24 Stoneman 1993 World Bank Some Lessons For SA

The World Bank: Some Lessons for South Africa
Author(s): Colin Stoneman

Source: Review of African Political Economy, No. 58, Setting an Agenda for Change in
Africa (Nov., 1993), pp. 87-98
Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.
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Review of African Political Economy No.58: 87-98
? ROAPE Publications Ltd., 1993
ISSN 0305-6244; RIX #5810
Debate
The World Bank: Some This may seem to be a loose, or

perverse, use of the word 'totalitarian-
Lessons for South Africa
ism' in this context, given the associa-
Colin Stoneman tions of the market with an 'anything
goes' philosophy. But it is easy to
Economic Orthodoxy demonstrate that all markets are in fact
interfered with by governments (and
Orthodox structural adjustment poli- other actors), and what is new about
cies, now imposed on nearly all of the 'new world order' is that for the
Africa and likely to be forced on a first time there is a single unchallenged
future South African government, will authority with the financial power to
perform a double function so far as lay down which interventions are
outside interests are concerned: they acceptable. Policies previously re-
will help to safeguard the economic garded as purely the business of
interests of both foreign capital and individual countries and not the out-
white 'kith and kin' in the region; and side world, such as infant-industry
they will attempt to prevent experi- protection, subsidies on basic foods,
mentation with alternative policies the balance between the state and the
and so reduce the 'threat of a good private sector, funding policies for
example'(Melrose, 1985) for the rest of education, health and other social
the world. services, to say nothing of trade and
exchange-rate policies, are now rou-
Structural Adjustment is not tinely regarded as subject to influence
Structural Enough if not outright determination by the
World Bank and the IMF. This is not
Structural adjustment sounds to be a just a matter of denying countries the
good idea in the face of the horrors of right to make their own mistakes, to
an apartheid-structured society or the prefer different choices to outsiders, it
corrupt, inefficient, one-party, state- is also denying them the right to use
dominated dictatorships so common the very policies of import-substitut-
in Africa until recently, and still not ing industrialisation, protection,
extinct. But I would argue that such subsidisation and state intervention
cases merely provide a pretext for that are widely accepted to have been
imposing a single economic strategy instrumental in bringing about the
worldwide, irrespective of whether success of late developing countries,
countries were actually this unaccept- such as Germany in the last century,
able socially, or unsuccessful economi- and the newly industrialised countries
cally. Having been freed of the fear of (NICs) in this. This was for some time
stalinist totalitarianism, we are now denied by World Bank ideologists, but
faced with the actuality of a world- in the face of the evidence they appear
wide market totalitarianism to which to have dropped the issue (Amsden,
no exceptions are tolerated. 1989). The metaphor of 'pulling up the
88 Review of African Political Economy
ladder after us' may seem apt, until it colonial pattern, and some even cre-
is pointed out that the powerful are ated worse structures involving cor-
still using these policies: the Japanese ruption, repression and destitution for
and South Korean markets are still the majority of their populations. But
very closed to imports and invest- some succeeded.
ment, the Multi-Fibres Agreement
(which places quotas on textile and The wholesale imposition of structural
clothing imports from third-world adjustment should thus best be seen as
countries) is still in force, and Europe a return to the former colonial rela-
still subsidises its farmers - but then tionship, this time taking a multilateral
tells Zimbabwe that it must reduce its form, but no less disadvantageous to
subsidies (which are in any case neces- the peripheral countries. It is in this
sary mainly because of the dumping of sense that some analysts have begun
excess European grain on the world using the term 'recolonisation' to de-
market). scribe the impact of structural adjust-
ment in the 1980s and early 1990s.
But what were those failed policies
that structural adjustment is seeking It has also been Largely Unsuccessful
to
reverse, and why were they instituted?
In fact they derive from post-colonial The new policy shift began with the
attempts to restructure economies away publication in 1981 of the 'Berg Re-
from the inherited colonial structures port' which argued that the problems
which featured extreme inequalities of of sub-Saharan African countries were
wealth and income internally and largely self-inflicted, through an over-
external relations that were character- emphasis on the state, neglect of
ised by free trade with a metropolitan agriculture, suppression of markets,
