48. UMIL VS.
RAMOS Same; Same; Same; Same; Rationale behind lawful arrests without warrant
VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 311
Umil vs. Ramos
G.R. No. 81567. July 9, 1990.*
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL,
ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA O. UMIL, and
NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners, vs. FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82. July 9, 1990.*
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners, vs. GEN. RENATO DE
VILLA and GEN. RAMON MONTANO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84. July 9, 1990.*
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO
T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON
CASIPLE, petitioners, vs. HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL.
EVARISTO CARINO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT.
ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame,
Quezon City, respondents.
G.R. No. 83162. July 9, 1990.*
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A.
OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA. VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioner, vs. BRIG. GEN.
ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 85727. July 9, 1990.*
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
_______________
* EN BANC.
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312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
OF: DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner, vs. BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. LIM, COL.
RICARDO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332. July 9, 1990.*
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B.
NAZARENO. ALFREDO NAZARENO, petitioner, vs. THE STATION COMMANDER
OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT.
JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT.
MAURO AROJADO, respondents.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Arrest of a person without a
warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law.—The arrest of a person
without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law. The occasions
or instances when such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Same; Arrest without a warrant is justified when the person
arrested is caught in flagranti delicto.—An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under
Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is
justified when the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of
committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed and the person
making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person
arrested has committed it.
stated in the case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui.—The rationale behind lawful arrests,
without warrant, was stated by this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui
thus: “To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the
evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large
extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of
criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioners had freshly committed or were actually
committing an offense when apprehended so that their arrests without a warrant
were clearly justified.—The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in
whose behalf these
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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 313
Umil vs. Ramos
petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were
actually committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests without a
warrant were clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of valid
informations filed against them in court.
Criminal Law; Habeas Corpus; Subversion; The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults
against the State are in the nature of continuing crimes.—However, Rolando Dural
was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed
subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando
Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense
when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection
therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing
crimes.
Same; Same; If a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody
of an officer under process issued by a court or judge and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order or if such person is charged before
any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.—It is to be noted that, in all
the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts
against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his liberty
is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, and that the
court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if such person
is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed.
Same; Same; No compelling reason to abandon the doctrine laid down in the
case of Ilagan vs. Enrile; As the court stated in Morales Jr. vs. Enrile, in all petitions
for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner’s
detention.—We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is
based upon express provision of the Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the
law. The fears expressed by the petitioners are not really unremediable. As the Court
sees it, re-examination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan
case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the better practice would be, not to
limit the function of habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or not the court
which issued the process, judgment or order or of commitment or
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314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
Page 1 of 12
 before whom the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the
process, judgment or order or to take cognizance of the case, but rather, as the Court
itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, “in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must
inquire into every phase and aspect of petitioner’s detention—from the moment
petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the merits
of the petition:” and “only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due
process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied.” This is exactly what the
Court has done in the petitions at bar. This is what should henceforth be done in all
future cases of habeas corpus. In short, all cases involving deprivation of individual
liberty should be promptly brought to the courts for their immediate scrutiny and
disposition.
CRUZ, J., Dissenting:
Fact that subversion is a continuing offense to justify the arrest without warrant of any
person at any time as long as the authorities say he has been placed under surveillance
on suspicion of the offense is a dangerous doctrine.
FELICIANO, J., Concurring:
There is no obstacle to a careful examination of the doctrine of continuing crimes as
applied to such offenses as subversion and inciting to sedition and possibly other
offenses in some future case where that issue is raised squarely and is unavoidable.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting:
Warrantless arrest may be exercised only in the most urgent cases and when the guilt
of an offender is plain and evident.
CORTÉS, J., Concurring:
I join Mr. Justice Feliciano in his separate concurring statement.
PETITIONS for Habeas Corpus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82.
Ramon S. Esguerra, Barbara Anne C. Migallos and Agripino G. Morga for
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 315
Umil vs. Ramos
Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No. 83162.
Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Associates for petitioner
in G.R. No. 85727.
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. No. 86332.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
PER CURIAM:
These are eight (8) petitions for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which have been
consolidated because of the similarity of issues raised, praying for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus, ordering the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the
persons named therein and to explain why they should not be set at liberty without
further delay.
In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners as they have been legally
arrested and are detained by virtue of valid informationsfiled in court against them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were
made without warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, so
that the informations filed against them are null and void.
The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their respective
pleadings, and it finds that the persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor
arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances
attending these cases do not warrant their release on habeas corpus.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is
recognized in law. The occasions or instances when such an arrest may be effected are
clearly spelled out in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which
provides:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
1. (a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
2. (b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
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316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
1. personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
2. (c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.”
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule
113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught
in flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has
just been committed and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the
facts indicating that the person arrested has committed it. The rationale behind lawful
arrests, without warrant, was stated by this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui
Malasugui 1 thus:
“To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence
and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent,
at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals,
facilitating their escape in many instances.”
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these
petitions for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were actually
committing an offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were
clearly justified, and that they are, further, detained by virtue of valid informations filed
against them in court.
A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight (8) petitions
is in order.
_______________
1 63 Phil. 221.
