Simplicius On Aristotle On The Heavens 1 3 4 PDF

SIMPLICIUS
On Aristotle
On the Heavens 1.3-4
IAN MUELLER
Ian Mueller’s unexpected death in August 2010 is a great loss to the

profession as well as to his family, friends and students. He contrib-
uted no fewer than eleven volumes of translation (two of them
part-volumes) to the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle translation
series; three will be published after his death. He wrote at a very
steady pace and his complete mastery of the philosophy of the exact
sciences in antiquity was established by his 1981 book on Euclid, and
by some 50 articles in the subject. He wrote with exemplary clarity,
and was always patient and kind in explaining to those who were
slower to follow.
Ian would typically visit the office of the Ancient Commentators
project at King’s College, London, to finalise his volumes with the
research associates, and he always dealt with complications in a calm
and helpful manner. His colleagues were looking forward to welcom-
ing him as a visiting research fellow in King’s, as he had planned to
spend more time in London. He had made other contributions to the
Ancient Commentators project, including a seminal article, ‘Aris-
totle’s doctrine of abstraction in the commentators’, in the project’s
collected volume, Aristotle Transformed, and a number of transla-
tions in its three-volume Sourcebook on the commentators. He gave
generous advice over the years to the editor and to a large number of
translators to whom he sent comments on request. His contribution
will be sadly missed.
The Editor
SIMPLICIUS
On Aristotle
Translated by
Ian Mueller
LON DON • N E W DE L H I • N E W YOR K • SY DN EY

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Acknowledgements
The present translations have been made possible by generous

and imaginative funding from the following sources: the National
Endowment for the Humanities, Division of Research
Programs, an independent federal agency of the USA; the
Leverhulme Trust; the British Academy; the Jowett Copyright
Trustees; the Royal Society (UK); Centro Internazionale A. Beltrame
di Storia dello Spazio e del Tempo (Padua); Mario
Mignucci; Liverpool University; the Leventis Foundation; the
Arts and Humanities Research Council; Gresham College; the
Esmée Fairbairn Charitable Trust; the Henry Brown Trust; Mr
and Mrs N. Egon; the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific
Research (NWO/GW); the Ashdown Trust; Dr Victoria Solomonides,
the Cultural Attaché of the Greek Embassy in London.
The editor wishes to thank Dirk Baltzly, Ian Crystal, Sebastian
Gertz, Pantelis Golitsis, and Alan Lacey for their comments,
Michael Griffin for preparing the volume for press, and Deborah
Blake at Bristol Classical Press, who has been the publisher
responsible for every volume since the first.
Typeset by Ray Davies

Printed and bound in Great Britain
Contents
Abbreviations vii
Introduction 1
Translation of the text commented on (On the Heavens 1.3, 25
270a12-4); outline of the commentary
Translation of the commentary 33
Notes 145
Appendix 1. The ‘fragments’ of Philoponus, Against Aristotle 169
Appendix 2. The ‘fragments’ of Alexander’s commentary on 171
De Caelo
Appendix 3. On the purity of the elements 175
Appendix 4. The signs of the zodiac 176
Bibliography 177
Textual Questions 181
English-Greek Glossary 185
Greek-English Index 203
Index of Passages 213
(a) Passages quoted by Simplicius 213
(b) Early texts cited in the notes 213
Index of Names 217
(a) Names mentioned by Simplicius 217
(b) Scholars cited in the Introduction and Notes to the 220
Translation
Subject Index 223
v
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Abbreviations
In most cases works are referred to by author or editor’s name and

date of publication, full information being provided in the Biblio-
graphy. However, the following abbreviations are used:
Against Proclus = Hugo Rabe (ed.), Ioannes Philoponus, De Aeterni-

tate Mundi contra Proclum, Leipzig: Teubner, 1899.
CAG = Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 23 vols, Berlin: G. Re-
imer, 1882-1909.
DK = Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz (ed. and tr.), Die Fragmente
der Vorsokratiker, 6th edn, 3 vols, Berlin: Weidmann, 1954.
LSJ = George Henry Liddell and Robert Scott (comps), Henry Stuart-
Jones (rev.), A Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford: Clarendon Press
and New York: Oxford University Press, 1966.
RE = Paulys Realencyclopaedie der Classischen Altertumswissen-
schaft, 51 vols, Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1893-1997.
In addition the following names are used without dates:
Bessarion for emendations by the Renaissance humanist recorded in

Heiberg’s apparatus.
Hankinson for Hankinson (2002).
Heiberg for Heiberg (1894)
Karsten for Karsten (1865).
Moerbeke for Latin readings found in Bossier (2004).
Moraux for Moraux (1965).
Rescigno for Rescigno (2004).
Rivaud for Rivaud (1925).
Ross for Ross (1936).
vii
Introduction
This volume translates the second half of Simplicius of Cilicia’s

commentary on Aristotle’s De Caelo 1.2-4, in which Aristotle argues
that the world is everlasting;1 the first half is in Mueller (2010).
Approximately 29% of this material is commentary in the ordinary
sense, that is passage-by-passage explication of what Aristotle is
saying. Another 11% (20,1-25,22 and 92,22-109,15) is more general
philosophical discussion and treatment of some alternative views.
The explications and general discussions, roughly 40% of 1.2-4,
have already been translated into English in Hankinson (2002), a
work to which I am much indebted. The other 60% is Simplicius’
discussion of the objections raised by his Christian contemporary
John Philoponus2 (in a lost work which I shall call Against Aristotle)
to Aristotle’s attempt to prove the everlastingness of the world. About
40% of that material containing Philoponus’ objections (roughly a
fourth of 1.2-4) is translated in Wildberg (1987), another work to
which I am much indebted. So what is new in this translation,
somewhat more than one third of the whole, could be characterised
as Simplicius’ responses to Philoponus. Since the debate between
Simplicius and Philoponus is an extremely important item in the late
stages of the transition from paganism to Christianity in the Byzan-
tine Empire, it seemed desirable to include Simplicius’ responses in
the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series. But to print them in
isolation did not seem reasonable since they obviously have to be read
in connection with what they are responses to. Moreover, it is clear
that a considerable portion of the material translated by Hankinson,
e.g., the long excursus on coming to be at 92,22-109,15, is introduced
by Simplicius in anticipation of his attack on Philoponus. The possi-
bility of incorporating the two earlier translations into this one was
considered, but it was decided that this was not feasible because of
(hardly unexpected or surprising) differences in predilections be-
tween the two previous translators and between them and myself.
Hence the decision to make a new translation which could rely on
its predecessors for discussions of many issues3 and give readers
direct access to a historically and philosophically important docu-
ment in its entirety.
1
2 Introduction
1. The disputes between Simplicius

and Philoponus
Aristotle begins chapter 2 by asserting that all motions are either
simple, that is rectilinear or circular, or composed of simple motions
because the only simple magnitudes are straight and circular lines.
He characterises circular motion as motion around the centre, recti-
linear motion as motion up or down, up being away from the centre,
down to the centre. He then introduces a distinction between ‘simple’4
bodies and compounds of them, and says that the simple bodies
necessarily have simple motions and that it is necessary that there
be a simple body which moves naturally in a circle by its own nature.
This simple body is heaven, the world above the moon, the substance
of which is a fifth element or aithêr, and for Simplicius Aristotle’s
principal goal in 1.2-4 is to establish the difference between heaven,
the only change in which is uniform motion in a circle, and the
sublunary world which is composed of the four simple bodies or
elements which move in a straight line, earth and water, which move
down, and air and fire, which move up.5 For Simplicius the motions
of the four simple bodies are inseparably connected with their contin-
ual change into one another, their acting on and being acted on by
one another, a kind of change from which heaven is free.
For Simplicius and Aristotle both heaven and the sublunary world
are everlasting, but for Philoponus both came into existence in
roughly 5500 BC when god created them and will end when god in
some sense destroys them, an event thought to be imminent by
Philoponus and his Christian contemporaries. However, the focus of
the debate between Philoponus and Simplicius is heaven since that
is the focus of 1.2-4, and one might say that they take for granted that
the universe or cosmos is eternal if and only if heaven is.
Simplicius takes it that prior to the texts which are commented on
in this volume Aristotle has established not only the distinction
between heaven and the sublunary world, but also the fact that
heaven is more complete or perfect than the sublunary world, prior
to it, and without weight or lightness. Although Philoponus would
accept that there is a sense in which heaven is more complete than,
better than, and prior to the sublunary world, he does not accept
these assertions in the strong sense in which Aristotle and Simplicius
intend them, and he raises explicit objections6 to Aristotle’s argu-
ments against heaven being without weight or lightness. However,
although Philoponus is ultimately interested in defending a Chris-
tian cosmological picture in opposition to Aristotle’s, his concern in
Against Aristotle is, as this appellation suggests, merely to argue that
Aristotle’s own arguments are inconclusive. To put this another way
Philoponus’ concerns are eristic, and one cannot assume that an
argument he makes represents a position to which he subscribes as
Introduction 3
opposed to a flourish he hopes will be persuasive. Since we don’t have
anything like the full text of Against Aristotle we cannot be certain
about its overall character, but Philoponus’ parallel work Against
Proclus suggests that my characterisation is correct. If what I have
said is true of Philoponus, it is even more true of Simplicius, whose
argumentation is frequently both eristic and ad hominem. In re-
sponding to Philoponus’ arguments he freely casts aspersions on his
opponent’s intelligence and motivation, and makes whatever counterar-
guments he can think of, whether or not they represent a consistent
position. In this sense one might say that the dispute between Sim-
plicius and Philoponus is a combat between rhetoricians rather than a
philosophical, cosmological, or theological debate. There are, to be sure,
philosophical, cosmological, and theological issues in the debate, but the
overlay of rhetoric cannot and should not be disregarded.
The structure of the part of De Caelo treated here is relatively
simple, and can be seen by looking at ‘The text commented on’ section
below. Aristotle argues first that heaven does not come to be or perish
(270a12-22), from which he infers that it does not increase or de-
crease in size (270a22-5) or change in quality (270a25-35). If we can
trust to Simplicius’ silence, Philoponus did not even discuss these
further inferences, perhaps because he was only concerned to defend
his Christian view that the world came to be (and will perish).
Simplicius summarises the argument that heaven does not come
to be or perish briefly at 92,4-7:
I. The body which moves in a circle, i.e. heaven, does not have a
contrary;
II. what comes to be or perishes has a contrary from which it
comes to be and into which it perishes;
III. therefore, the body which moves in a circle does not come to
be or perish.
At 270a17-20 Aristotle suggests an argument for I, the premisses of

which Simplicius presents as follows at 92,12-17:
IV. There is no contrary to circular motion;

V. ‘what has a contrary also has a motion which is contrary to
its natural motion, namely the motion with which its contrary
moves naturally’.
For Simplicius the rather contorted V is clearly true (enargês) since,

as he puts it rather opaquely, ‘since the natures of contrary natural
forms are contrary, their motions are as well because nature is a
starting point of motion’.7 Given V as ‘clearly true’, I follows from IV,
the proof of which takes up chapter 4. It remains only to establish II,
which Aristotle formulates in the following remark:
4 Introduction
Everything which comes to be comes to be from a contrary and
some substratum and it likewise perishes by the action of a
contrary and into a contrary with something underlying, as was
said in our first discussions. (270a14-17)
The first discussions are undoubtedly the discussion of the principles

of coming to be in the first book of the Physics. Simplicius tells us at
121,4-8 that Philoponus argued against both IV and II, and later, at
157,21-5, that he also objected to V. I shall consider these proposi-
tions in the order in which Simplicius discusses them, first II, then
V, then IV.
The issues involved with II are not so much the truth or falsity of
a clearly understood Aristotelian doctrine as an interpretation of
what he says on the question of coming to be and perishing and
whether what he says entitles him to the premiss he needs for his
argument. On the question of interpretation Philoponus is concerned
with what the Aristotelian commentators Alexander and Themistius
have to say as well as with Aristotle’s pronouncements. His discus-
sion depends upon a distinction between what are called contraries
in the strict sense (kuriôs), which I will call ordinary contraries, and
cases of the contrasting pair form/privation. A simple and repre-
sentative case of coming to be and perishing involving ordinary
contraries is an ordinary object or piece of material (an ordinary
substratum) coming to be warm from being cold. Philoponus implies
that Aristotle and Alexander only recognise this kind of coming to be
and perishing, and he accepts that if this were the only kind of
coming to be and perishing, the cosmos as a substratum undergoing
changes between ordinary contraries would be everlasting. Phi-
loponus argues that if Aristotle had acknowledged coming to be and
perishing involving forms and their privations he could not infer that
the cosmos does not come to be or perish. One of the strong points of
Philoponus’ argumentation is the fact that Aristotle mentions only
contraries and not form and privation in his formulation of II. Sim-
plicius, however, has no interest in defending the view that the
cosmos does not come to be by restricting coming to be to cases
involving ordinary contraries. He argues, with extensive quotation,
that Aristotle does not believe that all coming to be involves ordinary
contraries. He even claims (125,20-2) that Aristotle posits form and
privation as principles of coming to be and perishing ‘more than’
(mallon hêper) contraries. At 128,16-129,3 he attempts to explain
why Aristotle formulated II using the word ‘contrary’ rather than
speaking of form and privation, when in Simplicius’ view he clearly
intends to include the latter.8 We will see that this conception intro-
duces other difficulties for Simplicius, but now I wish to look at the
arguments of Philoponus designed to force acceptance of the view
that there is coming to be involving form and privation as well as9
Introduction 5
other cases in which ordinary contraries are involved, a position
which Simplicius, of course, accepts. I list here Philoponus’ argu-
ments (123,11-124,17) with Simplicius’ responses (129,4-131,17) in
parentheses:
1. Substances come to be, but, according to Aristotle in the

Categories, substance has no contrary (Simplicius quotes two
passages from Physics 1 to show that Aristotle says that sub-
stances do come to be.)
2. Irrational souls come to be, but they have no contrary. (Sim-
plicius expresses agnosticism on the question whether
irrational souls come to be, but, he says, if they do their doing
so is a matter of a body taking on a form which it did not have
previously.)
3. Geometrical figures come to be, but Aristotle holds that
figures are not contrary to one another. (Simplicius argues both
that Aristotle recognises contrariety among figures and that he
can get along with figures and their privations.)
4. Left comes to be from right, but these are relatives, not
contraries. (Simplicius insists that left and right are contraries
(as well as relatives).)
5. Individuals in any of the categories in which there are no
contraries do not come to be from contraries. (Simplicius says
that even in such cases there is the opposition of form and
privation.)
6. Air has no colour or flavour, but things with colour or flavour,
e.g. water, come to be from it. (Simplicius insists that air does
have some colour, but also finds nothing problematic in the idea
that something without a quality in one range, e.g. colour, might
come to be something which does have such a quality.)
7. Light comes to be from dark, which is the privation of light.
(Simplicius sees no difficulty here.)
Philoponus goes on to argue that if (as Simplicius thinks) Aristotle

himself intends to include form and privation as contraries, then he
cannot maintain the view that the cosmos did not come to be. Phi-
loponus would be in a stronger position if he restricted himself to this
negative formulation (‘cannot maintain’), but in Simplicius’ repre-
sentation he appears to slip into the positive claim that Aristotle
must accept that the cosmos came to be, although Philoponus is in no
position to establish this:10
For every natural form which has its being in a substratum and
matter there is always an opposite privation, from which it has
come to be and into which it is resolved when it perishes. But
both heaven and the whole cosmos have been given form by a
6 Introduction
natural form, so that they, too, will have a privation from which
they have come to be and into which they perish. For just as
human being comes to be from not human being and house from
not house and, to speak generally, each natural or manufac-
tured form <of such and such> comes to be from not such and
such, so too heaven, since it is also a natural form, has come to
be from not heaven and the cosmos has come to be from not
cosmos. But this argument presumably requires that before the
cosmos came to be there existed some substratum and matter
in which the privation of heaven and cosmos existed and from
which, when it had changed, heaven and the cosmos came to be,
but it would not necessitate that heaven have no beginning and
not come to be, as the Philosopher proposed to prove, but rather
the contrary, that it comes to be and has a beginning of exist-
ence. (132,4-17)
Simplicius’ rejoinder to this argument seems rather weak. He claims

that Aristotle does not hold that ‘for every natural form which has its
being in a substratum or matter there is always an opposite priva-
tion’ but only that this is true of every natural form which comes to
be, and Aristotle obviously holds that the cosmos does not come to be,
since he argues in Physics 8 that heavenly motion is eternal. Sim-
plicius agrees with Philoponus that the cosmos is a natural form
existing in matter. This might seem to commit him to the view that
the cosmos could conceivably come to be in the way Philoponus
describes, but, according to Simplicius, there simply is no privation
from which the cosmos might come to be. Where, he asks, does
Aristotle say that every natural form has an opposite privation?
‘Would Aristotle be so superficial as to think that there is a privation
opposed to heaven and nevertheless to try to demonstrate that it is
everlasting and to demonstrate this from its not having an opposite?’
(133,1-311). But, of course, the real issue is not whether Aristotle
believed the cosmos came to be, but whether his doctrine of coming
to be leaves open the possibility that it might have. Simplicius gives
at least some indications that he is aware of the weakness of his
position. At 122,29 he says that even if there were a privation of
heaven and the whole cosmos, one would need a further demonstra-
tion that it came to be and will perish. And at the end of his discussion
of chapter 4 (200,14-18) he admits that Aristotle might have done
better to ‘argue’ for the everlastingness of the cosmos on the basis of
Neoplatonic ideas about the dependence of heavenly motion on Soul,
Mind or Being, and ultimately the One, ideas of which he gives a
thorough exposition at 93,23-98,15 and which he associates with the
argument in Physics 8 that heavenly motion is everlasting.
When Philoponus says that heaven and the whole cosmos have
also been given form by a natural form, he means or implies that the
Introduction 7
cosmos or heaven is a compound of matter and form. Simplicius
accepts this characterisation, and says it is ‘not at all disputed’
(133,25), but he proposes to look at what Philoponus says in support
of this truth. The discussion is mainly of interest because it touches
on the difficult question of the nature of matter. For Simplicius the
ultimate substratum of everything in the cosmos is what he would
call prime matter. He tells us that Philoponus thinks that what the
Peripatetics call the second substratum is the ultimate substratum.
Philoponus himself explains the difference between Aristotle’s con-
ception of prime matter and the second substratum at 83,14-18 of his
commentary on the Categories (CAG 13.1): ‘Prime matter ... is incor-
poreal and without form or shape before it is filled out and receives
the three dimensions and becomes three-dimensional (what Aristotle
calls second substratum), and then it receives qualities and produces
the elements ....’ The second substratum or three-dimensional is also
called qualityless body, but for Philoponus it is the true ultimate
substratum and a substratum common to all things, heavenly and
sublunary, the ‘prime matter’ of the Peripatetics (and Simplicius)
being an incomprehensible fantasy.12
Simplicius quotes Philoponus as deriding those who say that
heaven is immaterial, assuming that they mean it is an intelligible
object. Simplicius responds that what these people mean is that the
matter of heaven is superior to the matter of the sublunary world in
which things come to be and perish. He cites Aristotle’s suggestion
that everlasting natural substances either have no matter or have
matter which can only change place but does not come to be or change
in quality or in size (Metaphysics 8.4.1044b6-8). Thus we have a
situation in which Philoponus insists that there is an ultimate matter
which is the common substratum of everything material and Sim-
plicius responds that there are two such matters, one for the heavens,
the other for the sublunary world.13 To Philoponus’ suggestion that if
there are two such matters they ought to have both something in
common which makes them matters and some differentiating char-
acteristics, Simplicius responds that the two matters should not be
thought of as two species of a genus, but as two stages in the
declination of things from the One in which heaven has a priority
over the sublunary world. Clearly Philoponus’ identification of a
single universal substratum is a fundamental part of his claim that
heaven is as perishable as things in the sublunary world. Simplicius
insists that there cannot be one common matter because there are no
interchanges between the two domains, a fact which he says in a
rhetorical remark14 Philoponus could not possibly deny.
In the last passage quoted Philoponus concedes that his argumen-
tation would imply that the cosmos comes to be from a pre-existing
substratum. But that is not a conclusion acceptable to Philoponus,
who at 136,17 refers to his Against Proclus for arguments against it.
8 Introduction
If one can trust Simplicius’ representation, in Against Aristotle Phi-
loponus did not repeat the arguments of Against Proclus, but only
argued against what he took to be a misunderstanding of the Chris-
tian doctrine that the cosmos came to be from what is not as the view
that what is not is an enduring substratum for the cosmos in the way
that wood is an enduring substratum from which a wooden ship is
created. Simplicius denies the existence of this misunderstanding.
For him the important point is the requirement that coming to be
must be from a substratum and have an efficient cause. Simplicius
also tells us that Philoponus gave many arguments that divine
creation involves the simultaneous creation of form and substratum,
but he does not describe them or answer them directly.15 Instead he
gives his own account of eternal creation as the only way of avoiding
a question to which the Christians have no satisfactory answer: why
was the cosmos created at one time rather than another?
Starting at 270b4 Aristotle gives what Simplicius calls three
corroborations (marturiai) or confirmations (pisteis) of his view of the
character of heaven: the fact that people always assign heaven to the
divine (270b4-11), the fact that no changes have ever been observed
in heaven (270b11-16), the use of the word aithêr, allegedly derived
from aei thein (‘always running’),16 to refer to heaven. Simplicius does
not report any comment by Philoponus on the third of these consid-
erations, but it appears from Simplicius’ discussion at 139,23-141,11
that Philoponus took the opportunity to point out, citing Aristotle as
an authority, that important Greek thinkers did not think that the
cosmos was everlasting: Plato said that it came to be (although it
will not perish because of the will of god), Empedocles and Heracli-
tus that it alternates between existence and non-existence
through time. Simplicius cannot deny that Aristotle says these
things, but he insists that Philoponus misconstrues their meaning.
Aristotle is stating the superficial sense of what these people said,
while being aware that their true doctrine was the same as his
own: the cosmos is everlasting and dependent on a timeless reality
for its existence.
Philoponus also denies the significance of people’s assigning
heaven to the divine and of the fact that no change has been observed
in heaven. Even if people do assign heaven to the divine, they also
think that gods inhabit sacred places on earth, but they do not
assume such places to be everlasting. Simplicius replies that consid-
ering these places to be sacred is not incompatible with assigning
heaven to the divine, and he cites the prophet David as making such
an assignment and for the belief that the cosmos is everlasting.
Against Aristotle’s remark that heaven has never been observed to
change, Philoponus says that many things in the sublunary world
exist for a long time without being observed to change, and that
heaven is subject to destruction if god wills it since it is a finite body
Introduction 9
with finite power. Simplicius appears to adopt a kind of Heraclitean-
ism, according to which anything which is subject to change is
changing all the time, so that if anything goes without changing for
an hour it is everlasting. Moreover, although the cosmos is a finite
body with finite power, it is held in everlasting existence by an
unchanging and eternal creator.
In chapter 4 Aristotle turns to the proof of IV: there is no contrary
to circular motion.17 But, as we have seen, Aristotle also needs V,
which I shall now formulate as ‘if two things are contrary they have
contrary motions’ or, since the relevant things are substances:
V. If two substances are contrary they have contrary motions.
Simplicius gives his own presentation of the arguments for IV at

144,5-156,24 before turning to Philoponus, where, after belittling
him for objecting to the arguments for either IV or V when he is
willing to concede the conclusion Aristotle wants to get from them,
namely I (heaven or the cosmos has no contrary), he turns at 157,26
to Philoponus’ objections to V. The discussion is made complicated by
the fact that several independent points are intertwined. First, Phi-
loponus weakens his rhetorical position by formulating V as:
V’. If two substances have contrary motions they are contrary

(157,26-7).
Second, Philoponus argues that Aristotle should have taken into

account other kinds of change in addition to change of place, so that
the relevant principles should be:
V*. If two substances are contrary they admit of contrary

changes,
or, in Philoponus’ formulation:
V*’. If two substances admit of contrary changes they are con-

traries.
Philoponus invokes Aristotle’s dictum in the Categories that:
A. The same substance can admit contraries
to argue that V’ or V*’ imply that the same substance will be contrary
to itself, which is not only itself impossible, but also incompatible
with another dictum of the Categories:
B. Substance has no contrary.

10 Introduction
In the course of his discussion Philoponus mentions both qualitative
and quantitative change (a substance can become hotter or colder,
larger or smaller) and change of place (air rises and sinks).
Simplicius does not get around to pointing out Philoponus’ logical
mistake in substituting V’ or V*’ for V or V* until 162,20 (cf. 163,34-
164,27), and he himself is sometimes somewhat cavalier about the
difference between them.18 Blocking the substitution would by itself
eliminate Philoponus’ argument, but Simplicius chooses to explain
why A and V’ or V*’ are both true, that is why the same substance
can admit contraries and not be contrary to itself. He does this by
invoking a distinction between active and passive changes. Active
changes include the natural motions of the elements, which are due
to the nature inherent in them, and, e.g., fire heating other things;
passive changes include constrained motion and being heated by fire.
Simplicius first says (159,34-160,9) that any of V, V’, V*, V*’ are to
be understood in terms of active changes, but that the changes
relevant to A are all passive. But since he, like Philoponus, is
convinced that Aristotle is only thinking about change of place, he
ultimately decides (160,21-30) that Aristotle intends V only to apply
to motion and not to, e.g., causing something to get warmer. Sim-
plicius’ position means that he has to deny the relevance of
Philoponus’ claim (158,13-10) that air moves both up and down
naturally, a claim which Philoponus supports by saying that in either
case air moves to fill a void. Simplicius responds (160,31-161,21;
161,28-162,14) by claiming that the motion of air up to fill a void is
natural, but its motion down is due to the need to fill the void.
At 163,14 Philoponus considers the possibility of escaping the
difficulty he has adduced by replacing V’ with:
V**’. If two substances have contrary motions they have con-

trary qualities.
Philoponus concedes that V**’ would entail that if something has no

contrary qualities (as Aristotle is taken to have believed of heaven),
then there would be no contrary to its motion, but he denies (cor-
rectly) that V**’ would be entitled to assert:
V**. If two substances have contrary qualities they have con-

trary motions.
Philoponus points out that this proposition should be false for Aris-
totle since he believes that the hupekkauma moves in a circle and so
should, according to Aristotle (IV), have no contrary to its motion,
but, being fire, it does have contrary qualities. Simplicius responds
by saying that the motion of the hupekkauma is irrelevant because
its motion is not natural (as Philoponus believes) but ‘hypernatural’.
Introduction 11
Simplicius takes Philoponus’ proposal to consider V**’ in place of
V’ as an indication that he thinks that for substances having contrary
qualities, in particular contrary ‘substantial’ qualities, is incompat-
ible with being themselves contraries. This claim, which is repeated
at 165,21-3, seems unjustified, since all Philoponus looks to be doing
is considering an alternative interpretation without suggesting that
it is or is not compatible with another alternative.19 However, Sim-
plicius sees his main task as countering Philoponus’
‘misapprehension’ by explaining why Aristotle can call substances,
such as fire and water, with contrary qualities contraries (as he does
most explicitly at 2.3, 331a3-6 of On Coming to be and Perishing)
while maintaining in the Categories that substance has no contrary
(B). Unfortunately, Simplicius’ exposition starting at 166,14 does not
make any reference to Philoponus, so that we have no idea of what
features in it he might have objected to. And what Simplicius says is
a variation on common themes in the commentary tradition, and the
position he adopts is hardly distinguishable from the one expressed
by Philoponus in his commentary on the passage in On Coming to be
and Perishing just referred to.
Simplicius begins by explaining that in the Categories primary
substance20 is a composite of form and matter, which itself is taken
as a substratum. He distinguishes sharply between this substratum
and the ‘accidental’ contraries which belong to it, contraries which
underlie Aristotle’s A. And B is true because substance is being taken
as a substratum:
The statement in the Categories that there is no contrary to

substance is true. For there is no contrary with respect to
matter, which is only a substratum. And there is none with
respect to form } (for <form> is also substance, even if it is in
matter); rather, together with matter, <form> underlies con-
traries. And much more is it true that there is no contrary with
respect to the composite of form and matter, since this is still
more a substratum for contraries. (166,24-30)
However, form itself has contraries as components, e.g., the form of

fire includes heat, dryness, and lightness. Simplicius makes, but does
not explain, a distinction between these ‘substantial’ contraries in the
form and the accidental contraries invoked to explain A. It is the
substantial contraries which Aristotle has in mind when in On the
Heavens he speaks (implicitly) of contrary substances:
But here <in On the Heavens> he has taken <as contraries> the
differentiae which belong substantially, each contrary contrib-
uting to the filling out of a different substance and the
differentiae belonging per se and not accidentally to the sub-
12 Introduction
stances. And he said that substances are contrary to each other
with respect to those differentiae which belong per se to the
different substances. For differentiae which belong accidentally
exist in the same substance in turn. And so, when he says ‘the
motions of contrary things are contrary’, he is calling sub-
stances which have substantial differentiae which are contrary
to one another contrary substances, but he is not doing so
insofar as they are substances and exist per se, but insofar as
they are constituted by the contrary differentiae from which
contrary motions follow; for upward motion is conjoined with
heat and lightness, downward motion with coldness and heavi-
ness. (167,14-24)
I turn finally to Aristotle’s arguments in chapter 4 for IV, which,

despite their mathematical overlay, are really quite nebulous. I shall
content myself with stating Simplicius’ understanding of them, the
most important of Philoponus’ objections to them, which sometimes
invoke Alexander and Themistius, and Simplicius’ replies.
According to argument 1 (270b32-271a5), the most obvious candi-
date to be the contrary of motion in a circle is motion in a straight
line. ‘But the motions in a straight line are opposed to one another by
places, since up/down is a differentiation and contrariety with re-
spect to place.’ For Simplicius Aristotle is here invoking the principle
that a thing can have at most one contrary and the fact that for him
the only simple rectilinear motions are from above to below and from
below to above, and those two motions are contrary. Equally impor-
tant for Simplicius’ understanding of Aristotle’s reasoning is the idea
that ‘above and below are contrarieties of place, and the motions from
those regions have contrariety most of all; for the motions which go
from contrary places into contrary places are contrary’ (146,4-7), an
idea which he bases on 271a27-8 (‘the contrarieties of motion are
derived from the contrarieties of places’).
In responding to this argument Philoponus first21 says that even if
motions up and down and circular motion do not ‘conflict’ (makhetai)
with respect to contrariety of places, they do conflict in other ways:
In the case of the motions in a straight line motion is from one

point to another and is unbroken in all its parts, but in the case
of motion in a circle it is from and into the same thing with not
even a chance part remaining unbroken. And motion in a circle
conflicts with motion in a straight line because it is impossible
for a motion on the same straight line to occur twice without
having stopped, but motion in a circle can go around the same
line infinitely many times without stopping. (171,27-31)
In response Simplicius points out that (according to Aristotle) ‘con-

Introduction 13
trariety of places’ is fundamental to the idea of contrariety of motion,
and he insists on the connection between this kind of contrariety of
motion and the conflict among the sublunary bodies which produces
their coming to be and perishing:
Things which naturally go to places which are contrary to one

another are always given form by contrary qualities, heat and
coldness, lightness and heaviness; and things which are given
form by these contrary qualities, which cause different impul-
sions, go to contrary places. These, and not ‘unbroken’ and
‘broken’, are the contraries which come to be from one another.
For a circle does not change into a straight line, nor does what
moves in a circle change into what moves in a straight line, nor
does what moves from and to the same point change into what
moves from one point to another, nor does what is separated by
rest change into what moves continuously.22 For these are not
contrarieties relating to qualities which act and are acted on,
and they do not have the same substratum, since if they did it
would result that sublunary things change into heavenly ones
and heavenly things into sublunary ones. (172,7-18)
Simplicius’ association of rectilinear motion with the kind of contrar-

ies involved in coming to be and perishing enables him to set aside
Philoponus’ invocation of the contrariety convex/concave, which is
found in heaven, as irrelevant to the unchangingness of heaven,
which also exhibits many other contrarieties such as motion/rest,
odd/even, same/different, one/many.
Aristotle’s second argument (271a5-10) is very obscure. I quote it
in full:
Moreover, if someone assumes that the same statement which

holds of the straight line also holds of the circular one (namely
that motion from A toward B is contrary to motion from B
toward A), he is <still> speaking about motion in a straight line,
since such motion is finite, but the circular motions between the
same points are infinite.
Simplicius takes Aristotle to be arguing that motion from A to B on

a circular arc greater or less than a semicircle is not contrary to
motion from B to A on such an arc on the grounds that infinitely many
such arcs can be drawn through two points. Prior to considering
Philoponus’ objections he explains Aristotle’s reasoning as follows:
From what he said before Aristotle has obtained that motions

from contrary places are contrary, and that contrary places are
those which are at the greatest distance, and that the greatest
14 Introduction
distance is determinate, just as the least is, and that every
distance which has a determinate size is measured by the
straight line between the distances; for that straight line is one
and determinate because it is the least line having the same
limits, but circular arcs which are joined to the same points are
infinite and so indeterminate; and consequently these arcs do
not determine the distance between A and B, and consequently
the greatest distance itself is not derived from the circular arcs;
and consequently the places of A and B are not contrary; and
consequently the motions from A and B are not contraries if
they occur on an arc and not on a straight line. (176,15-26)
Philoponus, perhaps with understandable exasperation, suggests

that Aristotle’s argument is intended as a joke and turns to refuting
the accounts of it given by Themistius and Alexander. Themistius
construed the argument as saying that motions on the infinitely
many arcs from A to B will be contrary to the one rectilinear motion
from B to A, contradicting the dictum that a single thing has a single
contrary. Philoponus replies by saying that the motion from A to B
on a given arc will be contrary only to the motion from B to A on the
same arc. Although not endorsing Themistius’ position as an inter-
pretation of Aristotle, Simplicius insists that his position is correct.
Philoponus raises a perhaps more interesting issue when he points
out that the same difficulty should arise for rectilinear motion since
there are infinitely many upward motions from centre to periphery
and infinitely many downward ones. He also claims that these up-
ward or downward motions are not of the same kind whereas the
circular motions between two points are of the same kind because
they all have the same pair of end points, so that all the motions from
A to B on circular arcs treated as one can be taken as contrary to all
the motions from B to A taken as one. Simplicius responds:
In the case of straight lines from the centre, all of which are
equal, the interval between up and down, which is the greatest
in this extension, is determinate, so that all the points on the
periphery of the upper region, taken as one, are opposite to what
is down.23 But, since the arcs between A and B are unequal and
make the intervals between A and B unequal, they do not make
the place A be at the greatest distance from the place B in terms
of all the arcs. Consequently the places are not contrary, since
they do not have the greatest distance between them one and
determinate. ... But it is clear from what has been said that in
the case of the straight lines everything which is up, taken as
one, being at the same distance from what is down, is opposite
to what is down taken as one, but that in the case of arcs, in
which the kinds of distances are different, there is neither one
Introduction 15
kind, as he thinks, nor a contrariety of A to B with respect to
these arcs at all. (177,25-178,7)
Alexander appears to have given an exegesis similar to Simplicius’.

In response Philoponus invokes a contrast between what is true in
mathematics and what is true in nature. In mathematics it is true
that there is no greatest circle on which two points lie, but in reality
there is a greatest circle, e.g., the celestial equator. Philoponus goes
on to argue that the inner limit of the sphere of the fixed stars and
the outer limit of the sphere of the planets move in contrary directions.
Simplicius does not address this claim until 194,21-198,6, but here he
responds to Philoponus’ attempt to make something a determinate
circular distance between two points: what Philoponus says is perhaps
an adequate riposte to the claim that there is no greatest circle through
two points, but it does not suffice to rule out there being infinitely many
circular arcs through the points, even if the arcs are mathematical or
conceptual and not physical things. As Simplicius puts it:
Even if it is not possible to take a greater arc drawn on the same

points than the one this person mentions, it would still always
be possible to take a lesser one in the inner spheres. And even
if such arcs drawn in the heavenly body are not natural things,
the distances between the points would be different - conceptu-
alisation is also sufficient to determine this. For when the points
fall outside the straight line between them, the distance be-
tween them remains indefinite, so that they are not at the
greatest distance from each other, their places are not contrary
to one another, and the motions from them are not contrary, and
the bodies moving with them are not contrary. (179,14-22)
In the third argument (271a10-13) Aristotle considers the case in

which the arc with endpoints A and B is a semicircle and therefore
unique. He claims that motion on this arc is the same as motion on
the straight line AB since ‘we always suppose that each thing is
distant by a straight line’. Simplicius realises that this argument
could have been used in the previous case, and he seems to think of
it as in some sense the real argument in both cases. As he puts it:
If contrary motions are contrary because they are from places

which are most widely distant from one another, and the greatest
distance is determinate, and we judge a determinate distance by
reference to the least line of those having the same limits, and this
is the straight line, it is clear that also on this hypothesis the
contrary motions will occur as on a straight line. (148,1-5)
Simplicius’ confrontation of Philoponus on the third argument, start-

16 Introduction
ing at 179,24, is long and difficult. He first tells us that Philoponus
took Aristotle to be claiming that the straight line is the measure of
the length of an arc and argued against this claim. Simplicius simply
denies that Aristotle made such a claim; he only said that the
distance between two points is measured by the straight line between
them. As he puts it now:
The person who takes the motions from C and D as contrary

takes them as occurring on the diameter, since the determinate
distance is determined by the diameter, the greatest distance is
determinate, and the contrary distance is greatest. (181,4-7)
At 181,20 we are told that Philoponus went on to argue that even

if it is granted that the distance between two points is measured
by the straight line between them, it remains the case that we can
define the greatest distance between two points on an arc in terms
of the arc. Philoponus’ argument invokes the signs of the zodiac,
but it can be understood in terms of the hours on a clock face.
According to Philoponus the most distant hours are the diametri-
cally opposed ones such as 9 and 3 o’clock. It may be the case that
2 is at a greater distance from 9 in terms of the arc through 6, but
it is at a lesser distance in terms of the arc through 12. ‘Therefore
only points which divide a circle into two equal parts are separated
by the greatest distance in every direction.’ No doubt Philoponus
is right that we could define the greatest distance between points
on a circle in this way, but there would not seem to be any
compelling reason to do so. Simplicius’ response is that, if Phil-
oponus is taking the distance between points in terms of the
circumference, then contiguous points such as 8 and 9 are at the
greatest distance, but if he is taking the distance between points
in terms of the straight line joining them, he is in agreement with
Aristotle. And if he wants to take them in both ways, he is adding
a way which has nothing to do with the determination of contrary
places.
At 182,17 the discussion turns to an argument of Alexander’s,
which, Simplicius tells us, is accurately recorded by Philoponus:
Every interval is measured by what is least;

in every case the interval on a straight line is least;
therefore, the straight line and the <interval> on the straight
line are the measure of every interval;
however, it is for the measure to find what is most distant and
contrary;
therefore, the contrary in intervals is <to be found> with the
straight line and on it;
Introduction 17
and so <the contrary in intervals> is not on an arc. (182,31-
183,2)
Philoponus objects to Alexander’s addition of the words ‘and on it’ in

the next-to-last proposition of the argument. Simplicius, who para-
phrases this proposition as ‘What is at a greatest distance in intervals
and contrary is found with the straight line and the interval on it’,
first responds to Philoponus with an argument which would seem to
be aimed at showing that Alexander does not need the addition:
But if <the contrary in intervals> is found with <the straight

line>, it is clear that contrary intervals are defined in terms of
<the straight line> and are <what they are> by reference to it;
and a thing is defined in terms of that from which it is found,
and a thing is <what it is> by reference to what it is defined in
terms of. (183,12-14)
But it turns out that Philoponus really wants to argue against a claim
which might be formulated as ‘the points which are at the greatest
distance in a measured interval are in the stick which does the
measuring’. Simplicius responds (correctly it would seem) that the
points are in the distance which is measured not in the measuring
stick. This leads Simplicius into a disquisition on the way measure-
ment and the application of criteria in general works.
I move on to 185,2324 where the interpretation of Alexander is
again the issue. As we have seen, in Simplicius’ understanding the
third argument only concerns the motions in reverse directions on
one semicircle. However, Alexander, presumably interested in argu-
ing generally against the idea that the distance between two points
might be specified in terms of an arc, pointed out that one might draw
a greater arc between two close points and a lesser one between two
points further apart. Philoponus, adhering to his position that points
at the limits of a semicircle can be taken to be at a greatest distance,
takes Alexander’s statement to be trivially true and irrelevant. Sim-
plicius concedes that Alexander’s statement is of no use for the third
argument, which concerns only two given points and a semicircle
connecting them, but insists, again correctly, that Alexander shows
that the distance between two points is not specified in a determinate
way in terms of arcs.
The fourth argument (271a13-19) is, in fact, two for Simplicius. In
the first, which is really a repetition of the third, Aristotle asserts
that ‘similarly’ in a circle ACBD with diameter AB a motion from A
to B through C is not contrary to a motion from B to A through D. In
the second Aristotle points to what, for Simplicius, is the real concern
of the whole of chapter 4 when he says that even if the motions on the
two semicircles are contraries, still the motions in reverse directions
18 Introduction
on one circle are not contrary. Philoponus does not appear to have
had much to say about this passage. At 188,3 he says that if the
argument is the same as the third argument there is no need for him
to say any more. However, he really thinks that the two arguments
are different and censures Themistius for taking them to be the
same, as Simplicius also does. Philoponus’ grounds are that the
arguments concern different cases and, more significantly, he thinks
that Aristotle’s conclusion in the fourth argument is correct since, for
example, the sun’s motion above the earth from an eastern point to
a western point is not contrary to its motion under the earth from the
western point back to the eastern one. Simplicius agrees that these
motions are not contrary, but he thinks that Aristotle is considering
the case of two separate motions on the two semicircles, and for that
case the reasoning of the third argument suffices:
The arcs do not define the greatest distance in terms of which

contraries are characterised; but rather the greatest distance is
defined in terms of the diameter ... . And consequently again if
the motions are taken as contraries, they are taken as moving
the distance on the straight line, not the distance on the arc.
(149,6-10)
Hence, for Simplicius, Philoponus’ acceptance of the fourth argument

is wrong-headed because based on a misunderstanding.
In the fifth argument (271a19-22) Aristotle proves what for Sim-
plicius is the only essential point: reverse motions on the same circle
are not contraries ‘since these motions are from and into the same
thing, but contrary motion is defined as from a contrary into a
contrary’. Alexander explains why this argument is different from its
predecessors:
It would have been possible to use this argument also in the case
of the motions previously discussed. For none of them was from
a contrary into a contrary. But this is more evident in the case
of the circle, motion on which is not just not from a contrary into
a contrary, but not even from one thing into another, but from
and into the same thing. And that is why he also has set out the
argument for this case. (150,15-19)
Before considering Philoponus’ response to this argument it is neces-

sary to look at the final passage in chapter 4 (271a23-33) because,
whereas Philoponus treats it as a sixth argument, Simplicius consid-
ers it a ‘part’ (194,8) of the fifth argument, another way of proving the
same thing. For simplicity I shall refer to it as the sixth argument.
The argument is very problematic textually.25 Here I quote the
version of the text I use.
Introduction 19
But also if a motion in a circle were contrary to another motion
in a circle, one of them would be pointless because it is necessary
that what moves in a circle, wherever it begins from, reach all
the contrary places in the same way; but the contrarieties of
place are above and below, front and back, and right and left,
and the contrarieties of motion are derived from the contrarie-
ties of places. For if they were equal, they would not move, and
if one of the motions were dominant, the other would not exist.
Consequently, if both were, one of the bodies would be pointless,
because not moving with its motion. For we say that a sandal
which is not worn is pointless. But god and nature do nothing
pointless.
For Simplicius this passage is a reductio ad absurdum of the assump-

tion that reverse motions on a circle are contrary. For if they were
they would be from contrary places, and so things moving with them
would have ‘contrary natures’ and so come into conflict when they
meet. But then the two things would either cancel each other so that
both would be pointless or one would dominate the other, in which
case the other would be pointless. 26
After his discussion of the sixth argument at 154,18, Simplicius,
thinking specifically of the sphere of the planets and the sphere of the
fixed stars, raises the question whether motions on two different
circles might be contrary. He says that one might think so on the
grounds that the two spheres move from contrary places, the sphere
of the fixed stars from the east, that of the planets from the west.
Simplicius does his best to refute this argument, which is obviously
specious since ‘from the east’ and ‘from the west’ as applied here
specify directions not places of origin. Simplicius also claims that if
the two motions were contrary the things moving with them ought to
be contrary in nature, meet with one another, and change into one
another, something which is, of course, not true of the fixed stars and
the planets. In this passage Simplicius looks forward to an objection
of Philoponus at 195,14-17 that Aristotle ought to have considered
the question whether the two spheres move in contrary ways. Sim-
plicius responds there that it is perfectly obvious that the spheres do
not move in contrary ways in the relevant respect since they don’t
affect one another, and he repeats the arguments he has already
used.
In connection with the fifth argument Philoponus raises objections
to the definition of contrary motion as from and into a contrary,
although Simplicius insists that Aristotle has been relying on the
definition all along. Philoponus’ position is that, although this defini-
tion does apply to rectilinear motion and ordinary changes, there is
no reason why it should apply to circular motion, for which another
definition might be appropriate. He argues by trying to show that the
20 Introduction
Aristotelian definition leads to impossibilities. Simplicius’ responses
are inadequate because he ignores the fact that Philoponus’ immedi-
ate goal is refutation of Aristotle’s claims, not establishing an
alternative to them.27 Ultimately Simplicius is in the position of
saying that Aristotle is not willing to call the opposition clock-
wise/counterclockwise a contrariety (192,10-11; 196,2-4). In
connection with the sixth argument Philoponus asks at 197,10 why
it is not true in the case of two contrary rectilinear motions on the
same straight line that either one or both is pointless. Simplicius
acknowledges the force of this objection, while implying that Phi-
loponus borrowed it from someone else. His response is, however,
rather weak: sublunary things, unlike heavenly ones, are naturally
constituted to conflict and overpower one another, and the result is a
good for the universe as a whole.
2. The text
This translation is based on Heiberg’s edition of Simplicius’ commen-
tary (Heiberg (1894)), which I wish to discuss briefly here. My
remarks are based on Heiberg’s preface to his edition (cited here by
Roman numeral page) and his earlier, more detailed but slightly
discrepant report to the Berlin Academy (Heiberg (1892)). They
relate only to book 1.
For Heiberg the most important manuscript is:
A Mutinensis III E 8, thirteenth-fourteenth century, in the

Este Library in Modena (Wartelle (1963), no. 1052).
Heiberg ((1892), p. 71) singles out A for its correctness and purity.
But he admits that it is badly deficient and hastily written, with
frequent incorrect divisions of words, misunderstandings of abbre-
viations, arbitrary use of accents and breathing marks, extremely
many omissions, and frequent insertions in a wrong place of words
occurring in the vicinity. A glance at the apparatus on almost any
page of Heiberg’s edition makes clear how often he feels forced to
depart from A. On the whole these departures seem justified, but
there are some cases where he follows A and produces a text which
seems to me impossible or at least very difficult.
Heiberg thought that A and another text derived independently
from a lost archetype. That other text is:
B Ottobonianus gr. 83, sixteenth century, in the Vatican Li-

brary (Wartelle (1963), no. 1896).
B stops in book 1 (at 292,25 in Heiberg’s text), the remaining pages

Introduction 21
being torn out. Heiberg stresses its defective quality. Among the
other manuscripts which Heiberg cites are:28
C Coislinianus 169, fifteenth century, in the National Library

in Paris (Wartelle (1963), no. 1560).
D Coislinianus 166, fourteenth century, in the National Li-

brary in Paris (Wartelle (1963), no. 1558).
E Marcianus 491, thirteenth century, in the library of San

Marco in Venice (Mioni (1985), pp. 299-300; not in Wartelle
(1963)).
Heiberg took D and E to be significantly different from A and B, and

C to be intermediate between D and E, on the one hand, and A and
B, on the other. C and D are, in fact, not complete texts of Simplicius’
commentary, but texts of De Caelo with extensive marginalia, the
majority of which are derived from Simplicius’ commentary (not
necessarily word-for-word quotations). According to Heiberg E,
which is a complete (although lacunose) text, and D were copied from
the same prototype, E being copied by an uneducated scribe. E was
corrected by Bessarion (E2), using the Latin translation of William
Moerbeke, a work to which I shall return shortly.
Heiberg also cites three printed versions of the commentary in his
apparatus:
(a) The editio princeps of the Greek text. Simplicii Commen-

tarii in Quatuor Libros de Coelo, cum Textu Ejusdem, Venice:
Aldus Romanus and Andrea Asulani, 1526.
(b) The editio princeps of the Latin translation of William

Moerbeke. Simplicii philosophi acutissimi, Commentaria in
Quatuor Libros De coelo Aristotelis. Venice: Hieronymus Scotus,
1540.
(c) Karsten (1865).
Citations of (a) are rare because Heiberg ((1892), 75) realised that it
was a translation back into Greek of Moerbeke’s Latin translation.29
However, he did not realise that (b) was ‘corrected’ in the light of (a).
In my reports on what is in Heiberg’s apparatus criticus I omit what
he says about (b), but, when it seems to me useful, I do cite as
‘Moerbeke’ the readings in the recent edition of Moerbeke’s transla-
tion of Simplicius’ commentary on book 1 (Bossier (2004)).
Karsten’s edition was published one year after his death. It in-
cludes no critical apparatus, and has no preface by Karsten.
22 Introduction
Throughout it is based on single manuscripts. For 1-94,16 Karsten
relied on a ms. Heiberg took to be descended from B:
Taurinensis C.I.13, sixteenth century, in the National Library

in Turin (Wartelle (1963), no. 2086).
And for the rest of book 1 he relied on a ms. Heiberg took to be derived
from E:
Parasinus, gr. 1910, fifteenth century, in the National Library

in Paris (Wartelle (1963), no. 1396).
In the absence of a critical apparatus or inspection of these manu-

scripts, it is impossible to tell what alterations of his source Karsten
made, but there is little doubt that he made ‘improvements’.30 I have
sometimes thought it desirable to adopt them rather than what
Heiberg prints. For Karsten’s readings I have relied on Heiberg’s
apparatus, which includes an extensive, although not complete, re-
cord of Karsten’s text. My departures from Heiberg’s text are re-
corded in the footnotes and in the ‘Textual Questions’. For the text of
De Caelo itself I have relied on Moraux.
3. Brackets and parentheses

Square brackets are placed around lower case Roman numerals
which I have inserted for clarification. Angle brackets are used to set
off major and possibly debatable insertions made for clarification.
(Many minor insertions such as the substitution of a noun for a
pronoun are made without remark when they are judged to be
relatively certain; in particular I have frequently inserted a proper
name where Simplicius has only a ‘he’ or a third person singular
verb.) If an insertion represents an addition to the Greek text a
footnote explaining this is attached. Parentheses are used as punc-
tuation marks and to enclose Greek words inserted as information.
Occasionally they are used to mark an insertion by Simplicius in a
quotation.
Notes
1. That is, has no temporal beginning or end. For the most part discussion
focuses on the question of whether the cosmos had a temporal beginning.
2. There is some discussion of Philoponus and Simplicius with references
in the Introduction to Mueller (2010).
3. In particular I refer the reader to Hankinson’s translation for discus-
sion of the philosophical meaning and merits of what is said by both Aristotle
and Simplicius. The notes in Wildberg’s translation are largely textual, but
Wildberg (1988) is essentially a philosophical commentary on the fragments
Introduction 23
of Against Aristotle; to facilitate the reader’s use of this material I have
provided an index to the fragments found in the text translated in this
volume as Appendix 1. I would also like to record here my indebtedness to
Rescigno (2004), which provides a text, Italian translation, and analysis of
the fragments of Alexander’s commentary on book 1 of De Caelo. In Appendix
2 I give an index to those fragments found in the text translated in this
volume.
4. I use the quotation marks here because Simplicius holds that what we
(and Aristotle) call simple bodies are really composites the motions of which
are determined by their dominant component; see Appendix 3 on the purity
of the elements.
5. This description is rendered much more complex by considering the
‘entireties’ of the four elements, which form concentric layers, with a spheri-
cal earth at the centre of the cosmos, followed by water, air (divided into a
stagnant air beneath the mountain tops and a pure air above them, and fire).
For Simplicius (and at least for the sake of argument Philoponus) and
(according to Simplicius) Aristotle, the entireties of earth, water, and stag-
nant air are at rest, whereas the entireties of pure air and fire (both together
or sometimes fire alone being called the hupekkauma) revolve along with the
dominant east-west motion of heaven.
6. See 66,17-70,33 in the commentary on chapter 3.
7. 92,18-20; cf. 108,5-6.
8. Simplicius is here in agreement with Themistius, whom Philoponus
cites (131,20-4) as correcting rather than explaining Aristotle’s position.
9. Simplicius sometimes represents Philoponus as claiming that there is
no coming to be involving contraries; see, e.g., 123,11-14. This seems un-
likely.
10. cf. Wildberg (1988), p. 193.
11. cf. also 133,11-19. When Simplicius first introduces the question
whether there is a contrary to the cosmos or heaven at 121,25 he gives a
citation from Philoponus according to which, even if the motion of heaven
does not have a contrary, it does have a privation. Simplicius responds to the
objection in the same weak way: since Aristotle believes the motion of heaven
is eternal he cannot believe it has a privation.
12. See especially chapter 11.1-9 of Philoponus’ Against Proclus. Sim-
plicius indicates (136,9-10) that many arguments have been given against
the doctrine that the ultimate substratum is the three-dimensional but
contents himself with one (136,1-7) according to which, since it is matter, the
three-dimensional should be formless, without shape, size, number, or colour
but also since it is three-dimensional, it is finite and should have form, shape,
size, number, and colour. Philoponus would presumably accept that the
three-dimensional is formless, except in the sense of being three-dimen-
sional, but deny that this entails that it has form, shape, size, number, or
colour.
13. For an argument that Simplicius is mistaken in this interpretation of
Aristotle, see Sorabji (1988), 14-15. At one point (156,13-14) Simplicius
suggests that the matters of the different heavenly spheres are different.
14. 134,26-32; cf. 142,24-5, where Philoponus concedes that heaven has
never been observed to undergo ‘any of the things which lead to perishing’.
15. For Philoponus the simultaneous divine creation of matter and form
is a consequence of the fact that god created without a pre-existing substra-
tum and that form cannot exist without a substratum. For statements of the
24 Introduction
simultaneous creation of form and matter in Against Proclus; see, e.g., 6.11,
158,10-23 and 164,20-165,2; 11.1, 409,8-18; 12.6, 476,11-21.
16. Simplicius adds (118,20-2) without explanation that the word aithêr
indicates that heaven ‘is highest and superior to the things beneath it and is
finest and purest’.
17. For Simplicius’ rather weak attempt to explain the final words of
chapter 3 (270b26-31) as a preliminary to the proof of IV see 144,17-29;
Longo ((1961) ad loc.) considers the Aristotelian passage to be out of place.
18. Simplicius asserts what amounts to V’ at 157,3-6; cf. 161,21-3 and
167,25-7.
19. There is a similar apparent misrepresentation at 164,15-19.
20. It is necessary to keep in mind that in the disagreement between
Philoponus and Simplicius the important cases of primary substance are the
simple bodies and the cosmos or heaven.
21. I pass over what seems to me an insignificant discussion (170,22-
171,17) of whether Aristotle is talking about contrariety of lines or
contrariety of motions on lines.
22. Simplicius’ point is that, e.g., a circle does not change into a straight
line as a result of the being acted on by the straight line.
23. i.e., the centre.
24. Passing over disagreements about the meaning of Aristotle’s remark
(271a12-13) that motion on a semicircle ‘is the same as motion on the
diameter’ (185,3-13), and about an obscure phrase of Alexander’s (185,13-
22).
25. See the notes on 152,3 and 32.
26. After giving his interpretation of the passage Simplicius quotes and
disagrees with a number of interpretive claims of Alexander (152,2-153,16).
He then gives Alexander’s version of the whole argument that there is no
contrary to motion in a circle, a version which is independent of this sixth
argument.
27. To give one example Simplicius objects (190,15-191,5) to Philoponus’
arguing both that rectilinear motions are more contrary to each other than
to circular motion and that there are different kinds of contrariety for
rectilinear and circular motions. But Philoponus makes these claims in
connection with different Aristotelian arguments.
28. I mention only the mss. cited in my footnotes.
29. A fact first noticed by Peyron (1810).
30. cf. Bergk (1883), p. 143, n.1 and p. 148.
Translation of the text commented on
(On the Heavens 1.3, 270a12-4);
outline of the commentary
Since in this work the ratio of commentary to text commented on is

unusually high I give here the text of Aristotle broken down in
accordance with the lemmas in Simplicius. I indicate the pages in the
commentary where the lemma is discussed directly and in Sim-
plicius’ diatribes against Philoponus. The figures inserted for chapter
4 are taken from Heiberg.
I. Heaven does not come to be or perish,

change in size, or change in quality.
Chapter 3.270a12-b25 (91,21-109,15)

3, 270a12-22 Similarly it is reasonable to suppose that <what moves
in a circle> also does not come to be or perish or increase or alter
because everything which comes to be comes to be from a contrary
and some substratum and it likewise perishes by the action of a
contrary and into a contrary with something underlying, as was said
in our first discussions. But the motions of contrary things are
contrary. And so if there can be no contrary to <what moves in a
circle> because there is also no motion contrary to motion in a circle,
it seems that nature was right to exempt what was not going to come
to be or perish from contraries; for coming to be and perishing are
found in contraries. (91,21-109,15, including a lengthy excursus on
the devolution of the cosmos from the One and the notions of coming
to be and perishing; cf. 119,13-136,12)
3, 270a22-5 Moreover, everything which increases is caused to in-

crease by something of the same kind which accrues to it and is
resolved into the matter; but there is nothing from which this has
come to be. (109,16-110,32)
3, 270a25-35 But if it does not grow or perish, it is possible to accept

by the same reasoning that it does not alter. For alteration is change
with respect to quality, and the states and conditions of quality (such
as health and illness) do not come to be without changes in affection.
But we see that every natural body which changes in affection, for
example the bodies of animals and their parts and similarly those of
25
26 Translation
plants and those of the elements, grows and decays. Consequently,
since the body which moves in a circle cannot grow or decay, it is
reasonable that it also does not alter. (111,1-115,20)
3, 270b1-4 That the first body is everlasting and does not admit either
growth or decay, but is without aging or alteration or affection is
evident from what has been said – if one trusts our assumptions.
(115,21-116,2)
3, 270b4-9 It seems that this theory corroborates the phenomena and

that the phenomena corroborate the theory. For all people have a
conception of the gods, and all of them, Greeks and non-Greeks – if,
indeed, they believe in gods – assign the highest region to the divine,
obviously because what is immortal is linked with what is immortal.
For it cannot be any other way. (116,3-117,5; cf. 139,27-142,7)
3, 270b10-11 So if (eiper) there is something divine, as there is, what we

have just said about the first substance of bodies is correct. (117,6-19)
3, 270b11-16 This also follows sufficiently <clearly> from perception,

at least if we speak in relation to human confidence. For, according
to the record handed down from one person to another in all past time,
nothing is observed to have changed either in the whole of the last
heaven or in any of its proper parts. (117,20-118,13; cf. 142,7-143,31)
3, 270b16-25 It seems that also the name has been transmitted until
the present time by the ancients, who understand matters in the way
in which we do. For one should believe that the same opinions occur
to us not just once or twice but infinitely often. And so, thinking that
the first body was different from earth, fire, air, and water, they
called the highest region aithêr, determining its name from its ‘al-
ways running’ (thein aei) through time everlasting. (However,
Anaxagoras badly misuses the name aithêr, since he uses it to mean
‘fire’.) (118,14-119,6)
119,7-144,4 Against Philoponus (with a lengthy discussion of coming

to be and perishing and of contrariety and privation).
II. Premiss needed for I: there is no

contrary to motion in a circle
Chapter 3, 270b26-Chapter 4, end (144,5-201,10)

