Conflict Batch 3 I Atty.
Torregosa I EH 501
1. BOUDARD VS TAIT
Facts: Emilie Boudard (appellant), widow of Marie Theodore Jerome Boudard and guardian of
her coappellants, her children born during her marriage with the deceased (Marie Theodore
Jerome Boudard), obtained a judgment in their favor from the Court of First Instance of Hanoi,
French Indo-China for the sum of 40,000 piastras, plus interest. The judgment was rendered
against Stewart Eddie Tait who had been declared in default for his failure to appear at the
trial before said court. Marie Theodore Jerome Boudard, who was an employee of Stewart
Eddie Tait, was killed in Hanoi by other employees of said Tait, although "outside of the
fulfillment of a duty".
Emilie Boudard and children appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
dismissing the case instituted by them, thereby overruling their complaint, and sentencing
them to pay the costs.
The dismissal of appellants' complaint by the lower court was based principally on the lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of Hanoi to render the judgment in question, for the execution of
which this action was instituted in this jurisdiction. The lack of jurisdiction was discovered in
the decision itself of the Court of Hanoi which states that the appellee was not a resident of,
nor had a known domicile in, that country.
The evidence adduced at the trial conclusively proves that neither the appellee nor his agent
or employees were ever in Hanoi, French Indo-China; and that the deceased Marie Theodore
Jerome Boudard had never, at any time, been his employee.
Issue: WON the service of summons is proper
Ruling: From notes:
Under existing jurisprudence and US authorities, the rule is uniform that in actions in personam,
the defendant can only be served with summons and jurisdiction over him can only be acquired
if he is still within the territory where the court sits. In other words, summons should be served
while defendant was still in Hanoi.
Here, the defendant was already in the Philippines when the summons was served. Such
extraterritorial service does not vest jurisdiction in favor of the Hanoi court.
From the full text:
No.
It was really unnecessary for the lower court to admit Exhibits D, E, F and H to M-1, nor can
these exhibits be admitted as evidence, for, as to the first point, the appellants failed to show
that the proceedings against the appellee in the Court of Hanoi were in accordance with the
laws of France then in force.
Moreover, it appears that said documents are not of the nature mentioned in sections 304 and
305 of Act No. 190. They are not copies of the judicial record of the proceedings against the
appellee in the Court of Hanoi, duly certified by the Proper authorities there, whose signatures
should be authenticated by the Consul or some consular agent of the United States in said
country.
The appellants argue that the papers are the original documents and that the Honorable
French Consul in the Philippines has confirmed this fact. Such argument is not sufficient to
authorize a deviation from a rule established and sanctioned by law. To comply with the rule,
the best evidence of foreign judicial proceedings is a certified copy of the same with all the
formalities required in said sections 304 and 305 for only thus can one be absolutely sure of
the authenticity of the record.
On the other hand, said exhibits or documents, if admitted, would only corroborate and
strengthen the evidence of the appellee which in itself is convincing, and the conclusion of the
lower court that the appellee is not liable for the amount to which he was sentenced, as alleged
for he was not du]v tried or even summoned in conformity with the law.
Moreover, the evidence of record shows that the appellee was not in Hanoi during the time
mentioned in the complaint of the appellants, nor were his employees or representatives. The
rule in matters of this nature is that judicial proceedings in a foreign country, regarding
payment of money, are only effective against a party if summons is duly served on him within
such foreign country before the proceedings.
2. NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES VS CA
FACTS: Northwest Airlines is an airline company operating its business in Japan. It entered into
a contract with a Philippine corporation, CF Sharp, for the latter to sell airlines tickets. When
Sharp failed to remit the proceeds, the airline sued before Japanese Courts.
The summons intended for the Philippine corporation was attempted to be served twice at its
office in Japan but without success. The first attempt failed because the officer authorized to
receive summons was not around. The second attempt also failed because while the officer
was already there, he claimed that he is no longer authorized or he is no longer connected with
Sharp.
The summons not having been served, the Japanese court resorted to service of summons
through diplomatic channels. Under this mode, the Japanese court requested its Supreme
Court to direct the service of the summons to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and then
the Ministry coordinated with the Japanese consular office in the Philippines, and the foreign
affairs coordinated with the Philippine court.
The court now served summons on the defendant at its principal office in Manila. When the
Philippine corporation failed to participate in the proceedings, the Japanese court rendered
judgment in favor of the airline, and when the judgment cannot be satisfied in Japan, the airline
filed an action before the Philippine court for the enforcement of the foreign judgment.
In its defense, Sharp argued that the decision rendered by the Japanese court is void because
it is vitiated by lack of jurisdiction over his person. It claimed that the service of summons was
not proper, relying on the case of Boudard v. Tait because like in that case, the summons was
served beyond the jurisdiction of the Japanese court.
1
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
Issue: WON Japanese court has jurisidction
Ruling: YES. Consequently, the party attacking (Sharp) a foreign judgment has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of its validity.
Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the
decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand.
Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law
on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines.
Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides that if the defendant is a foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines, service may be made:
(1) on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or,
(2) If there is no such resident agent, on the government official designated by law to
that effect; or
(3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.
If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive summons, the designation is
exclusive, and service of summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction unless
made upon him.
Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the government official
designated by law, to wit:
(a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign insurance company
(b) the Superintendent of Banks, in the case of a foreign banking corporation
(c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other foreign corporations
duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. Whenever service of process is so
made, the government office or official served shall transmit by mail a copy of the
summons or other legal proccess to the corporation at its home or principal office.
The sending of such copy is a necessary part of the service.
The service on the proper government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court,
in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code. Our laws and jurisprudence indicate a
purpose to assimilate foreign corporations, duly licensed to do business here, to the status of
domestic corporations.
We think it would be entirely out of line with this policy should we make a discrimination
against a foreign corporation, like the petitioner, and subject its property to the harsh writ of
seizure by attachment when it has complied not only with every requirement of law made
specially of foreign corporations, but in addition with every requirement of law made of
domestic corporations.
In as much as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four duly registered
branches at the time the collection suit against it was filed, then in the light of the processual
presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of Japan, and, as such, was amenable to the
jurisdiction of the courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said courts'
lawful methods of serving process.
Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not
only under the processual presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty.
3.Nagarmull vs Binalbagan Isabela
Principle : It is true that under the provisions of Section 50 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, a
judgment for a sum of money rendered by a foreign court "is presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title", but when suit for
its enforcement is brought in a Philippine court, said judgment "may be repelled by evidence of
a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact"
FACTS : Under Contract G/14370 dated May 6, 1949, plaintiff, a foreign corporation with
offices at No. 8 Dalhousie Square (East) Calcutta, India, agreed to sell to defendant, a domestic
corporation with offices at the Chronicle Building, Aduana Street, Manila, 1,700,000 pieces of
Hessian bags at $26.20
On September 8, 1949, plaintiff advised defendant that of the 850 bales scheduled for
shipment in July and August, the former was able to ship only 310 bales owing to the alleged
failure of the Adamjee Jute Mills to supply the in September, 54 bales were likewise defaulted
resulting in a total of 154 bales which is now the object of the controversy.
Meanwhile, on October 1, 1949, the Government of India increased the export duty of jute
bags from 80 to 350 rupees per ton, and on October 5, 1949, plaintiff requested defendant to
increase its letter of credit to cover the enhanced rate of export duty imposed
On November 17, 1949, plaintiff wrote defendant a letter reiterating its claim for
corresponding to the increased export taxes on the 154 bales delivered to defendant from the
defaulted shipments for the months of July, August and September, 1949
On February 6, 1951, defendant received notification from the Bengal Chamber of Commerce
Tribunal of Arbitration in Calcutta, India, advising it that on December 28, 1950, Plaintiff
applied to said Tribunal for arbitration regarding their claim. The Tribunal requested the
defendant to send them its version of the case. This, defendant did on March 1, 1951, thru the
then Government Corporate Counsel, former Justice Pompeyo Diaz.
As presented to the Tribunal of Arbitration, the whole case revolved on the question of
whether or not defendant is liable to the plaintiff for the payment of increased export taxes
imposed by the Indian Government on the shipments of jute sacks. Defendant contended that
if the jute sacks in question were delivered by plaintiff in the months of July, August, and
September, 1949, pursuant to the terms of the contract, then there would have been no
increased export taxes to pay because said increased taxes became effective only on October
1, 1949, while on the other hand, plaintiff argued that the contract between the parties and
2
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
all papers and documents made parts thereto should prevail, including defendant's letter of
September 29, 1949;
The Bengal Chamber of Commerce, Tribunal of Arbitration, refused to sustain defendant's
contention and decided in favor of the plaintiff.
For about two years, the plaintiff attempted to enforce the said award through the Philippine
Charge de'Affaires in Calcutta but constantly failed
Rtc and CA ruled in favor of plaintiff
Issue : The main issue to be resolved is whether or not the decision of the Tribunal of
Arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, as affirmed by the High Court of Judicature
of Calcutta, is enforceable in the Philippines.
Ruling: We are constrained to reverse the appealed decision upon the ground that it is based
upon a clear mistake of law and its enforcement will give rise to a patent injustice.
It is true that under the provisions of Section 50 of Rule 39, Rules of Court, a judgment for a
sum of money rendered by a foreign court "is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title", but when suit for its
enforcement is brought in a Philippine court, said judgment "may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact" (Emphasis supplied.)
Upon the facts of record, We are constrained to hold that the decision sought to be enforced
was rendered upon a "clear mistake of law" and because of that it makes appellant — an
innocent party — suffer the consequences of the default or breach of contract committed by
appellee.
There is no question at all that appellee was guilty of a breach of contract when it failed to
deliver one-hundred fifty-four Hessian bales which, according to the contract entered into with
appellant, should have been delivered to the latter in the months of July, August and
September, all of the year 1949. It is equally clear beyond doubt that had these one-hundred
fifty-four bales been delivered in accordance with the contract aforesaid, the increase in the
export tax due upon them would not have been imposed because said increased export tax
became effective only on October 1, 1949.