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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 317
Umil vs. Ramos
I
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1 February 1988, the
Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM)
received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit
(liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in
Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that the wounded
Page 2 of 12
person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando
Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of two (2)
CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the
Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined
thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Rolando Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses
as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and
fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos
Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the
Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Caloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie
Javelon with the crime of “Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in
Authority.” The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no bail
was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the information was amended to include, as
defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information, was still
unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this
Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court
issued the writ of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and the respondents filed a Return
of the Writ on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February
1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-
Subversion Act had
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318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
been filed against them, and they were accordingly released. The petition for habeas
corpus, insofar as Umil and Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and academic and
is accordingly dismissed, since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of an
accused in a criminal case who has been released on bail.2
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of
shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after
the commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting
incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army
(NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense,
the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy
or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are
in the nature of continuing crimes. As stated by the Court in an earlier case:
“From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they were initially
arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact. The crimes of
insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes,
and other crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof,
or incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No.
2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the
common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of
nationwide magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within
the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more
an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than
for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The
_______________
2 Zacarias vs. Cruz, G.R. No. L-25899, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 728.
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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 319
Umil vs. Ramos
arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses
which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before
the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is
bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government
forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement.
The arrest or capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves
the very survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If
killing and other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies
of armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or insurrection, most
assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their persons and detaining them while
any of these contingencies continues cannot be ess justified. x x x”3
The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against Rolando Dural and
Bernardo Itucal, Jr. for “Double Murder, etc.” was tried in the court below and at the
conclusion thereof, or on 17 August 1988, Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were
found guilty of the charge and sentenced accordingly. Rolando Dural is now serving the
sentence imposed upon him by the trial court. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no
longer available to him. For, as held in the early case of U.S. vs. Wilson:4
“In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact remains that
the defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law on March 29, when a
complaint sufficient in form and substance was read to him. To this he pleaded not
guilty. The trial followed, in which, and in the judgment of guilty pronounced by the
court, we find no error. Whether, if there were irregularities in bringing him personally
before the court, he could have been released on a writ of habeas corpus or now has a
civil action for damages against the person who arrested him we need not inquire. It is
enough to say that such irregularities are not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.”
_______________
3 Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, G.R. No. 61388, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 472, 488-489.
4 4 Phil. 317, 325.
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320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
II
In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo
Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified. When apprehended at the house of
Renato Constantino in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo
Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato
Constantino and other members of the rebel group. Amelia Roque, upon the other
hand, was a member of the National United Front Commission, in charge of finance,
and admitted ownership of subversive documents found in the house of her sister in
Caloocan City. She was also in possession of ammunition and a fragmentation grenade
for which she had no permit or authority to possess.
Page 3 of 12
 The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one Rogelio Ramos
y Ibanes, a member of the NPA, who had surrendered to the military authorities, told
military agents about the operations of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
and the New Peoples Army (NPA) in Metro Manila. He identified some of his former
comrades as “Ka Mong”, a staff member of the Communications and Transportation
Bureau; “Ka Nelia”, a staff member in charge of finance; “Ka Miller”, an NPA courier
from Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; “Ka Ted”, and “Ka Totoy”. He also pointed to a
certain house occupied by Renato Constantino located in the Villaluz Compound,
Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, which is used as a safehouse of
the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.
In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed under military
surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant issued by Judge
Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the house was
conducted at about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, by a combined team of the Criminal
Investigation Service, National Capital District (CIS-NCD) and the Constabulary
Security Group (CSG). In the course of the search, the following articles were found and
taken under proper receipt:
1. a)One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;
2. b)One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8 SN: 260577 & 2605778;
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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 321
Umil vs. Ramos
1. c)Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;
2. d)Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56mm;
3. e)Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;
4. f)One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever SN: 14903
5. g)One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;
6. h)One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
7. i)One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;
8. j)Voluminous Subversive documents.
When confronted, Renato Constantino could not produce any permit or authority to
possess the firearms, ammunition, radio and other communications equipment. Hence,
he was brought to the CIS Headquarters for investigation. When questioned, he refused
to give a written statement, although he admitted that he was a staff member of the
executive committee of the NUFC and a ranking member of the International
Department of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).
At about 8:00 o’clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988), Wilfredo
Buenaobra arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the Villaluz Compound. When
accosted, he readily admitted to the military agents that he is a regular member of the
CPP/NPA and that he went to the place to deliver letters to “Ka Mong”, referring to
Renato Constantino, and other members of the rebel group. On further questioning, he
also admitted that he is known as “Ka Miller” and that he was from Barangay San Pedro,
Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken from him were the following:
1. (1)Handwritten letter addressed to “Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co.” dated August
11, 1988;
2. (2)Handwritten letter addressed to “ROD from VIC (Schell datre)” dated
August 11, 1988;
3. (3)Handwritten letter addressed to “Suzie” from “Vic”, dated August 11, 1988.
Also found in Buenaobra’s possession was a piece of paper containing a written but
jumbled telephone number of Florida M. Roque, sister of Amelia Roque alias “Ka
Nelia”, at 69 Geronimo St., Caloocan City. Acting on the lead provided as to the
whereabouts of Amelia Roque, the military agents went to the given address the next
day (13 August 1988). They arrived at
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322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
the place at about 11:00 o’clock in the morning. After identifying themselves as military
agents and after seeking permission to search the place, which was granted, the military
agents conducted a search in the presence of the occupants of the house and the
barangay captain of the place, one Jesus D. Olba.
The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/CPP.
They found ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank deposit books, folders, computer
diskettes, and subversive documents as well as live ammunition for a .38 SPL
Winchester, 11 rounds of live ammunition for a cal. .45, 19 rounds of live ammunition
for an M16 Rifle, and a fragmentation grenade. As a result, Amelia Roque and the other
occupants of the house were brought to the PC-CIS Headquarters at Camp Crame,
Quezon City, for investigation. Amelia Roque admitted to the investigators that the
voluminous documents belonged to her and that the other occupants of the house had
no knowledge of them. As a result, the said other occupants of the house were released
from custody.