3, 270b26-31 It is also evident from what has been said why it is
impossible for the number of so-called simple bodies to be greater.
For it is necessary that a simple body have a simple motion, and we
Translation 27
say that the only simple motions are in a circle and in a straight line,
and of the latter there are two parts, motion from the centre and
motion to the centre. (144,5-145,9)
4, 270b32-271a5 One can gain confidence that no other motion is

contrary to motion in a circle from several considerations. In the first
place we suppose that a straight line is most of all opposite to a
circular one. For concave and convex are not only thought to be
opposite to one another, but also, taken together and as a pair, they
are thought to be opposite to the straight. So if something is contrary
to motion in a circle, it is most necessary that it be motion in a
straight line. But the motions in a straight line are opposed to one
another by places, since up/down is a differentiation and contrariety
with respect to place. (145,10-146,16; cf. 170,11-176,12)
4, 271a5-10 Moreover, if someone assumes that the same statement

which holds of the straight line also holds of the circular one (namely
that motion from A toward B is contrary to motion from B toward A),
he is <still> speaking about motion in a straight line, since such
motion is finite, but the circular motions between the same points are
infinite. (146,17-147,21; cf. 176,13-179,23)
Figure for 271a5-101
4, 271a10-13 Similarly in the case of the motion on a single semicir-

cle, for example, that from C to D and from D to C. For it is the same
as the motion on the diameter. For we always suppose that each thing
is distant by a straight line. (147,22-148,26; cf. 179,24-187,27)
4, 271a13-19 Similarly, even if someone were to draw a circle and lay

it down that motion on one semicircle is contrary to that on the other,
for example, that in the whole circle the motion from E to F on the
28 Translation
semicircle G is contrary to the motion from F to E on the semicircle
H. And even if these are contraries, nevertheless the motions on the
whole circle are not thereby contrary to one another. (148,27-149,28;
cf. 187,28-189,21)
4, 271a19-22 However, the motion in a circle from A to B is not

contrary to that from A to C either, since these motions are from and
into the same thing, but contrary motion is defined2 as from a
contrary into a contrary. (150,1-19; cf. 189,22-194,5)
4, 271a22-33 But also if a motion in a circle were contrary to another

motion in a circle, one of them would be pointless3 because it is
necessary that what moves in a circle, wherever it begins from, reach
all the contrary places in the same way; but the contrarieties of place
are above and below, front and back, and right and left, and the
contrarieties of motion are derived from the contrarieties of places.
For if they were equal, they would not move, and if one of the motions
were dominant, the other would not exist. Consequently, if both were,
one of the bodies would be pointless, because not moving with its
motion. For we say that a sandal which is not worn is pointless. But
Translation 29
god and nature do nothing pointless. (150,20-156,24, including an
excursus on whether the sphere of the fixed stars and the sphere of
the planets move in contrary ways; cf. 194,6-198,6)
156,25-201,10 Against Philoponus.
Notes
1. This figure is taken from Heiberg’s text at 146,23; the next are taken
from 147,29, 149,5, and 150,8.
2. cf. Physics 5.2, 229b21-2.
3. Following Allen (1936), I bracket the words epi to auto gar (‘For they
are to the same thing’); see the notes on 152,3 and 32.
SIMPLICIUS
On Aristotle
Translation
Simplicius on the first book of
Aristotle’s On the Heavens
<Chapter 3>
270a12 Similarly it is reasonable to suppose that <what moves
in a circle> also does not come to be or perish ... . 1
He has proved that the body which moves in a circle is something 91,25
different from sublunary things, more complete than they and prior
to them, having neither weight nor lightness. He next proves that it
‘does not come to be or perish or increase or alter’ with the conse-
quence that it does not undergo any change except change of place
and of such change <only> motion in a circle. Just as in the preceding 30
he derived2 the transcendence of what moves in a circle over sublu-
nary things from the difference in their motions, so now he derives
from the form of circular motion both the ungeneratedness of heaven
by comparison with the way we say sublunary things are generated3 92,1
and the fact that it does not increase or alter.
And first he proves that it does not come to be or perish by giving,
I believe, the following syllogism in the second figure:
[i] The body which moves in a circle does not have a contrary;
[ii] what comes to be or perishes has a contrary from which it 5
comes to be and into which it perishes;
and the conclusion is [iii] ‘therefore, the body which moves in a
circle does not come to be or perish’.
Of these two premisses he now proves the minor [i], which says that
the body which moves in a circle does not have a contrary. For the
demonstration of the major premiss [ii] he refers to the first book of
the Physics; he calls them ‘our first discussions’ because they deal 10
with the first principles of nature. He proves in turn that the body
which moves in a circle does not have a contrary with the same kind
of argument as follows:
[iv] What moves in a circle does not have a motion which is

contrary to its own natural motion;
[v] what has a contrary also has a motion which is contrary to its
natural motion, namely the motion with which its contrary moves 15
naturally (he has posited this with the words ‘But the motions of
contrary things (obviously natural things) are contrary’);
33
34 Translation
and the conclusion is [i] ‘what moves in a circle does not have a
contrary’.
Here again he has taken the major premiss [v] as something clearly
true. For since the natures of contrary natural forms4 are contrary,
their motions are as well because nature is a starting point of motion.
20 He demonstrates the minor premiss [iv], which says that there is no
motion contrary to the motion of the body which moves in a circle,
that is to motion in a circle, later,5 having said more things in
between.
The whole argument depends on these two things, one that if
something is going to come to be or perish there must always be
something underlying and a contrary from which it comes to be and
25 into which it perishes, the other that there is no motion contrary to
motion in a circle; he will pursue the demonstration of the latter in
several ways a little later, and he now assumes the former without
demonstration since it was proved in the Physics. Accordingly we
should now recall what he said there and, after having first distin-
guished the meanings of ‘comes to be’, we should clarify in which
30 sense Aristotle is now making his argument and in which one he
denies that heaven comes to be so that we may learn in what senses
Plato says the universe comes to be and Aristotle says that it does not
without contradicting one another.6
Now in general something is said to come to be if it receives its
existence from some cause. For certainly what is made is made by a
92,1 maker and what is generated is generated by a generator, and, as
Plato says,7 it is impossible for anything to come to be apart from a
cause. And it is clear that in this <general> sense the only thing
which does not come to be is the first cause of everything, and this
cause is both one and absolutely simple since everything participates
5 in the One and what doesn’t participate in it is nothing. However, the
One does not even participate in plurality, and so everything which
comes to be is pluralised. For plurality is given existence directly by
the One, since it is also necessary for plurality to participate in the
One in order that it not be infinitely many times infinite. However,
the One is without trace of plurality since it is one in the strict sense.
Because the first plurality which proceeds from the One participates
10 directly in the One it is unified and remains in the One; and to the
extent, however slight, to which it proceeds from the One, it does to
that extent come to be. And as a result of this divine men have
handed down to us theogonies, <describing> the plurality of gods
which remains in the One and, as some would say, processes forth by
the multiplication of the One; and these men make hymns to the
coming to be of this plurality insofar as it has gotten its existence
15 from the One, in just the way that we see progression from the monad
as the coming to be of numbers. However, insofar as plurality re-
Translation 35
mains in the One it is unified by the highest unification, no division
(in which what is not is first produced) yet appearing. And that
<plurality> is Being in the primary sense, and it is also the first
principle of beings, and not only something derived from a principle.
But, as the Socrates of the Phaedrus8 shows, a first principle does not
come to be. For this thing, which is self-substantiating in every way,
is first and is Being in the strict sense.9 For the absolutely One, which 20
is the cause of Being, is superior to what is self-substantiating and
reveals something which is double and both gives and is given
existence. And the first plurality is ruled by the One and is able to
give existence because of the One and to receive existence because of
plurality, and, as a result, it is not absolutely one because the One
which is the cause of all things is above it. The very first and most 25
authoritative being is a whole which exists simultaneously both in
terms of being and of the extendedness10 of being, and so the time of
our world is given its ‘always’ by Being.11 But since this time also
remains in the One, its always, which is forever, is a restricted <form
of eternity>. For, being a unified plurality or rather a pluralised one,
<Being> does not reveal either an extension in substance or an 30
extendedness in being in the strict sense, and therefore, it is also
what it is, genuine Being. 94,1
Next, what is given existence directly by12 <Being> is given exist-
ence directly; it moves from Being and becomes different from it and
is given substance in terms of this motion. And just as <Being> is
self-substantiating, so too this has come to be self-moving. For insofar
as it moves from13 Being, it is given existence because of motion, but, 5
insofar as it is proximate to Being and not yet separating from itself,
it has become self-moving just as what is prior to it 14 is self-substan-
tiating; and it has what moves and what is moved as the same thing
because it is still filled with the One and ruled by it.
But something pluralised proceeds from this, something which
also participates in the One in a way but does not remain in the One
and is not ruled by it; and therefore, because it is divided into parts, 10
it is no longer either self-substantiating or self-moving because it no
longer contains in itself the cause of existence connected to the One
in the way that what is unified15 and what comes after it do. This
thing immediately undergoes extension in substance and extended-
ness with respect to being16 because, departing and separating from
the One in every respect, it has become body and things of the same
kind as body. And time proceeds together with this from that eter- 15
nity, measuring the extendedness of its being and receiving the
always of time. But in this case there is no longer a simultaneous
whole with respect to either substance or extendedness of being or (as
some might say) with respect to life. And so, since this participates
in much which is not, it is not a being in the strict sense; for a
particular part of its substance is not exactly what it is (hoper todi),17 20
36 Translation
nor is its being <always> the same, but rather, as time flows, it is
different at different times, so that it also does not receive its genera-
tion from its cause as a whole simultaneously (since if it did it too
would be Being), but it receives its generation piece by piece in the
way that it can. Departing entirely from the One and participating
in it as something entering from outside, the plurality in it has
become a composite18 rather than a unified thing, and therefore it
25 also gets its existence entirely from an external source. For a plural-
ity which is unified contains the One in itself, and since the One is
what gives existence to all things and gives it in the strict sense, even
if a unified plurality moves down from the only thing which gives
existence, nevertheless it holds what gives existence in itself and it
has become self-substantiating. But a composite plurality receives
the one of composition from outside, and, coming to be in the indefi-
niteness and extension of this sort of plurality, it immediately
30 becomes the one form which is in matter, just as what is self-moving
is intermediate between the two.19 And so what participates by
composition in the One as form in matter does not exist simultane-
ously as a whole either in terms of substance or in terms of the
95,1 extendedness of being, and it is not at all the cause of being for itself
because of being divided, as a result of which it no longer contains in
itself the One. For what is divided exists part by part and is no longer
a whole or self-substantiating in the strict sense, just as what causes
motion part by part is not self-moving in the strict sense; for what is
5 self-substantiating or self-moving in the strict sense must be without
parts and unextended and coincident with itself as a whole, but what
has parts and is extended only has its being from outside. So as a
result and because it is composite and is not what it is as a simulta-
neous whole but has its being in coming to be, what has parts is what
comes to be in the strict sense as distinguished from what is in the
strict sense, namely what gets its being from itself and is simultane-
ously as a whole what it is. This sort of generated thing acquires both
10 change and motion directly from Being because it does not remain in
Being in the strict sense, and therefore it does not remain entirely in
the same condition, since, if it did, it would remain in the One, just
as genuine Being does. But it is always changing and moving out of
its previous state, and so time moves along with it, measuring and
ordering its unfolding, just as something else, whether it is place or
15 something else which has this power, orders the divided extension of
its substance and its corporeal nature. And so for the reasons given
this is what comes to be in the strict sense.
Because Being is unmoving and always in the same condition with
respect to substance and power and activity, it is necessary that what
20 is given existence directly from Being20 always continue to come to
be, since Being in the strict sense has entered into what comes to be
and the always of eternity has entered into the always of time. For
Translation 37
<what is given existence directly by being> receives the completeness
and entirety of Being, which exists as a simultaneous whole, part-by-
part as it is able, imitating its infinite power by means of this ‘to
infinity’. The much-honoured heaven shows itself to us as this sort of
thing, existing in corporeal nature as the first thing after the intelli- 25
gible order, a most beautiful image in relation to the best of
paradigms, since what comes to be moves down from unity and
sameness into similarity to Being and becomes an image because it
then is connected to Being by resemblance rather than by being.
Because it is moved in a motionless way and causes change in an
unchanging way, heaven has only those kinds of change which can 30
exist together with stability. Therefore it has change with respect to
place, the kind of change which can occur while the substance and
substantial constitution of a thing remain, since of the kinds of
change, it has the least connection with the substance and constitu-
tion of things. And of the kinds of change of place heaven has received
the one with which, although it changes place, it does not depart from
its place, but rather it remains in the same <place> while moving, 96,1
whereas, of things which move in a straight line, even one which
moves a very short distance does not remain in the same place.
Consequently motion in a circle is more rest than motion since in an
amazing way things which move in a circle remain fixed as a whole
but revolve in their parts. Being everlasting because of being given 5
existence directly by what is unmoving, heaven is superior to change
from not being into being or from being into not being, which it is
customary to call coming to be and perishing. For if it came to be at
some time not having previously been, it would be necessary that its
cause make something at some time, not having made it previously,
and that this cause no longer be preserved as unmoving and
always the same; and if it perished it would lose its similarity to 10
the unmoving cause, and that cause would no longer be the imme-
diate cause or what21 makes exist the things which are directly
given existence by it.
Since increase and diminution are a kind of coming to be and
perishing, they stand as completely alien to the generated thing22
which is introduced directly by the unmoving cause. But in a way
which we will perhaps understand as we proceed23 one can in a sense 15
observe qualitative change in that thing. And so the very first and
most perfect generator of corporeal existence gave existence to this
sort of thing, which does exist but it is not entirely unchanging; for
even if, as Plato says in the Statesman,24 it participated in many
blessed good things coming from its generator, nevertheless it shared
in body – that is, it was extended and divided and underwent unfold- 20
ing from being – and therefore it was impossible for it to endure with
absolutely no participation in change. And so, changing its place and
configurations and standing in different states at different times
38 Translation
because of its different ways of participating in the goodness accruing
to it from its causes, it introduces the things under it, but no longer
without motion in the way in which it was introduced but rather
25 giving existence to these things by moving. Here then substantial
change first appears and the coming to be and perishing of substance
take their start. But coming to be is not from what is not in any way
and perishing is not into what is not in any way25 because the causes,
changing from one state into another, give existence to the differ-
ences of the things which are introduced here.26
30 Perhaps one should state matters more clearly as follows. The
intelligible plurality27 is also unified with respect to the division of
itself, which is understood as taking place in the intelligible because
97,1 everything which genuinely is remains in the One. And therefore, not
only do the different forms exist together simultaneously in that
substance, but so do their contraries, and they participate in one
another and are unified with one another in such a way that their
participation is not something extraneous; nor does acting and being
5 acted on have any place there. And so those things transcend coming
to be in the strict sense.28 Extension, division, and change make their
appearance in the first things29 which come to be in the strict sense,
but their likeness to what has no parts is preserved in its purity. The
parts and forms which fill out that substance are distinguished from
one another; they act on and are acted on by one another because they
10 are separated from one another, but nevertheless, what acts acts and
what is acted on is acted on while the substance endures and their
activity with respect to one another brings about a completion; for by
participating in one another the forms in what comes to be are images
of the unity in what genuinely is. However, the things which are in
what is given existence directly by Being act perfectively, but the
things30 which are subsequently given existence from these move
down from the ‘always’ of time to the ‘somewhere in a part of time’
15 <and are involved with other things in generation>31 because they
are given existence in terms of the conditions of heavenly things
which come to be different at different times so that they are one way
when the sun happens to be in such and such a sign of the zodiac and
another way when it happens to be in another. And so when the
separation in the last plurality has become great and sublunary
substances are composed32 from things separated in this way, all
things do not participate in all things nor are all things in all things,33
20 but those different things which have come together in one form can
exist together with one another, and they participate in one another
without conflict, and contraries which endure the whole separation
in our world are all combined into the same thing,34 and most of all
the more generic of these, such as heat, cold, dryness, moistness, and
the things which accompany these and are apprehended by each of
25 the senses, such as whiteness, blackness, acuteness, heaviness,
Translation 39
sweetness, bitterness, roughness, smoothness, and the antitheses
related to smell. These things are not combined on their own, but
rather they are combined together with the bodies which underlie
them in which they have their existence. These bodies are the first
elements, fire, air, water, and earth, from which other things, ani-
mals and plants, are composed. But when a combining of something
harmonious and balanced deriving from heavenly things occurs, a
combining which has a suitability for this35 or that one of the compos- 30
ite forms, then that form shines out and holds together the
coincidence of the contraries and is held together by it. But when
contrary things such as fire and water, because they are naturally 98,1
difficult to mix, remain in conflict with respect to their contrary
qualities, then it is necessary that at some time one of them dominate
and increase from the diminishing of its opposite and at that time
that composite form, such as that of cow or horse, which is of a nature 5
to attach to that sort of balance of the elements, perishes; but when
another form of balance and a different suitability comes to the
elements because of overbearing and being overborne among the
elements, bees come to be from a cow, wasps from a horse and
different worms from different animals and plants.36 There are times
when a great overbearingness of the elements has occurred among
composites, and <the elements>, having then gotten weaker or37 10
having gotten older, become unsuitable for receiving a composite
form; they are dissolved and then move into their own entireties, and
there they are renewed and rejuvenated, and then they again move
toward combination. These things are most of all made clear by
water, which is most suitable for coming to be and nourishment when
it has become pure and is separated from its own entirety, as is seen
in the case of springs. 15
And it is clear that in our world coming to be and perishing are
changes which come to be by the action of a contrary, changes which
are from one contrary state into another; in the case of the elements
water, for example, is changed by fire into a structure which is
contrary to water, a fiery structure, and in this way fire comes to be
from what is contrary to itself in terms of contrary qualities,38 namely 20
water, by the action of a contrary of water, namely fire; for it is
necessary that what perishes be contrary to what makes it perish,
and that the result of coming to be be the same as what acts. For the
production of the elements is a change into themselves which is from
things which are acted on and produced by39 things which act, where
obviously the substrata are suitable for each of what acts and what
is acted on. And again, the perishing of a contrary comes about by the
action of a contrary; for water perishes into fire by the action of fire. 25
Consequently the perishing of one thing is the coming to be of another
and the coming to be of one thing is the perishing of another, with
qualities being destroyed into what is not; for when fire comes to be
40 Translation
from water the cold and moist quality departs from a corporeal
substance, which takes on the qualities of fire. And this happens
30 when the change is from one substance, that of water, into another
substance, that of fire. But when the elements act on and are acted
on by each other with respect to qualities more faintly so that they
99,1 implant in one another from themselves a condition, water becoming
warmer while remaining water, fire becoming cooler or moister while
remaining fire, then there is said to be a qualitative change and the
result is said to be an affection, since one substance has not come to
be from another, but a substance has only come to be differently
5 qualified. And it is clear that not just any condition comes to be from
any condition, but a contrary condition comes to be from its contrary;
for what is cooled is not cooled by dryness, but by coldness; for what
is affected is affected by what acts and acts with respect to its own
nature and by being what it is. For what acts naturally acts in this
way, and <what is acted on> is affected with the sort of affection
which the producer had, that is, the affection with respect to which
10 the producer acted; and what acts naturally and by itself implants
the kind of affection which the producer had as a quality and with
respect to which it acts. For what acts naturally wants to change
what is acted on into itself, but a contrary is changed into a contrary,
the heat in what is cooled into the coldness in what cools. But, as I
said, when there is a qualitative change, what comes to be comes to
15 be these things incompletely, and what was previously warm be-
comes cooler, but not in such a way to be cooled completely and
change into the nature of what does the cooling: this is what happens
in the case of things which come to be and perish <in the strict
sense>. However, in every case a contrary acts on a contrary and
destroys it, wanting to change what it acts on into itself. For example,
if fire acts on air, wanting to change it into itself and make it fiery,
20 then, since air is also assumed to be hot, fire does not want to change
the heat of the air; for heat can also exist in the fire. However, since
it is impossible for moistness to exist together with fire, fire destroys
this, not with heat by itself but with dryness, and the heat coinciden-
tally cooperates with the dryness.
And so one might also give the following syllogism. Sublunary
25 bodies which act naturally act with the desire to multiply themselves.
Things which act for the sake of multiplying themselves change what
they act on into themselves. Things which change what they act on
into themselves make the things in what they act on which cannot
exist together with themselves perish. Things which cannot exist
together are contraries, and contraries are destroyed by their con-
100,1 traries; for things which can exist together in a common substratum
do not destroy one another. And so when the contraries in what is
acted on are destroyed by their contraries in what acts and the
substratum takes on the qualities or quantities of what acts in place
Translation 41
of their contraries which it previously possessed, it changes into the 5
nature of what acts, and what was previously water becomes fire by
the action of fire via air as an intermediate: the heat, being more
active, first casts out the cold from the water and then the dryness
casts out the moistness. And any magnitudes or figures which cannot
exist together <with the new qualities> are changed into their con-
traries, and in this way the corporeal extension of water (or
something else40 in the water which is more material), accepting the 10
qualities contrary to the ones it had, changes from water into fire,
with the qualities it has in common with fire and which could exist
together with each of the qualities <involved in the change> endur-
ing. <This is true> whether the corporeal nature itself41 has some
qualities which are common at some time or prime matter has them;
for when a change occurs it is necessary that something remain
which is the subject of the change, and in the strict sense it is the 15
thing which changes with respect to the departing quality.
And so, some of these qualities themselves perish and others come
to be, but the substratum changes with respect to them, and this is
not just true in the case of coming to be but also in the case of
qualitative change. For it was also said42 about the latter that when
the change of what is acted on with respect to contrary qualities is
not complete but is only a slight alteration43 of different things from 20
different things, as in the case of water which is heated, then what is
acted on does not become different, but only differently qualified.
Now this is not just true in the case of qualitative changes in the way
I have said, but it is also true in the case of natural increase and
diminution; for what increases naturally, for example what is nour-
ished, changes the contrary conditions in the nourishment toward
itself and makes the nourishment similar <to itself>, and in this way
it attaches the nourishment to itself and grows. And even if the 25
capacity to take in nutrition involves something related to soul, it
nevertheless accomplishes what it does in terms of natural changes.44
But also things which change place change from one place to another
with the thing which changes enduring. And so every sublunary
transformation is a change, with the changing thing enduring in
some respect. Therefore what comes to be in time does not come to be
from what is not but from what is; for, just as the time at which these 30
things come to be is preceded by another time after which it exists,
so too what comes to be is preceded by something else after which and
from which what has come to be has come to be.45 And so it was 101,1
reasonable for Aristotle to posit change as the genus of all sublunary
transformation in the Physics.46
And it is also reasonable that this change is everlasting, not just
because it is given existence by the everlasting change in heaven,
which is a change of place with respect to the different configura-
tions47 but also because the perishing of one thing is always the 5
42 Translation
coming to be of another. And it is reasonable that the simple bodies
in our world endure forever in their own entireties, but undergo
coming to be and perishing in their parts. For even if the change of
compounds comes to be primarily with respect to these parts, and
when <the compounds> are dissolved <the parts> move naturally
into their proper regions and entireties, the entireties endure and
10 send away parts of themselves and again receive back parts, and this
happens forever because of the everlastingness of change.
And it is reasonable that, since coming to be is a change, things
that come to be and perish or increase and diminish or alter or change
in place – and in general what undergoes change – change from a
contrary state into a contrary by the action of a cause which is
15 contrary to it. And that is why in the first book of the Physics48
Aristotle, seeking the principles of natural things which come to be
and perish, says that they are contraries and what underlies them.
And it is clear that things which come to be or perish with respect to
qualities, such as heat or dryness, have contrary qualities and
change from them. However, things which change with respect to
20 substance, such as fire insofar as it is fire or a human being insofar
as it is a human being, also change because of the change of qualities
into one another. But they are substances insofar as they are fire or
a human being, and there is no form contrary to a substance. So from
what do they come to be, not as hot or cold, but as a human being? It
is clear that they come to be from what is not a human being but is
25 naturally constituted to become a human being. The seed and the
katamênia are things of this sort, not insofar as they are just seed or
katamênia, but insofar as they are not a human being but are of a
nature to become a human being. For it would not become a human
being if it were a human being, since what is does not become what
it is. Nor would it become a human being if it were neither a human
being nor of a nature to become one. So what single word do we use
to refer to this insofar as it is not something but is of a nature to
30 become it? It is customary to refer to it as a privation or lack (sterêsis)
and to say that what does not have the form which it is said to lack
but is of a nature to possess it, is lacking. And so a new-born puppy
lacks eyes because it is of a nature to have them, but what has been
made completely blind is said to lack eyes with respect to some other
102,1 privation but not this one, since this privation cannot make a turn
(anakamptei), but the privation involved in coming to be, from which
things which are said to come to be change into the form, does make
a turn into the form. Now when something comes to be cold from
being hot, it comes to be from what is not cold but is of a nature to
5 come to be cold and therefore from what is hot; for what is dry is not
of a nature to change into what is cold by the action of what is cold
because it is possible for dry to exist together with cold. So if it is not
true of everything which comes to be, that it comes to be from a
Translation 43
contrary form which exists together for a while with the substratum
in the way hot comes to be from cold (for first of all it is not true of
substances, since substance has no contrary), but it is true of every- 10
thing which comes to be, including what changes from contrary
forms, that it comes to be from what is not so and so but is of a nature
to be so and so, it is reasonable for Aristotle to call49 the general
common principles of coming to be form, privation, and substratum.
But when he calls50 form and privation contraries, he is not doing so
in terms of the strict meaning of ‘contrary’ since both of two contrar-
ies are forms. Rather he is doing so in terms of opposition (antithesis)
since form and privation are opposed to one another.
I have set these things out at length in the desire to articulate my 15
own thought about them most of all but – with reason – also that of
those who will read them carefully. I think that on the basis of what
has been said, everything for the sake of which this whole discussion
was started has become clear: how what comes to be comes to be from
some contrary and a substratum and how what perishes perishes
from a substratum and into a contrary by the action of a contrary.
This is now posited by Aristotle without demonstration because it has 20
been proved in the ‘first discussions’, as he says.51 However, it is
necessary to remember that even if a substance does not primarily
come to be from or perish into a contrary in the strict sense (because
substance is not contrary to substance), first of all it does come to be
from its proper privation, and second it, too, does come to be through
the coming to be of contraries from contraries, and again, conversely, 25
it perishes through the perishing of contraries into a contrary. For
when the qualities and quantities in the seed and the katamênia
change into the contraries of themselves into which they are of a
nature <to change>, that is, the qualities and quantities of a human
being, then the form of human being supervenes; and conversely,
when some elements overbear and their contraries are diminished
and the substratum is carried down into disharmony, the substance 30
perishes, but not otherwise.
But since this is enough of these matters, let us next see in what 103,1
sense of ‘comes to be’ Aristotle denies that heaven comes to be and
tries to demonstrate that it does not come to be, and in what sense
Plato says that both heaven and the whole cosmos come to be.
Now it is clear that Aristotle calls only one thing coming to be: the 5
change in time from not being into being, a change which is always
followed by perishing. On this basis he will demonstrate52 that
heaven not only does not come to be but also does not perish, and
<that this is his idea of coming to be> is even clearer when he clearly
demonstrates53 that what comes to be always perishes and what
perishes comes to be. For it is clear that he takes as coming to be and
perishing those cases which occur in a segment of time and attach to 10
sublunary things. And so, having demonstrated that there is a fifth
44 Translation
substance apart from sublunary things, namely the substance of the
heavenly body, which is prior to them in nature and more perfect, just
as he denies that the fifth substance has weight or lightness or moves
in a straight line (these being propria of sublunary things), so too he
15 denies that it54 comes to be or perishes <as they do>. I think this is
indisputable both because he says that coming to be and perishing
are a sort of change with one thing coming to be and perishing after
another and because, speaking against those who say that the cosmos
comes to be but does not perish, he proves55 that what comes to be
always perishes as well. And it is not at all surprising that Aristotle,
20 who always wants to take as assumptions things which are immedi-
ately clear to everyone, says that what comes to be is what shares in
all coming to be56 and is seen clearly to come to be and perish in a
segment of time.
Plato, too, certainly knows this kind of coming to be of sublunary
things which is the opposite of perishing, since in the tenth book of
the Laws he writes:57
And the coming to be of anything results when what affection

occurs? It is clear that it is when a starting point grows and
25 comes into the second transition and then into the neighbouring
one, and, coming as far as three, it takes on being perceived by
perceivers. So everything comes to be by transforming and
changing in this way. And it genuinely is whenever it endures,
but if it changes into another state it is completely destroyed.
However, Plato also knows the other kind of coming to be in which

what has moved down into corporeal extension and is not further able
30 to give itself existence but is only given existence by some other cause
is said to come to be as distinguished from that which genuinely is
and which is its immediate cause.58 For it is necessary that what
comes to be and gets its existence from elsewhere get its existence
104,1 from Being, which is self-substantiating; otherwise one proceeds to
infinity, always positing one thing which comes to be prior to another.
Having defined this kind of coming to be after this kind of Being in
the Timaeus, Plato says that the cosmos comes to be in this sense.
And the definition of both, which is based on our cognitive powers, is
something like this: 59
5 What is it which always is but does not come to be, and what is
it which60 comes to be but never is? The one is grasped by
thought with reason and is always the same,61 but the other is
opined by opinion with irrational perception and it comes to be
and is destroyed, but does not ever genuinely exist.
10 And Plato says that the cosmos also comes to be in this sense of ‘come
Translation 45
to be’, being given existence directly by the god who genuinely is. He
writes the following about the cosmos:62
Was it always without having any starting point of coming to be

or did it come to be?63 It has come to be, since it is visible and
tangible, and it has a body.
But everything of this sort has obviously come to be and does come to
be. For what is self-substantiating must have no parts and be coinci-
dent with itself as a whole. But what is extended and has parts
cannot be coincident with itself as a whole, and consequently, since 15
it is not self-substantiating, it always gets its existence by the action
of something else and is therefore said to come to be.64
However, some people interpret the term ‘is destroyed’ in the
definition of ‘come to be’ carelessly and think that Plato obviously
sentenced the cosmos and heaven to perishing. Therefore it is neces-
sary to say what this term ‘is destroyed’ means. Since immediately
after the words ‘comes to be and is destroyed’ Plato adds ‘but does not 20
ever (oudepote) genuinely exist’, he is, I think, clearly indicating to
those without preconceptions that existing forever transcends exist-
ing <only> at some time (pote), since ‘not ever’ is said in the strict
sense of everlasting things.65 However, <what is everlasting> exists
forever because it is produced directly from what genuinely is and is
unchanging; and conversely because it is not self-substantiating,
does not genuinely exist, and is not simultaneously a whole and 25
simultaneously everything which it is, <what is everlasting> changes
in some way; and it receives a different completeness for itself at
different times, but it receives it forever because of the directly
productive cause, which is unchanging, and because of its own suit-
ability, which it has because it is derived directly from what is
genuinely existent.
And I believe it is easy to see from what is written in the Statesman
that Plato thinks that change attaches to <the cosmos> not because
it comes to be or perishes in some segment of time, but rather because
of its corporeal nature because of which it does not have all its 30
blessedness simultaneously, as what genuinely exists does. As I
recall, what is written is sort of like this:66
What we call heaven or cosmos shares in many blessed things

because of what generated it. Nevertheless it also shares in 105,1
body, so that it would be completely impossible for it to remain
without a share in change.
Now suppose that it were to perish: if it perished into another cosmos,

it would be possible to use the word ‘change’; but if it perished into
what is not, it would not be said to change because what transforms
46 Translation
5 from one thing into another changes.67 But why does he say ‘<It is
completely impossible for it to remain> without a share in change’
unless it also contains something which does not change?
It is also clear from what is written in the Timaeus that Plato
thinks that the cosmos neither has come to be in a segment of time
nor perishes in a segment of time. First of all he says that time has
come to be together with heaven when he says68 clearly, ‘So time has
10 come to be together with heaven’. And so it is impossible for there to
be a time before there is heaven. But if this is so, heaven did not begin
to come to be after some time, since, if it did, time would have
preceded it, and when the time at which the cosmos came to be was
present, any preceding time would be entirely past. But it is also not
possible for it to perish in a segment of time either. For again, after
the present time at which it perishes there will be some future time.
15 But if Plato said,69 ‘so that having been generated simultaneously
they should also be dissolved simultaneously if some dissolution of
them ever occurred’, he was using these very words to indicate their
indissolubility. For if it is necessary that the cosmos be dissolved
together with time (if, indeed, it were dissolved), but time is
indissoluble (since what is dissolved at some time (pote) has time
after it since ‘some time’ is a part of time), it is clear that the
20 cosmos is indissoluble. And accordingly Plato added70 this to what
had been said:
And <time came to be> in accordance with the paradigm of the

eternal nature in such a way that it would be as like it as
possible; for the paradigm exists for all eternity, but it has come
to be, is, and will be forever through all time.
Now how could a thing of this sort, which ‘has come to be, is, and will
25 be for all time’ have come to be after some time, say, for example, six
thousand years ago,71 or perish at some time?
However, these people, who are unable to distinguish the forever
of time from the always of eternity and say that time comes to be and
perishes in a segment of time, have no shame and they call as a
witness Plato when he says,72 ‘so that it be as similar as possible to
the perfect Intelligible Living Thing in imitating the eternal nature’.
30 But how could what exists in a segment of time (and – as these people
say – a very short one) be as similar as possible to eternity, especially
if it is compared with what is forever? And what need is there to say
very much when Plato has said clearly that because of their own
nature, which is corporeal and extended, both heavenly and sublu-
nary things (both earth – for he speaks clearly about earth73 – and
obviously the entireties of the other elements) are not completely
105,1 immortal since they participate in some change, but that because of
the goodness of what directly creates them, which always bestows the
Translation 47
appropriate goods upon them, they are indissoluble and will not meet
‘a fate of death’?74 But I think it is better to hear the words of Plato 5
himself, or rather the words of the creator of all things, whose
thoughts and deeds Plato, acting as a prophet, has proclaimed to us
when he said,75
Now when all the gods, both those who revolve invisibly76 and
those who are visible to the extent they wish, had come to be,
the generator of this universe said the following to them: ‘Gods,
of gods whereof I am the creator and of works the father, those
which are my own handiwork are indissoluble save with my
will.77 Now everything which is bound is dissoluble, but to will 10
to dissolve what is well harmonised and in good condition is the
work of someone bad. Therefore, also, since you have been
generated you are not completely immortal or indissoluble,
but78 you will not be dissolved or meet a fate of death since with
my will you have attained79 a greater and more authoritative
bond than those with which you were bound together when you
were born. So now learn what I have to say to you. There 15
remain80 three kinds of mortals which have not been generated,
and if these are not generated, heaven will be incomplete since
it will not contain all the kinds of living things, but it ought81 to
contain them if it is going to be sufficiently complete. But if
these things were generated and shared in life because of me,
they would be equal to the gods. In order that they be mortal
and this universe be genuinely everything, you must turn in
accordance with nature to the creation of living things, imitat- 20
ing my power which was involved in your generation. And as far
as concerns the part of them which it is appropriate to call by
the same name as the immortals, the part which is called divine,
and has command in those of them who always wish to follow
justice and you, I will give it birth and existence and hand it over
to you. And then, weaving what is mortal together with what is
immortal, you must fashion and generate living things and give
them nourishment82 and make them grow.83 And when they 25
decay you must receive them again’.
What could show more clearly than this passage that Plato thinks
that the things84 which are given existence directly by the creator of
the universe are indissoluble and immortal because of the creator’s
goodness, even if, insofar as it was up to them, that is, up to their own 107,1
division and separation from Being, they would be dissoluble because
they get their unity (which Plato calls a ‘bond’) from outside them-
selves? And what could be clearer than the words ‘not completely
immortal’ (that is not unchangeable in every way like I am), ‘but you
will not be dissolved or meet a fate of death’?85 And who is so 5
48 Translation
shameless or mindless as to think after hearing these words that
Plato considers heaven to be perishable? And it is no less clear when
he says that three mortal kinds still remain (the gods obviously not
being mortal) and he orders the everlasting <gods> to use their own
natural transformation86 and motion to weave together everything
mortal with what had been made everlasting by the creator. For it
10 would not be possible for them to be made mortal unless what gives
them existence were changing. And so he also says this: ‘In order that
they be mortal and this universe be genuinely everything, you must
turn in accordance with nature to the creation of living things’. How
then can heavenly things be mortal when they are brought into
existence by a creator who acts without moving and eternally? I think
that the words ‘you must fashion and generate living things and give
them nourishment and make them grow, and when they decay you
15 must receive them again’ are also appropriately addressed to the
gods who rule the elements87 and preside over their entireties insofar
as those gods also contain something everlasting; for particular living
things are generated and nourished and grow directly from these
sublunary elements, and when they decay they are again resolved
into the entireties of the elements.88
I myself am not unaware that saying this much might be thought
20 to go beyond the measure with respect to explaining what Aristotle
says <in De Caelo>, but because I proposed to dissolve the objections
of those who dispute the view that heaven does not come to be or
perish and bring forward Plato as someone who provides support for
them against Aristotle,89 I think it is not unsuitable to have recorded
25 Plato’s views on these matters. But we should return to Aristotle’s
words.
Similarly it is reasonable to suppose that <what moves in a

circle> also does not come to be or perish ....90
It was said earlier91 that, having proved that the body which moves
in a circle is prior in nature to and more perfect than sublunary
things and transcends motion in a straight line, he is now proposing
30 to remove from it all the other changes as well, coming to be and
perishing, increase and diminution and the qualitative change co-or-
dinate with these,92 so that it would only have the change which is
least connected to substance, change of place, and only change of
108,1 place in a circle, which is appropriate to everlasting things. And it
was also said that he first gives an argument that it does not come to
be or perish, and the analysis of the syllogisms was set out. And it
was said that Aristotle demonstrated the other premisses in these
syllogisms. He demonstrated the one which says that the body which
moves in a circle has no contrary using the assertion that ‘the
5 motions of contrary things are contrary’; for if things which have
Translation 49
contrary starting points of motion are contrary in nature, it is clear
that the motions of contrary things are contrary. So if there is no
natural motion contrary to the natural motion of the body which
moves in a circle – the discussion is about natural motions –, that is
motion in a circle, it is clear that the body which moves in a circle has
no contrary. (Alexander constructs a syllogism93 in the first figure as 10
follows: if there is no motion contrary to the motion of a natural
body, there is nothing contrary to the body; there is no motion
contrary to the natural motion of the body which moves in a circle;
therefore there is no contrary to the body which moves naturally
with this motion.)
Now Aristotle assumes two premisses of the whole argument
without demonstration, one which says that what comes to be and 15
perishes comes to be from a contrary and perishes into a contrary
with some substratum underlying, the other that there is no contrary
to motion in a circle. But, having assumed the second premiss now,
he demonstrates it using many proofs later, and therefore he post-
poned bringing in the demonstration of it. He refers the
demonstration of the other premiss to what is said in the first book
of the Physics, things which I have also articulated94 at length as well 20
as I could. These two premisses being assumed, he infers the body
which moves in a circle will not come to be or perish, there being
nothing from which it could come to be or into which it could perish.
In this connection Alexander asserts that since things which have
contrary motions are natural contraries most of all, earth is naturally
more contrary to fire than water is. However, water, being cold and 25
moist, is opposed to fire, which is hot and dry, in both qualities, but
earth, being cold and dry, is opposed to it in one only, cold.
And Alexander asserts that Aristotle, by saying95 that ‘nature was
right to exempt what was not going to come to be ... from contraries’,
is indicating that heavenly things must be naturally without genera- 30
tion, and that it is not the way it is thought to be by some people96
who make heaven perishable in its own nature and ask for certain
postulates in their desire to make it not perish; and Aristotle does
seem to reject Plato’s statement97 (written as if spoken by the creator)
‘you are not completely immortal, but you will not be dissolved
because of my will’.
But Plato is here indicating that heavenly things are not com- 35
pletely immortal insofar as concerns their nature, which is extended
and corporeal and derived from what genuinely is, and is therefore 109,1
not capable of possessing all everlastingness simultaneously, but
that they do endure without dissolution because of the existence
which they are given directly by the unmoving cause and which
makes their changing unchanging, and because of their freedom from
extension,98 which they receive99 at the start from the stronger bond
of unification. And I think that the words ‘not completely immortal’ 5
50 Translation
are added to show that heavenly things do not get their immortality
both from themselves and from their cause in the way self-substan-
tiating things do, but only from their cause from which alone they are
brought into existence. And I also affirm that Plato thinks100 that the
heavenly body transcends contraries – not absolutely the pre-emi-
10 nent101 contraries, which exist together and combine with one
another but, unlike sublunary contraries, do not destroy one another
or change into one another,102 – but rather the contraries which
change into one another and cannot exist together with each other,
15 the kind of contraries found in sublunary things. For it is immedi-
ately clear that the heavenly body participates in motion and rest
simultaneously, since it revolves in the same place, and that it
participates in sameness and difference and unity and plurality.
270a22 Moreover, everything which increases is caused to in-

crease by something of the same kind which accrues to it ... .103
He has inferred104 that the heavenly body does not come to be or
perish, taking as a hypothesis that there is no natural motion con-
20 trary to motion in a circle. But he is going to demonstrate105 this
hypothesis, and he now uses what is inferred from it, namely that the
heavenly body does not come to be or perish, as if it were demon-
strated. And, using this in addition, he proves that the heavenly body
does not increase or diminish, making the assumption that increase
is a kind of coming to be and that, just as nothing comes to be without
having something contrary to it from which it can come to be, so too
it does not increase or diminish without such a contrary; for dimin-
25 ishing is also a kind of perishing. And so he again syllogises106 in this
way:
What increases increases from a contrary from which it also

comes to be;
the body which moves in a circle does not have a contrary from
which it comes to be;
<therefore, the body which moves in a circle does not increase.>
But it is clear that increase is a kind of coming to be, and that what
increases increases from a contrary; for what is added to what
increases becomes similar to it and is thus added to it and nourishes
30 it and causes what it is added to to increase. But what becomes
similar to what it is added to comes to be similar from what is
dissimilar to it and contrary. And so it is not possible for what does
110,1 not have a contrary to become something similar, because everything
which comes to be comes to be from a contrary. But the same thing
is contrary to similar things, so that the contrary to what is added is
also contrary to the similar thing to which there is an addition.
Translation 51
Aristotle indicates something even more precise with the words
‘but there is nothing from which this has come to be’. For something
is nourished and caused to grow, either directly or from a distance, 5
by that from which it comes to be. For an animal comes to be from
seed and katamênia, but seed and katamênia come to be from the
things by which the animal is nourished and caused to grow, and so
the animal is nourished and caused to grow by the things from which
it comes to be. And so what does not have anything from which it
comes to be cannot have anything by which it is nourished and caused
to grow either. For there will no longer be anything which is added 10
since what is added also comes to be from that from which the thing
to which it is added comes to be.
Alexander says:
If what is added becomes something similar to the body which

moves in a circle and causes it to increase, it will also move in a
circle, since motion of parts and of the whole are in the same
direction. But if this were so, the whole would also come to be.
But it has been proved that it does not come to be.107
Aristotle says that what is added ‘is resolved into the matter’ of 15
that to which it is added, that is, into flesh and bones and the other
homoiomerous parts. For these are the things which are nourished
directly, and they play the role of matter in relation to the organic
parts and the whole animal.
It can be proved with the same argument that the heavenly body
does not diminish either. For what diminishes diminishes when some
part in it departs. But what departs becomes dissimilar and changes
into its contrary, so that, no longer existing together with it, it 20
departs. Consequently what diminishes must have a contrary from
which it both increases and comes to be. But the body which moves
in a circle does not increase or come to be or have a contrary. But in
general what is not of a nature to increase perishes if it diminishes,
but what is heavenly has been proved to also be imperishable.
But why does Aristotle not, like us, give an argument about
increase on the basis of nourishment, but rather says directly that 25
what causes increase must be of the same kind as what it causes to
increase? Is it because of his absolute precision? For it seems that he
believes that the simple bodies also increase naturally by the addi-
tion of things similar to them (as he makes clear shortly when he
says108 that we see that the elements grow and decay), but that
organs are not nourished naturally, but by the nutritive soul. But it 30
is clear that even if this is the way things are, the demonstration
which we have given is not undermined, since a thing comes to be
from that by which it is caused to increase when that becomes of the
same kind and is added.
52 Translation
111,1 270a25-35 But if it does not grow or perish, it is possible to

accept by the same reasoning that it does not alter. ...
Just as he proved that it does not increase because it does not come
to be (‘For’, he says,109 ‘there is nothing from which this has come to
be’), so now he proves that it does not alter because it does not
5 increase or diminish (I think that here he calls diminishing perish-
ing110). And he argues as follows:
What alters changes with respect to quality;

what changes with respect to quality changes in affection;
(For there are three kinds of corporeal qualities:111 those related to a

perceptible affection (pathos) only, as when someone is warmed on
the surface; those related to a condition (diathesis), as when someone
is deeply changed (diatethêi) with respect to heat so as also to be
10 called hot; those related to a state (hexis), when a condition becomes
stable. But affection is seen in all these cases, and so Aristotle says
that they ‘do not come to be without changes in affection’. For even if
state and condition are different in species they are also brought to
completion together with an affection, since they come to be when
something is affected.)
consequently, things which alter change in affection.
15 But we see that all natural bodies which change in affection – the
bodies of animals and the plants and the simple bodies and abso-
lutely everything which changes in affection – increase and diminish.
So, if what alters corporeally increases and diminishes, then what
does not increase or diminish does not alter, since it doesn’t change
in affection either.
And this argument may be put categorically as follows:
20 What alters in affection increases and diminishes;

the body which moves in a circle does not increase or diminish;
therefore, the body which moves in a circle does not alter in
affection.
It seems to me that it is rather in this way that Aristotle argues, and

he infers the conclusion that it does not alter with the sense that it
does not alter in affection.112
Alexander says:
It should be signalled that the text is not expressed in terms of

25 necessity but in terms of reasonableness.113 For it is not the case
that if states involving an affection are found in things which
Translation 53
are of such a nature as to be affected, then a fortiori it is
necessary that they also be found in things not subject to
affection. Nor is it the case that if we see that the things around
us which alter also increase and diminish, that it is reasonable
and universal that if something alters it increases. The reason-
ing is necessary if a thing alters in the same respect in which it
increases or diminishes, but not otherwise. But also in the 30
Categories114 Aristotle himself says that ‘it is not necessary for
what changes in affection to either increase or diminish’. If for
a thing there is some contrary to its formal substance and also
some contrary to its affections, it is at the same time subject to 112,1
coming to be and perishing and to increase and diminution
because of the contrariety in substance, but it is subject to
alteration because of the contrariety in affection. But in the case
of things which have no contrariety in substance but are in
qualities which have a contrariety115 and which do not come
to be and increase nothing prevents these things, which do
not come to be or increase, from altering and being affected 5
in this way.
And he says:
It should also be signalled that Aristotle does not prove that

these things do not alter because there is no contrary to their
accidental quality. However, if he thought that there is no
contrary, he would have used this, just as he proved116 that they
do not come to be because they have no contrary. And from this
consideration it should be proved to those who assert117 that
Aristotle says that the fifth body is qualityless that they do not
know what they are asserting. For if he said that it was quality- 10
less, it would have been easy for him to prove on this basis that
it does not alter, since what doesn’t have qualities at all could
not change with respect to quality either. I have signalled this
in order to prove that, even if the body which moves in a circle
under the sun happened to be heated by the revolution of the
sun and transmitted the heat coming from the motion of the sun
to the body under it, nothing absurd is implied for the substance 15
of the body which moves in a circle.118 For what alters is not
always perishable; only things which can change in substance
are, and such are things for which there is some contrary to
their substance and form. For, as Aristotle says,119 it is ‘not
affected by any of the difficulties to which mortals are subject’,
but he does not say that it is absolutely not affected. For if there
is a contrary to an accident of something, it is not the case that 20
thereby it is necessary that there also be something contrary to
the thing itself. For the stars do have a colour, and if every
54 Translation
colour is light or dark or a mixture of these, then there would be
a contrary to the colour itself of the stars or their colour would
be composed from contraries. However, the stars are not perish-
able because the colour is not contained in their substance.
These are more or less Alexander’s very words, and I think it is worth
25 noting first whether Aristotle would reason so unsoundly and fal-
laciously in a treatise of this sort – even if out of shame this person
says that <the argument> has been taken in a reasonable way. And
next I think it should be said that Aristotle does not deny that there
is any alteration in heavenly things, since he does not deny that there
is also a perfective bequeathing to and reception from one another.
30 He only denies change in affection, which, even when it is accidental,
is nevertheless frequently the cause of increase and diminution; for
what is dried and undergoes the affection of dryness is diminished
very much in condition and even more in state,120 and what is
moistened because moisture accrues to it increases, and in this way
too what is condensed diminishes and what is made rarer increases.
35 But even if these things are not seen as causes, nevertheless increase
and diminution always accompany the affections which cause altera-
tion. However, they do not accompany every alteration. For it is clear,
113,1 I think, that the heavenly bodies act on one another and exchange
with one another different proper goods at different times in accord-
ance with their different configurations. For just as the moon is
observed at different times receiving the solar light in a different part
of itself in accordance with its different positions relative to the sun,
5 so too everything interacts with everything, even if such alterations
are not perceptible by us. This is also clear, I think, from their
influences on things in our world; for at different times they become
the causes of different things in accordance with their different
configurations and combinations. And also in the case of the moon
increase and diminution are not observed to be accompanied by
this sort of alteration121 even though this sort of alteration is clear;
10 nor are <increase and diminution> observed in the case of the
other stars, except when they reach apogee or perigee; for then
they are perceived as having a different size because of their
different distance from us. For these exchanges do not involve
being affected; rather they are perfective. For in heaven contraries
can also exist together.122
But in our world contraries, not being of a nature to exist together
15 with one another because of their separation from one another, do
away with each other, and accordingly act by affecting one another.
For when iron has been heated by fire and altered in affection it can
no longer cool, even though it is naturally cold, because it acts in
accordance with its affection. However, even if the moon is in a way
altered by solar rays and transmits the light of the sun to us, it does
Translation 55
so with its proper specificity, since the alteration does not change 20
anything of its substance123 but only brings its inherent powers to
perfection. For Melissus, too, is right to say,124 ‘What becomes differ-
ent (in substance obviously) by a single hair in ten thousand years
would be destroyed in the entirety of time’. Consequently, if someone
says that heavenly things are also altered by one another, let him say
that this alteration is not a matter of being affected but of perfecting,
just as the soul might also be said to be altered when it is divinely 25
inspired. For an affection comes about because of a change of some-
thing substantial, and so the form of alteration with respect to
affection is different from that of alteration with respect to power.125
As a result I think that Aristotle was right to deny to heavenly
things not alteration of every kind without qualification, but only
alteration in affection, the kind of alteration which always accompa-
nies increase and diminution and coming to be and perishing.
Because of this he changed the alterations which he was going to 30
deny <of heaven> into <matters of> affection by saying that ‘the
states and conditions of quality ... do not come to be without changes
in affection’ – but change in affection directly involves affection. And 114,1
in proceeding he makes clear that he says that heaven does not alter
in the sense that it is not affected by saying126 that ‘the first body is
without ... alteration or affection’. Consequently one should agree
with Alexander that Aristotle leaves alteration in the domain of
heavenly things since quality also exists there, but one should not 5
agree that Aristotle thinks the alteration involves being affected,
since if he thought that he would not try to demonstrate that it does
not alter because it is not affected. And one should also understand
this in connection with its demonstration and see the necessity of the
demonstration. For natural bodies which are affected in being
changed increase and diminish and come to be and perish, but they
do not increase or diminish by altering, but both <increase/diminu-
tion and being affected> exist in perishable things and each has its 10
own principle (logos). And that is why Aristotle says127 in the Catego-
ries that it is not necessary for what changes in affection to either
increase or diminish; for they do not increase or diminish by the
principle of affection even if increasing and diminishing always
attach to things which are affected and have a changeable nature.
But how can Alexander say128 that things which have a contrariety
in substance increase and diminish and come to be and perish? For 15
there is no contrary to substance except its privation, and the priva-
tion has no effectiveness but only presents a suitability <to become
something>, and what comes to be from the privation does not come
to be from it as something productive but as coming after it and from
something suitable toward it. So, if coming to be is not just from a
contrary, but also by the action of a contrary, and contrariety is found 20
in qualities, it is clear that coming to be and perishing, increase and
56 Translation
diminution occur with respect to qualities which are affections, since
coming to be and perishing, increase and diminution occur when the
elements change into one another with respect to their qualities and
they change by acting on and being affected by one another. So in a
25 certain sense, change in substance is accidental because it is conse-
quent on qualitative change, since it is necessary that direct change
in the strict sense be by the action of a contrary, but there is no
contrary to substance, although there are contraries to the qualities
which fill out the substance. And <substantial> change is substantial
in this way: it involves things that belong substantially. So it is
correct and precise for Aristotle to say that these things which alter
30 in affection are also affected in substance, since when an affection is
intensified it always produces a change in the elements which consti-
tute the substance. But he is correct to deny that there is alteration
in affection in heavenly things, what he has already demonstrated
being sufficient for this. For if things which alter in affection are also
affected in substance and come to be and perish and increase and
35 diminish, it is clear that things which transcend these things are also
superior to alteration in affection.129
115,1 Consequently130 one should listen attentively to what Alexander
says131 about the spheres after the sun being heated by it and
transmitting the heat to things here, never agreeing that there is
some affective heat in heaven, since, if there were, change in sub-
5 stance would always be a consequence. But one should say that what
is transmitted by the sun is something perfective and creative of life
and exists together with the natural states of <the spheres after the
sun>, but it does not change them in the way affective alteration
does. For in our world the air receives the heat which generates life
from the sun by being affected and it heats things here by affecting
them; for things here receive not only the emanations from the sun
but also those from other heavenly bodies by being affected. But if
what is heavenly is ‘not affected by any of the difficulties to which
10 mortals are subject’,132 it is clear that it also refuses every affection
which belongs to mortal things, and so it refuses that the affective
heat which intensifies and dissolves substance and in general the
form which is involved in coming to be in this way attach to it.
Consequently if only this kind of affection is being talked about,
namely affection involved in coming to be, every affection is denied of
heaven because it is of this sort. But if there is also something called a
15 perfective affection, which also attaches to heaven, there will be a
different story about that. And even if someone were to hypothesise
contrary colours or other qualities in heavenly things, those things
would not be perishable because contraries exist together harmoniously
there, as has been said frequently,133 without conflicting. Therefore they
do not act on one another by affecting and they are not acted on by being
20 affected, because they don’t want to change one another.
Translation 57
270b1 From ‘That ... everlasting and does not admit either
growth or decay’ to ‘is evident from what has been said ...’
He recalls what has just been demonstrated about the body which
moves in a circle, that it is everlasting because it does not come to be
or perish, and does not increase or diminish; and being like this, it is 25
‘without aging’ and indeed ‘without alteration’ and without alteration
in the sense that it is ‘without affection’. It does not seem to me that
he adds ‘without affection’ pointlessly at the end but because all these
things134 occur because of affections. With the words ‘if one trusts our
assumptions’ he might be referring to the first hypotheses from which
the demonstrations were carried out.135 Plotinus says of these that 30
‘‘There would be no issue for Aristotle if one accepted from him136 the
hypotheses about the fifth body’, taking this from there, I think. But
he might also be calling hypotheses all the lemmas from which the
demonstrations were carried out. However, perhaps it is more appro-
priate to understand as a hypothesis the one which says that there is
no contrary to motion in a circle and that things which come to be and 35
perish come to be from contraries and perish into contraries. Aristotle
has assumed137 these as hypotheses and inferred everything from 116,1
them. He is going to demonstrate one of them here,138 and the other
was demonstrated in the Physics.
270b4 From ‘It seems that this theory corroborates the pheno-
mena’ to ‘For it cannot be any other way’.139 5
These two things contribute to our confidence in the truth of some-
thing: demonstrative argument and common human preconception
or clear truth derived from perception. If these harmonise, especially
in the case of natural things, which get their demonstration from
perception, our confidence admits of no question; but if they conflict,
some degree of puzzlement remains. So it is reasonable for Aristotle 10
to also introduce after the demonstrations the confirmation derived
from the phenomena, which is sufficient for some people, and indeed
for most, to believe these things. He adduces three corroborations from
the phenomena, first that based on people’s conception of heavenly
things, second that based on the perception and record of them, and
third that based on a word, since people call <the first body> aithêr.140 15
Alexander divides the first consideration into two: that all people
believe there are gods; and that they accept that the divine is in the
upper region. He says:
The argument has proved that both things are true. And first
that there is something divine; for, this argument proving that
there is some body which does not come to be or perish or
increase and is not affected and is prior to all other bodies and
58 Translation
20 more perfect than they, has established and demonstrated that
there are gods. But also the argument which proved that this
body is what moves in a circle around the centre of the universe
has established that it is in the upper <region>.
Alexander says these things. But perhaps Aristotle is now invoking

as evidence all people’s conception that there are gods because all
people ...141 he adds ‘if they believe in gods’ because of the Hippons
25 and of Diagoras142 and people who may live in places unknown to us
and are ill-fated in this way, but all those who believe in gods assign
the upper region to the divine. However, Aristotle did not establish
that there are gods on the basis of the fact that there is a body of this
sort, unless it is in the sense of there being vehicles of the gods (since
he proved that there are eternal intellectual gods in the eighth book
of the Physics and in the Metaphysics).143
30 And Alexander understands the words ‘what is immortal is linked
with what is immortal’ as referring to the heavenly body and the
region <it occupies>, the heavenly body being god; and he under-
stands ‘for it cannot be any other way’ as saying that it is impossible
117,1 for the upper region to be divine if there is no god there. And that is
certainly true, but what Aristotle is saying is that what is immortal
– the heavenly body and not the region – is linked with what is
immortal – god.144 And when he says that ‘it cannot be any other way’
he means that it cannot be any other way than that what is immortal
is linked with what is immortal. And he proves that all people (and
5 not Greeks only but also non-Greeks) have145 a conception of this sort
as something natural in their souls.
270b10 From ‘So if (eiper) there is something divine, as there is’

to ‘is correct’.
In this connection Alexander puts forward the syllogism in this way:
If (ei) there is something divine – that is, if there are gods – what
10 we have said about the body which moves in a circle is also
correct;
but there are everlasting gods, and they are in the upper region
(and all the things we have said);
therefore, what we have said about the first substance is cor-
rect.
But perhaps Aristotle is saying that ‘if (ei) there is some divine body’,
that is, the body which moves in a circle (and not ‘if there are gods’),
then what we have said about it is correct.
15 Alexander correctly notes that the word ‘if’ (eiper) is like a causal
connective146 because what is said is clearly true. For if (ei) there are
Translation 59
gods inside the cosmos (he has left out ‘inside the cosmos’ because it
has been proved and is clearly true), there is some divine body which
is attached to them. So if (eiper) there is some divine body, what was
said about the body which moves in a circle is correct because this is
the divine <body>, as is also made clear by the common preconception
of people.
270b11 This also follows sufficiently <clearly> from perception 20

