, several
uniformed and armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of
their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not informed of the
gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.11

On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past
noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused
him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The
armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to
the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up
to the light, then forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her
and told her to stay.12

Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz,
"Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula" de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and
residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also
members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house
two barangaycouncilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men. 13

The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw
the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who
drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The
leader of the team who entered his house and abducted him was "Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit
old. Another one of his abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30 years old.14
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond.
Both of them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as his brother
Reynaldo's. The van stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each
brought to a different room. With the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers continuously
hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15
minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymond's) room and it was his (Raymond's) turn to be beaten
up in the other room. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New People's Army. Each time he said he
was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns. He was questioned where his comrades were, how many soldiers
he had killed, and how many NPA members he had helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him.15

In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up would
salute them, call them "sir," and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high
officials, but he saw their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that the
uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin,
wore white pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his
parents and family, and a habeas corpus case filed in connection with the respondents' abduction.16 While these
officials interrogated him, Raymond was not manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up.
When the guards got drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only at night,
usually with left-over and rotten food.17

On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat him up. They
doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45
pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood. When he could no
longer endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the same
ordeal in another room. Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come back the next day
and kill him.18

The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then made noise with
the chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to check on him, he managed to
free his hand from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad and firing range and
stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break his chains. After walking through a forested area, he came
near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were doing the laundry, asked where he
was and the road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay. 19 He reached the highway, but some
soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him
to another place near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit
with chains until his back bled. They poured gasoline on him. Then a so-called "Mam" or "Madam" suddenly called,
saying that she wanted to see Raymond before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned
inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained. 20

For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated. When the wounds
were almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when respondents' guards got drunk. 21

Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel bars. He
stayed all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating,
removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen people22 had been detained in
that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself. 23

For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a small
house with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the firing range,
helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They were also sometimes detained in what
he only knew as the "DTU."24
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took their urine
samples and marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating,
their stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in white arrived. They
also examined respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They
brought with them the results of respondents' urine test and advised them to drink plenty of water and take their
medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the "master" of the
DTU, "Master" Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While
there, he met a soldier named Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of them. 25

One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other armed men
wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one
or two weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up
by Hilario's men.26

From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo. They were
detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of "Kapitan" for about three months. When they arrived in
Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of the house to a basketball court in the center of
the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already waiting, seated. He was about two arms' length away
from respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in the
affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would
be scared if he were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not
believe that Gen. Palparan was an evil man.27

Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:

Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?"

Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..."

Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, basta't sundin n'yo ang
lahat ng sasabihin ko... sabihin mo sa magulang mo - huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan
at sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon.
Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno."28

Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. At about 3:00 in
the morning, Hilario, Efren and the former's men - the same group that abducted them - brought them to their
parents' house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not
walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him.
As they were afraid, Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents that if they continued to
join human rights rallies, they would never see their children again. The respondents were then brought back to
Sapang.29

When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with the four
"masters" who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse. 30 When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for
him. He was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his
strength and be healthy and to take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was
expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He also said that they should prove that they are on
the side of the military and warned that they would not be given another chance. 31 During his testimony, Raymond
identified Gen. Palparan by his picture.32
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine, named
"Alive," was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and instructed to
take one capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine. The "Alive" made them
sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking up. 33

After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond
that while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as "Oscar," a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in
Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his house, and got acquainted
with other military men and civilians.34

After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24 th Infantry Battalion. He
was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond was then
blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the
barracks.35

The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then he
learned that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training.
He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from
Laguna. She told him that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy,
Bulacan. She confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go
home and be with her parents. During the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry. 36

After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen
Empeño and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan" whose name they later
came to know as Donald Caigas, called "master" or "commander" by his men in the 24 th Infantry Battalion.
Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and
Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were
threatened that if they escaped, their families would all be killed. 37

On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be thankful
they were still alive and should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006,
respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had
already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from
September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name "Oscar" and holding
himself out as a military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24 th Infantry Battalion whose names and
descriptions he stated in his affidavit.38

On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the
24th Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8,
2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as
"Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered
enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock. 39

Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and
Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan,
Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had
a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house. 40 Another time, in another
"Operation Lubog," Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they
arrived, only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son right before
Raymond's eyes.41
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near
the sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in
Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007
until June 2007.42

In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to
bring food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the
camp, viz:

Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang
kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig,
walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo.
Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at ito'y sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.

Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na
trak at dinala sa loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay.
Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.

Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo,
piniringan, ikinadena at labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng
sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3;
sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.

Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa pick
up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at
napakamasangsang ang amoy.

May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot
sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.

xxx xxx xxx

Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen.
Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang
tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa
isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.

Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa
amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o
hindi.

Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa
amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil
magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin
ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena. 43

On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for
Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care of the
food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell their produce.
They were no longer put in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for
Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna. 44
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They helped farm
adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had
saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange
text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They
earned some more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them.

There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their guards
lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents' house did
not have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio. In the evening of August 13,
2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the
radio. When none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway,
leaving behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed
from captivity.45

Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymond's affidavit insofar as they related to matters
they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he
saw the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got
acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay,
Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond escaped.
With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until he could no longer bear the
pain.

At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated from
Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a
mountainous area. He was instructed to use the name "Rodel" and to represent himself as a military trainee from
Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to a
market in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was also
brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of "Alive" in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove
a black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once
outside the province. In one of their trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw
the sign board, "Welcome to Camp Tecson."46

Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino
specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases
of human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct
medical examinations on the respondents after their escape. He first asked them about their ordeal, then
proceeded with the physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were
consistent with their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on August
15, 2007, two days after respondents' escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took
photographs of the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination. 47

Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction and torture. In compliance with the October
25, 2007 Resolution of the Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but denying
any involvement therein, viz:

13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time arrested, forcibly abducted,
detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled issue
laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners' parents before the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the
24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of the 7 th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt.
Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and
members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela
 Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents therein
submitted a return of the writ... On July 4, 2006, the Court of Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt.
Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and on September
19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then Commanding General, 7 th Infantry Division, Philippine Army,
stationed at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no evidence was introduced to
establish their personal involvement in the taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June 27,
2007..., it exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence establishing his
involvement in any capacity in the disappearance of the Manalo brothers, although it held that the
remaining respondents were illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the
latter.48

Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of National
Defense, which attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the Manalo
brothers' alleged abduction. He also claimed that:

7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military directional operations, neither
does he undertake command directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP
operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of National Defense is focused in providing
strategic policy direction to the Department (bureaus and agencies) including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines;

8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable Supreme Court in this case, I have
directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d) of
the Amparo Rule and to submit report of such compliance... Likewise, in a Memorandum Directive also
dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP
should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court
against any members of the AFP:

(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;

(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person
identified in the petition which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;

(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the death or
disappearance;

(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance as well as any
pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance;

(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and

(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. 49

Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ,
attesting that he received the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting
on this directive, he did the following:

3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be
issued directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged
disappearance and the recent reappearance of the petitioners.
 3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result thereof to Higher
headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct of the investigation on the matter by the concerned
unit/s, dispatching Radio Message on November 05, 2007, addressed to the Commanding General,
Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is
attached as ANNEX "3" of this Affidavit.

3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to be conducted by the concerned
unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ
of Amparohas been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters.

3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to another Petition for the Writ
of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeño pending
before the Supreme Court.

3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest efforts to establish the
surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible,
including any military personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity in the commission of the
complained acts, to the bar of justice, when warranted by the findings and the competent evidence that
may be gathered in the process.50

Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col. Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in
G.R. No. 179994, another Amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeño and Merino, which averred
among others, viz:

10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the 24 th Infantry Batallion detachment as
detention area, I immediately went to the 24th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no untoward
incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel
Merino being held captive;

11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan;

12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries with the Philippine National
Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed that none was
reported to their good office;

13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire into the alleged beachhouse in
Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel
Merino were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such beachhouse was used as a detention place
found to have been used by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeño and Merino. 51

It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S.
Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners could
not be secured in time for the submission of the Return and would be subsequently submitted. 52

Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost Marshall,
7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial jurisdiction
of this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan. 53 The
24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry Division.54

On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding General of the 7 th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen.
Jovito Palaran,55 through his Assistant Chief of Staff,56 to investigate the alleged abduction of the respondents by
CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de
la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy
Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by
the alleged elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative liability of said auxiliaries, if
any.57 Jimenez testified that this particular investigation was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual
procedure, but because the Commanding General saw news about the abduction of the Manalo brothers on the
television, and he was concerned about what was happening within his territorial jurisdiction. 58

Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having them execute sworn statements and
conducting an investigation on May 29, 2006.59 The investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and finished at
10:00 in the evening.60 The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn
statements of all six persons on that day. There were no other sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo
family, nor were there other witnesses summoned and investigated61 as according to Jimenez, the directive to him
was only to investigate the six persons.62

Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements. 63 The six persons were not known to Jimenez as it
was in fact his first time to meet them.64 During the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in
the Office of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question to the six persons. 65

Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza
had to come back the next day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements was interrupted by a
power failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the jurats of their statements indicated
that they were signed on May 29, 2006.66 When the Sworn Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he personally
wrote his investigation report. He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and finished it on June 1,
2006.67 He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of Personnel. 68

As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the report is
herein substantially quoted:

III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly
taken from their respective homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February 2006
by unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of
the victims filed a case for Abduction in the civil court against the herein suspects: Michael dela Cruz,
Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged
members of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).

a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "B") states that
he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete building of a
church located nearby his residence, together with some neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February
2006, he was being informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the abduction of the brothers
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he was one of the suspects, he claims that they
only implicated him because he was a CAFGU and that they claimed that those who abducted the Manalo
brothers are members of the Military and CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any participation or
involvement on the abduction of said victims.

b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "C") states
that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member
based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo
being his neighbors are active members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also knows their elder
Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA Leader operating in their province. That at the time of the
alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and for accusing him to be one of the suspects, he claims that
on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the concrete chapel being constructed nearby his
residence. He claims further that he just came only to know about the incident on other day (15 Feb 06)
when he was being informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied any
participation about the incident and claimed that they only implicated him because he is a member of the
CAFGU.

c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "O") states that he is a
resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato
Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much aware about the background of the two (2)
brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their
elder brother "KUMANDER BESTRE" TN: Rolando Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14
February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned
only about the incident when he arrived home in their place. He claims further that the only reason why
they implicated him was due to the fact that his mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother
Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his father and for that reason they
implicated him in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently denied any involvement on the
abduction of said Manalo brothers.

d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in (Exhibit "E") states that he is a
resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to
him being his barriomate when he was still unmarried and he knew them since childhood. Being one of
the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat,
Bulacan. He claims that he was being informed only about the incident lately and he was not aware of any
reason why the two (2) brothers were being abducted by alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The
only reason he knows why they implicated him was because there are those people who are angry with
their family particularly victims of summary execution (killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando
Manalo who is an NPA leader. He claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his
father and he was living witness to that incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement on
the abduction of the Manalo brothers.

e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "F") states that he is a
resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based
at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him
being their barrio mate. He claims further that they are active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their
brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14
February 2006, he was in his residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan.
That he vehemently denied any participation of the alleged abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned
only about the incident when rumors reached him by his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is
merely fabricated because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers.

f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "G") states that he is a
resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a
CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very
well the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for
twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are active supporters or sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and
whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader operating within the area. Being one
of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was helping in the construction of their concrete chapel
in their place and he learned only about the incident which is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo when one of the Brgy. Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the matter.
He claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against him as being one of the abductors and
 he considers everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains loyal to his service to the
government as a CAA member.

IV. DISCUSSION

5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case, the proof of linking them to
the alleged abduction and disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14
February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their
alleged involvement theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis to indict them as
charged in this investigation.

Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past to quote: the killing of the
father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish
a fact that they were the ones who did the abduction as a form of revenge. As it was also stated in the
testimony of other accused claiming that the Manalos are active sympathizers/supporters of the
CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the first place, they were in connivance with the
abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of CAFGU's, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their
village from any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware of the
activities of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is concerned.

V. CONCLUSION

6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged charges of abduction committed by
the above named respondents has not been established in this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to
indict them for any administrative punishment and/or criminal liability. It is therefore concluded that they
are innocent of the charge.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two (2)
civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case.

8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.69

In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's assessment of the foregoing evidence and
assail the December 26, 2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED,
REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND MANALO.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS (HEREIN
PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL
OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR
CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES
OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C)
CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS,
 AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO
THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN) WHO
ATTENDED TO THEM FROM FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.70

The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us
hearken to its beginning.

The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that resulted from a
two-day National Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the
Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was "envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based perspective on the issue
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances," 71 hence "representatives from all sides of the political and
social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice system" 72 participated in mapping out ways to resolve
the crisis.

On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and
enforced disappearances."73 It was an exercise for the first time of the Court's expanded power to promulgate
rules to protect our people's constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in
response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. 74 As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the
intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is
confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due
process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings."75 On the other hand, "enforced
disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the
government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law." 76

The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means "protection" in Spanish.77 In 1837, de
Tocqueville's Democracy in America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the
practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists. 78 One of them, Manuel Crescencio Rejón,
drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan, 79 which granted judges the power to protect all
persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into the national
constitution in 1847, viz:

The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the exercise and preservation of those
rights granted to him by this Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by the
Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state governments, limiting themselves to granting
protection in the specific case in litigation, making no general declaration concerning the statute or
regulation that motivated the violation.80

Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican constitutionalism.81 If, after hearing, the judge
determines that a constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official, or the official's
superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment
of the right in question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived from the U.S. with the
limitations on judicial power characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in Mexico. It enables courts to
enforce the constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this
power to make law for the entire nation.82

The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in
response to the particular needs of each country.83 It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal
Supreme Court, one piece of Mexico's self-attributed "task of conveying to the world's legal heritage that
institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived." 84 What began as a protection
against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several
purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ;
(2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo casacion for the
judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for the judicial
review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the protection of peasants' rights derived from the
agrarian reform process.85

In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has been constitutionally adopted to protect against
human rights abuses especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries adopted
an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of constitutional rights, including socio-economic
rights.86 Other countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the protection of
the writ of Amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.87

In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of Amparo, several of the
above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the
1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by
the Amparo contra leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the
remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution.88 The Clause is an offspring of the
U.S. common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison.89

While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction or
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102,90 these remedies
may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ of Amparo through summary proceedings and
the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the
common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights
abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy
provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to
make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative
responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. 91

The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these
offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield
leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is
to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining
Order"92 to stop petitioners and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to liberty
and other basic rights on August 23, 2007,93 prior to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought
ancillary remedies including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access
Orders and other legal and equitable remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule
135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to
have their petition treated as an Amparo petition as it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances
of the Manalo brothers' enforced disappearance. The Court granted their motion.

With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner. Petitioners' first argument in disputing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals states, viz:
 The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and giving full faith and credit to the
incredible uncorroborated, contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving
affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo. 94

In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners' cause of action, to
determine whether the evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:

Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis
supplied)

Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:

Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The parties shall establish their claims
by substantial evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court
shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the
privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied)

Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.95

After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents
were abducted from their houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14,
2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture,
and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner.
His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing experience and tenacious will to
escape, captured through his different senses and etched in his memory. A few examples are the following:
"Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang
tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel."97 "May naiwang mga
bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas." 98 "Tumigil ako sa
may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena." 99 "Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-
bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa malapit
na lugar."100

We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on respondent Raymond Manalo's affidavit and
testimony, viz:

...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently identified by the petitioners
(herein respondents) to be military personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed
men who barged into his house through the rear door were military men based on their attire of fatigue
pants and army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de
la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan,
and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served as lookouts during
the abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the six military men were Ganata, who headed the
abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and George. Subsequent incidents of their long captivity, as
narrated by the petitioners, validated their assertion of the participation of the elements of the
7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.

We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion that the petitioners were
either members or sympathizers of the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre,
who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners.

The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction were, at best, merely superficial.
The investigation of the Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division focused on the one-sided version of
the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall
could delve only into the participation of military personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall should
have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated...

Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established. At the very least, he was aware of the
petitioners' captivity at the hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other
officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in
person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to be
doing. Gen. Palparan's direct and personal role in the abduction might not have been shown but his
knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long captivity at the hands of military
personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged
and not merely tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of law and without probable
cause.