On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for
inquest after which an information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The case is docketed therein as Criminal
Case No. C-1196. Another information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed
against Amelia Roque before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, which is
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-150458.
An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Wilfredo
Buenaobra before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 23715. Bail was set at P4,000.00.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court on
behalf of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At the hearing of the case, however,
Wilfredo Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP Stockade at Camp
Crame, Quezon City. Accordingly, the petition for habeas corpus filed on his behalf is
now moot and academic. Only the petition of Amelia Roque remains for resolution.
The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and Buenaobra are officers
and/or members of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not
controverted or
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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 323
Umil vs. Ramos
traversed by said petitioners. The contention must be deemed admitted.5 As officers
and/or members of the NUFC-CPP, their arrest, without warrant, was justified for the
same reasons earlier stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant of
Roque was additionally justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in possession
of ammunitions without license to possess them.
III
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, without warrant, is also justified under the rules. Both
are admittedly members of the standing committee of the NUFC and, when
apprehended in the house of Renato Constantino, they had a bag containing subversive
materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition for which they had no license to
possess or carry.
Page 4 of 12
 The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o’clock in the evening of
13 August 1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of
Renato Constantino at Marikina Heights, Marikina, which was still under surveillance
by military agents. The military agents noticed bulging objects on their waist lines.
When frisked, the agents found them to be loaded guns. Anonuevo and Casiple were
asked to show their permit or license to possess or carry firearms and ammunition, but
they could not produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC Headquarters for
investigation. Found in their possession were the following articles:
1. a)Voluminous subversive documents
2. b)One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1) magazine for
Cal. 7.65 containing ten (10) live ammunition of same caliber;
3. c)One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit tampered with one (1)
magazine containing five (5) live ammunition of same caliber.
At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as “Ka
_______________
5 Lorenzo vs. Mc Coy, 15 Phil. 559.
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324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
Ted”, and Ramon Casiple as “Ka Totoy” of the CPP, by their comrades who had
previously surrendered to the military.
On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other documentary evidence
were forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal at Pasig, Metro Manila, who conducted an
inquest, after which Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were charged with
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Metro Manila. The cases are docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 74386 and 74387,
respectively. No bail was recommended.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf
of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said Anonuevo and Casiple
were unlawfully arrested without a warrant and that the informations filed against
them are null and void for having been filed without prior hearing and preliminary
investigation. On 30 August 1988, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, and after
the respondents had filed a Return of the Writ, the parties were heard.
The petitioners’ (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully arrested
because there was no previous warrant of arrest, is without merit. The record shows
that Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were carrying unlicensed firearms and
ammunition in their person when they were apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed against them are
null and void for want of a preliminary investigation. The filing of an information,
without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, is sanctioned by the
Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:
“Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant.—When a person is
lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial
Court the complaint or information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or
fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of
the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested
may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule,
but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, with
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Umil vs. Ramos
the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible
person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided in
the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15)
days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been
first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the
filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to
adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule.”
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however, refused to sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In the
informations filed against them, the prosecutor made identical certifications, as
follows:
“This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 112
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, that no preliminary investigation was
conducted because the accused has not made and signed a waiver of the provisions of
Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; that based on the evidence presented,
there is reasonable ground to believe that the crime has been committed, and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof.”
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the informations had been
filed against them in court. Petitioners cannot now claim that they have been deprived
of their constitutional right to due process.
IV
In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya is
justified under the Rules, since she had with her unlicensed ammunition when she was
arrested. The record of this case shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the PC
Intelligence and Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a search
warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro
Manila, conducted a search of a house located at Block 19, Phase II, Marikina Green
Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to be occupied by Benito Tiamson, head of
the CPP-NPA. In the
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326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
course of the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive
documents and several rounds of ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car
of Vicky Ocaya. As a result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought to the PC
Headquarters for investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could not produce any permit or
authorization to possess the ammunition, an information charging her with violation
of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The case is
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny Rivera, on the other hand, was
released from custody.
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this Court on behalf of
Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera. It was alleged therein that Vicky Ocaya was illegally
arrested and detained, and denied the right to a preliminary investigation.
It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in flagranti delicto so that
her arrest without a warrant is justified. No preliminary investigation was conducted
because she was arrested without a warrant and she refused to waive the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
as amended.
V
Page 5 of 12
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Amelia Roque
claim that the firearms, ammunition and subversive documents alleged to have been
found in their possession when they were arrested, did not belong to them, but were
“planted” by the military agents to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their
aforesaid claim. On the other hand, no evil motive or ill-will on the part of the arresting
officers that would cause the said arresting officers in these cases to accuse the
petitioners falsely, has been shown. Besides, the arresting officers in these cases do not
appear to be seekers of glory and bounty hunters for, as counsel for the petitioners
Anonuevo and Casiple say, “there is absolutely nothing in the evidence submitted
during the inquest that petitioners are on the ‘AFP Order of
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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 327
Umil vs. Ramos
Battle with a reward of P150,000.00 each on their heads.’ ”6On the other hand, as
pointed out by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a
witch hunt or a fishing expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA
safehouses pointed to by no less than former comrades of the petitioners in the rebel
movement.
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly observes:
“x x x. To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque, Buenaobra,
Anonuevo and Casiple, was the lawful search and seizure conducted by the military at
the residence of Renato Constantino at Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina
Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila. The raid at Constantino’s residence, was not a witch
hunting or fishing expedition on the part of the military. It was a result of an in-depth
military surveillance coupled with the leads provided by former members of the
underground subversive organizations. That raid produced positive results. To date,
nobody has disputed the fact that the residence of Constantino when raided yielded
communication equipment, firearms and ammunitions, as well as subversive
documents.
