Prop Doctrines

CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE
DOCTRINES
CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY
LADERA v. HODGES
G.R. No. 8027-R; Vol. 48, No. 12, Official Gazette 5374
September 23, 1952
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
Issue: Is Ladera’s house an immovable property?
Held: YES. The old Civil Code enumerates among the things declared by it as immovable
property the following: lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kind adhered to the soil.
The law does not make any distinction whether or not the owner of the lot is the one who built.
Also, since the principles of accession regard buildings and constructions as mere accessories
to the land on which it is built, it is logical that said accessories should partake the nature of the
principal thing.
MINDANAO BUS COMPANY vs.THE CITY ASSESSOR & TREASURER and the BOARD OF
TAX APPEALS of Cagayan de Oro City
G.R. No. L-17870
September 29, 1962
Labrador, J.:
Issue: Whether or not tools, equipment and machineries of petitioner bus company are taxable
realties, by reason of their being intended or destined for use in an industry.
Held: No. The law that governs the determination of the question at issue is Par. 5, Art. 415 of
the Civil Code which states that: “Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended
by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or
on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works.
So that movable equipment to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be

"essential and principal elements" of an industry or works without which such industry or works
would be "unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established." We
may here distinguish, therefore, those movable which become immobilized by destination
because they are essential and principal elements in the industry for those which may not be so
considered immobilized because they are merely incidental, not essential and principal. The
tools and equipment in question in this instant case are, by their nature, not essential and
principle municipal elements of petitioner's business of transporting passengers and cargoes by
motor trucks. They are merely incidentals — acquired as movables and used only for
expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. Even without such tools and equipments, its
business may be carried on, as petitioner has carried on, without such equipment, before the
war. The transportation business could be carried on without the repair or service shop if its
rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to another.
Aside from the element of essentiality the above-quoted provision also requires that the industry
or works be carried on in a building or on a piece of land. But in the case at bar the equipments
in question are destined only to repair or service the transportation business, which is not
carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land, as demanded by the law. Said
equipments may not, therefore, be deemed real property.
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MAKATI LEASING & FINANCE CORP. v. WEAREVER TEXTILES

G.R. No. L-58469
May 16, 1983
De Castro, J.
Issue: Whether the machinery in suit is real or personal property.
Held: The SC ruled that it is personal property. The SC relied on its ruling in Tumalad v.
Vicencio, that if a house of strong materials can be the subject of a Chattel Mortgage as long as
the parties to the contract agree and no innocent 3rd party will be prejudiced then more so that
a machinery may treated as a movable since it is movable by nature and becomes immobilized
only by destination. And treating it as a chattel by way of a Chattel Mortgage, Wearever is
estopped from claiming otherwise.
SANTOS EVANGELISTA v. ALTO SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC.

G.R. No. L-11139
April 23, 1958
Concepcion, J.
Issue: Can an agreement to subject a house to a chattel mortgage binding upon third persons?
Held: No. It is true that the parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house
as personal property for purposes of said contract However, this view is good only insofar as the
contracting parties are concerned. It is based, partly, upon the principle of estoppel. Neither this
principle, nor said view, is applicable to strangers to said contract. Much less is it in point where
there has been no contract whatsoever, with respect to the status of the house involved, as in
the case at bar.
TSAI v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 120098
October 2, 2001
Quisumbing, J.
Issue: Whether or not the acquired machineries should be considered as Chattels or Real
Properties.
Held: Petitioners contend that the nature of the disputed machineries, i.e., that they were heavy,
bolted or cemented on the real property mortgaged by EVERTEX to PBCom, make them ipso
facto immovable under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New Civil Code. This assertion, however,
does not settle the issue. Mere nuts and bolts do not foreclose the controversy. We have to look
at the parties' intent.
While it is true that the controverted properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract
of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties herein gives us a contrary indication. In
the case at bar, both the trial and the appellate courts reached the same finding that the true
intention of PBCOM and the owner, EVERTEX, is to treat machinery and equipment as chattels.
In the absence of any showing that this conclusion is baseless, erroneous or uncorroborated by
the evidence on record, we find no compelling reason to depart therefrom.
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Too, assuming arguendo that the properties in question are immovable by nature, nothing
detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of
estoppel. As far back as Navarro v. Pineda, 9 SCRA 631 (1963), an immovable may be
considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is used as security in the
payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it, as in the case at bar.
SERG’S PRODUCTS, INC. vs. PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC.

G.R. No. 137705.
August 22, 2000
Panganiban, J.:
ISSUE: Whether the machineries purchased, imported and installed by Petitioner became real
property by virtue of immobilization.
HELD: No. Petitioners installed the machines subject of the writ of seizure in the factory built on
their own land for use in the chocolate-making industry. While each machine by itself is a
movable or personal property, together these may be treated as immovable by destination being
essential and principal elements in petitioner’s industry.
Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code classifies as real property, “machinery, receptacles, instruments
or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be
carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the
said industry or works.”
However, the contracting parties may validly stipulate that real property be considered as
personal. Section 12.1 of the Agreement between the parties provides “The PROPERTY is, and
shall at all times be and remain, personal property notwithstanding that the PROPERTY or any
part thereof may now be, or hereafter become, in any manner affixed or attached to or
embedded in, or permanently resting upon, real property or any building thereon, or attached in
any manner to what is permanent.”
Since the petitioners agreed to the above-quoted stipulation, they should not be allowed to claim
otherwise on the principle of estoppel. A party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying
the truth of any material fact found therein. The machines in this case are personal properties
capable of being subjects of a Writ of Replevin.
BURGOS v. CHIEF OF STAFF

G.R. No. L-64261
Dec. 26, 1984
Escolin, J.
Issue: Whether or not the properties seized under the disputed search warrants were
immovable properties, thus making them unsusceptible to seizure under such warrants.
Held: No. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptacles,
instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works
which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the
needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co.
v. Castillo, the Court ruled that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized
when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a
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tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person
acted as the agent of the owner.
Petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the printing
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted
to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.
LOPEZ v OROSA
G.R. Nos. L-10817-18
February 28, 1958
FELIX, J.:
Issue: Whether real estate or immovable property mean land and building?
Held: No. We cannot subscribe to this view, for while it is true that generally, real estate
connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the
building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real
propertie could mean only one thing — that a building is by itself an immovable property, a
doctrine already pronounced by this Court in the case of Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co.
Moreover, and in view of the absence of any specific provision of law to the contrary, a building
is an immovable property, irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it
is adhered to belong to the same owner.
JULIAN S. YAP vs. HON. SANTIAGO O. TAÑADA, etc., and GOULDS PUMPS
INTERNATIONAL (PHIL.), INC.
G.R. No. L-32917
July 18, 1988
NARVASA, J.:
ISSUE: Whether or not the water pump had become immovable property by its being installed
in petitioner’s residence.
HELD: Yap's next argument that the water pump had become immovable property by its being
installed in his residence is also untenable. The Civil Code considers as immovable property,
among others, anything "attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it
cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object." The
pump does not fit this description. It could be, and was in fact separated from Yap's premises
without being broken or suffering deterioration. Obviously the separation or removal of the pump
involved nothing more complicated than the loosening of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners.
Yap's last claim is that in the process of the removal of the pump from his house, Goulds' men
had trampled on the plants growing there, destroyed the shed over the pump, plugged the
exterior casings with rags and cut the electrical and conduit pipes; that he had thereby suffered
actual-damages in an amount of not less than P 2,000.00, as well as moral damages in the sum
of P 10,000.00 resulting from his deprivation of the use of his water supply; but the Court had
refused to allow him to prove these acts and recover the damages rightfully due him. Now, as to
the loss of his water supply, since this arose from acts legitimately done, the seizure on
execution of the water pump in enforcement of a final and executory judgment, Yap most
certainly is not entitled to claim moral or any other form of damages thereof.
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MACHINERY & ENGINEERING SUPPLIES, INC. vs. CA

G.R. No. L-7057
October 29, 1954
CONCEPCION, J.:
ISSUE: Whether or not an action for replevin is the proper remedy to recover machinery and
equipment classified as real properties.
HELD: No. The special civil action known as replevin, governed by Rule 62 of Court, is
applicable only to "personal property".
Ordinarily replevin may be brought to recover any specific personal property unlawfully taken or
detained from the owner thereof, provided such property is capable of identification and
delivery; but replevin will not lie for the recovery of real property or incorporeal personal
property. (77 C. J. S. 17)
When the sheriff repaired to the premises of respondent, Ipo Limestone Co., Inc., machinery
and equipment appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the concrete foundation of
said premises, in a fixed manner, in such a way that the former could not be separated from the
latter "without breaking the material or deterioration of the object." Moreover, said machinery
and equipment were "intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry" carried on said
immovable and tended." For these reasons, they were already immovable property pursuant to
paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 415 of Civil Code of the Philippines. As such immovable property,
they were not subject to replevin.
However, the Supreme Court noted and affirmed the decision of CA stating that:
The question of ownership and the applicability of Art. 415 of the new Civil Code are immaterial
in the determination of the only issue involved in this case. The question as to whether the
machinery or equipment in litigation are immovable or not is likewise immaterial, because the
only issue raised before the trial court was whether the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, at the
Petitioner's instance, was justified in destroying the machinery and in refusing to restore them to
their original form, at the expense of the Petitioner.
Laurel v. Garcia
G.R. No. 92013
July 25, 1990
Gutierrez, JR., J.:
Issue: Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine
Government?
Held: NO. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out.
It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of
procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the
property has become patrimonial.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an
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application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose
is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and
public welfare and cannot be the object of appropration. Articles 419-421 of the Civil Code
apply.
Issue: Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to
sell the Roppongi property?
Held: NO. There is no law authorizing its conveyance. It is not for the President to convey
valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must
be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and
legislative concurrence.
Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for the deferment of the sale of the
Roppongi property does not withdraw the property from public domain much less authorize its
sale. It is a mere resolution; it is not a formal declaration abandoning the public character of the
Roppongi property. In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations is conducting hearings
on Senate Resolution No. 734 which raises serious policy considerations and calls for a fact-
finding investigation of the circumstances behind the decision to sell the Philippine government
properties in Japan.
RABUCO v. VILLEGAS
G.R. No. L-24661
February 28, 1974
TEEHANKEE, J.
Issue: Whether or not Republic Act 3120 is constitutional.
Held: Yes. Respondents city officials' contention that the Act must be stricken down as
unconstitutional for depriving the city of Manila of the lots in question and providing for their sale
in subdivided small lots to bona fide occupants or tenants without payment of just compensation
is untenable and without basis, since the lots in question are manifestly owned by the city in its
public and governmental capacity and are therefore public property over which Congress had
absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it in its private or
proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived without due process and without just
compensation.
Here, Republic Act 3120 expressly declared that the properties were "reserved as communal
property" and ordered their conversion into "disposable and alienable lands of the State" for sale
in small lots to the bona fide occupants thereof. It is established doctrine that the act of
classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power which will
not be interfered with by the courts.
The Court in a case reaffirmed the established general rule that "regardless of the source or
classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own
funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the
benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such
lands subject to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it
owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of its public work, the
municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local
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administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is the same as if the State itself holds the
property and puts it to a different use" and stressed that "the property, as has been previously
shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or proprietary
capacity. That it has in its name a registered title is not questioned, but this title should be
deemed to be held in trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of
the City of Manila granted by the sovereign upon its creation."
There as here, the Court holds that the Acts in question (Republic Acts 4118 in Salas and
Republic Act 3120 in the case at bar) were intended to implement the social justice policy of the
Constitution and the government program of land for the landless and that they were not
"intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its character as communal
land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the National Government: ... The
subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by
Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent domain
without just compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the Constitution,
but simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal with state property."
MACASIANO v. DIOKNO
G.R. No. 97764
August 10, 1992
Medialdea, J.:
ISSUE: Is the disputed municipal ordinance authorizing the flea market on the public streets
valid?
HELD: Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed
public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no
authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority
is vested upon them by Congress. One such example of this authority given by Congress to the
local governments is the power to close roads as provided in Section 10, Chapter II of Blg. 337,
known as Local Government Code, which should be read and interpreted in accordance with
basic principles already established by law. These basic principles have the effect of limiting
such authority of the province, city or municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare. Article
424 of the Civil Code lays down the basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted to
public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and
cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private persons. Aside from the
requirement of due process which should be complied with before closing a road, street or park,
the closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from
public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for
public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from public use, the property then
becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit concerned. It is only then that the
respondent municipality can use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed. However, those roads
and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic
are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local government
has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons.
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B.

LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE VEGA
G.R. No. 108998
August 24, 1994
BIDIN, J.
Issue: Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land which he
acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a vendor who has complied
with the requirements for registration under the Public Land Act (CA 141)?
Held: Yes. The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the two adjacent parcels of land applied for registration
of title under a bona-fide claim of ownership long before June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it
is conclusively presumed that all the conditions essential to the confirmation of their title over
the two adjacent parcels of land are sought to be registered have been complied with thereby
entitling them to the issuance of the corresponding certificate of title pursuant to the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or
through his predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has
been in possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or legal
requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by his predecessor-in-interest, the
said period is tacked to his possession. In the case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land
not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this except
that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the land sought to be
registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the required length of time. As aforesaid, the
disputed parcels of land were acquired by private respondents through their predecessors-in-
interest, who, in turn, have been in open and continued possession thereof since 1937. Private
respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof,
acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an
imperfect title.
The Province of Zamboanga Del Norte VS. City of Zamboanga

G.R. No. L-24440
28 March 1968
Bengzon, J:
ISSUE: Which of the two norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or that obtaining under the law of
Municipal Corporations, must be used in classifying the 50 lots in question?
HELD: The Law on Municipal Corporation should be followed.
Under the Civil Code, to be of public property, they should fall under the phrase "public works
for public service" for it has been held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works
must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated
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properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. ( Hence, even the hospitals and schools cannot be
considered as public properties.) Unlike in the classification regarding State properties,
properties for public service in the municipalities are not classified as public.
However, the Law on Municipal Corporation provides that to be considered public, it is enough
that the property be held and devoted for governmental purposes like local administration,
public education, public health, etc.
Supporting jurisprudence are found in the following cases: (1) HINUNANGAN V. DIRECTOR
OF LANDS, where it was stated that "... where the municipality has occupied lands distinctly for
public purposes, such as for the municipal court house, the public school, the public market, or
other necessary municipal building, we will, in the absence of proof to the contrary, presume a
grant from the States in favor of the municipality; but, as indicated by the wording, that rule may
be invoked only as to property which is used distinctly for public purposes...." (2) VIUDA DE
TANTOCO V. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO held that municipal properties necessary for
governmental purposes are public in nature. Thus, the auto trucks used by the municipality for
street sprinkling, the police patrol automobile, police stations and concrete structures with the
corresponding lots used as markets were declared exempt from execution and attachment since
they were not patrimonial properties. (3) MUNICIPALITY OF BATANGAS VS. CANTOS held
squarely that a municipal lot which had always been devoted to school purposes is one
dedicated to public use and is not patrimonial property of a municipality.
CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 133250
July 9, 2002
Carpio, J.
ISSUES:
1. Are reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain?
2. Are submerged areas of the Manila Bay alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain?
3. Can AMARI, a private corporation, acquire and own under the Amended JVA, 367.5
hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay?
HELD:
1. YES. The reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands were held by the Court to be
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of
Manila Bay are part of the "lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural resources"
and consequently "owned by the State." As such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be
alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The mere
reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of the
State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or
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presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable

and open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as
alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited and classified." The President has the authority
to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the
Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino's
issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer
needed for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had already reclaimed
the Freedom Islands although subsequently there were partial erosions on some areas. The
government had also completed the necessary surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom
Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral
lands, and national parks." Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed
Freedom Islands necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public
domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural
resources that the State may alienate to qualified private parties. All other natural resources,
such as the seas or bays, are "waters x x x owned by the State" forming part of the public
domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. NO. The submerged areas of the Manila Bay were held to be inalienable and outside the
commerce of man until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and
declared no longer needed for public service.
CA No. 141 requires that lands of the public domain must first be classified as alienable or
disposable before the government can alienate them. These lands must not be reserved for
public or quasi-public purposes. Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973,
revoked all laws authorizing the reclamation of areas under water and revested solely in the
National Government the power to reclaim lands.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the National
Government's implementing arm to undertake "all reclamation projects of the government,"
which "shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any
person or entity." Under such contract, a private party receives compensation for reclamation
services rendered to PEA. Payment to the contractor may be in cash, or in kind consisting of
portions of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring alienable lands of the public domain.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares
which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential
act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain
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open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title.
There can be no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public domain, and in their
present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea,
these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters x x x owned by the State," forming
part of the public domain and consequently inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the
sea can these submerged areas be classified as public agricultural lands, which under the
Constitution are the only natural resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and
transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then officially classify these
lands as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition. Thereafter, the government may
declare these lands no longer needed for public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands
be considered alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the commerce of
man.
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be
owned by the PEA," could not automatically operate to classify inalienable lands into alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain. Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands
of the public domain would automatically become alienable once reclaimed by PEA, whether or
not classified as alienable or disposable.
3. NO. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, Since the Amended JVA also
seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila
Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public
domain.
Villarico v. Sarmiento
G.R. No. 136438
November 11, 2004
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Issues:
1. What is contemplated by the phrase "intended for public use" in Article 420?
2. What are the effects if a property is of public dominion?
Held:
1. Public use is “use that is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite
public.”
Applying this to the instant case, the lot under scrutiny consists of stairways which were built for
the use of the people as passageway to the highway. Consequently, it is a property of public
dominion.
2. Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and hence it: (1) cannot be
alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot be acquired by
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prescription against the State; (3) is not subject to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be
burdened by any voluntary easement.
Applying this in this case, considering that the lot on which the stairways were constructed is a
property of public dominion, it cannot be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way,
which the petitioner here is claiming. In fact, its use by the public is by mere tolerance of the
government through the DPWH. Petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself. Verily, he cannot
claim any right of possession over it.
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OWNERSHIP
JAVIER v. VERIDIANO II
G.R. No. L-48050
October 10, 1994
Bellosillo, J.
Issue: Whether or not a prior case of forcible entry is res judicata upon the second case on
quieting of title.
Held: No. In a complaint for forcible entry, what is at issue is prior possession, regardless of who
has lawful title over the disputed property. The only issue in an action for forcible entry is the
physical or material possession of real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession
de jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective of the actual condition of the
title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by strong
hand, violence or terror. A judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive
only on the question of possession and not on the ownership. It does not in any way bind the
title or affect the ownership of the land or building; a judgment in forcible entry or detainer case
disposes of no other issue than possession and declares only who has the right of possession,
but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of
ownership.
SPOUSES BUSTOS V. CA
G.R. No 120784-85
January 24, 2001
Pardo, J.
Issue: Can petitioners be ejected from their own land?
Held: No. Admittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and executory. However, the
ministerial duty of a court to order execution of a final and executory judgment admits of
exceptions such as where it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice to direct
suspension of the execution of the judgment, or whenever necessary to accomplish the aims of
justice, or when certain facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment became final,
which would render execution of the judgment unjust.
In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted because petitioners are now legal
owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To eject petitioners would then result
to grave injustice. Placing petitioners in the possession of the land in question is a necessary
and logical consequence of the decision declaring them as rightful owners of the property. One
of the essential attributes of ownership is possession. An owner, who cannot exercise the
“seven juses” or attributes of ownership, is a crippled owner.
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SORIANO vs. CA
G.R. No. 128177
August 15, 2001
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Issue: May a winning party in a land registration case effectively eject the possessor thereof,
whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB?
Held: No. Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a
thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by
law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner,
among which are the right to enjoy the thing owned and the right to exclude other persons from
possession thereof. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with
or without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an
owner and possession of a holder. A person may be declared owner but he may not be entitled
to possession. The possession may be in the hands of another either as a lessee or a tenant.
A person may have improvements thereon of which he may not be deprived without due
hearing. He may have other valid defenses to resist surrender of possession. A judgment for
ownership, therefore, does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident. There is
no dispute that private respondents’ (petitioners below) title over the land under litigation has
been confirmed with finality. As explained above, however, such declaration pertains only to
ownership and does not automatically include possession, especially so in the instant case
where there is a third party occupying the said parcel of land, allegedly in the concept of an
agricultural tenant.
GARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 133140
August 10, 1990
Puno, J.
Issue: Whether Garcia’s possession is in a concept of an owner?
Held: No. Garcia’s possession which started only in 1986 could not ripen into ownership. He has
no valid title thereto. His possession in fact was that of an intruder, one done in bad faith (to
defeat PBCom’s Writ of Possession). His possession is certainly not in the concept of an owner.
This is so because as early as 1981, title thereto was registered in the name of the Magpayo
Spouses which title was subsequently cancelled when the property was purchased by PBCom
in a public auction sale resulting in the issuance of title in favor of the latter in 1985.The Court
stressed that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when a
thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by
law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one
of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. Atty. Pedro Garcia and his wife
Remedios exercised their right to dispose of what they owned when they sold the subject
property to the Magpayo spouses. On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a
thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a
thing with or without right. Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the
concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept of an owner may
be the owner himself or one who claims to be so. On the other hand, one who possesses as a
mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership,
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whether his belief be right or wrong.The records show that petitioner occupied the property not
in the concept of an owner for his stay was merely tolerated by his parents. Consequently, it is
of no moment that petitioner was in possession of the property at the time of the sale to the
Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a valid transfer of ownership. On the other hand,
petitioner’s subsequent claim of ownership as successor to his mother’s share in the conjugal
asset is belied by the fact that the property was not included in the inventory of the estate
submitted by his father to the intestate court. This buttresses the ruling that indeed the property
was no longer considered owned by petitioner’s parents.  The Court upheld the Court of
Appeals in holding that the mortgage to PBCom by the Magpayo spouses is valid
notwithstanding that the transfer certificate of title over the property was issued to them after the
mortgage contract was entered into. Registration does not confer ownership, it is merely
evidence of such ownership over a particular property. The deed of sale operates as a formal or
symbolic delivery of the property sold and authorizes the buyer to use the document as proof of
ownership. All said, the Magpayo spouses were already the owners when they mortgaged the
property to PBCom.
RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 129609
November 29, 2001
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Issue: Whether or not the renewal of contract of lease between Rodil and the Republic is valid.
Held: Yes. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law. Every owner has the freedom of disposition over his property. It is an
attribute of ownership, and this rule has no exception. The REPUBLIC being the owner of the
disputed property enjoys the prerogative to enter into a lease contract with RODIL in the
exercise of its jus disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC has the right to eject usurpers
of the leased property where the factual elements required for relief in an action for unlawful
detainer are present.
Issue: Whether or not Rodil may validly eject herein respondents even though the former is not
in actual possession of the property.
Held: Yes. In an action for unlawful detainer the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical
possession. Respondents have admitted that they have not entered into any lease contract with
the REPUBLIC and that their continued occupation of the subject property was merely by virtue
of acquiescence. Since the occupation of respondents was merely tolerated by the REPUBLIC,
the right of possession of the latter remained uninterrupted. It could therefore alienate the same
to anyone it chose. Unfortunately for respondents, the REPUBLIC chose to alienate the subject
premises to RODIL by virtue of a contract of lease entered into on 18 May 1992. Resultantly,
petitioner had the right to file the action for unlawful detainer against respondents as one from
whom possession of property has been unlawfully withheld.
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ISAGUIRRE v. DE LARA
G.R. No. 138053
May 31, 2000
Gonzaga – Reyes, J.
Issue: Does the mortgagee in an equitable mortgage have the right to retain possession of the
property pending actual payment to him of the amount of indebtedness by the mortgagor?
Held: No. A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of a principal
obligation. Recording the document, in which it appears with the proper Registry of Property,
although, even if it is not recorded, the mortgage is nevertheless binding between the parties,
constitutes it. Thus, the only right granted by law in favor of the mortgagee is to demand the
execution and the recording of the document in which the mortgage is formalized. As a general
rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged property since a mortgage is merely a
lien and title to the property does not pass to the mortgagee. However, even though a
mortgagee does not have possession of the property, there is no impairment of his security
since the mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed,
whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was
constituted. If the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the mortgage creditor may institute an action
to foreclose the mortgage, whether judicially or extrajudicially, whereby the mortgaged property
will then be sold at a public auction and the proceeds there from given to the creditor to the
extent necessary to discharge the mortgage loan. Apparently, petitioner’s contention that “to
require him to deliver possession of the Property to respondent prior to the full payment of the
latter’s mortgage loan would be equivalent to the cancellation of the mortgage is without basis.
Regardless of its possessor, the mortgaged property may still be sold, with the prescribed
formalities, in the event of the debtor’s default in the payment of his loan obligation.
A simple mortgage does not give the mortgagee a right to the possession of the property unless
the mortgage should contain some special provision to that effect. Regrettably for petitioner, he
has not presented any evidence, other than his own gratuitous statements, to prove that the real
intention of the parties was to allow him to enjoy possession of the mortgaged property until full
payment of the loan.
The trial court correctly issued the writ of possession in favor of respondent. Such writ was but a
necessary consequence of affirming the validity of the original certificate of title in the name of
respondent Felicitas de Lara, while at the same time nullifying the original certificate of title in
the name of petitioner Cornelio Isaguirre. Possession is an essential attribute of ownership;
thus, it would be redundant for respondent to go back to court simply to establish her right to
possess subject property.
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SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA
SANTOS v. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181
G.R. No. 116100
February 9, 1996
REGALADO, J.
Issue: Can a damage not amounting to a legal injury suffered by tenants be actionable against
the property owner?
Held: No. In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to
the claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of
abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code
can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should
have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts
should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as
owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the
owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established
by law.16 It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their property.
Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or
tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without
detriment to servitudes constituted thereon."
ABEJARON vs. NABASA

