I.
Definition of Evidence (Rule 128,
Section 1)
 is the means, sanctioned by these
rules, of ascertaining in a judicial
proceeding the truth respecting a
matter of fact.
1. Basic Concepts
a. Evidence and Proof;
Evidence – is the medium of proof.
Proof – is not evidence itself, there is
proof only because of evidence.
It is merely the probative effect of
evidence and is the conviction or
persuasion of the mind resulting from a
consideration of the evidence.
Is the effect or result of evidence.
b. Factum probandum and factum probans
Factum probandum – the fact
proposition to be established.
It is the fact to be proved, it is the fact
which is in issue in a case and to which
the evidence is directed.
May be affected by judicial admission of a
party.
Factum probans – the fact of material
evidencing the fact or proposition to be
established.
Is the probative or evidentiary
tending to prove the fact in issue.
c. Forms of evidence
i. Object (real) evidence (Rule 130,
section 1)
 Objects as evidence are those
addressed to the senses of the
court. When an object is relevant
to the fact in issue, it may be
exhibited to, examined or viewed
by the court.
ii. Documentary evidence
 Documents as evidence consist of
writing or any material containing
letters, words, numbers, figures,
symbols or other modes of written
expression offered as proof of their
contents.
iii. Testimonial evidence
 It is evidence consisting of the
narration of a person, known as a
witness, made under oath and in
the course of the judicial
proceedings in which the evidence
is offered.
d. Other classification of evidence
i. Direct and Circumstantial
Direct - that which proves a fact in issue
or dispute without the aid of any inference
or presumption. It is evidence to the
or precise point.
Example: The eye witness account; the
scar to show the wound
Circumstantial - proof of facts or fact
from which taken singly or collectively, the
existence of the particular fact in issue
maybe inferred or presumed as a
necessary or probable consequence.
ii. Cumulative and Corroborative
Cumulative - additional evidence of the
fact same kind bearing on the same point.
E.g.: testimonies of several eyewitnesses
to the same incident.
Corroborative - additional evidence of a
different kind or character but tending to
prove the same point.
It is evidence which confirms or supports.
Thus: (i) the medico legal certificate
describing the injuries to have been
caused by a sharp pointed instrument
corroborates the statement that the
accused used a knife to stab the victim.
(ii) the positive results of a paraffin test
corroborates the allegation that the
person fired a gun and
(iii) the ballistics examination on the gun
of the suspect corroborates the statement
that he fired his gun at the victim.
iii. Primary and Secondary
Primary (best)- that which the law
regards as affording the greatest certainty
of the fact in question.
E.g.: the original of a contract is the best
evidence as to its contents; the marriage
contract as to the fact of marriage; a
receipt as to the fact of payment; the
birth certificate as to filiation.
Secondary- that which is necessarily
inferior and shows on its face that a better
evidence exists.
E.g.: Xerox copies of documents;
narration of witnesses as to a written
contract.
iv. Positive and Negative
Positive - evidence that affirms the
occurrence of an event or existence of a
fact, as when a witness declares that
there was no fight which took place.
Negative - when the evidence denies the
occurrence of an event or existence of a
fact, as when the accused presents
witnesses who testify that the accused
was at their party when the crime was
committed. Denials and alibi are negative
evidences.
The general rule is that positive evidence
prevails over negative evidence, or that a
positive assertion is given more weight
over a plain denial.
e. Liberal Construction;
Like all other provisions under ROC, the
rules on evidence must be liberally
construed.
Rules of procedure are mere tools
intended to facilitate rather than frustrate
the attainment of justice.
A strict and rigid application of the rules
must always be avoided if it would
undermine the power of the primary
objective of enhancing substantial justice.
Although strict compliance on the rules is
desired, liberal interpretation is warranted
in cases where a strict compliance of the
rules will not serve the end of justice.
However, the rule on liberal construction
is not a license to disregard the evidence,
or lack thereof on record or to misapply
the laws.
The rule on Electronic Evidence shall also
be construed liberally.
CASES:
GARBO vs. CA, 327 PHIL 780, JULY 5,
1996;
FACTS: The RTC appointed (P) Gloria Z.
Garbo administratrix of the intestate
estate of Manuel G. Garbo. Three months
later, the intestate estate of Manuel G.
Garbos wife, Magdalena B. Garbo, filed a
petition for the allowance of Manuel G.
Garbos Last Will and Testament which
devised and bequeathed all of Manuels
properties and assets exclusively to his
wife Magdalena.
(P) filed her opposition, the court issued
an Order allowing the Last Will and
Testament to be probated and appointed
(PR) Antonio B. Gradiola, the
administrator of the estate of Magdalena
B. Garbo, as administrator of the estate of
Manuel G. Garbo.
(P) filed her notice of appeal and,
subsequently, her record on appeal.
Contending that pertinent pleadings were
not included in the record on appeal, (PR)
objected to its admission.
The probate court issued an Order
requiring (P) to submit an amended or
corrected record on appeal, within ten
(10) days from receipt. (P) filed her
compliance not by filing the amended
record on appeal but by attaching the
omitted pages to be annexed or inserted
to the original record on appeal which
(PR) stressed in his opposition to
compliance to be improper as it failed to
follow what was required by the Order.
(PR) moved for the dismissal of petitioners
appeal. The probate court gave petitioner
five days within which to comment on the
motion to dismiss appeal. However,
neither the required comment nor the
amended record on appeal was filed, thus
the probate court dismissed the appeal.
The probate court directed the issuance of
letters of administration in favor of (PR).
Protesting that the issuance of letters of
administration is unjustified in view of her
pending notice of appeal and the alleged
non-finality of the Order, (P), on filed her
motion for reconsideration which was
denied.
(P) filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus before CA which was
dismissed the petition, without
pronouncement as to costs. (P) filed her
motion for reconsideration but without
success.
SC gave due course to the petition,
Resolution and required both parties to file
their respective memoranda.
ISSUE: W/N the probate court and (R) CA
properly dismissed petitioners appeal?
HELD: DENIED
Procedural rules are tools designed to
facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts
and litigants alike are thus enjoined to
abide strictly by the rules. And while the
Court, in some instances, allows a
relaxation in the application of the rules,
this, we stress, was never intended to
forge a bastion for erring litigants to
violate the rules with impunity.
The liberality in the interpretation and
application of the rules applies only in
proper cases and under justifiable causes
and circumstances. While it is true that
litigation is not a game of technicalities, it
is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the
prescribed procedure to insure an orderly
and speedy administration of justice.