The military agents working on the information provided by Constantino that other
members of his group were coming to his place, reasonably conducted a ‘stake-out’
operation whereby some members of the raiding team were left behind the place. True
enough, barely two hours after the raid and Constantino’s arrest, petitioner Buenaobra
arrived at Constantino’s residence. He acted suspiciously and when frisked and
searched by the military authorities, found in his person were letters. They are no
ordinary letters, as even a cursory reading would show. Not only that, Buenaobra
admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there to deliver the letters to Constantino.
Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of Constantino and
Buenaobra, petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple arrived at Constantino’s place. Would it
be unreasonable for the military agents to believe that petitioners Anonuevo and
Casiple are among those expected to visit Constantino’s residence considering that
Constantino’s information was true, in that Buenaobra did come to that place? Was it
unreasonable under the circumstances, on the part of the military agents, not to frisk
and search anyone who should visit the residence of Constantino, such as petitioners
Anonuevo and Ca-
_______________
6 Rollo of G.R. Nos. 84583-84, p. 105.
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328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
siple? Must this Honorable Court yield to Anonuevo and Casiple’s flimsy and bare
assertion that they went to visit Constantino, who was to leave for Saudi Arabia on the
day they were arrested thereat?
As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military authorities to effect her
arrest without warrant considering that it was Buenaobra who provided the leads on
her identity? It cannot be denied that Buenaobra had connection with Roque. Because
the former has the phone number of the latter. Why the necessity of jumbling Roque’s
telephone number as written on a piece of paper taken from Buenaobra’s possession?
Petitioners Roque and Buenaobra have not offered any plausible reason so far.
In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted reasonably, under
the time, place and circumstances of the events in question, especially considering that
at the time of petitioners’ arrest, incriminatory evidence, i.e, firearms, ammunitions
and/or subversive documents were found in their possession.
Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor innocently visiting
a camp, but were arrested in such time, place and circumstances, from which one can
reasonably conclude that they were up to a sinister plot, involving utmost secrecy and
comprehensive conspiracy.”
VI
In G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the petitioner
Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of an Information for Violation of Article
142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, is similarly not warranted.
The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General Secretary of the
Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an
association of drivers and operators of public service vehicles in the Philippines,
organized for their mutual aid and protection.
Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of 23 November 1988,
while he was sleeping in his home located at 363 Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was
awakened by his sister Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a group of persons wanted to
hire his jeepney. When he went down to talk to them, he was immediately put under
arrest. When he asked for the warrant of arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes,
bodily lifted him and placed him in their owner-type jeepney.
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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 329
Umil vs. Ramos
He demanded that his sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to accompany him, but the
men did not accede to his request and hurriedly sped away.
He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at Blumentritt,
Manila where he was interrogated and detained. Then, at about 9:00 o’clock of the same
morning, he was brought before the respondent Lim and, there and then, the said
respondent ordered his arrest and detention. He was thereafter brought to the General
Assignment Section, Investigation Division of the Western Police District under Police
Capt. Cresenciano A. Cabasal where he was detained, restrained and deprived of his
liberty.7
The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is justified in
view of the Information filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 88-683-85, charging him with violation of Art.
142 of the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a
judicial warrant of arrest since petitioner when arrested had in fact just committed an
offense in that in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, during a press conference at the
National Press Club.
Page 6 of 12
“Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and operators to
go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to force the government to give in to
their demands to lower the prices of spare parts, commodities, water and the immediate
release from detention of the president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang Samahan ng Tsuper
Operators Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of
PISTON president Medardo Roda and also announced the formation of the Alliance
Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988.”8
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Press Club in order to investigate
him, but he gave the lawmen the slip.9 He was next seen at about 5:00 o’clock that
afternoon at a
_______________
7 Petition, Nos. 4 to 8, inclusive.
8 Return of Writ.
9 Exhibit 2.
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330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
gathering of drivers and symphatizers at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia
Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard to say:
“Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at hindi tayo
titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto nating pagbaba ng
halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at ang pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na si Ka
Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na. ”10 (emphasis supplied)
The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was invited
for questioning and brought to police headquarters after which an Information for
violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against him before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila.11
Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that the petitioner is detained
by virtue of a valid information filed with the competent court, he may not be released
on habeas corpus. He may, however be released upon posting bail as recommended.
However, we find the amount of the recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we
reduce it to P10,000.00 only.
VII
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no merit in the
submission of Narciso Nazarenothat he was illegally arrested and is unlawfully
detained. The record of this case shows that at about 8:30 o’clock in the morning of 14
December 1988, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men near the corner of
T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of the
suspects in the killing was Ramil Regala who was arrested by the police on 28 December
1988. Upon questioning, Regala pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions
in the killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the police officers, without
_______________
10 Exhibit 1.
11 Exhibit 4.
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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 331
Umil vs. Ramos
warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the police headquarters for
questioning. Obviously, the evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong because on 3 January
1989, an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2) others,
with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the motion
was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to
post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same
trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf
of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas
corpus, returnable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna,
Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter
resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for
habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the
respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Metro Manila which had taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact,
denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno (presumably because of the
strength of the evidence against him).
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna
are based upon the facts and the law. Consequently, we will not disturb the same.
Evidently, the arrest of Nazareno was effected by the police without warrant pursuant
to Sec. 5 (b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after he was positively implicated by his co-
accused Ramil Regala in the killing of Romulo Bunye II; and after investigation by the
police authorities. As held in People vs. Ancheta: 12
“The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a crime, does
not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the
_______________
12 68 Phil. 415.