... .
He adds this second confirmation to what has been demonstrated
about the body which moves in a circle not coming to be and perishing
and being without affection. It is based on perception, both our own
and that which has been transmitted to us from earlier, on the basis
of which records of such things have been transmitted. I have heard
that the Egyptians have in writing observations of the stars from no 25
less than six hundred and thirty thousand years, the Babylonians
ones from no less than one million four hundred and forty thou-
sand.147 In all this time from which accounts are transmitted, nothing
has been reported about heaven being different from what it is now,
either in the number of stars or in their magnitude or colour or in the 30
motions which bring them back to the same point. How is it possible
that what in so many years has never varied but always been at its 118,1
own acme, should, while being at its acme, perish? For these people148
say that these days are already the last for the cosmos. However, I
believe that it is clear that what remains in unvarying sameness for
even one hour transcends coming to be and perishing.149 For we see
that everything which has come to be starts from incompleteness at 5
the beginning of some period of time and advances into its own
completeness and acme and then moves down from its acme into its
decline and perishes. However, it is clear that what has remained in
sameness during all the time known to people is free from coming to
be and perishing and neither comes to be nor perishes.
Aristotle calls the body which moves in a circle the ‘last heaven’, 10
contrasting it with the whole cosmos, which is also called ‘heaven’.
And notice that what another person might use as the clearest of
demonstrations, he uses as confirmations which come after the dem-
onstrations.
270b16 From ‘It seems that also the name has been transmitted
... by the ancients’ to ‘ since he uses it to mean “fire”‘. 15
He brings in a third confirmation in support of <heaven’s> everlast-
ingness which is based on the name which has been transmitted from
the ancients up to the present. On the basis of the name he shows us
two ideas about it held by those who determined the name. For they
60 Translation
called it aithêr as being highest and seated above all the sublunary
20 elements, each of which they called by its own name, honouring
heaven especially with the name of aithêr, which indicates that it is
highest and superior to the things beneath it and also finest and
purest. The name also indicates always running, which is indicative
of its everlasting motion150 and at the same time the everlastingness
of its existence.
25 Wanting to show that it is not only the descendants of those who
determined the name who have held this opinion up until the pre-
sent, he says that the same opinions occur to people many times, even
if sometimes gaps occur between them. And it is clear that one should
think that it is the same true opinions which occur many times. For
the nature of things endures and leads those who briefly stray from
30 it back to it again. But I do not think that the same false opinions are
119,1 always recycled, since they are indeterminate and occur when souls
are moved in an indeterminate way.
Aristotle censures Anaxagoras for incorrectly deriving the word
aithêr from aithein, that is ‘burn’, and consequently applying it to
fire.151 For if this were the natural understanding of the word we
5 would also have called fire aithêr. Now what is the point of using two
words with one meaning and leaving what is meant by one of them
in the dark?152
But again this person, who signs himself ‘grammarian’, proposes
the clear goal of persuading those who are like him to accept that the
cosmos is perishable and comes to be at some time, and consequently
10 shows scorn for those who demonstrate that heaven does not come to
be or perish; and he stirs up a sewerful of arguments against what
Aristotle says here. So let us call upon the great Heracles as a
co-worker and descend to clean up the crap in his arguments.153
He starts by setting out the distinction among the senses of ‘does
not come to be’ and ‘comes to be’ which Aristotle makes154 toward the
15 end of this book and asks, ‘In which of these senses is Aristotle now
demonstrating that heaven does not come to be?’ And he writes:
Heaven or the cosmos could not be said to not come to be in the

sense that it is, in fact, impossible for it to come to be, since it
clearly exists and has taken on the completeness of its own
20 nature. So, if it is not possible for it to come to be in the sense of
having a beginning of its existence, even if it has not been
brought into existence by a process of coming to be, there is only
one further hypothesis left.155 Since Aristotle wanted to deny
that the cosmos comes to be in this sense and made use of an
axiom according to which everything which comes to be comes
to be from a contrary, it should be asked whether everything
which comes to be in time always comes to be from a contrary.
Translation 61
Here he denies the third sense of ‘does not come to be’, namely, 25
‘cannot come to be’, since, as he says, it exists and has taken on
completeness. But Aristotle certainly knows that it exists, but it
exists neither as something which came to be nor as something which
is at one time and not at another.
This person says that if it does not come to be in the sense in which
contact, lightning, and, in general, what occurs in an instant come to
be (this is what is meant by ‘having a beginning of its existence, even 30
if it has not been brought into existence by a process of coming to be’),
then there is one hypothesis left concerning its not coming to be. So
which of the three senses of ‘does not come to be’ enumerated by
Aristotle is now being asked about? If it is neither the sense in which
what is instantaneous does not come to be nor the sense of ‘is possible 120,1
to have come to be but has not yet come to be’ nor the sense of ‘is
impossible to have come to be’ (and this person says clearly that it is
not the sense of ‘is, in fact, impossible to come to be’),156 then he
proposes in a ‘pointless’ way157 (to use his word) to ask, in which of
the senses of ‘does not come to be’ which he has distinguished does
Aristotle say the cosmos does not come to be? And notice what 5
hypothesis he says is left if it is not true that the cosmos comes to be
in the way an instantaneous thing does (that is, if it does not come to
be in this way – for Aristotle has included instantaneous things
among things which do not come to be). And it is clear that Aristotle
does say that heaven does not come to be in the sense of ‘cannot have
come to be’ and not in the sense in which things cannot possibly exist
in any way, as this person thinks, that is, in the sense that two and 10
two cannot have come to be three. For it is not because this cannot
arise through a process of coming to be that it is true to say that it
cannot have come to be; rather it is true because it is something
which cannot exist at all.
Notice158 what a sound mind this man has: he is unable to decide
such things and yet dares to speak against Aristotle; he is unable to
see the sense of ‘does not come to be’ which Aristotle has proposed 15
and yet fights against it. And you surely see that he thinks that
Aristotle does away with the idea that the cosmos comes to be in the
sense of ‘having had a beginning of existence, even if it has not been
brought into existence by a process of coming to be’. This is what one
can see in the case of instantaneous things; and such a thing surely
has a beginning of existence even if it did not come into existence
through a process of coming to be. And Aristotle counted this not only 20
as not coming to be in the first sense of ‘not coming to be’ but also as
coming to be in the first sense of ‘coming to be’ when he said159 ‘being
at one time and not at another either with or without a process of
coming to be’. So, even if this person is ignorant about what he is
arguing against, one should understand that Aristotle says that
heaven does not come to be or perish in the sense that it is everlast-
62 Translation
25 ing. Aristotle mentioned this as the third sense of not coming to be
when he said,160 ‘In one sense something is said to not come to be if it
is entirely impossible for it to have come to be in such a way that it
is at one time and not at another’, and he meant impossible in the
sense that ‘it is not true to say that it might come to be’. Of this sort
is that of which it is not true that it was not previously and later is
and again later is not, but rather true to say that it always is. Having
specified161 ‘comes to be’ in a first way by saying ‘if something
30 previously is not and later is’ or in general can have come to be –
whether by changing from not being into being over a course of time
121,1 or instantaneously (‘previously’ and ‘later’ indicating parts of time) –
and again having specified what is similar to this as perishing
(namely what is earlier and later is not or is possibly not whether it
changes into not being over a course of time or instantaneously),
Aristotle says that heaven does not come to be and does not perish in
the sense that it is superior to this kind of coming to be and perishing.
5 And, as has been said before,162 Aristotle uses two premisses for
the demonstration of this, one which says that what comes to be
comes to be from a contrary and perishes into a contrary, the other
that there is no motion contrary to motion in a circle. This person
proposes to argue against both of them, and he first argues against
10 the first. I have already said163 all that I was able to say for under-
standing Aristotle’s conception of these matters, and I think that it
is easy to dissolve the objections of this man on the basis of what I
have said. He says that Aristotle and his commentator Alexander
think it is true in the case of contraries in the strict sense that
contraries come to be from contraries, but others say that the hy-
pothesis is <also> sound in the case of privation and form. He makes
15 clear that he does not understand what Aristotle says in this case
either since Aristotle himself says164 that ‘musical comes to be from
not musical, but not from every not musical but from unmusical’, and
that ‘<it is necessary that all> the tuned come to be from the untuned
and the untuned from the tuned, and that the tuned perish into the
untuned, not just any untuned but the one which is opposite. And it
20 does not make any difference whether one says this of harmony or of
order or of composition’. How then can this person say that even in
the first book of the Physics, on the basis of which I have set out these
things, Aristotle discusses coming to be <only> in the case of contrar-
ies in the strict sense? However, it is clear that Aristotle also
discussed coming to be on the basis of contraries in the strict sense,
and it was not necessary for this person to discuss it at length or to
bring in things more mindless than the foregoing, even though none
25 of them was needed. For he proposes to prove that Aristotle says that
heaven has no contrary in the strict sense of contrary, and he tries to
prove this on the basis of the assertion that heaven does have an
opposite privation. For, he says, Aristotle would not have said that
Translation 63
heaven does not have a contrary if he were calling privation a
contrary. Again it is necessary to quote what he says because <there 122,1
will be> people who cannot believe that anyone ever wrote such
mindless things. He says,
Even if it were to be agreed that there is no motion contrary to

the motion of heaven, it is certainly not impossible that there be
a privation of this kind of motion. For there is an opposite
privation to every natural thing which exists in a substratum. 5
But motion is also a natural thing (since the absence of motion
prior to a motion and after its cessation is a privation of this
kind of motion). So if it is not impossible for there to be a
privation opposite to the motion of heaven, it follows that Aris-
totle did not make use of <opposites> relating to form and
privation but <opposites> in the sense of contraries.
In connection with this the first question is why he does not under- 10
stand that Aristotle would not have agreed that there is a privation
of the heavenly motion, since he believes that he has proved in the
eighth book of the Physics165 that motion in a circle is everlasting. But
if there were – as this person says there is – an absence of motion
before and after this motion, how would the motion be everlasting?
And secondly, isn’t he taking what is in question as if it were agreed 15
upon? For it is now being asked whether heaven and its motion are
everlasting or whether, having come to be at the beginning of some time,
it will also have an end of existence at some time. And this person
assumes that Aristotle also accepts it as agreed that there is a privation
of the motion both before it and after it. Here he is either ignorant of
what the word ‘privation’ means, or, if he knows that it means an 20
absence of a form in something which is naturally constituted to possess
it, it is amazing that, whether maliciously or ignorantly, this person,
who is asking about the everlastingness of something, takes it as agreed
that there is a privation of it before it exists and following its existence;
for I do not think that even he is unaware that, since privation is an
absence of form, it cannot exist together with form. And Aristotle says
clearly in the Physics,166 ‘Being a human being and being unmusical are 25
not the same thing; and one endures, but the other does not endure;
what is not an opposite endures (for the human being endures), but the
not musical and the unmusical do not endure’. How then can Aristotle,
who thinks <heaven> is everlasting, have assumed it has a privation?
And how can this person, who is asking whether it is everlasting, take
it as agreed that it has a privation? And if this person believed this is 30
true, he would still need another demonstration to show what he is
striving to show, namely that in the same way as himself, heaven and
the whole cosmos have come to be at the beginning of some time and
will perish in a part of time.
64 Translation
I am constrained to draw out these sorts of mistakes of his at even
123,1 greater length, not because it takes much discussion to dissolve them
(for what is said is clear167 even to a blind person), but so that those
who have been impressed by him because of the large size of his books
(even before reading them) will learn the sorts of things this person
doesn’t know and the sorts of quarrels he gets himself ready for. And
so he says a little later:
5 White and black and in general opposites between which there

is something are always, I suppose, contraries. For there is
nothing between a form and its privation, since each of these
exists in matter, and matter is not between them.
What say? White and black do not exist in matter? What? Matter is
between white and black? And why, if there is some path and
10 duration from privation into form and from form into privation, will
there not also be something in between them, even if it doesn’t have
a name?168
After saying many things of this sort he proposes to prove first that
it is not true that coming to be is from contraries in the strict sense169
and then that there is no coming to be from a privation.170 And he
thinks he proves that coming to be is not from contraries in the strict
sense through many considerations, of which the first is this:
15 If not only accidents but also individual substances come to be

and if, as Aristotle himself teaches in the Categories,171 there is
no contrary to substance, how can everything which comes to be
come to be from a contrary?
He continues,
Secondly, if irrational souls also come to be and not every kind

of soul does not come to be and perish,172 let someone tell us from
20 what contrary the soul of a horse or an ox or any of the other
irrational animals has come to be, or again into what opposite
they are resolved when they perish. Moreover, it will appear
more clearly that the doctrine is false, if one investigates the
kinds of soul. For what is the contrary of the kind related to
spirit or to reproduction, nutrition, growth, and desire?
Thirdly, Aristotle’s hypothesis is obviously not true not just
25 in the case of substances but also in the case of accidents
themselves. For a triangle or circle or the other figures come to
be, and it is clear that none of these comes to be from a contrary,
since figure is not contrary to figure, as Aristotle also thinks.173
And fourthly, left comes to be from right, but these are
relatives and not contraries.174
Translation 65
And in general it is clear that the individuals in any of the 30
categories in which there are no contraries do not come to be
from contraries (he also adds this as a fifth consideration).
Sixthly, even in the case of <the category> of quality itself, in
which there are most of all contraries, such as hot and cold, dry
and moist, it is not universally true (as <Aristotle> says it is)
that contraries come to be from contraries, since it is not neces-
sary that these always come to be from contraries. For if air has
neither colour nor flavour (as is clear from the fact that it cannot 35
be seen or tasted), but it changes into water, which does have 124,1
both colour and flavour, from what kind of contrary colour and
flavour in the air do the colour and flavour in the water come to
be? And if air changes into earth or fire, the same thing should
be said. But also living things with variegated colours and
differences of flavours come to be because of the putrefaction of 5
air.175 So from what sort of contraries in the air do they come to
be, when air does not have <colour or flavour>?
But this person agrees that the colour comes to be from its proper
privation, that is, from the colourlessness in the air. But in the case
of fire he asks about its colour, that is about light,176 and says,
Either there is a contrary to light or there is not. If there is not, 10

light could not come to be from a contrary. But if there is, what
would it be other than darkness? But darkness is the privation
of light (he claims to have proved this elsewhere177) and not a
contrary. But if someone were to agree that darkness is the
contrary of light,178 Aristotle’s doctrine is refuted just as much
if not more. For when fire comes to be from the illuminated air 15
of day which is rubbed179 it clearly does not come to be from it
as illuminated but from it as air, and, accordingly, it also comes
to be from night air. So the light in the <fire> which has come
to be has not come to be from a contrary.
These are the things which this man brings forward in many lines as
overturning Aristotelian doctrine, and I need only to say again a few
things I have already said;180 these will, I think, dissolve both what 20
he has said and what he is going to say. If I quote some of the things
which Aristotle wrote in the first book of the Physics, to which
Aristotle refers181 in the present argument, it is possible to see that
he does not think that all coming to be is from things which are called
contraries in the strict sense, but most of all from the opposites
related to form and privation:
First it is necessary to assume that, among everything which 25

there is, not just anything is of a nature to be acted on by just
66 Translation
anything, nor does anything come to be from anything whatso-
ever, unless one takes this in an accidental sense. For how could
white come to be from musical unless musical were accidentally
30 attached to white182 or black? But white comes to be from not
white183 and not from every not white but from black or from
125,1 intermediates <between black and white>; and musical comes
to be from not musical, but not from every not musical but from
unmusical or an intermediate (if there is one). And nothing
perishes into the first chance thing; for example white does not
perish into musical – if it184 ever does, it is in an accidental sense
–, but it perishes into not white, but185 not just any not white,
5 but into black or what is intermediate. In the same way too186
musical perishes into not musical, and not just any not musical,
but into unmusical or an intermediate (if there is one). It is the
same in the case of all other things, since things which are not
simple but composite conform to the same principle, but we
overlook that this happens because the opposite conditions do
not have names. For it is necessary that everything tuned come
10 to be from untuned, and the untuned from the tuned, and that
the tuned perish into the untuned, not just any untuned but the
one which is opposite. And it does not make any difference
whether one says this of harmony or of order or of composition,
since it is evident that the account is the same. Indeed, a house
or a statue or anything else whatsoever comes to be in the same
way. For a house comes to be from some things not being put
15 together but being divided in some way, and a statue and
anything which has been given shape comes to be from shapeless-
ness, some of these being an ordering, others a composition. Now
if this is true, everything which comes to be would come to be from
contraries, and everything which perishes would perish into con-
traries or intermediates. But intermediates are composed of
contraries,187 so that everything which comes to be naturally
20 comes to be from contraries or things composed of contraries.188
I think that these words also suffice to prove that Aristotle posits as
principles of what comes to be or perishes form and privation more
than what are called contraries in the strict sense and takes most of
his examples from form and privation – and many things in the next
part of the Physics make this same thing clear. Let me add something
25 briefly and, I think, shame this completely shameless person: 189
So we have said how many principles of the things involved in

coming to be190 there are and why.191 It is clear that there must
be192 contraries and some substratum for them. In another way
this is not necessary since one of the contraries will be sufficient
to produce the change by its absence and presence.
Translation 67
It is clear that the absence of form is privation, which he shortly after
refers to with this word and opposes to form. For, having said that 30
one principle is the substratum, he adds,193 ‘And one is194 the logos’ 126,1
(that is, the form) ‘and, moreover, the contrary of this, the privation’.
That he is bringing all the contrarieties or antitheses under the
heading of the antithesis between form and privation as something
which is present everywhere is clear from these words and from other
things which he has said in this part of the Physics, which it would 5
be long to quote.
Since this is the case, this man is first of all obviously completely
ignorant of what Aristotle says, because he thinks he has demon-
strated that Aristotle says that coming to be and perishing come
about only in terms of the antithesis between contraries in the strict
sense; and second all his objections, which he has made on the basis 10
of this kind of guesswork, are empty because they are beside the point
and do not touch Aristotle’s demonstration. For, although he is not at
all reliable as a witness since he is ignorant of the subject under
discussion, even he bears witness that coming to be is from priva-
tion,195 as Aristotle also believes. For he says,
Insofar as fire which comes to be from air has become coloured,

it has not taken on its coming to be from a contrary, but only 15
from the appropriate privation.
It is not sufficient to show the unsoundness of this, but one should

also establish the doctrine itself <by showing> how coming to be is
from contraries and what these contraries are and in addition dis-
solve the objections of this man one by one. And so, after I have
reminded us of a few of things said previously, I will turn to dissolving 20
them.
This much should be said first: what comes to be is one thing, what
it comes to be is another, but both come to be because something acts.
For what acts and what comes to be are relative to one another, so
that what acts produces coming to be and everything which comes to
be and what it comes to be come to be because something acts. For,
as Plato, too, says,196 ‘It is impossible for a thing to come to be without
a cause’, and obviously a cause which is different from itself. For it is 25
necessary that the whole of what is self-substantiating be simultane-
ously a whole which gives and is given existence, but what comes to
be does not exist simultaneously as a whole. For if it did it would not
have come to be. What comes to be is that in which the activity of
what acts is fixed, that is, it is the substratum, for example, the stone
which is carved into Hermes. What something comes to be is the form
or shape which is brought to completion by the activity. And notice 30
that the stone which is carved is carved by the carver who carves,
because the stone is what comes to be, the shape is what it comes to
68 Translation
be. Everything which comes to be because something acts is arranged
127,1 in terms of the form on the basis of which what acts acts; the stone,
for example, is arranged in terms of the form of Hermes in the carver,
the wood in terms of the form of the ship in the shipbuilder, and the
seed and katamênia in terms of the form of the animal in nature.
Everything which is arranged in terms of some arrangement which
it did not have previously is arranged in terms of that arrangement
(otherwise it would not be said to be arranged); it did not have the
5 arrangement previously, but it was suitable for being so arranged,
and therefore it possesses the absence of that form which is naturally
constituted to come to be in it. But the absence of what is naturally
constituted to come to be in something is a privation. Therefore, what
comes to be possesses the privation of the form which it is going to
receive; and it is necessary that the privation depart if the form is
going to be present, since it is not possible for the absence and the
presence of the form to exist together.
10 And this doctrine starts with substantial coming to be and spreads
to all coming to be. For in the case of accidents it is also true to say
that what becomes white was not white previously but possessed the
absence of whiteness and was suitable for whiteness and was made
white by the cause which produces whiteness. In the case of what are
called contraries in the strict sense, it is always true that if what is
naturally constituted in relation to an antithesis does not possess one
15 of the contraries, it possesses the other or an intermediate. For what
becomes white possesses the absence of whiteness and is either black
or something intermediate which is a blending of both white and
black and has the relation of opposite to each of the extremes. Grey
has this relation to white and black, and lukewarm has it to hot and
20 cold. Similarly in the case of opposites which are relatives, what
comes to be to the right comes to be so from being to the left (that is
from having been previously to the left) or from being somewhere in
between. And if an affirmation were to come to be it would come to
be from a denial, and a denial would come to be from an affirmation
(these things have no intermediate). And the antithesis of form and
privation is common to all these cases. For what comes to be white
from being black or to the right from being to the left comes to be from
25 what is not black or to the left and from the absence of what it is
naturally constituted to be; and so it is necessary that everything
which comes to be cast off its previous way of being arranged and take
on in its place that form with respect to which it is said to come to be.
And this is reasonable since it is necessary that what cannot exist
together with the form which arrives depart; and the opposites
30 involved in any antithesis cannot exist together. In every case, before
the form with respect to which the thing which comes to be is said to
come to be has arrived, its opposites inhered in what comes to be, that
is, in the substratum; and in all cases the privation of the form which
Translation 69
arrives, whether the form is substantial or accidental, inhered, but in
the cases of accidental forms, in addition to the privation, there also
inhered the opposites of those forms related to the other antitheses.197
If I am correct in saying these things, then I can produce a
syllogism from what I have said as follows:
Everything which comes to be comes to be because something 128,1

acts; what comes to be because something acts is arranged in
terms of the form in terms of which what acts acts;
what is arranged by some form previously possessed the ab-
sence of that form and a suitability for it, that is, it previously
possessed the privation of the form, and so was arranged in 5
terms of it;
what possesses the privation of the form which it is going to
come to be (either it alone in the case of substances or also other
things which are antithetical to the form which is going to
supervene in the case of accidents) first casts off the privation
and perhaps also the antithetical things because they cannot
exist together with the form which is said to come to be, and
then is arranged in terms of that form;
what casts off opposites and then comes to be what it is said to 10
come to be changes from the opposites into the opposite form;
therefore, everything which comes to be what it comes to be
comes to be from the opposite (Q.E.D., as the geometers say);
and coming to be is from opposites and perishing is into oppo-
sites – <in perishing> the form departs, and the substratum
takes on things opposite to it, the privation in every case, and 15
in some cases also other antithetical things in addition.
But why does Aristotle say198 that what comes to be comes to be

from contraries and not from opposites? Is it because he has called all
opposites contraries, characterising them in terms of not being able
to exist together, a feature which belongs to things as opposites, and
so he sometimes calls the things from which there is coming to be
contraries and sometimes opposites? For he does say,199 ‘<What 20
comes to be is> ‘either a substratum or an opposite. And I call human
being a substratum and the unmusical an opposite’. And frequently
he calls opposites contraries and contraries opposites, characterising
them in terms of not enduring. And so he says,200 ‘what is not an
opposite endures; for the human being endures but the not musical
and the unmusical do not endure’. However, in the Categories,201 25
having proposed to do this very thing – that is, to present the
differences found in opposites –, he distinguished contraries from the
other opposites by saying that in the case of contraries the two
opposite things are forms; in the same way right and left also satisfy
the common definition of opposites because they cannot exist to-
70 Translation
gether and they satisfy the common definition of contraries because
both are forms), but he bound them with another difference, that of
30 being relatives, by which they go beyond <the other kinds of oppo-
129,1 sites>; and he maintained that form and privation deserved their
own antithesis since they differ from the other opposites because they
are not both forms; and he distinguished affirmation and denial
insofar as when the denial does away with one thing there is nothing
to prevent introducing the others.202
5 Although all this person’s objections have been dissolved as a
batch by what has been said as being beside the point, there is
nothing to prevent briefly going through them individually.203 For if
there is not only coming to be from contraries in the strict sense, as
has been proved, but also form comes to be from privation and this
mode of coming to be is common to everything which comes to be,
obviously nothing prevents substance from also coming to be. And
Aristotle, who says that a house or an animal comes to be, also says
10 that a plant and a substance come to be. I do not infer this from some
syllogism, but listen to him saying clearly,204
It will be evident to a person who does an investigation that

substances and everything else205 which is without qualification
comes to be from a substratum, since there is always some206
substratum from which what comes to be comes to be;207 for
example, plants and animals come to be from the208 seed (and
15 obviously from the opposite, such as shapelessness or formless-
ness or disorder).
And in another passage he says,209
A house or a statue or anything else whatsoever comes to be in

the same way. For a house comes to be from some things not
being put together but being divided in some way, and a statue
and anything which has been given shape comes to be from
shapelessness, some of these being an ordering, others a com-
position.
20 And even if irrational souls come to be and perish, as this person

says, they are obviously the form of bodies with souls which come to
have souls from lacking them (just as bodies come to have form from
lacking it), and, conversely, they come to be without soul from having
had one, when the soul perishes, if, indeed, it does perish. And it is
clear that the kinds of soul come to be in the same way. For coming
to be from a privation is common to all such things, and nothing
25 absurd will follow.
And in response to the third objection, which argues on the basis
of figure, it suffices to invoke the shapelessness which Aristotle
Translation 71
frequently mentions. For even if a figure comes to be from another
figure the substratum is without shape in relation to the shape which
is going to accrue to it (or without angles, if it is a circle and turns
into a figure with angles). But to see that Aristotle recognised an-
tithesis in the case of shape, listen to what he says in the first book 30
of the Physics210 about Democritus: 130,1
And Democritus <postulates> solid and void, of which he says

the one is being, the other not being, and he speaks of <things
differing> in position, shape, and order. But these are genera of
contraries: of position up and down and front and back, of shape
angle, straight, and circular.
However, if this person had any love of learning he should have

investigated why Aristotle says in the Categories ...211 indeed having 5
angles and being circular cannot exist together with one another in
the same substratum.
And if left comes to be from right, it also comes to be from a
contrary. For both are relative forms and contraries, but they differ
from other contraries because they are also said in relation to some-
thing else, and they are characterised by this difference. But coming 10
to be from an opposite attaches to relatives and to other things. For
the antithesis of form and privation attaches to all the categories,
even those which do not contain contraries in the strict sense. In this
way his fourth and fifth criticisms are dissolved.
The sixth, about which he is clearly puffed up, can be dissolved in
the same way. For this air <in our world>, which is a composite and
shares in fire and has a surface, always has some colour, just as glass 15
does, but because it is the most transparent of all bodies and passes
through vision without offering resistance, it is thought to be invis-
ible and have no colour. Furthermore, the other qualities exist
together with the primary qualities which give substance to the four
elements; but not every other quality exists together with every
primary quality or in every kind of mixture of them; I mean that not
all of the other qualities related to colour or sound or flavour or odour
or resistance exist together with each of heat and coldness and 20
dryness and moistness or with any kind of mixture of them. Rather
colour blossoms forth because of the heat and dryness which consti-
tute fire, and so all colours are fiery; and sound accrues to heat and
moistness, which give form to air and similarly in other cases. And 25
so when water or fire comes to be from air, the qualities which are
first principles change into their contraries, and the qualities proper
to these elements, such as colour or flavour, grow out of their own
privations. For even if air in itself is without colour or flavour,
nevertheless it is suited to change into fire and water, and colours 30
and flavours appear together with them.
72 Translation
So too it is agreed that light – whether it is the colour of fire (as
131,1 this person says212) or it is a form of fire (as Plato, the explainer of the
truth, says213) – comes to be from the absence of light and is produced
by it. But what else is the unlightened than the darkened, if, indeed,
darkness is an absence of light (as this person also thinks – and he
says he has demonstrated it, I know not where)?214 So too, since
change is a transformation from one thing into another, it is possible
5 for a change to have come to be when fire is ignited from the rubbing
of air which is illuminated in the day and obviously has been illumi-
nated from having been darkened in accordance with the nature of
air itself (but not from a tree or a stone215 or from what is not in any
way, as this person thinks).
10 And when he says that living things with variegated colours and
differences of flavours come to be because of the putrefaction of air
and asks from what sort of contraries they come to be, when air does
not have contraries, how much is he worth when he is not even able
to understand that simple and pure air by itself cannot become
putrefied nor can it alone generate living things of this sort? Rather,
when air has been made full of the four elements which arise from
15 exhalations blended together near the earth, then from these things
there also arises putrefaction in that region and living things of this
sort come to be. Let these considerations be sufficient for dissolving
his objections!
But perhaps there was no need of my arguments since he clearly
agrees in his own words that Aristotle’s doctrine according to which
things which come to be come to be from contraries can be true of
the most generic antithesis, that between form and privation, but
20 is not always true of the remaining kinds of contrariety. But what
he says next mischievously brings Themistius into conflict with
Aristotle. He says,
When Themistius216 changes the term ‘contraries’ into ‘oppo-

sites in the sense of form and privation’ he himself in a way
quietly teaches us that Aristotle’s hypothesis is not correct.
25 However, Themistius certainly knows the things said in the Physics

to which Aristotle also refers this argument, and he says reasonably
that Aristotle takes the words ‘from a contrary’ and ‘into a contrary’217
universally, taking them as referring to the most generic opposition,
that between form and privation. But this person realised he was
writing for students of the trivium218 and so, I believe, either he did
not read or, if he did, he did not understand what is said in the
30 Physics about coming to be and therefore spit out so much nonsense
about the word ‘contraries’ in the belief that quantity would suffice
to dumbfound his listeners.
But since he says, ‘Let it be agreed that Aristotle is here calling
Translation 73
form and privation contraries and that everything which comes to be
comes to be from an appropriate privation, just as what perishes 132,1
turns back from form to privation’ from empty-headedness rather
than love of learning, and having said this he thinks he can use it to
prove that, according to Aristotle, too, heaven will be seen to come to
be and perish, let us also inspect these remarkable proposals of his
and see from what clearly true axioms219 he infers the things he is
striving to prove. He says,
For every natural form which has its being in a substratum and 5
matter there is always an opposite privation, from which it has
come to be and into which it is resolved when it perishes. But
both heaven and the whole cosmos have been given form by a
natural form, so that they, too, will have a privation from which
they have come to be and into which they perish. For just as
human being comes to be from not human being and house from
not house and, to speak generally, each natural or manufac- 10
tured form <of such and such> comes to be from not such and
such, so too heaven, since it is also a natural form, has come to
be from not heaven and the cosmos has come to be from not
cosmos. But this argument presumably requires that before the
cosmos came to be there existed some substratum and matter
in which the privation of heaven and cosmos existed and from
which, when it had changed, heaven and the cosmos came to 15
be,220 but it would not necessitate that heaven have no begin-
ning and not come to be, as the Philosopher proposed to prove,
but rather the contrary, that it comes to be and has a beginning
of existence.
He says these things in these very words, and it is worth asking him,
since he says he is expressing the views of Aristotle, how he shows
that Aristotle says that for every natural form there is always an 20
opposite privation from which it comes to be and into which it
perishes. It is completely clear that Aristotle says that heaven is a
natural body and moves in a circle naturally, since he says,221
We say that all natural bodies and magnitudes can change place
on their own, since we say that nature is a starting point of
motion in222 them. For every change of place – we call change 25
of place motion – is either straight or in a circle or mixed from
these.
And I do not need to go on at length about the confirmation of this

since this person also accepts it. However, to see that, although
heaven is a natural thing, Aristotle does not think that it has an
opposite privation from which it comes to be and into which it
74 Translation
perishes, listen to him saying that nature has freed it from contrar-
ies. He says,223
30 It seems that nature was right to exempt what was not going to
come to be ...224 from contraries; for coming to be and perishing
are found in contraries.
But this person makes clear that he thinks that the coming to be
and perishing <of the cosmos> follows from Aristotle’s doctrines
when he says, ‘But this argument ... requires that before the cosmos
came to be there existed some substratum and matter ..., but it would
not necessitate that heaven have no beginning and not come to be, ...
133,1 but rather the contrary, that it comes to be and perishes’. Now would
Aristotle be so superficial as to think that there is a privation opposed
to heaven and nevertheless to try to demonstrate that it is everlasting
and to demonstrate this from its not having an opposite? And why do I
say these things when Aristotle has demonstrated that the circular
5 motion is everlasting, and nevertheless this person thinks225 that Aris-
totle hypothesises that that there is a privation of motion in a circle?
But suppose that someone does not understand < this person > as
speaking against Aristotle but as himself proposing a syllogism with
the premisses:
Heaven is something natural;

what is natural has an opposite privation.
Let someone who says this be required to prove that every natural
form which exists in matter as a substratum always has an opposite
10 privation. For obviously what comes to be and perishes has an
opposite privation. But where does the idea that everything which is
natural has an opposite privation come from? Doesn’t Aristotle also
clearly say in the first book of the Physics that form and privation are
principles not of all natural things but only of those which come to
be? For he writes,226 ‘<We have said> how many principles of the
natural things involved in coming to be there are’, and throughout
his whole discussion of things which come to be and perish and in
15 general change he posits these principles. And in the second book of
the same treatise he says,227
We must seek the first causes both in the case of coming to be

and perishing and also of every natural change, so that, know-
ing their principles, we can try to reduce each case of coming to
be <to them>.
But notice also the knavery or mindlessness of what this person says.
20 And here I am uncertain whether one should blame his mindlessness
Translation 75
or his knavery. Perhaps one should rather blame both. In any case,
he has introduced two premisses, one which says that heaven has
been given form by a natural form which is in matter, the other that
what has been given form by a natural form has an opposing priva-
tion. He passes over as clear this second premiss, which is a false
assumption, but he invokes many arguments in the attempt to
establish the first, which says that heaven is a natural form in 25
matter. However, this premiss is not at all disputed, and so, because
of an excess of cleverness, he is casting doubt on things which are
agreed upon. But perhaps there is nothing to prevent looking into
what he says in this connexion as well. He says, ‘It is completely
ridiculous to say that heaven is immaterial, since it is perceptible, not
intelligible’. But it is clear that those who say heaven is immaterial228 30
do not say it is immaterial in the sense of intelligible, but in the sense 134,1
of being superior to the matter which is involved in coming to be and
perishing and receives and casts off forms. Indeed, in book 8 of the
Metaphysics Aristotle says:229
If one is to investigate correctly, it is necessary to investigate

natural substances which come to be in this way. For230 these
are the causes and they are this many, and it is necessary to 5
know the causes. But there is a different account in the case of
natural substances which are everlasting, since perhaps some
do not have matter or at least not this sort of matter but only
matter which can change place.
For since Aristotle always investigates matter on the basis of change,

but he knows only change of place in heaven, it is reasonable for him
to have left it only this kind of matter.
This person, who thinks that the body which the Peripatetics call 10
the second substratum is matter,231 seems to waste a lot of words in
his eagerness to prove that heaven has a body and therefore also
matter. But who would doubt that heaven has a body? However, if
this body is its matter, it is not necessary that it have a privation
opposed to it (as this person thinks) and that it come to be and perish,
since privation co-exists with that matter which underlies things 15
which come to be and perish. It is, then, perhaps superfluous to speak
against these arguments of his, except for the fact that he obviously
thinks that, since both heavenly things and sublunary ones are
three-dimensional, they do not differ from one another at all. Here he
badly misuses the fact that the same words are used in both cases.
For who would say that the heavenly body has the same nature as
things in our world? He writes, 20
Why is it surprising that, just as it is agreed that one and the

same matter underlies the multitude of kinds (ideai) of sublu-
76 Translation
nary things and is suited for all forms – as is proved by the fact
that all sublunary things change into one another –, so too the
same matter is naturally constituted to receive the kinds of
heavenly things?
Why does he not understand that, if the matter of heavenly and

25 sublunary things were the same and received the same forms, then
they would certainly also have to change into one another? However,
even though he has sounded off with all these things in a rash and
thoughtless way, I do not think he would say that heavenly and
sublunary things change into one another. If he were speaking while
imagining things above to be below, he would reasonably be consid-
ered to be a drunken man among the sober. For heavenly and
30 sublunary things ought to have interchanged many times already, if
the matter, being the same, were similar on either side <of the moon>
as far as not holding onto the forms which come to it for even a short
time. To what great thick-headedness in reasoning does it belong to
think that what is three-dimensional in heavenly things does not
135,1 differ from what is three-dimensional in our world in any way
because each is three-dimensional? For on this kind of reasoning
substance would not differ from substance insofar as it is substance,
nor would the light of the sun differ from light here insofar as it is
light. But it seems that I am forgetful and dull-witted, having forgot-
ten that this person said earlier232 ‘with head uncovered’233 that the
5 light of the sun is the same as that of a firefly. So how can I set out
these things before him as absurdities? I do not even know how he
will react to the statement that the most unworthy substance in this
world does not differ at all from the substance of the creator insofar
as it is substance or the statement that being in this world does not
differ from being there. Or will the person who mashes divine and
10 human things together into one mush234 be embarrassed at this? But
since he is striving to prove that also according to Aristotle heaven is
material, expecting to demonstrate from that that heaven comes to
be and perishes, let him hear the things I set out a little while ago235
in which Aristotle says that heaven does not have the same sort of
matter as things which come to be but only matter for change of
15 place. And it seems that Aristotle knew in advance the misunder-
standings of these sorts of superficial people since a little after the
text I set out before he wrote this:236
Not everything has matter, but all things which come to be and
change into one another do. Those things which, without ever
changing, are or are not have no matter.
And even if he says in On the Heavens237 that heaven is material, he

says it because it is an individual and perceptible thing, but he does
Translation 77
not say it because it has the matter which underlies things which 20
come to be and perish, but only because it has matter for change of
place. For he has made this distinction clearly.
This person says,
But if heavenly matter differs from sublunary matter the two

matters will be composites of the nature which is common to
them and its differentiae.
When he says this, he is thinking that the differences are only

differences of species; he is not aware of difference by declination in 25
terms of which things which proceed from the One differ.238 However,
the procession of every specific feature in and of itself is brought to
completion in terms of this declination.
But since he is obviously scornful of incorporeal matter,239 he says
that he has also demonstrated in the eleventh discourse of his
refutations of Proclus240 that it is impossible for the mythic
(mutheuomenos) incorporeal and formless matter to exist, but rather
bodies are ultimately to be resolved into the three-dimensional. 30
However, I have not come across his boastings there nor would I be
pleased to come across his loose nonsense when even now I do not
know how, having proposed to elucidate Aristotle’s On the Heavens,
I have fallen into the dung of Augeas.241 Nevertheless I also say 136,1
against his wilful denial on the subject of matter that if the first
matter is the three-dimensional, then, insofar as it is matter, no
natural forms belong to it substantially, no shape, no size, no num-
ber, no colour; but, insofar as it is three-dimensional it is obviously 5
also finite (since it is not infinite), and it has a determinate size and
shape and colour on its surface and is ordered by forms and numbers.
How then is it possible for contraries to be true together of matter?
Let him say, and let him not amaze the ignorant by signing his name
to lots of discourses. And it would be possible to give many argu- 10
ments, old and new, against this doctrine, which has already
produced many criticisms, but even what I have said suffices for this
person if he could get serious and seek what is true in the more
difficult arguments rather than to declare what comes into his
head242 in a thoughtless way.
But thus far – he says – he has refuted the arguments of Aristotle
which try to establish that the cosmos does not come to be, as if he
refuted anything with this sort of babble. However, he agrees243 that 15
with what he has said he has not refuted the claim that the cosmos
comes to be from a pre-existing substratum. And so he wants to prove
that the cosmos receives its existence from what is not. He briefly
refers to his Against Proclus244 for the proof of this, but he <also> puts
forward the argument objecting <to his position> and tries to dissolve
it. He says:
78 Translation
They say that if something were to come to be from what is not
in any way, it would result that what is not is, since what is not
20 has been changed into what is. Now if someone says that what
comes to be comes to be from what is not in the way that a ship
comes to be from wood (that is, with what is not being a
substratum for what comes to be and changing into it), it would
truly follow that what is not is. But I do not think that there is
anyone so lacking in brains as to hypothesise that there is
25 coming to be from what is not in this way; rather, insofar as
anything comes to be without previously existing in any way, it
is brought into existence.
Here either I do not understand what this person is saying at all or

he has obviously heard the ancient discourses without under-
standing them. For no one reduced the idea that there is coming to
be from what is not into the absurdity that what is not is, but into the
impossibility of anything coming to be from what is not because what
30 is not lacks efficacy. For, thinking that what comes to be comes to be
from a substratum and is produced by an efficient cause, they said
with reason that nothing comes to be from what is not, with what is
not serving either as an element or as an efficient cause. For Par-
137,1 menides is the first person we know by hearing to have asked this
question, and he has written this in his verses on the fact that being
does not come to be.245
For what origin will you seek for it?

How and from where did it grow? I will not allow you to say
5 or think from what is not. For it cannot be said or thought
that it is not.
And Aristotle sets out the difficulty in this way:246
They say that nothing which is247 comes to be or perishes

because it is necessary that what comes to be come to be either
from what is or from what is not, but it is impossible that it come
10 to be from either of these. For what is cannot come to be since
it is already, and nothing can have come to be from what is not,
since it is necessary248 that there be a substratum.
So who is it who makes a reduction into the absurdity that what is

not has been changed into what is?249 And in general, if, as this
person says, ‘insofar as anything comes to be without previously
existing in any way, it is brought into existence’, what is to prevent
the following being true? Even if it is not in the respect in which it
15 comes to be (it comes to be with respect to shape), nevertheless it is
with respect to a substratum, just as with respect to shape the stone
Translation 79
Hermes is not before it has come to be but it is with respect to the
stone.250
But he tries to prove with many arguments that things which are
produced immediately by god do not come to be from some pre-exist-
ing substratum, but that the form comes to be together with the
substratum. If only he knew what it means to be produced immedi-
ately by the creator-god! For then, I think, he would not have fallen 20
into these blasphemies about heaven. For we also say that the
substratum was constructed (paraskeuasthênai) by the creator nei-
ther spontaneously nor as a result of some other cause, but we say
that the creator-god immediately introduces the substratum of
heaven – if there ever is such a thing251 – simultaneously with its
form; and we do not say that this happens through coming to be or in
the sense of <heaven’s> having come to be later after previously not 25
existing, but rather we say that this happens through god’s goodness,
<heaven> being introduced by god through his very being, and not
through his choosing and doing different things at different times;
and we say that <heaven> is dependent on his goodness and the
eternal permanence of his existence, just as those people are accus-
tomed to say about the ‘son’.252 For it is not possible for a generative
creator-god to ever be quiescent without doing anything, just as the 138,1
sun cannot not give light and fire cannot not heat; and coming to be
and perishing do not yet show themselves in this existence (huposta-
sis).253 In the case in which what has no prior suitability was not
previously and later is, why would it come forth at one time but not
at another?254 In fact, just as there is a time which is prior to the time 5
of a thing’s manifestation in being, and the time of its manifestation
is continuous with the prior time and ordered after it (and if someone
were to ask why today manifested itself at this time it is easy to say,
‘because it has received this position, in which some days precede it,
others follow it, in the whole of time’), so too what is coming to be at
the present time has antecedents from which it comes to be and 10
consequents into which it changes.255 For the motion of heavenly
things by which <things> are brought to completion directly also has
a motion prior to it and one which follows it; and as a result such
things do not come to be or perish earlier or later but they do so
now.256 So I think that if <heaven> received existence from what is
not and perished into what is not, no one could give the reason why
this happened now but not earlier. However, because what always 15
exists is not given existence because of a change, it does not raise the
question why now and not earlier. Rather what always exists is
introduced directly by the creator because of the creator’s unchang-
ing and eternal goodness, all of which exists simultaneously; and it
exists forever because it was introduced by an unmoving cause which
acts directly by being; and it has received an existence which is 20
descended from its cause; and it extends around itself in the most
80 Translation
perfect of shapes, sphericity; and it moves in a circle because among
natural motions only circular motion is unceasing. For it was neces-
sary that the first thing separated from what is unextended and the
first moving thing deriving from what is unmoving be extended with
the most perfect shape, and also move with the unceasing motion
25 which is capable of existing together with everlasting substance.
But,257 since it was necessary, in order that the universe genuinely
be a universe, that the goodness of the creator not stop with everlast-
ing things but that things which receive their being in a part of time
also exist to the limits of the universe, the things which come to be
immediately because of the creator himself were also <made> ever-
lasting because of his changeless activity. For this reason he orders
30 all sublunary things by means of the everlasting motion which he
bestowed upon heavenly things and by means of their configurations,
which vary from time to time.
This person also agrees with this since he says:
It has been agreed that as a whole and in its parts heaven is the
most authoritative part of the cosmos, and it most holds the
parts of the cosmos together, since all bodies inside heaven are
139,1 guided naturally by its motion. Among sublunary things there
is coming to be and perishing and the other things asserted by
Aristotle to be there. For here transformation is through
change, and things which come to be come to be from a substra-
tum and from opposites, and the perishing of one thing is the
coming to be of another because not even in the extremities258 of
5 the universe is a substance entirely destroyed, but in a way
change here is only alteration and substance is not destroyed.
Accordingly one should not transfer what holds of the coming to be of

sublunary things to heaven, which Aristotle proposed to demonstrate
completely transcends the whole nature of sublunary things and
their coming to be. And so to avoid misunderstandings Aristotle says
10 that heaven is immaterial (although Aristotle clearly says that,
because it changes place, it also has some substratum for change of
place, although not a substratum for substantial change in the way
sublunary things have).259 Let this person compare these things with
what he himself has said, if he wishes, and consider what seems to
harmonise more with the greatness of god and the nature of things;
15 and Aristotle’s rules (kanonôn) having been assumed for sublunary
things, let him hear what are the only things which Aristotle says
come to be and perish, even though he too thinks that heaven is
brought into existence by god, as this person agrees. However, run-
ning together words, this person says that heaven comes to be
because it is produced by god, and immediately transfers what is
appropriate to the coming to be of sublunary things, that is coming
Translation 81
to be from a substratum and a privation, to the coming to be of
heaven. However, as I have said, although Aristotle maintains these 20
things in the case of sublunary coming to be, he demonstrates that
heaven completely transcends this kind of coming to be from oppo-
sites. However, let these things suffice since we have also discussed
them previously.260
But since this person has overcome the ‘more forceful’ (as he
thinks) of Aristotle’s arguments about the cosmos not coming to be,
and he next proposes to undermine confidence derived from the 25
shared belief of humans and from perception, let us take a look at his
siege engine against those ideas. Aristotle has said261 that all people,
Greek and non-Greek, assign the upper region to the divine because
what is immortal is linked with what is immortal, and a little later,
recounting the views of his predecessors on the construction of the 30
cosmos, he says, ‘Everyone says that it has come to be, but ... some
say it is everlasting, others that it perishes ..., and others, for example
Empedocles of Acragas and Heraclitus of Ephesus, that there is an
alteration with it sometimes being one way and sometimes another
...262 and this goes on forever’. And this person has thought that
Aristotle’s using the witness of ordinary people and a little later 140,1
bringing in those renowned in philosophy as providing evidence for
the contrary view of heaven offered him a feast.263 However, if, in the
case of the doctrine that being is one Aristotle cited as evidence the
common conception according to which there are many things, and
proposed to correct the view of Parmenides and Melissus, I think it
would be possible for anyone, even late learners, to say that, thinking 5
the common conception to be true, he raised objections against the
apparent meaning of those men in order that those who attach
themselves in a superficial way to the doctrine of those men and are
not able to grasp their depth, not be disturbed concerning the views
which are clearly true in this way.264 Now then, is Aristotle unaware
that Plato did not say that the cosmos came to be in some part of time, 10
when Plato says265 that time has come to be with heaven and clearly
adds the reason why he says that the cosmos has come to be, the
reason being not that so and so many years ago it came into existence,
but that it is visible and tangible and has a body? These are features
which indicate not having anything which is self-substantiating but
being reasonably said to have come to be because of being given 15
existence only by something external. For what is self-substantiating
must have no parts and coincide with itself as a whole with a whole,
but body is extended and has parts and therefore has its existence
only from something else and is said to come to be. But it is not said
to come to be in the Aristotelian sense of the term in which ‘coming
to be’ indicates a change from one thing into another and which is
another sense of coming to be.266 And even if this person was not able 20
to satisfactorily understand the words of Plato, and even if he was not
82 Translation
able to understand the words of Aristotle which have been set out, he
ought to understand when Aristotle says267 that according to Plato
‘heaven came to be but nevertheless will be for all time’. For who,
hearing Aristotle say these things would suppose that he thinks that
Plato says heaven has come to be in that sense of coming to be which
25 Aristotle himself denies of heaven?268
Similarly Empedocles, too, presents the intelligible cosmos, which
is united under Love in an enigmatic way (as was the Pythagorean
custom) and the perceptible cosmos, which is separated from it by
Strife, but he says that they neither come to be nor perish in time,
but that the intelligible cosmos stands as something that is and the
30 perceptible cosmos as something which comes to be, and he says that
the perceptible cosmos recycles in succession forever. And so that I
do not seem to some people to be fabricating ‘empty blessings’269 I will
set out a few lines of Empedocles:270
141,1 ... at one time all things coming together into one because of
Love,
at another again all271 being carried272 apart by the hate of Strife,
...
and insofar as many are brought to completion from one when it
in turn has divided,
they come to be and there is no abiding life for them;
5 but insofar as they never cease their thorough interchanging,
they are always unchanging in a circle.
Consequently, instead of being eternally, what is separated from the

intelligible cosmos by Strife comes to be and has ‘no abiding life’, but
recycles forever. And Aristotle did not fail to understand these
10 things, which are clearly expressed as enigmas, but he also argues
against them by dealing with their apparent meaning.
And even if, as this person says, people disagree with one another
on other matters, nevertheless they all agree in assigning the upper
region to the divine, and, accordingly, this belief would be fixed,
implanted in human souls as a common conception. But he says,
15 Even if everyone assigns the upper region to the divine, this is

not evidence that they suppose heaven to be imperishable. For
they raise their hands to holy places and temples, thinking they
are full of gods, and no one thinks that they are without begin-
ning or perishing; rather they think that one place is more
appropriate for a god than another.273
20 This person says these things again without heeding the difference
between heavenly things and things in our world, and he puts both
in the same rank. So he is clearly injured in the eyes of his soul.
Translation 83
Nevertheless it should also be said in response to this remark that
people have fashioned temples and holy places and statues on earth
as imitations of heavenly things, and they have constructed recepta-
cles of divine illuminations in them, receptacles which are more
symmetric with and nearer to themselves <than are heavenly
things>. And why do I speak of the sacred worship which comes into 25
existence with the cosmos? Even David, whom the Jews take as a
prophet, says about god,274 ‘He has set his tabernacle in the sun’. And
David makes clear that he does not think that god settled in at a
certain time when he says,275 ‘<God>, who establishes the earth so
that it will not be moved for all eternity’. It is clear that, even if he 142,1
frequently uses the phrase ‘eternity’ to mean ‘for a long time’, he is
nevertheless taking ‘for all eternity’ to mean ‘unceasing’. But if the
earth is unceasing, it is clear that heaven and the sun are so too.
Furthermore, if people see their temples as bereft of divine light at
some time and go to different temples at different times, they all still 5
dedicate heaven, from which the race of men is derived, to god, and
it follows that those who are not corrupted by pointless conceptions
consider this close relation to be everlasting.
This person says,
However, one also should not think that the fact that heaven
has not been observed to have changed either as a whole or in
its parts in all past time is a demonstration that heaven is
completely imperishable and has not come to be.276 For some 10
animals live for a longer time than others. And parts of the
earth, such as mountains, and stones, such as adamant, last for
practically the whole of time. And there is no record of a begin-
ning of existence or an increase or diminution of Mount
Olympus. And in the case of mortal animals, it is necessary that 15
their most authoritative parts endure in their own nature as
long as the animals should be preserved, and so it is also
necessary that the most authoritative parts of the cosmos them-
selves be preserved for as long as god wishes the cosmos to exist.
It has been agreed277 that as a whole and in its parts heaven is
the most authoritative part of the cosmos and it most holds the
parts of the cosmos together, since all the bodies inside heaven 20
are guided naturally by its motion. Therefore, it is necessary
that heaven, both as a whole and in its parts, not depart at all
from its proper nature as long as the cosmos should be pre-
served. But if Aristotle has correctly proved278 that every body
has finite power, and heaven is a body, it is clear that it admits
of perishing since it satisfies the definition of perishing, even if
until this time it has not been observed to undergo any of the 25
things which lead to perishing.
84 Translation
I have quoted these things which, like those people who – as the
saying goes – carry around the strange Eurycles,279 contain their own
refutation at rather great length, so that I can speak briefly against
all of them <by asking,> ‘Which of the things which come to be and
perish do not have a beginning of their own existence and power, and
30 an acme and a decline’? The gulls and the crows and Mount Olympus
change somewhat every day and every hour, and after some time this
change is perceptible, since some parts of Olympus are always break-
ing off, and it changes shape, and animals and their more authorita-
tive parts reach their acme and decline from it. So if something
remains completely the same for one hour, why can’t it do so for the
35 next hour and the one after that and for an infinite time?280 So if
143,1 heaven, of which some record is handed down and which is, as they281
say, already coming to the end of the last days of its own existence,
is observed not to have varied at all either in substance or in size or
in the number of the parts which fill it out or (what is amazing) in the
speed of its motion, how is it possible that, if, as this person says,
5 heaven is at its acme in terms of the proper definition of its nature,
heaven has not also perished by constraint? But if, as this person
says, all bodies inside heaven are guided naturally by its motion,
then it is clear that, since the motion always has its own proper
completeness, the things guided by it will also remain and undergo
nothing which makes them worse.
10 But if Aristotle has demonstrated that by its own nature a finite
body has finite power (and not just Aristotle but Plato before him282),
and since in addition to this Aristotle has also demonstrated that the
circular motion is everlasting and that heaven neither comes to be
nor perishes, and Plato says283 that heavenly things are indissoluble
because of the will of god, how much better would it be for this person
15 to set aside his contentious empty-headedness and ask how state-
ments of wise men, which seem to those who attend to them
carelessly to be in conflict, show their own harmony to those who are
more attentive? For, although the corporeal nature of heaven is
inseparable from the unchanging, eternal, goodness of the creator,
each of these philosophers separated them in discourse because he
20 wanted to see the power of each in itself. Plato did this more clearly
in the Statesman284 when he separated in discourse the providential
goodness of the creator from the natural existence of the cosmos. And
it is clear that even if heaven has a ‘restored immortality’285 never-
theless, because it is brought into existence directly by the
unchanging and eternal creator to which it is akin in substance, it is
25 suited to unceasing participation in the goodness which is furnished
by the creator and to an inborn dependence on his power for all time,
so that the power of the creator is never incomplete, and his goodness
is not transient, and the creation is not carried down to non-existence
because of its unsuitability. But, in order that I do not go on at length
Translation 85
and write the same things twice, it is necessary in this connection to
recall286 the words spoken by the creator to the heavenly beings, 30
according to Plato.
I thought that for those who are attending closely to the things said 144,1
by Aristotle I should dissolve the arguments against them. And the
objections and dissolutions relating to the texts already set out have
proceeded this far. So come, let us return and set out the texts which
come immediately after the ones already discussed, and elucidate them.
270b26 It is also evident from what has been said why it is 5

impossible for the number of so-called simple bodies to be
greater. ...
He has proved that heaven does not come to be or perish. And from
this he has proved that it does not increase or diminish or alter. And
in the proof that heaven does not come to be or perish he used two
premisses, one saying that what comes to be comes to be from a
contrary (he referred the demonstration of this to the beginning of the 10
Physics), the other that there is no contrary to the body which moves
in a circle. When he has proved the latter from the assertion that if
there is a contrary to the body which moves in a circle, there must be
a motion contrary to circular motion (a conditional which he ex-
pressed with the words287 ‘the motions of contrary things are con-
trary’), he has by conversion that if there is not some other motion 15
contrary to motion in a circle, there is nothing contrary to the body
which moves in a circle. Consequently the whole proof still depends
on the assertion that there is not some other motion contrary to
motion in a circle.
Wanting to demonstrate this premiss, he mentions again the
simple bodies and the simple motions. He needed to bring these
things forward because, since motion in a circle is simple, if there 20
were a motion contrary to it, that would be one of the simple motions.
And he mentions the simple bodies because the body which moves in
a circle is simple, and if it had a contrary, the contrary would be one
of these simple bodies. Each of these is used to establish the other:
for if simple bodies are the ones which move with simple motions,
then if only these five bodies are simple, then also only these three 25
motions are simple motions; and if there are three simple motions, in
a circle, up, and down, then also only these five bodies are simple. He
has introduced these subjects again so that we do not seek the
contrariety of the body which moves in a circle and of motion in a
circle among indefinite things,288 but among definite ones, the simple
bodies and motions.
The reason that there are three simple motions but five simple 30
bodies is that in the case of things moving in a straight line there is
something absolutely heavy and something absolutely light, and
86 Translation
these are contrary to one another; but there are also two intermedi-
145,1 ates; they share in both, but each shares more in one.289 And so these
intermediates move with the same motion as the things in which they
share more, since they move in accordance with what predominates.
But they don’t move in the same way as what they share in more,
since earth moves as far as the centre, and fire moves up to heaven,
but the intermediates move as far as the extreme (akros) elements
5 because air is not perfectly (akrôs) light, and water is not perfectly
heavy. Consequently it was possible to divide the motions into five.
But if it has been proved290 that there is no contrary to motion in a
circle, it is reasonable that motion in a circle remain undivided; for
there is nothing which moves less in a circle as there is something
less light or less heavy. For being less attaches to these intermediates
because of the mixture of the contrary.
<Chapter 4>
10 270b32 One can gain confidence that no other motion is con-
trary to motion in a circle from several considerations. ...
He proves with several arguments that no other motion is contrary
to motion in a circle. In my opinion he carries out the reasoning on
the basis of a division.291 For since motion in a circle and the two
motions in a straight line are the simple motions, if there is a
15 contrary to motion in a circle, it must be either some motion in a
straight line or else motions on a circular arc must be contrary, either
those on some segment of a single circle which is either greater or less
than a semicircle, or those on one semicircle or those on two semicir-
cles of a single circle or those on a single circle. But if none of these
are contrary, there is no contrary motion at all.
20 The first of these arguments is the following:
[i] If some motion is contrary to motion in a circle, it would most

of all be a motion in a straight line;
[ii] but motion in a straight line is not contrary to motion in a
circle;
[iii] therefore, no other motion is contrary to motion in a circle.
And he gives the following tacit proof of the conditional [i]:
If a straight line is thought to be most of all opposite to a circular

one (as an unbroken line is thought to be contrary to one which
25 is broken everywhere),292 then motion in a straight line should
also be thought to be most opposite to motion in a circle;
but the antecedent;
therefore the consequent.
Translation 87
In the middle <of the passage> he dissolves an objection which is
brought against this additional assumption [ii]; it says that the
concave in a circular arc is most of all opposed to the convex. He says
that the concave and the convex are the same in substratum and
differ only relatively,293 and even if they are opposite to one another 30
relatively, nevertheless, when they are taken as a pair and combined
into one arc, they are opposite to a straight line; but the difference of
motions is not determined by relations.294 Consequently, the original
assertion is true: a circular arc is opposite to a straight line; and the
previous conditional [i] is true: if there is a contrary to motion in a 146,1
circle it is most of all motion in a straight line.
He proves that the additional assumption [ii] of the original syllo-
gism, which says ‘but motion in a straight line is not contrary to
motion in a circle’, is also true on the basis of the fact that motions in
a straight line are contrary to one another, upward motion to down-
ward; for above and below are contrarieties of place, and the motions 5
from those regions have contrariety most of all; for the motions which
go from contrary places into contrary places are contrary. So if the
motions in a straight line are contrary to one another, and for a single
thing there is a single contrary (he omits to say this now because it
is clear since it has been said many times), and there are two motions
in a straight line and no more (and that is why he set out the
differences of the simple motions earlier295), motion in a straight line 10
will not be contrary to motion in a circle.
One should try to understand whether this argument is an argu-
ment from more and less, as Alexander says, or whether argument
from the most and its opposite <the least>is not at all a demonstra-
tion from the genus of more and less, because in my opinion less is 15
opposite to more and not to most – unless <Aristotle> is now using
‘most’ to mean ‘more’.296
271a5 Moreover, if someone assumes that the same statement

... .
Since he has said297 that motions in a straight line from contrary
places are contrary, it is easy to make the assumption that in the case
of an arc which is greater or less than a semicircle, motions from 20
opposites to opposites are contrary, for example that the motion from
A toward B is contrary to that from B toward A.298 And so he says that
even if this sort of assumption seems to be true of an arc, in fact, it is
taken as if it were about a straight line, if it is taken as about motion
from a contrary place to a contrary place. And he adds the reason in
a remarkable way when he says, ‘such motion is finite, but circular 25
arcs299 between the same points are infinite’. By ‘finite’ he means
‘one’, since it is impossible to join more than one straight line from a
point to a point because a straight line is the least line having the
88 Translation
same limits, and the least is unique. And that he means that the
30 straight line is finite in number, not magnitude, is made clear by his
147,1 saying that the circular arcs are infinite, since the arcs are infinite
in number, not magnitude; for it is possible to draw infinitely many
circular <lines>. For if the motions from A and from B are contrary,
and contrary motions are from contrary places, and motions from
contrary places are from places which are most widely separated, and
motions from places which are most widely separated are from places
5 which are separated by a determinate distance (since the greatest
distance is determinate), and what is at determinate distances is at
things having a straight line between them (since what determines
and measures distances is a straight line; for it alone is determinate
because it alone is the least line having the same limits), and the
motions which come from distances300 which have the distance be-
10 tween them as a straight line occur as on a straight line, then, if the
motions from A and from B are taken as contraries, they are taken
as in a straight line. But circular arcs which are drawn between (epi)
the same points are indefinitely or infinitely many. So since motions
from contrary places are contrary, the motion from A on the least301
arc will be no more contrary to the motion from B on the same arc
15 than to the motion from B on the greatest arc. For B is equally
contrary to A on the greatest arc. And the argument is the same in
the case of infinitely many <arcs>. For in the case of arcs it is not
possible to take either a greatest or a determinate one since for any
arc which is drawn it is possible to take a greater one and a lesser
one. Furthermore, if the motion from A takes place on the straight
20 line between A and B, and the motion from B on the arc <between
them>, then, if the motion from A is contrary to the motion from B,
motion in a straight line will be contrary to motion in a circle.302
271a10 Similarly in the case of the motion on a single semicircle

... .
In destroying the view that motions along an arc greater than a
semicircle or less than one are contrary on the basis of the fact that
25 the arcs are infinitely or indeterminately many, he gave the impres-
sion that what he said followed because of the number of those arcs
and not because of the nature of the circular arc and of the straight
line. And so now he proves the same thing again in the case of a single
semicircle, which obviously has one arc. For also in the case of the
semicircle drawn on CD,303 if the motions on the arc from C and from
148,1 D are taken as contraries, they are the same as the motion on the
diameter. For, again, if contrary motions are contrary because they
are from places which are most widely distant from one another, and
the greatest distance is determinate, and we judge a determinate
distance by reference to the least line of those having the same limits,
Translation 89
and this is the straight line, it is clear that also on this hypothesis the
contrary motions will occur as on a straight line. And the demonstra-
tion holds no less when it takes place for a single semicircle <than it
does in the case of the infinitely many arcs>. And the situation is the
same in this case as in that:304 if motion from A is contrary to motion
from B and one occurs on a straight line, the other on an arc, motion
in a straight line will be contrary to motion in a circle. And it is clear 10
that the contrariety of things moving on an arc is taken as <it is
taken> in the case of things moving in a straight line because the
motions are taken in terms of the greatest distance, and the greatest
distance is determined in terms of the straight line; for it is possible
to draw different arcs, greater and smaller ones, of different circles
between the same points, and to draw a greater segment305 of a circle
between less distant points and a smaller segment between more
distant points.
Alexander says:306 15
If someone, having specified the contraries up and down and

joined the straight line CD, drew a semicircle around it, and
then thought that up and down were not defined by the straight
line <but by the semicircle>, then, first of all, nothing which
moves naturally would move either up or down on the semicir-
cle, but it would move on a straight line, since it would move on
a least line. For Diogenes307 says that even donkeys go after food 20
and drink on a straight line. Moreover, motion on a semicircle
of this kind which has above and below as limits is not simple,
since it is not just circular but at the same time upward or
downward. For even if you were to draw a whole circle around
a straight line from earth to heaven, something moving on this
would not be moving with a simple motion either, but at the
same time it would be moving with a motion up or down along 25
with a circular motion, since only the motion around the centre
is simple and in a circle.
271a13 Similarly, even if someone were to draw a circle ... .

He has proved that in the case of a single semicircle the motions on
it from the limits of the diameter are also not contrary because the 149,1
greatest distance, which gives form to contraries, is not defined by an
arc but by a straight line. Now he proves in the case of two semicircles
G and H joined to make a single circle that308 even if I cause one thing
to move on semicircle G from E to F and another to move on semicircle 5
H from F toward E, even so the motions are not contrary, and for the
same reason. For the arcs do not define the greatest distance in terms
of which contraries are characterised; but rather the greatest dis-
tance is defined in terms of the diameter EF. And consequently again
90 Translation
if the motions are taken as contraries, they are taken as moving the
10 distance on the straight line, not the distance on the arc.
Having proved in the case of an arc greater or less than a semicir-
cle and in the case of a single semicircle and in the case of two
semicircles joined together that the motions on them are not contrar-
ies even if they seem to take place from opposites, he adds, ‘And even
if these are contraries, nevertheless the motions on the whole circle
15 are not thereby contrary to one another’, using an indirect counter-
argument.309 For the person who has proved that the motions on the
semicircles are contrary has not thereby proved that those on the
circle are, the case for which the demonstration is now being pro-
posed to us. For in the case of arcs and semicircles, the motions from
their limits are thought to be contrary because the limits of the arcs
20 from and to which they move are opposite, but in the case of motions
on a whole circle, if two things move in reverse directions to one
another, there are not any opposite starting points of motion since
each is from a point to itself. He will make the difference between
motions on a semicircle and motions on a circle clearer when he
25 proves next that motions which occur on a whole circle are not
contraries. Consequently he has used the demonstrations for arcs
and semicircles superfluously but not to no purpose; rather he proves
through them that the nature of an arc does not admit opposition
with respect to motion at all.
150,1 271a19 However, the motion in a circle from A to B is not

contrary to that from A to C either ... .
Now he directly proves the very thing which was proposed for proof,
that not even the motions which occur in reverse directions on a
5 whole circle are contrary to one another. And he proves it from the
definition of contrary motions (motions which come about from con-
trary places and into contrary places are contrary) and from the
definition of motion in a circle. For if ABC were a circle and some-
thing,310 beginning from A, were to move on the B side of the circle as
far as A and something else (or even the same thing), beginning from
10 A and proceeding in the reverse direction through the C side of the
circle, were also to reach A, both of these motions are from A and to
A, that is, from and to the same thing; for to have moved in a circle
is to have moved around the whole of it. However, contrary motions
are from contrary places to contrary places, not from and to the same
thing. So the motions in a circle are not contrary. The inference is in
15 the second figure.
Alexander says,
It would have been possible to use this argument also in the case
of the motions previously discussed. For none of them was from
Translation 91
a contrary into a contrary. But this is more evident in the case
of the circle, motion on which is not just not from a contrary into
a contrary, but not even from one thing into another, but from
and into the same thing. And that is why he also has set out the
argument for this case.
271a23 From ‘But also if a motion in a circle were contrary to 20

another motion in a circle, one of them would be pointless’ to
‘But god and nature do nothing pointless’.
Having proved that motions to the same thing which proceed in
directions reverse to one another are not contrary, he now proves the
same thing by reductio ad impossibile with the following syllogism: 25
[i] If motion on a circle were contrary to motion in the reverse

direction on the same circle, one of them would be pointless;
[ii] but it is impossible that what is pointless exist; 151,1
[iii] therefore, a motion in a circle is not contrary to a motion in
a circle.
And he proves the conditional [i] in the following way:
Wherever they begin, each of two things which move in reverse

directions on the same circle reach all the places on the circle;
and if these motions themselves are contrary, as they are being
assumed to be, and the contrarieties of motion are derived from 5
the contrarieties of places, both things will reach all the con-
trary places in the circle in the same way;
but the contrarieties of place are above and below, front and
back, and right and left, and if there is contrariety of place in a
circle, all the contrarieties are simultaneously, since one is no
more than another;
and so, moving in reverse directions through the whole circle, 10
they meet one another, and because they are from contrary
places everywhere and have contrary natures (since they would
not move in contrary ways if they did not have contrary starting
points of motion), they conflict with one another;
and if they were equally strong (this is what ‘equal’ means),
‘they would not move’, since things which are equally strong,
moving from contraries, stop each other, so that, remaining 15
motionless, both would be pointless;
but if one of the motions were dominant, the thing dominated
by the dominant one would be carried around with the motion
of the dominant thing, and in this way the motion in a circle
would be single, and the dominated motion would not complete
the circle;
92 Translation
and in this way, one of the motions would be pointless, being
unable to reach the end of its proper activity; for we call some-
20 thing pointless if it does not supply what it is used for, as in the
case of a sandal;
consequently, if both are equally strong, they will remain mo-
tionless and both will be pointless, but if one is dominant, what
is dominated will be pointless.
And in this way the conditional [i] in the syllogism is demonstrated.