(P) offers no cogent reason and none
appears on record to justify her failure to
file her amended or redrafted record on
appeal as directed by the probate court
twice despite the vehement objection of
the private respondent.
In correcting a record on appeal, Rule 41,
Section 7 of the Rules of Court requires
the appellant, within the time limited in
the order, redraft the record by including
therein, in their proper chronological
sequence, such additional matters as the
court may have directed him to
incorporate, and shall thereupon submit
the redrafted record for approval, upon
notice to the appellee, in like manner as
the original draft.
The submission of the redrafted record on
appeal as well as its approval are essential
to perfect an appeal in special
proceedings, as in this case.
Petitioner simply failed to comply with the
requirements of the rule, hence the Order
lapsed into finality. It is a settled rule that
once an order or decision acquires finality
it may not be altered or modified save in
some exceptional circumstances none of
which is present in this case. Moreover,
Rule 41, Section 13 of the Rules of Court
is quite explicit:
Sec. 13. Effect of failure to file notice,
bond, or record on appeal. - Where the
notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on
appeal is not filed within the period of
time herein provided, the appeal shall be
dismissed.
The dismissal of petitioners appeal was,
therefore, beyond cavil.
The case of Grearte is not in point. While
there appears to be some similarity of
facts between the instant case and
Grearte the SC note that in the latter case
(R) filed the required amended record on
appeal. In the instant case, however,
petitioner never bothered to do so.
SSS. vs. CHAVES, 440 SCRA 269, OCT.
13, 2004;
FACTS: PR spouses Juanito and Agustina
Obedencio, filed Civil Case for Specific
Performance at the RTC, they prayed that
the SSS be ordered (1) to cancel the
mortgage on the properties of the
spouses; (2) to release the documents
covering the said properties; and (3) to
pay the spouses moral damages.
The (P) filed its Answer with Counterclaim
alleging that the PRs had an unpaid
obligation.
After the issues were joined, a pre-trial
conference was scheduled, Atty. Filoteo,
acting assistant branch manager of the
SSS and only lawyer of the said branch,
entered his appearance as counsel for the
(P).
He manifested that he had filed his pre-
trial brief through registered mail. The
hearing was, however, cancelled because
the respondent judge was indisposed. The
hearing of the case was reset, this time,
Atty. Filoteo failed to attend because of an
official mission to Zamboanga City.
On motion of Atty. Bacal, counsel of the
respondent spouses, respondent judge
issued an Order declaring petitioner in
default and allowed PRs to present their
evidence ex-parte.
The (P) filed a MR praying for the lifting of
the order of default. The motion was
denied, the (P) appealed the Order
denying the MR to the CA which was
dismissed.
SC denied the petition.
There is no question that it is the
discretion of the trial judge to declare a
party-defendant as in default for failure to
appear at a pre-trial conference. Rule 20,
Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, thus:
A party who fails to appear at a
pretrial conference may be non-
suited or considered as in default.
To be relieved of the effects of the order
of default, Sec. 3, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court provides that the defendant must
file a motion under oath to set aside the
order of default; that he must show that
his failure to appear at the pre-trial was
due to fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect and accompany the
motion with affidavit of merit.
The motion to lift the order of default
must further show that the (D) has a
meritorious defense or that something
would be gained by having the order of
default set aside.
A perusal of (P’s) motion to lift order of
default shows that it is neither under oath
nor accompanied by an affidavit of merit.
There was no notice of hearing. There was
also no showing, that it has meritorious
defense or that something would be
gained by having the order of default set
aside. Thus, the trial Court correctly
denied petitioner’s motion.
The (P) moved for reconsideration, which
was denied.
Hence, (P) through (OSG) assails the
Decision and Resolution of the appellate
court alleging that;
A. Rules of Procedure should be liberally
construed pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1 of
the ROC in order to protect the
substantive rights of the parties.
B. (P) has the right to have its day in
court in order to present its meritorious
defense against the unfounded and
baseless claim of respondent spouses.
ISSUE: W/N the default order of the LC
should be lifted, so that substantial justice
would prevail over technical rules?
HELD: DENIED
Seeking relief from Section 2, Rule 1 (now
Section 69 ), and Section 2, Rule 20 (now
Section 4, Rule 1810 ) of the Revised
ROC, and invoking our pronouncements in
Rinconada Telephone Company, Inc. v.
Buenviaje, the (P) asserts that although
respondent judge has the discretion to
declare a defendant in default for failure
to appear during pre-trial conference, the
strict, rigid and arbitrary application
thereof denied the petitioner a reasonable
opportunity to present its meritorious
defense, refute the evidence of the (PR’s),
present his own, and exercise his right to
due process. The (P) contends that the
rules should be liberally construed in order
to protect the substantive rights of the
parties.
(P) further avers that contrary to the
unsubstantiated claim of (PR’s), their
obligation remains outstanding. This is
evidenced by the statement of account
prepared by the SSS Real Estate Loans
Department.
PR’s, in turn, insist that petitioner violated
Section 2, Rule 20, (now Sections 4 and 5
of Rule 1817 ) of the Revised ROC and
Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15.
The records reveal that (P) failed to
comply not only with one rule. Other than
failing to appear during pre-trial, (P) does
not deny that its MR to lift the order of
default lacked verification, notice of
hearing and affidavit of merit.
If not accompanied by affidavits of merit,
the TC has no authority to consider the
same. A motion to lift an order of default
is fatally flawed and the TC has no
authority to consider the same where it
was not under oath and unaccompanied
by an affidavit of merit. In effect, the
petitioner failed to set aside the order of
default and must suffer the consequences
thereof.
Procedural rules are not to be disregarded
or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in
prejudice to a party’s substantive rights.
Like all rules they are to be followed,
except only when for the most persuasive
of reasons they may be relaxed to relieve
a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.
Here, the (P) has not shown any
persuasive reason why he should be
exempt from abiding by the rules.
Accordingly, the order declaring the
petitioner in default and the denial of the
motion to lift the order of default are
juridically unassailable.
A judgment of default against the (P) who
failed to appear during pre-trial or, for
that matter, any defendant who failed to
file an answer, does not imply a waiver of
all of their rights, except their right to be
heard and to present evidence to support
their allegations.
In the instant case, PRs claim that they
had fully paid their obligation with the
SSS. In their prayer in Civil Case No. 94-
211 for Specific Performance filed before
the RTC, they ask that (P) be ordered to
cancel the mortgage on their properties,
to release the documents covering the
said properties and to pay them damages,
litigation expenses and attorney’s fees.