power. These imperial powers dic- over-valued currencies, corruption etc.
tated specialisation in primary-com- Only in the sequels (1984, 1989) was
modity production for their colonies, the influence of deteriorating terms of
in order to gain for themselves a trade, rising oil prices, and the debt
cheaper supply of inputs than was crisis, given more than passing refer-
available to their rival colonial pow- ence.
ers. The free markets inside the em-
pires prevented the colonies from Few would now claim that defence of
developing significant industry, and currencies at ten or more times their
they were obliged to buy most of their value on the world market is sensible
needs from their colonial masters. In policy, nor that states - least of all
Africa, only South Africa and Zimba- states with scarce resources of skills
bwe (then Southern Rhodesia), were should try to substitute for the market
allowed enough local power through across a wide range of economic
concessions to their settlers so as to be activities rather than making strategic
able to pursue policies of economic interventions. However, it did not take
nationalism involving the protection the World Bank to tell this to even the
of infant industries. most state-oriented countries such as
Angola and Mozambique. The latter's
This was the course most ex-colonies president, Samora Machel, made his
embarked on when they eventually famous 'The state does not sell matches'
obtained independence. To be sure, speech in 1981 before the Berg report
many of them failed to break the was published. It is also common-
Debate: World Bank & Lessonsfor South Africa 89
sense that a growing cumulative defi- Africa reworked the World Bank fig-
cit - whether on external or internal ures with different (and in my view
account -will sooner or later have to more plausible) criteria as to which
be funded (although the present UK were non-adjusters or adjusters, and
government seems to be reluctant to as to which were special cases, and got
acknowledge this). Where govern- the opposite result. The issue is there-
ments refused to recognise these truths fore unresolved, and in no way can the
adjustment policies have performed a World Bank claim that the statistics
useful function, and in some case clearly support its case (Parfitt, 1990).
brought about the preconditions for Clearly a number of World Bank
sustainable growth. But the package personnel have lost faith in structural
contains other elements, including the adjustment, and much press comment
liberalisation of the trade and foreign has been along the lines of how much
exchange regimes, privatisation, an the World Bank needs an unequivocal
end to subsidies (even if affordable), success story.
and a general minimisation of the
state's role. These are not only much Zimbabwe was chosen for this role for
more controversial, theoretically as two reasons: first it was an embarrass-
well as politically, they are also com- ing advertisement for alternative poli-
monly not applied even now (let alone cies, with even the US ambassador to
at comparable earlier stages of devel- Zimbabwe, James Rawlings, speaking
opment) by the rich countries. And of in September 1988 of the US's 'recog-
course they have been forced on nition that Zimbabwe's economy is
countries like Zimbabwe which al- healthy and dynamic with the poten-
ready had a good record on the earlier tial for greater growth based on the
less contentious parts of the package successes of the past' (EIU, 1988);
as well as on countries which didn't. second this very success, especially the
balance of payments surplus and the
The result has been that the record of manageable debt, meant that struc-
structural adjustmnent for the countries tural adjustment would be applied in a
concerned has been dubious at best context with fewer problems than was
and in some countries disastrous, usual in adjusting countries. Zimba-
despite the sensible ingredients. In the bwe therefore came under severe pres-
late 1980s the World Bank, having sure to liberalise in the late 1980s as we
proclaimed that success for the poli- see below. In March 1991, after it
cies had been demonstrated by Ghana began what it claimed was a 'home-
(endnote 1) and later Tanzania, de- grown' economic structural adjust-
cided that wider demonstrations were ment programme (known locally as
needed and published a continent- 'Esap'), the World Bank resident rep-
wide survey (World Bank, 1989), which resentative in Zimbabwe, Christian
after omission of special cases showed Poortman, incautiously argued that
a small average increase in GDP because of its earlier dynamic eco-
growth for adjusting countries. Zim- nomic performance 'Zimbabwe could
babwe was omitted from the non- be the first to succeed with such
adjusters because of the severity of the reforms' (EIU, 1991).
droughts that it had suffered (logically
this should have meant its inclusion 'Success', however, can be viewed
with extra weighting!). The United from two directions. If structural ad-
Nations Economic Commission for justment is seen as successful hardly
anywhere in Africa, different criteria programme for the simple reason that