For that these things meet with one another follows from their
moving in reverse directions on the same circle, and that they clash
25 when they meet follows from the assumption that they are contrary
in nature and proceed from contrary places.
I think it is for this reason that Aristotle has hypothesised con-
trary places and given their names, indicating that, if the motions in
a circle are contrary, there are also contrary places everywhere in the
circle, since they are not more in one place than another, and also
indicating that since the moving things reach all the contrary places
in the same way, they always have their contrariety to one another
30 renewed, and therefore they conflict. What follows from their conflict
is that either they stop each other or one dominates and carries what
it dominates around with itself, in which case it is necessary that
either both or at least one is pointless.
He proves the additional assumption [ii], which says, ‘But it is
impossible that anything natural be pointless’ by also assuming
another premiss, namely that nothing of which god and nature are
35 causes is pointless because they do nothing pointless, and tacitly
making the following inference:311
152,1 God and nature are the causes of natural things;

nothing of which god and nature are causes is pointless;
therefore nothing natural is pointless.
I myself think it is necessary to analyse Aristotle’s demonstration

in this way and for the reasons given. However, Alexander says:312
5 When Aristotle says, ‘reach all the contrary places in the same
way’ he does not mean that some places in a circle are contrary.
Rather he says this to indicate that what moves in a circle must
go through every part of the circle. And, indeed, what moves in
a circle must necessarily go through every part of the circle, and
the contrariety of the places would not be needed for this
<point>.
10 But I think <Aristotle>, proceeding in a better way, is pointing out313

that if there are contrary motions on a circle, there must be contrary
Translation 93
places too, since contrary changes of place occur in accordance with
contrarieties of places. However, <Alexander> says that from there
being contrary motions on the circle <Aristotle infers> that there are
contrary places on the circle and that there is an above and below,
and the other antitheses, on the circumference. But even if this is 15
absurd, he obviously does not infer it as simply absurd as much as as
a consequence of the hypothesis,314 their taking their start from
contrary places contributing to the <conclusion that> the things
moving in reverse directions come into conflict. I give as evidence the
fact that this absurdity does follow from there being contrary places,
and that he also uses the assertion that, from wherever it begins, 20
what moves <in a circle> ‘reaches all the contrary places in the same
way’, from which it follows that they are always renewed in the
contrariety of their power.
Alexander says:
But it is also possible that two arguments are expressed in this

text. One of these is that one of the motions is pointless; having
asserted this, he later gives the explanation for it after the other
argument, when he adds, ‘For if they were equal, they would not 25
move ... .’ For these words prove that one of the motions is
pointless.
However, the words ‘they would not move’ indicate that both would
be pointless, and Aristotle has asserted that ‘one of the bodies would
be pointless’ with respect to the other hypothesis, according to which
one thing dominates and the other is dominated, but he has asserted
that ‘God and nature do nothing pointless’ with respect to both
hypotheses.
Alexander says: 30
The words in the middle of this passage would be a different

argument. For in some manuscripts, what is written is not
‘because, it is necessary that what moves in a circle’ but ‘Fur-
thermore,315 it is necessary that what moves in a circle’, as if he
were adding something different to what has already been said.
And what is added would be that if there were contrary motions
on the same circle, they would necessarily pass through all the 153,1
contrarieties of place in the circle; and he adds what the contra-
rieties of place are. Consequently it is necessary that there be
contrarieties of place on the circumference. For the contrary
motion occurs on the circle either because the motion is in the
direction of contrary things316 (as it is when motion occurs on a
straight line), or, if not, because it occurs through contrary 5
places, which motion in a circle would do if it had contrariety;
for it is not able to occur in the direction of contrary places, at
94 Translation
least if it is toward the same place. Having said this, Aristotle
does not further add that it is absurd to say that there are
contrary places – above and below or the other antitheses or
10 even all of them – on a single circular circumference which is
continuous; rather, taking up the <first> argument again, he
shows why he said initially that ‘one of them would be pointless’.
So Alexander. But perhaps the person who wrote ‘furthermore’ did

not apprehend the continuity of the one argument nor that it is out
of keeping with Aristotle’s customary style to use these sorts of
hyperbatons. But why does Alexander say that motion in a circle ‘is
not able to occur in the direction of contrary places, at least if it is
toward the same place’? For, in general, if the circle is hypothesised
15 to have contrary places, the motion, I think, is entirely through
contrary places and also in the direction of contrary places.
Alexander sets out in a concise way and, as he says, in accordance
with his master Aristotle,317 the demonstration that there is no
motion contrary to motion in a circle and no contrary to the body
which moves in a circle as follows:
20 If there is a motion contrary to motion in a circle, either it is in

a straight line or it is circular. But, as will be proved, it is
neither, and so there is none at all.
There is no motion in a straight line contrary to circular motion.
For what sort of motion in a straight line will be contrary to it?
And why one rather than another? Furthermore, motions in a
straight line are contrary to one another, and for a single thing
there is a single contrary. But if we are able to prove318 that no
motion in a straight line is contrary to motion in a circle, then,
25 in general, motion in a straight line will not be contrary to
motion in a circle.
But neither is motion in a circle contrary, since contrary mo-
tions are from contraries and into contraries. For the
contrarieties in motion are derivative from the contrarieties of
places, but things that move circularly and on a circle move
from and to the same place even if they move in reverse direc-
tions to one another. But nothing is contrary to itself.
30 Consequently, motions in a circle will not be contrary to one
another. For the things which move in directions reverse to one
another in this way do undergo something contrary (hupenan-
tion), but their motions are not contrary, since the definition of
contrary <motions>319 does not apply to them.
But if neither motion in a straight line nor motion on a circle is
contrary to motion in a circle, there will not be any contrary to
what moves in a circle naturally.
154,1 And it is clear that things which move on a semicircle and
Translation 95
things which move on a circle are not said to move in the same
way because things which move in a circle move continuously
from and to the same thing, but motions on a diameter320 are not
continuous because what moves <in this way> must turn, and
what turns must first stand still. 5
Let these things suffice for the clarification of what Aristotle says.
And let me add that one should bring forward what is said here for
those who believe that Aristotle does not say that god is an efficient
cause but only a final one. For it says here clearly that ‘god and
nature do nothing pointless’. However, some people also do violence 10
to this statement. Some of them understand ‘god’ to mean ‘heaven’,
on the grounds that its motion is the cause of the nature of things
here. And they are correct if they add the word ‘direct’, since god on
his own gives existence to heavenly things and through their motion
also creates the sublunary things, which come to be and perish. For,
as Plato321 also says, the unmoving cause makes whatever it makes 15
on its own everlasting and equal to the gods. However, some others
of these people say that in assigning the same rank to god and nature
in this passage Aristotle makes a mistake because of the axiom.322
However, since with what he says here, which is expressed in
terms of the motion being on a single circle, Aristotle has given a
proof that even if things move in directions reverse to one another on 20
the same circle, there is no motion contrary to motion in a circle (for
either both will be pointless, if both are brought to a stop by force, or
one will be, when it is carried around by the stronger), it is worth
asking why the motion of the sphere of the planets is not contrary to
the motion of the sphere of the fixed stars;323 for these do not just
move in reverse directions; they also seem to move from opposite 25
places to opposite places, if, indeed, the sphere of the fixed stars
moves from east to west, and the spheres of the planets move from
west to east. For the fact that this motion does not occur on the same
circle does not seem to prevent there being a contrariety, since it is
not necessary that everything which moves from the centre or to the
centre move on the same straight line or that they always meet each
other. And in general the motions on one circle which are thought to 30
be contrary do have an apparent contrariety because they are in
reverse directions but not because they are from contrary places. And
this is most of all the specific feature of contrary motions. However,
the sphere of the fixed stars and that of the planets are thought to
move from contrary places.
Now it should be said that the contrary motions about which we
are now enquiring ought to be from and into contrary places, since
this is the definition of contrary motions.324 However, things which 155,1
move in accordance with them ought to be equally strong in power
with one another, if the contrariety is not going to give out quickly
96 Translation
because one of them dominates. But the things which move with
these motions also ought to meet with one another and be contrary
5 in nature (if we are going to call the motions of natural contraries
contrary) and change into one another, having a common substra-
tum. For things which come to be from one another are contraries in
this sense –this I think has been proved in a reasonable way.
Let us then see if the motion of the sphere of planets and the
motion of the sphere of the fixed stars have any of these features
which have been distinguished. First of all east and west, from which,
10 as opposites, the planets and the fixed stars are thought to move,
have their being in relation to us and not to the universe. For what
is east to some people is west to others. Secondly, each of these
spheres could be said to move both from the east and from the west
at the same time.325 For just as the hemisphere of the sphere of the
fixed stars which is above earth obviously moves from east to west,
15 so the hemisphere under earth obviously moves in the reverse direc-
tion from west to east; for otherwise the stars which have set would
not rise again. And the hemisphere of the sphere of the planets which
is above earth seems to move from west to east, that under the earth
in the reverse direction, but both move by revolving from and to the
same things. And if you conceive some point outside of each of the
spheres, every part of either which begins from it ends up again at it,
20 and similarly both depart from it naturally and proceed toward it
naturally. In general how can they be said to move from contraries
into contraries when each of them is always in every place, albeit
with different parts at different times, and they move naturally from
every place and to every place equally? Moreover, if the sublunary
elements, which move in a straight line, made continuous reversals
25 in their motion and naturally rose and sank equally, and most of all
in a different place so that they did not meet one another, but some
moved to the right, some to the left, no one, I think, would say that
either their motions or the moving things themselves, being similarly
related to all places, were contrary. For each of the elements which
30 move in contrary ways moves from a contrary place toward a con-
trary place and is related in a suitable way to the one and in an alien
way to the other.
However, the motions of the two spheres are not equally strong
either, if, indeed, the sphere of the fixed stars carries the sphere of
the planets around with it. However, the dominant sphere does not
constrain the dominated one or eliminate its natural motion, as
happens in the case of contrary motions. It is clear that there is no
35 constraint because the sphere of the planets is filled with (koresthen)
156,1 the motion of the sphere of the fixed stars, but nevertheless preserves
its own natural motion, always counterrevolving in the same meas-
ures. However, if it were constrained by a contrary and thus stronger
motion, it would certainly also have completely ceased its own proper
Translation 97
motion long ago, and if it did not, nevertheless, being constrained, it
would not have preserved the sameness of its motion for all time.
Consequently the things which move in this way are not contrary 5
either.
And even if these motions themselves were contrary because in
reverse directions, the motions and the things having them are not
at all contraries in the sense that they change into one another, if,
indeed, the things having them are distinguished by proper places
and are not of a nature to meet one another either as whole or in their
parts; for even if they touch one another, they do not do so as things
proceeding from contrary places and having contrary natures, but as 10
things which are always together and familiar with one another and
in agreement. In general the things which change one another have
a common substratum and are not able to exist together with one
another in it and so conflict in relation to the substratum and change
one another. But these <heavenly spheres> do not have a common
substratum but each has a substratum by itself, and they are of a
nature to exist together, touching one another in a friendly way.
However, the entireties of the sublunary <elements> do not change 15
one another either; only detached parts of them do so. So if no part of
these <heavenly things> becomes detached, the parts are not of a
nature to change into one another either; but if <the heavenly
things> changed as wholes, then, if the whole endured, the cosmos
would become different; and if the whole perished, the cosmos would
no longer change, but perish along with the whole.326
What then! someone might say, does the motion in reverse direc- 20
tions of the spheres have no power? And does its being one way or the
other make no difference? Rather the motion has the greatest power,
since it harmonises the whole cosmos and furnishes the cause of
sublunary coming to be and perishing. But it does not do so in such a
way that one motion is changed by the other, which is what was asked
about, but in such a way that there arises a harmonious ordering of
secondary things in relation to prior ones.
Let these things be said with respect to our investigation. But 25
since, to quote the lyric poet Alcaeus,327 ‘the pig is worked up328 again’,
it is necessary to turn away again to this grammarian, who in his
discussions displays a great deal of badness of character as well as
mindlessness. Having said in this connection that Aristotle shows
that heaven does not come to be or perish using two hypotheses, one 30
which says that everything which comes to be comes to be from a
contrary, the other which hypothesises that there is no contrary to
the heavenly body, he says (speaking in this way with these very
words), ‘We have accepted the second hypothesis – I mean that there
is no contrary to the heavenly body – since there is no contrary to 157,1
substance in general,329 but we have refuted the first, which is
false’.330
98 Translation
The person who says these things spends a whole book, the fifth,
seeking victory by refuting the arguments which demonstrate that
there is no motion contrary to motion in a circle. And he does not
understand that, since nature is a starting point of motion, if there
is no natural structure which is contrary to the substance of heaven,
5 that is to the natural structure of heaven, there is also no natural
motion contrary to its natural motion. But this person concedes that
nothing is contrary to heaven – something which, because Aristotle
accepts it, he would no longer have to demonstrate using the fact that
there is no contrary to motion in a circle – and does battle with this
demonstration, obviously because of his empty-headedness. For if a
10 person who pays attention to truth concedes what is to be demon-
strated, why would he disagree about the way it is demonstrated? Let
this be an indication of this person’s mindless desire for victory.
Meanwhile we should point out that since, as I think, the premiss
in question, that what comes to be comes to be from a contrary, has
been firmly established, because the things said against it have been
15 proved331 to be beside the point and spoken mindlessly, and the minor
premiss which says that there is no contrary to heaven has been
accepted by this person, it follows directly in the second figure that
heaven does not come to be, and we no longer need to demonstrate
that heaven has no contrary from the assertion that there is no
motion contrary to motion in a circle. However, since, even though he
20 thinks that this demonstration contributes nothing to the proposed
conclusion, he strives for victory by trying to overturn it, let us ring
the bells of these arguments of his too and hear the way they sound
cracked.
Aristotle having proposed to prove that there is nothing contrary
to the body which moves in a circle because the motions of contraries
are also contrary but no motion is contrary to motion in a circle, this
25 person raises objections to both of these assertions, first to the
assertion that the motions of contraries are also contrary. He asks:
Does Aristotle think that the substances of things of which he

says the motions are contrary are contrary? Or does he think
that even though the substances themselves of bodies are not
contraries they do at least always share in contrary qualities in
the way that fire and water move in contrary ways but one
30 shares in the hot quality, the other in the cold and, for example,
the flesh of an Ethiopian and the flesh of a Scythian share in
contrary colours even if they are not contrary in substance?332
And if Aristotle is saying that the substances themselves of
the bodies, the substances which move with contrary motions,
are contraries, then he himself will be caught contradicting
himself, since he taught us in the Categories333 that substance
35 has no contrary and most of all substance which is a composite
Translation 99
of matter and form. There he taught that ‘it is a proprium of
substance to be one and the same in number and receptive of 158,1
contraries’. How then can things which change334 in contrary
ways be contrary? For then a substance which is the subject of
contrary changes (so that it will become light and dark, hot and
cold, larger and smaller) will be contrary to itself. For it is
arbitrary to say that things which change place in contrary
ways are contrary, but things which change with respect to 5
quality or increase and diminish are not. For nature is a start-
ing point of change and rest not just with respect to place, but
also with respect to quality and quantity (and clearly also with
respect to substance, although this person does not add this; for
change with respect to coming to be and perishing is natural).
And things which change with respect to quality and coming to 10
be335 are bodies which are more contrary than those which
change place if, indeed, change of place is only something acci-
dental.
And it is not only in the case of the other kinds of change that
we see bodies which are the same in number changing naturally
in contrary ways, but also in the case of change of place itself.
For air has a starting point not only of movement upward, but
also of movement downward, since if some of the earth or water 15
lying under air is taken away, it immediately fills that space,
just as, if something lying above it is taken away, it moves
upward. But if someone makes the force of the void rather than
a natural starting point responsible for the downward motion,
what is to prevent one from saying that in the case of the
upward motion of the air there is the same cause, since it moves
up if there happens to be an empty space, and otherwise it does 20
not? And perhaps it is not just possible but also necessary that
what holds in the case of the other contrary changes also holds
in the case of change of place; and motion is one genus of change,
and air is one substratum. Consequently it does not follow that
things which change in contrary ways are contrary in sub-
stance, since nothing is contrary to itself.
Now if this person were perplexed about these matters and making 25
enquiry and raised the question how the statements of a wise man
which seem to conflict are in fact harmonious, he would rightly be
considered a lover of learning. (I mean the statements in the Catego-
ries that there is no contrary to substance, and that a substance
which is one and the same in number can admit contraries, and what
is said here, namely that the motions of contraries are contrary.) For
if things which have contrary motions are contrary (as Alexander and 30
not Aristotle said336), substance itself would seem to be contrary to
itself, and it would not just have a contrary, it would have itself as
100 Translation
contrary. But if when he says, ‘Therefore it is entirely necessary that
either what is shown in the Categories or what is shown here be
159,1 rejected as false, and if what is shown in the Categories is true and
in agreement with the nature of things, it is false that bodies which
move with contrary motions are contrary in substance’, he speaks
rashly without making enquiry, then, I think, he will be rightly
judged as a late learner rather than a lover of learning. For when
those who have been trained in argument from childhood hear some-
thing which seems to be contradictory and has not been challenged,
5 especially if they hear it from men like this one,337 they investigate
whether they can somehow harmonise these kinds of things with one
another because they have already come across many apparently
conflicting things which actually harmonised. But because late learn-
ers only look at a few cases, they are struck by the apparent conflict
and, inclining by chance toward one of the apparently discordant
texts, they condemn the other. I think that this is what has befallen
10 this person in this case too. But it should be said that, if, indeed,
nature is a starting point of motion and rest, what person with a mind
would doubt that the motions of things which are natural contraries
are contrary? That would be similar to someone doubting a person
who says that the activities of naturally good <people> are good.
But we should next investigate why it is true that a substance
15 which is one and the same in number is the subject of contrary
changes so that it will become light and dark, hot and cold, larger and
smaller, and move up and down, as happens in the case of air. Why
won’t the substance itself which moves with contrary motions be
contrary to itself even though we say that one substance is not
contrary to another? One should notice first that the things which are
20 said in the Categories which this person says are ‘true and in agree-
ment with the nature of things’, namely that there is no contrary to
substance and that a substance which is one and the same in number
is of a nature to move and change in contrary ways, also seem to
superficial people to be in conflict with and contrary to one another
because of the same objections. For if a substance which is the same
25 in number is disposed in contrary ways because it becomes light and
becomes dark, but things which are disposed in contrary ways are
contrary to one another, why won’t the substance itself be contrary
to itself?
For the dissolution of these matters, it should be noted that some
natural changes are active and some are passive, active being those
with respect to which natural bodies are said to act, to heat or cool,
30 to make light or dark, to cause to increase or diminish; passive those
with respect to which what is acted on undergoes something natu-
rally by the action of what produces these things naturally, for
example, being heated or cooled and or being affected in the other
ways. But change of place is only active, so that nothing is made to
Translation 101
change place naturally by another thing in the way that it is heated
or made dark; it is only moved by the nature which is inside it. Since
this is the way things are, when Aristotle says here that ‘the motions 35
of contrary things are contrary’,338 he is talking about active changes. 160,1
For in their case nature is the starting point of motion in the sense
that it causes motion rather than being moved and acts rather than
being acted on. And so fire and water are said to be contrary in the
sense that they activate contrary changes, that is, contrary activities:
one makes things hot and dry, the other makes them cold and moist; 5
and the one goes upward, the other downward. For, as I have said,
these changes are also activities. But when Aristotle says that a
substance which is one and the same in number is receptive of
contraries, he is taking the contraries to be passive, since what
receives is acted on, just as what gives acts. And so the same underlying
substance is lightened or darkened, increased or diminished, but the 10
same substance in and of itself does not make things both light and
dark; for what acts with respect to its own substance which is already
complete cannot activate contrary activities both of which are pro-
jected from the substance, and this most of all when what acts is
something natural and simple. But what is acted on with respect to
its own incompleteness and is able to be acted on and is naturally
related to both opposites is reasonably said to undergo contraries in 15
turn. And in its case it is not absurd that a thing be contrary to itself,
but not in the same respect, but rather insofar as it is disposed in
contrary ways at different times, as in the case of a body which is
heated at one time and cooled at another whether substantially (as
when it becomes fire at one time and water at another) or acciden-
tally; but fire cannot heat at one time and cool at another, nor can it 20
go up naturally at one time and down at another. And therefore it was
not pointless for Aristotle to trace the differences between natural
substances back to their changes of place and not to the other
changes; for only changes of place are active because what changes
place acts with respect to the nature within it. But when the other
changes, which are both naturally active and naturally passive, are 25
taken as passive they make the underlying substance itself appear to
be contrary to itself. However, as I said, change of place is active; and
so nothing is moved naturally by the action of anything else, but it is
made warm and light and comes to be and increases and undergoes
the contraries of these by the action of something else. For these
bodies naturally act on and are acted on by one another. 30
But since this person says that air also has a contrariety with
respect to changes of place, it is amazing that he does not realise what
he himself said,339 namely that in the fourth book of this treatise
Aristotle says340 that what sinks to the bottom of everything, as earth
does, is absolutely heavy, what rises to the top of everything, as fire 35
does, is absolutely light, and what is intermediate between these, I
102 Translation
161,1 mean water and air, which rise above some things and sink below
others, are both heavy and light. And also Aristotle frequently says341
that these things are not simple in the strict sense. So what is
surprising, if air sometimes moves up and sometimes down in accord-
ance with what is dominant in it at any time, not having both of these
5 contrary active powers in the same respect, but putting them forward
in accordance with its own varying qualitative change? For it has a
downward impulsion when it is thickened and an upward one when
it is thinned. However, when some space below it is emptied and air
is drawn down into it, this happens because of the emptying, since
the universe always contracts itself and admits no empty space, but
10 rather pushes finer and more mobile things into the spaces which are
in danger of being made empty. Since air, at least in its own nature,
is lighter, it is of a nature to move upward, and if nothing above
makes room for the rising air, some bodies are necessarily made
denser or they mutually replace one another, so that the region can
receive air which has come to be from water.342 So it is not correct for
15 this person to say that air changes position up and down in the same
way so that if it moves down because there cannot be a void, it moves
up for same reason. This is made clear by the air which comes to be
from water: although it is more moist it nevertheless runs upward
and also constrains what lies above it to become denser. So it is clear
from what has been said that it is not strange even if what underlies
contrary changes in a passive way becomes contrary to itself, but
20 what is active does not activate contrary motions, and it cannot
become contrary to itself.
Nor is it arbitrary <to say> that things which change place natu-
rally with contrary motions are contrary, but those which change in
quality or increase or diminish in contrary ways are not;343 if, indeed,
only natural changes of place are active, and it is not possible for the
25 same substance to naturally activate contrary activities (because the
activities are attached to an active nature), but contrary passive
changes do arise in the same subject. And one should not view
contrary changes in this indeterminate and confused way and attrib-
ute what happens in the case of passive changes to active ones.
But since this person is prolix344 and thinks that air moves up and
30 down naturally in the same way, he should be asked whether he says
that air has both weight and lightness in the way Aristotle says, that
is, not in relation to the same thing, but having lightness in relation
to water and heaviness in relation to fire, or whether it has both of
them in and of itself. And if he thinks the latter he should be asked
162,1 whether it is said to have weight because of some other thicker thing
in it and lightness because of some other finer thing in it or whether
it has both in every part of itself. And it is clear that this <last
alternative> is impossible since air would be completely motionless
if each power on its own dragged it in accordance with this alterna-
Translation 103
tive.345 But if it is light because of one of its parts and heavy because 5
of another (in the way that we are light because of the fire in us and
heavy because of the earth), air would be a composite, and it would
be true to say of it, as it is true to say of us, that the natural changes
of the contrary substances which are naturally in it are contrary. And
there would be nothing absurd if you wanted to say that air is
contrary to itself because it is composed of contrary parts. But if he
says that air has both motions because it is light relative to one thing
and heavy relative to another, it is clear that because of the two 10
motions it will move to the same place, which lies under fire and
above water; and, again, there will be a single natural motion for a
single thing, and the motions of air will not be contrary in reality, but
only relatively speaking, and what moves will not be contrary to
itself.
In general Aristotle says that ‘the motions of contrary things are 15
contrary’ in order to affirm the truth of its conversion with antithesis,
which says that there is no contrary to something the motion of which
has no contrary. If he proves that there is no other motion contrary
to motion in a circle, he will have proved that there is no contrary to
the body which moves in a circle, a proposition which, as he says, this
person accepts without demonstration, but nevertheless he has 20
stretched out this many words.346
This is Aristotle’s view, but the grammarian says that it is arbi-
trary to say that bodies which change place with contrary motions are
contrary while saying that things which make contrary changes with
respect to quality or increase are not contraries. It seems that he
believes that if the motions of contrary things are contrary, then also
things of which the motions are contrary are contrary. However, 25
unless these two are equivalent, it is not correct to posit the antece-
dent when the consequent is posited. Nor does it follow from what
Aristotle says that, as this person says, things which change in
contrary ways with respect to quality or place are contrary to them-
selves, unless this equivalence is proved first. But if these are
equivalent to one another (that is ‘the motions of contrary things are
contrary’ and ‘things of which the motions are contrary are contrary’), 30
it is clear that what follows is not absurd.347 However, I think I have
already explained in detail how matters stand, but I have set out
these things now in order to make clear that this person, who has no
understanding of the entailments among propositions, is deceiving
himself in thinking that he and those who make mindless presuppo-
sitions say anything.
And, forgetting, as it seems, that the subject of discussion is
simple, natural motions, he says that since the soul changes or is able 163,1
to change to virtue and vice and also to false and true understanding,
it will then be contrary to itself with respect to the same thing.
However, having had this idea, he ought to have raised the difficulty
104 Translation
why the soul acts both from virtue and from vice, but fire never acts
5 as a cooling agent. And, having raised this difficulty, he ought to have
found as a solution that simple natural things act because of what
they are and so, as long as they exist, they activate the same uniform
activities; but that, although the soul gives life because of what it is
and therefore is always ready to perform this activity, it does not act
from virtue or vice or falsehood or truth because of what it is, but
because it puts forward opinions and choices differently at different
times.
10 But let’s go on to what comes next and see whether these things
sound more coherent than what has preceded them. He writes the
following (again it is necessary for me to quote more of what this man
says to avoid appearing like a bribed witness for the prosecution
(sukophantês) to those who do not believe me):
These things are true348 if they say that things which move with
contrary motions are bodies which are contrary in substance.
But if someone were to say that they are not contrary in
15 substance because of the universal truth that there is no con-
trary to substance but, rather, things which move in contrary
ways always share in contrary qualities,349 as in the case of fire
and earth (since fire is hot, earth cold, and fire is light, earth
heavy), then it would follow from this by conversion with an-
tithesis that things which do not share in contrary qualities do
not move with contrary motions, and that there is no motion
20 contrary to the motion of such things at all. But it is not true
that if there is no motion contrary to the motion of some body,
the body does not share in a contrary quality, since conversion
from the antecedent is not sound.350 But if someone says that
these are equivalent, so that things which have a motion to
which there is a contrary motion also share in contrary qualities
and things which share in contrary qualities always also have
25 a motion to which there is a contrary motion, he is demanding
that an undemonstrated thesis be granted to him. But he is,
nevertheless, refuted by the facts themselves. For the entireties
of the elements clearly share in contrary qualities, but there is
no motion contrary to the motion of at least the hupekkauma
and the <upper> air, since their motion is circular, seeing that
Aristotle himself thinks that there is no motion contrary to
30 motion in a circle.
In this connection I first signal that this person thinks that things
which share substantially351 in contrary qualities, as fire and earth
do, are not contraries in substance. For if substantial contrariety is
not due to these qualities, the remaining possibility is that it is due
35 to matter itself. And I don’t think that even this person would say
Translation 105
that, but nevertheless he assumes that Aristotle would speak in this 164,1
way. And I think that what comes next is filled with utter mindless-
ness and stupidity. For, although Aristotle has said that the motions
of contraries are contrary, this person makes a conversion and hy-
pothesises that things which move in contrary ways are contraries in
the sense that they share in contrary qualities. And if he has con-
verted the proposition thinking that the terms are not equivalent, let
him tell us what things he should assume when he does not even 5
know that it is not possible to convert terms which are not equivalent
or to present them indifferently in one order or another. But if he
proceeded in this way in the belief that they are equivalent, why does
he say that they are not equivalent and consequently that it is not
possible to convert from the antecedent and say that if some body
does not have a contrary motion, it does not share in a contrary
quality? Notice how he says that the person who believes that the 10
terms are equivalent is demanding that an undemonstrated thesis be
granted to him and has <himself> converted the terms posited by
Aristotle as if taking them to be equivalent. He makes clear that he
has converted them when he says that things which move in contrary
ways share in contrary qualities and, using the conversion with
antithesis of this, that what does not share in contrary qualities does
not move with contrary motions (motions being the antecedent, 15
contraries the consequent).352 He starts from these things and the
conversion, not understanding, as I said before, that Aristotle wants
to prove that there is no contrary to what moves in a circle on the
basis of the fact that there is no motion contrary to motion in a circle.
But this person, having converted the terms, has inferred353 that
there is no motion contrary to motion in a circle, but <Aristotle> will
prove this using a proper demonstration with the goal of inferring 20
from it that there is no contrary to the substance of heaven, since this
was needed for proving that heaven does not come to be. But this
person, striving for victory, continues to try to prove from the ‘facts’,
as he says, that the terms are not equivalent and cannot convert. And
here again he makes the conversion, but even more mindlessly. He
says,
For the air and the hupekkauma have contrary qualities and 25
both move with a circular motion; therefore, if motion in a circle
is not contrary to motion in a circle, these things which have
contrary qualities will not have contrary motions.
And here <I say two things>. First of all fire and air do not have as
contraries those qualities from which their change of place follows,
since both are hot and both are light, even if one is more light because
of dryness, the other less light because of moistness.354 And secondly 30
it has been proved earlier355 and I think reasonably on the basis of the
106 Translation
fact that the air and the hupekkauma move along with the sphere of
the fixed stars that motion in a circle is not a proprium of the nature
of fire and air, but rather they share in the motion in a better way
because they are obviously suited to share in it. That they do move
35 along with the sphere of the fixed stars is made clear by the comets
which arise in them as well as the other appearances which rise and
set with the fixed stars. And it is not just these things356 which move
165,1 along with the sphere of the fixed stars but also the sphere of the
planets; but whereas the sphere of the planets also has its own
motion, the sublunary spheres357 are moved in their entireties in
accordance with a better participation.
Let this much which I have said be sufficient so that no one who
despises the unsoundness of this person’s arguments charges us with
taking too much trouble. A person who makes such a charge should
5 realise that I too have not endured this trouble for the sake of his
arguments but for the sake of those who are deceived by their
quantity and this very speaking against Aristotle. So I am not
unaware that those who come after us will consider not just this
person’s words but also mine superfluous and not worth attending to.
But it is necessary to take the measure of the next thing Charybdis358
says.
10 In this material which I have set out he has frequently alleged that
there is no contrary to substance, and he thinks that Aristotle
contradicts himself because he says this clearly in the Categories but
here he says that the motions of things contrary in substance are
contrary.359 I think he completely misunderstands what is meant by
saying that there is no contrary to substance. I give as evidence the
15 division on the basis of which he made his response. It is at the
beginning of the passage which has just been set out and reveals how
he thinks, where he writes:360
These things are true if they say that things which move with
contrary motions are bodies which are contrary in substance.
But if someone were to say that they are not contrary in
substance because of the universal truth that there is no con-
20 trary to substance, but rather things which move in contrary
ways always share in contrary qualities, as in the case of fire
and earth (since fire is hot, earth cold, and fire is light, earth
heavy)... .
You see that he has contrasted things which are contrary in quality
with those which are contrary in substance, and that, obviously
thinking that the former are different from the latter and that
<things which are contrary in quality> are not opposed because of
just any qualities but because of substantial ones,361 he says, ‘as in
25 the case of fire and earth since fire is hot, earth cold, and fire is light,
Translation 107
earth heavy’. Now if he does not believe that fire and earth and things
like them are contrary in substance, then, since every composite
substance (and he thinks that these most of all have no contrary) is
composed of matter and substantial qualities, what other natural
composite substance is left of which he thinks it is true that there is
no contrary to substance?362 He has written clearly that he believes
that this is said of composite substance in the Categories, since in the 30
third chapter of his fifth book he writes the following:363
If Aristotle is saying that the substances themselves of the

bodies, the substances which move with contrary motions, are
contraries, then he himself will be caught contradicting himself,
since he taught us in the Categories that substance has no
contrary and most of all substance which is a composite of 35
matter and form.
So what sort of natural body composed of matter and form is it which 166,1
is not given form by opposite qualities? For even if someone takes it
to be the three-dimensional itself – and matter is the three-dimen-
sional according to this grammarian364 –, then this becomes a natural
body and composite substance when it has been given form by
antithetical qualities, and the <substance> which is given form by
contrary qualities is nothing other than this <composite>. But also if 5
the body in question365 is not matter but a composite of matter and
form, its form also has antithetical differentiae; for Aristotle says
that ‘there is a matter for body and the same matter for a great body
and a small one’.366 So what sort of substance composed of matter and
form is there besides that which is given form by the antithetical
qualities, hot and cold, light and heavy, of which he thinks it is true 10
that substance has no contrary? He seems to agree that it is not true
of this substance.367 And so he tries to pursue the argument in
another direction, attacking368 the figure of conversion, itself some-
thing which he has also shown himself to be ignorant of. But this
person will also show his ‘ability’ in argumentation in what follows.
It would be good to explain to myself first, and thereby also to those 15
who are eager to learn, what it means in and of itself that there is no
contrary to substance. Aristotle, having taken what in the Categories
is substance in the strict sense, the individual thing, the substance
composed of form and matter, has taken it as a substratum, and so
he says it is neither in a substratum nor said of a substratum so that
he indicates in every way that it is a substratum. But contraries qua 20
contraries are accidents, since they are differentiae and differentiae
are qualities and accidents.369 And differentiae are not contrary to
substance, but they have their own contrary existence in substance.
And therefore Aristotle says both that there is no contrary to sub-
stance and that substance can receive contraries while being one and
108 Translation
25 the same in number. Consequently the statement in the Categories
that there is no contrary to substance is true. For there is no contrary
with respect to matter, which is only a substratum. And there is none
with respect to form, the composite of genus and differentiae (for
<form> is also substance, even if it is in matter); rather, together with
matter, <form> underlies contraries. And much more is it true that
there is no contrary with respect to the composite of form and matter,
30 since this is still more a substratum for contraries. (A substratum
cannot be a contrary; for it cannot be both members of a contrary pair,
since they are in a substratum; nor can it be one member of the
contrary pair both because that member is not a substratum, but is
in a substratum, and because if the substratum were a contrary it
could not receive its opposite.)
Substance in the strict sense according to Aristotle, individual
substance, which both comes to be and perishes, is composed of
35 matter and form. But form, of which we give a definition, is composed
of a genus and differentiae, and differentiae are qualities which are
167,1 antithetical to other qualities; for differentiae are divided out from
their appropriate genera by antithesis. And so substances are said to
be contrary with respect to these differentiae, not insofar as they
exist independently and are substances and substrata, but insofar as
they are given existence and form from contrary differentiae; for
example, fire qua fire and water qua water are not contraries because
5 they are substances which underlie contrary accidents ...,370 but they
are contrary to each other and conflict with each other and change
into each other insofar as one is hot and dry, the other cold and moist,
and one is light, the other heavy, and not insofar as they are sub-
10 stances and substrata, but rather insofar as they have contrary
qualities.
And so in the Categories Aristotle took the kind of substance which
is a composite of matter and form as a substratum and said that the
same substance is receptive at different times of contraries, but
contraries which exist as accidents,371 and he said that there is no
contrary to this kind of substance. But here <in On the Heavens> he
has taken <as contraries> the differentiae which belong substan-
15 tially, each contrary contributing to the filling out of a different
substance and the differentiae belonging per se and not accidentally
to the substances. And he said that substances are contrary to each
other with respect to those differentiae which belong per se to the
different substances. For differentiae which belong accidentally exist
in the same substance in turn. And so, when he says ‘the motions of
20 contrary things are contrary’, he is calling substances which have
substantial differentiae which are contrary to one another contrary
substances, but he is not doing so insofar as they are substances and
exist per se, but insofar as they are constituted by the contrary
differentiae from which contrary motions follow; for upward motion
Translation 109
is conjoined with heat and lightness, downward motion with coldness
and heaviness.
And these things do not contradict what is said in the Categories; 25
nor is it necessary, as this person says, to eliminate the view that the
motions of contrary things are contrary because one thinks that what
is said in the Categories is true.372 Rather373 one should understand
that in the first book of the Physics Aristotle said that the privation
of the form which is in matter, and is constituted from qualities which
are contraries, is contrary to the form; and he says that the form
comes to be from this privation because there is not always a contrary
form for every form; for there is no form contrary to human or 30
musical. But there is always a privation. And sometimes the priva-
tion involves a complete form which has complete qualities
constituting it; for example, the privation of fire in water exists
together with the form of water, which is complete and possesses the
qualities in it, coldness and moistness (the contraries of the qualities
of fire) complete, and, as a result, fire is said to come to be not just 35
from its own privation but also from the form which is contrary to it.
But when the privation does not exist together with a complete form, 168,1
but with something material which is suitably disposed to receive the
form which is opposite to the privation, as in the case of the privation of
human in seed, then what comes to be is said to come to be not from a
contrary form but from a privation. This is not because the seed is not
also a kind of form, but because it is an incomplete form and has the role 5
of matter in relation to the existence of the complete form and is entirely
derivative from it. Accordingly, a human being does not come to be from
seed as from a contrary form. And it is clear that there are also in the
seed some qualities which have contrariety to one another, but the
qualities are also incomplete and not like the complete qualities of
complete forms. Therefore, whatever qualities there are in the seed 10
which are contrary to human qualities change into human qualities
when the moist in the seed is dried and the spherical is stretched out.
And whichever qualities are of the same kind as human qualities change
from being incomplete to being complete. And so because the condition
of the substratum is incomplete, when an animal comes to be from seed
or musical comes to be from unmusical, it is said to come to be from the 15
privation of the form and not from a contrary form.
<To see> that I am not writing these ideas as my own but that they
are also accepted by the most reputable commentators and expressed
by Aristotle himself, listen to what Alexander has written in his
commentary on the Categories. Having first set out the text which
says, ‘It is a feature of substances that they have no contrary’,374 he
adds the following:
He in turn shows another concomitant of substance which, as 20

he himself says,375 is not peculiar to substance, namely, there is
110 Translation
no contrary to substance. And, accordingly, there is no contrary
to the substances which he has set out. However, he will say in
the Physics376 that the privation is contrary to substance as
form, and also more generally that a privation is said to be a
25 contrary; for it is his custom also to call things which are
assumed contrary by privation contraries. But in the case of the
elements, their forms, because of which they are fire or air or
water or earth, are contraries, as he also says in On Coming to
be and Perishing;377 for this is why they change into one an-
other. So he would be saying that there is no contrary to those
substances which he has set out <in the Categories>, and since
30 he proved in the second book of On Coming to be that, because
dryness, moistness, heat, and coldness give form to the simple,
primary bodies, these bodies themselves are also contrarieties.
169,1 From this alone it is clear that he does not say that a differentia
of substance is substance since a differentia was not among the
substances set out <in the Categories>.378
But also the divine Iamblichus has written the following in his
commentary on the Categories:
So it is a feature of substances that they have no contrary. For

contraries are always subsumed under a single genus, but there
5 is no single higher genus under which substance can be ordered;
and contraries are relative to one another, but substance is not
relative and has no additional need of the relation of contrari-
ety. Furthermore contraries are directed to (aponeuei) one
another, but substance is determined in and of itself.379
<Aristotle> establishes that substance has no contrary by induction

10 on the basis of primary and secondary substances. Shortly after this
<Iamblichus> has written:
Some people raise as a difficulty the question why rational

animal is not contrary to irrational animal. And we say that the
inherent differentia <rational> is contrary to a differentia <ir-
rational>, but the whole <rational animal> is not contrary to the
whole <irrational animal>. The reason for this is the following.
15 What receives contraries is not itself a contrary. For if it were
occupied by one contrary, it could not have the structure suit-
able for receiving the other contrary. Consider, for example,
soul, body, individual substances, and secondary substances: if
they did indeed receive contraries, they would not themselves
be contraries. But also, if something, such as animal, is divided
into contraries, even so it will not be a contrary, at least if it
embraces together the division of the contraries. Consequently,
Translation 111
none of these things will be a contrary. One could also realise 20
this from the definition of contraries since we define them to be
what is most separated from one other; however, in the way in
which they are being spoken of now, they exist together in the
same substance, that of animal.380 But why does Aristotle say381
that fire is contrary to water, and air to earth? We will answer
that obviously they are contrary with respect to the differentiae
which give them form, and these are not substances. Cold and 25
hot, dry and moist are contrary to one another, but the sub-
stances as wholes are not contrary to the substances as wholes,
and they have been constituted together on the same matter.
And what need is there to drag things out by quoting the lengthy
discourses of the commentators when it is possible to bring in Aris-
totle himself? He clearly reveals his own view shortly after the
beginning of the second book of On Coming to be and Perishing, when 30
he writes:382
There are four simple bodies and two of each belong to each of
the two regions;383 for384 fire and air move toward the boundary,
earth and water toward the centre. Earth and fire385 are the
extremes and purest, water and air are intermediate and more 170,1
mixed. And each is contrary to each since water is contrary to
fire, earth to air, since these are constructed from contrary
affections.
Now notice that he also says substances are contrary to substances,

water to fire and earth to air, and notice in what respect he has made 5
clear that they are contraries, not insofar as they are substances and
substrata, but insofar as they are constructed from contrary qualities
and so are able to act on and be acted on by one another.
I think that these things have proceeded far enough to this point.
And I think it has also become evident to those who are reasonably 10
perceptive about logical entailment how this person has been over-
thrown in this disagreement about the proposition that the motions
of contrary things are contrary. But this good fellow, who accuses
Aristotle of speaking cleverly but does not even understand some of
the things Aristotle says and uses others as an indication of Aris-
totle’s cleverness,386 after having made a lot of objections out of pride,
seems to accept the arguments he has <tried to> overturn and has
next written the following:
Even if we were to agree that it is true that a body is contrary 15

to a body and also that the motions of contrary bodies are
contrary and consequently that if there is no motion contrary to
the motion of a body, then the body has no contrary, it obviously
112 Translation
still must be proved that there is no motion contrary to motion
in a circle. Consequently if we set out each of the arguments
20 through which Aristotle tried to establish this and give a refu-
tation,387 it will be clear that, since it has not been proved that
there is no motion contrary to motion in a circle, it has also not
been proved that there is no body contrary to the body which
moves in a circle.
Now notice how the person who threatens things of this sort obvi-
ously does not even understand what Aristotle has written. For,
having set out Aristotle’s statement of the first argument388 and
25 Alexander’s exegesis, he has set Aristotle aside and passed over to
Alexander, and said that although Alexander announced that he
would prove that a straight line is not contrary to a circular one,
he obviously has not proved anything. But neither Aristotle nor
Alexander announced that they would prove this. But this person
does not understand the development of the argument, which is
the following:389
If there is a contrary to motion in a circle, it is motion in a

straight line;
30 but motion in a straight line is not contrary to motion in a circle;
therefore, there is no contrary to motion in a circle.
And he proves the conditional on the basis of the fact that a straight
line is thought to be opposite to a circular arc. But even if these are
opposites, the motions on them are not contraries because there is
not one motion in a straight line but two; each of them is opposite to
the other; and, as has been said many times, for a single thing there
is a single contrary.
171,1 Alexander390 is comparing rectilinear motion with motion in a
circle when he says:
Straight (hê eutheia) is thought to be contrary to circular (têi

kuklôi ) because the latter is thought to be broken everywhere,
but straight is the very most unbroken of all lines. So if it is not
contrary to circular, nothing else which is thought to be less
opposite to circular will be.
5 But this person thought that the straight <line> was being compared
with the circle (tôi kuklôi) and was bold enough to change what
Alexander wrote by writing, ‘Straight <line> is most of all thought to
be opposite to circle’, whereas Alexander wrote ‘to circular’, as is also
made clear by what follows. For even if the argument is based on
lines, nevertheless it is expressed for motions, and Alexander applies
10 both ‘unbroken’ and ‘broken’ to motions on the basis of lines, as is
Translation 113
made clear by what is added, namely, ‘So if it is not contrary to
circular ...’. However, Alexander also does not think that the demon-
stration can be accomplished from the premiss that the straight line
is not contrary to the linear circle, and so he did <not>391 announce
that he would prove this. For, even if the lines are contrary, the 15
motions cannot be contrary because motion in a straight line is
opposite to motion in straight line and for a single thing there is a
single contrary.
Next this person tries to prove that motion in a straight line is
contrary to both motion in a straight line and motion in a circle in
different respects, just as excess is contrary to deficiency and to
balance, and having more than one’s share is contrary to having less 20
and to a just distribution, and in general the cases in which things on
each side of balance, as unbalanced, are opposed to one another and
to balance.392 He says,
And both air and earth are in conflict with fire, but in different
respects; and the false and ignorance are in conflict with truth,
but the first is in conflict as a contrary, the second as a priva-
tion. And so in this case motion up conflicts with motion down 25
with respect to a contrariety of places, but motion in a circle
conflicts with each of the motions in a straight line not with
respect to a contrariety of places but with respect to the very
form of the motion;393 for in the case of the motions in a straight
line motion is from one point to another and is unbroken in all
its parts, but in the case of motion in a circle it is from and into
the same thing with not even a chance part remaining unbro-
ken. And motion in a circle conflicts with motion in a straight
line because it is impossible for a motion on the same straight
line to occur twice without having stopped, but motion in a circle 30
can go around the same line infinitely many times without
stopping. So if the motions are characterised by contraries, it is
clear that they would also be contraries.
You see how he does not understand the point of what has been said.
Aristotle, in demonstrating that there is no change of place contrary
to change of place in a circle, has said in these very words394 that ‘the 35
contrarieties of motion are derived from the contrarieties of places’. 172,1
But this person, who himself says literally, ‘Each of the motions in a
straight line conflicts with motion in a circle not with respect to a
contrariety of the places to which motions in accordance with them
go but with respect to the very form of the motion’, nevertheless 5
thinks that he can prove that motion in a circle is contrary to motion
in a straight line in terms of the contrariety which Aristotle says does
not apply,395 namely the contrariety with respect to places with
respect to which it is possible for contrary things to conflict with one
114 Translation
another and to change into one another; for things which naturally
go to places which are contrary to one another are always given form
by contrary qualities, heat and coldness, lightness and heaviness;
10 and things which are given form by these contrary qualities, which
cause different impulsions, go to contrary places. These, and not
‘unbroken’ and ‘broken’, are the contraries which come to be from one
another. For a circle does not change into a straight line, nor does
what moves in a circle change into what moves in a straight line, nor
does what moves from and to the same point change into what moves
15 from one point to another, nor does what is separated by rest change
into what moves continuously.396 For these are not contrarieties
relating to qualities which act and are acted on, and they do not have
the same substratum, since if they did it would result that sublunary
things change into heavenly ones and heavenly things into sublunary
ones. I do not believe that even this person accepts this, since he
20 clearly says that heaven is of a superior nature when he says,397 ‘It
has been agreed that as a whole and in its parts heaven is the most
authoritative part of the cosmos, and it most holds together the parts
of the cosmos, since all bodies inside heaven are ... guided by its
motion’. How then are these things going to change into one another?
But if contraries of this sort, contraries which change into one
another, must be understood in terms of contrariety of places, then it
25 was pointless for this person to go on to spend many arguments
contentiously proving that, even if motion in a straight line and
motion in a circle are not contrary with respect to places, they are
contrary in some other ways, and that it would be more reasonable
to say that motion in a circle is contrary to motion in a straight line
because it is opposed to motion in a straight line in many respects
than to say that motion up is contrary to motion down when it is
30 contrary only with respect to places. For things which come to be and
perish are akin to one another, and they are opposite in many ways
to things which do not come to be and perish; and they are said to
have a contrariety in relation to one another with respect to which
they change into one another, but they do not have this contrariety
in relation to things which do not come to be and perish.
But since he said earlier398 that two contraries conflict with one
35 thing, as earth and air conflict with fire, earth as something cold to
something hot, air as something moist to something dry, the excess
173,1 of his stupidity seems amazing to me. For he has contended many
times399 that these things are not contraries as earth and as air and
fire, and in general as substances. Why then does he not understand
that if hot is contrary to cold and dry to moist, two things are not
contrary to one, one thing is, and the elements also change into one
5 another with respect to those contraries? In general, if, as this person
says, two things are contrary to one not in the same respect but in
different ones, and in the case of excess and deficiency and his many
Translation 115
other examples of this kind both conflict with equality with respect
to inequality, which is common to them, and both conflict with
balance with respect to imbalance, which is common to them, but
they conflict with each other in some other respect, why – again – are
two things and not one contrary to one thing? For imbalance400 is one
thing and so is inequality.
He says,
But if the upper region to which things which move upward 10

move is the concave periphery of the lunar sphere, and the
upper region is contrary to the lower, heaven shares in one of
the contrary places and is contrary to something with respect to
that, just as fire is contrary to water, even if they are not
contrary with respect to being bodies or substances but with
respect to contrary qualities.
Again this person has forgotten the form of the contrariety with 15
respect to which the change of the contraries into one another occurs.
For even if the upper region is contrary to the lower, they are not
contrary in the sense that they change into one another, since the
upper region never becomes the lower one or vice versa; rather the
things which are in these regions or move to them are the things which
are contrary in the sense of also changing into one another. Therefore, 20
even if the upper region is in heaven and the lower one is in earth, earth
and heaven are not contrary in the sense that they change into one
another. Nor does heaven have any contrariety of this kind since this
person himself knows that Aristotle’s account of place, which says that
place is the limit of the containing thing, is not a complete account
because Aristotle was the first person to enquire about place.401 25
Next he says,402
Convex and the concave are opposed as contraries.403 For they

are not opposed in the way relatives are since they do not always
exist together; for there is convexity on the surface of a sphere,
but there is no concavity when the sphere is solid, and there is
concavity in the case of roofs which are concave inside and flat
outside. But convex and concave are not opposed as state (hexis)
and privation either since each is a quality. 30
It seems that this rash person is unaware that privation is one

species of quality.404 For if he were not, how could he say that convex
and concave are not opposed as state and privation because they are
qualities? He says,
But they are not opposed as affirmation and denial either. And 174,1
so it remains that concave and convex are opposed as contrar-
116 Translation
ies.405 So if these two are certain qualities or affections of the
heavenly body, the heavenly body is receptive of contraries and
so of perishing and coming to be.
5 Isn’t this person here obviously departing completely from the point
of what Aristotle is saying? First because, where Aristotle applies the
words ‘concave’ and ‘convex’ to a line on which motion in a circle
occurs (since every motion comes about on a line), this person took
them as applying to a solid, saying that it is not possible for a line to
exist on its own without a body, but every natural line has its being
10 in a body; and in fact concave and convex exist in different limits of
a spherical body.
And as a result of this he also censures Alexander for saying that
if, considered in connection with one line, concave were contrary to
convex, the line itself would be contrary to itself. However, if Aristotle
applied the words ‘concave’ and ‘convex’ to the extension on which
15 motion in a circle occurs and the extension has no breadth, it is clear
that Alexander also has spoken correctly. For neither Alexander nor
Aristotle has spoken about the concave and the convex which exist in
different limits of a spherical body, but about those which exist in the
linear distance on which a motion in a circle occurs. And,406 even if
20 heaven does have concavity and convexity in different limits of its
spherical body and contains these as contrary to one another, it also
contains many other contrarieties in itself,407 since it contains motion
and rest in itself, and odd and even, and sameness and difference,
and one and many, and a multitude of other things of this kind. But,
first of all, how can concavity and convexity, which exist in different
25 limits, meet one another or act on one another or be acted on by one
another in such a way that by changing into one another they become
causes of coming to be and perishing? Secondly one should under-
stand that although it is necessary that where there is coming to be
and perishing there are always contraries from which coming to be
occurs and into which perishing occurs, it is not necessary that where
there are contraries there is always coming to be and perishing. For
it is not the case that all contraries are of a nature to act on and be
30 acted on by one another in such a way as to also change into one
another; rather it is only those which are studied in terms of active
and passive qualities, that is heat, coldness, dryness, moistness, and
the things linked with these, light colour, dark colour, sweetness,
bitterness, lightness, heaviness, and such. It is because of the change
35 of these things into one another that other contraries, like, say,
175,1 concave and convex, odd and even, change into one another, and the
same is true of substances themselves, as was said earlier.408 So if
heaven transcends that contrariety which involves active and pas-
sive qualities, it is reasonable that it also transcend coming to be and
perishing.
Translation 117
And it is also worth noting that if heaven had a contrary into which 5
it changes, that contrary would be external to the substance of
heaven, not in it, since, if the contrary were in heaven it would be
constitutive of it and not destroy it; and so too the contraries which are
parts of the sublunary world conflict with one another and change each
another into themselves, but the whole which comes to be is everlasting
because the perishing of one thing is always the coming to be of another.
So, let the person who wishes to refute the doctrine of Aristotle prove 10
that heaven has some contrary external to it, even if it is not contrary
in terms of substance but in terms of the qualities in it in the way that
fire has water as its contrary because it has contrary qualities.
And this person does not infer anything sensible when he says:
If they say universally that sharing in one or both of two

contraries of any kind is a demonstration that what shares 15
comes to be and perishes, then, since the heavenly body also
admits the contrariety relating to concavity and convexity (and
further the concavity of the lunar sphere is one of the contrary
places), they should also say that heaven comes to be and
perishes. But if not every contrariety is a cause for bodies of
coming to be and perishing, then, just as it is not the case that 20
changing place up and down in contrary directions is coming to
be and perishing, so too it is not the case that something is
exempted from coming to be and perishing just because it is
exempted from contrary changes of place.
For sharing in two contraries simultaneously in the way heaven

shares in concave and convex does not prove coming to be and
perishing. For contraries which can exist together do not conflict with 25
or destroy one another and therefore are not causes of coming to be
and perishing. Rather what possesses one of a pair of contraries and
a substratum in common with what shares in the other contrary is
receptive of coming to be and perishing, the contraries changing one
another in a single substratum. Changing place up or down is not
itself coming to be or perishing, but they are propria of things which 30
do come to be and perish. For one thing is light and another heavy,
and these things are hot and cold and dry and moist, and coming to
be and perishing result from <these qualities> because of their
change into one another in the same substratum. But perhaps these
motions upward and downward themselves are also in a way cases of
coming to be and perishing, if, indeed, fire moves upward and earth 176,1
moves downward in the desire to take on their own pure form. And
so if what is given form by contrary active and passive qualities
always has a natural motion which is a contrary because lightness
and heaviness are always apportioned substantially together with
those qualities, it is true to say that what is superior to contrary 5
118 Translation
changes of place always also transcends coming to be and perishing
because it also transcends this kind of contrariety which involves
those qualities. And therefore Aristotle has said409 that the motions
of things contrary in this way are contrary and that, if there is no
motion contrary to motion in a circle, there is also no contrary to what
10 moves in a circle, and he has added that ‘it seems that nature was
right to exempt what was not going to come to be ... from contraries;
for coming to be and perishing are found in contraries’ – obviously
the kind of contraries which conflict in a single substratum.
So in this way this good fellow has pointlessly written down many
arguments directed against the first of Aristotle’s arguments. Let’s
15 see how he deals with the second argument.410 From what he said
before, Aristotle has obtained that motions from contrary places are
contrary, and that contrary places are those which are at the greatest
distance, and that the greatest distance is determinate, just as the
least is, and that every distance which has a determinate size is
measured by the straight line between the distances;411 for that
20 straight line is one and determinate because it is the least line having
the same limits, but circular arcs which are joined to the same points
are infinite and so indeterminate; and consequently these arcs do not
determine the distance between A and B, and consequently the
greatest distance itself is not derived from the circular arcs; and
consequently the places of A and B are not contrary; and conse-
25 quently the motions from A and B are not contraries if they occur on
an arc and not on a straight line.
Aristotle has inferred these things in this way from indisputable
lemmas, but this person does not understand what he says, and says,
‘I wonder very much if the philosopher has made use of these sorts of
30 arguments in jest rather than seriously’. And it is clear that because
he considers this rigorous development of the arguments as jest, but
his own arguments (which we will hear) as serious, he might appear
to be very worthy. For having first set out Themistius’ paraphrase of
Aristotle’s words and then the exegesis of Alexander of Aphrodisias
(trying to appear wise in this way as well), he proposes to refute
177,1 Aristotle’s view in terms of each.
Themistius says that those who say that the motions on the
circumference are contrary are led into the absurdity that infinitely
many things are antithetical to one because the arcs drawn through
A, B are infinitely many.412 And this person makes a joke of the
argument by saying that there are infinitely many contraries to the
infinitely many motions; for he says that there are two motions which
are contrary to one another for each of the infinitely many arcs. He
does not yet understand that since motions from contrary places are
5 contrary, each of the infinitely many motions from B will be contrary
to one motion from A. So there will be infinitely many contrary
motions, and the argument of Themistius is correct.
Translation 119
Secondly, he adduces against the argument that even if the arcs 10
through A, B are infinitely many, nevertheless they are of the same
kind as one another and therefore all the motions from A taken as
one are opposite to the motions from B taken as one.413 And then,
after superfluously setting out examples, he says:
I am amazed that <Aristotle> did he not see that the same thing
also happens in the case of motions in a straight line; for the
centre of the universe, to which all heavy things move, is one,
but light things moving from the centre to the periphery do not 15
end up at one point but at infinitely many.
And in this connection he does not shrink from tastelessly drawing

diagrams depicting the centre of the universe, the peripheral circle,
and the lines from the centre, again not being able to understand the
same thing which previously had also been the cause of his misun-
derstanding, namely that motions from contrary places are contrary, 20
contrary places are those at the greatest distance from one another,
and these places are determinate and have a determinate distance
between them. For if this person understood these things he would
not have been ‘amazed’ that Aristotle, who previously maintained
these things, which are very clear, did not see that ‘the same thing’
happens in the case of motions in a straight line as happens in the
case of arcs. For, in fact, the same thing does not happen since in the 25
case of straight lines from the centre, all of which are equal, the
interval between up and down, which is the greatest in this exten-
sion, is determinate, so that all the points on the periphery of the
upper region, taken as one, are opposite to what is down.414 But, since
the arcs between A and B are unequal and make the intervals 30
between A and B unequal, they do not make the place A be at the
greatest distance from the place B in terms of all the arcs. Conse-
quently the places are not contrary, since they do not have the
greatest distance between them one and determinate.
But this person does not understand these things and says that the
absurdity follows much more reasonably in the case of straight lines
than in the case of arcs because the motions on the arcs are from the 35
same point and to the same point and therefore are akin and of the
same kind, but those on straight lines, even if they all start from the 178,1
same point are not to the same point. Consequently it is true in the
case of straight lines more than in the case of arcs that infinitely many
things are contrary to one thing. But it is clear from what has been said
that in the case of the straight lines everything which is up, taken as
one, being at the same distance from what is down, is opposite to what
is down taken as one, but that in the case of arcs, in which the kinds of 5
distances are different, there is neither one kind, as he thinks, nor a
contrariety of A to B with respect to these arcs at all.
120 Translation
Alexander more suitably reduces this argument to the assertion
that motions on an arc are not contrary at all because there is no
10 greatest distance separating A from B along an arc, as is made clear
by the fact that it is possible to draw to the points A and B infinitely
many arcs which have different lengths (diastêmata). And this per-
son again speaks a lot of nonsense in objecting to trying to
demonstrate things about nature on the basis of geometrical princi-
ples. He says,
15 It is true to say of mathematical things,415 which are abstrac-

tions, that it is possible to draw arcs through the same points to
infinity so that one cannot take a greatest,416 but it is impossible
in the case of natural things, which are apprehended with
affections and matter. And therefore it is possible to take the
greatest natural circumference in the universe, and so things
which move in contrary ways from the limits of a diameter of
the universe on the greatest arc of the universe move with
20 contrary motions, since the points from which they have moved
are also at the greatest distance from each other with respect to
the arc; for it is impossible for there to be an arc greater than
the outermost circumference of the universe. So if the two
peripheries417 move in contrary ways to one another from the
points of the diameter at which the limits (that is the concave
limit of the sphere of the fixed stars and the convex limit of the
sphere of the planets) of the outer spheres fit together with one
25 another, the inner and the outer peripheries move with con-
trary motions; consequently their bodies418 themselves are
contraries.
For the sake of brevity I have gathered together these things he

has written, in most cases in succession but in a few cases scattered
here and there. It is also necessary in this case to show his stupid
desire for victory.419 For first of all he says that it is true of mathe-
matical things that it is possible to draw arcs from the same points
30 to infinity so that one cannot take a greatest,420 but it is impossible
in the case of natural things. So does he not know that every natural
body has a surface because it is limited and that every surface is
continuous and that everything which is continuous is divisible to
infinity,421 since this is the definition422 of continuity? And it is clear
that anything which is of a nature to be divided is divisible to infinity
35 (although not into infinitely many things423), in such a way that it is
not possible to take a magnitude which is itself extended, but is not
divided by what is unextended by comparison with it (as body is
179,1 divided by plane, plane by line, and line by point). Things which, like
those in heaven, are indivisible naturally are also extended and are
divisible conceptually (kat’ epinoian), and the distance between the
Translation 121
points on them which are thought to be opposite is only determined
by the determinate straight line joining them. And it is not possible
to take <just> one arc between the points. For an arc on the concave
surface of the sphere of the fixed stars and the convex surface in the
sphere of the planets is conceptual, not natural. So why isn’t it also 5
possible to draw conceptually in the depth of each sphere <different>
arcs from the same points, greater ones in the sphere of the fixed
stars, lesser ones in the sphere of the planets? For, in general, how
can he think that he can say that there is no greater arc in heaven 10
than the circumference in the concave <limit> of the sphere of the
fixed stars?424 For the circumference in the convex limit of that sphere
would be greater than this, if, indeed, the bodies of the spheres have
depth and are not just surfaces and if the points in the convex surface
<of the sphere of the fixed stars> move on greater circles <than those
inside it>. However, even if it is not possible to take a greater arc
drawn on the same points than the one this person mentions,425 it 15
would still always be possible to take a lesser one in the inner
spheres. And even if such arcs drawn in the heavenly body are not
natural things, the distances between the points would be different –
conceptualisation is also sufficient to determine this. For when the
points fall outside the straight line between them,426 the distance
between them remains indefinite, so that they are not at the greatest 20
distance from each other, their places are not contrary to one another,
and the motions from them are not contrary, and the bodies moving
with them are not contrary. However, this ignorant person has
lumped together in a pointless way everything that Aristotle and his
commentators have said.
This person also puts forward counterarguments against Aris-
totle’s third argument,427 which says that even if the motion in the 25
reverse direction is not taken to be along an indeterminate arc (it
being possible to draw infinitely many arcs around the same points)
but along one determinate arc, for example, the semicircle, even so
the distance of C from D will be measured in terms of a straight line.
Not understanding the arguments of either Aristotle or his exegetes,
this person puts forward many arguments in an attempt to prove that 30
it is not necessary that the straight line is the measure of every
magnitude or even of every line; rather it is only the measure of lines
of the same kind as it with which it can coincide, but it does not
coincide with an arc. And so he constructs all his arguments as if
Aristotle and his commentators were saying that the interval on an
arc is measured by a straight line.
But perhaps it is again necessary to quote some things he says for 35
those who do not believe me:
if the straight line is in fact the least of those drawn through the 180,1
same points, it is not thereby necessary that it be the measure
122 Translation
of every line and every magnitude; but clearly it is the measure
of things which are of the same kind as it, with which it can
coincide. But it does not coincide with an arc and it is not of the
5 same kind as it. And therefore it cannot be the measure of it.
Now isn’t it immediately clear that he thinks that they are saying
that an arc is measured by a straight line? But if these words aren’t
sufficient to prove his stupidity, listen also to what comes next:
Even if craftsmen frequently measure some round artifacts

with a straight line, for example, with a cubit,428 they do not
10 measure the curved line as such with the cubit in the way that
in the case of rectilinear artifacts the cubit is fitted to the
straight edge itself of the artifact. In the case of an arc they do
not fit the cubit to the arc itself, since that is impossible. Rather
they take the rectilinear intervals on the circumference and
measure them with a straight line,429 so that again what is
15 measured is like what measures it. But suppose someone were
to maintain that since by learning the size of the diameter of a
circle, the size of the perimeter of the circle is also learned, a
straight line is the measure of an arc. Then, since it is also
possible to learn the diameter from learning the perimeter, he
should also say that an arc is the measure of a straight line. In
20 addition, we do not learn that the three straight lines of an
equilateral triangle are equal to one another in any other way
than on the basis of the circles drawn on one of the sides of the
triangle as diameter.430 Why then is an arc more to be assessed
on the basis of a straight line than a straight line is on the basis
of an arc?
Let no one who is refined (kathariôteros) blame me for pursuing