In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth Division (Justices Buzon, chairman;
Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing
evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the abduction or the detention.
Hilario's involvement could not, indeed, be then established after Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw
Hilario drive the van in which the petitioners were boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not
testify. (See the decision of the habeas proceedings at rollo, p. 52)

However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300 van in which the petitioners
were brought away from their houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that Hilario
participated in subsequent incidents during the captivity of the petitioners, one of which was when Hilario
fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least a week in a house of strong materials (Exhibit D,
rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board
the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more or less
three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where the petitioners came face to face with Gen.
Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners'
parents, where only Raymond was presented to the parents to relay the message from Gen. Palparan not
to join anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not again see their
sons should they join any rallies to denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206)
Hilario was also among four Master Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom
Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan required Raymond to take the medicines
for his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions when the petitioners saw that Hilario
had a direct hand in their torture.
 It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and forced disappearance of the
petitioners was established. The participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and
Caigas, among others, was similarly established.

xxx xxx xxx

As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally involved in the abduction. We also
do, for, indeed, the evidence of their participation is overwhelming. 101

We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's statements were not corroborated by other
independent and credible pieces of evidence. 102 Raymond's affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the
affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr.
Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, 103 also corroborate
respondents' accounts of the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond Manalo's familiarity
with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the "DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col.
Jimenez to be the "Division Training Unit,"104 firms up respondents' story that they were detained for some time in
said military facility.

In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Commission
considered similar evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was abducted and
tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early
November 1989. The Commission's findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and credible statements,
written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal. 106 These statements were supported by her
recognition of portions of the route they took when she was being driven out of the military installation where she
was detained.107 She was also examined by a medical doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second
degree burns on her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of cigarette burning and torture
she suffered while in detention.108

With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention,
it logically holds that much of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves,
and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral
statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the torture
they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military
officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise.

We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of Amparo. There is no quarrel that the
enforced disappearance of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have
escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are
physically free, they assert that they are not "free in every sense of the word" 109 as their "movements continue to
be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of
Raymond) are still at large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and
security."110 (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again abducted,
kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.111

Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point out that this right is "often associated with
liberty;" it is also seen as an "expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and unusual
punishment." Conceding that there is no right to security expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987
Constitution, they submit that their rights "to be kept free from torture and from incommunicado detention and
solitary detention places112 fall under the general coverage of the right to security of person under the writ
of Amparo." They submit that the Court ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of person in
view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates that, "The State values the
dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." Finally, to justify a liberal
interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile113 that "the
right to liberty may be made more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise of
that liberty"114 such as a requirement to "report under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of
liberty"115 or being put under "monitoring and surveillance."116

In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to their right to life and liberty, and
a violation of their right to security.

Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has indeed been violated as respondents
assert. The right to security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution which provides, viz:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge...

At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her person - houses,
papers, and effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state's power over a person's
home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself. 117 The
purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: 118

The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by
officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such usurpation
when attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to
privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace and security of every
individual, whether it be of home or of persons and correspondence. (Tañada and Carreon, Political Law
of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right
against unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul
than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable
can only be for the best causes and reasons.119 (emphases supplied)

While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 120 guarantees essentially the right to be alive121 - upon which the
enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality
of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and property may
be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he
established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and
property... pervades the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence." 122 In a broad sense, the
right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his
body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life while existing,
and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of
life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual."123

A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right.

First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its "whereas" clauses, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief
and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people."
(emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but
essentially an individual international human right.124 It is the "right to security of person" as the word "security"
itself means "freedom from fear."125 Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.126 (emphasis supplied)

In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) also provides for the right to security of person, viz:

1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or
detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedure as are established by law. (emphasis supplied)

The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to life,
liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of
action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-founded as people react
differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their
imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more
correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the
"threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the
right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision. 127

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III,
Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body cannot be searched or invaded
without a search warrant.128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical
disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself
escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront
to the bodily integrity or security of a person.129

Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily integrity. When employed to vitiate the free
will such as to force the victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an invasion of
both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will. Article
III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz:

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall
be used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the free will - although not involving
invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of "freedom
from threat" as afore-discussed.

Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses of persons under investigation for the
commission of an offense. Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation should
all the more be protected from these degradations.

An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a right against torture was made by the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.130 In this case, the claimant, who
was lawfully detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his
right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides, viz: "Everyone has
the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ..." (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that
"(n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Although the
application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the
concept of security in holding, viz:

...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of domestic authorities at the time when they
could reasonably have been expected to take measures in order to ensure his security and to investigate
the circumstances in question.

xxx xxx xxx

... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply with the procedural obligation
under Art.3 to conduct an effective investigation into his allegations.131 (emphasis supplied)

The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women has also made a statement that the
protection of the bodily integrity of women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz:

...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women of human rights and
fundamental freedoms under general international law or under specific human rights conventions is
discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women). These rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and security of
person.132

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In the
context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of
bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a
corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the
1987 Constitution.133 As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee
of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection
to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations,
organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,134viz:

(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality
preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as
its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim
or his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. 135

This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of government protection has been interpreted by
the United Nations' Human Rights Committee136 in not a few cases involving Article 9137 of the ICCPR. While the
right to security of person appears in conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled
that the right to security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not
necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v.
Colombia,138 a case involving death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose
social views differed from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:
 The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate paragraph. Its location as a part of paragraph
one could lead to the view that the right to security arises only in the context of arrest and detention. The
travaux préparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt
with in the other provisions of article 9. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to
the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to security of the person. These elements have been
dealt with in separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only reference to the right
of security of person is to be found in article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended to narrow the
concept of the right to security only to situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time,
States parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the Covenant. It cannot be the case
that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction,
just because that he or she is not arrested or otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation
to take reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of article 9 which
would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons within its
jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant.139(emphasis supplied)

The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,140 which involved a political activist and prisoner of conscience
who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements following his release from detention.
In a catena of cases, the ruling of the Committee was of a similar import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial
Guinea,141 involving discrimination, intimidation and persecution of opponents of the ruling party in that
state; Tshishimbi v. Zaire,142 involving the abduction of the complainant's husband who was a supporter of
democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,143 involving the murder of the complainant's partner and the
harassment he (complainant) suffered because of his investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v.
Zambia,144 involving an assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance.

Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the "right to security" not only as
prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford
protection of the right to liberty.145 The ECHR interpreted the "right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of the
European Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey.146 In this
case, the claimant's son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The family's requests
for information and investigation regarding his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a
violation of her son's right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:

... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and
procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely
to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual it is incumbent
on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as
requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and
to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into
custody and has not been seen since.147 (emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the case at bar, we now determine whether
there is a continuing violation of respondents' right to security.

First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents' life, liberty and security.

While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them, would
be killed. In Raymond's narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he
attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain "Mam," who wanted to see him before he was
killed, spared him.

This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It should be
stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or
voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June
2007 when respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents' captors even told them that they
were still deciding whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz:

Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa
amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o
hindi.148

The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With their
escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific
officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to
have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño, and Manuel Merino, among others.

Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens
because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit
their movements or activities.149 Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their
abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or
written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents' abduction,
detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again
be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life,
actionable through a petition for a writ of Amparo.

Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of military
elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture,
they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents' abduction as revealed by the
testimony and investigation report of petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the
7th Infantry Division.

The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied on
the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation
for the first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn
statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their
credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the
family or neighbors of the respondents.

In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated October
31, 2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action
in the event the writ of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP, which should
essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant
evidence; identification of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause, manner,
location and time of death or disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in
the death or disappearance; and bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent court. 150 Petitioner AFP
Chief of Staff also submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of respondent
Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to
the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent
reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide results of the investigations to respondents. 151 To this
day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on
October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results of the investigation which they now seek
through the instant petition for a writ of Amparo.

Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of
respondents' right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom from threat" is violated by the apparent threat
to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is
likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.

Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question.

First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports of the investigation undertaken in
connection with their case, except those already in file with the court.

Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo and Donald Caigas.

Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals all medical reports, records and charts, and
reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo brothers, to
include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until
August 12, 2007.

With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the production order sought by respondents
partakes of the characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a search
warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the application must be
under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one specific offense; and (4) the probable cause must be
personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.152 In the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that other than the bare, self-
serving and vague allegations made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the
documents respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting
details. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true
in the present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been shown.

Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under the Amparo Rule should not be confused
with a search warrant for law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional
provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the
government from the demand of the people such as respondents.

Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the production of documents or things under Section 1,
Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:

Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.

Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending
may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by
or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books of accounts,
letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain
evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody
or control...

In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,153 the respondent judge, under authority of Rule 27, issued
a subpoena duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the books and papers of Material
Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated the
search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the argument and held that the subpoena pertained to a civil
procedure that "cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution..."
Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself undertook "to provide results of the investigations
conducted or to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged disappearance of
the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher
headquarters."

With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the disclosure of the present places of
assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical
personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a writ
of Amparo. They add that it will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official functions and
duties of military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal injury or even
death.

On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald
Caigas, whom respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is
relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure
would also help ensure that these military officers can be served with notices and court processes in relation to
any investigation and action for violation of the respondents' rights. The list of medical personnel is also relevant in
securing information to create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical interventions,
when applicable and necessary.

In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security, these rights are snuffed out from
victims of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of
silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 26, 2007 is affirmed.
G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008

DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M. ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS

MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF NELSON
DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE stationed in Boracay Island,
represented by the PNP STATION COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18th DIVISION,
SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA. LOURDES T. SANSON,respondents.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;1 and Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the
Writ of Habeas Data2) is the petition for certiorari and for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data
filed by the above-named petitioners against the Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario [in his capacity as presiding
judge of RTC Br. 5, Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC], the Philippine National
Police stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP Station Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in
Cebu, 18th Division, and the spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents.

The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:

The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the "private respondents"), filed
with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga-Malay, Aklan (the "MCTC") a complaint3 dated 24 April
2006 for forcible entry and damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos
Madriaga, Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas (the "petitioners") and other John
Does numbering about 120. The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they are the registered
owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-hectare parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay,
Malay, Aklan (the "disputed land"); (2) they were the disputed land's prior possessors when the petitioners - armed
with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons numbering 120 - entered the
disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private respondents' permission and against the objections of
the private respondents' security men, and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.

In their Answer4 dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint. They
essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the
private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents' certificate of title to the disputed property
is spurious. They asked for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.

The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision 5 in the private respondents' favor. It
found prior possession - the key issue in forcible entry cases - in the private respondents' favor, thus:

"The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended Commissioner's Report and
Sketch found on pages 245 to 248 of the records and the evidence the parties have submitted. It is shown
in the Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch that the land in question is enclosed by a concrete
and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink and green highlighter as shown in the Sketch Plan (p. 248). Said
perimeter fence was constructed by the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The foregoing findings of the
Commissioner in his report and sketch collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that after they acquired the
land in question on May 27, 1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex 'A', Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276,
rec.), they caused the construction of the perimeter fence sometime in 1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio
Sanson, pp. 271-275, rec.).

From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs were in actual physical
possession of the whole lot in question since 1993 when it was interrupted by the defendants (sic) when
on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the Heirs of Antonio Tapuz entered a portion of the land in question
with view of inhabiting the same and building structures therein prompting plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to
confront them before BSPU, Police Chief Inspector Jack L. Wanky and Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapaño.
As a result of their confrontation, the parties signed an Agreement (Annex 'D', Complaint p. 20) wherein
they agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the land in question and agreed not to build any structures
thereon.

The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of January 4, 2005 when the
plaintiff posted security guards, however, sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006, the
defendants some with bolos and one carrying a sack suspected to contain firearms with other John Does
numbering about 120 persons by force and intimidation forcibly entered the premises along the road and
built a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex 'E', Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in question which incident
was promptly reported to the proper authorities as shown by plaintiffs' Certification (Annex 'F',
Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in the police blotter and on same date April 19, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a
complaint with the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan
but no settlement was reached as shown in their Certificate to File Action (Annex 'G', Complaint, p. 13);
hence the present action.

Defendants' (sic) contend in their answer that 'prior to January 4, 2005, they were already occupants of
the property, being indigenous settlers of the same, under claim of ownership by open continuous,
adverse possession to the exclusion of other (sic)'. (Paragraph 4, Answer, p. 25).

The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is enclosed by a perimeter fence
constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as noted by the Commissioner in his Report and reflected
in his Sketch, thus, it is safe to conclude that the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual physical possession of the
land in question from 1993 up to April 19, 2006 when they were ousted therefrom by the defendants by
means of force. Applying by analogy the ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Molina, et
al. vs. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the land were in the possession of plaintiffs from 1993 to April 19, 2006,
defendants' claims to an older possession must be rejected as untenable because possession as a fact
cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities.

Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the land in question on April
18, 2006 at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon as shown in their Certification (Annex 'D', Defendants'
Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).

The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made to the commissioner who
constituted (sic) the land in question that they built structures on the land in question only on April 19,
2006 (Par. D.4, Commissioner's Amended Report, pp. 246 to 247), after there (sic) entry thereto on even
date.

Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of defendants' witnesses, Rowena
Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, in their Joint Affidavit (pp.
143- '144, rec.) [sic] categorically stated 'that on or about April 19, 2006, a group of armed men entered
the property of our said neighbors and built plastic roofed tents. These armed men threatened to drive
our said neighbors away from their homes but they refused to leave and resisted the intruding armed
men'.
 From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry happened on April 18,
2006 but it was only on April 19, 2006 when the defendants overpowered by their numbers the security
guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to the controversy.

Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their pictures attached as
annexes to their position paper were not noted and reflected in the amended report and sketch
submitted by the Commissioner, hence, it could be safely inferred that these structures are built and (sic)
situated outside the premises of the land in question, accordingly, they are irrelevant to the instant case
and cannot be considered as evidence of their actual possession of the land in question prior to April 19,
20066."

The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court ("RTC," Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan) then
presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin ("Judge Marin").

On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents' motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction through an Order dated 26 February 2007, with the issuance conditioned on the private
respondents' posting of a bond. The writ7 - authorizing the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision - was
actually issued by respondent Judge Elmo F. del Rosario (the "respondent Judge") on 12 March 2007 after the
private respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider the issuance
of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.

The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and to Defer Enforcement
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an Order dated 17 May 20078.

Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. 9 The respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a
Special Order10 a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the Sheriff's written notice to the
petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively take actual
possession of the land.

The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a Petition for
Review11(under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of the Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order
of Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil Case No. 7990.

Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for Demolition on 19 March
2008.12

It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition last 29 April 2008. The petition
contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of
the writ of amparo under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual positions diametrically
opposed to the MCTC's findings and legal reasons. Most importantly, the petitioners maintain their claims of prior
possession of the disputed land and of intrusion into this land by the private respondents. The material factual
allegations of the petition - bases as well of the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo - read:

"29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot guns intruded into the
property of the defendants [the land in dispute]. They were not in uniform. They fired their shotguns at
the defendants. Later the following day at 2:00 a.m. two houses of the defendants were burned to ashes.
 30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up by defendants to protect
their property from intruders. Two of the armed men trained their shotguns at the defendants who
resisted their intrusion. One of them who was identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y GEGANSO, 19 years old,
single, and a resident of Binun-an, Batad, Iloilo, fired twice.

31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to ashes. [...]

32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were reported by one of the HEIRS OF
ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists trained their shotguns and fired at minors namely IVAN GAJISAN
and MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion. Their act is a blatant violation of the law
penalizing Acts of Violence against women and children, which is aggravated by the use of high-
powered weapons.

[…]

34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered petitioners continue
because the private respondents Sansons have under their employ armed men and they are influential
with the police authorities owing to their financial and political clout.

35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute by defendants and the
atrocities of the terrorists [introduced into the property in dispute by the plaintiffs] are attested by
witnesses who are persons not related to the defendants are therefore disinterested witnesses in the
case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada.
Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is submitted to prove that the plaintiffs resorted to atrocious
acts through hired men in their bid to unjustly evict the defendants. 13"

The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for forcible entry that the private
respondents filed below. Citing Section 33 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7691,14 they maintain that the forcible entry case in fact involves issues of title to or possession of real
property or an interest therein, with the assessed value of the property involved exceeding P20,000.00; thus, the
case should be originally cognizable by the RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners reason out that the RTC - to where the
MCTC decision was appealed - equally has no jurisdiction to rule on the case on appeal and could not have validly
issued the assailed orders.

OUR RULING

We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally defective, both in substance and
in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect
to content and substance.

The Petition for Certiorari

We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the petition for certiorari to
nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. It is not lost on us that the petitioners have a pending
petition with the Court of Appeals (the "CA petition") for the review of the same RTC orders now assailed in the
present petition, although the petitioners never disclosed in the body of the present petition the exact status of
their pending CA petition. The CA petition, however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on 2 August 2007, which
indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest of the interrelated assailed orders) were
received on 1 August 2007 at the latest. The present petition, on the other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or
more than eight months from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the present petition is separated in point of
time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC orders by at least eight (8) months, i.e., beyond the
reglementary period of sixty (60) days15 from receipt of the assailed order or orders or from notice of the denial of
a seasonably filed motion for reconsideration.