are used to judge it in Washington. it didn't need one: with its diamond
From there, faster economic growth, revenues it had no need for borrowing
reduced levels of poverty, even indus- to cover balance of payments deficits.
trialisation, would be nice. But their Zimbabwe was between these two
absence is embarrassing rather than cases, and as it lacked any equivalent
destructive, for the bottom line is that of the massive diamond revenues
Africa is now firmly reintegrated into might be seen as the most virtuous, for
the world market, the actual main aim it was neither in arrears with any
of the international financial institu- creditors (least of all the IMF) nor had
tions, and far more important than it ever sought a rescheduling of its
mere economic development. debts. It had no IMF programme
because like Botswana it did not need
Successful Alternatives have been one, although it did need programmes
Largely Ignored or Drummed into line of development-oriented finance then
denied it by both Britain and the US
That the main impetus for forcing and restricted by the World Bank.
countries to reform is ideological rather
than economic or democratic is sup- The second example in fact concerns
ported by two examples relating to the World Bank, which was continu-
Zimbabwe. As we see below in more ing to lend for a range of development
detail, Zimbabwe was surprisingly purposes, such as infrastructure up-
successful economically in the 1980s grading, irrigation and skill develop-
despite severe constraints, while main- ment. But in 1982 it had also lent
taining a policy strongly resistant to Zimbabwe US$70m to set up an 'ex-
the second half of the structural adjust- port-revolving fund'(endnote 3) (ERF)
ment package. The British government to promote exports of manufactured
was widely criticised in 1988 for goods, no doubt seeing this as part of a
advancing large sums to the military process of reintegrating Zimbabwe
dictatorship in Nigeria, whilst deny- into the world market. Unfortunately
ing any programme aid to Zimbabwe, for its strategic aims, Zimbabwe made
despite its better political, economic, a great success of manufactured ex-
and human rights record. The re- ports in a context which after March
sponse of Margaret Thatcher's govern- 1984 reverted to being one of control-
ment was two-fold: Nigeria had led trade. Negotiations for an ex-
promised to reform in five years'panded time fund which would also help
(endnote 2); and Zimbabwe did 'not other sectors of the economy to export,
have an IMF programme'. The latter went through all the technical stages
point discloses the real motivations. It easily, possibly because it involved
may be understandable that Britain people in the less ideological lower
should not have wished to support levels of the World Bank, many of
Zambia at the time because of its whom were genuinely committed to
arrears with the IMF and numerous promoting Zimbabwe's success. But
other creditors, and because of its after a long delay in Washington,
refusal or inability to meet the IMF's without any technical problems being
conditions for rescheduling and con- raised, nor any doubts being cast on
tinued support. But on the other hand the potential of Zimbabwe to benefit
Botswana, although it received sub- from the loan, it was finally vetoed for
stantial development aid, had no IMF ideological reasons at the highest lev-
els of the Bank. The last thing that theChile, which, thanks to military dicta-
Bank wanted to happen was for Zim- torship was able to impose neo-liberal
babwe to succeed with 'the wrong policies earlier and longer than the rest
policies' (Stoneman, 1991). Only when of Latin America. It is currently grow-
Zimbabwe agreed to liberalise trade ing very fast (although two cata-
would it get the funds (although in strophic drops in GDP of 15 per cent or
such a context such a fund becomes more, one in the 1970s, the other in the
irrelevant). The 'threat of a good 1980s, means that average growth over
example' was diminished. the last two decades has barely reached
2 per cent per annum), and this success
Consequences: the 50 Per Cent follows a radical restructuring of the
economy (involving deindustrialisation
Solution
of much of the more advanced parts)
What Open Market Policies Imply for and dramatic growth in the export of
Economic Development primary agricultural commodities, in-
cluding fruit, vegetables, cut-flowers
As well as enforcing more prudent and wine. Undoubtedly it is a world
economic policies (some aspects of leader in these areas, but with dozens
which are unexceptionable), structural of other countries (including Zimba-
adjustment brimgs an end to most bwe) beginning to compete seriously,
areas of discretion in economic policy, it may well prove that its base is too
whether revolutionary experimenta- narrow to sustain success for much
tion, reactionary projects like apart- longer (although 'success' still in-
heid, or even cautious attempts to cludes roughly 50 per cent unemploy-
change structures through the state in ment). If this proves wrong, Chile will