G.R. No. 84831
June 20, 2001
Puno, J.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner had the legal title of ownership in accordance with the
applicable law.
Held: No. Sec. 4 of PD 1073 reads:
"Sec. 4. The provision of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act,
are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-
interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.”
Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as further amended by P.D. No. 1073, now reads:
"(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
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all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter."
However, as Abejaron’s 30-year period of possession and occupation required by the Public
Land Act, ran from 1945 to 1975, prior to the effectivity of PD 1073 in 1977, the requirement that
occupation and possession should have started on June 12, 1945, or earlier, does not apply to
him.
Petitioner claims that he started occupying the disputed land in 1945. At that time, he built a
nipa house, a small store, and a fence made of wood to delineate his area. This nipa house
was improved in 1949 into a two-storey house. The small store was also made bigger in 1950.
The wooden fence was also changed to a fence made of hollow blocks. The two-storey house,
bigger store, and hollow-block fence all stand to this day. In 1951, petitioner planted coconut
trees near his house. While the petitioner has shown continued existence of these
improvements on the disputed land, they were introduced later than January 24, 1947. He has
failed to establish the portion of the disputed land that his original nipa house, small store and
wooden fence actually occupied as of January 24, 1947. In the absence of this proof, we
cannot determine the land he actually possessed and occupied for thirty years which he may
acquire under Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Worthy of notice is the fact that the disputed
land was surveyed, subdivided into and identified by lots only in the 1970's. Therefore, prior to
the survey, it would be difficult to determine the metes and bounds of the land petitioner claims
to have occupied since 1947 in the absence of specific and incontrovertible proof.
Finally, as admitted by the petitioner, he has never declared the disputed land for taxation
purposes. While tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property or supported by other effective proof.
Even the tax declarations and receipts covering his house do not bolster his case as the earliest
of these was dated 1950.
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC v. CA

G.R. No. 76216 - 76217
September 14, 1989
FERNAN, C.J.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner may validly invoke the doctrine of self help.
Held: No. Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized
petitioner's drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the
basis of the doctrine of self-help enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil Code. Such
justification is unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time of
actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When possession has
already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property. This is
clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, "In no case may possession be acquired
through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who
believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must invoke
the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."
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CAISIP v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. L-28716
November 18, 1970
Concepcion, C.J.
ISSUE: Whether the acts of appellants of stopping Gloria Cabalag from weeding the land and
failing to do so to forcibly dragged Cabalag for about 8 meters towards a forested area justified
under Article 429 of the Civil Code?
HELD: No, their acts cannot be justified under Article 429 of the Civil Code. The Court held that,
Art. 429 of our Civil Code, reading:
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of
his property.
Upon which appellants rely is obviously inapplicable to the case at bar, for, having been given
20 days from June 6, 1959, within which to vacate Lot 105-A, complainant did not, on June 17,
1959 — or within said period — invade or usurp said lot. She had merely remained in
possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become its co-possessor.
Appellants did not "repel or prevent in actual or threatened ... physical invasion or usurpation."
They expelled Gloria from a property of which she and her husband were in possession even
before the action for forcible entry was filed against them on May 17, 1958, despite the fact that
the Sheriff had explicitly authorized them to stay in said property up to June 26, 1959, and had
expressed the view that he could not oust them therefrom on June 17, 1959, without a judicial
order therefor.
It is urged, that, by weeding and refusing to leave Lot 105-A, Gloria had committed a crime in
the presence of the policemen, despite the aforementioned 20-day period, which, appellants
claim, the sheriff had no authority to grant. This contention is manifestly untenable, because: (1)
said period was granted in the presence of the hacienda owner's representative, appellant
Caisip, who, by not objecting thereto, had impliedly consented to or ratified the act performed by
the sheriff; (2) Gloria and her husband were thereby allowed to remain, and had, in fact,
remained, in possession of the premises, perhaps together with the owner of the hacienda or
his representative, Caisip; (3) the act of removing weeds from the ricefield was beneficial to its
owner and to whomsoever the crops belonged, and, even if they had not authorized it, does not
constitute a criminal offense; and (4) although Gloria and her husband had been sentenced to
vacate the land, the judgment against them did not necessarily imply that they, as the parties
who had tilled it and planted thereon, had no rights, of any kind whatsoever, in or to the standing
crops, inasmuch as "necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor," and the cost
of cultivation, production and upkeep has been held to partake of the nature of necessary
expenses.
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People v. Pletcha
G.R. No.19029
June 27, 1977.
Bison, J.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pletcha can properly invoked Article 429.
HELD: Yes. The principle of self-help authorizes the lawful possessor to use force not only to
prevent a threatened unlawful invasion or usurpation thereof; it is sort of self-defense. It is lawful
to repel force by force. He who merely uses force to defend his possession does not possess by
force. The use of such necessary force to protect proprietary or possessory rights constitutes a
justifying circumstance under our penal laws.
The appellant need not rush to court to seek redress before reasonably resisting the invasion of
property. The situation required immediate action and Article 429 gave him the self-executory
mechanics of self-defense and self-reliance.
Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 74761
November 6, 1990
Fernan, C.J.
Issue: Whether petitioner spouses Andamo can claim damages for destruction caused by
respondent’s waterpaths and contrivances on the basis of Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code on quasi-delicts.
Held: Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one
under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-
delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the
defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by
the plaintiff.
Clearly, from petitioner’s complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an
assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage
sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the
basis for the recovery of damages.
It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
Civil Code provides that “the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to
injure the rights of a third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover,
adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his
own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures
must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be
dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature.
If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter
can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
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Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 74761
November 6, 1990
Fernan, C.J.
Issue: Whether a land owner has the absolute right to do anything with his property.
Held: No. It must be stressed that the use of one’s property is not without limitations. Article 431
of the Civil Code provides that “the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner
as to injure the rights of a third person.” SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.
Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must
use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of
others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such
structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot
be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of
nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the
latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., vs. TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO., THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK
G.R. No. 35223
September 17, 1931
Romualdez, J.
Issue: Whether or not the bonus in question is civil fruits?
Held: NO.Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: First, the rents of
buildings; second, the proceeds from leases of lands; and, third, the income from perpetual or
life annuities, or other similar sources of revenue. It may be noted that according to the context
of the law, the phrase "u otras analogas" refers only to rent or income, for the adjectives "otras"
and "analogas" agree with the noun "rentas," as do also the other adjectives "perpetuas" and
"vitalicias." That is why we say that by "civil fruits" the Civil Code understands one of three and
only three things, to wit: the rent of a building, the rent of land, and certain kinds of income.
As the bonus in question is not rent of a building or of land, the only meaning of "civil fruits" left
to be examined is that of "income."
Assuming that in broad juridical sense of the word "income" it might be said that the bonus in
question is "income" under article 355 of the Civil Code, it is obvious to inquire whether it is
derived from the land mortgaged by Mariano Lacson Ledesma to the appellant bank for the
benefit of the central; for it is not obtained from that land but from something else, it is not civil
fruits of that land, and the bank's contention is untenable.
It is to be noted that the said bonus bears no immediate, but only a remote accidental relation to
the land mentioned, having been granted as compensation for the risk of having subjected one's
land to a lien in favor of the bank, for the benefit of the entity granting said bonus. If this bonus
be income or civil fruits of anything, it is income arising from said risk, or, if one chooses, from
Mariano Lacson Ledesma's generosity in facing the danger for the protection of the central, but
certainly it is not civil fruits or income from the mortgaged property, which, as far as this case is
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concerned, has nothing to do with it. Hence, the amount of the bonus, according to the
resolution of the central granting it, is not based upon the value, importance or any other
circumstance of the mortgaged property, but upon the total value of the debt thereby secured,
according to the annual balance, which is something quite distinct from and independent of the
property referred to.
EQUATORIAL REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC. v. MAYFAIR THEATER, INC.