We note in this regard that the petitioners' counsel stated in his attached "Certificate of Compliance with Circular
#1-88 of the Supreme Court"16 ("Certificate of Compliance") that "in the meantime the RTC and the Sheriff issued a
NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION not served to counsel but to the petitioners who sent photo copy of the
same NOTICE to their counsel on April 18, 2008 by LBC." To guard against any insidious argument that the present
petition is timely filed because of this Notice to Vacate, we feel it best to declare now that the counting of the 60-
day reglementary period under Rule 65 cannot start from the April 18, 2008 date cited by the petitioners' counsel.
The Notice to Vacate and for Demolition is not an order that exists independently from the RTC orders assailed in
this petition and in the previously filed CA petition. It is merely a notice, made in compliance with one of the
assailed orders, and is thus an administrative enforcement medium that has no life of its own separately from the
assailed order on which it is based. It cannot therefore be the appropriate subject of an independent petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 in the context of this case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be the material date for
Rule 65 purposes as the above-mentioned Notice to Vacate is not even directly assailed in this petition, as the
petition's Prayer patently shows.17

Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of willful and deliberate
misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum shopping.

By the petitioners' own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (docketed as CA - G.R. SP No.
02859) for the review of the orders now also assailed in this petition, but brought the present recourse to us,
allegedly because "the CA did not act on the petition up to this date and for the petitioner (sic) to seek relief in the
CA would be a waste of time and would render the case moot and academic since the CA refused to resolve pending
urgent motions and the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of demolition despite the defect of LACK OF
JURISDICTION."18

Interestingly, the petitioners' counsel - while making this claim in the body of the petition - at the same time
represented in his Certificate of Compliance19 that:

"x x x

(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
copy of the petition is attached (sic);

(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held that the ORDER TO VACATE
AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS is not capable of being the subject of a
PETITION FOR RELIEF, copy of the resolution of the CA is attached hereto; (underscoring supplied)

(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this date the same had not
been resolved copy of the MR is attached (sic).

x x x"

The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the appellate court level is replete with
significance regarding the petitioners' intentions. We discern -- from the petitioners' act of misrepresenting in the
body of their petition that "the CA did not act on the petition up to this date" while stating the real Court of
Appeals action in the Certification of Compliance -- the intent to hide the real state of the remedies the petitioners
sought below in order to mislead us into action on the RTC orders without frontally considering the action that the
Court of Appeals had already undertaken.
At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the present petition, the same relief
that it could not wait for from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02859. The petitioners' act of seeking against
the same parties the nullification of the same RTC orders before the appellate court and before us at the same
time, although made through different mediums that are both improperly used, constitutes willful and deliberate
forum shopping that can sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal of the petition under the combined
application of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs of Section 3, Rule 46; Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65;
and Rule 56, all of the Revised Rules of Court. That a wrong remedy may have been used with the Court of Appeals
and possibly with us will not save the petitioner from a forum-shopping violation where there is identity of parties,
involving the same assailed interlocutory orders, with the recourses existing side by side at the same time.

To restate the prevailing rules, "forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or
the other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against
whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in
another, other than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses
their processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful and deliberate violation
of the rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt." 20

Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is defective as one (1) of the seven
(7) petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - did not sign, in violation of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1,
Rule 65; all in relation with Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of Court. Of those who signed, only five (5) exhibited their
postal identification cards with the Notary Public.

In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the supporting attachments,
to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly assumed jurisdiction over the private respondents' complaint, which
specifically alleged a cause for forcible entry and not - as petitioners may have misread or misappreciated - a case
involving title to or possession of realty or an interest therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary
Reorganization Act, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive jurisdiction over forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts. These first-level courts have had jurisdiction over these cases - called accion interdictal - even before the
R.A. 7691 amendment, based on the issue of pure physical possession (as opposed to the right of possession). This
jurisdiction is regardless of the assessed value of the property involved; the law established no distinctions based
on the assessed value of the property forced into or unlawfully detained. Separately from accion
interdictalare accion publiciana for the recovery of the right of possession as a plenary action, and accion
reivindicacion for the recovery of ownership.21 Apparently, these latter actions are the ones the petitioners refer to
when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19, par. 2 of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7691, in which jurisdiction may either be with the first-level courts or the regional
trial courts, depending on the assessed value of the realty subject of the litigation. As the complaint at the MCTC
was patently for forcible entry, that court committed no jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari under the
present petition.

In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for violation of the non-
forum shopping rule, for having been filed out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.

The Writ of Amparo

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in
the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies
to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life,
liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules,
or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property
or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo - in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that
its issuance demands - requires that every petition for the issuance of the Pwrit must be supported by justifying
allegations of fact, to wit:

"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission,
or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;

(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;

(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of
the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation,
together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for.

The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs."22

The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts
determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or
violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.

The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations heretofore
quoted,23that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition. These allegations are supported by the
following documents:

"(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez
and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of the petitioners, id., petitioners' prior
possession, private respondents' intrusion and the illegal acts committed by the private respondents and
their security guards on 19 April 2006;

(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing of guns, etc.)
committed by a security guard against minors - descendants of Antonio Tapuz;

(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially corroborating Nemia's affidavit;

(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod regarding the incident of
petitioners' intrusion into the disputed land;

(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating the altercation
between the Tapuz family and the security guards of the private respondents, including the gun-poking
and shooting incident involving one of the security guards;
 (f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a house owned by Josiel
Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain Jorge Buenavente, was accidentally burned by a fire."

On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the overriding involvement of
property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the property disputed by the
private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent
that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to
the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the
alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the
threat to the rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.

A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them - the statements of Nemia Carreon y Tapuz and
Melanie Tapuz are practically identical and unsworn. The Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other
hand, simply narrates what had been reported by one Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the
burning of two residential houses was "accidental."

As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the forcible entry case which
rejected all the petitioners' factual claims. These findings are significantly complete and detailed, as they were
made under a full-blown judicial process, i.e., after examination and evaluation of the contending parties'
positions, evidence and arguments and based on the report of a court-appointed commissioner.

We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a dispute (with incidents giving
rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that was brought to and ruled upon by the MCTC; subsequently
brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still pending; still much later brought to the appellate court without
conclusive results; and then brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the issuance of the writ of
amparo that, if decided as the petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC appeal moot.

Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate
facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo. Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing
threat to the persons of the petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-
related and focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged
perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather
than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.

Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our action may carry the unintended
effect, not only of reversing the MCTC ruling independently of the appeal to the RTC that is now in place, but also
of nullifying the ongoing appeal process. Such effect, though unintended, will obviously wreak havoc on the
orderly administration of justice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not intend to
weaken or negate.

Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators, clear and patent
to us, that the petitioners' present recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate
the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of
an improper remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners' misrepresentations pointed out above; from
their obvious act of forum shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of the writs of
certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when
recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of improper
remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo - extraordinary though they may be - will
suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as a
substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these processes - the
situation obtaining in the present case.
While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the institution of
separate actions,24 for the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions,25 and for the consolidation of petitions for the
issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and civil action.26 These rules were adopted to
promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties
resort to other parallel recourses.

Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the
reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of
amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security -
the personalconcern that the writ is intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the
danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a
proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-
existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.

The Writ of Habeas Data

Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:

"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty
or security of the aggrieved party;

(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;

(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information, if known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the
database or information or files kept by the respondent.

In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."

Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:

"1. [ … ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the PNP may release the
report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts of violence employed against them by
the private respondents, furnishing the Court and the petitioners with copy of the same;

[…]

66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine National Police [PNP] to
produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute
and likewise the investigation report if an investigation was conducted by the PNP."

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the
petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right
to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less
demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already set
forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of
previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ
of habeas data is nothing more than the "fishing expedition" that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on
habeas data - had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright
denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form
and substance patent from its body and attachments.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 103
SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-49833. February 15, 1990.]

JUANITO RAMOS, SALVADOR RAMOS, ESPERIDION RAMOS, LYDIA RAMOS and AGAPITA VDA. DE
RAMOS, Petitioners, v. HON. BIENVENIDO A. EBARLE, Judge, Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental,
Branch II, and SPOUSES BERTOLO HINOG and DELA PAZ CORTES, Respondents.

Dominador B. Borje, for Petitioners.

Jorge C. Paderanga for Private Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; JUDGMENT; LITIS PENDENTIA, REQUISITES. — Under the rules and
jurisprudence, for litis pendentia to be invoked as a ground for the dismissal of an action, the concurrence of the
following requisites is necessary: (a) Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both
actions; (b) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) The
identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO LITIS PENDENTIA IN CASE AT BAR. — The rights asserted in each of the cases involved are
separate and distinct; there are two subjects of controversy presented for adjudication. Also, two causes of action
are clearly involved. Civil Case No. OZ 642 is for annulment of an instrument and recovery of possession and
ownership of the one-half (1/2) share of the widow in the conjugal partnership properties. The alienation and
transfer thereof to private respondents without the knowledge and consent of said widow is the actionable wrong.
This cause of action properly pertains to the widow, Agapita Manisan, who is the real aggrieved party and,
therefore, the real party in interest. Thus, the participation of the other petitioners in the case in that particular
regard is not even necessary and they should not have been impleaded therein. On other hand, the real parties in
interest in the second action, Civil Case No. OZ 731, not only include the widow but all the heirs of Manuel Ramos.
The case is anchored on the alleged fraudulent acts employed by private respondents in securing Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 300 although the deed purporting to be a sale was actually intended only as a mortgage.
Necessarily, the real parties in interest and the cause of action are not the same. Furthermore, the subject matter
affected by said cause of action is the entire deed and, consequently, the entire parcel of land and not merely a
part or half thereof.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHILE A DECISION IN ONE CASE MAY AFFECT THE OTHER CASE IDENTITY OR DISCRETENESS OF
THE CAUSES OF ACTION IS NOT DETERMINED BY IT. — It necessarily follows from the above disquisition that the
third requisite for litis pendentia is also not present. There being different causes of action, the decision in one
case will not constitute res judicata as to the other. Thus, a finding that there was no fraud in executing a deed of
sale instead of a mortgage will not be res judicata as to the question of whether or not the widow consented to or
participated in the transaction. Of course, a decision in one case may, to a certain extent, affect the other case as
they involve the same parcel of land. This, however, is not the test to determine the identity or discreteness of the
causes of action.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DIFFICULTIES OR INCONVENIENCE IN PURSUING CAUSES OF ACTION BY SEPARATE REMEDIES
DO NOT JUSTIFY DISMISSAL. — Whatever difficulties or inconvenience may be entailed if both causes of action are
pursued on separate remedies, the proper solution is not the dismissal order of the trial court. The possible
consolidation of said cases, as well as stipulations and appropriate modes of discovery, may well be considered by
the court below to subserve not only procedural expedience but, more important, the ends of justice.
 DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioners pray in this original action for the writs of certiorari and mandamus primarily for the annulment of the
orders of respondent judge, dated October 11, 1978 and November 18, 1978, issued in Civil Case No. OZ 731 of the
then Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental.

Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased Manuel Ramos, namely, his widow, Agapita Vda. de Ramos, and their
children, Juanito, Salvador, Esperidion and Lydia. The records reveal that on May 26, 1977, they filed a complaint
docketed as Civil Case No. OZ 642 in the same trial court earlier referred to. This complaint was later amended, as
a matter of right, before answer thereto was filed. In both their original and amended complaints, petitioners
prayed that the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Properties" executed by Manuel Ramos on February 16, 1960 in
favor of respondent spouses be declared null and void, but "only in connection with the alleged participation
therein of plaintiff Agapita Manisan Vda. de Ramos," one of the petitioners herein. Additionally, petitioners prayed
for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 300 of the Register of Deeds of Misamis Occidental issued by
virtue of the aforementioned deed, and for them to be declared" to be the rightful owner (sic) of 23.0000
hectares, more or less, out of the 46.0000 hectares, as the plaintiffs does (sic) not question the legal effect of such
transactions of their late father as the rightful owner of the one-half under consideration." 1

On May 22, 1978, petitioners moved for the admission of a second amended complaint. This time, petitioners
likewise sought the annulment of the same deed of sale but focused the allegations of said amended complaint on
the alleged mistake and fraud that made the document defective. Petitioners alleged that although the contract
was designated as a sale, the intention was actually to mortgage the properties. Petitioners claimed therein that
they are in possession of the properties and have been in possession of the same since time immemorial. On the
basis of those allegations, petitioners sought to recover title to the entire parcel of land in question. 2

In its order dated June 9, 1978, the motion to admit the second amended complaint was denied by the trial court.
It pointed out that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . in the original and first amended complaint, plaintiffs were only claiming 23 hectares of land, this being the
share of Agapita Manisan in the conjugal land containing a total area of 46 hectares which was sold by her
husband, Manuel Ramos (deceased), to the defendants. Both complaints further alleged that they were not
questioning the ownership of Manuel Ramos as to the half portion conveyed, hence, the sale was valid insofar as
the 23 hectares was (sic) concerned. However, the 2nd amended complaint now changed these allegations
claiming the whole parcel of 46 hectares alleging practically new matters therein." 3

A motion for reconsideration of this order, filed on June 19, 1978, was denied by the trial court on June 1, 1978
holding that the second amended complaint would substantially alter the cause of action of the case." 4

On July 24, 1978, petitioner instituted Civil Case No. OZ 731 copying and embodying the same allegations in the
rejected second amended complaint in Civil Case No. OZ 642. 5 However, instead of being designated as an action
for "annulment of instrument and/or legal redemption" like the aforesaid second amended complaint, the case
was now denominated as one for "reconveyance and/or legal redemption." chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Private respondents moved to dismiss the second case on three grounds, that is, (1) that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause; (2) that there was no cause of action; and (3) that the
action was already barred by laches and/or prescription. 6 Despite an opposition thereto, the trial dismissed the
complaint in Civil Case No. OZ 731 on October 11, 1978 on the ground of litis pendentia. The court ruled
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . any judgment that may be rendered in Civil Case No. 642, regardless of which party may be successful, would
amount to res adjudicata in this case under consideration. From the allegations of both complaints, the cause of
action of the plaintiffs is premised solely on the invalidity of the instrument of sale although they have availed of
different remedies — one for reconveyance and the other for annulment. Perforce, these remedies emanate from
a single cause of action which under our rules cannot be resorted to by splitting the cause of action to be the basis
for filing a separate complaint. Whatever judgment may be rendered on the document in question would finally
settle the issue of validity amounting to res adjudicata of the case at bar. What plaintiffs failed to get by the denial
of their second amended complaint in Civil Case No. OZ 642, they are now pursuing this instant case to seek the
same relief in the prior case." 7

From the foregoing factual antecedents, the sole question to be resolved in the present recourse is whether or not
the trial court was correct in dismissing Civil Case No. OZ 731 on the ground of litis pendentia.

Under the rules and jurisprudence, for litis pendentia to be invoked as a ground for the dismissal of an action, the
concurrence of the following requisites is necessary: (a) Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same
interest in both actions; (b) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. 8

Petitioners assert herein that there could be no litis pendentia because the two cases involved distinct halves of
the forty-six (46) hectares of land. They claim that the dismissal of Civil Case No. OZ 723 on that ground is
inconsistent with the lower court’s refusal to admit the second amended complaint in Civil Case No. OZ 642. These
arguments, as formulated, appear to be strained and inconclusive. Nevertheless, we rule in petitioners’ favor as,
properly considered, there is merit in their position.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

The rights asserted in each of the cases involved are separate and distinct; there are two subjects of controversy
presented for adjudication. Also, two causes of action are clearly involved. Civil Case No. OZ 642 is for annulment
of an instrument and recovery of possession and ownership of the one-half (1/2) share of the widow in the
conjugal partnership properties. The alienation and transfer thereof to private respondents without the knowledge
and consent of said widow is the actionable wrong. This cause of action properly pertains to the widow, Agapita
Manisan, who is the real aggrieved party and, therefore, the real party in interest. Thus, the participation of the
other petitioners in the case in that particular regard is not even necessary and they should not have been
impleaded therein.

On other hand, the real parties in interest in the second action, Civil Case No. OZ 731, not only include the widow
but all the heirs of Manuel Ramos. The case is anchored on the alleged fraudulent acts employed by private
respondents in securing Transfer Certificate of Title No. 300 although the deed purporting to be a sale was actually
intended only as a mortgage. Necessarily, the real parties in interest and the cause of action are not the same.
Furthermore, the subject matter affected by said cause of action is the entire deed and, consequently, the entire
parcel of land and not merely a part or half thereof.