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332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
fulfillment thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be
perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making the arrest
has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act having the
characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to believe that the person
sought to be detained participated therein.”
VIII
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been
filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the
order, or if such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not
be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing
that:
“Sec. 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and
that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ
is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in
the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
Page 7 of 12
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.” (emphasis supplied)
At this point, we refer to petitioners’ plea for the Court to reexamine and, thereafter,
abandon its pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 13 that a writ of habeas corpus is no
longer available after an information is filed against the person detained and a warrant
of arrest or an order of commitment is issued by the court where said information has
been filed.14 The petitioners
_______________
13 G.R. No. 70748, Oct. 21, 1985, 139 SCRA 349.
14 Actually, the requirement in the Ilagan case doctrine that a
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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 333
Umil vs. Ramos
claim that the said ruling, which was handed down during the past dictatorial regime
to enforce and strengthen said regime, has no place under the present democratic
dispensation and collides with the basic, fundamental, and constitutional rights of the
people. Petitioners point out that the said doctrine makes possible the arrest and
detention of innocent persons despite lack of evidence against them, and, most often,
it is only after a petition for habeas corpus is filed before the court that the military
authorities file the criminal information in the courts of law to be able to hide behind
the protective mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners assert, stands as an obstacle
to the freedom and liberty of the people and permits lawless and arbitrary State action.
We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is based
upon express provision of the Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the law. The
fears expressed by the petitioners are not really unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-
examination or reappraisal, with a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine
is not the answer. The answer and the better practice would be, not to limit the function
of habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to whether or not the court which issued the
process, judgment or order of commitment or before whom the detained person is
charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process, judgment or order or to take
cognizance of the case, but rather, as the Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs.
Enrile, 15 “in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and
aspect of petitioner’s detention—from the moment petitioner was taken into custody
up to the moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition;” and “only after
such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our
Constitution has in fact
_______________
warrant of arrest or order of commitment should be issued even after the
information has been filed against the detained person, would seem superfluous. As
aptly stated in the early case of U.S. vs. Wilson, 4 Phil. 381, “where a person who has
been legally arrested without a warrant was actually before a court, that court had a
right to proceed against him without in the first place issuing a warrant for his
detention.”
15 G.R. Nos. 61016 and 61107, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538, 563.
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334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
been satisfied.” This is exactly what the Court has done in the petitions at bar. This is
what should henceforth be done in all future cases of habeas corpus. In short, all cases
involving deprivation of individual liberty should be promptly brought to the courts for
their immediate scrutiny and disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727
(Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner’s provisional liberty is hereby ordered
reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez,
Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado,
JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., See separate opinion.
Feliciano, J., See separate concurring statement.
Sarmiento, J., I dissent. See dissenting opinion.
Cortés, J., I join Mr. Justice Feliciano in his separate concurring statement.
CRUZ, J., Dissenting and Concurring:
I dissent insofar as the ponencia affirms the ruling in Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile that
subversion is a continuing offense, to justify the arrest without warrant of any person
at any time as long as the authorities say he has been placed under surveillance on
suspicion of the offense. That is a dangerous doctrine. A person may be arrested when
he is doing the most innocent acts, as when he is only washing his hands, or taking his
supper, or even when he is sleeping, on the ground that he is committing the
“continuing” offense of subversion. Libertarians were appalled when that doctrine was
imposed during the Marcos regime. I am alarmed that even now this new Court is
willing to sustain it. I strongly urge my colleagues to discard it altogether as one of the
disgraceful vestiges of the past dictatorship and uphold the rule guaranteeing the right
of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures. We can do no less if we are
really to reject the past oppression and commit ourselves to the true freedom. Even if
it be argued that the military
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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 335
Umil vs. Ramos
should be given every support in our fight against subversion, I maintain that that fight
must be waged honorably, in accordance with the Bill of Rights. I do not believe that in
fighting the enemy we must adopt the ways of the enemy, which are precisely what we
are fighting against. I submit that our more important motivation should be what are
we fighting for.
Except for this reservation and appeal, I concur with the decision.
FELICIANO, J., Concurring
I concur in the result reached in each of the eight (8) consolidated Petitions for Habeas
Corpus. At the same time, I have some reservations concerning certain statements
made by the Court in G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. Ramos) (Part I of the Decision) and
in G.R. No. 85727(Espiritu v. Lim) (Part VI of the Decision).
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v. Ramos), the per curiamopinion states
categorically that: “the crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to
commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature
of continuing crimes.” The majority here relies upon Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile (121
SCRA 472 [1983]). The majority there made the same equally broad statement but
without any visible effort to examine the basis, scope and meaning of such a sweeping
statement. Garcia-Padilla did not even identify the specific offenses which it regarded
as “in the nature of continuing offenses which set them apart from the common
offenses” (121 SCRA at 489). It appears to me that in G.R. No. 85727(Espiritu v. Lim)
(Part VI of the Decision), the per curiamopinion has in effect included the offense of
“inciting to sedition” penalized under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code as a
“continuing offense” under the capacious blanket of the majority opinion in Garcia-
Page 8 of 12
Padilla, at least for purposes of determining the legality of the arrest without a warrant
of petitioner Deogracias Espiritu.