To avoid its liability for the aforesaid increase in the export tax, appellee claims that appellant
should be held liable therefor on the strength of its letter of September 29, 1949 asking
appellee to ship the shortage. This argument is unavailing because it is not only illogical but
contrary to known principles of fairness and justice. When appellant demanded that appellee
deliver the shortage of 154 bales it did nothing more than to demand that to which it was
entitled as a matter of right. The breach of contract committed by appellee gave appellant,
under the law and even under general principles of fairness, the right to rescind the contract
or to ask for its specific performance, in either case with right to demand damages. Part of the
damages appellant was clearly entitled to recover from appellee growing out of the latter's
breach of the contract consists precisely of the amount of the increase decreed in the export
tax due on the shortage — which, because of appellee's fault, had to be delivered after the
effectivity of the increased export tax.
To the extent, therefore, that the decisions of the Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal
Chamber of Commerce and of the High Court of Judicature of Calcutta fail to apply to the facts
of this case fundamental principles of contract, the same may be impeached, as they have
been sufficiently impeached by appellant, on the ground of "clear mistake of law". We can not
sanction a clear mistake of law that would work an obvious injustice upon appellant.
4. TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, RENATO D. TAYAG, vs. BENGUET
CONSOLIDATED, INC
Corporation, stock certificate, court decree, jurisdiction
Facts: Idonah Slade Perkins, who died on March 27, 1960 in New York City, left among others,
two stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of appellant, the certificates being in the
possession of the County Trust Company of New York, which as noted, is the domiciliary
administrator of the estate of the deceased. Then came this portion of the appellant's brief:
"On August 12, 1960, Prospero Sanidad instituted ancillary administration proceedings in the
Court of First Instance of Manila; Lazaro A. Marquez was appointed ancillary administrator,
and on January 22, 1963, he was substituted by the appellee Renato D. Tayag. A dispute arose
between the domiciary administrator in New York and the ancillary administrator in the
Philippines as to which of them was entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in
question. On January 27, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila ordered the domiciliary
administrator, County Trust Company, to "produce and deposit" them with the ancillary
administrator or with the Clerk of Court. The domiciliary administrator did not comply with the
order, and on February 11, 1964, the ancillary administrator petitioned the court to "issue an
order declaring the certificate or certificates of stocks covering the 33,002 shares issued in the
name of Idonah Slade Perkins by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., be declared [or] considered as
lost."3
It is to be noted further that appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. admits that "it is immaterial"
as far as it is concerned as to "who is entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in
question; appellant opposed the petition of the ancillary administrator because the said stock
certificates are in existence, they are today in the possession of the domiciliary administrator,
the County Trust Company, in New York, U.S.A...."
It is its view, therefore, that under the circumstances, the stock certificates cannot be declared
or considered as lost. Moreover, it would allege that there was a failure to observe certain
requirements of its by-laws before new stock certificates could be issued. Hence, its appeal.
ISSUE: Whether the court in the Philippines can declare the stock certificates as lost
RULING: As was made clear at the outset of this opinion, the appeal lacks merit. The challenged
order constitutes an emphatic affirmation of judicial authority sought to be emasculated by
the wilful conduct of the domiciliary administrator in refusing to accord obedience to a court
decree. How, then, can this order be stigmatized as illegal?
As is true of many problems confronting the judiciary, such a response was called for by the
realities of the situation. What cannot be ignored is that conduct bordering on wilful defiance,
if it had not actually reached it, cannot without undue loss of judicial prestige, be condoned or
3
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
tolerated. For the law is not so lacking in flexibility and resourcefulness as to preclude such a
solution, the more so as deeper reflection would make clear its being buttressed by
indisputable principles and supported by the strongest policy considerations.
It can truly be said then that the result arrived at upheld and vindicated the honor of the
judiciary no less than that of the country. Through this challenged order, there is thus dispelled
the atmosphere of contingent frustration brought about by the persistence of the domiciliary
administrator to hold on to the stock certificates after it had, as admitted, voluntarily
submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the lower court by entering its appearance through
counsel on June 27, 1963, and filing a petition for relief from a previous order of March 15,
1963.
Thus did the lower court, in the order now on appeal, impart vitality and effectiveness to what
was decreed. For without it, what it had been decided would be set at naught and nullified.
Unless such a blatant disregard by the domiciliary administrator, with residence abroad, of
what was previously ordained by a court order could be thus remedied, it would have entailed,
insofar as this matter was concerned, not a partial but a well-nigh complete paralysis of judicial
authority.
1. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. did not dispute the power of the appellee ancillary
administrator to gain control and possession of all assets of the decedent within the
jurisdiction of the Philippines. Nor could it. Such a power is inherent in his duty to settle her
estate and satisfy the claims of local creditors.5
It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary
administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in her
name in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is equally beyond
question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the
unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in
any wise as immune from lawful court orders.
Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue8 finds application.
"In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the corporation
being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above undeniable proposition, not even appellant
is insensible. It does not dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it were so minded.
2. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. would seek to bolster the above contention by its
invoking one of the provisions of its by-laws which would set forth the procedure to be
followed in case of a lost, stolen or destroyed stock certificate; it would stress that in the event
of a contest or the pendency of an action regarding ownership of such certificate or certificates
of stock allegedly lost, stolen or destroyed, the issuance of a new certificate or certificates
would await the "final decision by [a] court regarding the ownership [thereof]."15
Such reliance is misplaced. In the first place, there is no such occasion to apply such by-law. It
is admitted that the foreign domiciliary administrator did not appeal from the order now in
question. Moreover, there is likewise the express admission of appellant that as far as it is
concerned, "it is immaterial ... who is entitled to the possession of the stock certificates ..."
Even if such were not the case, it would be a legal absurdity to impart to such a provision
conclusiveness and finality. Assuming that a contrariety exists between the above by-law and
the command of a court decree, the latter is to be followed.
4. What is more the view adopted by appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. is fraught with
implications at war with the basic postulates of corporate theory.
We start with the undeniable premise that, "a corporation is an artificial being created by
operation of law...."16 It owes its life to the state, its birth being purely dependent on its will.
As Berle so aptly stated: "Classically, a corporation was conceived as an artificial person, owing
its existence through creation by a sovereign power."17 As a matter of fact, the statutory
language employed owes much to Chief Justice Marshall, who in the Dartmouth College
decision defined a corporation precisely as "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing
only in contemplation of law."18
There is thus a rejection of Gierke's genossenchaft theory, the basic theme of which to quote
from Friedmann, "is the reality of the group as a social and legal entity, independent of state
recognition and concession."21 A corporation as known to Philippine jurisprudence is a
creature without any existence until it has received the imprimatur of the state according to
law. It is logically inconceivable therefore that it will have rights and privileges of a higher
priority than that of its creator. More than that, it cannot legitimately refuse to yield obedience
to acts of its state organs, certainly not excluding the judiciary, whenever called upon to do so.
As a matter of fact, a corporation once it comes into being, following American law still of
persuasive authority in our jurisdiction, comes more often within the ken of the judiciary than
the other two coordinate branches. It institutes the appropriate court action to enforce its
right. Correlatively, it is not immune from judicial control in those instances, where a duty
under the law as ascertained in an appropriate legal proceeding is cast upon it.
To assert that it can choose which court order to follow and which to disregard is to confer
upon it not autonomy which may be conceded but license which cannot be tolerated. It is to
argue that it may, when so minded, overrule the state, the source of its very existence; it is to
contend that what any of its governmental organs may lawfully require could be ignored at
will. So extravagant a claim cannot possibly merit approval.
5. One last point. In Viloria v. Administrator of Veterans Affairs,22 it was shown that in a
guardianship proceedings then pending in a lower court, the United States Veterans
Administration filed a motion for the refund of a certain sum of money paid to the minor under
guardianship, alleging that the lower court had previously granted its petition to consider the
deceased father as not entitled to guerilla benefits according to a determination arrived at by
its main office in the United States. The motion was denied. In seeking a reconsideration of
such order, the Administrator relied on an American federal statute making his decisions "final
and conclusive on all questions of law or fact" precluding any other American official to
examine the matter anew, "except a judge or judges of the United States court."23
Reconsideration was denied, and the Administrator appealed.
It is bad enough as the Viloria decision made patent for our judiciary to accept as final and
conclusive, determinations made by foreign governmental agencies. It is infinitely worse if
through the absence of any coercive power by our courts over juridical persons within our
jurisdiction, the force and effectivity of their orders could be made to depend on the whim or
caprice of alien entities. It is difficult to imagine of a situation more offensive to the dignity of
the bench or the honor of the country.
Yet that would be the effect, even if unintended, of the proposition to which appellant Benguet
Consolidated seems to be firmly committed as shown by its failure to accept the validity of the
order complained of; it seeks its reversal. Certainly we must at all pains see to it that it does
not succeed. The deplorable consequences attendant on appellant prevailing attest to the
necessity of negative response from us. That is what appellant will get.
That is all then that this case presents. It is obvious why the appeal cannot succeed.
4
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the Honorable Arsenio Santos, the Judge of the Court of
First Instance, dated May 18, 1964, is affirmed. With costs against oppositor-appelant Benguet
Consolidated, Inc.
5. Asiawest Merchant Bankers vs CA
Gist of the facts: Malasian Court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner (Malaysian Corp)
for the recovery of performance bond it had put up in facvor of respondent (Phil Corp). Failed
to enforce it in Malaysia, petitioner filed a case in Philippine Court for enforcement.
Facts: Petitioner Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation organized under the
laws of Malaysia while private respondent Philippine National Construction Corporation is a
corporation duly incorporated and existing under Philippine laws.
Petitioner initiated a suit for collection against private respondent, then known as Construction
and Development Corporation of the Philippines, before the High Court of Malaya in Kuala
Lumpur entitled “Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad v. Asiavest CDCP Sdn. Bhd. and
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines.”
Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of
private respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda Project and the nonpayment of