Concededly, some items or pieces of evidence may be admissible in both actions. It cannot be said, however, that
exactly the same evidence will support the decisions in both. It is evident that the legally significant and controlling
facts in each case are entirely different. In the first case, what is material and determinative, as alleged and to be
proved, is the lack of consent of the widow in the document in question; in the other, it is the alleged mistake of
fraud in the execution of the instrument and the obtention of title by respondents pursuant thereto.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

It necessarily follows from the above disquisition that the third requisite for litis pendentia is also not present.
There being different causes of action, the decision in one case will not constitute res judicata as to the other.
Thus, a finding that there was no fraud in executing a deed of sale instead of a mortgage will not be res judicata as
to the question of whether or not the widow consented to or participated in the transaction. Of course, a decision
in one case may, to a certain extent, affect the other case as they involve the same parcel of land. This, however, is
not the test to determine the identity or discreteness of the causes of action. And, whatever difficulties or
inconvenience may be entailed if both causes of action are pursued on separate remedies, the proper solution is
not the dismissal order of the trial court. The possible consolidation of said cases, as well as stipulations and
appropriate modes of discovery, may well be considered by the court below to subserve not only procedural
expedience but, more important, the ends of justice.

ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the writ of certiorari is hereby issued SETTING ASIDE the questioned
orders, dated October 11, 1978 and November 18, 1978, issued in Civil Case No. OZ 731 by respondent judge.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 105

[G.R. No. 111455. December 23, 1998]

MARISSA A. MOSSESGELD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL, respondents.

DECISION
PARDO, J.:

The case is an appeal via certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court from the decision of the Court
of Appeals[1] affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 69, dismissing the petition of the putative
father, later substituted by the unwed mother, to compel the local civil registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,[2] to
register the certificate of live birth of petitioners illegitimate child using the surname of the presumed father.
On December 2, 1989, petitioner Marissa Alfaro Mossesgeld, single, 31 years of age, gave birth to a baby boy
at the Medical City General Hospital, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. [3] It was the third time that she delivered a
child.[4] The presumed father, one Eleazar Siriban Calasan, 42 years old, a lawyer, married, and a resident of 8632
San Jose St. Guadalupe Nuevo, Makati, Metro Manila, signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant,
indicating therein the childs first name as Jonathan, middle name as Mossesgeld, and last name as Calasan. Both the
presumed father, Eleazar S. Calasan and the mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld, accomplished the dorsal side of the
certificate of live birth stating that the information contained therein were true and correct. In addition, lawyer
Calasan executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the child.[5]
On December 6, 1989, due to the refusal of the person in charge at the hospital to placing the presumed fathers
surname as the childs surname in the certificate of live birth, petitioner himself submitted the certificate to the office
of the local civil registrar of Mandaluyong, for registration.
On December 28, 1989, the municipal treasurer of Mandaluyong, as officer in charge of the office of the local
civil registrar, rejected the registration on the basis of Circular No. 4, dated October 11, 1988, of the Civil Registrar
General, providing that under Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate children born on or after
August 3, 1988, shall use the surname of their mother.[6]
On October 9, 1990, lawyer Eleazar S. Calasan personally went to the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong to
inquire about the status of the registration of his illegitimate childs certificate of birth, but was furnished with a copy
of the letter dated January 17, 1990, of the Civil Registrar General denying registration of the certificate of live birth
of petitioners illegitimate child using the fathers surname, for it is contrary to law. [7]
On November 7, 1990, lawyer Eleazar S. Calasan filed with the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 69, a petition
for mandamus to compel the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, to register the certificate of live
birth of his alleged illegitimate son using his surname.[8]
On October 29, 1991, the lower court denied the petition, ruling that illegitimate children must use the
surname of their mothers, regardless of whether or not they had been acknowledged by their fathers in the record
of birth.[9]
On November 21, 1991, petitioner Calasan filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial. In the meantime,
on December 9, 1991, he filed a motion for leave to amend petition and to admit amended petition, substituting the
childs mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld as the petitioner.[10]
On February 11, 1992, the lower court granted the motion for leave to amend petition.[11] However, on June 3,
1992, the lower court denied the motion for reconsideration.
 In due time, petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
On July 23, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered decision affirming the judgment appealed from. [12]
Hence, this petition.
The issue raised is whether mandamus lies to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live
birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged fathers surname where the latter admitted paternity.
We deny the petition.
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines[13] provides that illegitimate children shall use the surname
and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. Consequently, the Local Civil Registrar
correctly refused to register the certificate of live birth of petitioners illegitimate child using the surname of the
alleged father, even with the latters consent. Of course, the putative father, though a much married man, may
legally adopt his own illegitimate child.[14] In case of adoption, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the
adopter, entitled to use his surname.[15]
The Family Code has effectively repealed the provisions of Article 366 of the Civil Code of the Philippines giving
a natural child acknowledged by both parents the right to use the surname of the father. The Family Code has
limited the classification of children to legitimate and illegitimate,[16] thereby eliminating the category of
acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction. [17]
Consequently, we rule that mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil registrar to register the certificate
of live birth of an illegitimate child using the fathers surname, even with the consent of the latter. Mandamus does
not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari. We AFFIRM the decision of the Court of
Appeals and that of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Branch 69, dismissing the petition for mandamus in Special Civil
Action No. 60146.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-62283 November 25, 1983

CARIDAD CRUZ VDA. DE SY-QUIA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE PEDRO REYNALDO SY-QUIA, respondents.

Alfredo P Rosete, Manuel O. Chan and Enrique O. Chan for petitioner.

Manuel B. Tomacruz and Dominador R. Santiago for private respondent.

AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

This case is about the necessity of taking the testimony of Doctor Ernesto Medina Cue on the serological tests
which he took in 1961 regarding the blood types of Jose Sy-Quia, Pedro Sy-Quia and Remedios Borres and which
are covered by his deposition of January 25, 1975 taken in his clinic at Pasay City over the objection of Jose Sy-
Quia.

The Court of Appeals in its decision of March 31, 1982 ordered that Doctor Cue should testify before the trial court
in Pasig, Rizal. His testimony should be admitted in lieu of his deposition.

Pedro M. Sy-Quia died in Mandaluyong, Rizal with an estate of over one and a half million pesos (Pl,500,000). He
was survived by his wife, Caridad, and his five legitimate children named Noel, Pedro, Jr., Asuncion, Mauricio and
Francisco.

He left a holographic will dated March 18, 1966, wherein he divided equally one-half of his net estate among his
widow and five children. The other half or free portion was divided equally among Pedro, Jr., Asuncion, Mauricio
and Francisco after setting aside the amount necessary to allow Asuncion, Mauricio and Francisco to complete
their education on the same level as Pedro, Jr.'s. The widow was designated executrix.

On October 20, 1967, his widow Caridad Cruz filed Special Proceeding No. 5473 with the Pasig Court of First
Instance for the probate of his will. After the requisite publication and hearing, the will was probated in Judge
Herminio Mariano's order of May 10, 1968.

More than three years later, Jose Pedro Reynaldo Sy-Quia filed a motion in the probate proceeding wherein he
alleged that he was an acknowledged natural child of the testator, Pedro M. Sy-Quia, begotten with Remedios
Borres (who later married Pedro Perolina in articulo mortis in 1949, Exh. X). He was born on October 31, 1937 as
shown in his birth certificate wherein he was represented to be "legitimate", his parents being Pedro Sy-Quia, 33,
and Remedios Borres, 24, both residing at 140 A. Mabini (Exh. V)

He prayed in his motion that being the testator's voluntarily acknowledged natural child, his pretention nullified
Pedro M. Sy-Quia's will and, therefore, his estate should be settled under the rules of intestacy.

The widow opposed the motion on the ground that Jose was asking for compulsory recognition which could not be
entertained under article 285 of the Civil Code. This incident was duly heard by the trial court.

Jose Sy-Quia presented Leopoldo Sy-Quia, Pedro's brother, who testified that Jose was Pedro's acknowledged
natural child. He also offered in evidence his school records at De la Salle College containing the signatures of P.M.
Sy-Quia, particularly Exhibit Y dated July 1, 1954, which was an authorization addressed to Brother Jerome signed
by Pedro M. Sy-Quia. It reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£
 This is to certify that I authorize the school doctor to administer the CDT (Cholera Dysentery
typhoid) vaccine to my son Jose P. Sy-Quia of advisory 2-D.

On the other hand, Caridad Cruz Vda. de Sy-Quia filed a motion for the taking of the deposition of Doctor Cue,
Clinical Laboratory, Pasay City. The motion was granted by the lower court. The deposition was taken on January
25, 1975 over the opposition of Jose Sy-Quia's counsel. He objected to its presentation in court as evidence since
Doctor Cue could have testified in court.

Doctor Cue's deposition purportedly proved that taking into account the blood groups and types of Jose Sy-Quia,
Pedro M. Sy-Quia and Remedios Borres, which, as already noted, he examined in 1961, Jose could not have been
the son of Pedro and Remedios.

The lower court in its order of May 14, 1975 found that there is no indubitable writing showing that Jose was an
acknowledged natural child of Pedro M. Sy-Quia, that his action for compulsory recognition should have been
brought during Pedro's lifetime and that the result of the blood tests explains why Pedro omitted Jose in his will.

Jose appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its aforementioned 1982 decision held that Jose's theory was that
he was already a voluntarily acknowledged natural child under article 278 of the Civil Code.

However, the Appellate Court ruled that the deposition of Doctor Cue was inadmissible evidence. It remanded the
case to the trial court and directed it to subpoena Doctor Cue to testify on the subject of his deposition and to be
cross-examined by Jose Sy-Quia's counsel.

Mrs. Sy-Quia appealed to this Court. Lawyer Manuel B. Tomacruz, Jose's counsel, did not submit his comment
although he was given three extensions expiring on March 25, 1983. He is censured for his unexplained failure to
submit his comment.

We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under article 278 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that "the voluntary recognition of a natural child
shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws" or
before August 30, 1950. Hence, article 278 may be given retroactive effect (p. 169, Report of Code Commission; 7
Padilla, Civil Code, 1975, p. 709).

Voluntary recognition "in any authentic writing" under article 278 means any genuine or indubitable writing
sufficient for compulsory recognition under article 135 of the Spanish Civil Code (De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866;
1 Tolentino, Civil Code, 1974, p. 585, 586).

The status of a person as a voluntarily acknowledged natural child "could be established by the ordinary means of
evidence without any limitations as to time" (Larena vs. Hubio 43 Phil. 1017, 1019). "An action based on voluntary
acknowledgment may be brought after the death of the father" (Javelona vs. Monteclaro, 74 Phil. 393, 400;
Guariña vs. Guariña-Casas 109 Phil. 1111). Hence, Jose's motion in the testate proceeding to claim his alleged
hereditary share is proper.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that Doctor Cue's deposition is inadmissible under section 4, Rule 24 of the
Rules of Court. But he should testify before the Appellate Court which is now authorized to receive evidence by
section 9 of the Judiciary Reorganization Law, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

WHEREFORE, the Appellate Court's decision is set aside. It is directed to receive the testimony of Doctor Cue within
thirty days from notice of the finality of this resolution and thereafter to render a new decision as may be
warranted under the facts and the law of the case. No costs.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
RULE 106

G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990

JOSE MODEQUILLO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, FLORIPER ABELLAN-SALINAS, JUANITO CULAN-CULAN and
DEPUTY SHERIFF FERNANDO PLATA respondents.

Josefina Brandares-Almazan for petitioner.

ABC Law Offices for private respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The issue in this petition is whether or not a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damages may
be satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code.

The facts are undisputed.

On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09218
entitled "Francisco Salinas, et al. vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.," the dispositive part of which read as follows:

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal should be, as it is hereby, reversed and set aside.
Judgment is hereby rendered finding the defendants-appellees Jose Modequillo and Benito
Malubay jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants as hereinbelow set forth. Accordingly,
defendants-appellees are ordered to pay jointly and severally to:

1. Plaintiffs-appellants, the Salinas spouses:

a. the amount of P30,000.00 by way of compensation for the death of their son Audie Salinas;

b. P10,000.00 for the loss of earnings by reason of the death of said Audie Salinas;

c. the sum of P5,000.00 as burial expenses of Audie Salinas; and

d. the sum of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.

2. Plaintiffs-appellants Culan-Culan:

a. the sum of P5,000.00 for hospitalization expenses of Renato Culan- Culan; and

b. P5,000.00 for moral damages.

3. Both plaintiff-appellants Salinas and Culan-Culan, P7,000.00 for attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.

All counterclaims and other claims are hereby dismissed. 1

The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of execution was issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City to satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito
Malubay at Malalag, Davao del Sur.

On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur
containing an area of 600 square meters with a market value of P34,550.00 and assessed value of P7,570.00 per
Tax Declaration No. 87008-01359, registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial
Assessor of Davao del Sur; and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur
containing an area of 3 hectares with a market value of P24,130.00 and assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax
Declaration No. 87-08-01848 registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the Provincial Assessor of
Davao del Sur. 2

A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein
that the residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the
commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles 152
and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt
sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under Article 155 of
the Family Code. As to the agricultural land although it is declared in the name of defendant it is alleged to be still
part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of a
cultural minority was not approved by the proper government agency. An opposition thereto was filed by the
plaintiffs.

In an order dated August 26, 1988, the trial court denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration thereof was
filed by defendant and this was denied for lack of merit on September 2, 1988.

Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari wherein it is alleged that the trial court erred and acted in
excess of its jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motion to quash and/or to set aside levy on the properties and in
denying petitioner' motion for reconsideration of the order dated August 26, 1988. Petitioner contends that only a
question of law is involved in this petition. He asserts that the residential house and lot was first occupied as his
family residence in 1969 and was duly constituted as a family home under the Family Code which took effect on
August 4, 1988. Thus, petitioner argues that the said residential house and lot is exempt from payment of the
obligation enumerated in Article 155 of the Family Code; and that the decision in this case pertaining to damages
arising from a vehicular accident took place on March 16, 1976 and which became final in 1988 is not one of those
instances enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code when the family home may be levied upon and sold on
execution. It is further alleged that the trial court erred in holding that the said house and lot became a family
home only on August 4, 1988 when the Family Code became effective, and that the Family Code cannot be
interpreted in such a way that all family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the
time of their occupancy prior to the effectivity of the said Code and that they are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of said Code; and that it also erred when it declared that
Article 162 of the Family Code does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.

Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code provide as follows:

Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried
head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which
it is situated.

Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied
as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed
by law.
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If
the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the
creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or
head of the family who owns the home.

Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:

Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except:

(1) For non-payment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;

(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men and others who have
rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building.

The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such,
and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.

In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether
judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article
153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a
leap year).

The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by
petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is provided that "the
provisions of this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable." It
does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded
to a family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a
retroactive effect.

Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the money judgment aforecited No. The debt or liability
which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976
and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both
preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from
execution provided in the Family Code.

As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made by the
sheriff shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 107

G.R. No. 84250 July 20, 1992

DAYA MARIA TOL-NOQUERA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ADRIANO R. VILLAMOR, Presiding Judge, Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Naval,
Leyte, and DIOSDADO TOL, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

Questioned in this action is the dismissal of a petition filed by Daya Maria Tol-Noquera for appointment as
administratrix of the property of the absentee Remigio Tol.

In Special Proceedings No. P-056, which was filed in December 1986, Daya Maria Tol alleged that she was the
acknowledged natural child of Remigio Tol, who had been missing since 1984. She claimed that a certain Diosdado
Tol had fraudulently secured a free patent over Remigio's property and had obtained title thereto in his name. She
was seeking the administration of the absentee's estate in order that she could recover the said property.

The petition was opposed by Diosdado Tol, who argued that Daya Maria Tol was not an acknowledged natural
child of the absentee and that the property sought to be administered was covered by an original certificate of title
issued in his name.

On March 31, 1987, the trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it was a collateral attack on a Torrens
title. The court also declared in effect that it was useless to appoint an administrator in view of the claim of a third
person that he was the owner of the absentee's property.

The petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, she filed a notice of appeal with this Court on
June 4, 1984. However, inasmuch as only questions of law were involved, we resolved to require the petitioner to
seek review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court within 15 days from notice.

In the petition now before us, it is argued that the original petition in the trial court was not intended as a
collateral attack on a Torrens title; hence, Art. 389 of the Civil Code 1 was not applicable.

The private respondent, on the other hand, contends that since the petitioner claims she is an illegitimate child of
Remigio Tol, she is prohibited under Art. 992 of the Civil Code 2 from inheriting ab intestato from the relatives of
her father.

The private respondent likewise questions the necessity of her appointment for the purpose only of having the
title annulled. He adds that in view of her allegations of fraud, she should have sued for the annulment of the title
within a period of one year, which had already expired. Lastly, the decision of the trial court had already become
final and executory because 76 days had already elapsed from the date of receipt of the said decision on May 21,
1987, to the date the petition was filed before this Court on August 5, 1987.

A study of the record reveals that the lower court was rather hasty in dismissing the petition.