SC note, that (P) had earlier filed an
answer stating that the PR spouses had an
unpaid obligation, before the (P) was
declared in default its counsel, Atty.
Filoteo, had manifested that he had filed
his pre-trial brief by registered mail.
SC also note that when the respondent
judge issued the default order, it allowed
PRs to present their evidence ex parte.
With the pre-trial brief and answer of (P),
the TC could then proceed to evaluate the
evidence like receipts, of the PRs against
the allegations of the (P), to determine
the PRs outstanding obligation. The (P’s)
averment that the PRs outstanding
balance should be weighed against the
PRs own evidence that they had fully paid
their obligation to petitioner.
In a civil case, the burden of proof is on
the (PL) to establish his case through a
preponderance of evidence. If he claims a
right granted or created by law, he must
prove his claim by competent evidence.
He must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of that
of his opponent. The PRs cannot railroad
the release of the mortgage through a
default order. In this case, when the
evidence during trial proves unsatisfactory
and inconclusive as to the full payment of
PRs obligation to SSS, then the mortgage
should not yet be cancelled prematurely.
QUIAMBAO vs. CA, 454 SCRA 17,
MARCH 28, 2005;
FACTS: Espie Catolico was walking along
in Tondo, Manila, inquiring as to the
whereabouts of her housemaid Gynalin
Garais who left the house the day before.
After having asked her neighbors and
bystanders to no avail, an old woman told
her that a certain policeman was looking
for her as her housemaid was in his
custody.
She went to the area as directed by the
old woman but there she was allegedly
accosted by (P), PO3 Quiambao and five
other persons. Quiambao and his
companions forcibly took Catolico’s
handbag and carried away its contents
consisting of precious assorted
merchandise, jewelry and other personal
items.
Catolico filed a statement with the PNP
accusing (P) and six (6) others, with
robbery-holdup and mauling committed
on. The complaint was corroborated by
Grace Commendador who witnessed the
actual incident and confirmed the
statement of Catolico.
Catolico filed another administrative
complaint with NAPOLCOM, charging (P)
with grave misconduct for the same
incident.
The Summary Dismissal Hearing Officer
recommended the dismissal of petitioner.
This recommendation was approved by
Acting PNP Chief and Police Deputy
Director General.
(P) appealed the resolution to NAPOLCOM,
NAB, rendered a decision affirming the
dismissal of petitioner from police service.
MR filed by (P) was denied but it was only
when petitioner received a certified xerox
copy of the Resolution of the NAB denying
his petition for reconsideration.
(P) filed a petition for review with the CA,
which dismissed.
CA ruled that the petition did not state all
the specific material dates showing that it
was filed within the reglementary period.
It found out that NAB’s decision was
received by (P) and he filed his MR. The
motion, was denied but according to the
CA, (P) did not disclose the date when he
received such denial.
The CA ruled that the issue of which
administrative disciplinary authority had
jurisdiction over the case was raised by
petitioner only for the first time before it.
He did not raise it before the SDHO nor
before the NAB.
CA found that a perusal of the annexes to
the comment of Catolico would readily
show that NAB resolved petitioner’s case
based on substantial evidence appearing
on the record before it. It observed that
(P’s) claim that his case was decided on
the basis of an incomplete record was
merely an afterthought. Said defense was
not raised by petitioner in his motion for
reconsideration of NAB’s decision,
likewise, (P) was not denied due process
as he was afforded reasonable opportunity
to be heard and to submit his evidence
before the SDHO and to appeal to NAB the
decision of the Acting PNP Chief dismissing
him from the police service, the CA ruled.
(P) filed a Motion for Extension of Time to
File Motion for Reconsideration followed by
the filing of his Motion for Reconsideration
on 17 February 1997. On the same day,
the CA issued a Resolution denying (P’s)
motion for extension of time.
SC: The petition is not imbued with merit.
Readily glaring upon examination of the
petition filed by (P) is its title "Petition for
Review on Certiorari." The title would
immediately lead us to conclude that the
petition is primarily anchored on Rule 45
of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Under this mode of appeal,
only questions of law may be entertained
by this Court and factual issues raised are
beyond the ambit of this review.
Even assuming that the petition was
brought under Rule 65, the petition would
still not lie as the implausibility of the
grounds on which the petition rests are
convincingly manifest and the grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction as the core of this mode of
review is strikingly wanting.
In certiorari proceedings under Rule 65,
questions of fact are not generally
permitted, the inquiry being limited
essentially to whether or not the
respondent tribunal had acted without or
in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion.
(P) contends that the CA acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in holding that the
petition was not meritorious since the
petition filed with the appellate court did
not state the date when (P) received a
copy of the Resolution of NAB to
determine if the petition was filed within
the reglementary period.
SECTION 6. Contents of the petition. –
The petition for review shall (a) state the
full names of the parties to the case,
without impleading the court or agencies
either as petitioners or respondents; (b)
contain a concise statement of the facts
and issues involved and the grounds relied
upon for the review; (c) be accompanied
by a clearly legible duplicate original or a
certified true copy of the award,
judgment, final order or resolution
appealed from, together with certified true
copies of such material portions of the
record as are referred to therein and other
supporting papers; and (d) contain a
sworn certification against forum shopping
as provided in Revised Circular No. 28-91.
(R) NAB rendered its Resolution denying
the motion.
A certified xerox copy thereof, duly
received by petitioner is hereto attached
as annex.
A reading of the foregoing allegation,
however, disclosed the fact that NAB
rendered a resolution denying (P’s) motion
for reconsideration. Although it would
seem anomalous as it is unnatural that
the purported resolution was received only
by (P).
SC is inclined to sustain (P’s) assertion for
the same is supported by the certified
xerox copy of the resolution and the
evidence is bereft of any showing that will
warrant a contrary conclusion.
Thus, the aforecited allegation
substantially complied with the
requirements under Section 6. The CA
believed that (P) had already been served
with a copy of the resolution prior to 23
September 1996. Such a conclusion,
however, is bereft of any evidentiary basis
and has no leg to stand on.
It is noteworthy that the date when (P)
received NAB’s resolution denying his MR
is material in determining when the fifteen
(15)-day reglementary period for filing a
petition for review with the CA starts to
run.
The failure to specifically state in the
petition on material dates such as the
date when the resolution or order denying
a MR was received is a ground for
dismissal in accordance with Section 7 of
the administrative circular and Rule 43.