the loan it extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan
By Pass; Project.
The High Court of Malaya (Commercial Division) rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner
and against the private respondent. Following unsuccessful attempts to secure payment from
private respondent under the judgment, petitioner initiated the complaint before RTC of Pasig,
Metro Manila, to enforce the judgment of the High Court of Malaya.
Private respondent sought the dismissal of the case via a Motion to Dismiss, contending that
the alleged judgment of the High Court of Malaya should be denied recognition or
enforcement since on in face, it is tainted with want of jurisdiction, want of notice to private
respondent, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact. Dismissal was,
however, denied by the trial court considering that the grounds relied upon are not the proper
grounds in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Subsequently, private respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counter claim’s and
therein raised the grounds it brought up in its motion to dismiss. In its Reply filed, the petitioner
contended that the High Court of Malaya acquired jurisdiction over the person of private
respondent by its voluntary submission the court’s jurisdiction through its appointed counsel.
Furthermore, private respondent’s counsel waived any and all objections to the High Court’s
jurisdiction in a pleading filed before the court.
In due time, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing petitioner’s complaint. Petitioner
interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court dismissed the same
and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in denying recognition and enforcement to the Malaysian
Court judgment.
Ruling: Yes. Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, the
rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized
states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally
respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different
countries.
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar
as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is
convincingly shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court
of competent jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted,
following due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing
to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud
in procuring the judgment.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes,
until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the
giving of due notice in the foreign forum Under Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which was the governing law at the time the instant case was decided by the trial court
and respondent appellate court, a judgment, against a person, of a tribunal of a foreign country
having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the
parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be
assailed by evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. In addition, under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of
Court, a court, whether in the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was
acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once the authenticity of the foreign
judgment is proved, the party attacking a foreign judgment, is tasked with the burden of
overcoming its presumptive validity.
In the instant case, petitioner sufficiently established the existence of the money judgment of
the High Court of Malaya by the evidence it offered. Petitioner’s sole witness, testified to the
effect that he is in active practice of the law profession in Malaysia; that he was connected
with Skrine and Company as Legal Assistant up to 1981; that private respondent, then known
as Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, was sued by his client,
Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur; that the writ of summons were
served on March 17, 1983 at the registered office of private respondent and on March 21, 1983
on Cora S. Deala, a financial planning officer of private respondent for Southeast Asia
operations; that upon the filing of the case, Messrs. Allen and Gledhill, Advocates and
Solicitors, with address at 24th Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan Sulaiman, Kuala Lumpur, entered
their conditional appearance for private respondent questioning the regularity of the service
of the writ of summons but subsequently withdrew the same when it realized that the writ
was properly served; that because private respondent failed to file a statement of defense
5
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
within two (2) weeks, petitioner filed an application for summary judgment and submitted
affidavits and documentary evidence in support of its claim; that the matter was then heard
before the High Court of Kuala Lumpur in a series of dates where private respondent was
represented by counsel; and that the end result of all these proceedings is the judgment sought
to be enforced.
In addition to the said testimonial evidence, petitioner also offered the documentary evidence
to support their claim:
(a) A certified and authenticated copy of the Judgment promulgated by the Malaysian High
Court dated September 13, 1985 directing private respondent to pay petitioner the sum of
$5,108,290.23 Malaysian Ringgit plus interests from March 1983 until fully paid;
(b) A certified and authenticated copy of the Order dated September 13, 1985 issued by the
Malaysian High Court in Civil Suit No. C638 of 1983;
(c) Computation of principal and interest due as of January 31, 1990 on the amount adjudged
payable to petitioner by private respondent;
(d) Letter and Statement of Account of petitioners counsel in Malaysia indicating the costs for
prosecuting and implementing the Malaysian High Courts Judgment;
(e) Letters between petitioners Malaysian counsel, Skrine and Co., and its local counsel, Sycip
Salazar Law Offices, relative to institution of the action in the Philippines;
(f) Billing Memorandum of Sycip Salazar Law Offices dated January 2, 1990 showing attorneys
fees paid by and due from petitioner;
(g) Statement of Claim, Writ of Summons and Affidavit of Service of such writ in petitioners
suit against private respondent before the Malaysian High Court;
(h) Memorandum of Conditional Appearance dated March 28, 1983 filed by counsel for private
respondent with the Malaysian High Court;
(i) Summons in Chambers and Affidavit of Khaw Chay Tee, counsel for private respondent,
submitted during the proceedings before the Malaysian High Court;
(j) Record of the Courts Proceedings in Civil Case No. C638 of
(k) Petitioners verified Application for Summary Judgment dated August 14, 1984; and
(l) Letter dated November 6, 1985 from petitioners Malaysian counsel to private respondents
counsel in Malaysia.
Having thus proven, through the foregoing evidence, the existence and authenticity of the
foreign judgment, said foreign judgment enjoys presumptive validity and the burden then fell
upon the party who disputes its validity, herein private respondent, to prove otherwise.
However, private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that fell upon it – to
prove by clear and convincing evidence the grounds which it relied upon to prevent
enforcement of the Malaysian High Court judgment.
Private respondent failed to sufficiently discharge the burden that fell upon it to prove by clear
and convincing evidence the grounds which it relied upon to prevent enforcement of the
Malaysian High Court judgment, namely, (a) that jurisdiction was not acquired by the
Malaysian Court over the person of private respondent due to alleged improper service of
summons upon private respondent and the alleged lack of authority of its counsel to appear
and represent private respondent in the suit; (b) the foreign judgment is allegedly tainted by
evident collusion, fraud and clear mistake of fact or law; and (c) not only were the requisites
for enforcement or recognition allegedly not complied with but also that the Malaysian
judgment is allegedly contrary to the Constitutional prescription that the every decision must
state the facts and law on which it is based.
Private respondent relied solely on the testimony of its two (2) witnesses, namely, Mr. Alfredo
N. Calupitan, an accountant of private respondent, and Virginia Abelardo, Executive Secretary
and a member of the staff of the Corporate Secretariat Section of the Corporate Legal Division,
of private respondent, both of whom failed to shed light and amplify its defense or claim for
non-enforcement of the foreign judgment against it.
Mr. Calupitans testimony centered on the following: that from January to December 1982 he
was assigned in Malaysia as Project Comptroller of the Pahang Project Package A and B for
road construction under the joint venture of private respondent and Asiavest Holdings;[37]
that under the joint venture, Asiavest Holdings would handle the financial aspect of the
project, which is fifty-one percent (51%) while private respondent would handle the technical
aspect of the project, or forty-nine percent (49%);[38] and, that Cora Deala was not authorized
to receive summons for and in behalf of the private respondent.[39] Ms. Abelardos testimony,
on the other hand, focused on the following: that there was no board resolution authorizing
Allen and Gledhill to admit all the claims of petitioner in the suit brought before the High Court
of Malaya,[40] though on cross-examination she admitted that Allen and Gledhill were the
retained lawyers of private respondent in Malaysia.
The foregoing reasons or grounds relied upon by private respondent in preventing
enforcement and recognition of the Malaysian judgment primarily refer to matters of remedy
and procedure taken by the Malaysian High Court relative to the suit for collection initiated by
1983; petitioner. Needless to stress, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not
necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which such
judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of the country in which the judgment is
relied on.[42] Ultimately, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the
service of summons or court process upon the defendant, the authority of counsel to appear
and represent a defendant and the formal requirements in a decision are governed by the lex
fori or the internal law of the forum,[43] i.e., the law of Malaysia in this case.
In this case, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was rendered that
determines the validity of the service of court process on private respondent as well as other
6
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
matters raised by it. As to what the Malaysian procedural law is, remains a question of fact,
not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other
fact. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that it may be
evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was
then incumbent upon private respondent to present evidence as to what that Malaysian
procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed service of summons upon a financial
officer of a corporation, as alleged by it, is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of
validity and regularity of service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the High
Court of Malaya must stand.
On the matter of alleged lack of authority of the law firm of Allen and Gledhill to represent
private respondent, not only did the private respondents witnesses admit that the said law
firm of Allen and Gledhill were its counsels in its transactions in Malaysia,[45] but of greater
significance is the fact that petitioner offered in evidence relevant Malaysian jurisprudence[46]
to the effect that (a) it is not necessary under Malaysian law for counsel appearing before the
Malaysian High Court to submit a special power of attorney authorizing him to represent a
client before said court, (b) that counsel appearing before the Malaysian High Court has full
authority to compromise the suit, and (c) that counsel appearing before the Malaysian High
Court need not comply with certain pre-requisites as required under Philippine law to appear
and compromise judgments on behalf of their clients before said court.
Furthermore, there is no basis for or truth to the appellate courts conclusion that the
conditional appearance of private respondents counsel who was allegedly not authorized to
appear and represent, cannot be considered as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the
High Court of Malaya, inasmuch as said conditional appearance was not premised on the
alleged lack of authority of said counsel but the conditional appearance was entered to
question the regularity of the service of the writ of summons. Such conditional appearance
was in fact subsequently withdrawn when counsel realized that the writ was properly
served.[48]
On the ground that collusion, fraud and clear mistake of fact and law tainted the judgment of
the High Court of Malaya, no clear evidence of the same was adduced or shown. The facts
which the trial court found intriguing amounted to mere conjectures and specious
observations. The trial courts finding on the absence of judgment against Asiavest-CDCP Sdn.
Bhd. is contradicted by evidence on record that recovery was also sought against Asiavest-
CDCP Sdn. Bhd. but the same was found insolvent.[49] Furthermore, even when the foreign
judgment is based on the drafts prepared by counsel for the successful party, such is not per
se indicative of collusion or fraud. Fraud to hinder the enforcement within the jurisdiction of a