time-honoured fashion. Policies which not so much be confirming the ortho-
will be constrained include pro- dox approach to development as blaz-
grammes of regional integration, being a new trail: free markets have not
cause component states will have little delivered success in the past.
scope for reducing tariff barriers to
each other, or giving other prefer- What Open Market Policies Imply for
ences, if they have been obliged to Investment and Employment
open up to world markets already.
Similarly it will be harder to protect It is popularly claimed on the basis of
infant industries, to escape from pri- neoclassical theory (in particular the
mary-product dependence, to create Hecksher-Ohlin theorem) that accept-
new comparative advantages, for these ance of world prices will promote
things involve looking ahead to future foreign investment that is keen to
markets and the prices they would exploit the resources - in particular
throw up, whereas obeying today's cheap labour - of developing coun-
market signals means accepting to- tries. To some extent this is true, as
day's comparative advantages in whatshown by the experience of some
are usually relatively unprofitable ar- export processing zones (EPZs) like
eas (that is what it means to be Mauritius. Yet out of over 200 EPZs
underdeveloped) - and today's com- worldwide, the number of clear suc-
parative disadvantages in profitable cesses can be counted on the fingers of
areas. one hand. This shows that there is
probably a market only for a tiny
Another World Bank 'success' story is fraction of the type of goods that very
cheap labour could produce, and with tion. This high an investment ratio is
the entry of India and China into this plainly an impossibility. Even if we
area it is decreasingly likely that any assume that each 'international' job
African country could gain significant creates two others for a quarter the
benefits from this market. cost in related downstream and serv-
ice industries, i.e. the average cost per
In fact most foreign investment pro- job falls to R50,000, an investment
motes what it is most familiar with, ratio of 30 per cent is still needed. It is
namely modern capital-intensive tech- in fact extremely optimistic to expect
nology. It is already the experience of that a 30 per cent investment ratio
liberalising countries in Africa that would indeed produce enough jobs (it
insofar as they have got any new would also imply a steady growth rate
investment it is capital-intensive, pro- of at least 6 per cent annually), but it is
viding fewer jobs than the former also over-optimistic to believe that 30
protected labour-intensive industries per cent would be achievable at a time
that were bankrupted by liberalisa- of expectations of much higher educa-
tion. This technology is designed in tional and health expenditure. Note
rich countries where US$50,000 is the furthermore that even this huge effort
average cost of an internationally com- would merely stop unemployment
petitive job. The process, of bringing it rising above the present unacceptable
into poor countries may be necessary levels. The actual outcome is much
if the latter are to compete in export more likely to be closer to what
markets where high quality and con- actually occurred in both South Africa
sistency are essential. South Africa, and Zimbabwe in the 1980s when
like most developing countries needs barely 10 per cent of school leavers
to look for niche markets in these found jobs (although in South Africa
areas, exploiting whatever advantages the ratio was falling to 7 per cent,
of geography, climate, skills, cultural whilst in Zimbabwe it was rising to
connections or resources it can muster. about 20 per cent).
The possibilities range from wines and
cut-flowers to the EC market, through Why a '50 per cent' Solution is Likely
high-quality clothing and footwear, to
stainless steel from Columbus and Thus even employing 50 per cent of
platinum-based catalytic converters. school leavers would be a startlingly
Almost certainly it does not mean good result for orthodox economic
labour-intensive sweat shops. policies, and reading their strategy
documents (uta, 1990, 1992) it is clear
But if open policies do therefore re- that they would see it as such. The
quire investment with first world tech-other 50 per cent (or they might well be
nology and capital-labour ratios in two-thirds as in Latin America) would
export industries, they also impose be thrown back onto subsistence in the
them in the domestic market. To rural areas, the bantustans, the urban
achieve employment for the annual informal sector, or simple unemploy-
increment to the labour force by these ment and crime. When, ever more
means would imply spending R100,000 rarely, orthodox econoniists do such
on each of some 800,000 new workers calculations, or are confronted with
or R80 bn, some 36 per cent of GDP - them, they take refuge in the 'multi-
or 48 per cent if we add the 12 per cent plier' as I did above to reduce the
or so needed to make good deprecia- impossible 48 per cent investment
ratio to an implausible 30 per cent, or agenda of the international financial