But the scenario is not present in the case
at bar for the paragraph 18 of the petition
filed with the CA reflected the date when
(P) actually received the resolution
denying his MR. Procedural rules must be
liberally interpreted and applied so as not
to frustrate substantial justice that this
Court seeks to achieve.
The instant case filed by Catolico is an
administrative case for grave misconduct
against (P) for the alleged robbery-holdup
and mauling incident that took place. In
resolving administrative cases, conduct of
full-blown trial is not indispensable to
dispense justice to the parties.
The requirement of notice and hearing
does not connote full adversarial
proceedings. Submission of position
papers may be sufficient for as long as the
parties thereto are given the opportunity
to be heard. In administrative
proceedings, the essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard, or an
opportunity to explain one’s side or
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of.
This constitutional mandate is deemed
satisfied if a person is granted an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of an
action or a ruling. It does not require trial-
type proceedings similar to those in the
courts of justice. Where opportunity to be
heard either through oral arguments or
through pleadings is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process.
In administrative proceedings, only
substantial evidence or that amount of
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion is required.
Thus, findings of fact of quasi-judicial
agencies are generally accorded respect
and even finality by the Supreme Court, if
supported by substantial evidence, in
recognition of their expertise on the
specific matters under their consideration.
Factual determinations made by the SDHO
and the NAB as affirmed by the CA are
undoubtedly beyond review and
conclusive upon this Court.
Such being the case, we cannot but affirm
their common conclusion as (P) failed to
advance substantial and convincing
evidence and arguments that will merit
the reversal of prior decisions on the case.
DISMISSED and the Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated 10 January 1997
AFFIRMED.
BARCENAS vs. TOMAS, 454 SCRA 593,
MARCH 31, 2005;
FACTS: A case for recovery of ownership
and possession of real property with
damages was filed by (R) Sps Anastacio
Tomas and Candida Caliboso against the
heirs of Veronica Tolentino. The Complaint
stated that after the death of her
husband, Benedicto Guerzon, Veronica
sold to (R’s), a one-hectare portion of her
undivided share in a 14.6-hectare
property, the land was co-owned by her
and her ten children.
(R’s) took possession of the property
immediately after the sale, the couple
migrated to the US, leaving the lot to
Victoriano Tomas, the husband's brother.
The heirs of Veronica executed an
Extrajudicial Partition covering the entire
property.
During the trial, (R’s) presented a Deed of
Sale evidencing the sale of the 1 hectare
lot. An Affidavit showed that Veronica's
children had subsequently confirmed the
sale. (P’s) denied knowledge of the two
documents and claimed that their
signatures on the Affidavit had been
forged.
Ruling that (R’s) had the better right of
possession and ownership of the land in
question, the MTC Nueva Ecija held that
the sale of the 1 hectare portion to them
had sufficiently been established by the
notarized document of sale and by their
continuous possession of the property
from.
MTC added that the authenticity and
genuineness of the Deed of Sale, as well
as of the Affidavit confirming it, could not
be assailed by mere unsubstantiated
denials that the documents were fake. It
ordered the defendants to vacate the
property immediately and to pay.
RTC affirmed the MTC Decision. (P’s)
elevated the case to the CA under Rule 42
of the Rules of Court.
CA: As earlier stated, the CA dismissed
the Petition for Review; (1) petitioners
had merely referred to themselves as the
"Heirs of Veronica Tolentino, (2) the
pleadings filed with the lower court had
not been appended to the Petition,
contrary to Section 2(d) of Rule 42; and
(3) among petitioners, only one had
signed the Verification and the
Certification of non-forum shopping.
ISSUES:
HELD: The Petition has no merit.
Dismissal Due to Procedural Defects
They point out that, with the exception of
Patricio, four surviving heirs of Veronica
Tolentino executed a Special Power of
Attorney giving Adelina Guerzon Barcenas,
one of herein (P’s), the right to represent
them and to act on their behalf.
As to their failure to attach the material
pleadings and other pertinent records,
(P’s) plead excusable neglect,
inadvertence and limited time, as well as
the alleged intransigence and
uncooperative attitude of the LC’s
personnel in furnishing them copies of the
documents.
As to a petition for review of a decision of
the RTC, the requirements as to form and
content are laid down in Section 2 of Rule
42 of the Rules of Court, which provides
thus:
Sec. 2. Form and contents. - The
petition shall be filed in seven (7)
legible copies, with the original
copy intended for the court being
indicated as such by the petitioner,
and shall (a) state the full names
of the parties to the case, without
impleading the lower courts or
judges thereof either as petitioners
or respondents; (b) indicate the
specific material dates showing
that it was filed on time; (c) set
forth concisely a statement of the
matters involved, the issues raised,
the specification of errors of fact or
law, or both, allegedly committed
by the Regional Trial Court, and
the reasons or arguments relied
upon for the allowance of the
appeal; (d) be accompanied by
clearly legible duplicate originals or
true copies of the judgments or
final orders of both lower courts,
certified correct by the clerk of
court of the Regional Trial Court,
the requisite number of plain
copies thereof and of the pleadings
and other material portions of the
record as would support the
allegations of the petition.
The (P) shall also submit together with the
petition a certification under oath that he
has not theretofore commenced any other
action involving the same issues in the
SC, the CA or different divisions thereof,
or any other tribunal or agency; if there is
such other action or proceeding, he must
state the status of the same; and if he
should thereafter learn that a similar
action or proceeding has been filed or is
pending before the SC, the CA, or
different divisions thereof, of any other
tribunal or agency, he undertakes to
promptly inform the aforesaid courts and
other tribunal or agency thereof within
five (5) days therefrom.
Under Section 3 of the same Rule, failure
to comply with the above requirements
"shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof."
Admittedly, all the infirmities besetting the
Petition before the CA affected only its
form. In appropriate cases, they have
been waived to give the parties a chance
to argue their causes and defenses on the
merits.
First, the evidence did not show that
petitioners had presented strong,
complete, and conclusive proof that the
notarized Deed of Sale was false. Without
that sort of evidence, the presumption of
regularity, the evidentiary weight
conferred upon such public document2
with respect to its execution, as well as
the statements and the authenticity of the
signatures thereon, stand.
Second, no evidence was presented to
establish the fact that the Affidavit
confirming the sale had been forged.
Forgery cannot be presumed. Whoever
alleges it must prove it by clear and
convincing evidence.