foreign judgment must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on facts not controverted or resolved in
the case where judgment is rendered,[50] or that which would go to the jurisdiction of the
court or would deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend the
action to which he has a meritorious defense.[51] Intrinsic fraud is one which goes to the very
existence of the cause of action is deemed already adjudged, and it, therefore, cannot militate
against the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment.[52] Evidence is wanting on
the alleged extrinsic fraud. Hence, such unsubstantiated allegation cannot give rise to liability
therein.
Lastly, there is no merit to the argument that the foreign judgment is not enforceable in view
of the absence of any statement of facts and law upon which the award in favor of the
petitioner was based. As aforestated, the lex fori or the internal law of the forum governs
matters of remedy and procedure.[53] Considering that under the procedural rules of the High
Court of Malaya, a valid judgment may be rendered even without stating in the judgment every
fact and law upon which the judgment is based, then the same must be accorded respect and
the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the judgment of the foreign court simply
because our rules provide otherwise.
All in all, private respondent had the ultimate duty to demonstrate the alleged invalidity of
such foreign judgment, being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the High Court
of Malaya. But instead of doing so, private respondent merely argued, to which the trial court
agreed, that the burden lay upon petitioner to prove the validity of the money judgment. Such
is clearly erroneous and would render meaningless the presumption of validity accorded a
foreign judgment were the party seeking to enforce it be required to first establish its
validity.[54]
6. Saudia Arabia Airlines vs. CA (supra)
Facts: Morada was a flight attendant of SAUDIA (the airline). During a lay-over in Jakarta, she
went to a disco dance with fellow crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi,
both Saudi nationals. Because it was almost morning when they returned to their hotels, they
agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When they were in the room, Allah
left on some pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a
roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for help and rescued her. Later, the
Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA officials interrogated her
about the Jakarta incident. They then requested her to go back to Jakarta to help arrange the
release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah Akkad and base manager
Baharini negotiated with the police for the immediate release of the detained crew members
but did not succeed because plaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraid that she might be
tricked into something she did not want because of her inability to understand the local dialect.
She also declined to sign a blank paper and a document written in the local dialect. Eventually,
SAUDIA allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the
Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention.
Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDIA. In September 1990, defendant
SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was already behind
her, her superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to the police station where the police
took her passport and questioned her about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as
the police put pressure on her to make a statement dropping the case against Thamer and
Allah. Not until she agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch
the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
7
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
One year and a half later or on lune 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few minutes before
the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board the plane and instead
ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA.
When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she
was asked to sign a document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close
the case against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear
before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once again and
see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did so after receiving
assurance from SAUDIA's Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the investigation was routinary
and that it posed no danger to her.
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June 27, 1993.
Nothing happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated plaintiff through an
interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the
airport, however, just as her plane was about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the
airline had forbidden her to take flight. At the Inflight Service Office where she was told to go,
the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah,
at the crew quarters, until further orders.
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court where the
judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to her in English,
sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only then did she realize that
the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta.
The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing and listening to the
music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of
Islamic tradition.
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner SAUDIA.
Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She then asked the Philippine Embassy in
Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal. Meanwhile, to pay for her upkeep, she worked
on the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah continued to serve in the
international flights.
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her
and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return she was terminated from the
service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-
Balawi ("Al-Balawi"), its country manager.
Issues: WON Philippine Courts have jurisdiction over the case
Ruling: Yes. The Court characterized the factual problem as a tort; Conflict rule on tort is “lex
loci actus”, but since several incidents happened in different states, the Court also applied the
“state of the most significant relationship rule” to arrive at the conclusion that in this case,
such a state was the Philippines, thus Philippine Law on torts was applied.
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain
set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as "characterization", or the "doctrine of
qualification". It is the "process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of
question specified in a conflicts rule." The purpose of "characterization" is to enable the forum
to select the proper law.
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or
operative fact. An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting
factor" or "point of contact".
Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract
claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of
celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the
determination of the applicable law. These "test factors" or "points of contact" or "connecting
factors" could be any of the following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his
origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In
particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a
contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed.
The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance
of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their
agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex
fori — the law of the forum — is particularly important because, as we have seen
earlier, matters of "procedure" not going to the substance of the claim involved are
governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the
otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the
reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law;
and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships
of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships
particularly contracts of affreightment.
After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in the Amended
Complaint deemed admitted for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are convinced that
there is reasonable basis for private respondent's assertion that although she was already
8
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely
testify in an investigation of the charges she made against the two SAUDIA crew members for
the attack on her person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made to
face trial for very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the "connecting factor"
or "point of contact" could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus
occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could
be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is
because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a
Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner
would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, "act with justice, give
her due and observe honesty and good faith." Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she
claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no
moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the
totality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of
complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told,
it is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi,
modern theories and rules on tort liability have been advanced to offer fresh judicial
approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort
liability, we find here an occasion to apply the "State of the most significant relationship" rule,
which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of this case.
In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship,
the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the
place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality,
place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the
relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complained of and the
place "having the most interest in the problem", we find, by way of recapitulation, that the
Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount application to and control in the
resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the complaint;
the appropriate venue is in Quezon City, which could properly apply Philippine law.
7. PEOPLE v. WONG CHENG (WONG CHUN)
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the information
that initiated this case and in which the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium
aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was anchored
in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and
dismissed the case.
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is erroneous
or not; and it will or will not be erroneous according to said court has or has no jurisdiction
over said offense.
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over a crime, like
the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdictional
waters.
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International
Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign
merchant vessel should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose
territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects the peace and
security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed
in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are
in general triable in the courts of the country within whose territory they were committed.
Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the
theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the
Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
In the case of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.]. 116), Chief
Justice Marshall said:
". . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously
inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the law to continual
infraction, and the government to degradation, if such individual or merchants did
not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction
of the country. . . ."
In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
". . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime
committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but
when she came within tree miles of a line drawn from the headlands which embrace
the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of
principles became applicable. (Wheaton, International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note
105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and
her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject to
such limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty through the proper
political agency. . . ."
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and Wildenhus vs.
Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U. S., 1), wherein it was said that:
". . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorders which disturb
only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the
sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may
be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of
the local jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to determine to which of the two
jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on