As we see it, the petition was not a collateral attack on a Torrens title. The petitioner did say there was a need to
appoint an administrator to prevent the property from being usurped, but this did not amount to a collateral
attack on the title. The alleged fraudulent issuance of title was mentioned as a justification for her appointment as
administrator. But there was nothing in the petition to indicate that the petitioner would attack the title issued to
Diosdado in the same proceeding. In fact, the petitioner declared that whatever remedy she might choose would
be pursued in another venue, in a proceeding entirely distinct and separate from her petition for appointment as
administratrix.

Regarding the Torrens certificate of title to the disputed property which was presented to defeat the petitioner's
appointment, we feel that the position of trial court was rather ambivalent. For while relying on such title to justify
the dismissal of the petition, it suggested at the same time that it could be attacked as long as this was not done in
the proceeding before it.

The private respondent's arguments that the petitioner cannot inherit ab intestato from the legitimate parents of
the absentee is immaterial to this case. Her disqualification as an heir to her supposed grandparents does not
inhibit her from petitioning for a declaration of absence or to be appointed as an administratrix of the absentee's
estate.

The relevant laws on the matter are found in the following provisions of the Civil Code:

Art. 381. When a person disappears from his domicile his whereabouts being unknown, and
without leaving an agent to administer his property the judge, at the instance of an interested
party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to represent him in all that may be necessary.

This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the power conferred by the
absentee has expired.

Art. 382. The appointment referred to in the preceding article having been made, the judge shall
take the necessary measures to safeguard the rights and interest of the absentee and shall
specify the powers, obligations and remuneration of his representatives, regulating them
according to the circumstances, by the rules concerning guardians.

Art. 383. In the appointment of a representative, the spouse present shall be preferred when
there is no legal separation.

If the absentee left no spouse, or if the spouse present is a minor, any competent person may be
appointed by the court.

Art. 384. Two years having elapsed without any news about the absentee or since the receipt of
the last news, and five years in case the absentee has left a person in charge of the
administration of his property, his absence may be declared.

Art. 385. The following may ask for the declaration of absence:

(1) The spouse present;

(2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic copy of the same;

(3) The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy;

(4) Those who may have over the property of the absentee some right subordinated to the
condition of his death.
 Art. 386. The judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect until six months after its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

It is not necessary that a declaration of absence be made in a proceeding separate from and prior to a petition for
administration. This was the ruling in Reyes v. Alejandro, 3 reiterating Pejer v. Martinez. 4 In the latter case, the
court declared that the petition to declare the husband an absentee and the petition to place the management of
the conjugal properties in the hands of the wife could be combined and adjudicated in the same proceeding.

The purpose of the cited rules is the protection of the interests and property of the absentee, not of the
administrator. Thus, the question of whether the administrator may inherit the property to be administered is not
controlling. What is material is whether she is one of those allowed by law to seek the declaration of absence of
Remigio Tol and whether she is competent to be appointed as administratrix of his estate.

The issue of whether or not the property titled to Diosdado Tol is really owned by him should be resolved in
another proceeding. The right of Daya Maria Tol to be appointed administratrix cannot be denied outright by
reason alone of such issue.

Even if it be assumed that the title obtained by Diosdado Tol is already indefeasible because of the lapse of the
one-year period for attacking it on the ground of fraud, there are still other remedies available to one who is
unjustly deprived on his property. One of these is a claim for reconveyance, another a complaint for
damages. 5 The petitioner can avail herself of such remedies if she is appointed administratrix of the estate of the
absentee.

Finally, we find that the appeal was perfected seasonably. Notice of appeal was filed on June 4, 1987, within the
15-day extension of the period to appeal as granted by this Court in its resolution dated July 8, 1987.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. This case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for determination of
the legal personality of Daya Maria Tol to petition the declaration of Remigio Tol's absence and of her competence
to be appointed as administratrix of his estate.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 108

G.R. No. L-32181 March 5, 1986

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
LEONOR VALENCIA, as Natural mother and guardian of her minor children, BERNARDO GO and JESSICA GO; and
THE HON. AGAPITO HONTANOSAS, Judge of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, Branch XI.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of respondent Judge Agapito Hontanosas of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch XI who ordered the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu to make the necessary cancellation and/or
correction in the entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu.

Respondent Leonor Valencia, for and in behalf of her minor children, Bernardo Go and Jessica Go filed with the
Court of First Instance of Cebu a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go
and Jessica Go in the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3043-R.

The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for correction of entry in the Civil
Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules
of Court, contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors, those harmless and
innocuous changes such as the correction of a name that is merely mispelled, occupation of parents, etc., and not
changes or corrections involving civil status, nationality, or citizenship which are substantial and controversial.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order directing the publication
of the petition and the date of hearing thereof in the Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the city
and province of Cebu, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, and notice thereof, duly served on the Solicitor
General, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City and Go Eng.

Respondent Leonor Valencia, filed her reply to the opposition wherein she admitted that the present petition
seeks substantial changes involving the civil status and nationality or citizenship of respondents, but alleged that
substantial changes in the civil registry records involving the civil status of parents, their nationality or citizenship
may be allowed if- (1) the proper suit is filed, and (2) evidence is submitted, either to support the allegations of the
petition or to disprove the same; that respondents have complied with these requirements by filing the present
special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court and that they have caused reasonable notice to be given to the persons named in the petition and
have also caused the order for the hearings of their petition to be published for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.

Subsequently, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that since the petition
seeks to change the nationality or citizenship of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go from "Chinese" to "Filipino" and their
status from "Legitimate" to Illegitimate", and changing also the status of the mother from "married" to "single" the
corrections sought are not merely clerical but substantial, involving as they do the citizenship and status of the
petitioning minors and the status of their mother.

The lower court denied the motion to dismiss.

After trial on the merits during which the parties were given all the opportunity to present their evidence and
refute the evidence and arguments of the other side, the lower court rendered a decision the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered granting the instant petition and ordering the Local
Civil Registrar of the City of Cebu to make the necessary cancellation and/or correction on the
following entries:

A. In the Record of Birth of BERNARDO GO, to register said Bernardo Go as 'FILIPINO' instead of
'CHINESE'; as 'ILLEGITIMATE instead of LEGITIMATE', and his father's (GO ENG) and mother's
(LEONOR VALENCIA) civil status as 'SINGLE instead of MARRIED';

B. In the Record of Birth of JESSICA GO to register said Jessica Go as 'FILIPINO' instead of

'CHINESE'; as 'ILLEGITIMATE' instead of 'LEGITIMATE' and father's (GO ENG) and mother's
(LEONOR VALENCIA) civil status as 'SINGLE instead of MARRIED': and

C. In both Records of Birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go to change the entry on Petitioner's
Citizenship from 'CHINESE to FILIPINO'.

Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, the Clerk of Court is hereby directed to
furnish a copy of this decision to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, who shall
forthwith enter the cancellation and/'or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica
Go in the Civil Registry as adverted to above.

From the foregoing decision, oppositor-appellant Republic of the Philippines appealed to us by way of this petition
for review on certiorari.

The petitioner Republic of the Philippines raises a lone error for the grant of this petition, stating that:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION OF THE PETITIONER'S CITIZENSHIP
AND CIVIL STATUS AND THE CITIZENSHIP AND CIVIL STATUS OF HER MINOR CHILDREN
BERNARDO GO AND JESSICA GO.

The petitioner premises its case on precedents from the 1954 case of Ty Kong Tin v. Republic (94 Phil. 321) to the
1981 case of Republic v. Caparosso (107 SCRA 67), that entries which can be corrected under Article 412 of the
New Civil Code as implemented by Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court refer to those mistakes that are clerical
in nature or changes that are harmless and innocuous (Wong v. Republic, 115 SCRA 496). In Republic v.
Medina(119 SCRA 270) citing the case of Chua Wee, et al, v. Republic (38 SCRA 409), there was this dicta:

From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until the promulgation of the
Revised Rules of Court on January 1, 1964, there was no law nor rule of court prescribing the
procedure to secure judicial authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or
alterations in the civil register pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the
Revise Rules of Court now provides for such a procedure which should be limited solely to the
implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the matter of correcting entries in the civil
register. Rule 108, lie all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its rule- making authority under Sec. 13 of Art. VIII of the
Constitution, which directs that such rules of court 'shall not diminish or increase or modify
substantive rights.' If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or
corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to
comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy or
 paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become
unconstitutional for it would be increasing or modifying substantive rights, which changes are
not authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil Code.

xxx xxx xxx

It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmless
and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial as well as
controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is also true that
a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy is used. This Court
adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.
As a matter of fact, the opposition of the Solicitor General dated February 20, 1970 while questioning the use of
Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court admits that "the entries sought to
be corrected should be threshed out in an appropriate proceeding.

What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black's Law Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding as
follows:

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of
which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter
an opportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding." (Platt v. Magagnini, 187 p. 716,
718, 110 Was. 39).

The private respondent distinguishes between summary proceedings contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil
Code and fullblown adversary proceedings which are conducted under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

She states:

It will please be considered that the nature of the matters that may be changed or corrected are
of two kinds. It may either be mistakes that are clerical in nature or substantial ones. Under the
first category are those 'harmless and innocuous changes, such as correction of a name that is
clearly misspelled, occupation of the parents, etc.,' (Ansaldo v. Republic, No. L-10276, Feb. 14,
1958, 54 O.G. 5886) or 'one' that is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding'. (Black v.
Republic, No. L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958, 104 Phil. 848).

To the second category falls those which affect the civil status or citizenship or nationality of a
party (Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, No. L-5609, Feb. 5, 1954, 94 Phil. 321: Tan Su v. Republic, No. L-
12140, April 29, 1959, 105 Phil. 578: Black v. Republic, No. L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958, 104 Phil. 848;
Bantoco Coo v. Republic, No. L-14978, May 23,1961, 2 SCRA 42: Barillo v. Republic, No. L-14823,
Dec. 28, 1961, 3 SCRA 725).

Changes or corrections in the entries in the civil registry were governed, at first, by Act No. 3753
(Civil Registry Law) which placed these matters exclusively upon the sound judgment and
discretion of the civil registrars. With the effectivity of the New Civil Code on August 30, 1950,
these matters were governed by Article 412 thereof which prescribes judicial order before an
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected. This requirement was deemed necessary to
forestall the commission of fraud or other mischief in these matters.

But even then, it is not any correction that can be considered under Article 412 of he Civil Code.
The nature of the corrections sought has to be considered and if found to refer only to clerical
errors the same may be allowed under said article which was construed to contemplate only a
summary proceeding.

And so in the Ty Kong Tin case, this Honorable Court took occasion to draw a distinction between
what entries in the civil register could be corrected under Article 412 of the New Civil Code and
what could not. In the process, to our mind, this Honorable Court set down propositions which
hold true not only in that case but also in the subsequent cases for the latter merely reiterated
the Ty Kong Tin decision. These are:

First, that proceedings under Article 412 of the New Civil Code are summary:

Second, that corrections in the entires in the civil register may refer to either mere mistakes that
are clerical in nature or substantial ones which affects the civil status or -the nationality or
citizenship of the persons involved; and

Third, that if the change or correction sought refers to mere correction of mistakes that are
clerical in nature the same may be done, under Article 412 of the Civil Code; otherwise, if it
refers to a substantial change which affects the civil status or citizenship of a party. the matter
should be threshed out in a proper action.

To our humble estimation, these propositions do not altogether bar or preclude substantial
changes or corrections involving such details as the civil status or nationality of a party. As a
matter of fact, just three years after the Ty Kong Tin decision, this Honorable Court allowed a
party to correct mistakes involving such substantial matters as his birthplace and citizenship in
the birth certificates of his two sons. (Lim v. Republic, No. L-8932, May 31, 1957, 101 Phil. 1235)

Only that where the correction pertains to matters which are important and controversial certain
conditions sine que non have to be complied with. Thus it was held:

If it refers to a substantial change which affects the status or citizenship of a party, the matter
should be threshed out in a proper action ... .' (Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, supra)

. . . . for changes involving the civil status of the parents, their nationality or citizenship, those are
grave and important matters which may have a bearing and effect on the citizenship and
nationality not only of said parents, but of the offsprings, and to seek said changes, it is not only
the State, but also all parties concerned and affected should be made parties defendants or
respondents, and evidence should be submitted, either to support the allegations of the petition
or complaint, or also to disprove the same so that any order or decision in the case may be made
in the entry in a civil register that will affect or even determine conclusively the citizenship or
nationality of a person therein involved. (Ansaldo v. Republic, 54 O.G. 5886; Emphasis supplied;
Reiterated in the cases of: Tan Su v. Republic, supra; Bantoto Coo v. Republic, supra; Barillo v.
Republic, supra; San Luis de Castro v. Republic, L-17431, April 30, 1963; Ilu Lin v. Republic, L-
18213, Dec. 24, 1963; Reyes v. Republic, No.
L-17642, Nov. 27, 1964; Calicdan Baybayan v. Republic, L-20707, March 18, 1966; Tan v. Republic,
L-19847, April 29, 1966).

If at all what is forbidden is, in the words of Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, 'only the entering of material
corrections or amendments in the record of birth by virtue of a judgment in a summary action
against the Civil Registrar. (Matias v. Republic, No.
L-26982, May 8, 1969.
 It will thus be gleaned from the foregoing that corrections involving such matters as the civil
status of the parents, their nationality or citizenship may be allowed provided the proper suit is
filed.

The court's role in hearing the petition to correct certain entries in the civil registry is to ascertain the truth about
the facts recorded therein. Under our system of administering justice, truth is best ascertained or approximated by
trial conducted under the adversary system,

Excerpts from the Report on Professional Responsibility issued jointly by the Association of American Law Schools
and the American Bar Association explain why:

An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for combatting this natural human
tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully known. The
arguments of counsel hold the case, as it were, in suspension between two opposing
interpretations of it. While the proper classification of the case is thus kept unresolved, there is
time to explore all of its peculiarities and nuances.

These are the contributions made by partisan advocacy during the public hearing of the cause.
When we take into account the preparation that must precede the hearing, the essential quality
of the advocate's contribution becomes even more apparent. Preceding the hearing inquiries
must be instituted to determine what facts can be proved or seem sufficiently established to
warrant a formal test of their truth during the hearing. There must also be a preliminary analysis
of the issues, so that the hearing may have form and direction. These preparatory measures are
indispensable whether or not the parties involved in the controversy are represented by
advocates.

Where that representation is present there is an obvious advantage in the fact that the area of
dispute may be greatly reduced by an exchange of written pleadings or by stipulations of
counsel. Without the participation of someone who can act responsibly for each of the parties,
this essential narrowing of the issues becomes impossible. But here again the true significance of
partisan advocacy lies deeper, touching once more the integrity of the adjudicative process itself.
It is only through the advocate's participation that the hearing may remain in fact what it
purports to be in theory; a public trial of the facts and issues. Each advocate comes to the
hearing prepared to present his proofs and arguments, knowing at the same time that his
arguments may fail to persuade and that his proofs may be rejected as inadequate. It is a part of
his role to absorb these possible disappointments. The deciding tribunal, on the other hand,
comes to the hearing uncommitted. It has not represented to the public that any fact can be
proved, that any argument is sound, or that any particular way of stating a litigant's case is the
most effective expression of its merits.

xxx xxx xxx

These, then, are the reasons for believing that partisan advocacy plays a vital and essential role in
one of the most fundamental procedures of a democratic society. But if we were to put all of
these detailed considerations to one side, we should still be confronted by the fact that, in
whatever form adjudication may appear, the experienced judge or arbitrator desires and actively
seeks to obtain an adversary presentation of the issues. Only when he has had the benefit of
intelligent and vigorous advocacy on both sides can he feel fully confident of his decision.

Viewed in this light, the role of the lawyer as a partisan advocate appears, not as a regrettable
necessity, but as an indispensable part of a larger ordering of affairs. The institution of advocacy
 is not a concession to the frailties of human nature, but an expression of human insight in the
design of a social framework within which man's capacity for impartial judgment can attain its
fullest realization. (44 American Bar Association Journal (1160-1161, 1958)

Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party's case, and where
the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is appropriate.

The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:

SEC. 3. Parties — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication.— Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an orde, fix
the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given
to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC, 5. Opposition. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register are-(1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to-(l) issue an order fixing the
time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise
entitled to oppose the petition: (I) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.

If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in
the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be
described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil
Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and
the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings.

In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of Bernardo Go and Jessica Go in
the Civil Registry of the City of Cebu was filed by respondent Leonor Valencia on January 27, 1970, and pursuant to
the order of the trial court dated February 4, 1970, the said petition was published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in the, Cebu Advocate, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Cebu. Notice thereof
was duly served on the Solicitor General. the Local Civil Registrar and Go Eng. The order likewise set the case for
hearing and directed the local civil registrar and the other respondents or any person claiming any interest under
the entries whose corrections were sought, to file their opposition to the said petition. An opposition to the
petition was consequently filed by the Republic on February 26, 1970. Thereafter a full blown trial followed with
respondent Leonor Valencia testifying and presenting her documentary evidence in support of her petition. The
Republic on the other hand cross-examined respondent Leonor Valencia.