G.R. No. 133879
November 21, 2001
Panganiban, J.
Issue: Whether or not Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. is entitled to back rentals from
Mayfair Theater, Inc. by virtue of the Contract of Sale executed between Equatorial and
Carmelo and Bauermann, Inc. (former owner of the subject property).
Held: No. In the case, there was no right of ownership transferred from Carmelo to Equatorial in
view of a patent failure to deliver the property to the buyer. By a contract of sale, “one of the
contracting parties obligates himself to transfer ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing
and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.” Ownership of the thing
sold is a real right, which the buyer acquires only upon delivery of the thing to him “in any of the
ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the
possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee.” This right is transferred, not by
contract alone, but by tradition or delivery. And there is said to be delivery if and when the thing
sold “is placed in the control and possession of the vendee.” From the peculiar facts of this
case, it is clear that petitioner never took actual control and possession of the property sold, in
view of respondent’s timely objection to the sale and the continued actual possession of the
property. While the execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized by law as equivalent
to the delivery of the thing sold, such constructive or symbolic delivery, being merely
presumptive, is deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the
land sold. In the case, Mayfair’s opposition to the transfer of the property by way of sale to
Equatorial was a legally sufficient impediment that effectively prevented the passing of the
property into the latter's hands. Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property
producing it by right of accession. Consequently and ordinarily, the rentals that fell due from the
time of the perfection of the sale to petitioner until its rescission by final judgment should belong
to the owner of the property during that period. Not having been the owner, Equatorial cannot be
entitled to the civil fruits of ownership like rentals of the thing sold.
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IGNACIO V. HILARIO
G.R. No. L-175
April 30, 1946
Moran, CJ
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff are entitled to an order of execution since they chose neither
to pay defendants for the buildings nor to sell to them the residential lot.
HELD: The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to
retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453. The
owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under article 361, either to pay for the
building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here did,
refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to
remove it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after
having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same. But this is not the case
before us.
We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-petitioners to

remove their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter
chose neither to pay for such buildings not to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends
substantially the judgment sought to be executed and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361
and 453 of the Civil Code.
IGNAO V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 72876
January 18, 1991
FERNAN, C.J.
ISSUE #1: Are private respondents builders in good faith on the land in question (thus applying
Art. 448 of the Civil Code, although the land in question is still owned by the parties in co-
ownership, hence, the applicable provision is Art. 486 of the Civil Code, which was not applied)?
RULING #1: It should be noted that prior to partition, all the co-owners hold the property in
common dominion but at the same time each is an owner of a share which is abstract and
undetermined until partition is effected.
“An undivided estate is co-ownership by the heirs."
As co-owners, the parties may have unequal shares in the common property, quantitatively
speaking. But in a qualitative sense, each co-owner has the same right as any one of the other
co-owners. Every co-owner is therefore the owner of the whole, and over the whole he
exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly
abstract, because until division is effected such portion is not concretely determined.
When the co-ownership is terminated by a partition and it appears that the house of an erstwhile
co-owner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to another co-owner which was however
made in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 should apply to determine the respective
rights of the parties.
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ISSUE #2: That, granting for the sake of argument that Art. 448 is applicable, did the
respondent Court err when it adjudged the working solution suggested in Grana and Torralba
vs. CA. (109 Phil. 260), which is just an opinion by way of passing, and not the judgment
rendered therein, which is in accordance with the said provision of the Civil Code?
RULING #2: Such ruling contravened the explicit provisions of Article 448 to the effect that "(t)he
owner of the land . . . shall have the right to appropriate . . .or to oblige the one who built . . . to
pay the price of the land . . . ." The law is clear and unambiguous when it confers the right of
choice upon the landowner and not upon the builder and the courts.
Thus, in Quemuel vs. Olaes, the Court categorically ruled that the right to appropriate the works
or improvements or to oblige the builder to pay the price of the land belongs to the landowner.
FILIPINAS COLLEGES, INC., vs. MARIA GARCIA TIMBANG, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-12812
September 29, 1959
Barrera, J.:
ISSUE: WON the failure of the builder in good faith to pay the price of the land after the owners
thereof exercised their option under Article 448 of the Civil Code shall excuse the owners, as
highest bidders to pay the auction price and by operation of Article 445, the owners of the land
automatically became the owners ipso facto.
HELD: NO. Article 448 and 546 of the Civil Code defines the right of the parties in case a
person in good faith builds, sows or plants on the land of another. Under the terms of this first
article, it is true that the owner of the land has the right to choose between appropriating the
building by reimbursing the builder of the value thereof or compelling the builder in good faith to
pay for his land. Even this second right cannot be exercised if the value of the land is
considerably more than that of the building. In addition to the right of the builder to be paid the
value of his improvement, Article 546 gives him the corollary right of retention of the property
until he is indemnified by the owner of the land. There is nothing in the language of these two
articles which would justify the conclusion of appellants that, upon the failure of the builder to
pay the value of the land, when such is demanded by the land-owner, the latter becomes
automatically the owner of the improvement under Article 445. The case of Bernardo vs.
Bataclan, 66 Phil., 590 cited by appellants is no authority for this conclusion. Although it is true it
was declared therein that in the event of the failure of the builder to pay the land after the owner
thereof has chosen this alternative, the builder's right of retention provided in Article 546 is lost,
nevertheless there was nothing said that as a consequence thereof, the builder loses entirely all
rights over his own building.
The appellants herein, owners o the land, instead of electing any of the alternative above
indicated chose to seek recovery of the value of their land by asking for a writ of execution;
levying on the house of the builder; and selling the same in public auction and because they are
the highest bidder in their own auction sale, they now claim they acquired title to the building
without necessity of paying in cash on account of their bid. In other words, they in effect pretend
to retain their land and acquire the house without paying a cent therefor. However, while it is
the inveriable practice, that where the successful bidder is the execution creditor himself, he
need not pay down the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgement,
nevertheless, when their is a claim by a third-party, to the proceeds of the sale superior to his
judgment credit, the execution creditor, as successful bidder, must pay in cash the amount of
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his bid as a condition precedent to the issuance to him of the certificate of sale. In the instant
case, the Court of Appeals has already adjudged that appellee Blas is entitled to the payment of
the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the school building. Blas has actually a lien on the
school building are concerned. The order of the lower court directing the Timbang spouses, as
successful bidders, to pay in cash the amount of their bid in the sum of P5,750.00 is therefore
correct.
With respect to the order of the court declaring appellee Filipinas Colleges, Inc. part owner of
the land to the extent of the value of its personal properties sold at public auction in favor of the
Timbang, this Court Likewise finds the same as justified, for such amount represents, in effect, a
partial payment of the value of the land.
Manotok Realty Inc. vs. Tecson

GR L-47475
August 19, 1988
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
ISSUE: Did respondent judge commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to
exercise option belonging to the owner of the property under Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil
Code?
HELD: Yes. The petitioner argues that since the judgment of the trial court has already become
final, it is entitled to the execution of the same and that moreover, since the house of the private
respondent was gutted by fire, the execution of the decision would now involve the delivery of
possession of the disputed area by the private respondent to the petitioner. We find merit in
these arguments. When the decision of the trial court became final and executory, it became
incumbent upon the respondent judge to issue the necessary writ for the execution of the same.
There is, therefore, no basis for the respondent judge to deny the petitioner's motion to avail of
its option to appropriate the improvements made on its property. Neither can the respondent
judge deny the issuance of a writ of execution because the private respondent was adjudged a
builder in good faith or on the ground of "peculiar circumstances which supervened after the
institution of this case, like, for instance, the introduction of certain major repairs of and other
substantial improvements..." because the option given by law either to retain the premises and
pay for the improvements thereon or to sell the said premises to the builder in good faith
belongs to the owner of the property.
Since the improvements have been gutted by fire, and therefore, the basis for private
respondent's right to retain the premises has already been extinguished without the fault of the
petitioner, there is no other recourse for the private respondent but to vacate the premises and
deliver the same to herein petitioner.
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BERNARDO VS. BATACLAN

G.R. No. L-44606
November 28, 1938
Laurel, J:
Issue: Whether or not defendant is a possessor in good faith and has the right to retain the land
in accordance with Article 453 of the Civil Code.
Held: The Civil Code confirms certain time-honored principles of the law of property. One of
these is the principle of accession whereby the owner of property acquires not only that which it
produces but that which is united to it either naturally or artificially. Whatever is built, planted or
sown on the land of another, and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the
owner of the land. Where, however, the planter, builder, or sower has acted in good faith, a
conflict of rights arises between the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of
the improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the
impracticability of creating what Manresa calls a state of "forced coownership," the law has
provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the
improvements after payment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for
the land and the sower to pay the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is allowed to
exercise the option because his right is older and because, by the principle of accession, he is
entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
In the case before us, the plaintiff, as owner of the land, chose to require the defendant, as
owner of the improvements, to pay for the land. The defendant states that he is a possessor in
good faith and that the amount of P2,212 to which he is entitled has not yet been paid to him.
Therefore, he says, he has a right to retain the land in accordance with the provisions of article
453 of the Civil Code. We do not doubt the validity of the premises stated. We find, however,
that the defendant has lost his right of retention. In obedience to the decision of this court in
G.R. No. 37319, the plaintiff expressed his desire to require the defendant to pay for the value
of the land. The said defendant could have become owner of both land and improvements and
continued in possession thereof. But he said he could not pay and the land was sold at public
auction to Toribio Teodoro. The law, as we have already said, requires no more than that the
owner of the land should choose between indemnifying the owner of the improvements or
requiring the latter to pay for the land. When he failed to pay for the land, the defendant herein
lost his right of retention.
The sale at public auction having been asked by the plaintiff himself and the purchase price of
P8,000 received by him from Toribio Teodoro, we find no reason to justify a rapture of the
situation thus created between them, the defendant-appellant not being entitled, after all, to
recover from the plaintiff the sum of P2,212. The judgment of the lower court is accordingly
modified by eliminating therefrom the reservation made in favor of the defendant-appellant to
recover from the plaintiff the sum of P2,212. In all the respects, the same is affirmed.
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HEIRS OF RAMON DURANO v. UY

G.R. No. 136456
October 24, 2000
GONZAGA-REYES, J.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not the heirs of Durano were builders in bad faith
(2) Whether or not the Spouses Durano should return the properties and pay indemnity in
reparation of the destroyed properties overran by the bulldozers
HELD:
(1) YES. A purchaser of a parcel of land cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man upon his guard, such as when the property subject of the purchase is in
possession of persons other than the seller. A buyer who could not have failed to know or
discover the land sold to him was in adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith.
In the same manner the purchase of the property of Durano III from Durano Co. could not have
been in good faith because it is not disputed that Durano III had acquired the property with full
knowledge of Spouses Uy’s occupancy thereon.
Furthermore, there even appears to be undue haste in the conveyance of the property to
Durano III, as bulldozing operations by Durano and Co. were still underway when the deed of
sale to Durano III was executed on September 15, 1970. There was not even an indication that
Durano Co. attempted to transfer the registration in its name before it conveyed to Durano III.
(2) YES. Since petitioners knew fully well the defect in their titles, they were correctly held by the
Court of Appeals to be builders in bad faith. And since they were in bad faith, the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built,
planted or sown without right of indemnity.
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith
may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to
replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or
sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the
proper rent.
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from
the builder, planter or sower.
Based on these provisions, the owner of the land has three alternative rights:
(1) to appropriate what has been built without any obligation to pay indemnity therefor, or
(2) to demand that the builder remove what he had built, or
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(3) to compel the builder to pay the value of the land, or pay the rent in case of the sower.
In any case, the landowner is entitled to damages under Article 451, above cited. The right of
the owner of the land to recover damages from a builder in bad faith is clearly provided for in
Article 451 of the Civil Code. Although said Article 451 does not elaborate on the basis for
damages, the Court perceives that it should reasonably correspond with the value of the
properties lost or destroyed as a result of the occupation in bad faith, as well as the fruits
(natural, industrial or civil) from those properties that the owner of the land reasonably expected
to obtain.
BALLATAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125683
March 2, 1999
Puno, J.
ISSUE: WON private respondents Go and Li Ching Yao can be compelled to demolish and
remove all the improvements they made on the land of Petitioner whose land area was
decreased and deliver the same to the latter. (accion publiciana)
HELD: No. All the parties in the case are possessors in good faith and as such Article 448 of the
Civil Code shall apply. It provides that the owner of the land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the building, planting
or sowing, after payment to the builder, planter or sower of the necessary and useful expenses,
and in the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure. The owner of the land may
also oblige the builder, planter or sower to purchase and pay the price of the land. If the owner
chooses to sell his land, the builder, planter or sower must purchase the land, otherwise the
owner may remove the improvements thereon. The builder, planter or sower, however, is not
obliged to purchase the land if its value is considerably more than the building, planting or
sowing. In such case, the builder, planter or sower must pay rent to the owner of the land. If
the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms
thereof. The right to choose between appropriating the improvement or selling the land on
which the improvement stands to the builder, planter or sower, is given to the owner of the
land.”
Petitioners, as owners of Lot No. 24, may choose to purchase the improvement made by
respondents Go on their land, or sell to respondents Go the subject portion. If buying the
improvement is impractical as it may render the Go's house useless, then petitioners may sell to
respondents Go that portion of Lot No. 24 on which their improvement stands. If the Go's are
unwilling or unable to buy the lot, then they must vacate the land and, until they vacate, they
must pay rent to petitioners. Petitioners, however, cannot compel respondents Go to buy the
land if its value is considerably more than the portion of their house constructed thereon. If the
value of the land is much more than the Go's improvement, then respondents Go must pay
reasonable rent. If they do not agree on the terms of the lease, then they may go to court to fix
the same.
In the event that petitioners elect to sell to respondents Go the subject portion of their lot, the
price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of payment. The Court of Appeals
erred in fixing the price at the time of taking, which is the time the improvements were built on
the land. The time of taking is determinative of just compensation in expropriation proceedings.
The instant case is not for expropriation. It is not a taking by the state of private property for a
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public purpose upon payment of just compensation. This is a case of an owner who has been
paying real estate taxes on his land but has been deprived of the use of a portion of this land for
years. It is but fair and just to fix compensation at the time of payment.
SPOUSES DEL OCAMPO v. ABESIA