25 inappropriate leisure if I choose to quote so much of this sort of thing
from this person. Rather let him blame those who attach themselves
uncritically to what this person says and those who sometimes do not
believe that a person who writes such things dares to speak against
someone so shamelessly. Where did Aristotle or one of his commen-
tators say that the circumference is measured by the straight line?
But this person does not understand that they say that the distance
30 between limits, such as those Aristotle calls C and D, is measured by
the straight line which joins them but not by an arc drawn around
them, and they certainly do not say that an arc is measured by a
straight line. For even if this were true, it would have nothing
whatsoever to do with the argument. For it was proposed to prove
that things which move in reverse directions on a semicircle do not
181,1 move with contrary motions because the limits, C and D, of the
semicircle are not contrary places because they are not at the great-
Translation 123
est distance from each other in terms of the circumference of the
semicircle; for it is also possible to draw an arc greater than the
semicircle on the points in terms of which they would be at a greater
distance from each other than they would be in terms of the arc of the
semicircle. However, the person who takes the motions from C and D 5
as431 contrary takes them as occurring on the diameter, since the
determinate distance is determined by the diameter, the greatest dis-
tance is determinate, and the contrary distance is greatest. Accordingly
Aristotle also says432 in this way that we suppose that things which are
separated by a determinate distance (and the greatest distance, by
which contrary places are separated, is determinate) are distant by a
straight line. For this is the determinate <distance> between the limits 10
which is least, and therefore the interval is measured by it. And
Alexander in explaining the passage says:
However, it is for the measure to find what is most distant and

contrary. Therefore the contrary is <to be found> with the
straight line and on it. Therefore the contrary motions on the
interval CD are not on the arc or the semicircle.
So, did one of these people say that a straight line is the measure of 15
the arc but not of the distance between C and D? But this person
doesn’t understand the point of what is being put forward because,
for what he thinks is the refutation of it he has introduced the fact
that those who measure the circumferences of artifacts take the
rectilinear intervals of the circumference and measure them with a
straight line, not noticing that this is exactly what Aristotle says: 433 20
‘We always suppose that each thing is distant <by a straight line>‘.
However, as is his custom, he in turn grants that it is true that the
straight line is the measure of every interval, and says that, even so,
the argument will not move them any closer to proving that the
motions in contrary directions from the limits of the semicircle are
not contraries. He says,434
Since a circle is a magnitude, parts of it are more or less distant 25

from each other. Gemini is more distant from the beginning of
Aries than Taurus is, and Cancer is more distant than these.
Therefore there are in the <zodiacal circle> some things which
are most distant, as are Aries and Libra, since the distance of
these on each semicircle is equal. Consider Aries and Scorpio.
Even if they are at a greater distance in terms of one part of the 30
circle, since they are separated from each other by seven signs,
they are closer to one another in terms of the other part, since
they are distant by five signs. Therefore, only Aries and Libra
and in general the signs which divide the circle into two equal
parts are separated by the greatest distance in every direction.
124 Translation
Since he has said these things it is fair to ask whether he is taking
35 the distance of the parts of the circle in terms of the circumference or
182,1 in terms of the straight line between them which joins them. For if it
is in terms of the circumference it is clear that in terms of the greater
circumference Taurus is more distant from the beginning of Aries
than Gemini is, and, also in terms of the greater circumference, the
location of Aries is more contrary to that of Sagittarius than to that
5 of Libra, because in terms of this it is more distant and places which
are most distant from each other are contrary. For, in general, if he
has taken the distance on the circumference, how does he dare to say
that Aries and Libra are separated by the greatest distance in every
direction? For it is true to say that they are separated by an equal
distance in every direction, but it is not possible to say that they are
separated by the greatest distance in any direction. For the signs
which are next to one another are at the greatest distance in terms
10 of the other arc. But if he is not defining the distance of the parts in
the circle in terms of the circumference, but in terms of the straight
line joining them, he is saying the same thing as Aristotle even if he
is not aware of it. For Aristotle says435 that if the <distance> from C
<to D> and the <distance> from D <to C> are taken as contrary, their
distance is the same as the distance on the diameter. This person
accepts that there is a greatest distance between C and D in terms of
15 the diameter, but he says that there is also one in terms of the
circumference because C and D are equally distant in every direction.
But what does this have to do with the greatest distance by which
contrary places are separated and from which contrary motions
<start>?436
And next,437 following up in his combination of mindlessness and
rashness, he says,
This became for Alexander a cause of deception. For he assumed

20 that the straight line is the measure and that it is for the
measure to find the things which are at the greatest distance
from each other and contraries, from which there follows the
conclusion which says, ‘therefore, it is for the straight line to
find the things in intervals which are at the greatest distance
from each other and contraries’. But he maliciously added <to
‘with the straight line’> the words ‘and on it’ when he said,
‘Therefore, the contrary in intervals is <to be found> with the
straight line and on it’ when he did not have ‘and on it’ in the
premisses.
25 Here again one should first notice that, having said that Alexander
was deceived, he immediately afterward says that Alexander was
being malicious on the same matter on which he himself says that
Alexander was deceived, not understanding that the person who says
Translation 125
something because of being deceived is not being malicious since the
deception is caused by ignorance, but that the person who acts
maliciously in arguments knows the truth and tries hard to twist it.
Second, how can he say that Alexander does not assume ‘on the 30
straight line’ in the premisses when Alexander, as this person him-
self has recorded, set out the argument as follows:
Every interval is measured by what is least;

in every case the interval on a straight line is least;
therefore, the straight line and the <interval> on the straight
line are the measure of every interval;
however, it is for the measure to find what is most distant and
contrary; 183,1
therefore, the contrary in intervals is <to be found> with the
straight line and on it;
and so <the contrary in intervals> is not on an arc.438
Is it not immediately clear that Alexander has also included ‘on a

straight line’ in the premiss and syllogised as follows?439
Every interval is measured by a least interval because this is

determinate;
what is measured by a least interval is measured by a straight 5
line and the interval on the straight line, since it the least of the
lines or distances having the same limits;
and the conclusion remains that for any interval the straight
line and the interval on the straight line is the measure.
And <Alexander> adds another premiss to this which says, ‘It is for 10
the measure to find what is most distant and contrary’, and he infers
that what is at a greatest distance in intervals and contrary is found
with the straight line and the interval on it. But if it is found with
this, it is clear that contrary intervals are defined in terms of (kata)
this and are <what they are> by reference to (kata) this; and a thing is
defined in terms of (kata) that from (kata) which it is found, and a thing
is <what it is> by reference to (kata) what it is defined in terms of (kata).
So which of these people is it fair to say is either deceived or malicious? 15
Is it the one <Alexander> who syllogises coherently in this way? Or is it
the one <Philoponus> who charges the other <Alexander> with decep-
tion and malice on the grounds that he <Alexander> has inferred (as
this person says) that it is possible to find the things which are most
distant and contrary with the straight line and added to the conclusion
that it is possible <to find> what is contrary in intervals on a straight
line, that is, the one <Philoponus> who also does not understand that
places are distant from each other with respect to (kata) the interval 20
from (kata) which their contrariety is found?440
126 Translation
But this person, who understands nothing which has been said,
wastes a lot of arguments proving again that, if we are measuring
with a cubit, the points which are most distant from each other are
not in the cubit used to make the measurement nor are they at the
greatest distance in that cubit. He could not even understand that if
25 the distance were only a cubit long, the things at the distance would
be in the limits of a cubit – not the limits of the wooden or bronze
cubit, but the limits of the intervening straight line; and the greatest
distance for the limits would be relative to (kata) this straight line
which measures as a determinate interval (because it is least), but is
measured as an indefinite interval.441 The wooden cubit does not add
the measure, but it makes the measure which inheres in the distance
clear.
30 But he is so out of tune with the meaning of what is said that he
writes (in these very words), ‘In general it is completely naïve and
absurd to say that the things in what is measured which are appre-
hended by means of the measure are also in the measure’, not
understanding the way in which the interval determined by a
straight line is both the measure of the greatest distance and some-
thing measured. Instead he mindlessly assembled a large number of
184,1 standards (kritêria) to prove that the distance and contrariety of
what is judged are not in the standards. He says, ‘For the distance
between true and false is not in the demonstration nor is that
between good and bad,442 nor is light and dark or running and
5 standing still in the faculty of vision, nor is high and low sound in the
faculty of hearing, nor is being twisted in the straightedge, and
neither does the straightedge possess the straightness which exists,
for example, in wood, although we learn about the straightness by
means of the straightedge.’
It is clear that it was pointless for him to digress into these things,
if one takes as the measure relating to the straight line not the one
which comes from outside (such as the bronze cubit), but rather the
10 one relating to the interval between separated things, which, as an
indefinite interval, is measured and, as something straight and least
and determinate, measures the distance from each other of separated
things (because of this the distance relating to the straight line is not
at all similar to external standards, but the bronze cubit is analogous
to them).
But he obviously does not know the specific character of the very
15 things which he has dragged in either. For if the standards do not
possess the logoi of what is judged, they cannot make a judgment. For
how can the faculty of vision distinguish dark and light if it has not
previously received an impression of them? But it does not possess
the impression in the sense of being light or dark but in the sense of
being a judge. In the same way, too, demonstration, which distin-
20 guishes truth and falsity, applies truth to what is judged, judging
Translation 127
truth in terms of fitting, falsehood in terms of deviation, and the
straightedge, which tests straight and twisted, applies straightness
to them in the same way. And clearly he has set out his examples in
droves because he is also unaware that the faculty of vision judges in
one way, demonstration and the straightedge in another: the faculty
of vision judges both light and dark as forms by a formal awareness,
having previously received the forms in perception, either actually or
potentially, but demonstration judges truth and the straightedge 25
straight by the fitting of the form which they contain, and they judge
falsehood and twistedness by deviation from this; for it is false to say
that a human being is not an animal.
And be assured that I am ashamed to be spending time with things
of this sort, but it is necessary to expose their unsoundness to help
those who listen to him superficially since with these things he is
trying to do away with the blessed everlastingness of heaven and the
unchanging goodness of its creator. For I know well that those who 30
judge443 reasonably will loathe not only what this person says but also 185,1
my arguments, which they will judge as jousting with shadows and
take as the work of an unfortunate leisure. And so now it is also
necessary to listen to what comes next.
In what way is it not the act of a person who completely despises
arguments to say that the antithesis of motions on a semicircle is the
same as the antithesis of motions on the diameter because the 5
semicircle and the diameter are limited by the same points? You see how
he does not notice that Aristotle does not say without qualification that
motions on the semicircle are the same as those on the diameter. Rather
he says444 that they are the same when they are taken as contraries (that
is, as coming from contrary places, that is places which are at the
greatest distance, that is places the distance between which is determi- 10
nate – since the greatest is determinate –, that is a distance which is
measured by what is least – for this is what a determinate distance is).
But if this person doesn’t know that a straight line is the least line of
those having the same limits, he should learn it.
Alexander says that even if things which move on a semicircle as
from contrary places do not move in a straight line, nevertheless they 15
do move with a contrary motion (that is, a motion from places which
are at a greatest distance) because they move through the interval
between them to the extent that (tosouton ... hoson) they are distant
from each other by a straight line.445 In response this person says that
‘even in this way Alexander will not escape agreeing that the reverse
motions which occur on a semicircle are contrary whether they are
contrary because of the circle or whether they are contrary because 20
of its diameter’. However, if it is because of the diameter,446 the
motions are not contraries as occurring on the semicircle; for C, D are
not at the greatest distance from each other because they are limits
of the semicircle but because they are on the straight line.
128 Translation
Alexander goes on to say that if every interval were not measured
by a straight line but by an arc, it would not be possible to take
25 anything at a greatest distance because it is possible to make both a
very great arc between things which are close by drawing a very
convex circumference and a smaller one between points which are
very distant. And again447 this person stretches out long arguments
in a contentious way to prove that also on a circumference the
greatest distance is the one which is equally long448 in every direction,
as is the interval from Aries to Libra. He does not understand that
30 there is a difference between being equal in every direction and being
greatest, and that the distance which moves from Aries through
186,1 Libra up to Sagittarius, taken on the circumference, is greater than
the distance which moves from Aries up to Libra. However, if the
distances are taken on the straight lines between the limits, the
distance from Aries to Libra is greatest because the diameter is
greater than all straight lines drawn through a circle. But if the
5 distance is taken on arcs, it is possible, as Alexander says, for more
than one arc to be drawn on the same points so that, if the distance
of the points from one another is taken in terms of a different arc at
a different time, what is greatest will no longer be determinate.
And again this person does not understand what Alexander is
saying, and says,
I do not know whether to say that the assertion449 that it is

possible to draw a smaller arc from widely separated things and
10 a greater one from close ones is the assertion of someone who
wants to be fraudulent or of someone who does not know that it
is not amazing if in different circles points which are close in
one of the circles (suppose the circle has a perimeter which is
one foot long and the points are half a foot apart <as measured
along the perimeter>) are said to be at a greatest distance
whereas points which are 25 feet apart from each other in a
circle which has a perimeter of 100 feet are not at a greatest
distance from each other.
15 Again he speaks the same nonsense about straight lines in saying

that the limits of a cubit-long straight line are at the greatest
distance since they are distant by the whole line, but in a straight
line of one hundred cubits the distance of the centre from an extreme
is not the greatest, since it isn’t distant by the whole but by the half.
And this person writes these things in the belief that Alexander is
taking a greatest and a not greatest distance in the case of different
20 points because Alexander says450 ‘because it is possible to make both
a greatest arc between things which are close’ ... and a smaller one
between points which are not close. He does not understand that
Alexander has not advanced <the argument> by making this hy-
Translation 129
pothesis since Aristotle has proposed to prove also that if the motions
in reverse directions between the limits of <one> semicircle are taken
as contrary, that is, as proceeding from places at a greatest distance,
they are taken as on the diameter. However, although Alexander
wants to prove that it is possible to draw greater and smaller arcs on 25
the same points, he has superfluously done the argument as applying
to different limits by saying that it is possible to make a greatest arc
between limits which are close and a smaller one between limits
which are very distant. But if this is possible in the case of different
limits, it is clear that it is much more possible in the case of the same
limits. But this person, not understanding this, stretches out lots of 30
arguments, proving that in the case of different magnitudes, it is not
at all amazing that closer ones are at a greatest distance from each
other and further apart ones are not. He says,
Even if we draw both a greatest arc and a least through the 187,1
same points, say A, B, it will not follow that the points A, B are
both at a greatest distance because of the greater arc and at a
lesser one because of the smaller arc. For451 if we fill out the
remaining arcs of the two circles, the points A, B will be poten-
tially four, not two, since they have a different relation to each 5
other in each of the circles.
This is what he says, in these very words, and is it not clear that he
does not understand what is said and is only spouting out empty
words? What is the point of this word ‘potentially’ here? For the
distances between the points A, B remain related to each other in the
same way actually, the distance of the greater arc being one thing,
that of the smaller another, and that of the straight line between A, 10
B being a third and always determinate because it is measured by the
straight line, which is determinate because the452 <straight> line
which has the same limits is one and least. But the distances relating
to the arcs are indefinite because many unequal arcs can have the
same limits; and because of this it is not possible for a greatest 15
distance for contraries which is definite to be defined by arcs; it can
only be done by a straight line.
But this person does not understand453 what is meant by saying
that the interval is measured by a straight line, namely that it is
determined to be in a straight line in such a way that what is in the
middle covers the extremes.454 Rather he thinks that <the interval>
is said to be in a straight line because a straight line added to the
distance from outside makes it straight. He says, 20
On what basis does Alexander say455 that in a circle there are no

points which are at a greatest distance from each other unless
every interval is measured by a straight line? For every meas-
130 Translation
ure only makes what is measured known; it does not make what
is measured be such as it is known to be by nature because of
the measure. For it is clear that a straight measure fits <only>
because the distance is a straight line.
25 However, Alexander is not considering a measure introduced from

outside. Rather he is considering the fact that sometimes the dis-
tance is made determinate by a straight determination (thesis), and
sometimes, when the distance is curved, it is indefinite.
And this person sets out the fourth argument456 which proves that
even if one takes two motions on one circle, that from E to F through
188,1 the semicircle G and that from F to E through the semicircle H, these
motions too are not contrary because they do not come from contrary
places, since the places do not have a determinate distance. This good
fellow is so emboldened by his vacuously spoken words as to say:
If this conclusion is reached by means of the same arguments

5 as its predecessor, there is no need for us to speak against it
since we have already confronted the predecessor to the best of
our ability.
And next he censures Themistius for saying457 that one should say
the same things as were said about the preceding argument concern-
ing things moving on just one semicircle. And he says that this
argument does not reach its conclusion from the same hypotheses as
10 its predecessor, since that one hypothesised motions reverse to one
another occurring on one and the same semicircle whereas this one
does not take motions on the same semicircle but it takes one motion
on a circle, the motion being divided in terms of the division of the
semicircles. He says,
It is reasonable that these motions are not contrary, since on a

circle both are a single thing if they are unified; for the motion
from east to west on one of the hemispheres, say that above the
15 earth, is not contrary to the motion from west to east on the
remaining hemisphere, that under earth. So this argument is
not the same as the preceding.
He was able to see that motions which occur as on one circle are not
contrary. <And he was able to see> that there are two arguments.458
One hypothesises two semicircles which are joined and similarly to
the previous theorem says that the motions on them are contrary
20 only when they are considered as occurring on the diameter by which
the points E and F are separated from each other. But the other
argument proceeds by agreeing to concede as a hypothesis that these
motions on the semicircles are also contrary, but not conceding that
Translation 131
this means that the motions on the whole circle are contrary. But this
person thinks that only this first argument, the one which says that
the motions on a circle are not contrary, is sound. And I do not see 25
how he has agreed to even this argument without self-contradiction!
Perhaps he was satisfied with speaking against Themistius’ state-
ment that one should say the same things as in the case of the
preceding argument even though, in my view, by using the word
‘similarly’459 Aristotle clearly shows that this argument about the two
semicircles proceeds in accordance with the argument before it, and
even though Themistius, having divided the arguments in his para- 30
phrase, does say with respect to the first argument that one should 189,1
say the same thing as in the case of its predecessor, but with respect
to the second he says that,460 ‘Even if someone were to agree that the
motions on a semicircle are contraries, he should not agree that
motion on the whole circle, which is the subject of discussion, is
divided into contrary motions’.
In the case of the hypothesis of these two semicircles I have said 5
in my exegeses of the arguments how the argument proceeds for
Aristotle, but it would not be a bad thing to now recall this.461 The
first argument of those proving that there is no motion contrary to
motion in a circle argues more universally from the more;462 it says,
‘So if something is contrary to motion in a circle, it is most necessary
that it be motion in a straight line. But the motions in a straight line 10
are opposed to one another by places ... .’ The second argument proves
that the motions in reverse directions on an arbitrary arc are not
contrary because there are infinitely many arcs around the same
limits. The third argument infers the same thing, having made its
hypothesis for the case of a determinate arc, that of a semicircle. And 15
next this fourth argument hypothesises two semicircles which are
joined and Aristotle says that the same things follow in their case,
but, accepting that these things are external to the problem, he
thinks it worthwhile to make an investigation in the case of the circle;
for the problem was to show that there is no motion contrary to
motion in a circle. If what I am saying is true, it is, I think, entirely463
possible to comprehend what follows, namely that this man does not 20
perceive the point of Aristotle’s discussion and does not understand
the discussions of his commentators.
But he has also armed himself for the fifth argument,464 which
proves that two motions which occur on the same circle and come
from and to the same point, but in reverse directions, because one
thing moves from A through the semicircle B back to A, the other 25
from A through the other semicircle C and again to the same thing,
A, are not contrary on the grounds that these motions are from and
into the same thing, but contrary motions are from a contrary and
into a contrary; and having, it would seem, used up his own counter-
arguments and being pressed, he now objects to the assertion that
132 Translation
30 those motions which are from contrary places are always contrary,
even though Aristotle has used this axiom in the other arguments
and consequently thought that there is no motion contrary to motion
190,1 in a circle because in a circle there are no places at a greatest distance
from each other unless the places are defined in terms of the diame-
ter. And so this person says that contrarieties of things of different
kinds are also different, and consequently, if contrary rectilinear
motions are from contrary places, it is not thereby necessary that
motions in a circle be contrary in this way. He says,
5 If they demand that whatever things attach to rectilinear mo-

tions also attach to circular motions, it will result that there
isn’t any motion in a circle at all. For every rectilinear motion
is a change from something to something, and the natural
simple motions are from a contrary into a contrary. For the
motion upward of light things such as fire is from below to
10 above, and above is contrary to below; and the motion of heavy
things such as earth is in the reverse direction. And also in the
case of change in quantity or quality, what changes always
transforms from one thing into a different one. So if every
change is from one contrary into another or simply from one
thing into another, but no motion in a circle is from one thing
into another but is rather from and into the same thing, then
circular motion is not even motion.
15 But what need is there for me to set out a lot of what this person says
and infect myself with the nonsense in it? But in the case of these
things and also in what he says later, one should notice first that he
is clearly agreeing that there is no motion contrary to motion in a
circle, contrary in the sense that the motions are from contrary
places. And clearly contrary places are those at the greatest distance,
20 but even so he stretches out so many arguments to prove that in a
circle the segments which are most distant from each other are the
ones separated by a diameter.465 And he writes the following in the
25th chapter of the fifth book (these are his very words): ‘Since the
limits of a semicircle are at the greatest distance, it is necessary that
the motions which occur contrarily from them be contrary because of
the definition of contrary <motions>’. Now you see how well those
25 words agree with these: ‘So if every change is from one contrary into
another or simply from one thing into another, but no motion in a
circle is from one thing into another but is rather from and into the
same thing, then circular motion is not even motion’.466
Secondly we should notice that it is even more superfluous for this
person to try to prove what Aristotle proposes,467 namely that there
is no motion contrary to a motion in a circle, when he himself put
forward all his counter argumentation against it, saying,468 ‘Let us
Translation 133
undertake to demonstrate that none of the arguments <aimed at> 30
establishing that there is no motion contrary to motion in a circle is
sound’. For if, as he says, no motion in a circle is from a contrary into
a contrary, and none is from one thing into another (and this is
jumping over the pit,469 as the saying goes, since what is not even 191,1
from one thing into another is a fortiori not from a contrary into a
contrary), it is clear that if someone hypothesises that a contrary
motion is one from contrary places – and he agreed to this earlier
when he said, ‘because of the definition of contrary <motions>‘470 –
then it follows necessarily that there is no motion contrary to motion 5
in a circle.
There is a third thing worthy of attention, namely how amateur-
ishly he puts it forward that in motion in a circle there is no
transformation from one thing into another because a revolution is
from and into the same thing. However, if always approaching471 is
not transforming from one thing to another, it is not a motion either.
But one might also be amazed by this piece of his stupidity: how 10
he adduces against Aristotle as an absurdity that there is no motion
in a circle at all if, as he says,472 ‘every change is from one contrary
into another’. Moreover, he objects to the argument of Aristotle
proving that there is no motion contrary to motion in a circle, in
which Aristotle defines a contrary motion as one from contrary
places. But how can the person who says these things473 say that 15
every change is from one contrary into another? But <this person>
has agreed clearly that motion from contrary places is not contrary
to motion in a circle and stated the reason when he said474 that motion
in a circle is from and into the same thing – for he says that this is
the specific feature of every circular motion.
This person does not understand that anyone who says that in
terms of another kind of contrariety there is a contrary to motion in
a circle is not objecting to Aristotle’s argument, but he also does not 20
seem to remember why Aristotle proposed to prove that there is no
motion contrary to motion in a circle. And so it should be recalled475
that two premisses were accepted for establishing that heaven does
not come to be or perish, the major saying that there must be a
contrary to what comes to be from which it comes to be and to what
perishes into which it perishes, the other that heaven – which is the 25
same as to say the body which moves in a circle – does not have a
contrary. For the demonstration of the second premiss another propo-
sition476 of the following sort was accepted: if the motions of contrary
things are also contrary, then if the motion of something does not
have a contrary, it itself does not have any contrary. As a result of
this it became necessary to prove that there is no contrary to motion
in a circle. And Aristotle made clear the kind of contrariety which he 30
is denying when he said477 in the fifth argument that ‘the contrarie-
ties of motion are derived from the contrarieties of places’. And this 192,1
134 Translation
is reasonable because things which come from contrary places have
contrary impulsions, some being heavy, others light; and the active
and passive qualities, heat, coldness, dryness and all the qualities in
terms of which the changes of bodies into one another and their
5 coming to be and perishing are brought about accompany these
qualities. Consequently motions which are antithetical in some other
way than being from contrary places and only occur in reverse
directions, as is the case with the motions of the sphere of the planets
and that of the fixed stars (this person thinks it right to also call these
motions contraries478) are of no relevance to the argument because
they are not from contrary places, as this person also agrees when he
says,479 ‘no motion in a circle is from one thing into another but is
10 rather from and into the same thing’. However, Aristotle does not
think it at all right to call these sorts of motion contrary; rather he
distinguishes them from contrary motions when he says in the fifth
argument:480 ‘However, the motion in a circle from A to B is not
contrary to that from A to C either, since these motions are from and
into the same thing, but contrary motion is defined as from a contrary
into a contrary’.
15 And this person says that there is one kind of contrariety for
motions in a circle and another for motions in a straight line both in
the words which I have set out481 and at the beginning of his dissolu-
tion of what he calls the sixth argument,482 where he writes, ‘It has
been said that since it is agreed that rectilinear motion and motion
in a circle are different, it is necessary that their contrarieties also be
20 different’. In general if you want to see the crudeness (allokotia) of
the things which this person says and that he is only out to speak
against everything that is said, whatever it might be, listen to what
he says here and what he says against the first argument.483 Here he
says that there is one kind of contrariety for rectilinear motions and
another for motions in a circle. There he maintains that motion in a
circle is more opposed to rectilinear motion than the motions in a
25 straight line are to each other. However, if the kinds of contrariety
were different, motion in a circle would not be opposite to motion in
a straight line at all. But there he wrote this: ‘But perhaps it would
be more reasonable for one to agree that motion in a circle is more
contrary to motion in a straight line than motion up and motion down
30 are to each other.’ But here he has written this: ‘Therefore, it is not
the case that whatever <properties> attach to contrary rectilinear
motions also attach to contrary motions in a circle; for since the
species of motion are different, it is also necessary that the contrarie-
ties for each species, whatever they might be, be different; in the
same way a colour and a flavour are both certainly qualities, but
193,1 since their species are different, the contrarieties applicable to these
species are different’. However, if motion in a circle is contrary to
motion in a straight line (as he said before), it is necessary that there
Translation 135
be one and the same contrariety between both. And again, forgetting
what he says here,484 he goes on to say <there>, ‘What is there to
prevent motion in a straight line from being contrary in genus to 5
motion in a circle’? And he would say that white is contrary to sweet
in this way since he says that motion in a circle differs from motion
in a straight line in the same way as flavour differs from colour.
And <here> he adds this kind of nonsense:
As in the case of contrary rectilinear motions the conflict of the

contraries occurs because they use the limits in alternation (for
what is the starting point for light things is the limit for heavy 10
ones), so too in the case of circular motions it is common to all
that they are from and into the same thing, but there is conflict
for the contrary motions because the limit of one is where the
other starts from.485 For of the two motions which start from
Aries the outer one moves toward the west (epi ta hêgoumena)
of Aries, to Pisces and Aquarius and the rest, and the inner one 15
moves toward the east (epi ta hepomena), I mean toward Taurus
and Gemini. And what the outer motion has made as a begin-
ning of motion for itself after Aries, namely, Pisces, the sphere
of the planets makes as a limit, and what the sphere of the
planets had as a beginning after Aries, I mean Taurus, attaches
to the sphere of the fixed stars as limit.
You should notice first that having said that the two motions start 20
from Aries, he next proposes that the one starts as if from Pisces, the
other as if from Taurus. And secondly that, although he has said
many times that it is common to all motions in a circle to proceed from
and into the same thing, he does not understand that, since the
motion is continuous, either it is not possible to take either a begin-
ning or a limit for it or every point is both its beginning and its end.
How then will either Pisces or Taurus be either a beginning of one 25
motion or a limit of the other when <beginning and limit> are related
in the same way to each <of the signs>?
And what kind of conflict is there between these motions? For
because things which move in reverse directions in a straight line
proceed from contrary places and encounter one another in accord-
ance with their contrary qualities they, striving for victory, fight to
change their opposites into themselves and to make their path easy
for themselves. But what conflict would there be between the sphere
of the fixed stars and that of the planets, since they don’t encounter 30
one another at all, they don’t put up obstacles to each other’s motions,
they don’t have those active and passive qualities, and they are not
of a nature to change into one another? But if someone yearns to learn
the reason why this motion in reverse directions of the heavenly 194,1
circles is necessary, Aristotle himself gives it later,486 and I say how
136 Translation
I understand it in the elucidation of these passages. Here I would say
this much: the reverse motion sustains the harmony of the whole
cosmos and provides the cause for the unceasing coming to be and
5 perishing of everything beneath the moon.487
However, if it seems appropriate, we will also sound out what this
person says against what he calls the sixth argument,488 and say first
that he does not even understand that this passage is part of the fifth
argument (although Alexander said that it is a superfluous addi-
tional argument). And although in explaining Aristotle’s text, I have
10 already clarified the whole meaning of the argument to the best of
my ability, it is also necessary now to recall some of the things I said
there: after proving that motions in reverse directions which occur on
an arc or on one semicircle or on two semicircles are not contrary, he
next proceeded to the very thing which was set out for proof, and
proposed to prove that the motions which occur in reverse directions
15 on a whole circle are not contrary either; and having proved this first
on the basis of the definition of contrary motions he now proves the
same thing by reductio ad impossibile. It is not necessary to say these
things, which were said a little while ago, twice except so that those
who encounter them learn that this person did not understand the
development of the argument and consequently considered it a sixth
20 argument for the fifth hypothesis, which considers motions in reverse
directions occurring on one circle, although it is a different way of
demonstrating the same hypothesis.489
This person raises an objection by asking why, even though en-
quiring about heaven,490 Aristotle hypothesised the motion in reverse
direction to be on one circle and not on two, as is the case with the
spheres of the fixed stars and the planets. And he says that Alexan-
der perceives the unsoundness491 of the present argument and,
25 thinking it right to try to help it, he492 says that motions in a straight
line are contrary because they come from and go into contrary places
even if they do not occur on one and the same straight line, but if
motions in a circle in reverse directions were contrary they would
occur on one circle. ‘For’, <Alexander> says, ‘it would be extremely
unreasonable that a motion occurring on one circle be contrary to a
30 motion occurring on another’; but he does not add or establish a
reason why this is so.
And it is clear, to begin with, that this person’s accusation493 of
Alexander is incorrect if we maintain the definition of contrary
motions which says that contrary motions are those which come from
contrary places. But if this person is saying that this is the definition
for contrary motions in a straight line, but there is another one for
195,1 circular motions, he is again forgetting the point of the demonstra-
tion, because it says that things which conflict with each other and
change into one another move in contrary ways. But these are the
things which are opposed with respect to the active and passive
Translation 137
qualities from which weight and lightness follow, and the contrary
changes of place of natural bodies occur with respect to weight and
lightness. And so the heavy is contrary to the light and the hot is 5
contrary to the cold, and they start from contrary places, and even if
they move on different straight lines, they are still contrary in form.
For what is cold here where we are is contrary to what is hot in Rome
because they are of such a nature that they would conflict and change
into one another if they were in the same place. However, if the
contrariety of motions appears more clearly when they are taken on 10
the same straight line, one would do better to accept Aristotle’s
taking the things moving in reverse directions to be on one circle,
since if there were contrariety between things moving in reverse
directions it would be more evident in the case of things moving on a
single circle; consequently if he had attempted his proof in terms of
two circles, he would have been more under suspicion. But this
person says,
Since the present investigation of heaven concerns nature,

<Aristotle> should have proved for the spheres of the fixed 15
stars and the planets that their motions are not contrary.
Consequently he has thrown awry and missed the point in
demonstrating something else and not what is being sought.
And again it is worth noticing with what lack of understanding this

person demands that Aristotle prove things that are perfectly clear
even to a blind person (as they say). For that the motions of the
spheres of the fixed stars and of the planets are not contrary, espe- 20
cially in terms of this form of contrariety, according to which things
which move in contrary ways are contrary and of a nature to change
into one another, is immediately clear from the very things we see.
For the bodies of these things are seen not to have changed into one
another in the whole of time even though they do touch one another.
Moreover the motions of these things are not from or into contrary
places, as even this person agrees; for if every circular motion is from 25
and into the same thing494 and every point is both a beginning and
end of the motion, what contrariety would there be between places in
different circles? Furthermore, things are said to move in contrary
ways when one of them ends in the place from which the other begins
and when each of the places is natural for one of them and unnatural
for the other. But the sphere of the fixed stars does not move from the 30
place of the sphere of the planets to its place, nor does the sphere of
the planets move from the place of the sphere of the fixed stars to its
place; nor is there some place which is natural for the one and
unnatural for the other; and in general a hemisphere of each of them 196,1
which is above earth moves in the same way as the hemisphere under
earth of the other.495
138 Translation
But if someone wants to call this496 itself a contrariety, then for
Aristotle, this is not the subject of discussion, which is rather the
motion of things which change into one another. For these are the
5 things which are contrary to one another because of the active and
passive qualities from which follow the contrary impulsions of bodies,
impulsions which are distinguished together with the contrarieties
of places. And so Aristotle also frequently gives demonstrations on
the basis of the definition of the changes of place of things which are
contrary in this way.
But how can someone say that the motion of what is said to wander
10 is contrary497 to the motion of the sphere of the fixed stars if it is
necessary that contrary motions be as equally strong as possible, and
that <of contrary motions> the motion which is natural for one thing
is unnatural for the other, but the sphere of the fixed stars dominates
that of the planets in such a way that the sphere of the planets,
insofar as it makes its own apparent motion a single motion (al-
though <the motions of the planets> are498 very many), is carried
around with the sphere of the fixed stars? Also, however, the sphere
of the planets is not carried around with the sphere of the fixed stars
15 unnaturally, since what moves unnaturally for all time would not
endure in its own perfection. Rather it is endowed with this motion
beyond its own nature, and the motion fills it with a more perfect life
and a more concise participation in the Good. In general the motion
which is opposite to the motion which is naturally co-ordinate with a
thing and belongs naturally to something which is co-ordinate with
what is contrary to the thing is said to be unnatural for the thing.
20 And so upward motion is unnatural for earth because it belongs
naturally to its contrary, fire.
So I think it is clear from what has been said that Aristotle was
right not to give his proof that there is no motion contrary to motion
in a circle in relation to these things499 for which it was clear that
there is never any change into one another. But if there were some
25 motion completely contrary to heaven’s motion in a circle in such a
way that the things moving with them had to change into one
another, it would be necessary that they sometime meet one another
and do so by moving on the same circle and not on different ones. For
even if they were on a different circle at some time, then, as is also
the case with things moving on different straight lines, there is
nothing to prevent them from moving in ways which are contrary in
form, since they are contraries. But just as contrariety is revealed better
30 by things moving on the same straight line, so too, if there were some
motion contrary to motion in a circle, it would be revealed better using
the same circle. For if it were proved that things moving in reverse
directions on one circle are not moving with contrary motions, it would
have been proved much more and more clearly that motions in reverse
directions which occur on different circles are not contrary.
Translation 139
But this person has also made the superficial statement500 that, 35
just as in the case of things which move in a straight line the upper
point is the limit for light things and the starting point for heavy ones
and conversely for the lower point, so too in the case of things which 197,1
move in a circle: even if they use the same point as both starting point
and limit, nevertheless they use it in different relations, since the
point is the starting point for one thing as moving toward the west,
and the limit for another as moving toward the east.501 Now what
does he mean by this? For the same point, the eastern one for
example, is the starting point for both the sphere of the fixed stars 5
and that of the planets, since both move from this point and both
move to the western point, except that in the case of the former the
hemisphere above earth moves in this way, in the case of the latter
the hemisphere beneath earth does so.
But when Aristotle says,502 ‘But also if a motion in a circle were
contrary to another motion in a circle, one of them would be pointless’
(because, since the things in motion proceed from contrary places and
are disposed to conflict, they are related, so that what dominates
makes the motion of what is dominated cease), this person objects to 10
what Aristotle has said by saying,
Why doesn’t the same absurdity, that if one motion dominates,

the other is pointless, follow in the case of things moving in
reverse directions on a straight line? But if they are equally
strong, they stop each other and both will be pointless, since we
say that what does not activate its own activity is pointless. But
this is absurd because neither god nor nature does anything 15
pointless.
Now the person who first introduced this as a difficulty was