In sum, the Court has bent over
backwards and patiently given this case
more than adequate review and found
absolutely no basis to reverse or modify
the Decisions of the three lower courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and
the assailed Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
DAIKOKU ELECTRONICS PHILS., INC.
vs. ALBERTO RAZA, 588 SCRA 788,
JUNE 5, 2009;
FACTS: Daikoku hired (R) Raza as
company driver, eventually assigning him
to serve as personal driver to its
president, Mamuro Ono. Alberto, at the
end of each working day which usually
starts early morning and ends late at
night, parks the car at an assigned slot
outside of Ono’s place of residence at
Pacific Plaza Condominium in Makati City.
On July 21, 2003, at around 8:00 p.m.,
Alberto, after being let off by Ono, took
the company vehicle to his own place also
in Makati City. In response, Alberto said
that he parked the car in the usual
condominium parking area but at the
wrong slot.
A day after, Alberto submitted his written
explanation of the incident, owning up to
the lie he told Ono and apologizing and
expressing his regret for his mistake.
Following an investigation, the
investigation committee recommended
that Alberto be suspended for 12 days
without pay for the infraction of parking
the company vehicle at his residence and
for deliberately lying about it.
The committee considered Alberto’s
voluntary admission of guilt and apology
as mitigating circumstances.
LA: LA on the finding that Alberto’s
dismissal was predicated on offenses he
was neither apprised of nor charged with,
rendered judgment for Alberto, disposing
finding the complainant’s dismissal
unlawful, (R’s) are hereby directed to
reinstate complainant to his former
position without loss of seniority rights
and other benefits.
The LA determined that while some form
of sanction against Alberto was indicated,
the ultimate penalty of dismissal was not
commensurate to the offense actually
committed and charged.
Daikoku appealed to the NLRC, for his
part, Alberto, thru counsel, wrote Daikoku
demanding reinstatement, either actual or
payroll, as decreed in the labor arbiter’s
appealed decision.
Pending resolution of Daikoku’s appeal,
Alberto filed before the NLRC a Motion to
Cite (R’s) in Contempt and to Compel
them to Pay Complainant for the
company’s alleged refusal to reinstate
him.
Alberto alleged that he reported back to
work, but instead of being given back his
old job or an equivalent position, he was
asked to attend an orientation seminar
and undergo medical examination, at his
expense.
To compound matters, the company
deferred payment of his backwages and
some other benefits. These impositions,
according to Alberto, impelled him to stop
reporting for work.
NLRC: by resolution, dismissed Daikoku’s
appeal for failure to perfect it in the
manner and formalities prescribed by law.
Acting on Daikoku’s MR, the NLRC issued
a Resolution reinstating Daikoku’s appeal,
setting aside the arbiter’s appealed
decision, and denying Alberto’s motion to
cite the company for contempt.
Daikoku’s MR is GRANTED. Motion to Cite
Respondents in Contempt is DENIED.
Alberto sought reconsideration of the
above ruling. Daikoku also moved for
reconsideration on the backwages aspect
of the NLRC resolution, the NLRC issued a
resolution denying only Alberto’s motion.
Alberto filed before the CA a Motion for
Summary Dismissal and to Cite Petitioner
in Direct Contempt, alleging that the
assailed NLRC resolutions become final as
against Daikoku which filed out of time a
prohibited second motion for
reconsideration.
CA: the appellate court rendered the
assailed decision dismissing Daikoku’s
appeal as well as denying Alberto’s
contempt motion.
The CA anchored its denial of Daikoku’s
petition on the interplay of the following
stated grounds or premises: (1)
prematurity of the petition for certiorari,
the NLRC not having yet resolved
Daikoku’s motion for reconsideration of
the NLRC’s May 31, 2006 resolution; (2)
even if the matter of prematurity is to be
disregarded, the NLRC May 31, 2006
resolution has become final and executory
as to Daikoku as its motion for
reconsideration was filed out of time; and
(3) there is no compelling reason for the
relaxation of procedural rules.
ISSUE: question of timeliness of
Daikoku’s motion for reconsideration NLRC
Reso.
HELD: DENIED. The CA Decision
AFFIRMED.
SECTION 15. MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION.––Motions for
reconsideration of any decision, resolution
or order of the Commission shall not be
entertained except when based on
palpable or patent errors; provided that
the motion is filed within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of decision,
resolution or order, with proof of service
that a copy of the same has been
furnished, within the reglementary period,
the adverse party; and provided further,
that only one such motion from the same
party shall be entertained.
Applying the above provision to the case
at bench, Daikoku had 10 days from June
16, 2006 when it received the May 31,
2006 NLRC resolution, or until June 26,
2006, within which to file a MR. As it
were, Daikoku filed its motion for
reconsideration of the May 31, 2006 NLRC
resolution on the 17th day from its receipt
of the said resolution. The motion for
reconsideration was doubtless filed out of
time, as the CA determined.
To be sure, the relaxation of procedural
rules cannot be made without any valid
reasons proffered for or underpinning it.
To merit liberality, petitioner must show
reasonable cause justifying its non-
compliance with the rules and must
convince the Court that the outright
dismissal of the petition would defeat the
administration of substantive justice.
Daikoku urges a less rigid application of
procedural rules to give way for the
resolution of the case on its merits. The
desired leniency cannot be accorded
absent valid and compelling reasons for
such a procedural lapse.
SC stress that the bare invocation of "the
interest of substantial justice" line is not
some magic wand that will automatically
compel this Court to suspend procedural
rules. Procedural rules are not to be
belittled, let alone dismissed simply
because their non-observance may have
resulted in prejudice to a party’s
substantial rights. Utter disregard of the
rules cannot be justly rationalized by
harping on the policy of liberal
construction.
Daikoku’s substantial rights, if any, may
still be amply addressed in the appellate
proceedings Alberto instituted and
pending before the CA. As to Alberto, his
appeal opens de novo his action for illegal
dismissal vis-à-vis the decision of the
NLRC.
Daikoku still had the opportunity to be
heard in opposition to Alberto’s appeal. Be
that as it may, it behooves the Court to
refrain from taking any dispositive action
that will likely preempt the CA in its
disposition of Alberto’s appeal. Indeed, the
issue as to whether or not there was a
valid ground for the dismissal of workers
is factual in nature, best threshed out
before the appellate court which has
jurisdiction to rule over controversies
traversing both issues or questions of fact
and law.
While not determinative of the final
outcome of this case, we are inclined to
agree with Daikoku’s treatment of the July
31, 2006 NLRC Resolution as an action
denying its motion for reconsideration of
the May 31, 2006 NLRC Resolution.