We are of the opinion that the petition filed by the respondent in the lower court by way of a special proceeding
for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register with the requisite notice and publication and the
recorded proceedings that actually took place thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper suit or
appropriate action.

In Matias v. Republic (28 SCRA 31), we held that:

xxx xxx xxx

. . . In the case of petitioner herein, however, the proceedings were not summary, considering
the publication of the petition made by order of the court in order to give notice to any person
that might be interested, including direct service on the Solicitor General himself. Considering
the peculiar circumstances of this particular case, the fact that no doubt is cast on the truth of
petitioner's allegations, or upon her evidence in support thereof, the absence of any showing
that prejudice would be caused to any party interested (since petitioner's own father testified in
her favor), and the publicity given to the petition, we are of the opinion that the Ty Kong Tin
doctrine is not controlling this case. "

Only last year, we had occasion to clarify the Ty Kong Tin doctrine, further. In Republic v. Macli-ing (135 SCRA 367,
370-371), this Court ruled:

The principal ground relied upon in this appeal is that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court upon which
private respondents anchor their Petition is applicable only to changes contemplated in Article
412 of the Civil Code, which are clerical or innocuous errors, or to corrections that are not
controversial and are supported by indubitable evidence. (Tiong v. Republic, 15 SCRA 262
[1965]).

It is true that the change from Esteban Sy to Sy Piao would necessarily affect the Identity of the
father. (Barillo v. Republic, 3 SCRA 725 [1961]) In that sense, it can be said to be substantial.
However, we find indubitable evidence to support the correction prayed for. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

In the case of Ty Kong Tin v. Republic, 94 Phil. 321 (1954), as well as subsequent cases predicated
thereon, we forbade only the entering of material corrections in the record of birth by virtue of a
judgment in a summary action. the proceedings below, although filed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, were not summary. The Petition was published by order of the lower Court once a
week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in accordance with law.
The Solicitor General was served with copy of the Petition as well as with notices of hearings. He
filed his Opposition to the Petition. The Local Civil Registrar of the City of Baguio was likewise
duly served with copy of the Petition. A Fiscal was always in attendance at the hearings in
representation of the Solicitor General. He participated actively in the proceedings, particularly,
in the cross-examination of witnesses. And, notwithstanding that all interested persons were
cited to appear to show cause why the petition should not be granted, no one appeared to
oppose except the State through the Solicitor General. But neither did the State present evidence
in support of its Opposition.

To follow the petitioner's argument that Rule 108 is not an appropriate proceeding without in any way
intimating what is the correct proceeding or if such a proceeding exists at all, would result in manifest injustice.

Apart from Bernardo Go and Jessica Go, there are four (4) other sisters and one (1) other brother born of the same
father and mother. Not only are all five registered as Filipino citizens but they have pursued careers which require
Philippine citizenship as a mandatory pre-requisite. To emphasize the strict policy of the government regarding
professional examinations, it was the law until recently that to take the board exams for pharmacist, the applicant
should possess natural born citizenship. (See. 18, Republic Act 5921 and Sec. 1, P.D. 1350)

The sisters and brother are:

1. Sally Go, born on April 29, 1934 was licensed as a Pharmacist after passing the government board examinations
in 1956.

2. Fanny Go, born on July 12, 1936 is a Registered Nurse who passed the government board examinations in 1960.

3. Corazon Go, born on June 20, 1939, during the trial of this case in 1970 was a fourth year medical student,
qualified to take the government board examinations after successfully completing the requirements for a career
in medicine, and presumably is a licensed physician now.

4. Antonio Go, born February 14, 1942 was an engineering student during the 1970 trial of the case and qualified
by citizenship to take government board examinations.

5. Remedios Go, born October 4, 1945 was a licensed Optometrist after passing the government board
examinations in 1967.

The above facts were developed and proved during trial. The petitioner failed to refute the citizenship of the
minors Bernardo and Jessica Go.

In this petition, it limits itself to a procedural reason to overcome substantive findings by arguing that the proper
procedure was not followed.

There are other facts on the record. Leonor Valencia is a registered voter and had always exercised her right of
suffrage from the time she reached voting age until the national elections immediately preceding the filing of her
petition. The five other sisters and brother are also registered voters and likewise exercised the right of suffrage.

An uncle of the mother's side had held positions in the government having been elected twice as councilor and
twice as vice-mayor of Victorias, Negros Occidental. Respondent Leonor Valencia has purchased and registered
two (2) parcels of land as per Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-46104 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-37275.
These allegations are well documented and were never contradicted by the Republic. As correctly observed by the
lower court.

The right of suffrage is one of the important rights of a citizen. This is also true with respect to
the acquisition of a real property. The evidence further shows that her children had been allowed
to take the Board Examinations given by the Government for Filipino citizens only.

It would be a denial of substantive justice if two children proved by the facts to be Philippine citizens, and whose
five sisters and brother born of the same mother and father enjoy all the rights of citizens, are denied the same
rights on the simple argument that the "correct procedure" not specified or even intimated has not been
followed.

We are, therefore, constrained to deny the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

The decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001

JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS minors, represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE
JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIFE DIZON, JUAN
DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP.,
FILIPINAS PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC. respondents.

VITUG, J.:

The petitioner involves the case of the illegitimate children who, having been born in lawful wedlock, claim to be
the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to enforce their respective shares in the latter's estate under the
rules of succession.

Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was during this marriage that
Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979
and the latter on 06 July 1982.

In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being
his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving
behind considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real property. It was on
the strength of his notarized acknowledgement that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for "Partition
with Inventory and Accounting" of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.

Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the
corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the
complaint, even while denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of
petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be
the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial court denied, due to lack of merit,
the motion to dismiss and subsequent motion for reconsideration on, respectively, 13 September 1993 and 15
February 1994. Respondents assailed the denial of said motions before the Court of Appeals.

On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court and ordered the case to be remanded
to the trial court for further proceedings. It ruled that the veracity of the conflicting assertions should be threshed
out at the trial considering that the birth certificates presented by respondents appeared to have effectively
contradicted petitioners' allegation of illegitimacy.1âwphi1.nêt

On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-trial brief and several other motions, respondents filed
an omnibus motion, again praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the action instituted was,
in fact, made to compel the recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of decedent Juan G. Dizon
and that the partition sought was merely an ulterior relief once petitioners would have been able the establish
their status as such heirs. It was contended, in fine that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to
likewise ascertain the question of paternity and filiation, an issue that could only be taken up in an independent
suit or proceeding.

Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial court, ultimately, dismissed the complaint of petitioners
for lack of cause of action and for being improper. 1 It decreed that the declaration of heirship could only be made
in a special proceeding in asmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or right.
Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the instant petition for review on certiorari. Basically,
petitioners maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent, embodied in an authentic
writing, is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action for judicial
approval following the doctrine enunciated in Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo.2

In the comment, respondents submit that the rule in Divinagracia being relied by petitioners is inapplicable to the
case because there has been no attempt to impugn legitimate filiation in Divinagracia. In praying for the
affirmance of dismissal of the complaint, respondents count on the case of Sayson vs. Court of Appeals,3 which has
ruled that the issue of legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting but must be
seasonably brought up in direct action frontally addressing the issue.

The controversy between the parties has been pending for much too long, and it is time that this matter draws to a
close.

The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing the
civil register or a final judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open
and continuos possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.4 The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court or record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and
no further court action is required.5 In fact, any writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it
is in itself voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. 6 Where, instead, a
claim for recognition is predicted on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record
of birth, a will, a statement before a court or record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statue of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's acknowledgement. 7

A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The
certificates of live would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.

There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.8 this presumption indeed
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access between the spouses
during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical
incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which
absolutely prevents sexual intercourse.9 Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article
170,10 and in proper cases Article 171,11 of the Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the presumption
becomes fixed and unassailable,12

Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect,
would impugn their legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step
cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only
the father,13 or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs,14 can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of
a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the
paternity of the husband can be rejected.

Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could find succor in Divinagracia. In said case, the Supreme
Court remanded to the trial court for further proceedings the action for partition filed by an illegitimate child who
had claimed to be an acknowledgement spurious child by virtue of a private document. Signed by the
acknowledging parent, evidencing such recognition. It was not a case of legitimate children asserting to be
somebody else's illegitimate children. Petitioners totally ignored the fact that it was not for them, given the
attendant circumstances particularly, to declare that they could not have been the legitimate children, clearly
opposed to the entries in their respective birth certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus.

The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged
illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e
whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly
adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the
paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally,15 one that can only be repudiated or
contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. 16 Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be
considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as having been an adulteress.17

WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 118387. October 11, 2001]

MARCELO LEE, ALBINA LEE-YOUNG, MARIANO LEE, PABLO LEE, HELEN LEE, CATALINO K. LEE, EUSEBIO LEE, EMMA
LEE, and TIU CHUAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION and HON.
JAIME T. HAMOY, in their capacities as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional Trial Court of Manila and
Branch 130, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, respectively and RITA K. LEE, LEONCIO LEE TEK SHENG
in their personal capacities and ROSA K. LEE-VANDERLEK, MELODY K. LEE-CHIN, LUCIA K. LEE TEK SHENG,
JULIAN K. LEE, HENRY K. LEE, MARTIN K. LEE, VICTORIANO K. LEE, NATIVIDAD K. LEE-MIGUEL, and
THOMAS K. LEE, represented by RITA K. LEE, respondents.

DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, seeks the reversal of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals dated October 28, 1994
in CA-G.R. SP NO. 31786[2]. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals upheld the Orders issued by respondents
Judges Hon. Lorenzo B. Veneracion[3] and Hon. Jaime T. Hamoy[4] taking cognizance of two (2) separate petitions filed
by private respondents before their respective salas for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records
of birth of petitioners pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is a story of two (2) sets of children sired by one and the same man but begotten of two (2) different
mothers. One set, the private respondents herein, are the children of Lee Tek Sheng and his lawful wife, Keh Shiok
Cheng. The other set, the petitioners herein, are allegedly children of Lee Tek Sheng and his concubine, Tiu Chuan.
Rita K. Lee, Leoncio Lee Tek Sheng, Rosa K. Lee-Vanderlek, Melody K. Lee-Chin, Lucia K. Lee Tek Sheng-Ong,
Julian K. Lee, Henry K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Victoriano K. Lee, Natividad K. Lee-Miguel and Thomas K. Lee (hereinafter
referred to as private respondents) filed two (2) separate petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries
in the records of birth of Marcelo Lee, Albina Lee-Young, Mariano Lee, Pablo Lee, Helen Lee, Catalino K. Lee, Eusebio
Lee, and Emma Lee (hereinafter referred to as petitioners). On December 2, 1992, the petition against all petitioners,
with the exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and docketed as SP. PROC.
NO. 92-63692[5] and later assigned to Branch 47 presided over by respondent Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion. On
February 3, 1993, a similar petition against Emma Lee was filed before the RTC of Kalookan and docketed as SP.
PROC. NO. C-1674[6] and assigned to the sala of respondent Judge Jaime T. Hamoy of Branch 130.
Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the false and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth
of petitioners by deleting and/or canceling therein the name of Keh Shiok Cheng as their mother, and by substituting
the same with the name Tiu Chuan, who is allegedly the petitioners true birth mother.
The private respondents alleged in their petitions before the trial courts that they are the legitimate children
of spouses Lee Tek Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married in China sometime in 1931. Except for Rita
K. Lee who was born and raised in China, private respondents herein were all born and raised in the Philippines.
Sometime in October, 1948, Lee Tek Sheng, facilitated the arrival in the Philippines from China of a young girl
named Tiu Chuan. She was introduced by Lee Tek Sheng to his family as their new housemaid but far from becoming
their housemaid, Tiu Chuan immediately became Lee Tek Shengs mistress. As a result of their illicit relations, Tiu
Chuan gave birth to petitioners.
Unknown to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of the
petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records of birth of petitioners by making
it appear that petitioners mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
 Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave maternal care and guidance to the petitioners. They
all lived in the same compound Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents were residing in. All was well, therefore,
before private respondents discovery of the dishonesty and fraud perpetrated by their father, Lee Tek Sheng.
The tides turned after Keh Shiok Chengs demise on May 9, 1989. Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of all
his children, including those of petitioners, be included in the obituary notice of Keh Shiok Chengs death that was to
be published in the newspapers. It was this seemingly irrational act that piqued private respondents curiosity, if not
suspicion.[7]
Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
conduct an investigation into the matter. After investigation and verification of all pertinent records, the NBI
prepared a report that pointed out, among others, the false entries in the records of birth of petitioners, specifically
the following:
1. As per Birth Certificate of MARCELO LEE (Annex F-1), their father, LEE TEK SHENG made it appear that
he is the 12th child of Mrs. KEH SHIOK CHENG, but upon investigation, it was found out that her
Hospital Records, the mother who gave birth to MARCELO LEE had given birth for the 1 st time, as per
diagnosis of the attending physician, Dr. R. LIM, it was GRAVIDA I, PARA I which means first pregnancy,
first live birth delivery (refer to: MASTER PATIENTS RECORDS SUMMARY Annex I). Also, the age of the
mother when she gave birth to MARCELO LEE as per record was only 17 years old, when in fact and in
truth, KEH SHIOK CHENGs age was then already 38 years old. The address used by their father in the
Master Patient record was also the same as the Birth Certificate of MARCELO LEE (2425 Rizal Avenue,
Manila). The name of MARCELO LEE was recorded under Hospital No. 221768, page 73.
2. As per Birth Certificate of ALBINA LEE (Annex F-2), it was made to appear that ALBINA LEE was the third
child which is without any rationality, because the 3rd child of KEH SHIOK CHENG is MELODY LEE TEK
SHENG (Annex E-2). Note also, that the age of the mother as per Hospital Records jump (sic) from 17
to 22 years old, but the only age gap of MARCELO LEE and ALBINA LEE is only 2 years.
3. As per Birth Certificate of MARIANO LEE (Annex F-3), it was made to appear that MARIANO LEE was the
5th child, but the truth is, KEH SHIOK CHENGs 5th child is LUCIA LEE TEK SHENG (Annex E-4). As per
Hospital Record, the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was only 23 years old, while the actual age of KEH SHIOK
CHENG, was then already 40 years old.
4. As per Birth Certificate of PABLO LEE (Annex F-4), it was made to appear that PABLO LEE was the
16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG which is impossible to be true, considering the fact that KEH SHIOK
CHENG have stopped conceiving after her 11th child.Also as per Hospital Record, the age of the mother
was omitted in the records. If PABLO LEE is the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, it would only mean
that she have (sic) given birth to her first born child at the age of 8 to 9 years, which is impossible to
be true.
Based on the birth record of MARIANO LEE in 1953, the recorded age of KEH SHIOK CHENG was 23
years old. Two years after PABLO LEE was born in 1955, the difference is only 2 years, so it is impossible
for PABLO LEE to be the 16th child of KEH SHIOK CHENG, as it will only mean that she have (sic) given
birth at that impossible age.
5. As per Birth Certificate of HELEN LEE (Annex F-5), it was made to appear that she is the 6th child of KEH
SHIOK CHENG, but as per Birth Certificate of JULIAN LEE (Annex E-5), he is the true 6th child of KEH
SHIOK CHENG. Per Hospital Record, KEH SHIOK CHENG is only 28 years old, while KEH SHIOK CHENGS
true age at that time was 45 years old.
6. EMMA LEE has no record in the hospital because, as per complainants allegation, she was born at their
house, and was later admitted at Chinese General Hospital.
7. As per Birth Certificate of CATALINO LEE (Annex F-7), it was made to appear that he is the 14th child of
KEH SHIOK CHENG, and that the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG a.k.a. Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, jumped from 28
 years old at the birth of HELEN LEE on 23 August 1957 to 38 years old at the birth of CATALINO LEE on
22 April 1959.
8. As per Birth Certificate of EUSEBIO LEE, the alleged last son of KEH SHIOK CHENG, the age of the mother
is 48 years old. However, as per Hospital Record, the age of Mrs. LEE TEK SHENG, then was only 39
years old. Considering the fact, that at the time of MARCELOs birth on 11 May 1950. KEH SHIOK
CHENGs age is 38 years old and at the time of EUSEBIOs birth, she is already 48 years old, it is already
impossible that she could have given birth to 8 children in a span of only 10 years at her age. As per
diagnosis, the alleged mother registered on EUSEBIOs birth indicate that she had undergone
CEASARIAN SECTION, which Dr. RITA K. LEE said is not true.