reasonable to raise it. But one should understand that even if things
which move in a straight line are brought to a stop by one another,
this is not pointless because these things are of a nature to stand still.
For earth and water and air are of a nature to move and to stand still;
and fire is thought to be always in motion, but, since it moves up from
below at one time and down503 from above at another, and contrary 20
motions are separated by rest, it is clear that fire too stands still
between its contrary motions. But the things which move in a circle
are of a nature to make their motion continuously, and if they stood
still it would be pointless. And in addition things which move in
reverse directions in a straight line and have contrary natural impul-
sions because they contain contrary active and passive qualities are 25
of a nature to act on and be acted on by one another and to come to
be from one another when they meet. But the things which move in
a circle and do not have either lightness or weight obviously don’t
have the active and passive qualities, heat and cold, dryness and
140 Translation
moistness, either, since, if they did, they would also have lightness
30 and heaviness. But since they do not act on and are not acted on by
one another, they are not of a nature to change into one another.
Consequently if a stronger thing encounters a weaker one and
carries it around into its own motion, then, in the case of things which
move in a straight line, what is carried around is changed into what
carries it around and becomes an addition to it, and increasing it
would not be pointless both because it produced something useful
and because it is no longer; but in the case of things moving in a circle,
198,1 what is carried around is not of a nature to change into what carries
it around nor would it be pointless to exercise its own activity.504 And
this is why Aristotle also used505 the example of a sandal which exists,
but does not display its own activity – that’s what it is to be pointless.
5 But what changes into something else is no longer and its very
non-being brings a benefit to the universe.
But this person is not satisfied with arguing against details and so
he sets out some general arguments about the motion of the heavenly
bodies, trying hard to show that their motions are of different kinds
10 and consequently so are their substances. Here then it is also neces-
sary to write some general things against the whole purpose of his
refutation and also to investigate in particular each of the things
which he has said badly. I say generally against his whole purpose
that Aristotle, having proposed to prove that everything which moves
in a circle taken as one thing transcends everything which moves in
15 a straight line and has a different nature from it, proved that motion
in a straight line is divided into contraries, but motion in a circle has
no contrary. Having previously demonstrated in the Physics that
coming to be is from contraries and perishing is into contraries, he
reasonably inferred that because sublunary things move in a straight
line it is necessary that they come to be and perish, but that heavenly
things, which move in a circle, endure without coming to be or
20 perishing. And so even if there is a difference in heavenly things
involving their motions, the differences do not go so far as contrari-
ety. For the motion of the sphere of the fixed stars is not contrary to
the motion of the things which are said to wander, as I think has been
proved506 with many arguments. Nor is a faster motion contrary to a
slower one of the same kind; for in our world a greater chunk of earth
moves faster than a smaller one, but it is not said to have a contrary
25 motion. And so even if the substances <of heavenly things> are
different from one another in some way, nevertheless they are not
disposed as contraries in such a way as to come to be from one
another. And so it would not be necessary for someone who thinks to
refute Aristotle’s views to prove that their motions and their sub-
stances are different, but necessary to prove that they have
differences which are contrary. But also, if there is some substantial
difference among heavenly things, it is not necessary that they not
Translation 141
be simple in terms of the simplicity which is ascribed to them. For, if 30
nothing prevents the sublunary elements, which are not only differ-
ent from one another but also disposed in contrary ways
(hupenantiôs), from being simple, all having moving in a straight line 199,1
as a common feature, what prevents heavenly things, which all move
in a circle, from also being simple in nature and having both one
common specific character (which Aristotle has called the fifth sub-
stance) derived from their common feature of moving in a circle and
transcending coming to be, and also a difference from one another
which does not proceed into contrariety? For who would not say that 5
there is a difference between the bodies of the stars and the heavenly
bodies507 or between the sun, which illuminates, and the moon, which
is illuminated? But they all move in a circle, they all are simple, they
all are superior to coming to be, and consequently they all are
distinguished by one substance, the fifth. For it is not now being
proposed to investigate the difference in kind between heavenly 10
things but to investigate their common superiority to sublunary
things, which it was necessary to distinguish by means of the contra-
riety involved in rectilinear motion. Accordingly, Aristotle divided
the sublunary simple bodies into two when he said,508 ‘I mean by
simple bodies those which have a starting point of motion naturally,
for example, fire and earth and their species and the things which are
akin ...’. And in book 3 of this treatise, contracting the four elements 15
into the light and heavy, he says,509 ‘It remains to speak about the
<other> two’. So if he contracts the species of these things and what
is akin to them into the pair given by the contrariety, what would be
absurd about his also taking what transcends this contrariety as one
of the simple bodies? If what I am saying is true, all the nonsense this
person utters in what he calls the ‘common arguments’ would be 20
pointless; and it would also be <seen to be> pointless if someone
noticed that these arguments of his are also based on things he said
previously and called irrefutable even though they are unsound in
this way and, as I think, proved unintelligible.
Since in his discussions of particular points he takes it as agreed
that the sphere of Saturn moves more slowly than the spheres under
it, let him learn that this is not necessarily so. For, if the excess of the 25
magnitude510 were great, then, even if it moved faster than the things
under it, it would be possible for it make its return to the same point
more slowly.
But since he has also added something like the assertion that if the
heavenly body does not move in a circle naturally but because of soul
(as in the case of animals) or because of some other superior power
(and as evidence he brings in Aristotle’s saying in the eighth book of
the Physics511 that heaven is moved by a superior cause), it would not
be possible to infer that heaven comes to be or that it does not from 30
its motion, he clearly does not understand that it is possible for the
142 Translation
same motion to be brought about by different causes and that the
heavenly body as natural is moved in a circle by Nature in one way,
35 and as ensouled it is moved in another way by Soul, and again as
200,1 possessing mind it is moved in another way by Mind. And it receives
the unchangingness and unceasingness and perpetually uniform
completeness of its motion from Mind, which is unchanging; and it
enjoys its changing motion differently512 at different times from Soul
because of Soul’s changing thoughts about what is always complete;
5 and because of its own nature heaven both possesses the power to
perform and does perform the activities which are appropriate to a
substance of this sort, one of which is the circular motion appropriate
to simplicity. And it is clear that the goods from both Mind and Soul
accrue to it because of its natural suitability, since it is not possible
to have mind unless one first has soul. For Plato says513 that it is not
10 possible for mind to accrue to anything without soul. Nor is it possible
to have soul without nature. And so Aristotle says514 that soul is the
actuality of – not just any body but – a natural body. Consequently, even
if heaven possesses soul and mind, it is not prevented from also being
natural; rather it is necessary that, while being natural, it shares in soul
and mind with the result that, even if it has its circular motion from Soul
and Mind, it has it in a still prior sense from Nature.
15 And I think it would be possible and perhaps easier to have proved
the everlastingness of heaven from its circular motion, since the
motion is derived from Soul and Mind, and accordingly in the eighth
book of the Physics515 the circular motion has been proved everlasting
because it is imparted by the unmoving cause. But here <in On the
Heavens> Aristotle proposed to prove that it is everlasting from its
natural motion because he wanted to prove the everlastingness and
20 superiority of heaven from the way its existence transcends sublu-
nary things. But this person thinks that he has dissolved these
arguments proving that there is no motion contrary to motion in a
circle as well as those in the Physics which say that things which
come to be come to be from contraries and things which perish perish
25 into contraries, and that he has set up this laughable book against
the everlastingness of heaven as some kind of trophy. But if he has
been seen many times not to be understanding what is said by
Aristotle and his commentators and everywhere to be thinking that
he can preserve his own really empty and pointless belief from
refutation by those who are renowned in philosophy, let him lie with
30 the fish, swimming in the sea of irrationality, and let him lie with the
person who, they say, being rejected and wanting somehow to become
famous, set the temple of Ephesian Artemis on fire.516 For anyone
who tries by every means to establish that heaven perishes or rather
desires to establish it in order to become famous would probably join
in even the destruction of heaven in order to achieve his aim if he had
such a power.
Translation 143
However we should now cleanse away this bitter talk with sweet 201,1
words, and turn to what Aristotle says next. But since this person
also tries to refute the arguments in the eighth book of the Physics
proving that the circular motion is everlasting and to deal with
arguments for the everlastingness of the cosmos which he says are
anonymous (adespotos), let them be passed over for now. For, want- 5
ing to show to those who are eager to learn that the things which
Aristotle demonstrated in On the Heavens also remain unaffected by
this new nonsense, I was diverted into this business. But if it ever
seems right to test out the rest of the things this person has said, I
will make the examination on the basis of another starting point.517 10
Notes
1. For the whole text on which Simplicius will now comment see pp. 25-9.
2. In 1.2, 269a18-30.
3. Heaven is generated in the sense that it is derived from higher eternal causes,
but it does not come to be and perish in the way sublunary things do.
4. That is, the natures associated with contrary natural forms, such as fire and
earth.
5. In the next chapter.
6. Simplicius resumes direct discussion of the lemma at 107,25.
7. Timaeus 28A5-6.
8. 245D1-3.
9. Simplicius follows Proclus’ doctrine that the One does not furnish its own
existence (is not self-substantiating (authupostatos)), but Being, which derives its
existence from the One is authupostatos; on this doctrine see Whittaker (1974),
217-22. Simplicius will stress that our cosmos does not furnish its own existence
but rather comes to be in his sense of being the product of higher things.
10. Simplicius uses paratasis (which I translate ‘extendedness’) here and three
lines below to refer to a temporal extension. He refers to spatial extension here
simply as being and below as extension (diastasis, also translated ‘dimension’,
‘distance’ and ‘separation’ where appropriate) of substance. Accordingly Simplicius
is saying in this passage that Being has no spatial or temporal extension.
11. That is, the everlasting duration of our world is derived from intelligible
Being and its ‘all at once’, eternal existence.
12. Inserting hupo with E. What is given existence by Being is Soul.
13. Inserting apo with Hankinson; Karsten inserts hupo, and Moerbeke has ab.
14. Being.
15. Being; what comes after Being is Soul.
16. cf. 93,29-30 with the note on 93,27.
17. This difficult phrase is perhaps meant to distinguish the parts of the cosmos
from the ‘parts’ of the world of Forms (Being), each of which is hoper todi.
18. The most important sense of composition here is composition from form and
matter.
19. What is self-moving should be Soul, which is intermediate between Being
and the world of form-matter composites; in the same way, Simplicius says,
form-matter composites are intermediate between the unified form and the indefi-
nite matter which is their substratum.
20. I have not translated autou de toutou in l7 because I do not know to what
they refer. Hankinson renders the equivalent of ‘the Being of this thing itself’.
21. Agreeing with Hankinson in accepting Karsten’s to where Heiberg prints
tôi.
22. Heaven.
23. See the discussion of 270a25-35 starting at 111,3.
24. cf. 269D7-E2.
145
146 Notes to pages 38-43
25. Simplicius presumably brings in this point because of Philoponus’ belief
that god created the cosmos from what is not; see 136,16ff.
26. Simplicius refers to the way in which changes in heaven effect changes in
the sublunary world; cf. 97,15-17.
27. Being, the world of Forms.
28. i.e., the kind of coming to be found in sublunary things, which act on and
are acted on by one another; see 111,3-115,20.
29. Heaven.
30. In the sublunary world.
31. The words in angle brackets translate the proskeitai en allois genesiourgôs
which occurs in the margin of D and are not printed by Heiberg. They are accepted
by Hankinson, and the context seems to require some such addition grammati-
cally.
32. Reading suntithemenôn for the suntithenenês printed by Heiberg; Moerbeke
has compositis. Simplicius is describing the formation of ordinary things out of
contrary qualities.
33. As happens in the world of Forms.
34. Reading tauto with D and Karsten for the touto printed by Heiberg.
35. Bracketing the ti printed by Heiberg but missing in A and B.
36. Hankinson ad loc. gives some references for this claim.
37. Reading ê with A and B for the kai printed by Heiberg.
38. This clause is added to explain that fire and water are not contraries in the
strict sense, but are called contraries because they have qualities which are
contrary in the strict sense; see, e.g., 167,14-24.
39. Inserting hupo as suggested by Hankinson.
40. i.e., prime matter understood as something prior to corporeal extension. The
phrase ‘corporeal extension’ suggests that Simplicius is thinking of Philoponus’
characterisation of first matter as the three-dimensional or qualityless body (see
the Introduction, p. 7).
41. Reading autê for the autês printed by Heiberg; Moerbeke has hec (= haec).
Here Simplicius apparently contrasts cases in which some qualities endure in a
change, e.g., when water changes into air, with cases in which none do, e.g., when
water changes into fire. In the former case the substratum can be thought of as
moist matter, but in the latter it is prime matter.
42. At 98,30-99,4 and 99,13-17.
43. parakhrôsis. 8 of the 9 occurrences of this term listed on the TLG are in
Simplicius. The one which is most clearly related to this one is at 1064,3 of his
commentary on the Physics (CAG 10).
44. Simplicius, unlike Aristotle, is hesitant about treating nutrition as a full-
fledged activity of soul; cf. 110,26-30.
45. cf. 96,27-9 with the note on 96,28.
46. Simplicius is thinking of 5.1; see 801,6-9 of his commentary on the Physics
(CAG 10).
47. i.e., it is the motion of the sun through the zodiac.
48. See, e.g., chapter 7, 191a3-7, quoted below at 125,25-8, and for this whole
paragraph see 123,11-129,3.
49. cf. Physics 1.7, 191a3-7, quoted below at 125,15-8.
50. cf. Physics 1.7, 191a13-14, cited below at 125,30-126,2. The question
whether when Aristotle refers to contraries at 270a14-17 he means to include form
and privation is central to Simplicius’ disagreement with Philoponus; see 123,11-
131,17.
Notes to pages 43-47 147
51. See 270a17 with 92,8-11.
52. Simplicius refers to 1.10-12.
53. In 1.12.
54. Translating autês instead of the autôn printed by Heiberg. With the latter
we would have to supply something like ‘heavenly things’.
55. Again the primary reference is to 1.12.
56. This presumably means all kinds of change, substantial, qualitative, quan-
titative, and local.
57. 894A1-8.
58. cf. 92,32-95,17.
59. Simplicius quotes Timaeus 27D6-28A4.
60. Simplicius omits a controversial aei (‘always’), printed by Rivaud; see
Whittaker (1969) and (1973), 387-8.
61. Simplicius adds a kai hôsautôs to Plato’s kata tauta.
62. Timaeus 28B6-8.
63. Simplicius omits Plato’s words ‘beginning from some starting point’.
64. cf. 94,8-95,17.
65. Simplicius tendentiously attempts to read into Plato’s words the idea that
the perceived world does not just exist for a particular time period.
66. Simplicius gives a quite approximate rendering of Statesman 269D7-E2. In
particular he writes menein (‘remain’) where Plato has gignesthai (‘be’).
67. And what is not is not another thing.
68. Timaeus 38B6. Simplicius quotes the continuation of these words just below
at 105,15-16 and 20-23.
69. Timaeus 38B6-7.
70. Timaeus 38B7-C3.
71. Simplicius’ mention of 6,000 years undoubtedly reflects standard Christian
estimates of the age of the world, which would have made the world approximately
6,000 years old in 500 AD; see, e.g., the entries ‘Alexandrian Era’ and ‘Byzantine
Era’ in Kazhdan (1991). And of course the Christians did not expect the world to
last much longer; cf., e.g., 143,1-2.
72. Timaeus 39E1-2, at the end of the description of the heavenly bodies and
time. Presumably these people thought that if the cosmos only imitated the eternal
nature it could not be everlasting. But for Simplicius the everlasting is an imita-
tion of the eternal or timeless.
73. On Plato’s account of the four elements only earth does not interchange with
the other three, as he says very explicitly at Timaeus 56D5-6. Simplicius is
obviously straining to read anything about the immortality of the entireties of the
four elements into Plato’s text; see also 107,14-19.
74. Timaeus 41B4, quoted just below. Hankinson quite rightly changes
Heiberg’s period to a question mark here.
75. Timaeus 41A3-D3.
76. Simplicius has aphanôs where Rivaud prints phanerôs. The anonymous
vetter of the first 21 CAG pages of this translation, to whom I am much indebted,
points out that Philoponus uses the same word in a citation of this passage at 93,23
of Against Proclus.
77. I have taken text and translation (with one minor change) of this first
difficult sentence from Cornford (1937); see pp. 367-71. Simplicius’ quotation
agrees with Rivaud’s text in its first eight words but then has aluta emou ge
ethelontos, where Rivaud prints di’ emou genomena aluta emou ge mê ethelontos.
78. Heiberg prints ou mên where Rivaud has outi men dê.
79. Simplicius has tukhontes where Rivaud prints lakhontes.
80. Heiberg prints esti loipa where Rivaud has eti genê loipa, which is also found
in Moerbeke (adhuc reliqua genera), a Bessarion correction, and Karsten. Sim-
plicius uses the word genê in a paraphrase at 107,7.
81. Simplicius has edei where Rivaud prints dei.
82. Simplicius has the plural trophas where Rivaud has the singular.
83. Simplicius has auxete where Rivaud prints auxanete.
84. That is, the heavenly bodies. It is important to bear in mind that for
Simplicius these are the audience to whom the creator is speaking.
85. Simplicius does not here include the god’s reference to his will as the reason
why heaven will not perish. According to Philoponus Plato held the false view that
the cosmos would not perish because of the will of god; see, e.g., Against Proclus,
144,6-15. For Simplicius’ explanation of Plato’s meaning see below 108,34-109,8.
86. tropê. Where Plato mentions ‘turning in accordance with nature’ (trepesthe
kata phusin) Simplicius paraphrases ‘using your natural transformation and
motion’ (dia tês phusikês heautôn tropês kai kinêseôs).
87. stoikheiokratoras, a hapax. With this sentence cf. 105,32-106,4.
88. Simplicius comments further on the speech of the demiurge at 108,28-
109,15.
89. It seems certain that Simplicius has at least Philoponus in mind here. For
Philoponus’ invocation of Plato as a person who believes that the cosmos has come
to be see chapter 6 of his Against Proclus.
90. 270a12-13.
91. With the exception of the lines on Alexander (108,9-14) the next two
paragraphs restate what was said at 91,23-92,21, the notes on which should be
consulted.
92. As opposed to the kind of ‘perfective’ qualitative changes seen in heaven.
93. Alexander’s formulation is more tortuous than my translation conveys
because he is trying to make the argument appear categorical.
94. Hankinson makes the chronologically difficult suggestion that Simplicius is
here referring to his commentary on the Physics, but it seems more likely that he
is referring to 98,15-102,31 above; see 102,15-21.
95. 270a20-1. The quotation omits a kai aphtharton found in our text of
Aristotle; see also 132,30. At this point Simplicius enters on the interpretation of
the creator’s statement in Plato’s Timaeus (see 106,10-14) that heaven is imper-
ishable only because he wills it to be so, a statement which obviously implies that
heaven would be perishable if the creator chose it to be so. Alexander is perfectly
happy to contrast Aristotle and Plato on this point, apparently taking it that for
Aristotle heaven is everlasting by nature. Simplicius tries to eliminate this con-
trast by saying that Plato only intends to contrast the everlastingness of heaven
and its dependence on a higher cause with the timeless eternity of Being, which is
‘self-substantiating’.
96. Alexander is presumably referring to those, such as Plutarch of Chaironea
(c. 100 AD), Atticus (second century AD) and his pupil Harpocration, and
Severus (date uncertain), who held that for Plato the world was generated in
time and therefore is perishable ‘in its own nature’, but imperishable because
of the will of god; for references see Baltes (1998), 115-18, 417-19. By ‘postu-
lates’ Alexander probably means the will of god, but the plural is puzzling; see
Rescigno, p. 258.
97. Simplicius gives an approximate version of Timaeus 41B3-5, included in the
passage quoted above at 106,9-25. Simplicius means that Aristotle seems to reject
this statement because he holds that nothing which comes to be lasts forever, and
he (apparently) ascribes to Plato the view that heaven has come to be.
98. i.e., they are freed from the coming to be and perishing which is associated
with all other extended things.
99. Reading prolambanomenên for Heiberg’s prolambanousan.
100. In agreement with Aristotle.
101. kata idiotêta. I do not understand the force of this expression, but Sim-
plicius is clearly using it to mark out the kinds of general contraries, such as
sameness and difference, which belong to all things, and ordinary contraries, such
as hot and cold, which cannot co-exist.
102. I have transposed sunuparkhontôn ... allêla from 13-15 to after enantiôn
in line 10. This requires dropping the alla in line 13.
103. In reading the discussion of this text it is important to realise that forms
of the same verb (auxein) are translated using forms of both ‘increase’ and ‘grow’.
104. In the previous lemma (270a12-22).
105. In chapter 4.
106. Heiberg’s sullogizesthai should probably be sullogizetai here. Moerbeke
has sillogizetur.
107. This argument, on which Simplicius does not comment, seems to presuppose
that heaven could only be nourished by something subject to generation, so that, if it
could be nourished, it, too, would be subject to generation; see Rescigno, p. 260.
108. In the next lemma (270a25-35) Simplicius suggests that Aristotle may not
have invoked the growth of living things because he thinks that growth is a
function of the nutritive soul, whereas the elements grow naturally with soul
playing no role. Simplicius is inclined to think that the growth of living things also
does not involve soul and so feels free to bring such growth into Aristotle’s
argument; cf. 100,23-6.
109. At 270a25 in the preceding lemma.
110. To be more precise (at the suggestion of a vetter): in the lemma Aristotle
says that the body which moves in a circle is without growth or perishing
(anauxêton kai aphtharton), and Simplicius says that he thinks Aristotle is here
calling ‘without diminishing’ (ameiôton) ‘without perishing’.
111. The distinction Simplicius makes here is a standard one and traces back
to Aristotle’s discussion of quality in chapter 7 of the Categories; see, for example,
132,12-19 of Porphyry’s commentary on the Categories (CAG 4.1).
112. Simplicius is constrained to admit that heaven does alter in some ways,
e.g., the moon appears to have a different colour at different times, but he wants
to insist that it is not the kind of alteration which sublunary things undergo when
they are affected by something.
113. to eulogon. Alexander pushes hard on Aristotle’s phrase ‘it is possible to
accept by the same reasoning’ (tês autês dianoias estin hupolabein).
114. 14, 15a22-4. At 114,12-14 Simplicius offers a tortured reading of this
passage as part of his own account of Aristotle’s position.
115. i.e., have qualities to which there are contraries.
116. At 270a12-22.
117. Although there appear to be no other extant texts in which the heavenly
body is described as qualityless for Aristotle, Rescigno (p. 268) quite appropriately
refers to fragment 5 of Atticus (des Places (1977)) in which Atticus charges
Aristotle with saying that ‘there is a body which is neither heavy nor light, neither
soft nor hard, neither moist nor dry, and practically saying that there is a body
which is not a body’ (sôma ou sôma).
118. Simplicius responds to this sentence and the remainder of the quotation at
114,35-115,20.
119. At 2.1, 284a14.
120. For the contrast between condition (diathesis) and state (hexis) see 111,7-
13.
121. Alteration involving affection. Simplicius is arguing that the waxing and
waning of the moon does not involve affection although such affection would be
observable if it occurred. He goes on to argue that the changes in the apparent sizes
of heavenly bodies are due to changes in their distance from us, not to the increase
and diminution he believes is associated with affection.
122. I am not sure what Simplicius has in mind here. At 109,8-15 he has said
that Plato (and so Simplicius himself) thinks that the heavenly body transcends
contraries, while conceding that it does admit certain ‘pre-eminent’ contraries such
as motion and rest. But those contraries would seem irrelevant here. Perhaps all
Simplicius means is that if there are contrary properties in heaven as a whole, they
do not act on one another in the way sublunary contraries do; cf. 115,16-20.
123. Here and in the rest of this paragraph Simplicius seems to move closer to
Alexander’s position that the alterations in heaven are only accidental, but Sim-
plicius never abandons his claim that the alterations are not matters of being
affected; the closest he comes is at 115,14-15.
124. Simplicius gives a version of DK30B7, 7-8. He cites it in a different way at
111,23-4 (the source for the whole fragment) and 113,8-9 of his commentary on the
Physics (CAG 9).
125. i.e., perfective alteration. Simplicius’ train of thought is a little loose here;
he should have said only that affective alteration sometimes brings about substan-
tial change but perfective alteration never does.
126. In the next lemma, 270b1-4.
127. See 111,29-31 with the note.
128. cf. 111,31-112,3. Simplicius’ disagreement with Alexander here seems
mainly a matter of formulation. Both presumably agree that substantial change,
e.g., from water to fire, involves a substratum changing contrary substantial
qualities. Simplicius picks up on Alexander’s talking about contrariety in sub-
stance on the grounds that in the Categories Aristotle says there is no contrary to
substance. But elsewhere (167,2-10) he says that substances can be called contrary
insofar as they are given form by contrary differentia, and his position hardly
seems different from Alexander’s, whom Simplicius even cites (168,20-169,2) on
this issue.
129. With this paragraph see also 166,14-169,2.
130. With this paragraph cf. 112,12-24.
131. At 112,12-24.
132. See 112,18-19 with the note.
133. See 113,13 with the note
134. That is, coming to be, growth, etc. For the importance of affections in
Simplicius’ interpretation see the discussion of the preceding lemma.
135. In this sentence and the next two Simplicius canvasses some alternative
interpretations of Aristotle’s word ‘assumptions’ (hupokeimena). The first takes
them as the preliminary assumptions (prolambanomena) listed by Simplicius at
12,6-11 in the commentary on chapter 2. There, as here, Simplicius tells us that
Plotinus refers to these as hypotheses, and he cites Ennead 2.1, 12-14. The words
‘taking this from there’ (enteuthen ... labôn auto) seem to me too obscure to
interpret. The next sentence is also obscure and may mean that he (Aristotle?
Plotinus?) took the assumptions or hypotheses to be all the premisses of all the
arguments up to this point. Finally Simplicius gives his own interpretation accord-
ing to which the assumptions are the premisses [ii] and [iv] of p. 92.
136. Here Simplicius writes autôi instead of the autou of 12,14, which is in our
text of Plotinus.
137. At 270a12-22; with what Simplicius says here cf. 92,2-21 with the notes.
138. In the next chapter.
139. Simplicius’ discussions of this lemma and the next should be read together;
for Simplicius the two constitute one confirmation of what Aristotle has said based
on people’s ideas. Alexander apparently believed that there were two ideas in
question, the existence of the divine or gods and its or their occupation of the upper
region. Aristotle is clearly concerned with the latter, but Simplicius disputes
Alexander’s suggestion that Aristotle is concerned with the former, I suspect,
because Aristotle has been talking only about a single divine body, not a plurality
of them.
140. Simplicius is summarising the present lemma and the next three lemmas.
141. The sentence is anacoluthic, but the meaning is clear.
142. Hippon and Diagoras are labeled atheists in some sources. For the sources
for Hippon see DK38; for Diagoras, Winiarczyk (1981).
143. The sentence is difficult. I take Simplicius to be pointing out against
Alexander that, although Aristotle has established that there is a divine body
(heaven), he has not established that there is a plurality of gods except in 12.6-9 of
the Metaphysics (and by a doubtful extension in 8.6 of the Physics), where Aristotle
argues for a multiplicity of divine prime movers corresponding to the spheres of his
astronomical theory.
144. The issue here seems insignificant. Whereas Alexander understands Aris-
totle to be asserting that the divine (heavenly) body, which he associates with god,
is linked with the upper region, Simplicius understands him to be saying that the
heavenly body, which, of course, is in the upper region, is linked with god.
145. Inserting ekhein with Karsten.
146. The issue raised here is whether Aristotle is speaking hypothetically or
taking it as established that there is something divine (so that the lemma should
start ‘So since there is ...’; cf. 18,9-15 in the commentary on 1.2.
147. The numbers are, of course, absurd, and there is also no good evidence that
the early Egyptians, unlike the Babylonians, even kept astronomical records. I
have not been able to locate a source or analogue for Simplicius’ particular
numbers, but the idea that the Babylonians and Egyptians were of enormous
antiquity was common.
148. i.e., the Christians such as Philoponus.
149. cf. 142,33-5 where Simplicius implies that there is no reason why what is
completely unchanging for one hour will not remain unchanging forever.
150. Reading the autou kinêsin of B, D, a correction of A, and Karsten for the
autokinêsin of A and E printed by Heiberg. Heaven is not self-moving for Sim-
plicius.
151. cf. [Aristotle], De Mundo 1, 392a4-8.
152. i.e., if two words with two distinct references are applied to the reference
of one of them, the other will be unnamed. Simplicius now embarks on a lengthy
disputation with Philoponus on the material he has just been discussing. He picks
up with a brief discussion of the remainder of chapter 2 (270b26-31) at 144,5.
153. cf. 135,31-136,1 with the note.
154. Aristotle gives three senses of ‘does not come to be’ (agenêtos) and three of
‘comes to be’ (genêtos) in chapter 11 at 280b6-20. Aristotle’s exposition is notori-
ously unsatisfactory, but Simplicius is clearly right to insist that when Aristotle
says that heaven is agenêtos he should be understood as denying that it is genêtos
in the first sense specified at 280b14-16, which Simplicius paraphrases at 120,29-
121,1. One might say that the denial that heaven is genêtos in this sense is tantamount
to saying that it is agenêtos in the third sense specified at 280b11-12 which holds of
something when ‘it is entirely impossible for it to come to be so that it is at one time
and not at another’. In Simplicius’ representation Philoponus discarded this sense as
irrelevant on the grounds that to say it applies to heaven would entail that heaven
does not exist. We seem to be faced with the option of taking Philoponus to be
arguing tendentiously (cf. Wildberg (1988), 188-9) or taking Simplicius to be
misrepresenting his position (cf. Davidson (1969), 358 n. 8).
155. We are not told what the remaining hypothesis is, but, as the sequel
starting at 121,4 shows, Philoponus is mainly interested in the question he now
raises: does everything which comes to be in time come to be from a contrary?
156. Moving Heiberg’s right parenthesis behind tugkhanontos, in agreement
with Bossier in his edition of Moerbeke’s translation. This requires changing the
question mark in line 5 to a full stop.
157. Simplicius apparently accuses Philoponus of ruling out all three of Aris-
totle’s senses of agenêtos and then asking in which of these senses Aristotle claims
that heaven is agenêtos.
158. Reading hora with Karsten and eliminating the an inserted by Heiberg,
who prints the âra which signals a question, whereas the manuscripts he reports
all have the ara which means, among other things, ‘therefore’. Without Heiberg’s
âra the question mark in line 15 goes.
159. De Caelo 1.11, 280b15-16. Simplicius here points to one of the awkward-
nesses in Aristotle’s divisions in 1.11: something which comes into existence
instantaneously counts as both agenêtos and genêtos.
160. De Caelo 1.11, 280b11-12. The specification of what ‘impossible’ means is
quoted from 280b13.
161. Simplicius now paraphrases 1.11, 280b14-16 and then 20-23. Aristotle
declares that heaven is everlasting at 2.1, 283b26-30.
162. See, e.g., 92,22-32.
163. See 98,15-102,14.
164. Simplicius quotes Physics 1.5, 188b1-2 and 12-16. He gives an extensive
quotation of their context below at 124,25-125,20.
165. In chapter 6.
166. 1.6, 190a17-20, translating Ross’s text. This means inserting to after
tauton in line 25, dropping Heiberg’s gar in line 26, placing parentheses around ho
gar anthrôpos hupomenei, followed by a comma, followed by to mê mousikon de kai
to amouson oukh hupomenei.
167. Reading dêlon with Karsten and D rather than the dêla printed by
Heiberg; Moerbeke has palam, his standard translation of dêlon.
168. The two sentences of Philoponus quoted here may be a feeble attempt to
explain the difference between form/privation and contraries in the strict sense,
and, of course, Simplicius believes that Aristotle uses the word ‘contrary’ to cover
both. But surely Simplicius would have to agree that the distinction is an impor-
tant one which should be explained.
169. It is, I think, certain (see, e.g., line 17 below) that Philoponus really only
argued that not all coming to be is from contraries in the strict sense. Philoponus
gives the same sort of arguments in 8.3 of Against Proclus (307,14-309,12), where
the final conclusion is that not everything which comes to be comes to be from a
contrary.
170. It is difficult to know what to make of this assertion, which is certainly
false. Philoponus’ view is that there is a coming to be of form from privation and
that in the coming to be of the world the privation is what is not in any way; see,
e.g., 131,17-20.
171. 5, 3b24-7.
172. For some discussion of later views of the immortality of parts of the soul,
see Sorabji (2004), vol. 1, pp. 264-8.
173. cf. De Caelo 3.8, 307b8-9 and De Sensu 4, 442b19-20.
174. Aristotle does not discuss left and right in the Categories, but he does say at
7, 6b15-19 that some relatives have contraries, and some do not. At 127,19-21
Simplicius treats right and left as relatives which are contrary (or at least opposite).
175. Philoponus makes this same kind of claim in On the Creation of the World
(Reichardt (1897)), 5.5, 216,22-3. Simplicius accepts it at 131, 9-17; cf. [Aristotle],
On Plants 2.4, 825b14-18.
176. At 130,31-131,2 Simplicius ascribes the identification of light as the colour
of fire to Philoponus but seems to dissociate himself from it; see also 89,4-7.
177. That darkness is a privation of light is standard Aristotelian doctrine,
associated particularly with De Anima 2.7, 418b3-20. But the doctrine was con-
tested in later antiquity. In his Paraphrase of Theophrastus (Bywater (1886), 8,
15-16) Priscian of Lydus says bluntly, ‘Darkness is not the privation of light, but
it, too, is an actuality (energeia)’. Wildberg ((1987), 84 n. 95) refers to Philoponus’
commentary on the De Anima (CAG 15, 341,10-342,16) for Philoponus’ justifica-
tion of the claim that darkness is the privation of light, but Philoponus, who is
mainly concerned to deny that light is a body, considers the possibilities that
darkness is or is not a privation; cf. also the treatment of the same Aristotle
passage in the commentary on De Anima sometimes ascribed to Simplicius (CAG
11, 133,7-21), where the alternatives are that darkness is a privation of light or an
energeia of earth. In his commentary on the Categories (CAG 13.1, 179,18-21)
Philoponus says he has proved that darkness is the privation of light ‘elsewhere’;
for a suggestion as to where elsewhere might be see Évrard (1985), 43. Finally I
mention that in the later On the Creation of the World (Reichardt (1897), 2.6)
Philoponus offers extensive argumentation for the claim that darkness is the
privation of light, the denial of which he associates with the Manichaeans.
178. And so not the privation of light.
179. For the idea of air becoming fiery because of rubbing see De Caelo 2.6,
289a19-28 with Simplicius’ comments at 438,30-439,13.
180. Simplicius’ first response to Philoponus’ arguments is a general discussion
of coming to be and perishing, contraries, and form and privation, repeating much
he said at 98,15-102,31. He responds to the arguments in a more specific way
starting at 129,4.
181. See 270a17.
182. Ross prints ‘not white’.
183. Heiberg prints ouk ek leukou, where Ross has ex ou leukou; but see Ross’s
note on 188b1. Karsten also prints ex ou leukou.
184. Ross, without citing any positive evidence, inserts a mê here.
185. Heiberg’s text has an eis mê leukon, which is not in the text of Aristotle.
186. Heiberg’s text omits a to printed by Ross and by Karsten.
187. Except in Karsten’s addition Simplicius omits Aristotle’s example which
says that colours are composites of black (dark) and white (light).
188. Physics 1.5, 188a31-b26.
189. Physics 1.7, 191a3-7.
190. Translating Heiberg’s tôn peri genesin. Ross’s text adds a phusikôn, and he
remarks that peri genesin should perhaps be excluded. See also 133,13-14, where
Simplicius includes phusikôn while stressing the significance of peri genesin.
191. Heiberg prints pôs, Ross pôs posai. And Ross begins the next sentence with
a kai, which is not in Heiberg.
192. Of the manuscripts reported by Heiberg only D has the word ‘two’, which
is in our mss. of Aristotle.
193. Physics 1.7, 191a13-14.
194. Heiberg omits a problematic hê, which is found in D and in many mss. of
Aristotle and was read by Simplicius (see 233,3-10 of his commentary on the
Physics (CAG 9)). Ross prints an unconvincing (to me) hês; see his note ad loc.
195. Of course, Philoponus believes that there is coming to be from a privation;
he is only trying to refute what he takes to be Aristotle’s assumption that coming
to be is only from a contrary; cf. 131,17-20.
196. cf. Timaeus 28A5-6.
197. That is, in every case of coming to be a form comes to be from a privation,
but in the case of the coming to be of an accidental ‘form’ in addition to the privation
there are positive characteristics from which it comes to be: black comes to be from
both not black and from white or grey or ... ; cf. 128,7-8 and 13-16 below.
198. At 270a22.
199. Simplicius gives a rough paraphrase of Physics 1.7, 190b12-14.
200. Physics 1.7, 190a18-20; for the text see the note on 122,25.
201. Simplicius is referring to chapter 10, where Aristotle makes his standard
division of opposites into relatives, contraries, state and privation, and affirmation
and denial and discusses each species in turn. What Simplicius goes on to say is
not found in that chapter, where Aristotle never mentions forms. But, taking for
granted that a privation is not a form, Simplicius only wants to point out that in
the case of opposite relatives and contraries both opposites are ‘forms’.
202. That is, simply to deny something can leave open many possibilities.
Aristotle does not make this point in the Categories, only the point that one or the
other of an affirmation and its denial must be true.
203. Simplicius now responds to each of the objections of Philoponus introduced
at 123,11-124,171.
204. Physics 1.7, 190b1-5.
205. Simplicius includes the alla which Ross brackets on philosophical grounds;
see Ross’s note ad loc.
206. Simplicius includes a ti not in our text of Aristotle.
207. Simplicius includes a ginetai not in our text of Aristotle.
208. Simplicius includes a tou not in our text of Aristotle.
209. Physics 1.5, 188b16-21, the context of which is quoted in full at 124,25-
125,20.
210. 1.5, 188a22-6. Simplicius’ text, which I have translated, deviates consider-
ably from Ross’s. He has: stereon where Ross prints to plêres; to men on where Ross
prints to men hôs on; gônia where Ross prints gegôniômenon agônion; and to euthu
where Ross prints euthu. Simplicius also omits an einai before phêsin.
211. I have translated the text as it stands, but assume that something has
dropped out. Aristotle does not use the words ‘having angles’ (gegôniômenos) or
‘being circular’ (peripherês) in the Categories.
212. cf. 89,4-7.
213. At Timaeus 58C5-8.
214. cf. 124,11-12 with the note. Heiberg’s comma after hopou should be a
question mark.
215. cf. Homer, Iliad (West (2000)), 22, 26 and Odyssey (Van Thiel (1991)), 19,
163.
216. In commenting on 270a12-22 Themistius says (CAG 5.4, 14,23-6) that
although Aristotle speaks of contraries he wants one to understand the generic
contrariety between form and privation: et in universum dum a contrario et in
contrarium dicit eam contrarietatem intellegi vult quae est secundum genus,
quaeque forma et privatio est ..., a passage which Simplicius paraphrases closely
in his response to Philoponus.
217. At 270a15-17.
218. Grammar, logic, rhetoric, subjects of low esteem for those who considered
themselves philosophers.
219. The ‘axioms’ which Simplicius has in mind are [i] that heaven is a natural
entity and [ii] that what is natural has an opposite privation. He agrees that
Aristotle holds [i] but denies that he holds [ii] as a general truth, since it is not true
of everlasting natural entities such as heaven or the cosmos.
220. For Philoponus’ denial that there is such a substratum, see 136,14-16.
221. 2, 268b14-18.
222. Simplicius inserts an en which is not in our texts of Aristotle; he does the
same thing at 27,28 in the commentary on chapter 2.
223. 270a20-2.
224. Simplicius omits a kai aphtharton found in our text of Aristotle; see also
108,29.
225. cf. 122,2-33.
226. 1.7, 191a3-4. Simplicius quotes these words somewhat differently at
125,25, on which see the notes.
227. Simplicius closely paraphrases Physics 2.3, 194b20-3.
228. Alexander of Aphrodisias denies that heaven has matter several times in
his commentary on the Metaphysics (CAG 1, 22,2-3, 169,18-19, 375,37-376,1). For
other examples see 5.4. of Iamblichus’ On the Mysteries (des Places (1966), 159-60)
and 1.19 of Proclus’ Platonic Theology 1 (Saffrey and Westerink (1968), 91,27-
92,1). Other references to heaven as immaterial include 3.9 of Hierocles of
Alexandria’s commentary on the Pythagorean golden verses (Koehler (1974),
120,6-8) and 111,25-6 of Hermeias of Alexandria’s commentary on Plato’s Phae-
drus (Couvreur (1901)).
229. 4, 1044b3-8.
230. Simplicius has kai gar where our texts of Aristotle have eiper ara.
231. See the Introduction, p. 7.
232. See 89,4-7.
233. gumnêi kephalêi. I take Simplicius to be referring to Philoponus’ alleged
impiety in a sarcastic way. Normally one would address the gods with head
uncovered.; see, e.g., Plato, Phaedrus 243B6.
234. Reading Mukonon with Karsten; Heiberg prints Mukônon, noting that A
and B have Mikônon. According to Strabo (Radt (2002-9)) 10.5.9 the phrase hupo
mian Mukonon was proverbially applied to those who use one name to refer to
things which are different by nature; cf. LSJ, s.v. Mukonos.
235. 134,3-7.
236. Metaphysics 8.5, 1044b27-9.
237. At 1.9, 278b3-4 and 279a7-9.
238. Simplicius has attempted to explain this declination at 92,33-98,15.
239. i.e., prime matter in the most common interpretation of it, an interpreta-
tion accepted by Simplicius; cf. the Introduction, p. 7.
240. Against Proclus, where the phrase ‘mythic incorporeal and formless mat-
ter’ occurs at 406,8-9.
241. One of Heracles’ labours was to clean the stables of Augeas; see, for
example, Gantz (1993), 392-3, and cf. above, 119,12-13.
242. to epion; cf., e.g., Plato, Phaedrus 264B6.
243. cf. 132,12-14.
244. In chapter 9 of that work Philoponus argues that everything which comes
to be in the strict sense comes to be from what is not.
245. DK28B8, 6-9.
246. Physics 1.8, 191a27-31.
247. Simplicius has ti tôn ontôn where Aristotle has tôn ontôn ouden.
248. Simplicius has dei. Ross prints dein, following Bonitz ((1862), 41) and two
citations of the passage by Simplicius (1140,24 and 1144,7 in his commentary on
the Physics (CAG 10)).
249. In the way that wood is changed into a ship.
250. Simplicius insists (but hardly proves) that in all coming to be there is an
enduring substratum.
251. ei ti pote esti. Simplicius’ point is that there never was a separate substra-
tum for the cosmos, as there is in the case of the stone statue.
252. It seems impossible to know exactly what, if any, Christian account of the
relation of God the Father to Jesus Christ, his son, Simplicius has in mind, but
certainly Simplicius’ characterisation would apply to the monophysitism dominant
at Alexandria and subscribed to by Philoponus.
253. i.e., at the level of the creator god.
254. A standard argument against the creation of the world in time.
255. I have changed Heiberg’s punctuation here, dropping the question mark
after ekeinon and putting a left parenthesis after it and replacing the full stop after
hepomenôn with a right parenthesis and a comma; cf. Bossier’s punctuation of
Moerbeke’s translation.
256. That is, at the appropriate now.
257. In the rest of this paragraph Simplicius gives an abstract paraphrase of
the speech to the created gods at Timaeus 41A7-D3, quoted above at 106,9.
258. Here the lower levels.
259. cf. 133,28-134,9 and 135,10-18.
260. Simplicius now turns to Philoponus’ criticism of 270b4-16.
261. Simplicius paraphrases 270b5-9 and then more or less quotes 1.10,
279b12-17. In connection with the material which follows one should also consult
Simplicius’ commentary on 279b12-21 at 293,11-301,28. As has already been
mentioned, Philoponus devotes book 6 of Against Proclus to arguing against the
view that Plato held the world to be everlasting.
262. I have not translated the word phtheiromenon, which is difficult and
bracketed by Moraux at 279b15.
263. In this and the next sentence Simplicius plays with 256A6-7 of Plato’s
Sophist, where the Eleatic guest speaks of having prepared a feast for young people
and the late learners among the old.
264. In this complex sentence Simplicius expresses his standard view of Aris-
totle’s criticisms of Plato and others, in this case the Eleatics: Aristotle knows the
true meaning of what the people he criticises say and that it is compatible with
ordinary true beliefs. But he worries about people who understand what these
people say in a false, superficial way and believe that it is true, and so he argues
against the superficial meaning to prevent people from accepting it.
265. Simplicius refers to Timaeus 38B6 and 31B5-6.
266. Translating Bessarion’s correction of E, which is adopted by Karsten: ho
tên ex allou eis allo metabolên sêmainei kai hoper allo geneseôs sêmainomenon esti.
Heiberg’s text runs to metabolên ex allou eis allo dêloun. kai hoti allo touto tês
geneseôs sêmainomenon, all of which is omitted in E, leaving a text which is
perfectly clear, but is inexplicit about the Aristotelian sense of coming to be.
267. Simplicius quotes 1.10, 280a31-2, but he leaves out the word loipon, which
gives the sense ‘for all the rest of time’. I suspect the omission is deliberate, since
Simplicius cites the text with loipon in his commentary on the passage at 311,25-7.
On the history of the passage see Moraux (1954), 173-4.
268. Simplicius’ point is perhaps that for Aristotle anything which comes to be
perishes, so if he says that for Plato heaven comes to be but does not perish he is
not using ‘come to be’ in his standard sense.
269. Imagined or dreamt good things; see Scholia on Lucian (Rabe (1906)),
246,15.
270. DK31B17, 7-8, 20-13. These lines or close variants of them are also
DK31B26, 5-6, 9-12, so that the textual situation is quite complicated; see Wright
(1981), 96-8 and 102. The principal text for B17 is 158,1-159,4 of Simplicius’
commentary on the Physics (CAG 9), where Simplicius omits the line ‘and insofar
as one thing has learned to come from many’, as he does here, but he has it at 33,26
of the Physics commentary, the principal source for B26. And Aristotle (Physics 8.1,
250b30-251a3) has the line in a quotation of it and the following four lines in a form
which corresponds to B26.
271. Heiberg prints dikha panta where Wright (1981) prints dikh’ hekasta.
272. Heiberg prints phoroumena from the principal text for DK31B26; Wright
(1981) prints phoreumena, following the principal text for DK31B17. Since this is
the reading of Heiberg’s ms. D (and Karsten), and A and B have nothing, one
should print phoreumena here.
273. With this quotation one should compare text 79 (pp. 89-90) of Wildberg
(1988), a quotation of the tenth-century philosopher Abu Sulayman al-Sijistani
which suggests that Philoponus said that all things are filled with god, so that
heaven differs from other things only in degree, not in kind. The anonymous vetter
of CAG pp. 135-56, to whom I am indebted for very many corrections, has called
my attention to 188,14-27 of Philoponus’ commentary on De Anima (CAG 15), in
which Philoponus says, ‘... It is absurd and contrary to reason to suppose that god
is everywhere spatially, at least if god cannot even be a body ..., but it is necessary
that god be everywhere in his activities, at least if it has been demonstrated that
he is the cause of all things.’
274. Simplicius cites Psalm 18.5 in the Septuagint version (Rahlfs (1935)): en
tôi hêliôi etheto to skhênôma autou (Heiberg prints hautou, noting that A, D, and
E have the autou printed by Rahlfs). In the Hebrew and in modern versions of the
Psalms this is 19.5, and a standard English translation is ‘In them (sc. the
heavens) he has set a tabernacle for the sun.’
275. Psalm 104.5 Septuagint (Rahlfs (1935) = 105.5 in Hebrew and modern
versions). The words translated ‘for all eternity’ are eis ton aiôna tôn aiônôn. For
Simplicius Being is eternal (aionios), whereas the earth is everlasting (aidios) or
unceasing (anekleiptos).
276. cf. 270b11-16.
277. cf. 73,12-15, and especially 138,32-3.
278. In Physics 8.10.
279. Eurycles was a ventriloquist/prophet first mentioned in line 1019 of
Aristophanes’ Wasps (Wilson (2007)), whose prophecies seemed to come from the
bellies of others. Simplicius is here picking up on Plato’s Sophist 252C6-9, where
the Stranger compares people whose speech contradicts their doctrines with people
who carry around the strange Eurycles.
280. cf. 118,4-5 where Simplicius affirms that anything which goes an hour
without changing transcends coming to be and perishing.
281. The Christians.
282. I do not know what in Plato is being referred to here. Richard Sorabji has
suggested to me that it is Timaeus 41A3-B6 (quoted at 106,6-14 and referred to
immediately hereafter). Philoponus makes the same claim about Plato at 6.29,
235,4-8 of Against Proclus.
283. Timaeus 41A7-B6, quoted above at 106,9-14.
284. Starting at 269C4.
285. Statesman 270A5.
286. See 106,4-25.
287. 270a17-18. In this paragraph Simplicius is again summarising 270a12-35
and indicating where the argument stands at this point.
288. i.e., composite bodies and motions.
289. i.e., air and water are both heavier than something and lighter than
something, but water is heavier than air, air lighter than water.
290. As will be done in the next chapter.
291. Simplicius is describing the reasoning of the whole chapter. The alterna-
tives which he goes on to mention are taken up in the successive lemmas.
292. Simplicius takes this idea from Alexander; see 170,34-171,4.
293. To an observer. From the outside, a circle or sphere is convex, from the
inside, concave.
294. Simplicius’ point is perhaps that the relational opposition of convex and
concave has no bearing on the question of contrary motions.
295. At 2, 268b20-2, but Simplicius could also be referring to 3, 270b29-31.
296. Alexander apparently construed Aristotle’s main argument to be some-
thing like:
a. Rectilinear motion is more contrary to circular motion than any other
motion; but it is not contrary; therefore no other motion is contrary to
circular motion.
Simplicius makes the trivial formal point that Aristotle uses the word malista
rather than mallon. On arguments from more and less see Aristotle, Topics 2.10,
114b37-115a14.
297. In the previous lemma at 271a3-4.
298. Heiberg’s text has a figure here, for which see p. 27.
299. peripheriai, where Moraux prints periphereis (one main ms. has
peripheriai). Karsten ‘corrects’ Simplicius to periphereis.
300. diastaseôn, ‘distant points ‘in Hankinson’s translation; cf. 176,19.
301. Of course, as Simplicius goes on to say, there is no least or greatest circular
arc with A and B as end points.
302. Contradicting what is established at 270b32-271a5.
304. cf. 147,19-21 with the note.
305. tmêma, presumably an arc.
306. Heiberg’s text has a figure here, like the figure for 271a10-13 on p. 27, but
rotated 90o.
307. This Diogenes is standardly taken to be the Cynic, but his identity is not
certain; see, e.g., Giannantoni (1990), V.B.185 and Hankinson’s note ad loc.
309. Reading, instead of the antiperistasin of A, D, and E printed by Heiberg,
antiparastasin with B, Moerbeke (antiparastasim), Bessarion, Karsten, and Hank-
inson. Aristotle is arguing that he is right about motions in reverse directions on
one circle, even if the hypothesis that the motions on two semicircles are contraries
is correct; see the note on 13,29 in Mueller (2010).
311. Reading sunagagôn with E and Karsten, instead of the sunagô printed by
Heiberg; Moerbeke has concludens.
312. Simplicius has given his reading of the lemma as one coherent argument.
He now turns to Alexander’s alternative reading and dissents from it. Lines 23-8
of the lemma (from ‘[For they are to the same thing] because’ to ‘derived from the
contrarieties of places’) are very problematic, and various emendations and exci-
sions have been proposed. Moraux’s suggestion that the lines have been misplaced
from the end of 271a13-19 is adopted by Leggatt (1995) . Following Allan (1936), I
have bracketed the words ‘For they are to the same thing’ after ‘one of them would
be pointless’; see also the note on line 32.
313. My understanding of these words is in line with Hankinson’s. Rescigno (pp.
285-6) takes the subject to be Alexander and takes Simplicius to be saying that
Alexander later did better to point out that etc.
314. That two things moving in reverse directions on the same circle are moving
in contrary ways.
315. Alexander’s other text has eti in place of hoti. It would also appear that
Alexander (and presumably Simplicius) did not have the words epi to auto gar,
which I have eliminated in the translation of the lemma. See Rescigno, pp. 292-3.
316. ep’ enantia, which I take to be synonymous with the ‘in the direction of
contrary places’ (ep’ enantious topous) which occurs two lines below. Alexander
dismisses this alternative because it has been ruled out by the preceding argu-
ments, leaving the alternative ‘through (dia) contrary places’, which he goes on to
rule out on the grounds that there are no contrary places on a circle.
317. Aristotle of Mytilene; see Moraux (1984), 399-425.
318. As we just have.
319. Being from contraries and into contraries (271b21). It is not clear to me
what Alexander means by saying that things which move in reverse directions on
a circle ‘undergo something hupenantios’.
320. Presumably motions on a semicircle with the diameter. This distinction
between motion on a circle and motion on a semicircle is certainly justified on
Aristotelian grounds (see Physics 8.8, 261b28-262a17), but it is not clear why
Alexander wishes to make it.
321. cf. Timaeus 41A3-D3, quoted at 105,28-106,25.
322. dia to axiôma katakhrômenon, an obscure phrase. Hankinson translates
the sentence, ‘But some say that Aristotle loosely equates God with nature in this
passage by means of this phrase.’ I, following the anonymous vetter of these pages,
take the ‘axiom’ to be the assertion that god and nature do nothing in vain.
323. Aristotle’s argument has purportedly eliminated the claim that two things
moving naturally in reverse directions on the same circle have contrary motions;
Simplicius now asks about the planets and the fixed stars, which might be thought
to move in reverse directions on different (concentric) circles, and tries to explain
why those motions are not contraries. Simplicius is looking forward to an objection
of Philoponus introduced at 193,3, the response to which at 193,19-194,5 echoes
what Simplicius goes on to say here; see also 195,14-196,34.
324. cf. 271a21.
325. kata tauton. I have imported the word ‘time’ from Moerbeke, who has
secundum idem tempus; Hankinson translates ‘in the same way’.
326. This sentence is obscure, but it does not express real possibilities for
Simplicius.
327. Fragment 393 (Campbell (1982)), a proverbial expression applied to vio-
lent, eristic people.
328. The parorinei of B, D, and Karsten seems more likely to be right than the
parorinnei of A and E printed by Heiberg.
329. cf., e.g., 123,15-17.
330. See 123,13-124,17.
331. See 124,17-131,17.
332. Replacing Heiberg’s full stop with a question mark, as in Bossier’s edition
of Moerbeke.
333. 5, 3b24-7. Philoponus goes on to quote 5, 4a10-11.
334. At this point translation becomes difficult because Philoponus uses forms
of kineisthai and related words to refer to change in general and specifically to
change of place.
335. i.e., substance.
336. Simplicius here contrasts what he reports Alexander as saying at 108,23-4
and Aristotle’s assertion at 3, 270a17-18 that contrary things have contrary
motions. He attacks Philoponus for thinking they are equivalent at 162,20-33 and
again at 163,35-164,18. Simplicius himself affirms not only Aristotle’s assertion
but also Alexander’s; see 157,3-6.
337. Aristotle.
338. At 270a17-18.
339. cf. 74,16-20.
340. 4.4, 311a16-29.
341. Aristotle does not ‘frequently’ say this, but Simplicius is quite convinced
he believes it. See Appendix 3 on the purity of the elements.
342. These last words show that Simplicius is thinking specifically about water
evaporating.
343. cf. 158,3-5.
344. polus; the translation is Moerbeke’s (prolixus).
345. kata touton is difficult. I read kata touto.
346. cf. 156,28-157,12.
347. Simplicius perhaps means that since nothing problematic follows from the
first statement, nothing problematic would follow from the second if they were
equivalent (as they are not).
348. That is, Philoponus’ objections hold.
349. Philoponus now considers the second alternative mooted at 157,27-31:
saying that things with contrary motions have contrary qualities rather than
saying that they are contrary in substance.
350. So, even if there is no motion contrary to motion in a circle, heaven may
still have contrary qualities.
351. Simplicius supplies this word, but I see no reason to think he is unjustified
in doing so. Elsewhere Philoponus speaks of substantial qualities in much the
same way as Simplicius; see, e.g., 11.5, 423,13-424,4 of Against Proclus. Simplicius’
ultimate concern is to harmonise the idea that a substance such as fire has no
contrary with the idea that the form of fire is specified in terms of the (substantial)
qualities, hot and dry, which do have contraries; see especially 166,14-170,7.
352. This formulation is hasty. Presumably the antecedent should be contrary
motions, the consequent contrary qualities.
353. sunêgage. This charge looks unfair since Philoponus argues against the
doctrine that there is no contrary to motion in a circle and only uses the fact that
Aristotle believes there is none in an attempt to convict him of an inconsistency.
354. I take Simplicius to be saying that the circular motion of the hupekkauma
and upper air is not associated with those qualities of fire and air which are
associated with their rectilinear motion.
355. see, e.g., 21,14-25, 34,13-21, 35,12-20 in the commentary on chapter 2.
Simplicius’ point here is that the motion of the upper air and the hupekkauma is
hypernatural and not natural, and therefore not relevant to what Aristotle is
talking about in chapter 4.
356. Heiberg prints hautai monai, noting that B has auta mona and A autai. It
is difficult to understand the feminine, and I would prefer the reading of B or
perhaps tauta mona.
357. i.e., the hupekkauma and the upper air.
358. Mythological sea monster, traditionally associated with the Sicilian bank
of the Straits of Messina, where as a whirlpool she, together with Scylla on the
opposite bank, made the safe passage of ships very difficult. Since Simplicius has
referred several times to Heracles and his labours, he may here be thinking of the
story according to which Charybdis, as the wife of Heracles, stole his cattle, for
which she was thrown in the sea by a thunderbolt from Zeus.
359. See, e.g. 157,34-158,1. On the question of whether substance has a con-
trary one should read the commentaries on the Categories of Philoponus (CAG
13.1, 74,13-27), Dexippus (CAG 4.1, 51,23-53,25), and Simplicius (CAG 8, 105,24-
110,25).
360. Simplicius repeats 163,12-17.
361. See the note on 163,31.
362. Simplicius wants to put Philoponus in the position of denying that, e.g.,
fire has a contrary and then to argue that in a sense fire does have one.
363. Simplicius repeats 157,32-5.
364. See the Introduction, p. 7. Simplicius here argues that it makes no
difference to his position if the matter of a natural body is Philoponus’ three-di-
mensional or whether, as Simplicius believes, the three-dimensional is a composite
of more fundamental matter and three-dimensionality.
365. i.e., the three-dimensional.
366. Simplicius quotes Physics 4.9, 217a26-7, on which see 689,16-690,17 of
Simplicius’ commentary on the Physics (CAG 9).
367. ‘This substance’ presumably refers to the four elements, but it is hard to
see how Simplicius can say that Philoponus agrees that this substance has a
contrary. At most Philoponus has claimed that Aristotle puts himself in the
position of accepting that such substance has a contrary even though this contra-
dicts his general claim in the Categories.
368. aitiômenos. Simplicius has, of course, explained how Philoponus misunder-
stands ‘conversion’, but nothing that he has said or will say makes clear what he
has in mind here.
369. Simplicius is here working with a standard theory according to which
differentiae are qualities (see, e.g., Metaphysics 5.14, 1020a32-b2) and qualities,
like all items in categories other than substance, are ‘accidents’; on this view, since
substance has no contrary, contraries will themselves be accidents. Of course, in
this discussion the relevant contrary qualities which differentiate substances are
hot/cold, wet/dry, and light/heavy, the differentiae of the four elements, which
Simplicius and others call ‘substantial’ qualities. The ancient commentaries on the
Categories all include discussions of the status of differentiae; particularly useful
here are Simplicius (CAG 8, 97,24-102,10) and Philoponus (CAG 13.1, 64,9-68,9).
370. Omitting the words kata tauta, which may be a dittograph since the same
words occur in the next line.
371. Here accidents are non-substantial qualities rather than differentiae.
372. cf. 157, 32-158,1.
373. The discussion in the rest of this paragraph is not directly relevant to the
issue of whether substances have contraries, but rather bears more on the question
whether coming to be is from contraries, a question which was addressed earlier
(123,11-132,31).
374. A version of 5, 3b24-5.
375. Categories 5, 3b27.
376. 1.7, 191a13-14.
377. cf. 2.3-4, especially 3, 331a1-3, quoted below at 169,30-170,4; however,
Aristotle does not speak about forms in this context.
378. cf. the note on 166,21. On what Alexander says here see Moraux (2001),
10-11.
379. This passage is essentially the same as 105,27-106,2 of Simplicius’ com-
mentary on the Categories (CAG 8), but there Iamblichus is not mentioned. The
two passages are also followed by essentially the same sentence, but in the
Categories the sentence has Aristotle as explicit subject; this is appropriate since
Aristotle does justify his claim by reference to primary and secondary substances.
380. The quotation to this point should be compared with 106,28-107,3 of
Simplicius’ commentary on the Categories (CAG 8) where Iamblichus is mentioned
and Simplicius goes on to criticise what he says. For the remainder of the passage
see 107,25-30, where again Iamblichus is not mentioned.
381. See the quotation immediately below.
382. 2.3, 330b30-331a3, with which one should consult the apparatus in
Joachim (1922); see also 229,22-230,7 of Philoponus’ commentary on On Coming
to be and Perishing (CAG 14.2), where Philoponus states what amounts to Sim-
plicius’ understanding of the sense in which substances are and are not contrary;
see also 74,13-27 of Philoponus’ commentary on the Categories (CAG 13.1).
383. Reading the topôn printed by Joachim (1922) and by Karsten, rather than
the prôtôn printed by Heiberg.
384. Reading the gar of Aristotle, printed by Karsten, rather than the oun
printed by Heiberg.
385. Simplicius reverses the order of the two terms.
386. cf. 26,23-8 in the commentary on chapter 2.
387. We now turn to the discussion of chapter 4.
388. At 270b32-271a5, which Simplicius has discussed at 145,12-146,16.
389. For Simplicius’ more precise formulation of the argument and a slight
disagreement with Alexander, see 145,12-146,16. In the present discussion Sim-
plicius is only concerned with the fact that Philoponus takes what for Simplicius
is an argument about motions as an argument about lines. The difference seems
insignificant since Aristotle’s argument about motions depends importantly on a
claim about lines.
390. Simplicius’ criticism of Philoponus’ construal of Alexander’s under-
standing cannot be conveyed in English, a problem which is made worse by the
ambiguity of Alexander’s formulation itself, an ambiguity which stems from forms
of the Greek expressions hê eutheia and hê kuklôi. The former usually means
‘straight line’ but can mean ‘rectilinear <motion>‘; the latter would normally mean
in De Caelo ‘<motion> in a circle’, but perhaps could mean ‘circular <line>‘,
although I have not found an occurrence of hê kuklôi with this sense – rather one
finds hê kuklikê. In any case Philoponus substituted hôi kuklôi (circle) for Alexan-
der’s hêi kuklôi (<motion> in a circle), and so, much to Simplicius’ outrage, took
Alexander to be talking about lines rather than motions. Simplicius (Alexander?)
is willing to concede that straight and circular lines might be contrary, but insists
that motion in a straight line and motion in a circle are not.
391. The insertion of ouk would seem to be required by which Simplicius has
said; see especially 170,26-8.
392. cf. 55,25ff.
393. This remark is quoted somewhat differently at 172,1-4.
394. 271a27-8.
395. This seems a misleading formulation. In the passage quoted Philoponus
concedes that rectilinear and circular motion are not contrary ‘with respect to
places’, but claims they are contrary in other respects. Of course, he does want to
connect these kinds of contrariety with perishability, a connection which Sim-
plicius denies.
396. Simplicius’ point is that, e.g., a circle does not change into a straight line
as a result of being acted on by the straight line.
397. cf. 138,32-4 and 142,17-20.
398. cf. 171,22-3.
399. cf., e.g., 165,32-5.
400. Following Wildberg (1987) in accepting the asummetria of D (and Moer-
beke, who has incommensuratio) in place of Heiberg’s summetria. Simplicius’
claim is that if, e.g., both excess and deficiency are contrary to due measure
because they both lack due measure, then there is really only one thing which is
contrary to due measure, namely lack of due measure.
401. Simplicius takes the trouble to note that in saying that the concave
periphery of the lunar sphere is the upper topos Philoponus is relying on Aristotle’s
account of place, which both he and Philoponus find inadequate, but, of course,
Philoponus is entitled to make use of Aristotle’s own views in criticising him. For
Philoponus’ criticisms of Aristotle’s account of place (apparently known to Sim-
plicius) see 557,8-589,26 of his commentary on the Physics (CAG 17), and for
Simplicius’ criticisms see 601,1-645,19 of his commentary on the same text (CAG
9).
402. The points Philoponus makes from here to 174,13 relate to Aristotle’s
obscure remark at 270b34-271a2, which Philoponus takes to be an attempt to rule
out the idea that concave and convex are contraries; for Simplicius’ understanding
of Aristotle’s remark, which includes the suggestion that concave and convex differ
as relatives, see 145,26-146,1.
403. The argument from here to 174,4 relies on the division in Categories 10 of
opposites into relatives, contraries, states and privations, affirmations and denials.
404. States are the first kind of quality mentioned by Aristotle in the Categories
(8, 8b26-7). It is the view of Simplicius that the privation of any item in a category
is also in the category; see, e.g., 65,2-13 of his commentary on the Categories (CAG
8). Philoponus’ position in his commentary on that dialogue (CAG 13.1) is less
clear. At 48,7-27 he says that privations should not fall under any category because
they are indefinite, while mentioning that others say that they should because
privation and possession are contraries. But at 144,2-14 he restricts himself to
saying that if a privation and a state are contraries they should be included in the
same category.
405. For reasons which are not clear to me this sentence is not treated as part
of the quotation by Heiberg or Wildberg (1987); it is so treated by Bossier.
406. Simplicius has first rejected Philoponus’ claim that Aristotle is talking
about spheres rather than circles, but he now goes on to develop the claim in which
he puts much more at stake: even if heaven is both concave and convex, and
concave and convex are contraries, they are not the kind of contraries involved in
coming to be and perishing.
407. For this point see also 109,8-15.
408. See, e.g., 99,24-102,14.
409. 3, 270a17-22.
410. 271a5-10. What Simplicius goes on to say is presumably intended as a
summary of his explication of that passage at 146,18-147,21, which should be
consulted.
411. diastaseôn; cf. 147,6.
412. cf. 19,20-3 of Themistius’ paraphrase of De Caelo (CAG 5.4). Philoponus
responds that only motions from A to B and B to A on the same arc are contrary
and is willing to accept that there are infinitely many contrary motions between A
and B, while maintaining the principle that for a single thing there is a single
contrary. Simplicius insists that since contrary motions involve contrary places,
one motion from A to B will have infinitely many contraries.
413. For Simplicius’ response to this suggestion see 177,32-178,7.
414. i.e., the centre.
415. mathêmatôn, emended here by Karsten to mathêmatikôn, but not at
178,30, where the same considerations would apply.
416. The text here says ‘greater’ (meizona), but it should say megistên, which is
what I have translated; see also 178,30.
417. Here peripheries are spherical surfaces, the inner surface of the sphere of
the fixed stars, which moves from east to west, and the outer surface of the sphere
of the planets, which moves from west to east. This sudden shift probably reflects
the fact that, as Simplicius goes on to say, he has brought together separate
passages in Philoponus. In any case Simplicius says nothing here about the
remaining part of this quotation, but see 154,18-156,24 and 194,21-198,6.
418. Apparently the sphere of the fixed stars and the sphere of the planets.
419. In the first part of the passage quoted (178,7-21) Philoponus is concerned
with Aristotle’s apparent (or alleged) view that because there is no longest circular
arc through points A and B there is no longest ‘circular distance’ between A and B,
so that the two motions between A and B on that greatest distance cannot be called
contraries. Philoponus first concedes that this is true mathematically speaking,
but if A and B are two diametrically opposed points on the surface of the universe
the great circle through them determines a greatest circular interval and so the
two motions between A and B on that circle can be considered contraries. Sim-
plicius apparently thinks that if he accepts Philoponus’ use of the distinction
between mathematical spheres or circles and physical ones he will be lost. So he
argues that the arcs on heavenly spheres invoked by Philoponus are themselves
conceptual, and this opens the possibility for conceptual argument. Simplicius
ends up focusing more on the possibility of drawing multiple arcs of different
lengths than on the question of the possibility of greatest arcs, and so avoids
having to talk about arcs which extend outside the universe.
420. Reading megistên for the meizona of Heiberg’s text; cf. 178,14.
421. It is not clear why Simplicius brings in divisibility at this point since his
real concern should be the possibility of taking greater and greater circular arcs
through two points.
422. cf., e.g., De Caelo 1.1, 268a6-7 with Simplicius’ comment at 8,12-14.
423. That is, there is no limit on the number of times something continuous can
be divided, but it cannot be actually divided infinitely many times.
424. Simplicius appears to grossly misrepresent what he has quoted Philoponus
as saying, since one would suppose that by ‘outermost circumference of the
universe’ Philoponus means the convex limit of the universe. Simplicius may
acknowledge this indirectly with his hypothetical concession at lines 14-15 (‘Even
if it is not possible ...’).
425. What Simplicius says could apply to either the special arc mentioned by
Philoponus or an arc of a cosmic great circle, but what follows is Simplicius’ only
argument against Philoponus’ use of the fact that the latter is a greatest arc.
426. An opaque formulation, which should mean something like ‘when the
interval between the points is not determined by the straight line between them’.
427. 271a10-13.
428. pêkhus, forearm, known as the cubitum in Latin. Translation is sometimes
difficult because the word is used both for a measuring implement and for its
length.
429. Philoponus imagines measuring the circumference of a hoop by dividing it
into short segments and measuring the straight lines connecting the end points of
the segments.
430. As Wildberg ((1987), 108) says, ‘This does not seem to be right. In order to
find out by means of a compass whether all sides of a triangle are equal, one has
to draw two circles with one side as the radius’. The sentence is definitely improved
(and made clearer) by bracketing diametron (‘as diameter’). For the construction
Philoponus has in mind see 1.1 of Euclid’s Elements (Heiberg (1883)).
431. Reading hôs with D rather than the tas printed by Heiberg.
432. cf. 271a13.
433. Simplicius quotes 271a13, which hardly says what he claims it does.
Aristotle’s words ‘by a straight line’ are only in D and not printed by Heiberg.
434. The reader may find it useful to consult the figure in Appendix 4 here, but
even so it is difficult to see why Philoponus thought that what he says advances
his case.
435. Simplicius gives a loose citation of 271a10-13.
436. There is a brief discussion similar to the preceding at 185,27-186,7.
437. From here until 183,21 there is a discussion of an argument of Alexander’s,
which is apparently quoted at 181,11-14 and accurately represented at 182,31-
183,2. From these two passages and what Simplicius says it would appear that
Philoponus did misrepresent Alexander. I have translated and made insertions
accordingly.
438. These last three lines are very close to 181,11-14.
439. Simplicius paraphrases the first three lines of the preceding argument and
then goes on to the rest of it.
440. I have inserted the names ‘Philoponus’ and ‘Alexander’ for clarification at
the suggestion of the anonymous vetter of the last 20 CAG pages of this transla-
tion, to whom I am grateful for many useful suggestions.
441. That is, the distance between two points is determined by the straight line
between them. That straight line is determinate, but if we ask how long the
distance is, we are treating the distance as indeterminate; cf. 184,7-12.
442. Perhaps a reference to some standard of good and bad has dropped out
here; Simplicius does not mention good and bad in his criticism of this material at
184,16-27.
443. Reading hêgoumenoi with A, B, and D rather than the êgmenoi of E printed
by Heiberg; Moerbeke has qui ... intelligunt.
444. Whereas Philoponus takes Aristotle’s remark that motion on a semicircle
is the same as motion on its diameter (271a12-13) as an unqualified assertion,
Simplicius takes it as resting on the false hypothesis that reverse motions on a
semicircle are contraries; cf. 147,28-148,6.
445. Alexander’s meaning is not transparent, but his explanation of why
reverse motions on a semicircle might be called contrary is presumably intended
to ward off rather than support the kind of move Philoponus makes.
446. As Simplicius believes it is.
447. cf. 181,24-182,17; and for a diagrammatic representation of the zodiac see
Appendix 4.
448. Reading aphestôsa with Bessarion and Karsten for the aphestanai printed
by Heiberg.
449. cf. 185,25-7.
450. cf. 185,25-7.
451. In the absence of further development the force of Philoponus’ reasoning
here is not apparent, and Simplicius’ criticism seems sound.
452. Reading estin hê with A, B, C, D, and Karsten rather than the esti printed
by Heiberg.
453. Reading ennoêsas with Wildberg (1987) for the misprint ennoêtas in
Heiberg.
454. For this definition of ‘straight’ cf. 137E3-5 of Plato’s Parmenides, 6.11,
148b27 of Aristotle’s Topics, and 109,21 of Proclus’ commentary on book 1 of
Euclid’s Elements (Friedlein (1873)).
455. cf. 185,23-4. Philoponus insists that the length of an arc is intrinsic to it,
and not given by the measure. Simplicius agrees with this, but insists that only a
rectilinear distance is determinate.
456. 271a13-19.
457. See 20,4-6 of Themistius’ paraphrase of De Caelo (CAG 5.4).
458. At 271a13-17 and 271a17-19.
459. At 271a13.
460. Themistius, paraphrase of De Caelo (CAG 5.4), 20,8-11.
461. Simplicius now summarises his discussion of all of 270b33-271a19 at
145,10-149,28.
462. cf. 146,11-16 with the note.
463. Reading pantôs with D and E rather than the pantos of A and B printed by
Heiberg; Moerbeke has semper.
464. 271a19-22.
465. cf. 181,20-33 and 185,27-186,7.
466. 190,12-15. Simplicius writes only ‘So if every change is from one contrary,
and so on’. Here and in the next paragraph he chooses to overlook the fact that
Philoponus is only trying to refute Aristotle, not build a positive theory.
467. Simplicius now takes 190,4-15 as an argument implying that there is no
motion contrary to motion in a circle in Aristotle’s sense.
468. cf. 170,14-22.
469. huper ta eskammena pêdan, roughly going excessively or unnecessarily far.
For the saying see Gardiner (1904).
470. 190,24.
471. i.e., moving toward but never reaching. Simplicius is right that one could
attach this conclusion to the argument at 190,12-15, but again Philoponus is trying
to show that Aristotelian premisses, if extended in a not implausible way, lead to
an absurd conclusion.
472. 190,12-13. Simplicius presumably is objecting that some changes are not
between contraries.
473. Aristotle. Simplicius insists that for Aristotle there are kinêseis, e.g.,
circular motion, which are not between contraries.
474. cf. 190,13-14.
475. Simplicius summarises his analysis of 3, 270a12-22 at 91,23-92,27.
476. In this formulation a logical truth.
477. 271a27-8.
478. cf. 194,21-197,7.
479. 190,12-13.
480. 271a19-22.
481. cf. 190,2-4.
482. 271a22-33; for the dispute about whether this is a genuine ‘sixth’ argument
see 194,6-9.
483. Particularly relevant to the rest of this paragraph is 172,23-33.
484. i.e., that contrariety is different for rectilinear and circular motion.
485. For what follows the reader might find the depiction of the zodiac in
Appendix 4 helpful.
486. In 2.3; for Simplicius’ discussion of this question see 395,19-405,27 of this
commentary.
487. With 193,8-194,5 cf. 154,18-156,24.
488. 271a22-33; Simplicius goes on to briefly summarise 145,10-156,24.
489. The contrast Simplicius makes in this sentence does not seem significant.
490. Following Wildberg (1987) in moving the raised dot after planômenês to
after zêtôn.
491. That is, its failure to take into account motions on two different circles.
492. In agreement with Rescigno (p. 294) I take ‘he’ to be Alexander and the
remainder of this paragraph to be derived from Philoponus’ account of Alexander.
Wildberg (1987) places a full stop after ‘help it’ and (apparently) takes the remain-
der of this sentence to report Philoponus’ own view, and the last sentence to be
Philoponus talking about Alexander. See also the next note.
493. The accusation is presumably that Alexander is wrong to say that contrary
circular motions must be on a single circle. Simplicius goes on from here to 196,34 to
give his own explanation of why Aristotle is justified in considering only single circles.
494. For Philoponus’ ‘acceptance’ of this claim, cf. 190,12-15.
495. cf., e.g., 155,12-20.
496. i.e., the motions of the heavenly spheres in reverse directions.
497. Reading enantian with Moerbeke (contrarium, in agreement with motum)
and Karsten rather than the enantias printed by Heiberg.
498. Reading ousas with A, B, and Karsten for the hosas of D and E printed by
Heiberg.
499. The planets and the fixed stars.
500. cf. 193,8-19.
501. Reading hê arkhê with A and B in place of the arkhê hê printed by Heiberg,
and dropping the hê in line 3 with A. Wildberg (1987) marks 196,35-197,3 as a
quotation and puts 197,10-15 in indirect discourse. My reversal of his decision
follows Bossier’s edition of Moerbeke.
502. 271a22-3.
503. Translating the katô of Bessarion and Karsten, which is not printed by
Heiberg.
504. Reading the energein of D, E, Moerbeke (agere) Karsten for the energoun
of A and B printed by Heiberg.
505. At 271a32-3.
506. See 154,18-156,24 with 193,19-194,5 and 195,14-196,34.
507. i.e., the spheres.
508. 2, 268b27-9.
509. 3.1, 298b7-8.
510. i.e., the length of Saturn’s orbit. Philoponus apparently said that Saturn
moved more slowly than the other planets because its sidereal period was longer;
Simplicius points out that despite this fact Saturn’s linear velocity might be
greater than that of other planets.
511. In chapter 6.
512. Reading allôs with D and Karsten rather than the allôi of A and E printed
by Heiberg; B and a second hand of A have allo. But the sentence is difficult in any
case.
513. A close paraphrase of Timaeus 30B3-4.
514. cf. De Anima 2.1, 412a11-21.
515. 6, 259b32-260a19.
516. Like many of the authors who refer to this incident, Simplicius does not
mention its perpetrator, Herostratus, on whom see RE, 8.1.1145-65. Many authors
refer to the alleged coincidence of the burning with the birth of Alexander the
Great, which sets its date in 356 BC. According to Valerius Maximus (Shackleton
Bailey (2000)), 8.14.ext. 5, the Ephesians decreed that the memory of the (by him
unnamed) perpetrator should be abolished, and his name was preserved only by
the fourth-century BC historian Theopompus.
517. For Simplicius’ subsequent criticism of Philoponus’ discussion of Physics
8, see 1129,29-1152,19, 1156,28-1169,9, 1171,30-1182,39, and 1326,38-1336,34 of
Simplicius’ commentary on the Physics (CAG 10).
Appendix 1
The ‘fragments’ of Philoponus,
Against Aristotle
I give here the correlation between passages translated in Wildberg (1987)

and their location in the text translated here. Wildberg attaches an
asterisk to indicate that the ‘fragment’ includes no direct citation or
paraphrase of an argument in Against Aristotle. I also indicate where a
fragment is discussed in Wildberg (1988). For a survey of these fragments
and Simplicius’ responses see section 1 of the Introduction to this volume.
Simplicius, in Cael. Wildberg (1987) Wildberg (1988)

fragment discussion
119,7-120,12 63 188-9
121,4-14 64* 189-90
121,25-122,9 65 190
123,4-7 66 —
123,11-124,17 67 189-92
126,5-16 68 192
131,17-132,17 69 192
133,21-9 70 194-5
134,9-28 71 194-5, 219
135,21-136,1 72 194
136,12-26 73 195-8
137,16-19 74* 198-201
138,32-139,6 75 155, 169
139,23-7 77* —
141,11-19 78 203
142,7-25 80 203-4
156,25-157,6 81 187
157,21-159,3 82 221-2
162,20-163,3 83* 223
163,11-30 84 223-4
164,21-7 85 223-4
165,10-166,13 86 225
170,11-171,9 87 224-5
171,17-32 88 225-6
172,23-173,15 89 —
169
170 Appendix 1
173,25-174,13 90 226
175,13-22 91 226-7
176,13-177,22 92 227-8
178,7-26 93 228-9
179,24-180,23 94 229
181,16-33 95 229
182,14-25 96 —
183,21-184,7 97 —
185,3-186,15 98 —
186,24-187,6 99 —
187,16-25 100 —
187,28-188,25 101 230
189,22-190,31 102 230
192,5-14 103 —
192,15-193,19 104 230-1
194,6-30 105 231
195,9-17 106 231
196,34-197,15 107 231
199,27-35 50* 165
Appendix 2
The ‘fragments’ of Alexander’s
commentary on De Caelo
I give here the correlation between passages translated in Rescigno (2004)

and their location in the text translated here.
Simplicius Rescigno Aristotle text

in Cael. fragment where relevant
108,9-14 28 (p. 256) 270a12-22
Alexander gives a syllogistic representation of Aristotle’s argument.
108,23-34 29 (257-8) 270a12-22

Alexander uses the statement that the motions of contrary things are
contrary (see also below 41, 158,29) to argue that earth is more contrary
to fire than water is. He also criticises ‘some people’ for making heaven
perishable but keeping it from perishing by invoking ‘certain postulates’.
Simplicius denies that heaven is perishable for Plato.
110,11-14 30a (259-261) 270a22-5

Alexander explains why what doesn’t come to be doesn’t increase in size.
111,24-112,24 31a (262-70) 270a25-35

Alexander says that Aristotle’s argument has to be refined so as not to
imply that heaven suffers no alteration in quality or affection whatsoever.
Heaven can change with respect to accidental qualities or affections, but
not with respect to substantial ones, and so it cannot come to be or perish,
increase or diminish. Alexander applies this point to heat coming from the
sun to this world and qualitative contrarieties in heaven; such things do
not concern substance and so do not entail coming to be or perishing,
increase or diminution. Simplicius replies to Alexander in the next three
passages, insisting that one should not talk about affection in connection
with heaven, since affection does entail coming to be and perishing,
increase and diminution.
114,1-6 31c (265-70) 270a25-35

Recurring to the previous passage, Simplicius says that one should agree
171
172 Appendix 2
with Alexander that there is alteration in the heaven, but disagree with
his belief that this alteration involves affection.
114,14-19 31d (265-70) 270a25-35

Simplicius takes issue with Alexander’s use of the phrase ‘contrariety in
substance’ when Aristotle denies that substance has a contrary; see the
note on 114,14.
114,35-115,2 31e (266-70) 270a25-35

Simplicius picks up on Alexander’s discussion of the heat of the sun and
the qualitative contrarieties in heaven. Things in our world are affected
by the heat of the sun, but the sun’s heat is perfective and creative and
does not act on things in this world in the ordinary sense. Similarly,
contrary qualities in heaven do not conflict with one another and so
produce coming to be and perishing.
116,15-22 32 (270-2) 270b4-9

Alexander takes Aristotle to have proved two things at this point: that
there are gods and that the divine is in the upper region. Simplicius denies
that Aristotle has established that there are gods; cf. 34, 117,8.
116,30-117,2 33 (272-3) 270b8-9

Alexander and Simplicius disagree in a minor way about the meaning of
Aristotle’s assertion that ‘what is immortal is linked with what is immor-
tal’.
117,8-19 34 (274-5) 270b10-11

Cf. 32, 116,15. Alexander takes the expression ti theion to refer to the gods,
while Simplicius takes it to refer to heaven. Alexander also says that the
word eiper here should be understood as causal (‘since’) rather than
hypothetical (‘if’). Simplicius apparently agrees.
121,11-14 27 (253-6) 270a14-17

According to Philoponus, Alexander and Aristotle think that the state-
ment that ‘everything which comes to be comes to be from a contrary and
some substratum’ is true of contraries in the strict sense, but others think
it holds for privation and form. Simplicius believes that Aristotle intends
to include form and privation among contraries in the statement.
146,11-16 35a (275-6) 270b32-271a5

Alexander thinks Aristotle is arguing from the more and the less. Sim-
plicius is sceptical because of Aristotle’s use of the word ‘most’ at 270b34.
148,14-26 36 (282-3) 271a13

Alexander’s explanation and justification of Aristotle’s statement that ‘we
always suppose that each thing is distant by a straight line’.
Appendix 2 173
150,15-19 37 (284-5) 271a5-22
Alexander says that the crucial premiss in the argument of 271a19-22
(‘contrary motion is defined as from a contrary into a contrary’) could have
been used in the three previous arguments.
152,4-15 38 (285-6) 271a22-33

152,21-153,11 39a (287-94) 271a22-33
After giving his own interpretation of 271a23-33 as a single argument,
Simplicius explains and rejects Alexander’s interpretation. In the first
passage Alexander explains away Aristotle’s statement that something
moving in a circle reaches all the ‘contrary places’ on it as meaning only
that such a thing goes through every point on a circle (because there are
no contrary points on a circle). Simplicius thinks that Aristotle’s argument
is a reductio of the assumption that motions in reverse direction on a circle
are contrary, an assumption which implies that there would be contrary
points on a circle. In the second passage Alexander claims that there are
two arguments in 271a23-33, one in 271a22-3 and 29-33, the other in
271a23-8.
153,16-154,5 40 (294-8) 271a5-33

Following his teacher, Alexander of Mytilene, Simplicius gives a repre-
sentation of the argument that there is no contrary to motion in a circle.
158,29-32 41 (298-9) 270a17-18

Simplicius points out that whereas Aristotle said ‘the motions of contrary
things are contrary’ Alexander invoked the claim (see above 29,108) that
‘things with contrary motions are contrary’, a statement frequently used
(with variations) by Philoponus.
170,23-171,14 35c (277-81) 270b32-271a5

Simplicius defends Alexander against what he takes to be (apparently
correctly) Philoponus’ misconstrual of Alexander’s construal of Aristotle’s
argument, the issue being whether Alexander illegitimately took Aristotle
to be talking about lines rather than motions.
174,11-19 42a (299-301) 270b34-271a2

Philoponus (incorrectly) censured Alexander for taking the notions of
convexity and concavity to apply to lines rather than surfaces.
176,32-177,1 43a (301-4) 271a5-10

Philoponus set out Themistius’ paraphrase and Alexander’s exegesis of
this passage in order to refute Aristotle.
178,7-13 43c (302-4) 271a5-10

Against Alexander’s exegesis of this argument Philoponus invoked the
174 Appendix 2
distinction between mathematical and natural things. Simplicius defends
Alexander.
181,10-14 44a (304-11) 271a10-13

Alexander invoked as a proponent of the view that the straight line is the
measure of the distance between two points and not of the length of a line
connecting them when Philoponus took Alexander and Aristotle to be
saying it was the measure of the length.
182,17-183,9 44b (304-11) 271a10-13

Alexander, accused by Philoponus of an illegitimate inference in his
analysis of Aristotle’s argument, is defended by Simplicius.
185,13-186,7 44c (306-11) 271a10-13

186,18-30 44d (308-11) 271a10-13
187,20-7 44e (308-11) 271a10-13
Philoponus’ disagreement with Alexander’s claim that distances have to
be measured by straight lines.
194,6-9 39c (287-94) 271a22-33

Alexander’s characterisation of this argument as superfluous is invoked
by Simplicius against Philoponus’ treatment of it as an additional argu-
ment.
194,23-33 39d (287-94)

According to Philoponus, Alexander was aware that Aristotle failed to
raise the question whether the motions on two different circles (notably
the ecliptic and the equator) were contrary and dismissed the claim that
such motions might be contrary as ‘extremely unreasonable’. Simplicius
defends Alexander.
Addendum
At 168,19-169,2 Simplicius quotes from Alexander’s lost commentary on
the Categories to support his own account of substance and contrariety.
Appendix 3
On the purity of the elements
In his Supplement to On the Soul (Sharples (2008), 125,7-13) Alexander
gives an argument against those who say that none of the four elements
can exist on its own, an argument which he rejects. The argument is based
on Plato’s statement (Timaeus 31B6-8) that nothing can be visible if it is
separated from fire or tangible without being solid or solid without earth,
a claim which was later extended to the other elements in terms of
unspecified properties holding of all ordinary things. So far as I know we
do not find this argument in Simplicius, although he obviously accepts its
conclusion, and insists (see, e.g., 161,1-2) that Aristotle accepts it as well.
Aristotle’s most explicit statement on the subject is at 2.3, 330b21-5 of On
Coming to be and Perishing, where he says that the elements are not
simple but mixed (mikta), the simple body corresponding to fire, for
example, being ‘fiery’ (puroeides). In his commentary on this passage (CAG
14, 227,26-228,25) Philoponus interprets Aristotle as saying not that the
simple bodies are composites in the ordinary sense accepted by Simplicius
but that they are form/matter composites, ‘fiery’ being a way of referring
to the form of fire. Philoponus is clearly responding to the argument based
on the Timaeus, which he mentions and attempts to disarm by saying that
there is no need to ‘characterise’ fire and earth in terms of visibility and
tangibility since they can be characterised in terms of other, Aristotelian
qualities. (It is conceivable that Philoponus is here following Alexander’s
commentary on On Coming to be and Perishing; see Gannagé (2005), 45-9.)
As far as I can see, nothing in Simplicius’ altercation with Philoponus
turns importantly on the question whether the elements exist in unmixed
states, although Simplicius’ conception of the elements as always compos-
ites does play an important role in his interpretation of Aristotle’s theory
of the elements.
175
Appendix 4
The signs of the zodiac
176
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Textual Questions
(a) Departures from Heiberg’s text

Listed here are places where I have translated a text different from the one printed
by Heiberg. In many cases notes on the lines in the translation provide more
information. For Simplicius’ quotations of other authors see section b.
94,1 Insert hupo after to with E.