Two factors point to such conclusion: (1)
Daikoku filed its motion for
reconsideration on July 3, 2006, way
before the issuance of the July 31, 2006
NLRC Resolution; and (2) while the NLRC
only mentioned Alberto’s motion in the
July 31, 2006 Resolution, the tenor of this
issuance conveys the impression that it
was the final ruling of the entire
controversy, one that puts to a final rest
the clashing interests of the parties.
Consider the following NLRC lines:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolution of 31
May 2006 STAND undisturbed.
Given the foregoing consideration, it may
validly be concluded that Daikoku’s motion
for reconsideration of the May 31, 2006
NLRC Resolution had, in effect, been
denied, on the ground of belated filing. In
a very real sense, therefore, the CA was
correct in its holding that the May 31,
2006 NLRC Resolution is final and
executory as to Daikoku.
To obviate any misunderstanding,
however, we wish to stress that this
disposition does not purport to pass upon
the correctness of, much more sustain,
the NLRC’s May 31, 2006 Resolution.
Neither should this Decision be taken as
affirming or negating the propriety of
Alberto’s dismissal from the service and
the consequent money award granted by
the NLRC.
f. Waiver of the rules of evidence;
 The rule on evidence may be
waived. When an objectionable
evidence is not objected to, the
evidence becomes admissible
because of waiver.
 As long as no law or principles of
morality, good customs, and public
policy are transgressed or no right
of third persons are violated, the
rules on evidence may be waived
by the parties.
ABRENICA vs. GONDA, GR 10100,
AUGUST 15, 1916;
FACTS: (D) Manuel Gonda alleged that
about 19 years ago he was the sole
possessor and owner of said parcels and
in the course of the trial endeavored to
prove that they had been sold to him by
the (PL) and his mother.
The issue presented by the pleadings is
whether said two parcels of land were sold
under right of repurchase by the (PL) to
the (D) for the period of seven years or
whether they were conveyed to the
defendant in absolute sale by the
plaintiff's parents.
The justice of the peace of the provincial
capital, who tried the case by assignment
of the judge of the CFI of the same
province, heard the evidence introduced
by the parties and after making a
sufficiently clear summary of and duly
considering the same, reached the
conclusion that the proofs introduced by
the plaintiff were entitled to the greater
credit and, on the grounds that the
plaintiff had not yet lost his right to
recover the lands from the (D) Gonda and
that the sale made by this (D) to the other
(D) De Gracia could have no legal effect
as Gonda was not the true owner of the
land entered judgment in behalf of the
(PL) and against the two (D) he ordered
each and both of them to return and
deliver to the (PL) the parcels of land
claimed by him and assessed the costs
against the (D) in equal shares.
The court made no finding in regard to the
damages demanded by the (PL) as there
was no evidence to show that any had
been caused. The (D) moved for a new
trial.
Their motion having been overruled, they
excepted to the ruling and, by proper bill
of exceptions, appealed to the SC.
In this instance the appellants allege in
the first place that the trial judge erred in
holding that he had jurisdiction to try the
case, and in trying the same in spite of
the fact that the Act which authorizes
justices of the peace to try by assignment
cases filed with the CFI is unconstitutional.
Before the hearing in first instance,
counsel for the (D) did in fact challenge
the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace
of the provincial capital to try the case at
bar, on the ground that Act No. 2041 of
the Philippine Legislature is
unconstitutional.
SC has held on various occasions, among
them in the decision rendered on
December 24, 1914, in the case of
Calampiano vs. Tolentino that said Act No.
2041 is valid and does not conflict with
the provisions of the Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902; that a justice of the peace,
acting under the designation under the
law just referred to, acts not as a justice
of the peace or holds a justice's court, but
acts as a judge of the zone of first
instance and holds, in effect, a CFI; and
finally, that for this reason the objection
that this case falls within that of
Barrameda vs. Moir, is not well taken.
The second error assigned by the
appellants to the judgment of the TC
consists, as they maintain, in that the
court founded its judgment on
inadmissible and illegal evidence which
was rejected by the same court during the
course of the trial.
In effect, the (PL) ought to have proven
that he sold, under right of repurchase for
the period of seven years, the two parcels
of land mentioned in the complaint, or,
what amounts to the same thing, that a
contract of sale with right of repurchase
(or one of pledge or mortgage, as it was
improperly called in the complaint and so
termed by the plaintiff) was entered into
between this latter and the defendant, on
the date aforementioned, in respect to
said parcels of land.
(PL) testifying at the trial in regard to the
existence of the contract, stated that it
was a verbal one between himself and
said (D). Assuredly such a contract could
not be proven a trial, except by means of
some written instrument in accordance
with the provisions of subsections 1 and 5,
section 335, of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
The (PL) having been placed on the stand
as a witness by his on attorney, testified
at length and answered all the questions
asked him with respect to the said
contract, the details of the same, the
persons who witnessed it, the place where
it was made, and various other
circumstances connected with its
execution.
It seems that only when the examination
was terminated did counsel for defendants
move to strike out all of the testimony
given and statements made by (PL) in
regard to the contract, on the ground that
the period for the fulfillment of the
contract exceeded one year and that it
could not be proven except by means of a
written instrument.
Defendants' counsel moved that the case
be dismissed on the ground that, as the
aforementioned testimony was stricken
out, there was no proof of the contract.
This motion being denied by the court,
counsel excepted to the ruling and on
cross-examination put several question to
the (PL) relative to the (PL’s) ownership in
said parcels of land and the manner in
which he acquired it.
Among these questions some were asked
which bore upon the answers given by the
(PL) on direct examination regarding the
existence of the contract by which,
according to the (PL), the (D) Gonda came
to hold said parcels.
Continuing to present evidence, the
plaintiff put three witnesses on the stand
and they were examined.
One of them, Juan Carandang, testified in
regard to the (PL’s) ownership and
possession of the lands.
The court sustained a motion by
defendants' counsel to strike out one of
the statements made by this witness in
which he stated that he knew by hearsay
that said lands had been "pledged"
Another of these witnesses, Domingo
Tamayo, testified that he was present at
the time the (PL) asked the (D) for the
P75 mentioned in the complaint, and
when the agreement was made with
regard thereto between the two men in
connection with the so-called pledge of
the lands in question.
And, finally, the third witness, Pedro
Mendoza, also the plaintiff's, testified that
he was present when the money was
tendered by the defendant to the plaintiff,
and heard the latter tell the witness
Domingo Tamayo to receive it.