the attending circumstances of the particular case, but all must concede that
felonious homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and that if the proper
9
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
authorities are proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has no right
to interfere to prevent it."
Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
"Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine
Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any local port, does not, as a general
rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of the Islands, such vessel being
considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when
the article, the use of which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the vessel
upon Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the laws of the land is
committed with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the
place of the commission of the crime, no court other than that established in the said
place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an agreement under an
international treaty."
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing
such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is
concerned, to which nation the ship where the crime in question was committed belongs.
Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the
following:
"There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the
territories of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The
inhabitants of the two countries, respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely
to come with their ships and cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers, in the
territories aforesaid, to which other foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into
the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of the said territories, respectively;
also to hire and occupy houses and warehouses for the purposes of their commerce;
and, generally, the merchants and traders of each nation respectively shall enjoy the
most complete protection and security for their commerce, but subject always to the
laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively." (Art. 1, Commerce and
Navigation Convention.)
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held
by this court not triable by our courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law
to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the
use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does
not bring about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding.
Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order.
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant
ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug
to produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose
that our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as
the Attorney-General aptly observes:
". . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel
at anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are
impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive of public order. It requires no
unusual stretch of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come into the
port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on board."
8. US v BULL
(1910 case about cattles and carabaos onboard a ship)
FACTS:The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1
of Act No. 55, The information alleges:
"That on and for many months prior to the 2nd day of December, 1908, the said H.
N. Bull was then and there master of a steam sailing vessel known as the
steamship Standard, which vessel was then and there engaged in carrying and
transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a foreign port, to wit, the port
of Ampieng, Formosa, to the port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the said
accused H. N. Bull, while master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day
of December, 1908, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carry,
transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the
port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and
carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit,
so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals, in this, to wit,
that the said H. N. Bull, master, as aforesaid, did then and there fail to provide stalls
for said animals so in transit and suitable means for tying and securing said animals
in a proper manner, and did then and there cause some of said animals to be tied by
means of rings passed through their noses, and allow and permit others to be
transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without being tied or
secured in stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and
failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so in
transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals
were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded,
bruised, and killed.
"All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine
Commission."
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that
—
"The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting
cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to
another, or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry
with them, upon the vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water
to provide for the suitable sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period
occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of shipment to the port of
debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided with adequate forage and
fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours from the time that the animals
are embarked to the time of their final debarkation."
ISSUES: Whether the Philippine court has jurisdiction.
RULING: YES. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state
that the court was sitting at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense
was committed on board a vessel registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine
Islands.
10
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of First Instance
or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are
disembarked.
This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province into which
such ship or water craft upon which the offense or crime was committed shall come after
the commission thereof. Had this offense been committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine
registry, there could have been no doubt of the jurisdiction of the court, because it is
expressly conferred, and the Act is in accordance with well recognized and established public
law. But the Standard was a Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered
or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws thereof.
We have then the question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this
character, committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when the neglect and
omission which constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship was within the
territorial waters of the United States. No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction
over an offense or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any
other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlands which
embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of
principles became applicable. The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of
the territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded by that
sovereignty through the proper political agency. This offense was committed within
territorial waters. From the line which determines these waters the Standard must have
traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor. During that part of her voyage the
violation of the statute continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it
is immaterial that the same conditions may have existed while the vessel was on the high
seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a
continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage
across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done within American
waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and
the person of the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but
the objection to the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is
restricted by the fact of the nationality of the ship. Every state has complete control and
jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to strict legal right, even public vessels may
not enter the ports of a friendly power without permission, but it is now conceded that in
the absence of a prohibition such ports are considered as open to the public ships of all
friendly powers. The exemption of such vessels from local jurisdiction while within such
waters was not established until within comparatively recent times.
Local officials exercise but little control over their actions, and offenses
committed by their crews are justiciable by their own officers acting under the laws to
which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general principle of
territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and finds its
justification in the fact that experience shows that such vessels are generally careful to
respect local laws and regulations which are essential to the health, order, and well-being
of the port. But comity and convenience does not require the extension of the same
degree of exemption to merchant vessels.
There are two well-defined theories as to the extent of the immunities
ordinarily granted to them. According to the French theory and practice, matters
happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern the tranquillity of the port or
persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the courts of the country to which the
vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
committed on board French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one member of the crew
against another. Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or claimed by Great Britain as
a right, although she has frequently conceded it by treaties. Writers who consider
exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory have sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but
Hall, who is doubtless the leading English authority, says that —
"It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality
of merchant vessels that so soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign state
they become subject to the local jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of
the country are touched."
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant
vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the
local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to
waive a portion of such jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant
vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject
themselves to the laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as
well in war as in peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty.
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by article
13 of the treaty of commerce and navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United
States, of July 4, 1827, which concedes to the consuls, vice-consuls, or consular agents of
each country "the right to sit as judges and arbitrators in such differences as may arise
between the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are
committed to their charge, without the interference of the local authorities, unless the
conduct of the crews or of the captains should disturb the order or tranquillity of the
country." This exception applies to controversies between the members of the ship's
company, and particularly to disputes regarding wages. The order and tranquillity of the
country are affected by many events which do not amount to a riot or general public
disturbance. Thus an assault by one member of the crew upon another, committed upon
the ship, of which the public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by this treaty
withdrawn from the cognizance of the local authorities.
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over offenses
committed on board a merchant vessel by one member of the crew against another which
amount to a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, and a fair and reasonable
construction of the language requires us to hold that any violation of criminal laws disturbs
the order or tranquillity of the country. The offense with which the appellant is charged had
nothing to do with any difference between the captain and the crew. It was a violation by
the master of the criminal law of the country into who port he came. We thus find that
neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the commission of the
offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law, are the courts
of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the
information in this case.
11
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege
that the animals were disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is claimed is
essential to the jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon
this issue would be to construe the language of the complaint very strictly against the
Government. The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the
completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the language of the statute confers
jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which the animals are brought. They are
then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of their disembarkation