In view of the foregoing facts, the NBI concluded that:

10. In conclusion, as per Chinese General Hospital Patients Records, it is very obvious that the mother of
these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most
probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG,
is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand
design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the
status of his 2nd family and secure their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint
would not have been necessary had not the father and his 2 nd family kept on insisting that
the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG.[8]
It was this report that prompted private respondents to file the petitions for cancellation and/or correction of
entries in petitioners records of birth with the lower courts.
The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions - SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 and SP. PROC. NO. C-1674 -
on the grounds that: (1) resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy and
filiation of petitioners; (2) the petition, which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed prematurely;
and (3) the action to impugn has already prescribed.[9]
On February 12, 1993, respondent Judge Veneracion denied the motion to dismiss SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 for
failure of the herein petitioners (defendants in the lower court) to appear at the hearing of the said motion. [10] Then
on February 17, 1993, Judge Veneracion issued an Order, the pertinent portion of which, reads as follows:

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is hereby given due course. Let this petition
be set for hearing on March 29, 1993 at 8:30 in the morning before this Court located at the 5th Floor of the City
Hall of Manila.

Notice is hereby given that anyone who has any objection to the petition should file on or before the date of
hearing his opposition thereto with a statement of the grounds therefor.

Let a copy of this Order be published, at the expense of the petitioners, once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

Let copies of the verified petition with its annexes and of this Order be served upon the Office of the Solicitor
General, and the respondents, and be posted on the Bulletin Board of this Court, also at the expense of the
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.[11]

On the other hand, respondent Judge Hamoy issued an Order dated April 15, 1993 taking cognizance of SP.
PROC. No. C-1674, to wit:
It appearing from the documentary evidence presented and marked by the petitioners that the Order of the Court
setting the case for hearing was published in Media Update once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, that is on
February 20, 27, and March 6, 1993 as evidenced by the Affidavit of Publication and the clippings attached to the
affidavit, and by the copies of the Media Update published on the aforementioned dates; further, copy of the
order setting the case for hearing together with copy of the petition had been served upon the Solicitor
General, City Prosecutor of Kalookan City, Civil Registrar of Kalookan City and the private respondents, the Court
holds that the petitioners have complied with the jurisdictional requirements for the Court to take cognizance of
this case.

x x x x x x x x x.

SO ORDERED.[12]

Petitioners attempts at seeking a reconsideration of the above-mentioned orders of Judge Veneracion and
Judge Hamoy failed, hence their recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Petitioners
averred that respondents judges had acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing the assailed orders allowing the petitions for the cancellation and/or correction of entries in petitioners
records of birth to prosper in the lower courts.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the petitioners raised the following arguments: (1) Rule 108 is
inappropriate for impugning the legitimacy and filiation of children; (2) Respondents judges are sanctioning a
collateral attack against the filiation and legitimacy of children; (3) Respondents judges are allowing private
respondents to impugn the legitimacy and filiation of their siblings despite the fact that their undisputed common
father is still alive; (4) Respondents judges are entertaining petitions which are already time-barred; and (5) The
petitions below are part of a forum-shopping spree.[13]
Finding no merit in petitioners arguments, the Court of Appeals dismissed their petition in a Decision dated
October 28, 1994.[14]Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the said decision was also denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated December 19, 1994.[15]
Hence, this petition.
I. Petitioners contend that resort to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is improper since private
respondents seek to have the entry for the name of petitioners mother changed from Keh Shiok Cheng to Tiu Chuan
who is a completely different person. What private respondents therefore seek is not merely a correction in name
but a declaration that petitioners were not born of Lee Tek Shengs legitimate wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, but of his
mistress, Tiu Chuan, in effect a bastardization of petitioners.[16] Petitioners thus label private respondents suits
before the lower courts as a collateral attack against their legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.
Debunking petitioners above contention, the Court of Appeals observed:
x x x x x x x x x.

As correctly pointed out by the private respondents in their comment x x x, the proceedings are simply aimed at
establishing a particular fact, status and/or right. Stated differently, the thrust of said proceedings was to establish
the factual truth regarding the occurrence of certain events which created or affected the status of persons and/or
otherwise deprived said persons of rights.[17]

x x x x x x x x x.
It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules
of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. [18] The petitions filed by private respondents
for the correction of entries in the petitioners records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or
biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as
shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners contention that the petitions before the lower courts were
actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children
of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latters children. There is nothing to impugn as there
is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners. [19]
Further sanctioning private respondents resort to Rule 108, the Court of Appeals adverted to our ruling in the
leading case of Republic vs. Valencia[20] where we affirmed the decision of Branch XI of the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Cebu City ordering the correction in the nationality and civil status of petitioners minor children as
stated in their records of birth from Chinese to Filipino, and legitimate to illegitimate, respectively. Although
recognizing that the changes or corrections sought to be effected are not mere clerical errors of a harmless or
innocuous nature, this Court, sitting en banc, held therein that even substantial errors in a civil register may be
corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of
the appropriate adversary proceeding.[21] In the said case, we also laid down the rule that a proceeding for
correction and/or cancellation of entries in the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in nature and
takes on the characteristics of an appropriate adversary proceeding when all the procedural requirements under
Rule 108 are complied with. Thus we held:

Provided the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly
developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite partys case, and where
the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered, the suit or proceeding is appropriate.

The pertinent sections of rule 108 provide:

SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place
for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the
petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date
of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register are - (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby. Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to - (1) issue an order fixing the
time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order for hearing to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise
entitled to oppose the petition: - (1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.

If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in
the record of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be
described as summary. There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil
Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled and/or corrected and
the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary proceedings.[22](Underscoring
supplied.)

To the mind of the Court of Appeals, the proceedings taken in both petitions for cancellation and/or correction
of entries in the records of birth of petitioners in the lower courts are appropriate adversary proceedings.
 We agree. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:

In the instant case, a petition for cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth was filed by private respondents
and pursuant to the order of the RTC-Manila, dated February 17, 1993, a copy of the order setting the case for
hearing was ordered published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines. In the RTC-Kalookan, there was an actual publication of the order setting the case for hearing in
Media Update once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. In both cases notices of the orders were ordered
served upon the Solicitor General, the Civil Registrars of Manila and Kalookan and upon the petitioners
herein. Both orders set the case for hearing and directed the Civil Registrars and the other respondents in the case
below to file their oppositions to the said petitions. A motion to dismiss was consequently filed by herein
petitioners Marcelo, Mariano, Pablo, Helen, Catalino and Eusebio, all surnamed Lee, and Albina Lee-Young in the
RTC-Manila, and an opposition was filed by Emma Lee in the RTC-Kalookan.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the petitions filed by the private respondents in the courts below by way of
a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil registers with the requisite parties,
notices and publications could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action.[23] (Underscoring
supplied.)

The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings adversarial does not give trial courts the license
to go beyond the ambit of Rule 108 which is limited to those corrections contemplated by Article 412 of the New
Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature. [24] The petitioners point to the case of Labayo-
Rowe vs. Republic,[25] which is of a later date than Republic vs. Valencia,[26] where this Court reverted to the doctrine
laid down in earlier cases,[27] starting with Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic,[28] prohibiting the extension of the application of
Rule 108 beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections. Petitioners contend that as held in Go, et al. vs. Civil
Registrar,[29] allowing substantial changes under Rule 108 would render the said rule unconstitutional as the same
would have the effect of increasing or modifying substantive rights.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that in the cited case of Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic,[30] the reason we
declared null and void the portion of the lower courts order directing the change of Labayo-Rowes civil status and
the filiation of one of her children as appearing in the latters record of birth, is not because Rule 108 was
inappropriate to effect such changes, but because Labayo-Rowes petition before the lower court failed to implead
all indispensable parties to the case.
We explained in this wise:

x x x. An appropriate proceeding is required wherein all the indispensable parties should be made parties to the
case as required under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court.

In the case before Us, since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal, representing the Republic of the Philippines as the only respondent, the proceedings taken, which is
summary in nature, is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought. Aside from the
Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been made respondents. They include
not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as
their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected by the change
should be notified or represented x x x.

x x x x x x x x x.

The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status would be
changed from legitimate to illegitimate. Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and embarrassment
resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact that the notice of hearing
of the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State
will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court,
was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. If Rule
108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the
eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings
as earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase
or modify substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil
Code.[31] (Underscoring supplied).

Far from petitioners theory, this Courts ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic[32] does not exclude recourse to Rule
108 of the Revised Rules of Court to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries of the civil register. The only
requisite is that the proceedings under Rule 108 be an appropriate adversary proceeding as contra-distinguished
from a summary proceeding. Thus:

If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register] is merely to correct
the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary
procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may
affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations
which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues
involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be
threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties
who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations
of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted. x x x. [33](Underscoring supplied.)

It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy
granted upon mere application or motion. But this is not always the case, as when the statute expressly
provides.[34] Hence, a special proceeding is not always summary. One only has to take a look at the procedure
outlined in Rule 108 to see that what is contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per se. Rule 108 requires
publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e., once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks (Sec. 4). The Rule also
requires inclusion as parties of all persons who claim any interest which would be affected by the cancellation or
correction (Sec. 3). The civil registrar and any person in interest are also required to file their opposition, if any,
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice (Sec. 5). Last,
but not the least, although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court
shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same (Sec. 7).
Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia,[35] that Rule 108, when all the
procedural requirements thereunder are followed, is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial
corrections and changes in entries of the civil register. It must be conceded, however, that even after Republic vs.
Valencia[36] there continues to be a seesawing of opinion on the issue of whether or not substantial corrections in
entries of the civil register may be effected by means of Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The
more recent cases of Leonor vs. Court of Appeals[37] and Republic vs. Labrador[38] do seem to signal a reversion to
the Ty Kong Tin ruling which delimited the scope of application of Article 412 to clerical or typographical errors in
entries of the civil register.
In Republic vs. Labrador, the Court held that Rule 108 cannot be used to modify, alter or increase substantive
rights, such as those involving the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child. We ruled thus:

This issue has been resolved in Leonor vs. Court of Appeals. In that case, Respondent Mauricio Leonor filed a
petition before the trial court seeking the cancellation of the registration of his marriage to Petitioner Virginia
Leonor. He alleged, among others, the nullity of their legal vows arising from the non-observance of the legal
requirements for a valid marriage. In debunking the trial courts ruling granting such petition, the Court held as
follows:
On its face, the Rule would appear to authorize the cancellation of any entry regarding marriages in the civil
registry for any reason by the mere filing of a verified petition for the purpose. However, it is not as simple as it
looks. Doctrinally, the only errors that can be canceled or corrected under this Rule are typographical or clerical
errors, not material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage. A clerical error is one which is
visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or
writing (Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or some harmless and innocuous change such as a correction
of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent (Ansalada vs. Republic, L-
10226, Feb. 14, 1958).

Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her children from
legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial x x x.

Clearly and unequivocally, the summary procedure under Rule 108, and for that matter under Article 412 of the
Civil Code cannot be used by Mauricio to change his and Virginias civil status from married to single and of their
three children from legitimate to illegitimate. x x x

Thus, where the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registry will change the status of a person from
legitimate to illegitimate, as in Sarah Zitas case, the same cannot be granted in summary proceedings. [39]

It is, therefore, high time that we put an end to the confusion sown by pronouncements seemingly in conflict
with each other, and perhaps, in the process, stem the continuing influx of cases raising the same substantial issue.
The basis for the pronouncement that extending the scope of Rule 108 to substantial corrections is
unconstitutional is embodied in the early case of Ty Kong Tin vs. Republic[40] that first delineated the extent or scope
of the matters that may be changed or corrected pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code. The Supreme Court
ruled in this case that:

x x x. After a mature deliberation, the opinion was reached that what was contemplated therein are mere
corrections of mistakes that are clerical in nature and not those that may affect the civil status or the nationality or
citizenship of the persons involved. If the purpose of the petition is merely a clerical error then the court may issue
an order in order that the error or mistake may be corrected. If it refers to a substantial change, which affects the
status or citizenship of a party, the matter should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of
the issue involved. Such action can be found at random in our substantive and remedial laws the implementation
of which will naturally depend upon the factors and circumstances that might arise affecting the interested
parties. This opinion is predicated upon the theory that the procedure contemplated in article 412 is summary in
nature which cannot cover cases involving controversial issues.[41]

This doctrine was taken a step further in the case of Chua Wee, et al. vs. Republic[42] where the Court said that:

From the time the New Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950 until the promulgation of the Revised Rules of
Court on January 1, 1964, there was no law nor rule of court prescribing the procedure to secure judicial
authorization to effect the desired innocuous rectifications or alterations in the civil register pursuant to Article
412 of the New Civil Code. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court now provides for such a procedure which should
be limited solely to the implementation of Article 412, the substantive law on the matter of correcting entries in
the civil register. Rule 108, like all the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme
Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section 13 of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which directs that such
rules of court shall not diminish or increase or modify substantive rights. If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond
innocuous or harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said Rule 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would
be increasing or modifying substantive rights, which changes are not authorized under Article 412 of the New Civil
Code.[43] (Underscoring supplied).
 We venture to say now that the above pronouncements proceed from a wrong premise, that is, the
interpretation that Article 412 pertains only to clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous nature, effectively excluding
from its domain, and the scope of its implementing rule, substantial changes that may affect nationality, status,
filiation and the like. Why the limited scope of Article 412? Unfortunately, Ty Kong Tin does not satisfactorily answer
this question except to opine that the procedure contemplated in Article 412 is summary in nature and cannot,
therefore, cover cases involving controversial issues. Subsequent cases have merely echoed the Ty Kong Tin doctrine
without, however, shedding light on the matter.
The flaw in Ty Kong Tin lies in its theory that Article 412 contemplates a summary procedure.
First of all, Article 412 is a substantive law that provides as follows:

No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order.

It does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed except to say that the corrections or changes
must be effected by judicial order. As such, it cannot be gleaned therefrom that the procedure contemplated for
obtaining such judicial order is summary in nature.
Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms corrected and changed. In its ordinary
sense, to correct means to make or set right; to remove the faults or errors from[44] while to change means to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. [45] The provision
neither qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it distinguish on the basis of the effect
that the correction or change may have. Hence, it is proper to conclude that all entries in the civil register may be
changed or corrected under Article 412. What are the entries in the civil register? We need not go further than
Articles 407 and 408 of the same title to find the answer.

Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register.

Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

It is beyond doubt that the specific matters covered by the preceding provisions include not only status but
also nationality. Therefore, the Ty Kong Tin pronouncement that Article 412 does not contemplate matters that may
affect civil status, nationality or citizenship is erroneous. This interpretation has the effect of isolating Article 412
from the rest of the articles in Title XVI, Book I of the New Civil Code, in clear contravention of the rule of statutory
construction that a statute must always be construed as a whole such that the particular meaning to be attached to
any word or phrase is ascertained from the context and the nature of the subject treated. [46]
Thirdly, Republic Act No. 9048[47] which was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001 substantially amended
Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname.- No entry in
a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and
change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil register are now to be
corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by the city or municipal civil registrar or consul
general. The obvious effect is to remove from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in
entries of the civil register. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial changes and
corrections in entries of the civil register. This is precisely the opposite of what Ty Kong Tin and other cases of
its genre had said, perhaps another indication that it was not sound doctrine after all.
It may be very well said that Republic Act No. 9048 is Congress response to the confusion wrought by the failure
to delineate as to what exactly is that so-called summary procedure for changes or corrections of a harmless or
innocuous nature as distinguished from that appropriate adversary proceeding for changes or corrections of a
substantial kind. For we must admit that though we have constantly referred to an appropriate adversary
proceeding, we have failed to categorically state just what that procedure is. Republic Act No. 9048 now embodies
that summary procedure while Rule 108 is that appropriate adversary proceeding. Be that as it may, the case at bar
cannot be decided on the basis of Republic Act No. 9048 which has prospective application. Hence, the necessity for
the preceding treatise.
II. The petitioners contend that the private respondents have no cause of action to bring the cases below as
Article 171 of the Family Code allows the heirs of the father to bring an action to impugn the legitimacy of his children
only after his death.[48]
Article 171 provides:

The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article
only in the following cases:

(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing this action;

(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted therefrom; or

(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.

Petitioners contention is without merit.