institutions - to create a single world
resort to references to 'trickle down' or
'the informal sector'. market - needs to be confronted.
But these are at best wishful thinking Zimbabwe was Remarkably

and at worst a disguise for the fact that Successful in the 1980s
the orthodox have no solution for a
half or more of the population. Refer- First, why is Zimbabwe's post-colo-
ences to market forces eventually find-nial record relevant to South Africa? It
ing them jobs have no historical is surprising that this question needs
precedent to support them and little to be answered at all, but it does
theoretical justification. Lewis's el- because so few South Africans are
egant model (Lewis, 1954) has not prepared to admit that other countries
come about in practice, and indeed may have anything to teach them. Of
how could the market deal with a course South Africa is different, with
problem which lies outside it? (The its own specificities. But so is every
only linkage is through the supposed country; however, there are numerous
effect of the unemployed driving down similarities and shared historical expe-
wages so that profits and investment riences that make Zimbabwe's record
rise and new jobs are created. Clearly of much value, providing both posi-
the leakages from this benign cycle tive and negative lessons. Apart from
have proved nearly complete in prac- the common experience of white mi-
tice). If unemployed people receive no nority rule, both countries have min-
income and exert no effective demand, eral-dependent economies in which
the market has no information as to substantial manufacturing capacity has
whether they constitute 50 per cent of been developed through import-sub-
the population, or 60 per cent, or 90 stituting industrialisation, largely as a
per cent. So the equilibrium it reaches result of the economic nationalism of
may be optimal for the lucky 50 per those white minorities.
cent (or 40 per cent or 10 per cent) who
happen to be inside already, but But the particular reason for discuss-
clearly not for the population as a ing the Zimbabwean experience here
whole. Investment to provide the right is that Zimbabwe's very economic
type of affordable jobs for the whole success in the 1980s provides good
population is therefore primarily a evidence for the existence of an alter-
political, not an economic, decision. native to the orthodoxy. During the
1980s real GDP growth in Zimbabwe
Alternatives: Some Lessons from the averaged over 4 per cent per annum,
Experience of Zimbabwe about three times that in South Africa
or in Africa as a whole. Furthermore it
In face of a situation in which a was if anything faster in the second
bankrupt orthodoxy nevertheless half holdsof the decade, so contrary to some
nearly all the levers of power, alterna-
suggestions, there is little evidence
tive policies need to be carefully that the experiment was 'running out
tailored. It is not enough to show that
of steam'. Over the decade, and par-
alternative strategies are both theoreti-
ticularly since March 1984 after the
cally possible and historically success-
decision to terminate an IMF pro-
ful (which I attempt to illustrate ingramme,
the Zimbabwe diversified ex-
next section); in addition the basic ports in the direction of manufactures,
repaid its debts without resort to South Korea), and to respond quickly
rescheduling, expanded education and and appropriately to shocks. The con-
health services, created food security straints were serious enough, but mis-
sufficient to enable it to ride out the takes were made in responding to
devastating drought of 1987 without them that often made their conse-
imports - and all this in face of a quences worse than they need have
daunting battery of constraints, in- been.
cluding destabilisation, rigged export
markets, donor hostility and four Depackaging Structural Adjustment
drought years. To emerge with an
average growth rate of 4 per cent may How then do we explain this signifi-
not seem remarkable until one consid- cant (albeit somewhat mixed) success
ers what might have been the growth in such difficult circumstances? It is
rate in the newly industrialised coun- not simply a matter of Zimbabwe
tries, the world's great success stories being a non-adjuster; in some respects
of the 1970s and 1980s, had they it followed very conservative financial
suffered similar constraints. Suppose, policies after the initial profligacy of
for example, that South Korea had not the first three years. The overborrowing
had massive donor flows from the US did not at the time seem inappropriate
in its initial import-substituting phase in view of the initial growth rate of 10
in the early 1960s. Would it have had per cent, but when this declined with
the base to grow at 8 per cent thereaf- the world slump and the beginning of
ter? Suppose then that it had not had the drought of 1982-84, a balance of
access to cheap loans, that it had not payments crisis forced the signing of
had access to an open US market (at a an IMF programme in 1982. But as the
time when it was closed to most other economic situation worsened (1983
countries), that it had been landlocked, showed a 3.6 per cent decline in GDP),
that it had been subject to continuous so did the balance of payments, and in
destabilisation by North Korea and March 1984 Zimbabwe returned to
China. What would its growth record direct foreign exchange controls know-
have been, despite its widely praised ing that this would bring an end to the
export-oriented policies? Only 6 per IMF facility after only a third of it had
cent? Or maybe only 4 per cent? been drawn down. It then pursued a
home-grown structural adjustment
Nevertheless it is not the intention to programme which soon restored ex-