is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be different if the disembarkation
of the animals constituted a constitutional element in the offense, but it does not.
Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of the
Act can not be left to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question which must be
determined by the court from the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the
defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain cattle,
which came from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means for
securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to
said animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1
of Act No. 275. The trial court found the following facts, all of which are fully sustained by
the evidence.
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and
fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The
sentence and judgment is affirmed. So ordered.
9. People vs Tulin
FACTS: Sometime in March 1991, M/T Tabangao, a cargo vessel owned by PNOC
Shipping, loaded with thousands of barrels of gasoline and oil, was sailing off the coast of
Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, was suddenly boarded, with the use of an aluminum
ladder, by 7 fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco. They detained the crew and took
complete control of the vessel.
The vessel was then painted with the name "Galilee," (the name M/T Tabango was painted
over) with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the
while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel to
the Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Air Force and Navy. However, search and
rescue operations yielded negative results.
The "M/T Tabangao" sailed to and anchored about 18 nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline
where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew
of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". After the transfer
was completed, the vessel went back to the Philippines.
The crew members were then released in 3 batches with the stern warning not to report the
incident to government authorities for a period of two days otherwise they would be killed.
Later, the members of the crew called the PNOC office to report the incident. The crew
members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The incident was also
reported to the NBI where the officers and members of the crew executed sworn statements
regarding the incident. A series of arrests was thereafter effected.
Tulin, Infante, Loyola, Changco, and a certain Hiong were arrested. The state Prosecutor filed
a case for qualified piracy against the accused.
(Si Cheong Hiong ra atong storyaan diri kay related sa iyang defense ang topic sa Conflict)
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong adduced evidence that he was employed at Navi Marine
Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company was engaged in the business of trading
petroleum and owned 4 vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker, who
offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of $300k. Hiong, was assigned to
supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore. Hiong was told that
"M/T Galilee" would be making the transfer. The transfer was then made and completed.
After the above transaction, Hiong went to the Philippines to discuss a new transaction with
Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new transfer. However, while sojourning, he
was arrested by the NBI.
The RTC convicted the accused hence the case at bar.
Hiong argued, among others, that the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an
accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed outside of
Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him for
trial, to convict, and sentence.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information with
qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to
Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was convicted for acts done outside
Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have
been committed within its territory.
ISSUE: WON accused-appellant Cheong Hiong can be convicted as accomplice when he was
not charged as such and when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed
outside Philippine waters and territory - YES
RULING: Suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao"
(renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters,
although the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was
off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant
Hiong's direct supervision. Although PD 532 requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel
and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the pirates of the vessel
and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed
in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title 1 of Book 2 of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an
exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong,
in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the penal code
but under a special law, PD 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, PD 532
should be applied with more force here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent
piracy in Philippine waters. It is likewise well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the
same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world.
AS REGARDS HIS CONVICTION AS AN ACCOMPLICE: The ruling of the trial court is within well-
settle jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is
that of an accomplice and not as principal. Any doubt as to the participation of an individual
in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility.
12
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
Emphasis must also be placed on Sec. 4 of PD 532 which presumes that any person who does
any of the acts provided in said section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is
proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal
presumption that he knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received
property taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom. Hence, Hiong is guilty.
10. Liang vs PP
Doctrine: The DFAs determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only
preliminary which has no binding effect in courts; mere invocation of the immunity clause does
not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.
-A diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of
the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial
activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.
Facts: The accused is an employee of ADB who was charged with grave oral defamation for
uttering defamatory words against a fellow employee. Liang was arrested and was able to post
bail. The MeTC released him under the custody of the ADB Security. The next day the MeTC
received an “office of protocol” from the DFA stating that Liang is covered by immunity from
legal processes under Sec. 45 of the Agreement with ADB. The MeTC dismissed the case
without notice to the prosecution. The MR was also denied, a petition for certiorari before the
RTC which set aside the MeTC ruling. Hence this petition.
Liang argues that he is covered under the Agreement and no preliminary investigation was
done to him.
Issue: WON Liang is immune from criminal prosecution?
Held: No.First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the
DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFAs determination that a certain person
is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving
ex-parte the DFAs advice and in motuproprio dismissing the two criminal cases without notice
to the prosecution, the latters right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due
process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry in what
capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution
evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time. At any rate, it has been ruled
that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of
the charges.
Second, under Sec. 45 of the Agreement, the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but
subject to the exception that the act was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary
to determine if petitioners case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution
should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the
opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because
our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official
duty. The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-
settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond
the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming
petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in
the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the
diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions. As already mentioned
above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to
say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such
as the one at bar.[6] Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked
only when specifically granted by law.[7] The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no
preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
11. US vs FOWLER, et. al.
Facts: The two defendants have been accused for theft for the 16 bottles of champagne as
while on board the vessel Lawton with US flag then navigating at the high seas, as cargo owned
by a certain Lindsay. Counsel for defendants presented a demurrer that the CFI had no
jurisdiction to try the crime charged inasmuch that as per the information filed, the crime was
committed at the high seas, which is outside the territorial jurisdiction of Manila. The
prosecution opposed it contending that by virtue of the orders of the Military Governor(MG)
and the Civil Commission(CC), admiralty jurisdiction over all crimes committed on board vessel
flying the flag of US has been vested with the CFI of Manila. Further, he argued that the
president of US has the authority to authorize the MG and CC to establish a judicial system
with authority to take cognizance of maritime and admiralty causes, citing a US SC decision,
which according to him is applicable in the archipelago and in the present case. Judge ruled in
favor of the defendants.
Issue: WON the CFI of Manila has jurisdiction to try the crime charged, which was committed
at high seas on board vessel of US.
Ruling: No. This case deals with a theft committed on board a transport while navigating the
high seas. Act No. 136 of the organic law, as well as Act No. 186 passed by the Civil Commission,
and which repealed the former law, Act No. 76, do not expressly confer jurisdiction or authority
upon this court to take cognizance of all crimes committed on board vessels on the high seas.
While the provisions of the law are clear and precise with respect to civil admiralty or maritime
cases, this is not true with respect to criminal cases. If any doubt could arise concerning the
true meaning of the law applicable to the case, Act No. 400 effectively dissipates such doubts.
This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136, by which the courts of justice of the Philippine
Islands were organized, in article 1 adds to article 56, consisting of seven paragraphs, another
paragraph numbered 8, which reads as follows: "Of all crimes and offenses committed on the
high seas or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the navigable waters of
the Philippine Archipelago, on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in
the Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws thereof." The purpose of this law was to
define the jurisdiction of the courts of First Instance in criminal cases for crimes committed on
board vessels registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands. The transport Lawton not being
a vessel of this class, our courts are without jurisdiction to take cognizance of a crime
committed on board the same.
13
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
12. MINORU FUJIKI v MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY
Doctrine: For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the
Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy
attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a
foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.
FACTS: Fujiki is a Japanese national who married Marinay in the Philippineson 2004. The
marriage did not sit well with Fujiki’s parents. He could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara. Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married in 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara.
She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010,
Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.Fujikithen filed a
petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)." Heprayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized;
(2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void under the
Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and
Civil Registrar General in the NSO.
RTC immediately dismissed the petition.It based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC. Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case
either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply.
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that
the petitioner failed to comply with A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as
the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v.
Republic which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of