G.R. No. L-49219
April 15, 1988
Melencio-Herrera, J.
Issue: Whether or not Art. 448 of the Civil Code is applicable, upon termination of co-ownership,
to a previous co-owner who built in good faith during the co-ownership on the land previously
owned in common.
Held: Yes. The SC stated that the court a quo correctly held that Article 448 of the Civil Code
cannot apply where a co-owner builds, plants or sows on the land owned in common for then he
did not build, plant or sow upon land that exclusively belongs to another but of which he is a co-
owner. The co-owner is not a third person under the circumstances, and the situation is
governed by the rules of co-ownership.
However, when, as in this case, the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears
that the house of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land
pertaining to plaintiffs, which the defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of
Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply. Manresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the
said provision of the Civil Code may apply even when there was co-ownership if good faith has
been established.
PACIFIC FARMS, INC. v. SIMPLICIO G. ESGUERRA, ET AL.

CARRIED LUMBER COMPANY
G.R. No. L-21783
November 29, 1969
CASTRO, J.
Issue: Whether there exists a materialman's lien over the six buildings in favor of the appellant.
Held: Article 447 of the Civil Code1 provides:
The owner of the land who makes thereon personally or through another, plantings,
constructions or works with the materials of another, shall pay their value; and, if he acted in
bad faith, he shall also be obliged to the reparation of damages. The owner of the materials
shall have the right to remove them only in case he can do so without injury to the work
constructed, or without the plantings, constructions or works being destroyed. However, if the
landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the materials may remove them in any event with a
right to be indemnified for damages.
The abovequoted legal provision contemplates a principal and an accessory, the land being
considered the principal, and the plantings, constructions or works, the accessory. The owner of
the land who in good faith — whether personally or through another — makes constructions or
works thereon, using materials belonging to somebody else, becomes the owner of the said
materials with the obligation however of praying for their value.2 The owner of the materials, on
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the other hand, is entitled to remove them, provided no substantial injury is caused to the
landowner. Otherwise, he has the right to reimbursement for the value of his materials.
Although it does not appear from the records of this case that the land upon which the six
buildings were built is owned by the appellee, nevertheless, that the appellee claims that it owns
the six buildings constructed out of the lumber and construction materials furnished by the
appellant, is indubitable. Therefore, applying article 447 by analogy, we perforce consider the
buildings as the principal and the lumber and construction materials that went into their
construction as the accessory. Thus the appellee, if it does own the six buildings, must bear the
obligation to pay for the value of the said materials; the appellant — which apparently has no
desire to remove the materials, and, even if it were minded to do so, cannot remove them
without necessarily damaging the buildings — has the corresponding right to recover the value
of the unpaid lumber and construction materials.
Well-established in jurisprudence is the rule that compensation should be borne by the person
who has been benefited by the accession.3 No doubt, the appellee benefited from the
accession, i.e., from the lumber and materials that went into the construction of the six buildings.
It should therefore shoulder the compensation due to the appellant as unpaid furnisher of
materials.
PECSON v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 115814
May 26, 1995
Davide, Jr., J.
Issue: The parties agree that the petitioner was a builder in good faith of the apartment building
on the theory that he constructed it at the time when he was still the owner of the lot, and that
the key issue in this case is the application of Articles 448 and 456 of the Civil Code.
Held: By its clear language, Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or
more parties, one of whom has built some works, or sown or planted something. The building,
sowing or planting may have been made in good faith or in bad faith. The rule on good faith laid
down in Article 526 of the Civil Code shall be applied in determining whether a builder, sower or
planter had acted in good faith.
Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter
who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. Elsewise stated, where the true
owner himself is the builder of works on his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is
entirely irrelevant. Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the case at bar.
Nevertheless, we believe that the provision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy
considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-ownership and
that the parties, including the two courts below, in the main agree that Articles 448 and 546 of
the Civil Code are applicable and indemnity for the improvements may be paid although they
differ as to the basis of the indemnity.
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TECHNOGAS PHILIPPINES, INC. V. CA

G.R. No. 108894, 268 SCRA 5
February 10, 1997
Panganiban, J.
ISSUE: Whether Petitioner became a builder in bad faith on the presumption that it should know
the metes and bounds of its property.
HELD: No. When petitioner purchased the land from Pariz Industries, the buildings and other
structures were already in existence. The record does not show that petitioner was aware of the
encroachment when it came into possession of the property. Likewise unclear is the identity of
the actual builder, but it may well be assumed that it was petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest,
Pariz Industries.
In view of the good faith of both petitioner and private respondent, their respective rights and
obligations are to be governed by Article 448 of the Civil Code. In Depra vs. Dumlao, where the
builder, planter or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arises between the owners,
and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing injustice to
the owner of the land. In view of the impracticality of creating a state of forced co-ownership,
the law has provided a just solution by giving the owner of the land the option to acquire the
improvements after payment of the proper indemnity, or to oblige the builder or planter to pay
for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent. It is the owner of the land who is authorized
to exercise the option, because his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he
is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.
Forcible removal of the encroaching structures would only be available should private
respondent choose to compel the petitioner to buy the land at a reasonable price but the latter
fails to pay such price. This has not taken place, constraining private respondent to: (1)
appropriate the encroaching portion of petitioner’s building after payment of proper indemnity, or
(2) obliging the latter to buy the lot occupied by the structure. Private respondent cannot
exercise a remedy of his own liking.
PLEASANTVILLE DEVL CORP. v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 79688
Feb. 1, 1996
Panganiban, J.
ISSUE: Whether or not a lot buyer who constructs improvements on the wrong property
erroneously delivered by the owner’s agent is a builder in good faith.
HELD: Yes. Good faith under Article 448 consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is
building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is
presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee.
In the case at bar, Kee had acted in the manner of a prudent man in ascertaining the identity of
his property. He went to the subdivision developer’s agent and applied and paid for the
relocation of the lot, as well as for the production of a lot plan by CTTEI’s geodetic engineer.
Upon Kee’s receipt of the map, his wife went to the subdivision site accompanied by CTTEI’s
employee, Octaviano, who authoritatively declared that the land she was pointing to was indeed
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Lot 8. Kee saw no reason to suspect that there had been a misdelivery. The steps Kee had
taken to protect his interests were reasonable.
Kee believed that Lot 8 was what he bought from petitioner at the time he built improvements on
it. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8 but Lot 9. Thus, Kee’s good
faith. Petitioner failed to prove otherwise.
GEMINIANO v COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 120303
July 24, 1996
DAVIDE, Jr., J.
ISSUE: Whether the private respondents are builders in good faith or mere lessees?
HELD: No. Being mere lessees, the private respondents knew that their occupation of the
premises would continue only for the life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be considered as
possessors nor builders in good faith. In a plethora of cases, this Court has held that Article 448
of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same Code, which allows full reimbursement of
useful improvements and retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, applies only to
a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner
thereof. It does not apply where one's only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract;
otherwise, it would always be in the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his
property.
EULOGIO AGUSTIN vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. Nos. L-66075-76
July 5, 1990
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.
ISSUES:
a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the land in question had become
part of private respondents' estate as a result of accretion.
b) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that the ownership of private
respondents over the accretion is not affected by the sudden and abrupt change in the course of
the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old bed.
Held: The petition is unmeritorious and must be denied.
a) The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the lots of the private
respondents who did not lose the ownership of such accretions even after they were separated
from the principal lots by the sudden change of course of the river, is a finding of fact which is
conclusive on this Court. That finding is supported by Art. 457 of the New Civil Code which
provides: Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
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Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the
deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the
water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river
(Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA 514).
b) The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon the
sudden and abrupt change of the course of the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted
to its old 1919 bed, and separated or transferred said accretions to the other side (or eastern
bank) of the river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this situation.
Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its
bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which
the segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same
within two years.
Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of
land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a
portion of land is separated from the estate by the current.
In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result of a strong
typhoon in 1968 caused a portion of the lands of the private respondents to be "separated from
the estate by the current." The private respondents have retained the ownership of the portion
that was transferred by avulsion to the other side of the river.
CUREG V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 73465
September 7, 1989
MEDIALDEA, J.
ISSUE: Whether or not an accretion automatically belongs to the adjacent land owner who has
an Original Certificate of Title and consider such accretion deemed registered.
HELD: No. The "subject land" is an alluvial deposit left by the northward movement of the
Cagayan River and pursuant to Article 457 of the New Civil Code:
To the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
The increase in the area of petitioners' land, being an accretion left by the change of course or
the northward movement of the Cagayan River does not automatically become registered land
just because the lot which receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. (See Grande v.
Court of Appeals, L-17652, June 30, 1962). As such, it must also be placed under the operation
of the Torrens System.
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Viajar v. CA
G.R.No. 77294
December 12, 1988
Medialdea, J.:
Issue: Whether the change in the course of the Suague River was sudden as claimed by the
plaintiffs or gradual as contended by the defendants. Assuming arguendo it was gradual,
whether or not the plaintiffs are still entitled to Lot ‘B' appearing in Exhibit "4" and to one-half (½)
of Lot "A," also indicated in Exhibit "4"
Held: The presumption is that the change in the course of the river was gradual and caused by
accretion and erosion. The defendants have sufficiently established that for many years the
Suague River overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the defendant gradually received
deposits of soil from the effects of the current of the river. The consequent increase in the area
of Lot No. 7511 due to alluvion or accretion was possessed by the defendants whose tenants
plowed and planted the same with coin and tobacco.
The quondam river bed had been filled by accretion through the years. The land is already plain
and there is no indication on the ground of any abandoned river bed. The river bed is definitely
no longer discernible now.
What used to be the old river bed (Lot A) is in level with Lot No. 7511. So are the two other
areas to the East. (Lots B and C) Lots A, B and C are still being cultivated.
Under the law, accretion which the banks or rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the
current of the waters becomes the property of the owners of the lands adjoining the banks. (Art.
366, Old Civil Code; Art. 457, New Civil Code which took effect on August 30, 1950 [Lara v. Del
Rosario, 94 Phil. 778]. Therefore, the accretion to Lot No. 7511 which consists of Lots A and B
(see Exhs. 'C' and '4') belongs to the defendants.
VDA. DE NAZARENO v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 98045
June 26, 1996
ROMERO, J.
Issue: Whether or not the subject land is private land being an accretion to petitioner’s titled
property
Held: No. In the case of Meneses v. CA, this Court held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring
property under Art. 457 of the Civil Code, requires the concurrence of these requisites : (1) that
the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the
action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is
adjacent to the banks of rivers (or the sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if
present in a case, give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any
accretion gradually received from the effects of the current of waters.
For petitioners to insist on the application of these rules on alluvion to their case, the above-
mentioned requisites must be present. However, they admit that the accretion was formed by
the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas Creek and
the Cagayan River bounding their land. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the accumulation of
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such boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the
action of the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River. In Hilario v.
City of Manila, this Court held that the word "current" indicates the participation of the body of
water in the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners' submission not having
met the first and second requirements of the rules on alluvion, they cannot claim the rights of a
riparian owner.
It is this Court's irresistible conclusion, therefore, that the accretion was man-made or artificial.
In Republic v. CA, this Court ruled that the requirement that the deposit should be due to the
effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the Civil Code
all deposits caused by human intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive
work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco v. Director of Lands, et al., where the land was not formed
solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river bordering said land but is also the
consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was deemed a man-made
accretion and, as such, part of the public domain.
In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun
Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill   operations. Even if this Court were to take into
consideration petitioners' submission that the accretion site was the result of the late Antonio
Nazareno's labor consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials into the
Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his land, the same would still be part of the
public domain.
HEIRS OF NAVARRO v. IAC