I would respectfully recall to my learned colleagues in the Court that “inciting to
sedition” is defined in Article 142 of the
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336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
Revised Penal Code in terms of speech1 and that consequently it is important constantly
to distinguish between speech which is protected by the constitutional guaranty of
freedom of speech and of the press and speech which may constitutionally be regarded
as violative of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. Precisely because speech which
the police authorities might regard as seditious or as criminal inciting to sedition may
well turn out to be only an exercise of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom, I would
submit that we must apply the concept of “continuing offense” narrowly for purposes
of application of Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court. In my view, the
very broad statement made about “continuing crimes” in G.R. No. 81567 (Umil, et al. v.
Ramos) constitutes dictum, considering that Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr.
had already been tried in the court below for “double murder, etc.” and found guilty of
the offense charged, sentenced accordingly, and at least in the case of Rolando Dural,
service of the sentence imposed upon him by the trial court had already begun.
Similarly, in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu v. Lim) the statement that the arrest of
petitioner Espiritu without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of Section
5 (b), Rule 113 of the
_______________
1 Article 142. Inciting to sedition.—The penalty of prision correccionalin its
maximum period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, without taking any direct part in the crime of sedition, should incite others
to the accomplishment of any of the acts which constitute sedition, by means of
speeches, proclamations, writings, emblems cartoons, banners, or other representa
tions tending to the same end, or upon any person or persons who shall utter
seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, or any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof, or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing
the functions of his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together
for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or
which lead or tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the
peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who shall
knowingly conceal such evil practices. (As amended by Com. Act No. 202).
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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 337
Umil vs. Ramos
Revised Rules of Court does not appear strictly necessary, considering that the
petitioner had already been charged in a valid information filed with the competent
court, which court had presumably issued an order for his commitment, and
considering further that he is entitled to bail.
There is thus no obstacle, to my mind, to a careful examination of the doctrine of
“continuing crimes” as applied to such offenses as subversion and inciting to sedition
and possibly other offenses, in some future case where that issue is raised squarely and
is unavoidable.
SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting Opinion
I beg to differ from my brethren. I submit that habeas corpus lies in all eight cases.
G.R. No. 81567
The majority says that Rolando Dural’s arrest without a warrant is lawful under the
Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
1. (a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
2. (b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
3. (c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.1
“Rolando Dural,” so states the majority, “was arrested for being a member of the New
People’s Army (NPA), an outlawed
_______________
1 RULES OF COURT, Rule 113, sec. 5.
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338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
subversive organization,”2 and that “[s]ubversion being a continuing offense, the arrest
of Rolando Dural without a warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing
an offense when arrested.”3
As I said, I beg to differ.
First, Rolando Dural was charged with “Double Murder with Assault upon Agents
of Authority.”4 If he had been guilty of subversion—the offense for which he was
supposedly arrested via a warrantless arrest—subversion was the logical crime with
which he should have been charged.
The authorities could not have rightly arrested him for subversion on account of
the slay of the two CAPCOM soldiers, a possible basis for violation of the Anti-
Subversion Act, because as the majority points out, “he was not arrested while in the
act of shooting [them]. . .[n]or was he arrested just after the commission of the said
offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident.”5
Second, I do not believe that a warrantless (or citizen’s) arrest is possible in case of
subversion—in the absence of any overt act that would justify the authorities to act.
“Subversion,” as the term is known in law, means “knowingly, wilfully and by overt
acts affiliat[ing] [oneself] with, becom[ing] or remain[ing] a member of the Communist
Party of the Philippines and/or its successor or of any subversive association as defined
in sections two and three hereof. . .”6 Logically, the military could not have known that
Dural, at the time he was taken, was a member of the New People’s Army because he
was not performing any overt act that he was truly, a rebel. Indeed, it had to take a
“verification”6 before he could be identified as allegedly a member of the underground
army. Under these circumstances, I am hard put to say that he was committing
subversion when he was arrested, assuming that he was guilty of subversion, for
purposes of a warrantless arrest.
_______________
2 Decision, 7.
3 Supra; emphasis in the original.
4 Supra, 6.
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 5 Supra, 6; emphasis in the original.
6 Exec. Order No. 276, sec. 3; emphasis ours.
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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 339
Umil vs. Ramos
“Overt act” is made up of “[e]very act, movement, deed and word of the
[accused],”7 indicating intent to accomplish a criminal objective. Dural, at the time he
was arrested, was lying in a hospital bed. This is not the overt act contemplated by law.
Under the Rule above-quoted, the person must have either been apprehended in
flagranti (first paragraph) or after the act, provided that the peace officer has “personal
knowledge” that he, the suspect, is guilty. (second paragraph.) As I stated, Dural was
not caught in the act. Moreover, what the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the
Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) had in its hands was a mere “confidential
information.” I do not think that this is the personal knowledge referred to by the
second paragraph.8 Plainly and simply, it is hearsay.
The rule, furthermore, on warrantless arrest is an exceptional one. By its language,
it may be exercised only in the most urgent cases and when the guilt of an offender is
plain and evident. What I think we have here is purely and simply, the military taking
the law in its hands.
By stamping validity to Rolando Dural’s warrantless arrest, I am afraid that the
majority has set a very dangerous precedent. With all due respect, my brethren has
accorded the military a blanket authority to pick up any Juan, Pedro, and Maria without
a warrant for the simple reason that subversion is supposed to be a continuing offense.
That Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New People’s Army” 9 is
furthermore to me, a hasty statement. It has yet to be established that Dural is indeed
a member of the Communist Party’s military arm. And unless proven guilty, he is
presumed, and must be presumed most of all by this Court, to be innocent.
The majority also says that habeas corpus is moot and academic because Dural has
been convicted and is serving sen-
_______________
7 Cramer v. U.S., 325 U.S. 1, 34 (1944), a treason case.
8 Prior to its amendment, paragraph (b) required merely “reasonable ground” to
justify a warrantless arrest. See RULES OF COURT (1964), Rule 113, sec. 6, par. (b).