bigamy.
ISSUES: (1) W/N A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable.(NO)
(2) W/N a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen
on the ground of bigamy.(YES)
(3) W/N the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.(YES)
HELD:
I.For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove
the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections
24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the
Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a certification or copy
attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a
foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer of the Philippine Foreign Service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of
office.
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment
would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form
and contents of the petition, the service of summons, the investigation of the public
prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the trial and the judgment of the trial court. This is absurd
because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." The interpretation of
the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada, this Court
explained that "if every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff
would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation."
Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve
into the merits of a foreign judgment.
III.To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. However, this does not apply in a petition for
correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign
judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a
foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to
recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already
tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in
a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered
to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine
courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to
14
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical
difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the
only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for
bigamy.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging
party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there
is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine
courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations. The
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
establishes a new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil registry.
Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the
foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines. GRANTED.
13. MIJARES VS. HONORABLE RANADA
KEYWORDS: 1 Billion for Marcos victims
FACTS: The essential facts bear little elaboration. A complaint via class suit was filed against
the Marcos Estate by ten Filipinos representing 10,000 Filipinos whose heirs were tortured,
detained, raped or summarily executed during the Martial Law era before the US District Court
in Hawaii. Plaintiffs invoked the US Alien Tort Act. The District Court awarded $
1,964,005,859.90 and such was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals. The Marcos Estate did
not appeal hence the judgment became final.
The plaintiffs now filed a civil case before the RTC Makati for the enforcement of judgment.
The plaintiffs paid only P410 as docket fees, basing the rates on Special Proceedings cases.
Marcos estate filed a motion to dismiss for failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees in
accordance with the SC circular since such was arguably pecuniary in nature and considering
the fact that the damages amounts to almost P2 billion. Plaintiffs argued that such was
incapable of pecuniary estimation since the action was merely for enforcement of foreign
judgment. Petitioner also invokes the Bill of Rights which state that free access to the courts
should not be denied by reason of poverty. CHR intervened in this case. RTC ruled that the
filing fees should be P472,000,000.00.
RTC based its decision on the graduated rates on Section 7(a) Rule 141. Check lang nya the
provision at the bottom of the digest.These are the only facts. The rest of this lengthy case is
about the ruling.
ISSUES:
1. WON the case is incapable of pecuniary estimation
2. WON the proper filing fees was paid
3. WON the RTC has jurisdiction
RULING:
I. This is a case capable of pecuniary estimation.
The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized
states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally
respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different
countries.
There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in
personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to
the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not
conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent
title.[21] However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our
local courtson the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party,[22] collusion,
fraud,[23] or clear mistake of law or fact.[24] Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign
judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum.
There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of action arising from the
enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that arising from the facts or allegations that
occasioned the foreign judgment. They may pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an
essential difference in the right-duty correlatives that are sought to be vindicated. For
example, in a complaint for damages against a tortfeasor, the cause of action emanates from
the violation of the right of the complainant through the act or omission of the respondent.
On the other hand, in a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment awarding
damages from the same tortfeasor, for the violation of the same right through the same
manner of action, the cause of action derives not from the tortious act but from the foreign
judgment itself.
The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be undertaken in order to enforce a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. But there is no question that the filing of a civil complaint
is an appropriate measure for such purpose.
It is self-evident that while the subject matter of the action is undoubtedly the enforcement of
a foreign judgment, the effect of a providential award would be the adjudication of a sum of
money. Perhaps in theory, such an action is primarily for the enforcement of the foreign
judgment, but there is a certain obtuseness to that sort of argument since there is no denying
that the enforcement of the foreign judgment will necessarily result in the award of a definite
sum of money.
II. RTC has jurisdiction
Petitioners argue that if indeed an action for enforcement of foreign judgment may be capable
of pecuniary estimation, itmight lead to an instance wherein a first level court such as the
Municipal Trial Court would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. But under the
statute defining the jurisdiction of first level courts, B.P. 129, suchMTCC courts are not vested
with jurisdiction over actions for the enforcement of foreign judgments.
The SC said that: it is still under RTC jurisdiction since the same BP 129 states that RTC has
jurisdiction over “cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions.”
III. The proper filing fees were paid
The SC said while it is capable of pecuniary estimation, it is still an action against an estate
based on a judgment.
15
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501
We are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the complaint to enforce the US District
Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also an
action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit ofSection 7(a)
of Rule 141. What provision then governs the proper computation of the filing fees over the
instant complaint? For this case and other similarly situated instances, we find that it is covered
by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does, other actions not involving property.
Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that it was an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to the same amount required for other actions
not involving property. The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was
a grave abuse of discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable
rule and dismissed the complaint.
RELEVANT RULES OF COURT PROVISION
SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court.-
(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against an estate NOT
based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc., complaint,
or a complaint in intervention, and for all clerical services in the same time, if the total sum
claimed, exclusive of interest, or the started value of the property in litigation, is:
1. Less than P 100,00.00 P 500.00
2. P 100,000.00 or more - P 800.00but less than P 150,000.00
3. P 150,000.00 or more but - P 1,000.00less than P 200,000.00 (and so on and so forth)
XXXXXXXXX
(b) For filing
1. Actions where the valueof the subject mattercannot be estimated --- P 600.00
2. Special civil actions exceptjudicial foreclosure whichshall be governed byparagraph (a) above
--- P 600.00
3. All other actions notinvolving property --- P 600.00 (SC used this as basis for this decision)
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value,
thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.
BONUS:
BASIS FOR ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENT
While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments have not been authoritatively established, the Court can assert with certainty that
such an undertaking is among those generally accepted principles of international law.[68] As
earlier demonstrated, there is a (1) widespread practice among states accepting in principle
the need for such recognition and enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of varying degrees.
The fact that there is no binding universal treaty governing the practice is not indicative of a
widespread rejection of the principle, but only a disagreement as to the imposable specific
rules governing the procedure for recognition and enforcement.
Aside from the widespread practice, (2) it is indubitable that the procedure for recognition
and enforcement is embodied in the rules of law, whether statutory or jurisprudential,
adopted in various foreign jurisdictions. Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long ago
accepted into its jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an action for enforcement
of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from
internationally accepted doctrines.
LIMITATION BY OUR COURTS ON REVIEWING FOREIGN JUDGMENT
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of
jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of
fact or law. The limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all
legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.[32] Otherwise known as the
policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party expectations resulting from previous litigation, to
safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be
increased by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and in a larger sense to promote
what Lord Coke in the Ferrers Case of 1599 stated to be the goal of all law: rest and
quietness.[33] If every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff
would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
concluded litigation.
14. TUNA PROCESSING, INC vs. PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC.
Arbitration, General law v Special law
FACTS: Kanemitsu Yamaoka (hereinafter referred to as the "licensor"), co-patentee of U.S.
Patent Philippine Letters Patent and Indonesian Patent (collectively referred to as the
"Yamaoka Patent"), and five Philippine tuna processors, namely, Angel Seafood Corporation,
East Asia Fish Co., Inc., Mommy Gina Tuna Resources, Santa Cruz Seafoods, Inc., and
respondent Kingford (collectively referred to as the "sponsors"/"licensees") entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement.
Purpose of the MOA is for Yamaoka to enter into alliance with Kingford for so that
he may enforce his patents, and for the latter to be licensed under the same patents, to enforce
them and collect royalties in conjunction with the former.
Subsequently, petitioner Tuna Processors, Inc (TPI) was established in the State of
California. Stipulated was an arbitration clause whereby for any disputes arising from the
MOA, it should be submitted before the International Dispute Resolution in the State of
California.
Later, for unknown reasons, Kingford withdrew from TPI and reneged on its
obligations. So, TPI submitted the case for arbitration. Then, Kingford was ordered to pay TPI
for breach of the MOA.
To enforce award, TPI filed a Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC of Makati City. Then, a motion to
dismiss was filed by Kingford. But the first judge, prior inhibition, denied it. Kingford sought for
the judge’s inhibition, which the judge heeded even amidst unfounded allegations for
inhibition. The second judge, then granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed the petition
on the ground that TPI lacked legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.
Hence, this direct petition to SC under Rule 45, Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: WON TPI has the legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.
16
Conflict Batch 3 I Atty. Torregosa I EH 501