claim that the Zimbabwean record (or ternal balance. From then on the
the South Korean record) is wholly Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe main-
positive. The first three years of Zim- tained a realistic value for the Zimba-
babwe's independence saw serious bwe dollar by relating it to a
overborrowing, much of it unproduc- 'trade-weighted basket' of imports
tive in the short run, resulting in the and exports. (The currency was delib-
debt crisis of the late 1980s when the erately kept slightly overvalued; the
debt-service ratio approached 40 per World Bank from time to time esti-
cent. The successes were coupled with mated it as being between 10 per cent
a failure to create enough jobs, to and 20 per cent high. Black market
implement redistribution, especially rates suggesting 50 per cent to 100 per
of land, to plan meaningfully, to fully cent overvaluation did not accurately
work out government's role in indus- reflect underlying economic realities,
trial and trade policy (in the manner of but rather the premium that some
Debate: World Bank & Lessons for South Africa 95
individuals were prepared to pay at ties - it set its face firmly against later
the margin to get trapped funds out). parts. In particular it continued to
A substantial trade surplus was engi- control imports and foreign exchange
neered by tight import controls so as towhich can be seen as an essential part
repay the earlier debts. New borrow- of a policy of ISI (import substitution
ing was tightly monitored so that the industrialisation), and also (as in South
debt-service ratio was reduced from Korea) part of a policy of developing
nearly 40 per cent to under 25 per cent.export industries. The other part of the
Indeed the finance minister Dr export policy included an export sub-
Chidzero probably over-reacted to the sidy and other measures such as the
finger-burning suffered in the early export-revolving fund described above,
1980s, and set his face against further and although modestly funded it was
borrowing. As a result in 1987 when a very successful. Government also re-
new drought coincided with a hump tained a major role (probably exces-
in debt repayments, significant dam- sive) in economic regulation and in
age was done to the economy through agricultural marketing, and resisted
reductions in the real value of foreign demands for privatisation (indeed the
exchange allocations to industry to state sector expanded somewhat
about a third of the 1981 level. Never- through voluntary sales of assets by
theless, this was not part of a departing South African companies).
Ceausescu-like strategy to reduce debts Less satisfactorily, government put a
to zero, for Dr Chidzero argued that a lid on the budget deficit at around 10
roughly 20 per cent debt-service ratio per cent of GDP rather than trying to
was the price that a developing coun- squeeze it to 5 per cent; (endnote 4) but
try had to pay for access to necessary at least it halted what had threatened
development funds. The key point to get out of hand. Subsidies on
was that it was by then accepted that foodstuffs were reduced, but
borrowing had to be primarily for parastatals continued to require subsi-
investment that would generate its dies, largely though not entirely for
own surplus out of which repayments external reasons. For instance the Grain
would be made. Marketing Board's deficit derived in
large part from a combination of
Although the state continued to play paying decent prices to farmers and
an active role, controlling prices and the costs of storing surplus maize that
wage levels, most enterprise remained could not be sold profitably on the
in private hands, and markets contin- world market because of the dumping
ued to operate in wide areas of the of similarly surplus maize by the EC
economy. For instance the Zimbabwe and the US. Other major costs which
Stock Exchange flourished in the late had been squeezed under the pre-1984
1980s, with its industrial index rising IMF programme were those arising in
in real terms faster than any in the education, health and defence. All
world for two years. were protected after March 1984, al-
though this meant that few areas were
But if it can therefore be seen that left in which major savings could be
although Zimbabwe accepted the first made in government expeniditure. But
half of a structural adjustment pack- government had little choice in view of
age - basically the stabilisation part both needs and popular expectations
which amounts to little more than a in the former areas and in view of
prudent adaptation to external reali- continuing destabilisation and the costs
of protecting the Beira Corridor in the Insofar as economic factors were be-
case of defence. hind the shift to liberalisation it was in
the desire to relax the foreign-ex-
Despite the impeccable payments change constraints, worsened by the
record and an economy often rightly limits to aid imposed by the IFIs.
described as dynamic by outside ob- Much more important than the eco-
servers, Zimbabwe received little credit. nomic factors, however, were political
The external pressure for liberalisation factors, as interests with external links
continued to mount, with aid pro- were strengthened relative to domestic
grammes being squeezed on flimsy interests following the changes in
pretexts as in the case of Britain and Eastern Europe.
the US (which stopped its aid pro-
gramme in 1986 because of criticism of Conclusions - What South
the US policy in Angola made on 4
Africa Can Learn
July).
The obvious lessons from the above
The bottom line, however, was that are that considerable pressures will be
Zimbabwe still continued to grow at 4 applied to the future South Africa to