G.R. No. 68166
February 12, 1997
Hermosisima, Jr., J.
ISSUE: Can the petitioners rightfully claim ownership over the land through the principle of
accretion?
HELD: The disputed property was brought forth by both the withdrawal of the waters of Manila
Bay and the accretion formed on the exposed foreshore land by the action of the sea which
brought soil and sand sediments in turn trapped by the palapat and bakawan trees planted
thereon by petitioner Sulpicio Pascual in 1948.
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence of
the following requisites:
(1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and
(3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited on
the estate fronting the river bank; the owner of such estate is called the riparian owner. Riparian
owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners of lands
bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters. The alluvium, by mandate of Article
457 of the Civil Code, is automatically owned by the riparian owner from the moment the soil
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deposit can be seen but is not automatically registered property, hence, subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.
The disputed land is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be
the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined private respondents' own tract of land on the
northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of the Civil Code but Article 4 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:
"Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea,
form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and
are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or
for the coast-guard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners
of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof."
As part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intended for public use, and "so long as
the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public use, it is not
capable of being appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization
granted in due form by a competent authority." Only the executive and possibly the legislative
departments have the right and the power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by
action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of
establishment of special industries or for coast guard services.
CO-OWNERSHIP
DEL BANCO v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 72694
December 1, 1987
PARAS, J.
Issue: Can mere agreement to subdivide property terminate co-ownership?
Held: No. It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a
subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which they take actual and exclusive possession of
their respective portions in the plan and titles issued to each of them accordingly (Caro vs. Court
of Appeals, 113 SCRA 10 [1982]). The mechanics of actual partition should follow the procedure
laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Maganon vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282 [1986]).
Neither can such actual possession and enjoyment of some portions of the Island by some of
the petitioners herein be considered a repudiation of the co-ownership. It is undisputed that the
Cagbalite Island was purchased by the original co-owners as a common property and it has not
been proven that the Island had been partitioned among them or among their heirs. While there
is co-ownership, a co-owner's possession of his share is co-possession which is linked to the
possession of the other co-owners (Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234 [1977]).
Furthermore, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs
so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership (Valdez vs. Olonga, 51 SCRA
71 [1973], Tero vs. Tero, 131 SCRA 100 [1984]). Co-owners cannot acquire by prescription the
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share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership clearly
communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]).
An action for partition does not prescribe. Article 403 of the Old Civil Code, now Article 497,
provides that the assignees of the co-owners may take part in the partition of the common
property, and Article 400 of the Old Code, now Article 494 provides that each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common property, a provision which implies that the
action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches (Budlong vs. Pondoc,
79 SCRA 24 [1977]). An action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is
properly repudiated by the co- owner (Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Vicenta Ortiz Pardell and Ricardo Pardell VS. Matilde Ortiz Bartolome and Gaspar
Bartolome
G.R. No. L-4656
18 November 18, 1912
Torres, J:
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent spouses should pay rent to the petitioner, the
respondent wife’s sister and co-owner of the property in question, for the use of the: a) 2nd floor
for dwelling and b) 1st floor for the husband’s office.
HELD: Respondents should pay rent for the use of the 1st floor but not for the use of the 2nd
floor.
Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:
Each co-owner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance
with their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent
the co-owners from utilizing them according to their rights.
Respondents occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in the house of joint
ownership; but the record shows no proof that there was any detriment to the interest of the
community property, nor that she prevented the petitioner from utilizing the said upper story
according to her rights.
The respondent husband occupied for four years the lower floor of the same house as an office
for the justice of the peace, a position which he held in the capital of that province, strict justice,
requires that he pay his sister-in-law, the plaintiff, one half of the monthly rent which the said
quarters could have produced, had they been leased to another person. This conclusion as to
Bartolome's liability results from the fact that, even as the husband of the defendant co-owner of
the property, he had no right to occupy and use gratuitously the said part of the lower floor of
the house in question, where he lived with his wife, to the detriment of the plaintiff Vicenta who
did not receive one-half of the rent which those quarters could and should have produced, had
they been occupied by a stranger, in the same manner that rent was obtained from the rooms
on the lower floor that were used as stores.
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CARO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-46001
March 25, 1982
Guerrero, J.
ISSUES:
1. Is an oral agreement of partition valid?
2. Is the right of legal redemption still available when the co-ownership is already terminated?
HELD:
1. YES. An agreement of partition, though oral, is valid and consequently binding upon the
parties.
2. NO. Inasmuch as the purpose of the law in establishing the right of legal redemption between
co-owners is to reduce the number of participants until the community is done away with, once
the property is subdivided and distributed among the co-owners, the community has terminated
and there is no reason to sustain any right of legal redemption. The Court further held that the
effect is no different with respect to a conveyance which took place before the partition
agreement and approval by the court.
Bailon-Casilao v. CA
G.R. No. 78178
April 15, 1988
Cortes, J.:
Issues:
1. What is the effect of a sale by one or more co-owners of the entire property held in common
without the consent of all the co-owners?
2. What is the appropriate remedy of the aggrieved co-owners in case of such sale by a co-
owner?
Held:
1. The pertinent civil code provision is Art. 493. The Court ruled that even if a co-owner sells the
whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-
owners who did not consent to the sale. This is because under the aforementioned codal
provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets
only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided
share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners
is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
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2. The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of
possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner
or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it
continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it.
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent
were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided
shares of some of the co-owners is an action for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Neither recovery of possession nor restitution can be granted since the
defendant buyers are legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint ownership of the common
property claimed.
ROQUE v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 75886
August 30, 1988
Feliciano, J.
Issue: Whether or not an action for partition will not prosper from the moment an alleged co-
owner asserts an adverse title.
Held: No. An action for partition-which is typically brought by a person claiming to be co-owner
of a specified property against a defendant or defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be
co-owners — may be seen to present simultaneously two principal issues. First, there is the
issue of whether the plaintiff is indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned.
Second, assuming that the plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary
issue of how the property is to be divided between plaintiff and defendant(s).
Should the trial court find that the defendants do not dispute the status of the plaintiff as co-
owner, the court can forthwith proceed to the actual partitioning of the property involved. In case
the defendants assert in their Answer exclusive title in themselves adversely to the plaintiff, the
court should not dismiss the plaintiffs action for partition but, on the contrary and in the exercise
of its general jurisdiction, resolve the question of whether the plaintiff is co-owner or not. Should
the trial court find that the plaintiff was unable to sustain his claimed status as co-owner, or that
the defendants are or have become the sole and exclusive owners of the property involved, the
court will necessarily have to dismiss the action for partition. This result would be reached, not
because the wrong action was commenced by the plaintiff, but rather because the plaintiff
having been unable to show co-ownership rights in himself, no basis exists for requiring the
defendants to submit to partition the property at stake. If, upon the other hand, the court after
trial should find the existence of co-ownership among the parties litigant, the court may and
should order the partition of the property in the same action. Judgment for one or the other party
being on the merits, the losing party may then appeal the same. In either case, however, it is
quite unnecessary to require the plaintiff to file another action, separate and independent from
that for partition originally instituted. Functionally, an action for partition may be seen to be at
once an action for declaration of coownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the property involved.
The question of prescription also needs to be addressed in this connection. It is sometimes said
that "the action for partition of the thing owned in common (actio communi dividendo or actio
familiae erciscundae) does not prescribe." This statement bears some refinement. In the words
of Article 494 of the Civil Code, "each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
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thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concemed." No matter how long the co-
ownership has lasted, a co-owner can always opt out of the co-ownership, and provided the
defendant co-owners or co-heirs have theretofore expressly or impliedly recognized the co-
ownership, they cannot set up as a defense the prescription of the action for partition. But if the
defendants show that they had previously asserted title in themselves adversely to the plaintiff
and for the requisite period of time, the plaintiffs right to require recognition of his status as a co-
owner will have been lost by prescription and the court cannot issue an order requiring partition.
DE LIMA V. CA
G.R. No. L-46296
September 24, 1991
Medialdea, J:
Issue: Is petitioner’s action for partition already barred by the statutory period provided by law
which would then enable private respondent (Galileo De Lima) to perfect his claim of ownership
by acquisitive prescription?
Held: Yes. As a rule possession by a co-owner will not be presumed adverse to others, but will
be held to benefit all. It is understood that a co-heir or co-owner who is in possession of an
inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of other co-owners or co-heirs is
regarded as a depository, lessee or trustee. No prescription shall therefore run in favor of a co-
owner as against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the
co-ownership.
However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive
owner of the properties and denies the share of the others, the question involved is no longer of
partition but of ownership.
Evidence shows that Galileo Delima obtained the issuance of a new title in his name to the
exclusion of his co-heirs. The issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear
repudiation of the trust or co-ownership, and the lapse of ten years of adverse possession by
Galileo Delima was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription. Hence, when petitioners filed
their action for reconveyance and/or to compel partition on February 29, 1968, such action was
already barred by prescription.
AGUILAR vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 76351
October 29, 1993
Bellosillo, J.;
Issue: When may a co-ownership be dissolved?
Whether a co-owner of a property can be held liable for payment of rentals on a property co-
owned by him.
Held: Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the
co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in
common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states
that whenever the thing is essentially, indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be,
allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds
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accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked
by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its
subdivision would prejudice the interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in
agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper
reimbursement of the co-owners. In one case, this Court upheld the order of the trial court
directing the holding of a public sale of the properties owned in common pursuant to Art. 498 of
the Civil Code.
However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying
any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in common long as it is in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not injurious to the interest
of the other co-owners. Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the
whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not
injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the
respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his
co-participants joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and
enjoyment of the same.
CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124262
October 12, 1999
Quisumbing, J.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to ownership of the entire property by virtue of
prescription?
Held: No. On the issue of prescription, we have ruled that even if a co-owner sells the
whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-
owners who did not consent to the sale.[8] Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the sale or other
disposition affects only the seller’s share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only what
corresponds to his grantor’s share in the partition of the property owned in common. Since a
co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner
without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the
co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property. The
proper action in a case like this, is not for the nullification of the sale, or for the recovery of
possession of the property owned in common from the third person, but for division or partition
of the entire property if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who
possessed and administered it.[9] Such partition should result in segregating the portion
belonging to the seller and its delivery to the buyer.
In the light of the foregoing, petitioner’s defense of prescription against an action for
partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, “no co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of
the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.” In Budlong vs. Bondoc,[10] this
Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible.
It cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: “No
prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership.”
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LUCIO ROBLES vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 123509
March 14, 2000
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Issue: Whether or not a title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner (Hilario).
Held: There is merit to the contention of the petitioners that Hilario mortgaged the disputed
property to the Rural Bank of Cardona in his capacity as a mere co-owner thereof. The said
transaction did not divest them of title to the property at the time of the institution of the
Complaint for quieting of title. Maintaining that as co-owners of the subject property, they did not
agree to the real estate mortgage constituted on it, petitioners insist that their shares therein
should not have been prejudiced by Hilario's actions.
Hilario effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership. It is a fundamental

principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners,
absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of
a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal
acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the other co-owner; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear
and convincing.
Hilario did not have possession of the subject property; neither did he exclude the petitioners
from the use and the enjoyment thereof, as they had indisputably shared in its fruits. Likewise,
his act of entering into a mortgage contract with the bank cannot be construed to be a
repudiation of the co-ownership. As absolute owner of his undivided interest in the land, he had
the right to alienate his share, as he in fact did. Neither should his payment of land taxes in his
name, as agreed upon by the co-owners, be construed as a repudiation of the co-ownership.
The assertion that the declaration of ownership was tantamount to repudiation was belied by the
continued occupation and possession of the disputed property by the petitioners as owners.
POSSESSION
RIZAL CEMENT CO. v. VILLAREAL

G.R. No. L-30272
February 28, 1985
Cuevas, J.
Issue: How is possession acquired?
Held: Being an attribute of ownership, appellants' possession of the land in question goes far to
tip the scale in their favor. The right to possess flows from ownership. No person should suffer
adverse possession by another of what belongs to him. Were the oppositor - appellee rightful
owner of the land in question, it would not have allowed the tenants to cultivate the land and
give the owner's share to appellants and/or their predecessors. It would have opposed the
survey for applicants' vendors but did not as shown in the surveyor's certificate. Very
significantly petitioner did not present any witness in actual possession of the land in question.
As aptly found by the appellate court, respondents possess the property in the concept of an
owner.
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Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right or by the
fact it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established
for acquiring such right. Petitioner's evidence, consisting of tax receipts, tax declaration and
survey plan are not conclusive and indisputable basis of one's ownership of the property in
question. Assessment alone is of little value as proof of title. Mere tax declaration does not vest
ownership of the property upon the declarant. Settled is the rule that neither tax receipts nor
declaration of ownership for taxation purposes alone constitutes sufficient evidence of
ownership or of the right to possess realty. They must be supported by other effective proofs.
Neither can the survey plan or technical descriptions prepared at the instance of the party
concerned be considered in his favor, the same being self-serving.
WONG v. CARPIO
G.R. No. L-50264
October 21, 1991
BIDIN, J.
Issue: Are periodic visits to gather coconuts sufficient to prove prior possession?
Held: Yes. It should be stressed that "possession is acquired by the material occupation of a
thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the
proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring such right." (Art. 531, Civil Code; Rizal Cement
Co., Inc. vs. Villareal, 135 SCRA 15 [1985]); and that the execution of a sale thru a public
instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the
contrary . . . . If, however, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot
have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of it herself, because such
tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by another, then delivery has not been effected.
SOMODIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 82680
August 15, 1994
Quiason, J.:
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner had prior possession of the subject property.
Held: Yes. Petitioner took possession of the property in 1974 when he planted various kinds of
tress on it. In 1976, he started the construction of a building on the property. It is immaterial that
the building was unfinished and that he left for Kidapawan and visited the property intermittently.
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession (Ramos v. Director of
Lands, 39 Phil. 175 [1918]). It is enough that petitioner was able to subject the property to the
action of his will.
Even if the Court of Appeals is correct in its finding that petitioner started introducing
improvements on the land only in 1981, he still had priority of possession because respondent
Purisima entered the premises only in 1983.
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MAGLUCOT-AW v. MAGLUCOT
G.R. No. 132518
March 28, 2000
KAPUNAN, J.:
Issue: Whether or not the respondents are estopped from questioning the title to partition.
Held: Yes. Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took
possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped from questioning the title to partition
allotted to another party. Here, respondents already occupied the lots in accordance with the
sketch plan. This occupation continued until this action was filed. They cannot now be heard to
question the possession and ownership of the other co-owners who took exclusive possession
of Lot 1639-D also in accordance with the sketch plan. The payment of rentals by respondents
reveal that they are mere lessees. As such, the possession of respondents over Lot No. 1639-D
is that of a holder and not in the concept of an owner. One who possesses as a mere holder
acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief
be right or wrong. Since the possession of respondents were found to be that of lessors of
petitioners, it goes without saying that the latter were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the
concept of an owner from 1952 up to the time the present action was commenced.
CEQUEÑA v. BOLANTE
G.R. No. 137944
April 6, 2000
Panganiban, J.
ISSUE:.Between petitioners and respondent, who is the preferred possessor/s under Article 538
of the Civil Code?
HELD: Respondent is the preferred possessor under Article 538 of the Civil Code. The Court
conceded that despite their dispossession in 1985, the petitioners did not lose legal possession
because possession cannot be acquired through force or violence. To all intents and purposes,
a possessor, even if physically ousted, is still deemed the legal possessor. Indeed, anyone who
can prove prior possession, regardless of its character, may recover such possession.
However, possession by the petitioners does not prevail over that of the respondent.
Possession by the former before 1985 was not exclusive, as the latter also acquired it before
1985. The records show that the petitioners' father and brother, as well as the respondent and
her mother were simultaneously in adverse possession of the land.
Before 1985, the subject land was occupied and cultivated by the respondent's father
(Sinforoso), who was the brother of petitioners' father (Margarito), as evidenced by Tax
Declaration No. 26425. When Sinforoso died in 1930, Margarito took possession of the land and
cultivated it with his son Miguel. At the same time, respondent and her mother continued
residing on the lot.
When respondent came of age in 1948, she paid realty taxes for the years 1932-1948.
Margarito declared the lot for taxation in his name in 1953 and paid its realty taxes beginning
1952. When he died, Miguel continued cultivating the land. As found by the CA, the respondent
and her mother were living on the land, which was being tilled by Miguel until 1985 when he was
physically ousted by the respondent.
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Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred possessor because,
benefiting from her father's tax declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she has been in
possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand, petitioners' father acquired joint
possession only in 1952.
Aragon v. Insular Government

G.R. No. 6019, 19 Phil. 223
March 25, 1911
CARSON, J.:
ISSUE: Whether or not applicant is entitled to possess the subject land.
HELD: The facts of the case conclusively establish the right of possession and ownership of the
applicants.
Article 446 of the Civil Code is as follows:
Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed
therein, he must be protected or possession must be restored to him by the means established
in the laws of procedure.
ART. 460. The possessor may lose his possession —
1. By the abandonment of the thing.
2. By transfer to another for a good or valuable consideration.
3. By the destruction or total loss of the thing or by the thing becoming unmarketable.
4. By the possession of another, even against the will of the former possessor, if the new
possession has lasted more than one year.
Under these provisions of the code it seems quite clear that if the Government is justified in
disturbing the possession of the applicants, it can only be on the ground that they have
abandoned their property, or that it has been totally destroyed and has now become a part of
the public domain by the erosive action of the sea. It is quite clear that applicants have never
abandoned their possession under a claim of ownership of this land.
Doubtless the property has been injured by the erosive action of the sea. Doubtless the owners
in order to profitably enjoy the possession of this property will be compelled to make some
relatively small expenditures by way of a "fill" or a retaining wall. But the actual condition of the
property as it appears from the record makes a claim that it has been totally lost or destroyed
preposterous and wholly untenable. We need hardly add that if the applicants have not lost their
right of possession, the Government's claim of ownership, on the ground that this is a part of the
playa (shore) of Manila Bay, necessarily falls to the ground.
Our ruling in this case is merely that it affirmatively appears that the owners of the land in
question have never in fact nor in intent abandoned it, and that keeping in mind its location and
actual condition it cannot be said to have been totally destroyed for the purposes for which it
was held by them, so as to have become a part of the playa(shore) of the Bay of Manila.
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CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC OF THE MOUNTAIN PROVINCE v. CA

G.R. No. 80294-95
September 21, 1988
GANCAYCO, J.:
Issue: Whether the petitioner has acquired the lots through acquisitive prescription
Held: No. Private respondents were able to prove that their predecessors' house was borrowed
by petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent were destroyed. They never asked for the
return of the house, but when they allowed its free use, they became bailors in commodatum
and the petitioner the bailee. The bailees' failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to
the bailor did not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust
the property subject matter of commodatum. The adverse claim of petitioner came only in 1951
when it declared the lots for taxation purposes. The action of petitioner Vicar by such adverse
claim could not ripen into title by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the
absence of just title.
EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP. vs. SANTOS

G.R. No. 80298
April 26, 1990
CRUZ, J.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner may seize the books from private respondents because it
has been unlawfully deprived of the books due to the dishonored check issued by the impostor.
HELD: NO. Ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the
purchase only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such ownership
shall pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing
sold even if the purchase price has not yet been paid. Non-payment only creates a right to
demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing
checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer
ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which
he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for
them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the
private respondents to the books. We cannot see the justice in transferring EDCA's loss to the
Santoses who had acted in good faith, and with proper care, when they bought the books from
Cruz.
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CONSUELO S. DE GARCIA and ANASTACIO GARCIA vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA D. GUEVARA and JUAN B. GUEVARA
G.R. No. L-20264
January 30,1971
Fernando, J.
Issue: Whether or not a person who have been unlawfully deprived of a movable may recover
the same from the person in possession of the same?
Held: YES. The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code. It reads thus: "The
possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one
who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the
person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has
been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain
its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor." Respondent Angelina D. Guevara, having
been unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in question, was entitled to recover it from
petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia who was found in possession of the same. The only exception
the law allows is when there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a public sale, in
which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price.
DOMINADOR DIZON v. LOURDES SUNTAY