RULING: YES, IT HAS CAPACITY TO SUE

DECISION OF RTC

TPI is a foreign Corp organized under laws of California. So applicable law is Sec. 133
or now, 150 of the Revised Corp Code. In a nutshell, it states that:

NO foreign corp transacting business in the Philippines without license, or its

successors or assigns shall maintain or intervene in any action before Phil Courts or Admin
agencies, but, it can be sued.

This was the basis of the RTC in saying that TPI has no legal capacity because it
ADMITTED that it has no license to operate in the country.

ARGUMENT OF PETITIONER:

Under RA 9285 (Alternative Dispute Resolution of 2004), New York Convention, and
UNCITRAL Model Law, legal capacity is not required for a party to seek enforcement of
foreign arbitration judgment.

DILLEMA NOW:

How to RECONCILE Sec. 133 / 150 of the Revised Corp Code on one hand, and RA
9285, New York Convention, and UNCITRAL Model law on the other.

SC RESOLUTION:

1) ADR of 2004 being the Municipal law, is applicable.

2) Corp code is a GENERAL LAW (applies to all corporations) while ADR of 2004 is a SPECIAL
LAW (specific goal is to promote party autonomy in resolving their disputes). – as between a
general and special law, the latter shall prevail

3) ADR of 2004 provides exclusive grounds for the opposing party in an application for
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award. NONE of the grounds touched on the
capacity to sue of the party seeking the recognition and enforcement of the award.

4) When a party enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and, as in this
case, in fact submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract, by the arbitration
and by the result of arbitration.

TPI CAN FILE FOR RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARBITRAL AWARD.

CASE REMANDED.

17