per cent despite a net outflow of over 5follow the new orthodox open-market
per cent of GDP occasioned by debt- policies. The outcome will be a range
service, while Ghana, the World Bank's
of constraints against the undoing of
prime African example of adjustment the inequalities of income and prop-
success, was growing at 5 per cent on erty engineered by apartheid
the basis of net inflows of 5 per cent of (Padayachee, 1992). As in Zimbabwe,
GDP. What would Ghana have man- a new black elite will be welcomed
aged with an outflow at Zimbabwe's into the existing elite, thereby moder-
level? Alternatively, at what rate might ating its egalitarian fervour. But many
unadjusted Zimbabwe have grown people, probably a majority, will see
with a 5 per cent net inflow? no economic improvement, with only
a minority of school-leavers finding
Zimbabwe was thus not forced into jobs even if the economic growth rate
structural adjustment by financial im- averages 5 per cent (and that will
balances or the pressure of debt, as in depend on generous aid and invest-
so many other case; it had already ment flows). Nor does the experience
confronted and overcome these prob- of structural adjustment to date offer
lems. Nor had it 'run out of steam' or bright hopes of longer-run develop-
'hit the buffers'. Although many prob- ment bringing 'redistribution with
lems existed, and reforms in many growth': South Africa can discount the
areas were needed (and recommended possibility of becoming a new NIC
by the present author), the bottom line(ruled out by the structural adjustment
was that nevertheless growth was still package) or of attracting labour-inten-
strong, and possibly increasing (at the sive assembly industries away from
end of the decade financial analysts in Asia. All it can hope for is to develop
local merchant banks were speculat- further its comparative advantages in
ing as to whether having negotiated mineral and agricultural production,
the 'debt hump', a devastating drought much like Chile, although probably
and reduced the debt-service ratio, less successfully.
Zimbabwe had at last reached a path
of steady growth). We know that alternative policies do
Debate: World Bank & Lessons for South Africa 97
exist, and that they must be closely communist show-cases, the constraints
related to the successful policies fol- imposed on other capitalist develop-
lowed by the late industrialisers of the ing countries were lifted. South Africa
19th and early 20th centuries and by and Southern Africa as a whole need
the NICs and Zimbabwe more re- access to world markets without being
cently. Unfortunately we also know denied the right to protect their own
that such policies are now deemed by infant industries; this is what is in fact
the new totalitarianism to be wrong. available to signatories to the Lome
Convention. They also need interven-
How then can the future South Africa tions to undo the past interventions of
gain room for manoeuvre, avoid the apartheid and colonialism, to promote
blind alley that the orthodoxy will exports, and to create labour-intensive
direct it down, and adopt proven jobs meeting the basic needs of the
policies without antagonising the fi- population. It is ridiculous to expect
nancial powers that would undoubt- that any sort of solution to South
edly defeat it in a head-on Africa's problems could involve al-
confrontation? If there is an answer, it lowing its market to be flooded with
must draw on two elements: the cheap consumer goods from Asia,
uncertainties and divisions within the while millions of people who could be
World Bank; and the specificities of its producing such goods remain unem-
own situation. ployed. If they produce inefficiently at
first, this will have to be accepted, with
market opening following success as
On the first point, it is no secret that the
public certainties on the merits of in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
structural adjustment hide profound
uncertainties and controversy inside Finally it may be remarked that one of
the Bank in the face of the lack of Zimbabwe's major mistakes was to
visible success of its policies in Africa.
proclaim that it was building socialism
One analysis goes as far as to suggest while it was manifestly doing nothing
that the World Bank as an institution of the sort (Davies, 1988). In this way it
lost faith in structural adjustment alienated much support from the ma-
three or four years ago, but is obliged jor capitalist powers, while failing to
to continue promoting it until it has gain significant support from socialist
developed a new policy that can ones or being able to emulate their
command a new consensus (McCamey, success in job creation. It was prepared
1990). On the second point, the high to lose aid as a result of rhetoric, as
expectations of the population and when it attacked the US over its policy
likely social disruption in the event of in Angola and the Soviet Union over
disappointment are well-appreciated. Afghanistan. But it was not prepared
The ANC could use this, together with to risk the loss of aid through imple-
the risk of finding itself outflanked by menting land redistribution policies
more militant forces in Cosatu, the that were desperately needed for both
SACP, the PAC, AZAPO, the 'com- human and economic reasons.
rades' in the townships, etc, to
strengthen its bargaining position andthe chief lesson for South
Perhaps
obtain a range of exceptions to the Africa in this area therefore is that its
usual package. In effect this is similar actions need to be much more radical
to what South Korea and Taiwan than Zimbabwe's, while its rhetoric
gained: so as to make them into anti- should be less so.
Colin Stoneman is at the Centre for Bibliographic Note