G.R. No. L-30817
September 29, 1972
Fernando, J.
Issue: Whether or not Suntay has the right of possession over the diamond ring which was
pledged to Dizon’s pawnshop.
Held: Yes. The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code which provides in part that
one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the
person in possession of the same. Suntay having been unlawfully deprived of the ring in
question, is entitled to recover it from Dizon who was found in possession of the same. Neither
can Dizon’s defense of estoppels stand. Estoppel has its roots in equity with good faith as its
basis. How then can petitioner in all seriousness assert that his appeal finds support in the
doctrine of estoppels?
Neither the promptings of equity nor the mandates of moral right and natural justice come to his
rescue. He is engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence would manifest itself
to ascertain whether or not an individual who is offering jewelry by way of a pledge is entitled to
do so. If no such care be taken, perhaps because of the difficulty of resisting opportunity for
profit, he should be the last to complain if thereafter the right of the true owner of such jewelry
should be recognized.
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LEDESMA V COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 86051.
September 1, 1992
Davide Jr, J
ISSUE: Whether private respondent was unlawfully deprived of the cars when it sold the same
to Rustico Consunji, through a person who claimed to be Jojo Consunji, allegedly the latter’s
son, but who nevertheless turned out to be Armando Suarez, on the faith of a Manager’s Check
with a face value of P101,000.00, dishonored for being altered, the correct amount being only
P101.00.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
HELD: No. It is quite clear that a party who (a) has lost any movable or (b) has been unlawfully
deprived thereof can recover the same from the present possessor even if the latter acquired it
in good faith and has, therefore, title thereto for under the first sentence of Article 559, such
manner of acquisition is equivalent to a title. There are three (3) requisites to make possession
of movable property equivalent to title, namely: (a) the possession should be in good faith; (b)
the owner voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing; and (c) the possession is in the
concept of owner.
Undoubtedly, one who has lost a movable or who has been unlawfully deprived of it cannot be
said to have voluntarily parted with the possession thereof. This is the justification for the
exceptions found under the second sentence of Article 559 of the Civil Code.
There was a perfected unconditional contract of sale between private respondent and the
original vendee. The former voluntarily caused the transfer of the certificate of registration of the
vehicle in the name of the first vendee — even if the said vendee was represented by someone
who used a fictitious name — and likewise voluntarily delivered the cars and the certificate of
registration to the vendee’s alleged representative Title thereto was forthwith transferred to the
vendee. The subsequent dishonor of the check because of the alteration merely amounted to a
failure of consideration which does not render the contract of sale void, but merely allows the
prejudiced party to sue for specific performance or rescission of the contract, and to prosecute
the impostor for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.
It was therefore erroneous for the respondent Court to declare that the private respondent was
illegally deprived of the car simply because the check in payment therefor was subsequently
dishonored; said Court also erred when it divested the petitioner, a buyer in good faith who paid
valuable consideration therefor, of his possession thereof.
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DOCTRINES
AZARCON v. EUSEBIO
G.R. No. L-11977
April 29, 1959
LABRADOR, J.
Issue: Can the parties ousted in the property be entitled to the palay they planted?
Held: Yes. The evidence shows that in spite of the receipt by the defendants of the notice of the
writ of execution of October 3, 1955, which writ of execution commanded defendants "to
forthwith remove from said premises and that plaintiff have restitution of the same," defendants-
appellants nevertheless entered the land to gather palay which was then pending harvest. We
gather further from the record that the rice found on the disputed land at the time of the service
of the order of execution had been planted by defendants-appellants, who appear to have been
in possession of the land from 1951. While the court order of October 3, 1955 ordered the
defendant-appellant to move out from the premises, it did not prohibit them from gathering the
crop then existing thereon. Under the law a person who is in possession and who is being
ordered to leave a parcel of land while products thereon are pending harvest, has the right to a
part of the net harvest, as expressly provided by Article 545 of the Civil Code.
ART. 545. If at the time the good faith ceases, there should be any natural or industrial fruits,
the possessor shall have a right to a part of the expenses of cultivation, and to a part of the net
harvest, both in proportion to the time of the possession.
CORDERO v. CABRAL
G.R. No. L-36789
July 25, 1983
Abad Santos, J.
Issue: Whether or not respondents were possessors in bad faith and as such, are liable for the
fruits of the lot subject to the controversy.
Held: Yes. The controversy arose from the non-consummated transaction between the Gregorio
Ocampo, predecessor of plaintiffs and Antonio Rodriguez, predecessor of defendants. The
Court of Appeals held that the sale between the two have never materialized and Rodriguez'
occupation of the land was merely as a prospective owner and not adverse. Neither was it
continuous for 50 years since Ocampo was in possession of the same before Rodriguez came
to possession which was again merely with the consent and toleration of Ocampo. The disputed
land remains to be included in the transfer certificate title issued to Ocampo. And although the
defendants claimed in their answer that plaintiff's predecessor was only able to register the
same in his name through error or fraud, they made no claim of the alleged transaction between
their predecessors nor mentioned the name of Antonio Rodriguez.
Hence, the defendants, by their own admission, are in possession of the disputed land.
There is no evidence that they were possessors in bad faith. However, their good faith ceased
when they were served with summons to answer the complaint. Possession acquired in good
faith does not lose this character except in the case and from the moment facts exist which
show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.
(Art. 528, Civil Code.) As possessors in bad faith from the service of the summons they "shall
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DOCTRINES
reimburse the fruits received and those which the legitimate possessor could have received, ...
(Art. 549, Civil Code.)
Mendoza and Enriquez vs. De Guzman

G.R. No. 28721
October 5, 1928
MALCOLM, J.
ISSUE: Whether or not that in accordance with the provisions of articles 435 and 454 in relation
with article 361 of the Civil Code, the value of the "indemnization" to be paid to the defendant
should be fixed according to the necessary and useful expenses incurred by him in introducing
"las plantaciones en cuestion"?
HELD: Yes. Article 361 of the Civil Code in the original Spanish text uses the word
"indemnizacion." However one may speculate as to the true meaning of the term
"indemnizacion" whether correctly translated as "compensation" or "indemnity," the amount of
the "indemnizacion" is the amount of the expenditures mentioned in articles 453 and 454 of the
Civil Code, which in the present case is the amount of the necessary and useful expenditures
incurred by the defendant. Necessary expenses have been variously described by the Spanish
commentators as those made for the preservation of the thing (4 Manresa's Comentarios al
Codigo Civil, p. 258); as those without which the thing would deteriorate or be lost (Scaevola's
Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p.408); as those that augment the income of the things upon which
they are expanded (4 Manresa's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 261; 8 Scaevola's Comentarios
al Codigo Civil, p. 416). Among the necessary expenditures are those incurred for cultivation,
production, upkeep, etc. (4 Manresa's Comentarios al Codigo Civil, p. 257).
Here the plaintiffs have chosen to take the improvements introduced on the land and are
disposed to pay the amount of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by the defendant.
Inasmuch as the retentionist, who is not exactly a possessor in good faith within the meaning of
the law, seeks to be reimbursed for the necessary and useful expenditures, it is only just that he
should account to the owners of the estate for any rents, fruits, or crops he has gathered from it.
Robles and Martin vs. Lizzaraga Hermanos

G. R. No. L-16736
December 22, 1921
Romualdez, J:
Issue: Whether Evarista Robles is the owner of the aforesaid improvements and has the right to
demand payment of their value and whether she has any right to retain the building until the
said value is paid to her.
Held: Attention is called to article 453 of the Civil Code which reads:
Necessary expenditures shall be refunded to every possessor, but only the possessor in good
faith may retain the thing until they are repaid to him.
Useful expenditures shall be paid the possessor in good faith with the same right to retention,
the person who has defeated him in his possession having the opinion of refunding the amount
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DOCTRINES
of such expenditures or paying him the increase in value which the thing has acquired by
reason thereof.
This provision of law is in force and applies to personal as well as real property.wliThe
expenditures incurred in these improvements were not necessary inasmuch as without them the
house would have continued to stand just as before, but were useful, inasmuch as with them the
house better serves the purpose for which it was intended, being used as a residence, and the
improvements consisting of the addition of a dining room, kitchen, closet, and bathroom in the
lower and upper stories of the house, and a stable, suitable as a coach house and dwelling, it is
beyond doubt that such improvements are useful to the building.
Now then, was Evarista Robles a possessor in good faith when she made those improvements?
Article 434 provides that "good faith is always presumed and the burden of proving bad faith on
the part of the possessor rests upon the person alleging it." Lizarraga Hermanos did not allege,
nor prove in the first instance the bad faith characterizing Evarista Robles' possession, who, as
shown in the records and heretofore stated, began to occupy the house by permission of the
former owner, her mother Anastasia de la Rama, and continued later in the occupation by the
consent of her coheirs, and afterwards by considering herself the future owner of the building by
virtue of the contract with the present owner, Lizarraga Hermanos. The evidence shows that
said improvements were begun about the end of December, 1916, after the agreement with
Lizarraga Hermanos for the sale thereof to Evarista Robles.
We find that in the court below the presumption of good faith in favor of Evarista Robles'
possession at the time she made the improvements on the property was neither disputed nor
discussed, but on the contrary, there is positive evidence sufficient to support the conclusion
that when she made the improvements on the aforesaid building she was possessing it in good
faith.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
If the improvements are useful and Evarista Robles' possession was in good faith, the
conclusion set out in article 453 of the Civil Code, is inevitable; Evarista Robles is the owner of
such improvements, and entitled to reimbursement therefor, and to retain the building until the
same is made.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM v. THE COURT OF

APPEALS and THE CITY OF DAGUPAN
G.R. No. L-54526
August 25, 1986
FERIA, J.:
ISSUE: Does a possessor in bad faith have the right to remove useful improvements?
HELD: NO. Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that "he who builds, plants
or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to
indemnity." As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful improvements it had made
without right to indemnity.
Moreover, under Article 546 of said code, only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for
useful expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed; and under Article 547 thereof, only a
possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if this can be done without damage to
the principal thing and if the person who recovers the possession does not exercise the option
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DOCTRINES
of reimbursing the useful expenses. The right given a possessor in bad faith is to remove
improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided the thing
suffers no injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the
value they have at the time he enters into possession.
In Mindanao Academy, Inc. vs. Yap (13 SCRA 190), the Court ruled that "if the defendant
constructed a new building, as he alleges, he cannot recover its value because the construction
was done after the filing of the action for annulment, thus rendering him a builder in bad faith
who is denied by law any right of reimbursement."
4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 52

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW 1 CASE

Issue: Is Ladera’s house an immovable property?

So that movable equipment to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 1

MAKATI LEASING & FINANCE CORP. v. WEAREVER TEXTILES

Issue: Whether the machinery in suit is real or personal property.

SANTOS EVANGELISTA v. ALTO SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC.

TSAI v. COURT OF APPEALS

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 2

SERG’S PRODUCTS, INC. vs. PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC.

BURGOS v. CHIEF OF STAFF

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 3

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 4

MACHINERY & ENGINEERING SUPPLIES, INC. vs. CA

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 5

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act 3120 is constitutional.

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 6

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 7

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B.

The Province of Zamboanga Del Norte VS. City of Zamboanga

HELD: The Law on Municipal Corporation should be followed.

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 8

CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 9

presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 10

2. What are the effects if a property is of public dominion?

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 11

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 12

Issue: Can petitioners be ejected from their own land?

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 13

GARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Issue: Whether Garcia’s possession is in a concept of an owner?

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 14

RODIL ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 15

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 16

ABEJARON vs. NABASA

Held: No. Sec. 4 of PD 1073 reads:

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 17

GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC v. CA

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 18

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 19

ISSUE: Whether or not Pletcha can properly invoked Article 429.

Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 20

Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

Issue: Whether or not the bonus in question is civil fruits?

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 21

EQUATORIAL REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC. v. MAYFAIR THEATER, INC.

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 22

We hold, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-petitioners to

IGNAO V. COURT OF APPEALS

“An undivided estate is co-ownership by the heirs."

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 23

FILIPINAS COLLEGES, INC., vs. MARIA GARCIA TIMBANG, ET AL.

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 24

Manotok Realty Inc. vs. Tecson

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 25

BERNARDO VS. BATACLAN

4C (S.Y. 2014-2015) Page 26

HEIRS OF RAMON DURANO v. UY

(2) to demand that the builder remove what he had built, or