In the recent case of Babiera vs. Catotal,[49] we upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the
judgment of the RTC of Lanao del Norte declaring the birth certificate of one Teofista Guinto as null and void ab
initio, and ordering the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City to cancel the same from the Registry of Live Births. We ruled
therein that private respondent Presentacion Catotal, child of spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, had
the requisite standing to initiate an action to cancel the entry of birth of Teofista Babiera, another alleged child of
the same spouses because she is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit.[50]
We likewise held therein that:

x x x Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of the provision shows
that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wifes child. The provision, however,
presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that
Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other words, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioner is an
illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is not the latters child at all. x x x. [51]

Similarly, we ruled in Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals[52] that:

Petitioners insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench
cannot be sustained. x x x.

x x x x x x x x x.
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the instant case,
where a child is alleged not be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles
govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is
the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to
have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the
birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child; (3) that
in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by either
parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171
reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the husband or any of his heirs should
file the action impugning the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not err when it
refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late
Vicente are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that petitioner
was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451,
457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:

Petitioners recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170 of the Family Code] is not well taken. This
legal provision refers to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this is not an action
to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal
heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child
of the deceased, but that she is not the decedents child at all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an
acknowledged natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the
deceased.[53]

III. Petitioners claim that private respondents cause of action had already prescribed as more than five (5) years
had lapsed between the registration of the latest birth among the petitioners in 1960 and the filing of the actions in
December of 1992 and February of 1993.[54]
We disagree. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, inasmuch as no law or rule specifically prescribes
a fixed time for filing the special proceeding under Rule 108 in relation to Article 412 of the New Civil Code, it is the
following provision of the New Civil Code that applies:

Art. 1149. All other actions whose periods are not fixed in this Code or in other laws must be brought within five
years from the time the right of action accrues.

The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of three (3) elements, namely:
a) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; b) an obligation
on the part of the defendant to respect such right; and c) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative
of the right of the plaintiff. It is only when the last element occurs or takes place that it can be said in law that a
cause of action has arisen.[55]
It is indubitable that private respondents have a cause of action. The last element of their cause of action, that
is, the act of their father in falsifying the entries in petitioners birth records, occurred more than thirty (30) years
ago. Strictly speaking, it was upon this occurrence that private respondents right of action or right to sue
accrued. However, we must take into account the fact that it was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents
discovered that they in fact had a cause of action against petitioners who continue to use said falsified birth records.
Hence, it would result in manifest injustice if we were to deprive private respondents of their right to establish
the truth about a fact, in this case, petitioners true mother, and their real status, simply because they had discovered
the dishonesty perpetrated upon them by their common father at a much later date. This is especially true in the
case of private respondents who, as their fathers legitimate children, did not have any reason to suspect that he
would commit such deception against them and deprive them of their sole right to inherit from their mothers (Keh
Shiok Chengs) estate. It was only sometime in 1989 that private respondents suspicions were aroused and
confirmed. From that time until 1992 and 1993, less than five (5) years had lapsed.
 Petitioners would have us reckon the five-year prescriptive period from the date of the registration of the last
birth among the petitioners-siblings in 1960, and not from the date private respondents had discovered the false
entries in petitioners birth records in 1989.Petitioners base their position on the fact that birth records are public
documents, hence, the period of prescription for the right of action available to the private respondents started to
run from the time of the registration of their birth certificates in the Civil Registry.
We cannot agree with petitioners thinking on that point.
It is true that the books making up the Civil Register and all documents relating thereto are public documents
and shall be prima facieevidence of the facts therein contained.[56] Petitioners liken their birth records to land titles,
public documents that serve as notice to the whole world. Unfortunately for the petitioners, this analogy does not
hold water. Unlike a title to a parcel of land, a persons parentage cannot be acquired by prescription. One is either
born of a particular mother or not. It is that simple.
IV. Finally, petitioners accuse private respondents of forum shopping. They enumerate the other actions filed
by private respondents against them prior to the filing of their Rule 108 petitions in the lower courts, as follows:
(1) A criminal complaint for falsification of entries in the birth certificates filed against their father as
principal and against defendants as alleged accessories;
(2) A petition for the cancellation of the naturalization certificate of their father, Lee Tek Sheng; and
(3) A petition for partition of Keh Shiok Chengs estate.[57]
According to the petitioners, all the three (3) actions above-mentioned, as well as the Rule 108 petitions,
subject of the case before us, raise the common issue of whether petitioners are the natural children of Keh Shiok
Cheng or Tiu Chuan. They contend that in all these cases, the judge or hearing officer would have to resolve this
issue in order to determine whether or not to grant the relief prayed for. [58]
Forum shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending there is identity of parties, rights or causes
of action and reliefs sought.[59] Even a cursory examination of the pleadings filed by private respondents in their
various cases against petitioners would reveal that at the very least there is no identity of rights or causes of action
and reliefs prayed for. The present case has its roots in two (2) petitions filed under Rule 108, the purpose of which
is to correct and/or cancel certain entries in petitioners birth records. Suffice it to state, the cause of action in these
Rule 108 petitions and the relief sought therefrom are very different from those in the criminal complaint against
petitioners and their father which has for its cause of action, the commission of a crime as defined and penalized
under the Revised Penal Code, and which seeks the punishment of the accused; or the action for the cancellation of
Lee Tek Shengs naturalization certificate which has for its cause of action the commission by Lee Tek Sheng of an
immoral act, and his ultimate deportation for its object; or for that matter, the action for partition of Keh Shiok
Chengs estate which has for its cause of action the private respondents right under the New Civil Code to inherit
from their mothers estate.
We therefore concur in the finding of the Court of Appeals that there is no forum shopping to speak of in the
concept that this is described and contemplated in Circular No. 28-91 of the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated October
28, 1994 is AFFIRMED.
 [G.R. No. 138496. February 23, 2004]

HUBERT TAN CO and ARLENE TAN CO, petitioners, vs. THE CIVIL REGISTER OF MANILA and any person having or
claiming an interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought, respondent.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari filed by Hubert Tan Co and Arlene Tan Co seeking to
reverse and set aside the Order[1] dated September 23, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26,
dismissing their petition for correction of entries in the Civil Register. Likewise sought to be reversed and set aside
is the Order dated April 27, 1999 of the court a quo denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said
order.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
Hubert Tan Co was born on March 23, 1974. His sister, Arlene Tan Co, was born on May 19, 1975. In their
respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents Co Boon Peng and Lourdes Vihong K. Tan are Chinese
citizens.
Thereafter, Co Boon Peng filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the
Special Committee on Naturalization under Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 270. His application was granted and he
was conferred Philippine citizenship under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1055. The Chairman of the Committee
issued on February 15, 1977 Certificate of Naturalization No. 020778 in his favor. Thus, on February 15, 1977, Co
Boon Peng took his oath as a Philippine citizen. In the meantime, Hubert and Arlene Co finished college and earned
their respective degrees in architecture and accountancy in Philippine schools.
On August 27, 1998, they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court for correction of entries in their certificates of birth. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. Case No. 98-
90470. They alleged, inter alia, in their petition that:

(3) They were born in the Philippines and the legitimate children of CO BOON PENG;

(4) Co Boon Peng, who is formerly a citizen of China, was conferred Philippine citizenship by naturalization under
Presidential Decree No. 1055 and had taken his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
15th February, 1977 in the City of Manila;

(5) At the time of birth of [the] petitioners, their father CO BOON PENG was still a Chinese citizen that is why entry
in their respective birth certificates as to their fathers citizenship was Chinese;

(6) Upon granting of Philippine citizenship by naturalization to Co Boon Peng in 1977, [the] petitioners who were
born in the Philippines and still minors at that time became Filipino citizens through the derivative mode of
naturalization. Our Naturalization Law, specifically Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 535 which provides:

Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered
citizens thereof;

(7) The naturalization of petitioners father in 1977 was an act or event affecting and concerning their civil status
that must be recorded in the Civil Register, Article 407 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines which provides:
Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the Civil Register. [2]

The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, the trial court render judgment correcting and changing
the entries in their respective birth certificates as to the citizenship of their father Co Boon Peng, from Chinese to
Filipino.[3]
On September 23, 1998, the court a quo issued an order dismissing the petition outright on the ground that
the petition was insufficient, solely because the petitioners father Co Boon Peng applied for naturalization under LOI
No. 270 and was conferred Philippine citizenship by naturalization under PD No. 1055 and not under Commonwealth
Act (CA) No. 473. [4]
The petitioners sought the reconsideration of the assailed order arguing that LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 were
designed to grant citizenship to deserving aliens; hence, should be construed together. They averred that the benefit
of Section 15 of CA No. 473 should also be granted to the petitioners whose father was granted naturalization under
LOI No. 270. However, the RTC issued an Order on April 27, 1999, denying their motion for reconsideration for the
following reasons: (a) although Commonwealth Act No. 473 and Letter of Instructions No. 270 are statutes relating
to the same subject matter, they do not provide the same beneficial effects with respect to the minor children of
the applicant. Section 15 of CA No. 473 expressly provides for the effect of the naturalization on the wife and children
of the applicant while LOI No. 270 does not have any proviso to that effect; (b) LOI No. 270 clearly refers to qualified
individuals only. The rules and regulations promulgated by the Committee established pursuant to LOI No. 270 and
the amendments issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (LOI Nos. 292 and 491) clearly speak of qualified
individuals only; no proviso therein referred to its effect on the wife and children of the individual; (c) Section 15 of
CA No. 473 should not be deemed and incorporated in and applied to LOI No. 270; and, (d) the application of the so-
called pari materia rule of construction made by the petitioners is misplaced, as what should be applied in the instant
case is the rule on strict construction of legislative grants or franchise. The court a quo stressed that legislative
grants, whether they be of property, rights or privileges, whether granted to corporations or individuals, must be
strictly construed against the grantee and in favor of the grantor.
Aggrieved, the petitioners now come to this Court assailing the court a quos Order dismissing their petition
outright and its Order denying their motion for the reconsideration of the same.
The petitioners contend that the trial court erred in holding that their petition was insufficient. They assert that
contrary to the ruling of the trial court, they are qualified to claim the benefit of Section 15 of CA No. 473, which
provides that minor children of persons naturalized thereunder who were born in the Philippines shall likewise be
considered citizens thereof. They contend that although LOI No. 270, under which the petitioners father was
naturalized does not contain a provision similar to Section 15 of CA No. 473, the latter provision should be deemed
incorporated therein. They point out that both laws have the same purpose and objective, i.e., to grant Philippine
citizenship to qualified aliens permanently residing in the Philippines. The petitioners invoke the rule that statutes
in pari materia are to be read together.[5] They posit that CA No. 473 and LOI No. 270 should be harmonized and
reconciled since all statutes relating to the same subject, or having the same general purpose, should be read in
connection with it, and should be construed together as they constitute one law. [6]
The petitioners maintain that the letter and spirit of LOI No. 270 was to grant the privilege of Philippine
citizenship not only to qualified aliens but also to their minor children who were born in the country. They assert
that this is apparent from paragraph 4-A thereof, which extends the option to adopt Filipino names not only to
qualified applicants for naturalization but also to their wives and minor children. They submit that when then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos enacted LOI No. 270, he must be presumed to have been acquainted with the
provisions of CA No. 473 and did not intend to abrogate and discontinue the beneficial effects of Section 15 thereof;
otherwise, Pres. Marcos would have expressly repealed Section 15 of CA No. 473 in relation to LOI No. 270. Thus,
according to the petitioners, the naturalization of their father during their minority is an act or event affecting their
civil status that must be recorded in the Civil Register pursuant to Article 407 of the Civil Code.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General contends that the court a quo did not err in issuing the assailed
orders. Contrary to the petitioners theory, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are separate and distinct laws; therefore, are
not in pari materia. He points out that although LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 both govern the naturalization of aliens,
CA No. 473 deals with the requirements and procedure for naturalization by judicial decree; LOI No. 270, on the
other hand, deals with the requirements and procedure for naturalization by presidential decree.
The Solicitor General further asserts that the petitioners contention that the naturalization of their father is an
event affecting and concerning their civil status envisaged in Article 407 of the Civil Code has no legal basis. The
correction sought and allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court must be one that reflects a fact existing before
or at the time of birth. In the petitioners case, the naturalization of their father in 1977 took place long after they
were born. Moreover, according to the Solicitor General, under LOI No. 270 and its amendatory laws, the
naturalization of a father did not ipso facto render his children also naturalized. The petitioners thus cannot invoke
Article 407 of the Civil Code and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to avoid strict compliance with the naturalization
laws.
The petition is meritorious.
The rule on statutory construction provides that:

Statutes in pari materia should be read and construed together because enactments of the same legislature on the
same subject are supposed to form part of one uniform system; later statutes are supplementary or
complimentary (sic) to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in
mind the existing legislations on the subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto. [7]

Statutes in pari materia should be construed together to attain the purpose of an expressed national policy,
thus:

On the presumption that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in mind the previous statutes relating
to the same subject matter, it is held that in the absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the new
provision was enacted in accord with the legislative policy embodied in those prior statutes, and they all should be
construed together. Provisions in an act which are omitted in another act relating to the same subject matter will
be applied in a proceeding under the other act, when not inconsistent with its purpose. Prior statutes relating to
the same subject matter are to be compared with the new provisions; and if possible by reasonable construction,
both are to be construed that effect is given to every provision of each. Statutes in pari materia, although in
apparent conflict, are so far as reasonably possible construed to be in harmony with each other. [8]

LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are laws governing the naturalization of qualified aliens residing in the
Philippines. While they provide for different procedures, CA No. 473 governs naturalization by judicial decree while
LOI No. 270 governs naturalization by presidential decree; both statutes have the same purpose and objective: to
enable aliens permanently residing in the Philippines, who, having demonstrated and developed love for and loyalty
to the Philippines, as well as affinity to the culture, tradition and ideals of the Filipino people, and contributed to the
economic, social and cultural development of our country, to be integrated into the national fabric by being granted
Filipino citizenship. Under the LOI, the procedure for the acquisition of citizenship by naturalization is more
expeditious, less cumbersome and less expensive. The sooner qualified aliens are naturalized, the faster they are
able to integrate themselves into the national fabric, and are thus able to contribute to the cultural, social and
political well- being of the country and its people.
Clearly, LOI No. 270 and CA No. 473 are, as the petitioners correctly posit, statutes in pari materia. Absent any
express repeal of Section 15 of CA No. 473 in LOI No. 270, the said provision should be read into the latter law as an
integral part thereof, not being inconsistent with its purpose. Thus, Section 15 of CA No. 473,[9] which extends the
grant of Philippine citizenship to the minor children of those naturalized thereunder, should be similarly applied to
the minor children of those naturalized under LOI No. 270, like the petitioners in this case.
It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the certificate of naturalization of their father, Co Boon
Peng, and of his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to entitle them to Philippine citizenship. They
are likewise mandated to prove the following material allegations in their petition: (a) that they are the legitimate
children of Co Boon Peng; (b) that they were born in the Philippines; and, (c) that they were still minors when Co
Boon Peng was naturalized as a Filipino citizen;
The petitioners recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is appropriate. Under Article 412 of
the New Civil Code, no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. The law does
not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed. But the Court approved Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to
provide for a procedure to implement the law.[10] The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the New Civil Code are those
provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the New Civil Code which reads:

Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register.

Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) Marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

Specific matters covered by the said provision include not only status but also nationality. [11] The acts, events
or factual errors envisaged in Article 407 of the New Civil Code include even those that occur after the birth of the
petitioner. However, in such cases, the entries in the certificates of birth will not be corrected or changed. The
decision of the court granting the petition shall be annotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part of the
civil register in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar.[12]
To correct simply means to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from. To change means to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. Article 412 of the
New Civil Code does not qualify as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected or distinguished on the basis of
the effect that the correction or change may be.[13] Such entries include not only those clerical in nature but also
substantial errors. After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is to ascertain the truths about
the facts recorded therein.[14]
The proceedings in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are summary if the entries in the civil register sought to be
corrected are clerical or innocuous in nature. However, where such entries sought to be corrected or changed are
substantial: i.e., the status and nationality of the petitioners or the citizenship of their parents,[15] the proceedings
are adversarial in nature as defined by this Court in Republic v. Valencia, thus:

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party
seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest
it. Excludes an adoption proceeding.[16]

In such a proceeding, the parties to be impleaded as respective defendants are (a) the local civil registrar; and,
(b) all persons who have claims any interest which would be affected thereby. [17]
In this case, the petitioners alleged in their petition that they are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng, who
was naturalized as a Filipino citizen, but that their certificates of birth still indicate that he is a Chinese national. In
view of their fathers naturalization, they pray that the entries in their certificates of birth relating to the citizenship
of their father be changed from Chinese to Filipino.
The petitioners recourse to the procedure in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as amended, being appropriate, it
behooved the trial court to do its duty under Section 4, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, namely:

Sec. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for
the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the person named in the petition. The
court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.

After hearing, the court shall issue an order either dismissing the petition or issue an order granting the same. In
either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate
the same in the certificates of birth of the petitioners. The judgment of the court shall form part of the records of
the local civil register.[18]
In this case, the trial court dismissed the petition outright in violation of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Patently,
then, the trial court erred in so doing.
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 26, are SET ASIDE and REVERSED. The trial court is DIRECTED to reinstate the petition in Special
Proceedings NO. 98-90470 in the court docket, and ORDERED to continue with the proceedings in the said case
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
SO ORDERED.