Southern African Studies, York Uni-
versity, UK. Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant (Oxford
University Press, 1989); Rob Davies, 'The
Transition to Socialism in Zimbabwe: Some
Endnotes Areas for Debate'; and Colin Stoneman, 'The
Economy: Recognising the Reality' in C
1. As Ghana was seen to be growing at 5 per cent Stoneman (ed), Zimbabwve's Prospects, London,
per annum on the basis of net inflows of 5 per Macmillan, 1988; Finanicial Times, 'Survey on
cent of GDP, it is pertinent to ask whether it was Singapore', 29 March 1993; W Arthur Lewis,
the new policies or the reward for adopting 'Economic Development with Unlimited
them that was producing the growth. As after Supplies of Labour', The Manchester School of
five years Ghana was still not in a position to Economics and Social Studies, Vol. 22 (May
repay the accumulated debt, it had the loans 1954), pp.139-191.
rescheduled and continued receiving net flows
worth 5 per cent of GDP. Two further questions Patricia L McCarney, 'The Life of Ideas in Donor
are posed: how long must this process continue Agencies', mimeo, 1990; Anne McGregor (ed),
before the country can begin to service its own McGregor's Economic Alternatives (Kenwyn, Juta,
debts? And how does this experience differ from 1990); Dianna Melrose, Nicaraguta: Thze Thzreat of
the profligate borrowing to sustain earlier a Good Example? (Oxfam, 1985); Vishnu
policies so criticised by the World Bank? Padayachee, 'The IMF and World Bank in post-
apartheid South Africa' in Centre for
2. In fact in 1992 after six years of structural Development Research, Beyond Apartheid
adjustment its total external debt at US$29bn I (Copenhagen, 1992); Trevor W Parfitt, 1990,
was 113 per cent of GDP, debt-service arrears 'Lies, Damned Lies and Statistics: the World
were US$3.4bn and there was a debt-service Bank/ECAStructuralAdjustmentControversy',
ratio of about 70 per cent before rescheduling ROAPE no 47:128-141; Roger C Riddell,
(Finiayncial Times, 'Survey on Nigeria', 1 April Manuttfactutrintg Africa (London, James Currey,
1993). Meanwhile elections between two parties 1990, especially p 395); Colin Stoneman, 'The
approved by the military are scheduled for 1993. World BankandtheIMFinZimbabwe' in Bonnie
K Campbell and John Loxley (eds), Structural
3. ERFs ensure that potential exporters don't fail Adjtustmentt in Africa (London, Macmillan, 1989);
to produce because they have inadequate foreign Bob Tucker and Bruce R Scott (eds), 'Nedcor -
exchange to purchase needed inputs. Whatever Old Mutual Report' in Soutth Africa: Prospectsfor
the general foreign exchange constraint, a firm Successfiul Transitioni (Kenwyn, Juta, 1992).
export order wins the right to import essential
inputs whose foreign exchange costs are then World Bank: 'Accelerated Development in Sub-
reimbursed from the export earnings. Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action'
(Washington, 1981); 'Towards Sustained
4. On the other hand Reg Green has pointed out Development: A Joint Programme of Action for
in a personal correspondence that the budget Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington, 1984); 'Sub-
deficit was probably about the same size as Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable
defence expenditure, which at over three times Growth (Washington, 1989); World Bank and
the African per caput average was largely the UNDP, 'Africa's Adjustment and Growth in
justified by destabilisation. In other words, if the 1980s' (Washington, 1989); Economist
this constraint is allowd for, Zimbabwe was Intelligence Unit: Country Report: Zimbabwe/
otherwise following very tight financial policies. Malawi, No.4, 1988, p26 & No.2, 1991, p13. +
Books from ROAPE -'Zimbabwe: Politics,

Economics-and Society' by Stoneman & Cliffe:
;Tis book's clow intvstigation of the constitution1al, diplomatic and

cCoon?ic circumstances of Zimbabue, caught tip in a region domi-
nated b Soith Africa. rveals the several onstraimts on any trantsition
to socialsm. Th contr is oisd between conttinued domiinace of
the ecoiomo b y ycapitalist stucturs, ow rtinforced bi y black-bour--
geoisie able to use statepower, and an alterntative ossiblity ofa second
stage of national reorMIs that could fr some better dealfor peasants
and workers. Published by Pinter Press, 1988 at ?5.95 /$14.50.

24 Stoneman 1993 World Bank Some Lessons For SA

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24 Stoneman 1993 World Bank Some Lessons For SA

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The World Bank: Some Lessons for South Africa

Author(s): Colin Stoneman

The World Bank: Some This may seem to be a loose, or

ratio to an implausible 30 per cent, or agenda of the international financial

But these are at best wishful thinking Zimbabwe was Remarkably

Colin Stoneman is at the Centre for Bibliographic Note

Books from ROAPE -'Zimbabwe: Politics,

;Tis book's clow intvstigation of the constitution1al, diplomatic and

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