In the course of the examination of these
witnesses, the defendants' counsel moved
that their testimony be stricken out. The
court sustained one of these motions,
while as to the rest of them be said that
counsel's motion would be taken under
consideration; later, when one of these
witnesses, replying to a question by the
court, stated that the contract was not
executed in writing, the court said that the
motion was sustained.
The court finally granted the motion of
counsel for defendants for strike out the
testimony given by this witness.
Now then, it has been repeatedly laid
down as a rule of evidence that a protest
or objection against the admission of any
evidence must be made at the proper
time, and that if not so made it will be
understood to have been waived. The
proper time to make a protest or objection
is when, from the question addressed to
the witness, or from the answer thereto,
or from the presentation of the proof, the
inadmissiblity of the evidence is, or may
be, inferred.
A motion to strike out parol or
documentary evidence from the record is
useless and ineffective if made without
timely protest, objection, or opposition on
the part of the party against whom it was
presented.
Objection to the introduction of evidence
should be made before the question is
answered. When no such objection is
made, a motion to strike out the answer
ordinarily comes too late. (De Dios Chua
Soco vs. Veloso, 2 Phil. Rep., 658).
Objections to evidence and the reason
therefor must be stated in apt time."
(Kidder vs. McIlhenny, 81 N. C., 123; 46
Am. Dig., Century Ed., 933.)
It is held in general that by failing to
object to the proof of an oral contract a
party waives the benefit of the statute and
cannot afterward claim it. (20 Cyc., 320,
where several decisions on the subject are
cited.)
An objection to the admission of evidence
on the ground of incompetency, taken
after the testimony has been given, is too
late. (In re Morgan, 104 N. Y., 74; 9 N. E.,
861.)
The first witness to testify at the trial was
the plaintiff himself. From the first
question put to him that the contract of
pledge or mortgage of the lands, as the
(PL) himself improperly calls it, or the sale
of said lands with right of repurchase,
between him and the (D) Gonda, was a
verbal one and for the period of seven
years, made in the course of a
conversation between the (PL) and said
(D) in the house of Domingo Tamayo.
The (D’s)counsel did not endeavor
immediately to obtain from the witness a
statement as to whether that contract was
set forth in any instrument; he did not
object to the witness' continuing to testify
in regard to the contract, nor did he in any
way object to the questions they
continued to ask the witness concerning
the matter, though he did object to one
question as leading and to another one as
irrelevant, thus indicating that he had no
other objection to make to those
questions.
Only after witness, the (PL) did counsel for
the (D) move that all of his testimony and
statements be stricken out. It is obvious
that the court should not have granted
that motion; but we must also bear in
mind that the court did not grant other
similar and subsequent motions made
during the examination of the other
witnesses; he merely said that he would
take them under advisement.
The fact that the (D) counsel asked
various cross-questions, both of the (PL)
and of the other witness, in connection
with the answers given by them in their
direct examination, with respect to
particulars concerning the contract,
implies a waiver on his part to have the
evidence stricken out.
It is true that, before cross-examining the
(PL) and one of the witnesses, this same
counsel requested the permission of the
court, and stipulated that his clients'
rights should not be prejudiced by the
answers to those witnesses in view of the
motion presented to strike out their
testimony.
As no timely objection or protest was
made to the admission of the testimony of
the plaintiff with respect to the contract;
and as the motion to strike out said
evidence came to late; as the (D)
themselves, by the cross-questions put by
their counsel for the witnesses in respect
to said contract, tacitly waived their right
to have it stricken out, that evidence,
therefore, cannot be considered either
inadmissible or illegal, and court, far from
having erred in taking it into consideration
and basing his judgment thereon,
notwithstanding the fact that it was
ordered to be stricken out during the trial,
merely corrected the error he committed
in ordering it to be so stricken out and
complied with the rules of procedure
hereinbefore cited.
The LC was guided by the evidence in
making that finding, for it was proved that
the plaintiff sold to the (D) Gonda for the
period of seven years, with right of
repurchase, the two parcels of land. The
testimony of the (PL) himself and of the
witnesses Juan Carandang, Domingo
Tamayo, and Pedro Mendoza, of which
mentioned is made in the judgment,
proves those facts.
As against this testimony, the (D)
presented that of one of themselves,
Manuel Gonda, who stated that said two
parcels of land were sold to him outright
by the (PL) Galo Abrenica and his mother,
Mamerta Bonio, more than 19 years ago,
for the sum of P75.
But this allegation was in no matter
proven, for, having stated that an
instrument of sale was executed but that
it had been lost, he furnished absolutely
no proof of the existence of the
instrument, nor of any such sale having
been made between himself and the
plaintiff.
This defendant did, indeed, exhibit a copy
of the affidavit filed by him for the
purpose of the assessment of a piece of
land which he says included the two
parcels in question; but the plaintiff has
explained why the tax declaration of said
parcels was not made by him, but by the
defendant Gonda.
It is easily understood that the latter
might have made this declaration on May
26, 1906, that is, three months after the
land had been sold to him by the plaintiff
under right of repurchase, inasmuch as
said defendant had been the owner of said
parcels since the month of February of the
same year and, by reason of said sale,
was to be their owner for seven years, so
long as the plaintiff did not make use of
his right to redeem them.
On the other hand, the very fact that the
defendant Gonda did not declare these
parcels of land before May 26, 1906, is
proof that he did not purchase them
outright from the plaintiff and the latter's
mother 19 years ago.
As the plaintiff made use of his right to
recover the property within the period
stipulated by the contract and which did
not exceed ten years, and as he deposited
with the clerk of the court the sum of P75,
the price of the purchase, in due time, the
defendant is not entitled to oppose the
recovery, and the said parcels of land
must be delivered to the plaintiff, even
though they be in the possession of the
other defendant, Marcelino de Garcia, to
whom they were sold by his codefendant
Gonda, for the latter could not sell them
to De Gracia except under the condition
that they could be repurchased by the
plaintiff within the said period of seven
years.
Even still less right could the defendant De
Gracia have to retain possession of these
lands, if the contract executed between
the plaintiff and Manuel Gonda had been
one of mortgage for, as the defendant
Gonda was not the owner of the lands, he
could not lawfully convey them to his
codefendant.
There being no proof that any damages
was caused to the plaintiff by the
defendants' refusal to return said parcels
of land to him, no finding should be made
against the defendants with respect
thereto.