94,5 Insert apo before tou with Hankinson.
95,17 Bracket autou de toutou.
96,11 Read to with Karsten and Hankinson for Heiberg’s tôi.
97,15 Insert proskeitai en allois genesiourgôs from the margin of D after
hupelthonta with Hankinson.
97,18 Read suntithemenôn for Heiberg’s suntithenenês.
97,22 Read tauto with D and Karsten for Heiberg’s touto.
97,30 Bracket Heiberg’s ti, which is missing in A and B.
98,10 Read ê with A and B for Heiberg’s kai.
98,22 Insert hupo after metabolê with Hankinson.
100,13 Read autê for Heiberg’s autês.
103,14 Read autês for Heiberg’s autôn.
109,4 Read prolambanomenên for Heiberg’s prolambanousan.
109,10-15 Move the words alla ... allêla from lines 13-15 to line 10 to replace
the alla.
109,25 Read sullogizetai with Moerbeke for Heiberg’s sullogizesthai.
117,5 Insert ekhein after tina with Karsten.
118,23 Read the autou kinêsin of B, D, a correction of A, and Karsten for
the autokinêsin of A and E printed by Heiberg.
120,3 Move Heiberg’s right parenthesis from after zêtein to after
tunkhanontos.
120,5 Change Heiberg’s question mark to a full stop.
120,12 Read hora for Heiberg’s ara with Karsten, and drop Heiberg’s
inserted an.
120,15 Change Heiberg’s question mark to a full stop.
121,16 For the ouk ek of A, B, D, and E printed by Heiberg read ex ou
with Karsten and an insertion in D by its scribe.
123,2 Read dêlon with D, Moerbeke, and Karsten for Heiberg’s dêla.
131,4 Replace Heiberg’s comma after hopou with a question mark.
135,9 For Heiberg’s Mukônon read Mukonon with Karsten.
138,6-8 Drop Heiberg’s question mark after ekeinon in line 6. Enclose kan
... hepomenôn (lines 6-8) in parentheses followed by a comma.
Drop the full stop after hepomenôn.
181
182 Textual Questions
140,18-19 For Heiberg’s to metabolên ex allou eis allo dêloun. kai hoti allo
touto tês geneseôs sêmainomenon read ho tên ex allou eis allo
metabolên sêmainei kai hoper allo geneseôs sêmainomenon esti, a
correction of Bessarion adopted by Karsten.
149,15 For the antiperistasin of A, D, and E printed by Heiberg read
antiparastasin with B, Moerbeke, Bessarion, Karsten, and
Hankinson.
151,35 Read sunagagôn with E, Moerbeke, and Karsten for Heiberg’s
sunagô.
157,31 Replace Heiberg’s full stop after metekhousin with a question
mark.
162,3 Read touto for Heiberg’s touton.
164,35 Read auta mona with B for the hautai monai of A printed by
Heiberg.
167,5 Bracket the words kata tauta.
171, 14 Insert an ouk before epêngeilato.
173,9 For Heiberg’s summetria read asummetria with D, Moerbeke, and
Wildberg.
178,14 For Heiberg’s meizona read megistên.
178,30 For Heiberg’s meizona read megistên.
181,4 Read hôs for the first occurrence of tas with D
184,31 For the êgmenoi of E printed by Heiberg read hêgoumenoi with A,
B, D, and Moerbeke.
185,29 Read aphestôsa with Bessarion and Karsten for the aphestanai
printed by Heiberg.
187,12 For the esti printed by Heiberg read estin hê with A, B, C, D, and
Karsten.
187,16 Read ennoêsas for the misprint ennoêtas in Heiberg, noted by
Wildberg.
189,19 Read pantôs with D and E for the pantos of A and B printed by
Heiberg.
194,23 Move the raised dot after planômenês behind zêtôn with Wildberg.
196,9 Read enantian with Moerbeke and Karsten for Heiberg’s enantias.
196,13 Read ousas with A, B, and Karsten for the hosas of D and E
printed by Heiberg.
197,2 For Heiberg’s arkhê hê read hê arkhê with A and B.
197,3 Drop the hê with A.
197,20 Insert katô after anôthen with Bessarion and Karsten.
198,2 For the energoun of A and B printed by Heiberg read energein
with D, E, and Karsten.
200,4 For the allôi of A and E printed by Heiberg read allôs with D and
Karsten; B and a second hand of A have allo.
(b) Simplicius’ quotation of other texts

Here I bring together places where a quotation by Simplicius of a passage from a
text other than De Caelo 1.3.270a11-4 as printed by Heiberg differs from the
passage in a standard edition of the text. I have paid no attention to the numerous
differences regarding elision (e.g. de v. d’) or minor variations in spelling (e.g.,
hauton vs. heauton or teleiotaton vs. teleôtaton).
Textual Questions 183
ARISTOTLE
De Caelo
Moraux Heiberg
268b16 phamen autois 132,24 phamen en autois
280a31 loipon 140,22 omit
Metaphysics
Ross (1953) Heiberg
1044b4 eiper ara 134,4 kai gar
On Coming to be and Perishing

Joachim (1922) Heiberg
330b31-2 topôn 169,31-2 prôtôn
Physics
Ross Heiberg
188a22 to plêres 130,1 stereon
188a23 to men hôs on 130,1 to men on
188a23 einai 130,2 omit
188a25 gegôniômenon agônion 130,3 gônia
188a25 euthu 130,3 to euthu
188a36 tôi mê leukôi 124,29 tôi leukôi
188a37 ex ou leukou 124,30 ouk ek leukou
188b4 ei mê pote 125,3 ei pote
188b5 kai ouk 125,4 kai eis mê leukon ouk
188b6 kai to mousikon 25,5 kai mousikon
188b24-5 hoion khrômata ek 125,19 omit
leukou kai melanos
190a18 to men mê 122,26 to men gar mê
190a19-20 (ho gar anthrôpos 122,27 ho gar anthrôpos hupomenei to
hupomenei), to mê mousikon mousikon, to de amouson oukh
de kai to amouson oukh hupomenei. (also 128,24-5)
hupomenei.
190b2 hosa [alla] 129,11 hosa alla
190b3 ho hupokeitai 129,13 ti ho hupokeitai
190b4 ex hou to gignomenon 129,13 ex hou ginetai to ginomenon
190b4-5 ek spermatos 129,14 ek tou spermatos
191a4-5 peri genesin phusikôn 125,25 peri genesin
191a4 pôs posai 125,26 pôs
191a4 kai dêlon 125,26 dêlon
191a5 tanantia duo 126,27-8 tanantia
191a13 hês ho logos 126,1 ho logos
191a27 tôn ontôn ouden 137,7 ti tôn ontôn
191a31 dein 137,11 dei
EMPEDOCLES
DK31B17
Wright (1981) Heiberg
line 8 dikh’ hekasta phoreumena 141,2 dikha panta phoroumena
184 Textual Questions
PLATO
Timaeus
Rivaud Heiberg
28A1 aei 104,5 omit
28A2 omit 104,7 kai hôsautôs
28B7-8 ap’ arkhês tinos 104,11 omit
arxamenos
41A4 phanerôs 106,7 aphanôs
41A7-8 di’ emou genomena aluta 106,9-10 aluta emou ge ethelontos
emou ge mê ethelontos (41A7-8)
41B3-4 outi men dê 106,12 ou mên (also 107,4)
41B6 lakhontes 106,14 tukhontes
41B7-8 eti genê loipa 106,15 esti loipa
41C1 dei 106,17 edei
41D2 trophên 106,24 trophas (also 107,14)
41D3 auxanete 106,25 auxete (also 107,14)
PLOTINUS
Enneads
Wilberding (2006) Heiberg
2.1.14 autou 115,31 autôi
SEPTUAGINT
Psalms
Rahlfs (1935) Heiberg
18.5 autou 141,27 hautou
English-Greek Glossary
This glossary is derived from the Greek-English Indices for this volume and for
Mueller (2010) and gives standard Greek equivalents for many nouns, verbs,
adjectives, adverbs, and a few prepositions in the translation. It does not include
equivalents for words which have no relatively simple equivalent in English, and
it does not always attend to the difference in meaning between active, middle, and
passive forms of a verb. The reader will get a better sense of the range of a Greek
word by looking at the Greek-English Index for the word and ones closely related
to it. The letter ‘n’ indicates that an English word is a noun or nominalisation, ‘v’
that it is a verb or deverbative. There is a separate Index of Names.
abiding (n.): aiôn add nonsense (v.): prosphluareô

abode (n.): hedra addition (n.): prosthêkê, prosthesis
above: anô additional assumption (n.): proslêpsis
absolutely: haplôs adduce (v.): epagô
abstraction (n.): aphairesis adhere to (v.): proiskhô
absurd: atopos admire (v.): timaô
absurdity (n.): atopia admit (v.): dekhomai, epidekhomai
accept (v.): apodekhomai, admitting: dektikos
eisdekhomai, homologeô, advance (v.): prokhôreô, prokoptô
hupodekhomai, hupolambanô, affection (n.): pathos
paradekhomai, paralambanô, affirm (v.): episêmainô
prosiêmi, sunginôskô, sunkheô affirmation (n.): kataphasis
accidental: sumbebêkôs again: authis, palin
accompany (v.); sunedreuô age (v.): gêraskô
account (n.): apodosis, historia, logos agree (v.): homognômoneô, homologeô,
accrue (v.): epiballô, epiginomai, sumphôneô, sunaidô, sunkheô,
paraginomai, proseimi, suntithêmi
prosginomai agreeing: sumphônos
accurate: akribês agreement (n.): sunkhôrêsis
accuse (v.): enkaleô, episkêptô air (n.): aêr
acme (n.): akmê aithêr (n.): aithêr
act (n.): poiêsis akin: sunêthês
act (v.): draô, energeô, poieô alien: allotrios
act as a prophet (v.): propheteuô allege (v.): proiskhô
act childlishly (v.): neanieuomai alone: monos
acting (n.): drasis already: hêdê
activate (v.): energeô alter (v.): alloioô
active: drastikos, energêtikos alterable: alloiôtos
activity (n.): energeia alteration (n.): alloiôsis
actual: energeiai alternate (v.): enallassô
actualisation (n.): entelekheia alternately: enallax
acuteness (n.): oxutês always: aei
adamant (n.): adamas always moving: aeikinêtos
add (v.) epagô, epipherô, prostithêmi always: pantakhou, pantôs
185
186 English-Greek Glossary
amateurish: idiôtikos attain (v.): tunkhanô
amazing: thaumastos attend (v.): blepô, apoblepô
analysis (n.): analusis attention (n.): epistasis
analyse (v.): analuô attentive: prosektikos
ancient: arkhaios, palaios auditory: akoustikos
angle (n.): gônia authentic: gnêsios
angleless: agônios authoritative: kurios
animal (n.): zôion awareness (n.): sunaisthêsis
announce (v.): epangellô axiom (n.): axiôma
anonymous: adespotos axis (n.): axôn
antecedent (n.): hêgoumenon
antithesis (n.): antithesis babble (n.): phlênaphos
antithetical: antithetos babble utter nonsense (v.): lêreô
apogee, at: apogeios back: opisthen, opisthios
appear (v.): anaphainô, phainô backward: opisthen
appear together (v.): sunekphainô bad: kakos
appearance (n.): phasma badness of character (n.): kakotropia
apply (v.): epharmottô balance (n.): summetria
apportion with (v.): sundiaireô banquet (n.): thoinê
apprehend (v.): katalambanô be (v.): huparkhô, eimi, tunkhanô
apprehended: antilêptos bear witness (v.): martureô
approach (v.): plêsiazô beautiful: kalos
appropriate: oikeios begin (v.): arkhô
arbitrary: apoklêrôtikos beginning (n.): arkhê
arc (n.): periphereia beginningless: anarkhos
argue (v.): epikheireô, sullogizô belief (n.): dogma, doxa
argue against (v.): antepikheirô, believe (v.): hêgeomai, nomizô, pisteuô
antilegô belong (v.): huparkhô
argument (n.): epikheirêma, below: katô
epikheirêsis, kataskeuê, logos, bending (n.): kampsis
sullogismos beneficial: epôphelês
arm (n.): kheir bereave (v.): erêmoô
arm oneself (v.): anazônnumi beside the point: para thuras
arrange (v.): diatattô, diatithêmi best: aristos
articulate (v.): diarthroô bestow (v.): endidômi, epinaô
articulation (n.): diarthrôsis better: ameinôn, kreittôn
artifact (n.): kataskeusama between: metaxu
artificial: tekhnêtos binding: sunektikos
ask (v.): erôtaô, zêteô bitterness (n.): pikrotês
ask for (v.): aiteô black: melas
assert (v.): episêmainô blame (v.): aitiasthai
assign (v.): anieroô, apodidômi, blasphemy (n.): blasphêmia
didômai, klêroô blend together (v.): sumphurô
assign the same rank (v.): suntassô blessed: makarios
assume (v.): hupolambanô, lambanô blessedness (n.): makariotês
assume in addition (v.): proslambanô, blind (v.): ektuphlô
prosupotithêmi blind: tuphlos
assume in advance (v.): prolambanô blossom forth (v.): epantheô
assumption (n.): lêpsis boast (v.): kompazô
astound (v.): kataplêttô body (n.): sôma
astronomer (n.): astronomos bond (n.): desmos
attach (v.): exaptô, huparkhô, bone (n.): osteon
prosphuô, prosêkô book (n.): biblion, biblos
attach oneself to (v.): prosekhô both: amphô, amphoteros
bother (v.): enokhleô change (n.): kinêsis, metabolê
boundary (n.): horos change (v.): ameibô, metaballô,
brag childishly (v.): neanieuomai metalambanein
breadthless: aplatês change (form) (v.); allassô
break (v.): klaô, periklaô change a text (v.): metagraphô
break off (v.): aporrêgnumi change in quality (v.): alloioô
brevity (n.): suntomia change position (v.): methistêmi
bribed witness (n.): sukophantês change the shape of (v.):
brief: brakhus, suntomos metaskhêmatizô
bright: lampros, phôteinos changeable: metabolikos
bring (v.): suneisagô changing: kinêtos, metabatikos
bring about (v.): epiteleô chapter (n.): kephalaion
bring down (v.): hupopherô characterise (v.): kharaktêrizô
bring forward (v.): parapherô, proagô charge (v.): enkaleô
bring in (v.): epagô, epeisagô, paragô, child (n.): pais
paremballô, prosagô choice (n.): proairesis
bring into conflict (v.): sunkrouô choose (v.): haireô, proaireô
bring into existence (v.): paragô chunk of earth (n.): bôlos
bring to completion (v.): epiteleô circle (n.): kuklos
bring under the heading (v.): circuit (n.): periagôgê
apokoruphoô circular arc (n.): periphereia
bringing completion: teleiôtikos circular: diallêlos, enkuklios, kuklikos,
bronze (n.): khalkos peripherês
burn (v.): aithô, kaiô circumference (n.): periphereia
burning: kaustikos cite as evidence (v.): martureô
business (n.): askholia clarification (n.); saphêneia
clarify (v.): diasapheô, saphênizô
call (v.): kaleô, onomazô cleaning up (n.): katharsis
call upon (v.): parakaleô cleanse away (v.): apokluzô
care (n.): epistasis, eulabeia clear: dêlos, enargês, saphês
careful: epimelês clearly: dêlonoti
careless: atalaiporos clever: deinos
carry around (v.): periagô, peripherô, cleverness (n.): deinotês, phronêsis
sumperiagô, sumperipherô close: engus
carry down (v.): hupopherô close to earth: perigeios
carry out (v.): proagô coals (n.): anthrax
carry up (v.): anapherô cognition (n.): gnôsis
carve (v.): gluphô cognitive: gnôstikos
carver (n.): hermogluphos coincide (v.): epharmottô
cast off (v.): apoballô coincidence (n.): sundromê
cast out (v.): ekballô cold (n.): psuxis, psukhros
categorical: katêgorikos coldness (n.): psukhrotês, psuxis
category (n.): katêgoria collect (v.): sustrephô
causal: parasunaptikos collect together (v.): sunagô
cause (n.): aitia, aition colour (n.): khrôma
causing alteration: alloiôtikos colour (v.): khrôizô
caution (n.): eulabeia colourless: akhrômatos
cease (v.): lêgô, pauô combination (n.); sunthesis
censure (v.): memphomai combine (v.): sunkrinô, suntassô,
centre (n.): kentron, meson suntithêmi
certainly: amelei, pantôs combining (n.): sunagôgê
certainty (n.): enargeia come (v.): erkhomai
cessation (n.): paula come (into existence) (v.): parekhô
chance: apoklêrôtikos come across (v.): empiptô, entunkhanô
come from (v.): exerkhomai constraint (n.): bia
come to be (v.): ginomai construct (v.): kataskeuazô,
come together (v.): suntrekhô mêkhanaomai, paraskeuô
comet (n.): komêtês contact (n.): haphê
coming to be (n.): genesis contain (v.): periekhô, perilambanô
coming to be: genêtos containing: periektikos
commentator (n.): exêgêtês contend (v.): diateinô
common feature (n.): koinotêta contentious: philoneikos
common: koinos contentiousness (n.): philoneikia
commonality (n.): koinotêta continue (v.): epimenô
compare (v.): sunkrinô continuity (n.): sunekheia, sunokhê
comparison (n.): parexetasis, sunkrasis continuous: sunekhês
complain (v.): memphomai contract (v.): perisphingô, sunaireô
complete (v.): apoteleô, sumplêroô, contradict (v.): enantioomai
sunteleô, teleô, teleiô contradiction (n.): enantiologia,
complete: teleios, telikos enantiologos
completely: pampan, pantelôs, panu, contradictory: diaphônos
pantapasi contrariety (n.): enantiôsis, enantiotês
completeness (n.): teleiotês contrary: enantios, hupenantios
compose (v.): sunistêmi contrast (v.): antidiastellô
composite: sunthetos contribute (v.): epiballô, sumballô,
composition (n.): sunthesis sunteleô
concave: koilos converge (v.): sunneuô
concede (v.): didômai, endidômi, conversion (n.): antistrophê
sunkheô convert (v.): anastrephô, antistrephô
conceive (v.): epinoeô, noeô convex: kurtos
concentrate (v.): sunneuô cool (v.): psukhô
concept (n.): epinoia co-operate (v.): sunergeô
conception (n.) ennoia, hupolêpsis, co-ordinate: isostoikhos, sustoikhos
prolêpsis co-ordination (n.): epharmogê
conclude (v.): sumperainô correct (v.): euthunô
conclusion (n.): sumperasma correct: alêthês, hugiês, kalos, orthos
condensation (n.): puknôsis corroborate (v.): martureô
condense (v.): puknoô corrupt (v.): diaphtheirô
condition (n.): diathesis, katastasis cosmos (n.): kosmos
confidence (n.): pistis count (v.): aparithmeô
configuration (n.): skhêmatismos counterargument (n.): antilogia
configure (v.): skhêmatizô counterrevolve (v.): anelittô
confirmation (n.): marturia, pistis courage (n.): andreia
conflict (n.): diaphônia cover (v.); epiprostheô
conflict (v.): diaphôneô, stasiazô cow (n.): bous
conflictless: astasiastos cowardice (n.): deilia
confront (v.): apantaô craftsman (n.): tekhnitês
confuse (v.): sunkheô crap (n.): kopros
connect (v.): sunaptô create (life) (v.): zôipoieô
consequent (n.): hepomenon, lêgon create (v.): dêmiourgeô
consider (v.): apeidon, episkopeô, creation (n.): dêmiourgêma,
exetazô, hêgeomai, theôreô dêmiourgia
constitute (v.): sunistêmi creator (n.): dêmiourgos
constitution (n.): diathesis, sustasis criticism (n.): enklêma, euthuna
constitutive: sustatikos crow (n.): korax
constrain (v.): anankazô, biazô, crudeness (n.): allokotia
prosanankazô cube (n.): kubos
constrained: biaios cubit (n.): pêkhus
curved: peripherês despise (v.): epêreazô, kataphroneô
custom (n.): ethos, sunêtheia destroy (v.): anaireô, apollumi,
customary: sunêthês diaphtheirô, phtheirô
cut (v.): temnô destroy along with (v.): sumphtheirô
cylinder (n.): kulindros detach (v.): apospaô
cylindrical: kulindrikos determine (v.): horizô, tithêmi
development (n.): agôgê
dark colour (n.): melanotês deviation (n.): parallaxis
dark: melas diagram (n.): diagramma
darken (v.): melainô, skotizô diameter (n.): diametros
darkening (n.): melansis differ (v.): diapherô
darkness (n.): skotos difference (n.): diaphora, heterotês,
day (n.): hêmera parallaxis
decline (n.): parakmê different: alloios, allos, diaphoros,
deal with (v.): hupantaô, heteros
pragmateuomai different in kind: heteroeidês
decay (n.) phthisis differentia (n.): diaphora
decay (v.): aporreô, phthinô differently qualified: alloios
deceive (v.): apataô difficult: aporos
deception (n.): apatê difficult to mix: dusmiktos
declare (v.): apophainô difficulty (n.): aporia
declination (n.): huphesis dig (v.): skaptô
decline (v.): parakmazô digress (v.): pareiskukleô
defend (v.): apologeomai dimension (n.): diastasis
defend (oneself) (v.): amunô diminish (v.): hêssaomai, meioô,
deficiency (n.): elleipsis phthinô
deficient: ellipês diminishing (n.): meiôsis, phthisis
define (v.): diorizô, horizô diminution (n.): meiôsis
definition (n.): horismos, horos direct (v.): apoteinô
demand (v.): apaiteô, axioô direct: prosekhês
demiurgic: dêmiourgikos directly: autothen
demonstrate (v.): apodeiknumi disagree (v.): diapherô, diaphôneô
demonstrate previously (v.): disagreement (n.): antirrêsis
proapodeiknumi disciple (n.): akroatês
demonstration (n.): apodeixis discuss (v.), dialegô
demonstrative: apodeiktikos discuss at length (v.): makrologeô
denial (n.): apophasis discussion (n.): logos
deny (v.): anaireô, apophaskô, disdain (n.): kataphronêsis
paraiteomai disharmony (n.): anarmostia
depart (v.): apeimi, apophoitaô, disorder (n.): ataxia
exeimi, exerkhomai, existêmi, dispose (v.): diatithêmi
oikhomai disposition (n.): diathesis
depend upon (v.): exartaô dispute (v.): amphisbêteô
depict (v.): tupoô disregard (v.): pareidon
depth (n.): bathos dissimilar: anomoios
derivation (n.): anaphora dissoluble: lutos
derive (a word) (v.) etumologeô dissolution (n.): dialusis, lusis
descend (v.): huphiêmi, katabainô dissolve (v.): dialuô, luô
desiderative: orektikos, thumikos dissolve simultaneously (v.): sulluoô
desire (n.): ephesis, hormê distance (n.): apostasis, diastasis
desire (v.): ephiêmi, epithumeô, distinction (n.): diairesis
hormaô distinguish (v.): antidiaireô, aphorizô,
desire for victory (n.): philoneikia diaireô, diakrinô, diorizô
desired: ephetos distinguish together (v.): sundiaireô
disturb (v.): tarattô empty (v.): kenoô
divert (v.): perispaô empty: kenos
divide (v.): diaireô empty-headed: kenodoxos
divide (into parts) (v.): merizô empty-headedness (n.): kenodoxia
divided: meristos emptying (n.): kenôsis
divine: theios encounter (v.): entunkhanô, hupantaô
division (n.): diairesis, diakrisis, end (n.) teleutê, telos
merismos, logos end (v.): katalêgô
dodecahedron (n.): dôdekaedron end up (v.): teleutaô
doctrine (n.): dogma endless: diôlugios
dominate (v.): krateô endure (v.): anekhô, diateleô,
donkey (n.): onos hupomenô, menô
doubt (v.): amphiballô enigma (n.): ainigma
doubtful: amphibolos enigmatic: ainigmatôdos
down: katô enjoy (v.): apolauô
drag (v.): helkô enough: halis
drag down (v.): kataspaô, kathelkô enquire (v.): zêteô
drag up (v.): anelkô enquiring: zêtêtikos
draw (v.): agô, graphô, helkô, entailment (n.): akolouthia
perigraphô entangle in (v.): periballô
draw down (v.): kathelkô entire: holos
draw things out (v.): mêkunô entirely: pampan, pantelôs, pantapasi
draw through (v.): diagô entirety (n.): holotês
draw up (v.): anelkô enumerate (v.): aparithmeô
dry (v.): xêrainô epicycle (n.): epikuklos
dry: xêros equality (n.): isotês
dryness (n.): xerotês equally: homoiôs
due measure (n.): summetria equally strong: isosthenês
dumbfounding (n.): kataplêxis equivalence (n.): exisasmos
dung (n.): kopros err (v.): hamartanô
duration (n.): paratasis escape (v.): ekpheugô
escape notice (v.): lanthanô
eager to learn: philomathês especially: malista
earlier: emprosthen establish (v.): bebaioô, kataskeuazô,
early: arkhaios themelioô
earth (n.): gê establish together (v.): sunkataskeuazô
earthen: geôdês establishing: kataskeuastikos
east (n.): anatolê eternal: aiônios, diaiônios
eastern: anatolikos eternity (n.): aiôn
easy: eulutos, hetoimos, prokheiros, even: artios
rhaidios everlasting: aidios
eccentric: ekkentros everlastingness (n.): aidiotêta
educate (v.): paideuô everywhere: pantakhothen, pantakhou
effective: drastêrios evidence (n.): marturia, tekmêrion
efficient: poiêtikos evident: phaneros, prophanês
element (n.): stoikheion examination (n.): exetasis
elevation (n.): hupsos examine (v.): basanizô
eliminate (v.): aphanizô, diagraphô example (n.): hupodeigma, paradeigma
elucidate (v.): saphênizô exceed (v.): huperballô
elucidation (n.): dieukrinêsis excess (n.): huperbolê, huperokhê
emanation (n.): aporroia exchange (n.): metadosis
embrace (v.): periekhô, peripiptô exchange (v.): metadidômi
embracing: periektikos excuse (v.): sunginôskô
emplant (v.): empoieô, enspeirô exegesis (n.): exêgêsis
exegetical: exêgêtikos fine: leptos
exercise (v.): gumnazein fine-parted: leptomerês
exhalation (n.): anathumiasis fire (n.): pur
exist (v.): huparkhô, eimi, huphistêmi fire-fly (n.): pugolampis
exist before (v.): prouparkhô firm: bebaios
exist together (v.) suneimi, first: prôtos
sunuparkhô, sunuphistêmi fish (n.): ikhthus
existence (n.): hupostasis fit (v.): epharmottô
expect (v.): prosdokeô fit together (v.): harmozô
explain (v.): apologeomai, diarthroô, fitting (n.): epharmogê
exêgeomai fixed: aplanês
explain in detail (v.): dierkhomai flame (n.): phlox
explainer (n.): exêgêtês flat: epipedos
explanation (n.): aitia, exêgêsis flavour (n.): khumos
expose (v.): dielenkhô flavourless: akhumos
express (v.): paramutheomai flesh (n.): sarx
extend (v.): prosauxanô float (v.): epinêkhomai
extend along with (v.): sumparateinô flow (v.): khôreô, rheô
extended: diastatos flow out (v.): aporreô, ekkheô
extendedness (n.): paratasis flowing: rheustos
extension (n.): diastasis, ektasis follow (v.): akoloutheô, diadekhomai,
external: ektos, exô, exôthen, heterôthen epakoloutheô, hepomai, sumbainô
extreme: akros, eskhatos following: akolouthos, ephexês
eye (n.): omma, ophthalmos foot (n.): pous
force (n.): bia
fabricate (v.): anaplattô force (v.): biazô
fact (n.): pragma forceful: biaios
faculty (n.): dunamis foreign: xenos
faint: amudros forever: aei, aidios
fair: dikaios forget (v.): epilanthanô
fall (v.): piptô forgetful: epilêsmôn
fall away (v.): apopiptô form (n.): eidos, idea
fall down (v.): apopiptô form (v.): eidopoieô
fall from (v.): ekpiptô form into a sphere (v.): sphairoô
fall into (v.): empiptô formal: eidêtikos
fallacious: paralogos forming: eidopoios
false: pseudos formless: aneideos
famous: onomastos formlessness (n.): amorphia
far away: prosô fortunate: eutukhês
fashion (v.): apotupoô forward: emprosthen
fast: takhus frequently: pollakhou, pollakis
fate (n.): moira friendly: philikos
few: oligos frivolous: kakoskholos
fiery: purios front: emprosthen, prosthen, prosthios
fight (v.): makhomai full: plêrês
figure (n.): skhêma furnish (v.): khorêgeô, parekhô
figure out (v.): anikhneuô furthest down: katôtatô
fill (v.): korennumi, pimplêmi, plêroô
fill out (v.): anaplêroô, sumplêroô gap (n.): dialeimma
filling out: sumplêrôtikos gather together (v.): sullambanô
final: teleutaios, telikos general: katholikos
find (v.): heuriskô generate (v.): apogennaô, gennaô
find a solution (v.): euporeô generated: genêtos
find fault (v.): memphomai generating life: zôigonos
generative: gonimos half a foot (n.): hêmipodion
generic: genikos half: hêmisus
genesis (n.): genesis hand (n.): kheir
gentle: êremaios hand down (v.): diadidomai,
genuinely: ontôs paradidômi
genus (n.): genos happen (v.) sumbainô
geometer (n.): geômetrês happen to be (v.): tunkhanô
geometrical: geômetrikos hardness (n.): sklêrotês
get ready (v.): parapoduomai harm (n.): blabê
get weaker (v.): kamnô harm (v.): blaptô
give (v.): apodidômi, didômai harmful: blaberos
give as evidence (v.): tekmairomai harmonious: enarmonios,
give existence (v.): huphistêmi, homonoêtikos
sunistêmi harmonize (v.): harmozô, sumphôneô,
give life (v.): zôipoieô sunaidô, sunarmozô
give light (v.): phôtizô harmonising: sumphônos
give out (v.): ekleipô harmony (n.): harmonia, sumphônia
give shape (v.): skhêmatizô, morphoô have (v.): epekhein, iskhô, ekhô
give substance (v.): ousioô have the strength to (v.): iskhuô
giving existence: hupostatikos head (n.): kephalê
glass (n.): hualos hear (v.): akouô
go (v.): bainô, eimi hearing (n.): akoê
go after (v.): apeimi heart (n.): kardia
go beyond (v.): pleonazô heat (n.): thermê, thermotês
go on (v.): diateleô heat (v.): thermainô
go on at length (v.): mêkunô heaven (n.): ouranos
go past (v.): parekhô heavenly: ouranios
go through (v.): dierkhomai, heavens (n.): ouranos
eperkhomai heaviness (n.): barutês
goal (n.): skopos heavy: barus
god (n.): theos helix (n.): helix
good: agathos, kalos help (v.): boêtheô, sunergeô
good fellow (n.): khrêstos hemisphere (n.): hêmisphairion
good sir!: beltiste high: oxus
goodheartedness (n.): euêtheia higher: anôterô
goodness: agathotêtos highest: akros, anôtatô
governing: arkhikos hold (v.): huparkhô
grammarian (n.): grammatikos hold oneself up: (v.) anekhô
grand: diôlugios hold onto (v.): stegô
grant (v.): didômai, sunkheô, hold together (v.): sunekhô
grasp (v.): haireô holding together: sunektikos
great: megas hollow: koilos
greater: meizôn holy: hieros
greatness (n.): megaleiotês homocentric: homokentros
grey: phaios homoiomerous: homoiomerês
grow (v.): anaphuô, auxanô, honour (v.): timaô
prosauxanô honourable: timios
grow together (v.); sumphuô horse: hippos
growth (n.): auxêsis hot: thermos
guesswork (n.): huponoia hour (n.): hôra
guide (v.): ithunô house (n.): oikia
gull (n.): korônê human (n.); anthrôpos
human: anthrôpinos
hair (n.): thrix hupekkauma (n.): hupekkauma
hyperbaton: huperbaton induction (n.): epagôgê
hypernatural: huper phusin, inefficacy (n.): adraneia
huperphuês inequality (n.): anisotês
hypothesis (n.): hupothesis infect (v.): anapimplêmi
hypothesise (v.): hupotithêmi infer (v.): epagô, sullogizô,
hypothetical: hupothetikos sumperainô, sunagô, tekmairomai
inference (n.): akolouthia, sunagôgê
ice (n.): krustallos infinite: apeiros
idea (n.): ennoia, epibolê, epinoia, idea infinitely many: apeiros
ignite (v.): exaptô infinity (n.): apeiria
ignorance (n.): agnoia influence (n.): apotelesma
ignorant: anoêtos inhere (v.): enuparkhein
illuminate (v.): phôtizô injure (v.): blaptô
illumination (n.): ellampsis inner: endoterô, entos
image (n.): eikôn inseparable: akhôristos
imagination (n.): phantasia inside: endothen, entos
imagine (v.): phantazô inside the cosmos: enkosmios
imagining (n.): phantasia instantaneous: exaiphnês
imbalance (n.): asummetria intellectual: noeros
imitate (v.): mimeomai intelligible: noêtos
imitation (n.): mimêsis intense: sphodros
immaterial: aülos intensify (v.): epiteinô
immediate: amesos, prosekhês intermediate: mesos, metaxu
immediately clear: prodêlos interpretation (n.): exêgêsis
immortal: athanatos interval (n.): apostêma
immortality (n.): athanasia introduce (v.): eisagô, epeisagô,
imperishable: aphthartos paragô, proagô, prosagô
impious: asebês investigate (v.): anazêteô,
impossible: adunatos episkeptomai, episkopeô, meteimi,
impression (n.): tupos skopeô
impulsion (n.): rhopê investigation (n.): theôria, zêtêsis
in droves: khudên invisible: aoratos, aphanês
inanimate: apsukhos iron (n.): sidêros
inappropriate: akairos irrational: alogistos, alogos
inborn: sumphuês irrationality (n.): alogia
incline (v.): apoklinô irrefutable: anelenktos
include (v.): perilambanô, sullambanô issue (n.): pragma
incomplete: atelês jaw (n.): genus
inconsistent: anakolouthos jest (n.): paidia
incorporeal: asômatos jest (v.): paizô
incorrect: kakos join (v.): epizeugnumi, sunaptô
increase (n.): auxêsis join in (v.): sunephaptomai
increase (v.): auxanô, epiteinô, joke (v.): diapaizei
prosauxanô jousting with shadows (n.):
indefinite: aoristos skiamakhia
indefiniteness (n.): aoristia judge (v.): hêgeomai, krinô
indeterminate: aoristos judging: kritikos
indicate (v.): dêloô, emphainô, just distribution (n.): dikaiosunê
endeiknumi, sêmainô just: dikaios
indicate also (v.): sunemphainô justice (n.): dikê
indication (n.): epideixis, tekmêrion
indifferent: adiaphoros knavery (n.): panourgia
indisputable: anamphilektos katamênia (n.): katamênion
indivisible: adiairetos kind (n.): eidos, idea
know (v.): ginôskô, gnôrizô, noeô, oida living thing (n.): zôion
know in advance (v.): progignôskô long: makros
lack (n.): sterêsis long ago: palai
lack (v.): atukheô, elleipô, stasis look (v.): eidon
lacking due measure: asummetros look at (v.): blepô
lacking form: amorphos look into (v.): epeidon
last (v.): diamenô look to (v.): apeidon
last: eskhatos look!: idou
lasting: monimos loose: platus
later: husteros lose (v.): apollumi
lay down in advance (v.): Love (n.): Philia
proupotithêmi loving learning: philomathês
lead (v.): agô lower: katô, katôterô
lead back (v.): epanagô lowest: katôtatô
learn (v.): ginôskô, gnôrizô, manthanô lowly: eutelês
learning late: opsimathês lukewarm: khliaros
least: elakhistos, hêkistos luminous: euagês
leave (v.): apoleipô, eaô, existêmi lunar: selêniakos
leave in the dark (v.); episkiazô lyric poet (n.): melopoios
leave out (v.) aphaireô, pariêmi
left: aristeros magnitude (n.): megethos
leisure (n.): skholê maintain (v.): axioô, phulattô
lemma (n.): lêmma maintain previously (v.): proaxioô
length (n.): mêkos major (premiss): meizôn
lengthy: makros make (v.): poieô
less: elattôn, hêttôn make cold (v.): psukhô
let out (v.): aporriptô make fiery (v.): ekphlogoô
lie (v.): keimai make room (v.): hupexistêmi
lie above (v.): epipolazô, huperkeimai make similar (v.): exomoiôoô
lie at the top (v.): epipolazô malice (n.): kakourgia
lie together (v.): parakeimai malicious: kakourgos
lie under (v.): hupokeimai man (n.): anêr
life (n.): bios, zôê manifestation (n.): ekphansis
light (in colour): leukos manuscript (n.): antigraphon
light (n.): phôs many: polus
light (not heavy): kouphos mass (n.): onkos
light colour (n.): leukotês master (n.): didaskalos
lighten (in colour) (v.): leukainô master (v.): krateô
lightening (in colour) (n.): leukansis material: enulos, hulikos
lightness (n.): kouphotês mathematical thing (n.): mathêma
lightning (n.): astrapê mathematical: mathêmatikos
like: homoios matter (n.): hulê
limb (n.): kôlon mean (n.): mesotês
limit (n.): peras mean (v.): sêmainô
limit (v.): peratoô meaning (n.): ennoia, sêmasia
line (n.): grammê measure (n.): metron
line (of poetry) (n.): epos measure (v.): anametreô, katametreô,
line (of writing) (n.): stikhos metreô
linear: grammikos measuring: metrêtikos
link with (v.): sunartaô meet (v.): hupantaô, sumballô,
listener (n.): akroatês sunantaô
literate: grammatikos mention (v.): erô, hupomimnêskô,
living a long time: makrobios mnêmoneuô, onomazô
living: zôos middle (n.): mesotês
mind (n.): noos name (n.): onoma
mindless: anoêtos name (v.): onomazô
mindlessness (n.): anoia natural: phusikos, kata phusin
minor (premiss): elattôn nature: phusis
mischief (n.): panourgia near: plêsios
mischievous: kakoskholos necessitate (v.): anankazô
misinterpret (v.): parakouô necessity (n.): anankê
mistake (n.): parorama necesssary: anankaios
misunderstanding (n.): agnoia, need (n.): khreia
parakoê need in addition (v.): prosdeô
mix (v.): kerannumi, mignumi devise in addition (v.): prosexeuriskô
mixed: miktos negating: arnêtikos
mixture (n.): krasis, mixis negative: apophatikos
mobile: eukinêtos new: neos
mode (n.): tropos newborn: neogenês
moist: hugros next: ephexês, hexês, loipos
moisten (v.): hugrainô night: nukterinos
moistness (n.): hugrotês no longer: mêketi, ouketi
monad (n.): monas nonsense (n.): phlênaphos, phluaria
moon (n.): selênê note (v.); ephistêmi
mortal: thnêtos notice (v.): ephistêmi, suniêmi
most of all: malista nourish (v.): trephô
motion (n.): kinêsis, phora nourishment (n.) trophê
motion in a circle (n.): kuklophoria novel: xenos
motion in a reverese direction (n.): number (n.): arithmos, plêthos
antiphora nutritive: threptikos
motion in reverse directions:
antikinêsis object (v.): enistêmi, enkaleô,
mountain (n.): oros memphomai
move (v.): erkhomai, hiêmi, khôreô, objection (n.): antirrêsis, enstasis
kineô, pherô oblique: loxos
move along with (v.): sumparatheô, obscure (v.): suskiazô
sunkineô observation (n.): têrêsis
move closer (v.): prokoptô observe (v.): theaomai
move down (v.): huperkhomai obviously: dêlonoti
move in a circle (v.): kuklophoreomai occupy (v.): epekhô, katekhô
move in a straight line (v.): euthuporeô touch (v.): kathaptô
move in both directions (v.): occur (v.): aphikneomai, ginomai,
epamphoterizô sumbainô
move in reverse directions (v.): odd: perittos
antikineô, antipherô odour (n.) atmos
move in the opposite direction (v.): old: palaios
parapherô omit (v.): pariêmi
move together (v.): suneimi one foot long: podiaios
moving in a circle: kuklophorêtikos only: monos
moving: kinêtos opinion (n.): dogma, doxa
much-honoured: polutimêtos oppose (v.): antitithêmi
multiplication (n.): pollaplasiasmos order (n.): diakosmêsis, taxis
multiply (v.): pollaplasiazô order (v.): diakosmeô, euthetizô, keleuô
mush (n.): Mukônos ordering (n.): suntaxis
mush together (v.): sunkukaô ordinary: sunêthês
mutual replacement (n.): antiperistasis ordinary use (n.): sunêtheia
organic: organikos
naïve: euêthês other: allos, heteros, loipos
outer: ektos, exôterô possess in addition (v.): prosktaomai
outermost: exôtatô possible: dunatos
outside: ektos, exô posterior: husteros
overbear (v.): pleonekteô postpone (v.): anaballô
overbearingness (n.): pleonexia postulate (n.): aitêma
overpower (v.): krateô postulate (v.): aiteô
overtake (v.): hupertrekhô potentiality (n.): dunamis
overthrow (v.): anastrephô, anatrepô power (n.): dunamis
overturn (v.): anatrepô practically: skhedon
overturning: anatreptikos precede (v.): phthanô, proêgeomai,
prouparkhô
paltry: eutelês preceding: prosthen
paradigm (n.): paradeigma precise: akribês
parallel: parallêlos preconception (n.): prolêpsis
parallelogram (n.): parallêlogrammon predicate (n.): hatêgoroumenon
paraphrase (n.): paraphrasis predominance (n.): epikrateia
part (n.): meros, morion predominate (v.): epikrateô
partial: merikos pre-exist (v.): prouparkhô
participate in (v.): metekhô premiss (n.): lêmma, protasis
participation (n.): metalêpsis, prepare (v.): paraskeuô
methexis, metokhê presence (n.): parousia
particular: merikos present (v.): paradidômi, proagô
pass (v.): metabainô present as one’s own progeny (v.):
pass over (v.): eaô hupoballô
pass through (v.): diaporthmeuô preserve (v.): diasôzô, peripoieô, sôzô,
passage (n.): khôrion, lexis, rhêsis phulattô
passive: pathêtikos preside over (v.): epibainô
perceive (v.): aisthanomai, press (v.): stenokhôreô
sunaisthanomai prevent (v.): kôluô
perceptible: aisthêtos previous: prosthen, proteros
perception (n.): aisthêsis, sunaisthêsis pride (n.): philotimia
perfection (n.): teleiotês primary: prôtos
perfective: telesiourgos principle (n.): arkhê, logos
perhaps: isôs, mêpote, takha prior: proteros, prôtos
perimeter (n.): perimetros privation (n.): sterêsis
peripheral: perix privative: sterêtikos
perishable: epikêros, phroudos probable: eikos
perishing (n.): phthora problem (n.): problêma
perishing: phroudos proceed (v.): eimi, proeimi,
permanence (n.): diamonê proerkhomai
persuade (v.): peithô proceed together with (v.):
philosopher (n.): philosophos sumproerkhomai
philosophical: philosophos procession (n.): proodos, propodismos
philosophy (n.): philosophia proclaim (v.): ekphôneô
place (n.): khôra, topos produce (v.): apergazomai, paragô,
plane: epipedos poieô
plant (n.): phuton producing motion: poiêtikos
please (v.): areskô production (n.): poiêsis
plurality (n.): plêthos progression (n.): propodismos
point (n.): sêmeion, skopos proof (n.): deixis
pointless: mataios, matên proper: idios, oikeios
portion (n.): moira, morion prophet (n.): prophêtês
posit (v.): tithêmi proposal (n.): epibolê, problêma
position (n.): thesis propose (v.): propherô, protithêmi
proposition (n.): logos, protasis receptacle (n.): hupodokhê
proprium (n.): idion reception (n.): metalêpsis
prove (v.): deiknumi receptive: dektikos
prove first (v.): prodeiknumi reckless: atarakhos
provide (v.): parekhô recognise (v.): ennoeô
providential: pronoêtikos record (n.): mnêmê
proving: deiktikos record (v.): anagraphô
proximity (n.): plêsiasis recount (v.): historeô
punishment (n.): dikê rectilinear: euthugrammos
puppy (n.): skulakion recycle (v.): anakukleô
pure: eilikrinês, katharos reduce (to an absurdity): apagôgê
purpose (n.): skopos reductio ad impossibile (n.): apagôgê
pursue (v.): meteimi, meterkhomai eis adunaton
push (v.): ôtheô, sunôtheô refer (v.): anapempô
put around (v.): periballô refined: katharos
put forward (v.): diateinô, proballô, refutation (n.): antilogia, elenkhos
propherô, proteinô refute (v.) apelenkhô, dielenkhô,
putrefaction (n.): sêpedôn, sêpsis elenkhô
putrefy (v.): sêpô region (n.): khôra, topos
reject (v.): anainomai, apeipon,
qualitative change (n.): alloiôsis aporriptô
quality (n.): poion, poiotês relation (n.): skhesis
qualityless: apoios release (v.): aphiêmi
quantity (n.): plêthos, poson, posotês reliable: axiokhreôs
quarrel (n.): agôn remain (v.): epimenô, leipô, menô,
quick: takhus perileipomai
quiescent: apraktos remaining: loipos
quietly: êrema remarkable: thaumasios, thaumastos
quote (v.): paragraphô remember (v.): mimnêsko
remind (v.): hupomimnêskô
raise (v.): anateinô, meteôrizô remove (v.): aphaireô, exaireô
rank (n.): taxis renew (v.): ekneazô
rarefy (v.): manoô renown (n.): eukleia
rash: propetês, tolmêros renowned: kleinos
rashness (n.): propeteia, thrasutês replace mutually (v.): antiperiistêmi
ratio (n.): logos report (v.): historeô
rational: logikos reproach (n.): enklêma
ray (n.): akros reputable: dokimos
reach (v.): aphikneomai, katalambanô reputation (n.): doxa
reach a conclusion (v.): perainô require (v.): anankazô, apaiteô
read (v.): anagignôskô, entunkhanô resist (v.): antereidô
ready: eukolos, prokheiros resistance (n.): antitupia
reality (n.): huparxis resolve (v.): analuô
realise (v.): ennoeô, ginôskô respond (v.): hupantaô
reason (n.): aitia, aition response (n.): hupantêsis
reasonable: eikos, eulogos, metriôs rest (n.): êremia, monê, stasis
reasonably: eikotôs rest (v.): êremeô, menô
reasoning (n.): dianoia, logismos restrict (v.): sunaireô
recall (v.): hupomimnêskô, mimnêsko result (v.); sumbainô
receive (v.): apolambanô, dekhomai, resume (v.): epanalambanô
epidekhomai, hupodekhomai, retrogression (n.): hupopodismos
lankhanô return (v.): apokathistêmi
receive in advance (v.): prolambanô reveal (v.): apokaluptô, diaphainô,
receiving (n.): katadokhê emphainô
reverse: anapalin, apenantios, empalin set aside (v.): apotithêmi, eaô
revolution (n.): periagôgê, periodos, set out (v.): ektithêmi, paratithêmi,
periphora proektithêmi, protithêmi
revolve (v.): anakukleô, peridineô set out at length (v.): mêkunô
ridiculous: geloios set on fire (v.): empimprêmi
right: dexios, dikaios, kalos, orthos set together (v.) sundunô
rigorous: akribês set up (v.): anôrthoô
rise (v.): anabainô, anatellô setting out (n.): parathesis
rise above (v.): epipolazô settle in (v.) eisoikizô
rise to the top (v.): epipolazô sewer (n.): borboros
rise together with (v.): sunanatellô shake (v.): saleuô
risible: gelastikos shameless: anaidês
role (n.): logos shape (n.): morphê, skhêma
roof (n.): orophos shapeless: askhêmatistos
room (n.): khôra shapelessness (n.): askhêmosunê
roughness (n.): trakhutês share in (v.): koinôneô, metekhô
rub (v.): paratribô shine out (v.): ellampô
rule (n.): kanôn shining: phôteinos
rule (v.): krateô ship (n.): naus
ruler of the elements (n.): shipbuilder (n.): naupêgos
stoikheiokratôr short: brakhus
run (v.): theô, trekhô show (v.): deiknumi, dêloô, ekphainô,
run together (v.) sunkheô epideiknumi
sacred: hieros show oneself (v.): anaphainô
said previously: proeirêmenos showing (n.): parastasis
sameness (n.): tautotês shrink from (v.): okneô
sandal (n.): hupodêma side (n.): pleura
say (v.): eipon, erô, legô siege engine (n.): paraskeuê
saying (n.): paroimia sign (n.): tekmêrion
scale (of a fish) (n.): lepis sign (of the zodiac) (n.): zôidion
scatterdly: sporadên sign (v.): epigraphô
scorn (v.): duskherainô signal (v.): episêmainô
sea (n.): thalatta similar: homoios, paraplêsios
season (n.): hôra similarity (n.): homoiotês
seat (n.): hedra similarly: homoiôs
seat above (v.): huperidruô simple: haplous
see (v.): eidon, horaô, katamanthanô, simplicity (n.): haplotês
sunêgoreô, theaomai, theôreô simply: haplôs
see in (v.): entheôreô simultaneous: hama
seed (n.): sperma sink (v.); katabainô
sphere (n.): sphaira size (n.): megethos, poson
seek (v.) zêteô slight alteration (n.): parakhrôsis
seem (v.): dokeô, eoika slow: bradus
segment (n.): tithêmi small: mikros
self-moving: autokinêtos smaller: elattôn
self-satisfied: eukolos smell (n.): osmê
self-substantiating: authupostatos smoothness (n.): leiotês, malakotês
semicircle (n.): hêmikuklion solar: hêliakos
send away (v.): pempô solid: nastos, sterros, stereos
separate (v.): apomerizô, diakrinô, solidity (n.): sterrotês
dialambanô, khôrizô sometimes: eniote
separation (n.): diakrisis, diastasis soul (n.): psukhê
service (n.): hupêresia sound: hugiês
set (v.): duô sound (n.): phônê, psophos
sound (off) (v.): phthengomai subject to increase: auxêtos
sound out (v.): perikrouô sublunary: hupo selênên
space (n.): khôra substance (n.): ousia
space (n.): topos substantial: ousiôdês
spatial: topikos subsume (v.): hupotattô
speak against (v.): anteipon, anterô, succession (n.): diadokhê
antilegô suffer (v.): eaô
speak nonsense (v.): phluareô suffering: pathêtos
species (n.): eidos suffice (v.): arkeô
specific feature (n.): idion sufficient: hikanos
speech (n.): logos suitability (n.): epitêdeiotês
speed (n.): takhutês suitable: epitêdeios, prosphuês
spend (v.): dapanaô suited: epitêdeios
spend time (v.): endiatribô summer (n.): theros
spherical: sphairikos sun (n.): hêlios
spit out (v.): exeptuô superficial: epipolaios
spit upon (v.): periptuô superfluity (n.): periousia
spontaneous: automatos superfluous: perittos
spout out (v.): ekphusaô superior: huperteros
spread (v.): khôreô superiority (n.): huperokhê
spread around (v.): perikheô supervene (v.): epiginomai,
stable: monimos paraginomai
stand (v.): bainô, kathistêmi supply (v.): parekhô
stand in the way (v.): empodizô support (v.): sunêgoreô
stand still (v.): histêmi suppose (v.): hupolambanô, huponoeô,
standard (n.): kritêrion tithêmi
star (n.): astêr, astron surface (n.): epiphaneia
start (v.): arkhô, hormaô surprising: thaumastos
starting point (n.): arkhê surround (v.): periekhô
state (n.): hexis surrounding: perix
statement (n.): logos sustain (v.): sunekhô
statue (n.): agalma sweet: glukus, potimos
stir up (v.): anakineô sweetness (n.): glukutês
stone (n.): lithos swim (v.): nêkhô
stop (v.): histêmi syllogism (n.): sullogismos
stopping (n.): stasis symmetric: summetros
straight: euthus, ithutenês symmetry (n.): summetria
straightedge (n.): kanôn sympathy (n.): sumpatheia
strange: atopos synthesis (n.): sunthesis
stray (v.): apoplanaô
stretch out (v.): apoteinô, ekteinô, tabernacle (n.): skênoma
katateinô take (v.): lambanô, paralambanô
stretching (n.): ektasis take as a pair (v.): sunduazô
strict: kurios take away (v.): aphaireô, aphiêmi
Strife (n.): Neikos take away from under (v.): hupospaô
strike (v.): plessô take on (v.): apolambanô,
strike into perplexity (v.): kataplêttô metalambanein
strive (v.): spoudazô take on in addition (v.): proslambanô
strive for victory (v.): philoneikeô taking (n.): lêpsis
strong: iskhuros tangible: haptos
structure (n.): sustasis tasteless: apeirokalos
stupid: anepistatos teach (v.): didaskô
stupidity (n.): anepistasia, asunesia teacher (n.): didaskalos
subject to diminution: meiôtos teaching (n.): didaskalia
temple (n.): naos trouble (v.): enokhleô
term (n.): horos true: alêthês
test (v.): basanizô trust (v.): pisteuô
text (n.): lexis, rhêsis truth (n.): alêtheia
theogony (n.): theogonia try (v.): epikheireô, peiraô
theorem (n.): theôrêma try hard (v.): spoudazô
theory (n.): logos tune (v.): harmozô
thereby: hêdê turn (v.): anakamptô, meteimi,
thesis (n.): thesis strephô, trepô
thick: pakhus turn away (v.): apoklinô
thicken (v.): pakhunô twist (v.): diastrephô
thickness (n.): pakhutês twisted: diastrophos
thin (v.): leptunô
thing (n.): pragma unaffected: apathês, asaleutos
think (v.): boulomai, dianoeô, unbroken: aklastos
doxazein, epinoeô, noeô, nomizô, unceasing: anekleiptos
oiomai unchanging: akinêtos, ametablêtos
think of (v.): mnêmoneuô uncovered: gumnos
think of in addition (v.): prosennoeô uncritical: akritos
thinking (n.): phronêsis undemonstrated: anapodeiktos
thought (n.): epinoia, noêsis under suspicion: hupoptos
thoughtless: aperiskeptos undergo (v.): hupomenô, paskhô
threaten (v.): anateinô underlie (v.): hupokeimai
three-dimensional: trikhê diastatos undermine (v.): parapodizô, saleuô
throw (v.): rhiptô understand (v.): akouô, apodekhomai,
time (n.): aiôn, hôra, khronos ennoeô, ephistêmi, ginôskô,
today: sêmeron parakoloutheô, sunaisthanomai,
together: hama, homou sunêgoreô, suniêmi, sunneuô
tongue (n.): glôtta understand in addition (v.): prosennoeô
tool (n.): organon understanding (n.): gnôsis, noêsis,
touch (v.): ephaptô, haptô sunaisthêsis
trace back (v.): anikhneuô undivided: adiairetos
traceless: aneideos uneducated: apaideutos
train (v.): gumnazein unequal: anisos
transcend (v.): exaireô unextended: adiastatos
transcendence (n.): exairesis unification (n.): henôsis
transcendent: exairetos uniform: homalês, monoeidês
transfer (v.): metapherô unify (v.): hênoô
transform (v.): metabainô unintelligible: asunetos
transformation (n.): metabasis, tropê unity (n.): henôsis
transient: proskairos universal: katholikos, katholou
transition (n.): metabasis unknown: agnôstos
transmission (n.): metadosis unmoving: akinêtos
transmit (v.): diadidomai, diapempô, unmusical: amousos
metadidômi, paradidômi unnatural: para phusin
transparent: diaphanês unreasonable: alogos
traverse (v.): diexeimi, perieimi unreasonably: apeikotôs
treatise (n.): logos unrefuted: anelenktos
treatise (n.): pragmateia unshakable: asphalês, bebaios
tree (n.): drus unsound: sathros
triangle (n.):trigônon unsoundness (n.): sathrotês
trivium (n.): triodos unsuitability (n.) anepitêdeiotês
trophy (n.): tropaion unsuitable: anepitêdeios
trouble (n.): askholia unvarying: aparallaktos
unworthy: atimos white: leukos
up: anô whiteness (n.): leukotês
upper: anô whole: holos
use (n.): khreia whole (n.): holotês
use (v.): apokhraomai, khraomai, whiten (v.): leukainô
paralambanô, proskhraomai will (n.): boulêsis
valuable: timios will (v.): ethelô
value (n.): axiôma willful: authadês
vanishing: phroudos winter (n.): kheimôn
variegated: poikilos wisdom (n.): phronêsis
vary (v.): paralattô wise: sophos
vehicle (n.): okhêma wish (v.): boulomai, ethelô
verse (n.): epos with pleasure: hêdeôs
vice (n.): kakia withdraw (v.): hupexerkhomai
victory-loving: philoneikos without qualification: haplôs
view (n.): doxa, gnômê witness (n.): martus
virtue (n.): aretê wonder (v.): thaumazô
visible: horatos wood (n.): xulon
vision (n.): opsis wooden: xulinos
visual: optikos word (n.): onoma
vital: zôtikos words (n.): lexis, logos, rhêmata
void: kenos work (n.): ergon, poiêsis
work together (v.): suntrekhô
wander (v.): planaô working together: sunergos
want (v.): boulomai, ethelô worm (n.): skôlêx
warm: thermos worse: kheirôn
warm (v.): thermainô worship (n.): thrêskeia
wasp (n.): sphêx worth: axios
waste (v.): dapanaô write (v.): graphô
water (n.): hudôr write against (v.): antigraphô
watery: hudatinos write down (v.): sungraphô
way (n.): tropos write in addition (v.): epigraphô
weak: asthenês writing (n.): graphê
wear out (v.): kamnô written: anagraptos
weave together (v.): prosuphainô
weigh (v.) helkô year (n.): etos
weigh down (v.): bareô yearn (v.): epipotheô
weight (n.): baros yield (v.): hupeikô
west (n.): dusis, dusmai young: neos
Greek-English Index
This index, which is based on Heiberg’s text with my emendations and covers all
of the commentary on 1.2-4, indicates the English translations of those nouns,
verbs, adjectives, and some adverbs used by Simplicius only once. Words which
occur only in quotations (or apparent quotations) of Aristotle and earlier authors
are omitted. For the most part Greek words are given in the form which serves as
the basis of an entry in LSJ. A similar index for words used more than once is
included in Mueller (2010) The expression ‘m/p’ indicates that a verb occurs in the
middle or passive tense.
adamas, adamant, 142,12 amethodos, unsystematic, 29,36