The amendment was made to stop warrantless arrests based on suspicion and hearsay.
See FERIA, 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 20 (1987).
9 Decision, supra, 7.
340
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
tence. I likewise take exception. It has been held that: “The writ may be granted upon a
judgment already final.”10
The writ of liberty is a high prerogative writ.11Vindication of due process is its
historic office.12
G.R. Nos. 84581-82
In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, the majority avers that he had “manifested his desire
to stay in the PC-INP stockade,”13 for which habeas corpus has supposedly become
moot and academic. I am not convinced that that is reason enough to dismiss habeas
corpus as moot and academic. It is the duty of this Court, in my opinion, to make sure
that Buenaobra has made his choice freely and voluntarily. Personally, I find it indeed
strange why he should prefer to stay in jail than go scotfree.
There is further no doubt that Buenaobra’s petition is one impressed with a public
interest. In one case14 we denied a motion to withdraw a petition for habeas corpus in
view of its far-reaching importance to the nation, I do not see how we should act
differently, perhaps even insouciantly, here, especially since it involves persons who
think and believe differently from the rest of us.
Both Buenaobra and Amelia Roque supposedly admitted that they were ranking
officers of the Communist Party of the Philippines. According to the majority,
Buenaobra and Roque are bound by their admissions.15
_______________
10 Chavez v. Court of Appeals, No. L-29169, August 19, 1968, 24 SCRA 663, 684; see
Castro, J., Concurring, citing Fay v. Noia, 372 US 391(1963).
11 Supra, 683.
12 Supra, 690.
13 Decision, supra. 14.
14 Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, Nos. L-35546, 35538, 35539, 35540, 35547, 35556, 35567,
35571, and 35573, September 17, 1974, 59 SCRA 183, 247-248, citing among other
cases, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, No. L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA
835 and Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (1947).
15 Decision, supra.
341
VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 341
Umil vs. Ramos
That both parties had admitted to be members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (the National United Front Commission) is a naked contention of the
military. The fact that it has not been controverted, in my view, does not justify the
couple’s arrest without a warrant. Worse, by relying on the bare word of the military,
this very Court has, to all intents and purposes, condemned the duo for a crime
(subversion and/or illegal possession of firearms) the bone of contention, precisely,
below.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84
I also find the warrantless arrests of Domingo Añonuevo and Ramon Casiple to be
contrary to law. That they are “admittedly members of the standing committee of the
NUFC”16 and that “subversive materials”17 and unlicensed firearms were found in their
possession, are, like Buenaobra’s and Roque’s cases, barren claims of the military. I also
fear that by the majority’s strong language (that Añonuevo and Casiple are admitted
NUCF officers) the majority has pronounced the petitioners guilty, when the lower
courts have yet to sit in judgment. I think we should be the last to preempt the decision
of the trial courts. We would have set to naught the presumption of innocence accused
persons enjoy.
G.R. No. 83162
With respect to the case of Vicky Ocaya, I am afraid that I am inclined towards the same
conclusion. There was no basis—at the outset—to say that Ocaya was probably guilty of
illegal possession of firearms. As I have observed, a warrantless arrest must be
predicated upon the existence of a crime being actually committed or having been
committed. What I find here, rather, is nothing less than a successful fishing expedition
conducted by the military upon an unwary citizen. I am quite distressed to note that
this is still possible under a supposed democracy.
_______________
16 Supra.
17 Supra.
342
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
G.R. No. 85727
Page 10 of 12
Deogracias Espiritu was fast asleep in his house when he was placed under arrest. For
the life of me, I can not figure out how one can be picked upon in one’s own home and
held moments later without a warrant of arrest.
Espiritu was allegedly guilty of inciting to sedition as a result of a speech delivered
in a press conference at the National Press Club on November 21, 1988. He was,
however, arrested the day after, November 22, 1988. Under these circumstances, it
eludes me how an arrest without a warrant could be justified, either under paragraph
(a) or paragraph (b) of the Rule on warrantless arrests.
The majority avers that since an information had been filed with the court,
Espiritu’s detention, is allegedly justifiable. The question is whether or not an
information is an authority to hold a person in custody. Under the Rules, an
information means “an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense
subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court.”18 It is not, however, an order to keep
one under detention.
G.R. No. 86332
The offense for which Narciso Nazareno is being held—the fatal shooting of Romulo
Bunye II—was committed on December 14, 1988. It was, however, only on December
28, 1988 that the police collared a suspect, Ramil Regala, who subsequently pointed to
Nazareno as his accomplice. It also escapes me how Nazareno, under these
circumstances, could have been validly put under arrest without a warrant or the
existence of the circumstance described under either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule
above-quoted: The crime had long been committed prior to the arrest.
G.R. Nos. 81567; 84581-82; 84583-84; 83162;
85727 & 86332; Postscripts
The majority has disposed of these cases on the bedrock of
_______________
18 RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, sec. 4.
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VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 343
Umil vs. Ramos
what I view as doctrines that have lost their luster:
1. 1.The teaching of Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, 19 which held that subversion is a
continuing offense;
2. 2.The ruling in Ilagan v. Enrile; 20
I also find, for reasons to be set forth hereinafter, a glossing over of the fundamental
rights of the petitioners under the Constitution in the authorities’ handling of the
petitioners’ cases.
I hold that Garcia-Padilla is no longer good law under the present Constitution.
Two reasons persuade me. First, it is repugnant to due process of law. (“The arrest,
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which
require the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the
issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is
bailable.”21 Under the 1987 Constitution, not even “[a] state of martial law suspend[s]
the operation of [the Charter]. . .”22 Second, it leaves the liberty of citizens to the whim
of one man (“On these occasions [the existence of a state of emergency], the President
takes absolute command, for the very life of the Nation and its government, which,
incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so doing, the President is
answerable only to his conscience, the people and to God. For their part, in giving him
the supreme mandate as their President, the people can only trust and pray that, giving
him their own loyalty and without patriotism, the President will not fail them.”23)
Under the Charter now prevailing, the Chief Executive shares, to a certain extent, the
exercise of emergency powers, with Congress.24
As a law advocate under the regime of Marcos, I had challenged the soundness
of Garcia-Padilla. I doubted whether it could stand up under the aegis of the 1973
Constitution. I still doubt whether it can withstand scrutiny under the 1987
_______________
19 No. 61388, April 20, 1983, 121 SCRA 472.
20 No. 70748, October 21, 1985, 139 SCRA 349.
21 Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, supra, 489.
22 CONST., art. VII, sec. 18.
23 Garcia-Padilla, supra, 501.
24 CONST., supra.
344
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Umil vs. Ramos
Constitution.
The majority also fails to point out that six days after Garcia-Padilla was handed
down, the Court promulgated Morales, Jr. v. Enrile, 25 a case that in my view has
significantly whittled down Garcia-Padilla’s very esse. In that case, Mr. Justice
Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr. wrote for the majority:
xxx xxx xxx
1. 16.After a person is arrested . . . without a warrant . . . the proper complaint or
information against him must be filed with the courts of justice within the
time prescribed by law . . .
2. 17.Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid reason would
constitute a violation of Art. 125, Revised Penal Code, as amended. And the
person detained would be entitled to be released on a writ of habeas corpus,
unless he is detained under subsisting process issued by a competent court.26
I also gather from the records that none of the petitioners had been: (1) informed of
their right to remain silent; and (2) to have competent and independent counsel.27
As I said, the majority is denying habeas corpus on self-serving claims of the
military that the petitioners (Dural, Buenaobra, Roque, Añonuevo, and Casiple) are
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines—and that they have supposedly
confessed to be in fact members of the outlawed organization. The question that has
not been answered is whether or not these supposed confessions are admissible, for
purposes of a warrantless arrest, as evidence of guilt, in the absence of any showing that
they were apprised of their constitutional rights. I am perturbed by the silence of the
majority. I am distressed because as we held in one case, violation of the Constitution
divests the court of jurisdiction and entitles the accused to habeas corpus. 28
According to the majority, a “re-examination or re-appraisal . . . of the Ilagan
doctrine is not the answer.”29 In my consid-
_______________
25 Nos. 61016-7, April 16, 1983, 121 SCRA 538.
26 Supra, 560, 562.
27 CONST., art. III, sec. 12.
28 Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 (1949).
29 Decision, supra, 28.
345
VOL. 187, JULY 9, 1990 345
Umil vs. Ramos
ered opinion, Ilagan v. Enrile 30 does not rightfully belong in the volumes of Philippine
jurisprudence. In that case, the petitioners, three Davao-based lawyers, were held by
virtue of a simple information (“the petition herein has been rendered moot and
academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion . . . and
Page 11 of 12
the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against them”31) without any preliminary
investigation (examination) having been previously conducted (to justify the issuance
of a warrant). As I have stated, an information is not a warrant of arrest. The fact that
an information exists does not mean that a warrant will be issued.
Accused persons have the right of preliminary investigation (examination).32 It
forms part and parcel of due process of law.33 I find the majority’s reliance on U.S. v.
Wilson, 34 an ancient (1905) decision, inapt and untenable. In that case, the
accused had been served with a warrant and thereafter taken into custody. The
question that faced the Court was whether or not the warrant was valid, amid the
accused’s charges that the judge who issued it did not examine the complainant under
oath. We held that the query was academic, because the accused had already pleaded,
and the case had entered the trial stage.
The cases at bar are not on all fours. Here, no warrant has been issued. I submit
that in that event, the petitioners are entitled to freedom by way of the writ of liberty.
xxx
The apprehensions in question chronicle in my mind the increasing pattern of
arrests and detention in the country without the sanction of a judicial decree. Four years
ago at “EDSA”, and many years before it, although with much fewer of us, we valiantly
challenged a dictator and all the evils his regime had
_______________
30 Supra.
31 Supra, 364-365.
32 Ilagan v. Enrile, supra, 384, Teehankee, J., Dissenting.
33 Supra.
34 4 Phil. 316 (March 24, 1905).

346
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Maritime Agencies & Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
stood for: repression of civil liberties and trampling on of human rights. We set up a
popular government, restored its honored institutions, and crafted a democratic
constitution that rests on the guideposts of peace and freedom. I feel that with this
Court’s ruling, we have frittered away, by a stroke of the pen, what we had so
painstakingly built in four years of democracy, and almost twenty years of struggle
against tyranny.
It also occurs to me that I am interposing what looms as a quixotic outlook of
Philippine law on warrantless arrests and its implications on liberty. It is an impression
that does not surprise me. Quixotic as they may seem, and modesty aside, my views
reflect a strong bias on my part—forged by years of experience and sharpened by a
painful and lonely struggle for freedom and justice—toward men and women who
challenge settled beliefs. If this dissent can not gain any adherent for now, let it
nevertheless go on record as a plea to posterity and an appeal for tolerance of opinions
with which we not only disagree, but opinions we loathe.
I feel it is my duty to articulate this dissent.
Petitions dismissed except G.R. No. 85727.
——o0o——
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