adespotos, anonymous, 201,4 (amethodôs)
adikos, unjust, 19,18 ametria, unmeasuredness, 39,33
adioristos, in the same way, 161,27 ammôdês, sandy, 16,19
(adioristôs) amorphia, formlessness, 129,15
adraneia, inefficacy, 136,30 amorphos, lacking form, 129,21
aeikinêtos, always in motion, 197,19 amphibolos, doubtful, 133,26
agalma, statue, 141,22 amudros, faint, 98,30
agenêsia, not coming to be, 139,24 anabasis, motion up, 36,31
agnômôn, ignorant, 57,14 anadunô, to emerge, 25,25
agnômosunê, ignorance, 56,27 anágôgos, badly educated, 82,12
agnôstos, unknown, 116,25 anagôgós, elevating, 55,18
agôn, quarrel, 123,4 anagraptos, in writing, 117,26
agônios, without angles, 129,28 anainomai, to reject, 115,10
ainigma, enigma, 141,9 anaklaô, to be reflected back, 88,22
ainigmatôdos, enigmatic, 140,26 (m/p)
(ainigmatôdôs) anaklasis, reflection back, 83,8
aisthêtikos, having perception, 73,22 analogeô, to be analogous, 184,13
aitêma, postulate, 108,31 analogia, proportion, 81,24
aithô, to burn, 119,3 analogos, proportional, 81,33
akairos, inappropriate, 180,24 analusis, analysis, 108,2
akharis, distasteful, 46,12 anametreô, to be measured, 165,9
akhlus, mist, 26,26 (m/p)
akhôristos, inseparable, 143,17 anangellô, to declare, 90,17
akhumos, without flavour, 130,29 anapaula, rest, 78,24
akoustikos, involving hearing, 184,5 anapauô, to rest, 53,16
akribeia, precision, 15,29 anapausis, rest period, 53,15
akritos, uncritical, 180,25 (akritôs) anapherô, to move up, 158,20
alloiôtikos, causing alteration, anaphora, derivation, 168,6
112,35 anapimplêmi, to infect, 190,16
alloiôtos, subject to alteration, 112,3 anaplattô (anaplassô in LSJ), to
allokotia, crudeness, 192,20; and fabricate, 140,31
270a2 anaplêroô, to fill out, 187,3
alogia, irrationality, 200,29 anatasis, elevation, 54,9
ameinôn, better, 106,4 anathumiasis, exhalation, 131,14
amelei, certainly, 192,33 anatolikos, eastern, 197,4
203
204 Greek-English Index
anatreptikos, overturning, 124,18 apeirokalos, tasteless, 177,17
anazêteô, to investigate, 159,6 (apeirokalôs)
anazônnumi, to arm oneself, 189,22 apeiroplasiôn, infinitely many
anazôpureô, to burn, 85,18 times, 82,4
anêbaô, to be rejuvenated, 98,12 apekoruphoô, to bring under the
anedên, without restraint. 88,28 heading, 126,3
aneideos, formless, 135,29 apelenkhô, to be refuted, 124,14 (m/p)
aneimi, to go up, 36,12 apemphainô, to be incongruous,
anemphatos, without a trace, 93,8 35,10
anepikritos, unexamined, 25,32 apenantios, reverse, 188,9
anepitêdeios, unsuitable, 98,10 aperilêptos, impossible to grasp,
anepitêdeiotês, unsuitability, 143,28 49,21
aneuphêmeô, to be proclaimed, 85,15 aperriptô, to reject, 200,30
(m/p) aperuthriaô, to not be embarrassed,
aniêmi, to be dedicated to, 85,3 135,9
anieroô, to dedicate, 142,6 aphidruma, icon, 26,24
ankôn, elbow, 48,2 aphuktos, inescapable, 52,26
anoêtainô, be ignorant, 122,21 aplatês, without breadth, 174,15
anômalia, anomaly, 32,21 apogennaô, to generate, 131,13
anôrthoô to set up, 200,24 apokhê, distance, 148,2,3
anteisagô, to replace with, 77,30 apokhôreô, to depart, 69,33
antepikheirô, to put forward apoklêrôsis, arbitrary chatter, 27,6
counterarguments, 179,24 apokluzô, to be cleansed away, 201,2
antereidô, to offer resistance, 130,17 (m/p)
antereisis, pressure, 78,24 apokoruphoô, to bring under a
antheô, to blossom, 25,35 heading, 126,3
anthrôpeios, human, 48,27 apokrinô, to be chosen, 84,20 (m/p)
anthrôpiskos, humanoid, 86,4 apokruptô, to obscure, 89,12
antibainô, to come against, 76,10 apolausis, enjoyment, 72,20
antidiastellô, to contrast, 118,10 aponeueô, to be directed to, 169,8
antigraphon (see antigraphos in aponoia, rebellion, 86,4
LSJ), manuscript, 152,31 aponos, without difficulty, 53,12
antikoptô, to strike, 15,17 (aponôs)
antilêptos, apprehended, 97,24 apophoitaô, to depart, 94,14
antiphora, motion in a reverse apoplanaô, to stray, 118,29
direction, 156,20 aporêma, difficulty, 43,26
antitupoô, to have resistance, 12,30 aporrapizô, to reject, 69,13
anumneô, to hymn the praises of, aporrêgnumi, to break off, 142,31
91,10 aporroia, emanation, 115,7
aoratos, invisible, 130,17 aposbennumi, to die, 25,36 (m/p)
apantaô, to confront, 188,5 aposkeuazô, to argue against, 79,14
aparallaktos, unvarying, 118,4 apotelesma, influence, 113,6
apartaô, to make depend, 25,13 apôtheô, to be thrust away, 55,23
apaugasma, efflux, 86,14 (m/p)
apaxioô, to decline, 12,32 apotithêmi, to set aside, 143,15
apeikonizô, to be an image, 97,12 apotrepô,to turn away, 25,30
(m/p) apotupoô, to fashion, 141,23
apeikotôs, unreasonably, 107,23 apraktos, quiescent, 137,29
apeipon, to reject, 172,5 arkhegonos, original, 85,30
apeiria, unfamiliarity, 36,27 arrepês, transcending impulsion,
apeirodunamia, infinite power, 44,26 70,14
apeirodunamos, infinitely powerful, artiakis, even times (even), 29,32
79,5 artiperissos, even times odd, 29,29
asaleutos, unaffected, 201,7
asebeô, to sin, 84,30 diagramma, diagram, 177,16
askhêmatistos, without shape, 129,27 diagraphô, to eliminate, 167,26
askhetos, not relative, 169,7 diairetikos, relating to the method of
askhistos, undivided, 31,29 division, 52,25
askholos, without leisure, 79,19 diaittôn (see diaissô in LSJ),
askos, bag, 74,20 shooting star,17,7
astasiastos, without conflict, 97,20 diakoptô, to be interrupted, 46,19
(astasiastôs) (m/p)
astrapê, lightning, 119,29 diakorês, full, 80,14
astronomia, astronomy, 81,16 diakosmêsis, order, 95,25
astronomikos, astronomical, 36,27 dialeimma, gap, 118,27
asullogistos, not following, 62,14 dialektikos, dialectical, 28,20
asummetros, unbalanced, 171,20 diamartanô, to misunderstand
asunesia, stupidity, 180,7 entirely, 59,10
atar, nevertheless, 105,1 diamonê, permanence, 137,28
atarakhos, reckless, 159,5 dianoêtikos, intellectual, 59,27
(atarakhôs) diapaizei, to make a joke, 177,4
ataxia, disorder, 129,15 diaperainô, to be concluded, 11,10
ateleia, incomplete condition, 54,31 (m/p)
atheteô, to do away with, 70,3 diaperainô, to be concluded, 11,10
athroizô, to assemble, 25,24 (m/p)
athroos, in a batch, 129,4 (athroôs) diaphainô, to be revealed, 196,31
atimos, unworthy, 135,7 (m/p)
atmos, odour, 130,22 diaporthmeuô, to pass through,
atropheô, to be undernourished, 54,8 130,16
atukheô, to be lacking in, 136,24 diarkeô, to be sufficient, 78,6
authadês, willful, 136,1 diarthrôsis, articulation, 108,21
authis, again, 120,28 diasaleuô, to undermine, 62,2
automatos, spontaneously, 137,21 (ek diaspaô, to distort, 37,16
tautomatou) diazôgrapheô, to be figured, 12,18
auxêtikos, related to growth, 123,23 (m/p)
auxêtos, subject to increase 112,2 diêgeomai, to proclaim, 90,16
axiokhreôs, reliable, 126,12 diêkô, to extend, 83,32
diêrthrômenôs, explicitly, 34,14
barunô, to be burdened, 26,4 (m/p) dieukrinêsis, elucidation, 194,2
bebaiôsis, warrant, 55,15 diexeimi, to traverse,14,17
biblos (see bublos in LSJ), book, dikaiosunê, just distribution, 171,20
200,25 dikanikos, lawyer-like, 48,28
blabê, harm, 76,20 diolou, always, 44,21
blasphêmeô, to blapsheme, 88,29 diorismos, determination, 47,16
blasphêmia, blasphemy, 137,20 dipêkhus: two-cubit, 47,9
boaô, to shout, 88,31 dokimos, reputable, 168,16
boêthos (see boêthoos in LSJ), drastêrios, effective, 114,17
helping, 68,7 drimakos, drimakos, 59,11 (on which
borborôdês, filthy, 66,9 see the note)
borboros, sewer, 119,11 drus, tree, 131,7
dusaisthêtos, not able to perceive,
daktulos, finger, 48,2 73,23
deigma, showing, 25,7 dusmiktos, difficult to mix, 98,1
diaballô, to pass over, 89,29 dusôpeô, to be constrained, 57,17
diaboaô, to be celebrated, 90,24 (m/p) (m/p)
diadekhomai, to follow, 103,6 dussunesia, dull wittedness, 56,26
diadokhê, succession, 140,30 dustukheô, to be ill-fated, 116,25
diagô, to be drawn through, 186,3 (m/p) dustukhês, unfortnate, 82,11
eidêsis, knowledge, 55,8 epathlon, prize, 25,26
eidêtikos, formal, 184,23 epauxanô, to increase, 81,24 (m/p)
eikosaedron, icosahedron, 12,19 epeidon, to look into, 133,28
eisagô, to introduce, 129,3 epeiseimi, to impinge, 81,31
eisdekhomai, to accept, 100,11 epêreazô, to despise, 185,4
eisoikizô, to settle in, 141,28 (m/p) ephikneomai, to touch, 47,14
ekbainô, to deviate, 53,7 ephodos, argument, 63,6
ekballô, to cast out, 100,7 epibainô, to preside over, 107,16
ekdekhomai, to understand, 23,22 epideixis, indication, 170,12
ekleipô, to give out, 155,3 epididômi, to increase, 47,19
ekneazô, to be renewed, 98,11 (m/p) epiginôskô (epigignôskô in LSJ), to
ekpheugô, to escape, 185,19 witness, 45,9
ekphlogoô, to make fiery, 99,19 epikeimai, to lie on top, 66,21
ekphôneô, to proclaim, 106,6 epikêros, perishable, 114,10
ekphusaô, to spout out, 187,7 epilambanô, to occupy, 22,2
ekteinô, to be stretched out, 168,11 epilêsmôn, forgetful, 135,3
(m/p) epilogos, epilogue, 48,29
ektrepô, to turn aside, 66,10 epimelês, careful, 102,16
elaion, olive oil, 66,24 epinaô, to bestow, 106,3
eleeinos, to be pitied, 46,13 epipan, for the most part, 24,17
eleutheros, free, 76,29 epiphanês, well-known, 67,23
ellampô, to shine out, 97,30 epiphora, conclusion, 30,19
ellampsis, illumination, 141,24 epipotheô, to yearn, 193,33
elpizô, to hope, 25,30 epiprostheô, to cover, 187,18
emmelês, appropriate, 26,19 episkêptô, to accuse, 194,31
empimprêmi, to set on fire, 200,31 episkhô, to occupy, 22,8
enallassô, to alternate, 193,9 episkiazô, to leave in the dark, 119,6
enallax, alternately, 139,32 epistamai, to understand, 28,15
endeô, to bind, 128,15 epistêmonikos, scientific, 55,8
endoterô, inner, 179,16 epitasis, increase, 74,8
enegeirô (not in LSJ; cf. egeirô), to epitekhnêsis, artifice, 56,2
awaken, 55,18 epitithêmi, to impose, 26,20
eneimi, to be in, 48,29 epizêteô, to seek, 34,28
eneimi, to be possible, 150,15 epokhê, position, 83,2
enkephalos, brain, 73,18 êrema, quietly, 131,23
enkosmios, inside the cosmos, 117,16 ergazomai, to make, 76,12
enspeirô, to be emplanted, 141,13 erêmoô, to be bereaved, 142,4 (m/p)
(m/p) erôs, Love, 55,18
entelekheia, actualisation, 22,22 eruthrainomai, to blush, 88,18
enteuxis, reading, 25,32 etumologeô, to derive a word, 119,2
entheazô, to be divinely inspired, etumologia, etymology, 49,11
113,25 euarmostos, harmonious, 84,8
enthousiaô, to be divinely inspired, eudiairetos, easy to divide, 76,10
34,19 eudiakritos, discriminating, 75,1
epagôgê, induction, 169,9 euêthês, naïve, 183,32
epalêtheuô, to be true of, 58,13 eukairos, apropos, 90,19
epanalambanô, to resume, 153,10 eukinêtos, mobile, 161,9
epanapauô, to be based on, 199,21 eukraês, temperate, 84,17
(m/p) eulutos, easy, 193,29
epanerkhomai, to go up again, 72,14 euporeô, to find a solution, 163,5
epanô, above, 53,20 eusunkritos, synthesising, 75,2
epantheô, to blossom forth, 130,24 euthugrammos, rectilinear, 180,10
epaphê, contact, 66,2 euthuna, criticism, 136,9
epaporeô, to ask also, 51,15 euthunô, to correct, 140,5
euthuporos, moving in a straight hololampês, shining everywhere,
line, 65,31 85,14
eutukhês, fortunate, 185,2 homogenês, of the same genus, 30,4
exairô, to be raised, 65,32 (m/p) homognômoneô, to agree, 141,12
exaitheroô, to be made bright, 65,21 homoiôsis, likeness, 97,7
(m/p) homonoêtikos, harmonious, 115,17
exakontizô, to be thrown, 36,17 (m/p) hopêi, how, 157,21
exallassô, to differ, 31,11 (m/p) hopôsdêpote (see hopôs dê in LSJ), in
exêgêtikos, exegetical, 179,29 any way, 120,9
exeimi, to depart, 100,15 hugiainô, to be sound, 121,14
exeptuô, to spit out, 131,30 humnô, to make hymns to, 93,13
exesti, it is possible, 124,24 hupagô, to be led, 26,30 (m/p)
exetasis, examination, 201,10 hupargoreuô, to refer to, 12,11
exetazô, to consider, 194,20 huperbainô, to be too much, 67,15
exisasmos, equivalence, 162,28 huperbaton, hyperbaton, 153,13
exomoiôoô, to make similar, 100,24 huperedrazô (not in LSJ; cf. edrazô),
exôterô, outer, 178,22 to place above, 86,8
huperidruô, to be seated above,
geloios, ridiculous, 133,28 118,19 (m/p)
gennadas, gentleman, 48,14 hupexistêmi, to make room for,
gennêtikos, related to reproduction, 161,12
123,23 huphaireô, to take away, 34,26
geômetrês, geometer, 128,12 huphesis, declination, 135,24
geômetrikos, geometrical, 178,12 huphiêmi, to descend, 138,19
gêraskô, to get older, 98,10 huphizô, to lie at the bottom, 22,23
gigantikos, gigantesque, 86,4 hupodeigma, example, 198,3
glaphuros, elegant, 56,17 hupodeiknumi, to indicate, 80,29
glukus, sweet, 193,6 hupomnêma, commentary, 26,16
gnêsios, authentic, 12,22 huponoia, guesswork, 126,10
gnômê, view, 169,29 hupoptos, under suspicion, 195,13
gnôstikos, cognitive, 104,4 hupotattô (hupotassô in LSJ), to be
gnôstos, knowable, 55,17 subsumed (Iamblichus), 169,5 (m/p)
gônia, angle, 130,3
gramma, something written, 28,12 idiôtês, uneducated amateur, 73,25
graphê, what is written, 152,32 idiôtikos, amateurish, 191,6
gumnasia, exercise, 46,11 isarithmos, equal in number, 31,15
gumnos, uncovered, 135,4 isêmerinos (kuklos), equator, 25,2
iskhus, strength, 77,32
haphê, contact, 119,29 isodunameô, to mean the same
hêdeôs, with pleasure, 135,31 thing, 18,13
hedrazô, to be seated, 65,18 (m/p) isodunamos, having an equal power,
hekaterôthi, on either side, 134,31 84,6
hekatontapêkhus, of one hundred isokhronios, of the same age, 78,11
cubits, 186,16 isomegethês, equal in size, 84,7
hêmipodion, half a foot, 186,19 isotakhês, moving with equal speed,
hêmisus, half, 186,18 24,23
hermêneuô, to explain, 66,32 ithutenês, straight, 180,10
hêssaomai, to be diminished, 102,30
heteroeidês, of a different kind, 198,9 kainoprepês, novel, 59,9
heterokinêtos, moved by something kakotropia, badness of character,
else, 53,18 156,27
hidruô, to settle, 65,2 (m/p) kakourgia, malice, 183,16
hidrusis, foundation, 55,20 kakourgos, malicious, 182,22
historia, account, 117,27 kallos, beauty, 55,18
katabasis, moving down, 36,31 krasis, mixture, 130,19
katadokhê, receiving, 169,16 kritikos, being a judge, 184,18
katakhraomai, to misuse, 28,6 krokodeilos (see krokodilos in LSJ),
katakrinô, to be judged, 31,6 (m/p) crocodile, 29,16
katalêgô, to end, 195,29 kuathos, cup, 81,26
katalêptos, capable of being
apprehended, 33,13 lamprotêta, brightness, 89,8
katamanthanô, to see, 104,32 leptomereia, having fine parts, 30,36
kataphroneô, to despise, 165,4 leptotês, fineness, 72,22
kataplêxis, dumbfounding, 131,31 lêrêma, absurdity, 75,15
katapsêphizomai, to condemn, 159,8 lian, excessively, 75,13
katapsukhô, to be cooled down, 83,33 lithôdês, stony, 16,19
(m/p) logikos, rational, 169,11 (Iamblichus)
kataptustos, worthy to be spit upon, logismos, reasoning, 135,2
26,30 logizomai, to take into account, 82,10
katathrauô, to be broken into pieces, lutta (lussa in LSJ), frenzy, 58,15
85,17 (m/p)
katêgoros, prosecutor, 25,25 makrobios, living a long time, 142,11
kateimi, to go down, 36,12 makrologeô, to discuss at length,
katekhô, to occupy, 169,14 121,24
(Iamblichus) (m/p) maniôdês, mad, 88,28
kathaptô, to touch, 126,11 manôsis, rarefaction, 37,5
katharotês, purity, 72,21 marainô, to waste away, 73,30 (m/p)
katharsis, cleaning up, 119,12 mathêsis, learning, 59,27
kathêkô, to reach, 48,13 megaleiotês, greatness, 139,13
kathôs, seeing that, 163,29 megalorrêmôn, magniloquent, 42,18
katorthoô, to set straight, 59,6 meiôtos, subject to diminution, 112,2
keleuô, to order, 107,8 mêkhanaomai, to construct, 141,25
kenôsis, emptying, 161,8 mêkhanêma, arrangement, 84,28
kentrikos, central, 65,20 mêkunô, to set out at length, 102,15
kerannumi, to mix, 130,19 melania, blackness, 97,24
keratoeidês khitôn, cornea, 47,12 melanotês, dark colour, 174,33
khairô, to rejoice, 26,3 melitta (melissa in LSJ), bee, 98,7
kharaktêr, characteristic, 48,33 melopoios, lyric poet, 156,26
kheiragôgeô, to be guided, 66,28 mesêmbria, noon, 83,7
(m/p) metabolikos, changeable, 114,14
khiôn, snow, 76,25 metagraphô, to change a text, 171,6
khitôn, see keratoeidês khitôn metamelomai, to regret, 46,4
khliaros, lukewarm, 127,19 metaskhêmatizô, to change shape,
khôrêtikos, receptive, 76,7 142,32 (m/p)
khrêsimos, useful, 67,27 metastasis, change, 91,16
khronios, for a long time, 78,4 meteôros, high, 65,33
khudên, in droves, 184,22 meterkhomai, to pursue, 92,26
khuma, mass, 84,10 methuô, to be drunk, 134,29
khusis, flow, 40,1 metokhê, participation, 97,11
kinduneuô, to be in danger, 161,10 morphoô, to receive shape, 129,21
koinônia, commonality, 15,30 (m/p)
koloios, jackdaw, 42,17 (said of Mukônos, mush, 135,9 (on which see
Philoponus) the note)
kolumbêthra, pool, 66,9 mutheuô, to be mythical, 135,29 (m/p)
kompazô, to boast, 135,30
korônê, gull, 142,29 nastos, solid, 173,28
koruphê, zenith, 83,9 naupêgos, shipbuilder, 127,2
kosmikos, cosmic, 39,31 nearos, young, 42,17
nemesaô, to take offence, 26,18 parekduomai, to sneak out, 42,19
neogenês, new-born, 101,31 paremballô, to bring in, 108,18
nêphô, to be sober, 134,29 parepomai, to accompany, 89,5
neuron, sinew, 78,4 paristêmi, to call on, 68,6
nomos, rule, 28,20 parorama, mistake, 122,33
nomotheteô, to decree, 49,21 paula, cessation, 122,6
nukterinos, night, 124,16 peithô, to persuade, 119,8
pêkhuaios, being a cubit long, 186,15
oikêma, house, 81,29 pelagos, sea, 66,8
oikhomai, to depart, 98,28 pempô, to send away, 101,10
okhêma, vehicle, 116,28 pera, beyond, 107,20
okheô, to ride, 27,16 (m/p) perieimi, to go around, 171,31
oktahedron, octahedron, 12,19 perikaluptô, to envelop, 80,5
onos, donkey, 148,19 perinosteô, to wander about, 67,21
ophelos, use, 72,30 periphuô, to grow around, 27,14 (m/p)
oregô, to desire, 71,14 (m/p) peripiptô, to fall into, 137,21
orektikos, desiderative, 123,24 peripoieô, to preserve, 200,28
orophos, roof, 173,29 periptuô, to loathe, 185,1
osmê, smell, 97,25 perirreô, to flow around, 65,19
oudamothen, in no direction, 182,8 perispaô, to be diverted, 201,8 (m/p)
oxus, high, 184,5 perisphingô, to contract, 161,8
oxutês, acuteness, 97,24 perissartios, odd times even, 29,29
peristrephô, to revolve, 14,16 (m/p)
paidia, jest, 176,30 phantazô, to imagine, 134,28 (m/p)
pais, child, 159,3 phasis, phase, 36,32
paizô, to jest, 176,28 Philia, Love, 140,25 (referring to
pakhunô, to be thickened, 161,6 (m/p) Empedocles)
pakhus, thick, 162,1 philikos, friendly, 156,14
panteleios, absolutely complete, 39,20 philosopheô, to be a philosopher, 59,9
paradosis, teaching, 87,18 philotimia, pride, 170,13
paraineô, to espouse, 55,14 phleps, vein, 78,4
parakaleô, to call upon, 119,12 phthanô, to precede, 91,28
parakharattô (parakharassô in phusaô, to be inflated, 74,20 (m/p)
LSJ), to debase, 35,14 phusiologia, study of nature, 31,30
parakhôreô, to cede, 66,24 pimplêmi, to be made full, 131,14
parakhrôsis, slight alteration, 100,20 (m/p)
paraleipô, to leave out, 32,26 piston (see pistos in LSJ),
paralogismos, fallacy, 26,26 trustworthiness, 59,30
paralogizomai, to be fraudulent, pistoô, to confirm, 64,32 (m/p)
186,10 plagios, lateral, 15,12
paralogos, fallacious, 112,26 plastinx, disk of a balance, 68,15
paramutheomai, to express, 144,13 platos, breadth, 48,12
parangellô, to urge, 78,9 platus, loose, 135,31
paraphtheirô, to debase, 26,33 pleonakis, many times, 118,26
paraplekô, to be woven in, 37,31 pleonekteô, to overbear, 102,29
(m/p) plêsiasmos, nearness, 72,19
parapoduomai, to get ready for, plessô, to strike, 159,8
123,4 plinthinos, made of clay, 50,25
paraskeuê, siege engine, 139,27 pneuma, wind, 36,17
parastasis, showing, 106,26 podiaios, one foot long, 186,12
paratrekhô, to pass over, 42,16 pollaplasiasmos, multiplication,
paratripsis, rubbing, 88,20 93,13
pareisdusis, entrance, 85,20 polukhronios, lasting a long time,
pareiskukleô, to digress, 184,8 78,1
polustikhos, of many pages, 25,29 prosphuês, suitable, 178,7
polutimêtos, much-honoured, 95,24 prosthaphairesis, addition and
pôpote, ever, 26,19 subtraction, 36,30
porizô, to furnish oneself with, 72,11 prothumia, desire, 25,28
(m/p) proupokeimai, to be laid down in
potimos, sweet, 201,1 advance, 59,29
pragmateuomai, to deal with, 92,11 ptênos, winged, 79,11
prepô, to belong, 23,10 ptêsis, flight, 79,11
presbus, early, 32,15 puknos, dense, 54,13
proaireô, to choose, 137,27 puramis, pyramid, 12,19
proaphôneô, to announce previously, puretos, fever, 73,20
61,6 (aorist)
proaxioô (not in LSJ; see Lampe sathrotês, unsoundness, 165,4
(1961)), to maintain previously, sebomai, to reverence, 74,15
177,23 (aorist) selis, a papyrus column (translated
probainô, to move forward, 66,16 ‘page’), 25,33
prodeiknumi, to prove first, 162,28 sêmasia, meaning, 119,6
(aorist passive) sêmeron, today, 138,6
proeipon, to have said initially, semnunô, to glorify, 57,19
153,10 sêpedôn, putrefaction, 131,15
proekkeimai, to be set out, 165,10 sêpô, to putrefy, 131,12 (m/p)
proektithêmi, to set out, 146,9 sidêros, iron, 113,15
progignôskô, to know in advance, skaptô, to be dug, 191,1 (m/p)
135,14 skedastos, prone to scatter, 65,12
prokatekhô, to be occupied skênoma, tabernacle, 141,27
previously, 22,2 (m/p) (Septuagint)
prokhôreô, to advance, 186,22 skiamakhia, jousting with shadows,
promanteuomai, to foresee, 86,4 185,2
pronoêtikos, providential, 143,22 skôlêx, worm, 98,17
pronoia, foresight, 73,21 skopeô, to investigate, 189,18
prooimion, prologue, 48,29 skulakion, puppy, 101,31
proomologeô, to be agreed in sophia, wisdom, 25,33
advance, 64,12 (m/p) sôphroneô, to be of sound mind, 89,7
prophainô, to emerge, 52,13 (m/p) speudô, to strive, 65,14
prophêtês, prophet, 141,26 sphallô, to make fall down, 35,18
propheteuô, to act as a prophet, 106,6 sphêx, wasp, 98,7
prophtheirô, to perish already, 73,19 sphodra, very, 185,26
(m/p) sporadên, scatteredly, 178,27
prorrêteon, should be said first, stasiazô, to conflict, 115,18
126,20 stegô, to hold onto, 134,31
prosanankazô, to constrain, 161,17 stenokhôreô, to be pressed, 189,29
prosauxêsis, further increase, 43,12 (m/p)
prosdeô, to need in addition, 169,7 stereôma, firmament (Septuagint),
prosêgoros, in agreement, 156,10 90,17
prosekteon, one should pay sternon, chest, 48,28
attention, 11,15 stikhos, line (of writing), 124,18
prosexeuriskô, to devise in addition, stoikheiôdês, of an element, 85,21
59,13 stoikheiokratôr, ruler of the
proskairos, transient, 143,28 elements, 107,15
proskrinô, to be assimilated, 47,3 stratêgos, general, 87,6
(m/p) stratopedon, army, 87,7
proslogizomai, to factor in, 79,23 sukê, fig-tree, 30,2
prosphluareô (a hapax not in LSJ), sukophantês, bribed witness, 163,12
to add nonsense, 193,8 sullegô, to gather, 67,21
sulluoô, to be dissolved sungraphê, book, 67,15
simultaneously, 105,17 (m/p) sungraphô, to write down, 176,14
summartureô, to also give support, sunkataskeuazô, to be established
71,20 together with, 38,21 (m/p)
summenô, to endure together, 83,30 sunkhôrêsis, agreement, 188,21
sumparatheô, to move along with, sunkhraomai, to use, 45,16
95,13 sunkrasis, comparison, 113,8
sumperipoleô, to revolve with, 20,25 sunkrima, composition, 84,20
sumpherô, to be carried along with, sunkrisis, comparison, 17,28
42,24 (m/p) sunkritikos, comparative, 74,8
sumphônia, harmony, 143,16 sunkrouô, to bring into conflict,
sumphtheirô, to perish along with, 131,21
156,19 (m/p) sunkukaô, to mush together, 135,9
sumphuês, inborn, 143,26 sunneusis, convergence, 65,24
sumphurô, to be blended together, sunophruoomai, to frown, 88,19
131,14 (m/p) sunôtheô, to push, 161,10
sumphusis, blending, 85,31 suntaxis, ordering, 156,24
sumpleonazô (not in LSJ), to be sunteleia, completion, 88,3
magnified along with, 81,28 (m/p) suntomia, brevity, 178,27
sumplêrôtikos, filling out, 167,15 susphinxis (not in LSJ; see Lampe
sumplokê, combination, 26,26 (1961)), being held together, 46,3
sumproerkhomai, to proceed sustasiôtês, member of the same
together with, 94,15 sect, 91,18
sunalatheuô, to be true together, sustrephô, to get serious, 136,11 (m/p)
136,7
sunanakerannumai, to be mixed takhos, speed, 31,12
together, 85,27 takhutês, speed, 143,4
sunanakineô, to be stirred up tapeinos, low, 37,23
together with, 55,10 (m/p) tarattô (tarasssô in LSJ), to be
sunantaô, to meet, 197,25 disturbed, 140,9 (m/p)
sunapelenkhô (not in LSJ; see tegos, roof, 40,18
Lampe (1961)), to be refuted as tekhnitês, craftsman, 180,8
well, 66,14 (m/p) teleiôtikos, bringing completion,
sunapodeiknumi, to demonstrate 97,10
together, 41,32 telmation (cf. telma in LSJ), swamp,
sunapokatastasis, keeping pace 66,9
together, 37,35 temnô, to cut, 181,33
sunarmozô, to harmonise, 156,21 têrêsis, observation, 117,25
sunauxanô, to expand along with, tetragônon (see tetragônos in LSJ),
82,1 (m/p) rectangle, 14,14
sundesis, binding, 84,32 themelioô, to establish, 141,29
sundromê, coincidence, 97,31 (Septuagint)
sunêgoria, support, 72,11 theogonia, theogony, 93,11
sunêgoros, providing support, 67,24 theôrêma, theorem, 188,19
suneisagô, to bring, 198,67 theôria, investigation, 195,14
sunekphainô, to appear together, theosebeô, to honour god, 26,4
130,30 (m/p) theosebês, reverential, 26,13
sunektrekhô, move along with, 87,10 thêratês, searcher, 25,23
sunemphainô, to also indicate, thermasia, heat, 83,5
118,24 thermê, heat, 115,2
sunephaptomai, to join in, 201,1 thôlôdês, turbid, 65,21
sunergos, working together, 119,12 thrêskeia, worship, 141,25
sungeneia, kinship, 43,25 thruleô, to chatter, 26,10
sungramma, work, 49,11 thumikos, relating to desire, 123,23
timê, esteem, 26,8 trugê, sludge, 84,24
timiotês, value, 55,22 trugôdês, sludgy, 84,21
timôria, retribution, 84,29 tupoô, to depict, 177,18
tolmêma, adventure, 25,34 tupos, impression, 184,17
tolmêros, rash, 134,26
trakhus, rough, 26,17 zêtêtikos, making enquiry, 158,32
trekhô, to run, 184,4 zô, to live, 67,25
triodos, trivium, 131,28 zôidiakos (ho), zodiac, 14,25
tripêkhus, three-cubit, 47,9 zôigonos, (no iota subscript in LSJ),
trokhos, wheel, 15,2 generating life, 115,6
tropaion, trophy, 200,24 zôikos, animal, 53,17
Index of Passages
(a) Passages quoted by Simplicius
For Philoponus and Alexander see Appendices 1 and 2. In section (b) of Textual
Questions I indicate places where Heiberg’s text of a quotation deviates from
standard versions.
ALCAEUS 129,11-14; 1.7, 191a3-4: 133,13-14;

Fragment 393 (Campbell (1982)): 1.7, 191a3-7: 125,25-8;
156,26 1.7, 191a13-14: 126,1-2;
ARISTOTLE 1.8, 191a27-31: 137,7-11;
Categories 5, 3b27: 168,21; 5, 4.9, 217a26-7: 166,7-8
4a10-11: 157,26-158,1; 14, EMPEDOCLES (DK31)
15a22-4: 111,30 B17,7-8, 10-13: 141,1-6
De Caelo (outside of 1.3, 270a11-4) MELISSUS (DK30)
1.2, 268b14-18: 132,22-5; 1.10, B7, 7-8: 113,21
280a31-2: 140,21; 1.11, 280b11-12: PARMENIDES (DK28)
120,25-6; 1.11, 280b13: 120,27; B8, 6-9: 137,3-7
1.11, 280b15-16: 120,21-2; 2.1, PLATO
284a14: 112,18-19; 4.4, 311a16-29: Laws 8, 894A1-8: 103,23-8
160,34 Timaeus 27D6-28A4: 104,5-8;
Metaphysics 8.4, 1044b3-8: 134,3-7; 28B6-8: 104,10-12; 38B6: 105,9;
8.5, 1044b27-9: 135,16-18 38B6-7: 105,15-16; 38B7-C3:
On Coming to be and Perishing 2.3, 105,20-3; 39E1-2: 105,28-30;
330b30-331a3: 169,30-170,4 41A3-D3: 106,6-25; 41B2-4:
Physics 1.5, 188a22-6: 130,1-4; 107,2-4; 41B4: 106,4; 41C3-5:
1.5, 188a31-b26: 124,25-125,20; 107,11-12; 41D2-3: 107,14-15
1.5, 188b1-2: 121,16-17; PLOTINUS
1.5, 188b12-16: 121,17-20; Ennead 2 (Wilberding (2006)) 1,12-14:
1.5, 188b16-21: 129, 15-19; 115,30-1
1.7, 190a17-20: 122,25-7; SEPTUAGINT (Rahlfs (1935))
1.7, 190a18-20: 128,23-5; Psalms 18.5: 141,27; 104.5:
1.7, 190b1-5: 141,29-142,1
(b) Early texts cited in the notes

Only passages not cited in (a) are mentioned here. References are to the line in the
Greek text where a footnote number occurs.
ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS ARISTOTLE

In Metaph. (CAG 1) 22,2-3: 133,29; Categories 5, 3b24-5: 168,19: 5,
169,18-19: 133,29; 375,37-376,1: 3b24-7: 123,16; 157,34; 5, 3b27:
133,29 168,21; 7, 6b15-19: 123,29; 8,
ARISTOPHANES 8b26-7: 173,31; 10: 128,25; 173,26;
Wasps (Wilson (2007)), 1019: 145,26 14, 15a22-4: 111,20; 114,11
213
214 Index of Passages
De Anima 2.1, 412a11-21: 200,11; 2.7, 307,14-309,12: 123,12; 9: 136,17;
318b3-20: 124,12 11: 135,28; 11.5, 423,13-424,4:
De Caelo (outside of 1.3.270a11-14) 163,31
1.1, 268a6-7: 178,33; 1.2, in Cat. (CAG 13.1) 48,7-27: 173,31;
268b20-2: 146,10; 1.2, 269a18-30: 64,9-68,9: 166,21; 74,13-27: 165,13;
91,29; 1.9, 278b3-4: 135,18; 1.9, 169,30; 144,2-14: 173,31;
279a7-9: 135,18; 1.10, 279b12-17: 179,18-21: 124,12
139,27; 1.10-12: 103,7; 1.11, in De An. (CAG 15) 341,10-342,16:
280b6-20: 119,14; 1.11, 280b14-16: 124,12
120,29; 1.11, 280b20-23: 120,29; in GC (CAG 14.2) 229,22-230,7: 169,30
1.12: 103,8; 2.1, 283b26-30: in Phys. (CAG 17) 557,8-589,26:
120,29; 2.6, 289a19-28: 124,15; 3.8, 173,25
307b8-9: 123,28 On the Creation of the World
De Sensu 4, 442b19-20: 123,28 (Reichardt (1897)) 2.6: 124,12; 5.5,
Metaphysics 5.14, 1020a32-b2: 216,22-3: 124,5
166,21; 12.6-9: 116,29 PLATO
On Coming to be and Perishing 2.3-4: Parmenides 137E3-5: 187,18
168,28; 2.3, 331a1-3: 168,28 Phaedrus 243B6: 135,4; 245D1-3:
Physics 1.7, 190b12-14: 128,20; 1.7, 93,19; 264B6: 136,12
191a3-7: 101,15; 102,11; 1.7, Sophist 252C6-9: 145,26; 256A6-7:
191a13-14: 102,12; 168,23; 5.1: 139,34
101,2; 8.1, 250b30-251a3: 140,32; Statesman 269C4 ff.: 143,20;
8.6: 116,29; 8.6, 259b32-260a19: 269D7-E2: 96,19; 104,32; 270A5:
200,17; 8.8, 261b28-262a17: 151,4; 143,23
8.10: 142,22 Timaeus 28A5-6: 93,1; 126,24;
Topics 2.10, 114b37-115a14: 146,16; 30B3-4: 200,10; 31B5-6: 140,10:
6.11, 148b27: 187,18 38B6:140,10; 41A3-B6: 143,11;
[ARISTOTLE] 41A3-D3: 154,16; 41A7-B6: 108,28;
De Mundo 1, 392a4-8: 119,4 143,13; 41A7-D3: 138,25; 143,30;
On Plants 2.4, 825b14-18: 124,5 41B3-5: 108,32; 56D5-6: 105,34;
ATTICUS 58C5-8: 131,1
Fragments (des Places (1977)) 5: 112,8 PORPHYRY
DEXIPPUS in Cat. (CAG 4.10) 132,12-19: 111,8
in Cat. (CAG 4.1) 51,23-53,25: 165,13 PRISCIAN OF LYDIA
EUCLID Paraphrase of Theophrastus (Bywater
Elements 1 (Heiberg (1883)), prop. 1: (1886)) 8,15-16: 124,12
180,22 PROCLUS
HERMEIAS OF ALEXANDRIA in Euc. (Friedlein (1873)) 109,21:
Commentary on the Phaedrus 187,18
(Couvreur (1901)) 111,25-6: 133,29 Platonic Theology 1 (Saffrey and
HIEROCLES OF ALEXANDRIA Westerink (1968)) 91,27-92,1:
Commentary on the Golden Verses 133,29
(Koehler (1974)) 120,6-8: 133,29 SCHOLIA ON LUCIAN (Rabe (1906))
HOMER 246,15: 140,31
Iliad (West (2000)) 22, 26: 131,8 SIMPLICIUS
Odyssey (Van Thiel (1991)) 19, 163: in Cael. (other than the text
131,8 translated here): 8,12-14; 178,33;
IAMBLICHUS 18,9-15: 117,15; 21,14-25: 164,32;
On The Mysteries (des Places (1966)) 26,23-8: 170,12; 34,13-21: 164,32;
159-60: 133,29 35,12-20: 164,32; 55,25 ff.: 171,22;
JOHN PHILOPONUS 73,12-15: 142,19; 89,4-7: 124,9;
Against Proclus 4.14, 93,23: 106,7; 6: 293,11-301,28: 139,27;
107,23; 139,27; 6.7. 144,6-15: 438,30-439,13: 124,15
107,4; 6.29, 235,4-8: 143,11; 8.3, in Cat. (CAG 8) 65,2-13: 173,31;
Index of Passages 215
87,24-102,10: 166,21; SIMPLICIUS(?)
105,24-110,25: 165,13; in de An. (CAG 11) 133,7-21: 124,12
105,27-106,2: 169,9; 106,28-107,3: STRABO
169,22; 107,25-30: 169,22 Geography (Radt (2002-9)) 10.5.9:
in Phys. (CAG 9 and 10): 53,26: 135,9
140,32; 111,23-4: 113,21; 113,8-9: THEMISTIUS
113,21; 158,1-159,4: 140,32; in Cael. (CAG 5.4) 14,23-6: 131,22;
233,3-10: 126,1; 601,1-645,19: 19,20-3: 177,4; 20,4-6: 188,6;
173,25; 686,19-690,17: 166,8; 20,8-11: 189,2
801,6-9: 101,2; 1064,3: 100,20; VALERIUS MAXIMUS
1129,29-1152,19: 201,10; 1140,24: Memorable Doings and Sayings
137,11; 1144,7: 137,11; (Shackleton Bailey (2000))
1156,28-1169,9: 201,10; 8.14.ext. 5: 200,32
1171,30-1182,39: 201,10;
1326,38-1336,34: 201,10;
1360,24-1363,24: 154,9
Index of Names
(a) Names mentioned by Simplicius
In many cases information on an item or a reference to where information can be
found is provided in a note on a given passage. Page and line numbers indicate
where a given name is found.
Alcaeus: 156,26 (his words ‘the pig is 120,5.7.14.16.20.24 (dispute with

worked up again’ referred to Philoponus over Aristotle’s
Philoponus) distinction among senses of
Alexander (of Aphrodisias): 52 genêtos); 121,9.11.15.16.20.25.28;
occurrences; see Appendix 2 122,10.18.24.28; 123,16.25;
Anaxagoras: 119,2; 270b24 (calls fire 124,14.18.22.24; 125,22;
aithêr) 126,7.8.11.14; 129,9.26.29;130,5;
Aquarius (Hudrokhoos, sign of the 131,18 (dispute with Philoponus
zodiac): 193,15 about whether Aristotle believes all
Aries (Krios, sign of the zodiac): coming to be involves contraries in
181,26.28.29.32; 182,2.3.7; the strict sense, as opposed to form
185,29.30; 186,3; 193,13.14.16.18.20 and privation); 128,16 (the
Aristotle: 92,31 (does not contradict meaning of ‘contraries’ at 270a22);
Plato on the everlastingness of the 131,21.24.26(2) (dispute with
cosmos); 101,1 makes metabolê the Philoponus about whether
genus of all sublunary tropê); Themistius corrected or correctly
102,12 (says that the general interpreted Aristotle); 131,33;
principles of coming to be are form, 132,3.18.19.31; 133,1.6.11 (dispute
privation, and substratum); 103,4 with Philoponus on the question
(the only thing he calls coming to whether for Aristotle there is a
be is the change in time from not privation corresponding to every
being into being); 103,19 (always form); 134,2; 135,10.14.32
wants to use as assumptions things (discussion of the matter of
which are clear to everyone); heaven); 136,14; 137,7; 139,1.14.20
110,24 (does not invoke (dispute about whether coming to
nourishment and growth in be always requires a substratum);
arguing that the cosmos does not 139,24.27; 140,9.18.20.23; 141,10;
increase in size); 111,11.22.30; 142,22; 143,10(2).11.12; 143,31
112,27; 113,27; 114,4.11.29 (when (dispute with Philoponus about
he says that heaven does not alter whether all the earlier
he means that it does not alter in philosophers agree that the cosmos
affection); 112,8.25 (Alexander is everlasting); 151,26; 152,3.27;
argues against those who say 153,12 (dispute with Alexander of
Aristotle holds that heaven is Aphrodisias over the interpretation
without qualities); 115,30 (Plotinus of 271a22-33); 154,8 (believes that
on his belief in a fifth element); god is an efficient cause);
116,27 (Alexander is wrong to 157,27.33; 158,30; 159,35;
think that in chapters 2 and 3 160,7.22.33; 161,2.31; 162,14.20.26
Aristotle establishes that there are (dispute with Philoponus over
gods); 119,11.14.16.22.26.31; whether Aristotle is correct to say
217
218 Index of Names
that the kinêseis of contrary things Alexander of Aphrodisias): 153,17
are contrary); 163,29.34; (his formulation of the argument
164,1.11.17; 165,7.11.33; 166,8; that there is no contrary to motion
168,17; 169,23.28 (dispute with in a circle as presented by
Philoponus over Aristotle’s implicit Alexander)
speaking about contraries of Artemis, Ephesian: 200,31
substance in De Caelo and his (Philoponus compared to the
claim in the Categories that person who set the temple of
substance has no contrary); Artemis on fire in an attempt to
170,23.25.27 (dispute with become famous)
Philoponus over whether in Augeus, dung of: 136,1 (metaphor for
270b32-271a5 Aristotle is talking Philoponus’ arguments)
about contrariety of lines or of Babylonians: 117,27 (kept records of
motions on lines); 171,33; 172,5; astronomical observations for no
173,24; 174,6.14.17; 175,10; 176,7; less than 1,440,000 years!)
191,19; 192,11; 199,3 (dispute with Cancer (Karkinos, sign of the zodiac):
Philoponus over the relevance of 181,27
various forms of contrariety to Categories (Katêgoriai):
Aristotle’s claim that circular 111,30;114,10;123,16; 128,25;
motion has no contrary); 177,23 130,4; 157,34; 158,26.33; 159,19;
(discussion of whether one motion 165,12.30.34; 166,17.25; 167,10.25;
toward the centre is contrary to the 168,18; 169,3
infinitely many motions away from Charybdis: 165,9 (Philoponus called
the center); 179,29.33; by this name)
180,27(2).30; 181,7.20 (dispute over David: 141,26 (a prophet according to
whether Aristotle claimed that the the Jews)
straight line is the measure of Democritus: 129,30; 130,1 (Physics
every length, as opposed to every 1.5, 188a22-6 quoted to show that
distance); 188,28 (dispute, Aristotle thought shapes could be
involving Themistius, over whether contrary)
the argument of 271a13-19 is new); Diagoras of Melos: 116,25 (example of
194,1 (gives argument for the atheist)
necessity of the sun’s motion on the Diogenes: 148,19 (says that donkeys
ecliptic later); 195,11.18; go after food and drink in a
196,3.7.21; 197,7; 198,3.27 straight line)
(discussion of whether motions on Empedocles of Acragas: 139,3
two circles, notably the zodiac and (mentioned by Aristotle (De Caelo
the ecliptic, are contrary); 199,31 1.10, 279b16) as a person who
(says in Physics 8 that heaven is believed in alternating worlds);
moved by a higher cause); 200,10 140,25 (according to Simplicius
(says that soul is the actuality of a made the distinction between the
natural body, not just of a body); intelligible and the perceptible
200,18 (proposed in De Caelo to world); 140,31 (quotation of
prove that heaven is everlasting on DK31B17, 7-8, 10-13)
the basis of its natural motion); Heraclitus of Ephesus: 139,34
92,29; 101,15; 102,20; 103,2; (mentioned by Aristotle (De Caelo
107,20.22.25; 108,3; 154,16.18; 1.10, 279b16) as a person who
156,29; 157,7.22; 170,11.19; believed in alternating worlds)
176,15.27.33; 177,1; 179,22.24; Hippon (in plural): 116,24 (example of
182,11; 185,8; 186,22; 189,6.20.31; atheist)
190,27; 191,10.12.21; 194,10; Egyptians: 117,25 (kept records of
198,14; 200,26; 201,2.6 (other astronomical observations for no
mentions of less interest) less than 630,000 years!)
Aristotle of Mytilene (teacher of Ethiopian: 157,30 (example)
Index of Names 219
Eurycles: 142,26 (Philoponus’ (cited for the doctrine that a first
arguments compared to people who principle does not come to be)
carry Eurycles in their stomachs) Physics: (i) Phusikê akroasis, 92,9.26;
Gemini (Didumoi, sign of the zodiac): 101,15; 108,20; 116,29; 122,12;
181,26; 182,2; 193,16) 124,23; 131,25; 133,11; 144,10;
Greeks: 117,4; 139,29; 270b7 (all have 167,27; 168,23; 199,31; 201,3; (ii)
a conception of the gods and assign Physika, 101,2; 116,2; 122,25;
heaven to the divine) 129,30; 131,29; 198,16; (iii)
Heracles: 119,12 (called upon for aid Physikê, 121,22; 200,17.23
in the combat with Philoponus) Pisces (Ikhthues, sign of the zodiac):
Hermes: 126,28; 127,1; 137,15 (in all 139,15.17.20.25
three cases mentioned in Plato: 93,2; 126,24 (says it is
connection with the carving of a impossible for anything to come to
stone statue) be without a cause at Timaeus
Iamblichus: 169,2 (his commentary on 28A); 103,21 (knows of coming to
the Categories quoted) be in the ordinary sense); 104,18
Jews: 141,26 (regard David as a (the meaning of ‘is destroyed’ at
prophet) Timaeus 28A3); 104,29 (thinks that
John Philoponus: never referred to by there is change in the cosmos
name; see Appendix 1 because it is corporeal);
Laws (Plato’s dialogue): 103,23 (cited 105,7.28.32; 106,26; 107,5 (thinks
to show that Plato knows the the cosmos is everlasting);
ordinary sense of ‘come to be’ as 108,32.34 (what he means when
well as the sense in which things the creator says at Timaeus 41B3
come to be from the One) that the gods will not be destroyed
Libra (Zugos, sign of the zodiac): because of his will); 131,1 (thinks
181,28.33; 182,4.7; 185,29.31; light is a form of fire);
186,1.3 140,10.20.21.24 (Aristotle
Melissus: 113,21 (a version of understands that he thinks that
DK30B7, 7-8 quoted to support the the cosmos is everlasting); 143,11
view that what alters in any way (Like Aristotle, thinks that a finite
will eventually perish); 140,4 body has finite power); 143,13 (says
(Aristotle’s interpretation of him) that heavenly things are
Metaphysics (Meta ta phusika): indissoluble because of the will of
116,29; 134,2 god); 143,30 (separated in
Olympus (mountain): 142,13.30.32 discourse the goodness of the
(Philoponus’ claim that it has never creator from the natural existence
changed size disputed by of the cosmos in the Statesman);
Simplicius) 154,16 (says that the unmoving
On Coming to be and Perishing: (i) cause makes what it makes on its
Peri geneseôs kai phthora: 168,27; own everlasting); 200,10 (says that
169,30; (ii) Peri geneseôs: 168,30 what has mind must have soul);
On the Heavens (Peri ouranou): 92,30; 96,19; 103,3; 106,4.6;
135,18.32; 201,6 107,22.24; 143,39 (other mentions
Parmenides: 137,1 (the first person of less interest)
we know by hearing to have held Plotinus: 115,30 (Enneads 2.1, 12-14
that what is does not come to be cited in connection with Aristotle’s
from what is not; DK28B8, 6-9 reference to assumptions at 270b3)
quoted) ; 140,4 (Aristotle’s Proclus: 135,28; 136,17 (two mentions
interpretation of him) of Philoponus’ Against Proclus)
Peripatetics: 134,10 (Philoponus Pythagoreans: 140,26 (Like them,
thinks that what they call the Empedocles wrote in an enigmatic
second substratum is matter) way)
Phaedrus (Plato’s dialogue): 93,19 Rome: 195,8 (what is cold in
220 Index of Names
Alexandria is contrary to what is Scythian: 157,31 (example)
hot in Rome) Taurus (Tauros, sign of the zodiac:
Sagittarius (Toxotês, sign of the 181,26; 182,2; 193,16.18.21.25
zodiac): 182,3; 185,31 Themistius: 131,21.22.24 (said by
Saturn (Kronos, planet): 199,24 Philoponus to have corrected
(Philoponus believes that its Aristotle, whereas Simplicius
sphere moves more slowly than the thinks he has correctly understood
planetary spheres under it) Aristotle); 176,32; 177,1.9
Scorpio (Skorpios, sign of the zodiac): (Philoponus’ response to his
181,29 interpretation of 271a5-10 rejected
Socrates in the Phaedrus: 93,19 by Simplicius); 188,6.26.30
(shows that a first principle does (Philoponus’ denial of Themistius’
not come to be (245D1-3)) claim that the argument of
Son, the: 137,28 (Christians say that 271a13-19 is the same as that of
he is dependent upon god’s 271a10-13 rejected by Simplicius)
goodness and the eternal Timaeus (Plato’s dialogue): 104,3;
permanence of god’s existence) 105,8
Statesman (Plato’s dialogue): 96,8;
104,31; 143,20
(b) Scholars cited in the Introduction and in the notes to the Transla-
tion
This index does not include editors or translators of texts unless they are men-
tioned for their position on an editorial or interpretive issue; reference to a page
and line of the text translated indicates the place of a note in which the scholar in
question is mentioned.
126,1; 131,4; 135,9; 138,10; 140,19;
Allan, D.J., The text commented on, n. 141,2(2).27; 149,16; 152,1; 156,26;
3; 152,4 157,31; 165,35; 169,31.32; 173,9;
Baltes, Matthias: 108,30 174,2; 178,14.30; 181,4.20;
Bergk, Theodor: Introduction, n. 28 185,2.29; 187,12; 189,19; 196,9.13;
Bessarion, Basilius: Introduction, p. 197,3.20; 198,2; 200,4
21; 106,15; 140,19; 149,16; 185,29; Joachim, Harold H.: 169,30.31.32
197,20 Karsten, Simon: Introduction, pp. 21,
Boniz, H.: 137,11 22; 94,5: 96,11; 97,22; 106,15;
Bossier, F., Introduction, p. 21; 120,3; 117,8; 118,23; 120,12; 123,2;
138,10; 157,31; 174,2; 197,3 124,30; 125,4.19; 135,9; 140,19;
Cornford, F.M.: 106,10 141,2; 146,25; 149,16; 152,1;
Davidson, Herbert A.: 119,14 156,26; 169,31.32; 178,15; 185,29;
Évrard, Étienne: 124,12 187,12; 196,9.13; 197,20; 198,2;
Gantz, Timothy: 136,1 200,4
Giannantoni, Gabriele: 148,19 Kazhdan, Alexander P.: 105,24
Hankinson, R.J.: Introduction, p. 21, Leggatt, Stuart: 152,4
n. 3; 94,5; 95,17; 96,11; 97,15; Longo, Oddone: Introduction, n. 17
98,8.22; 106,4; 108,21; 147,9; Moraux, Paul: Introduction, p. 22;
148,19; 149,16; 152,10; 154,17; 139,33; 140,23; 146,25; 152,4;
155,12 153,17; 169,2
Heiberg, J.L.: Introduction, pp. 20, 21, Mioni, Elpidio: Introduction, p. 21
22; 96,11; 97,15.18; 97,22.30; 98,10; Peyron, Amadeo: Introduction, n. 95
100,13; Rahlfs, Alfred: 141,27.28
106,4.7.10.12.14.15.17.24.25; Rivaud, Albert: 104,5;
109,5.25; 118,23; 120,3.12; 122,25; 106,7.10.12.14.15.17.24.25
123,2; 124,30; 125,4.5.25.26.27; Rescigno, Andrea: Introduction, n. 3;
Index of Names 221
108,30; 110,14; 112,8; 152,10.32; Whittaker, John: 93,20; 104,5
194,25 Wildberg, Christian: Introduction, p.
Ross, W.D.: 122,25; 124,29.30; 22 n. 3, also n. 3(2), n. 10; 119,14;
125,3.4.5.25.26; 126,1; 129,11.30; 124,12; 141,19; 173,9; 174,2;
137,11 180,22; 187,16; 194,23.24; 197,3
Sorabji, Richard: Introduction, n. 13; Wright, M.R.: 140,32; 141,2(2)
123,18; 143,11
Wartelle, André: Introduction, pp. 20,
21, 22
Subject Index
aithêr: 118,16-24; 119,2-6 heaven: does not come to be or perish:

changes, active and passive: 91,25-92,21; 107,26-108,14; does
159,26-162,14 not increase or diminish:
coming to be (and perishing): the 109,18-110,32; the sense in which
senses of: 92,27-107,19; the senses heaven changes in quality and the
distinguished by Aristotle: sense in which it does not: 97,5-17;
119,13-121,4; coming to be of 111,3-115,20; Aristotle’s view that
Being, heaven, and the cosmos heaven and the cosmos are
from the One: 92,33-98,15; everlasting: 103,4-21; the sense in
137,16-138,31; 199,27-200,21; its which Plato says heaven comes to
place in the sublunary world: be and the sense in which he
98,15-102,31; does all coming to be denies it: 103,21-107,19; 108,28-
involve contraries in the strict 109,8; long-time observation
sense or does some involve form confirms its everlastingness:
and privation? 121,4-131,31 117,21-118,9; 142,7-143,9
concavity and convexity: 145,26-146,1; hupekkauma: 164,24-165,2
173,25-176,12 infinite and finite: 146,18-147,21
confidence, confirmation (pistis): lines and motions: 170,22-171,17
116,5-15; 118,11-13 mathematics and physics:
consensus among philosophers: 178,7-179,23
139,23-142,7 matter: 133,21-136,12; 139,9-12
contraries: 97,17-100,15; privation and form: 101,19-102,14; is
101,11-102,14; 109,8-15; there a privation corresponding to
123,11-124,17; 128,16-129,3; the form of heaven (or the cosmos)?
173,10-25; 175,4-176,12; 122,2-14; 132,4-133,19
177,1-179,23; 185,23-187,16; simple motions and simple bodies:
contrary motions: 145,12-16; 144,29-145,9
146,1-11; 146,18-147,21; straight line as measure of length or
147,23-148,14; 148,28-149,28; of distance: 179,24-181,20;
150,3-19; 150,23-154,5; 171,17-172, 182,17-183,21
33; 185,3-22; 187,28-189,4; substance: has no contrary: 102,23;
189,28-194,5; 196,34-198,6; is 123,11-17; 157,32-158,11;
planetary motion contrary to the 159,13-16; 165,10-170,7; in what
motion of the sphere of the fixed sense substance comes to be:
stars? 154,18-156,24; 98,15-30; 101,11-102,31;
194,21-196,34; do contrary things 126,20-127,9; 129,6-19; substance
have contrary changes (motions)? and quality: 157,32-158,11;
157,26-170,7 163,10-170,10; 172,33-173,10
criteria and measures: 183,21-184.27; substratum and coming to be or
187,16-27 change: 99,24-101,2; does the
eternity and time or everlastingness: cosmos come to be from what is
93,25-94,1; 94,8-95,17; 97,12-17; not? 136,12-138,31
105,25-106,4 zodiacal motions and distances:
god, an efficient cause: 154,6-17 181,20-182,17; 185,23-186,7;
193,7-26
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SIMPLICIUS

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The present translations have been made possible by generous

Typeset by Ray Davies

Translation of the commentary 33

In most cases works are referred to by author or editor’s name and

Against Proclus = Hugo Rabe (ed.), Ioannes Philoponus, De Aeterni-

In addition the following names are used without dates:

Bessarion for emendations by the Renaissance humanist recorded in

This volume translates the second half of Simplicius of Cilicia’s

1. The disputes between Simplicius

At 270a17-20 Aristotle suggests an argument for I, the premisses of

IV. There is no contrary to circular motion;

For Simplicius the rather contorted V is clearly true (enargês) since,

The first discussions are undoubtedly the discussion of the principles

1. Substances come to be, but, according to Aristotle in the

Philoponus goes on to argue that if (as Simplicius thinks) Aristotle

Simplicius’ rejoinder to this argument seems rather weak. He claims

V. If two substances are contrary they have contrary motions.

Simplicius gives his own presentation of the arguments for IV at

V’. If two substances have contrary motions they are contrary

Second, Philoponus argues that Aristotle should have taken into

V*. If two substances are contrary they admit of contrary

or, in Philoponus’ formulation:

V*’. If two substances admit of contrary changes they are con-

Philoponus invokes Aristotle’s dictum in the Categories that:

A. The same substance can admit contraries

B. Substance has no contrary.

V**’. If two substances have contrary motions they have con-

Philoponus concedes that V**’ would entail that if something has no

V**. If two substances have contrary qualities they have con-

The statement in the Categories that there is no contrary to

However, form itself has contraries as components, e.g., the form of

I turn finally to Aristotle’s arguments in chapter 4 for IV, which,

In the case of the motions in a straight line motion is from one

In response Simplicius points out that (according to Aristotle) ‘con-

Things which naturally go to places which are contrary to one

Simplicius’ association of rectilinear motion with the kind of contrar-

Moreover, if someone assumes that the same statement which

Simplicius takes Aristotle to be arguing that motion from A to B on

From what he said before Aristotle has obtained that motions

Philoponus, perhaps with understandable exasperation, suggests

Alexander appears to have given an exegesis similar to Simplicius’.

Even if it is not possible to take a greater arc drawn on the same

In the third argument (271a10-13) Aristotle considers the case in

If contrary motions are contrary because they are from places

Simplicius’ confrontation of Philoponus on the third argument, start-

The person who takes the motions from C and D as contrary

At 181,20 we are told that Philoponus went on to argue that even

Every interval is measured by what is least;

Philoponus objects to Alexander’s addition of the words ‘and on it’ in

But if <the contrary in intervals> is found with <the straight

The arcs do not define the greatest distance in terms of which