We therefore affirm the judgment
appealed from, with the costs of this
instance against the appellants. So
ordered
SSS CHEMICAL CORPORATION vs. CA,
353 SCRA 70, FEBRUARY 28, 2001;
FACTS: SCC Chemicals Corporation
through its chairman, private respondent
Danilo Arrieta and vice president, Pablo
Bermundo, obtained a loan from State
Investment House Inc (hereinafter SIHI)
in the amount of P129,824.48.
The loan carried an annual interest rate of
30% plus penalty charges of 2% per
month on the remaining balance of the
principal upon non-payment on the due
date-January 12, 1984.
To secure the payment of the loan, Danilo
Arrieta and private respondent Leopoldo
Halili executed a Comprehensive Surety
Agreement binding themselves jointly and
severally to pay the obligation on the
maturity date.
SCC failed to pay the loan when it
matured.
SIHI then sent demand letters to SCC,
Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding
receipt thereof, no payment was made.
SIHI filed Civil Case for a sum of money
with a prayer for preliminary attachment
against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of
cause of action. Petitioner contended that
the promissory note upon which SIHI
anchored its cause of action was null,
void, and of no binding effect for lack or
failure of consideration.
The case was then set for pre-trial. The
parties were allowed to meet out-of-court
in an effort to settle the dispute amicably.
No settlement was reached, but the
following stipulation of facts was agreed
upon:
1. Parties agree that this Court
has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the
defendant and that it has jurisdiction to
try and decide this case on its merits and
that plaintiff and the defendant have each
the capacity to sue and to be sued in
this present action;
2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent
a demand letter to the defendant SCC
Chemical Corporation dated April 4, 1984
together with a statement of account of
even date which were both received by
the herein defendant; and
3. Parties finally agree that the
plaintiff and the defendant SCC Chemical
Corporation the latter acting through
defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and Pablito
Bermundo executed a promissory note
last December 13, 1983 for the amount of
P129,824.48 with maturity date on
January 12, 1984.
The case then proceeded to trial on the
sole issue of whether or not the
defendants were liable to the plaintiff and
to what extent was the liability.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its
claim. The cross-examination of said
witness was postponed several times due
to one reason or another at the instance
of either party.
The case was calendared several times for
hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel
failed to appear despite notice. SCC was
finally declared by the trial court to have
waived its right to cross-examine the
witness of SIHI and the case was deemed
submitted for decision.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court
promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the testimony of private
respondent’s witness is hearsay.
2. Whether the promissory note was
genuine and genuinely executed as
required by law.
3. Whether the “best evidence rule”
should be applied.
HELD:
1. The Court of Appeals correctly found
that the witness of SIHI was a competent
witness as he testified to facts, which he
knew of his personal knowledge. Thus, the
requirements of Section 36, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court as to the admissibility
of his testimony were satisfied.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally
confined to personal knowledge; hearsay
excluded. – A witness can testify only to
those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his own perception, except
as otherwise provided in these rules.
Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As
a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded and
carries no probative value. However, the
rule does admit of an exception.
Where a party failed to object to hearsay
evidence, then the same is admissible.
The rationale for this exception is to be
found in the right of a litigant to cross-
examine. It is settled that it is the
opportunity to cross-examine which
negates the claim that the matters
testified to by a witness are hearsay.
However, the right to cross-examine may
be waived.
The repeated failure of a party to cross-
examine the witness is an implied waiver
of such right. Petitioner was afforded
several opportunities by the trial court to
cross-examine the other party's witness.
Petitioner repeatedly failed to take
advantage of these opportunities. No error
was thus committed by the respondent
court when it sustained the trial court's
finding that petitioner had waived its right
to cross-examine the opposing party's
witness. It is now too late for petitioner to
be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.
2. Petitioner's admission as to the
execution of the promissory note by it
through private respondent Arrieta and
Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the
question of the genuineness of signatures.
The admission having been made in a
stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the
parties, it must be treated as a judicial
admission. Under Section, 4 Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court, a judicial admission
requires no proof.
3. Respondent SIHI had no need to
present the original of the documents as
there was already a judicial admission by
petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of
the promissory note and receipt of the
demand letter.
It is now too late for petitioner to be
questioning their authenticity. Its
admission of the existence of these
documents was sufficient to establish its
obligation. Petitioner failed to submit any
evidence to the contrary or proof of
payment or other forms of extinguishment
of said obligation. No reversible error was
thus committed by the appellate court
when it held petitioner liable on its
obligation
g. No vested rights in the rules of
evidence;
New laws maybe issued under the
Principle that “No person has a vested
right in the rules of evidence”.
Parties to a pending case cannot demand
that a new rule of evidence should not
apply to them because it will be adverse
to their cause.
Rules of evidence may be altered or
repelled at anytime and will apply to
pending cases even if the effect is adverse
to a party therein.
The exceptions are rules which partake of
the nature of Ex post facto laws or Bills of
Attainder.
ALDEGUER vs. HOSKYN, 2 PHIL 500,
SEPT. 17, 1903;
FACTS: It appears from the decision that
Doña Petrona Inarda bought the land in
question in 1855 from Don Pablo Garcia.
Doña Petrona lived on the land until her
death, in 1876, when Don Miguel
Aldeguer, their grandfather, was
appointed guardian of Doña Petrona's four
children, the present plaintiffs.
In 1884 Don Manuel sold the land to one
Martinez, who sold it to the defendant,
Henry Hoskyn, in 1887. In the deed to
Martinez, Don Manuel stated that he
acquired the property by purchase from
Don Pablo Garcia twenty-four years
before. The court finds that this
declaration was the only evidence in the
case that Don Manuel had any title to the
land.
The appellant defendant below assigns as
error that the court found from parol
evidence alone the existence of the
contract of sale between Don Pablo and
Doña Petrona. It is true the court says
that no documentary evidence was
received on this point, but it is also stated
that the existence of a written contract
was proved, as also its record in the
registry of property, its attachment to a
complaint filed in court by the plaintiffs in
1892, its subsequent destruction with
other papers in the case, and the contents
thereof.
After such preliminary proof had been
made, parol evidence of the contents of
the document was properly received. Such
a ruling does not infringe section 795, par.
6, of said Code, which provides "that
nothing in this act contained shall be so
construed as to divest or injuriously affect
any property right that has already
become vested under existing law," even
if under article 1221 or other provisions of
the Civil Code, after the destruction of the
instrument, such parol evidence of its
contents could not have been given. The
general rule is that there is no vested
right of property in rules of evidence.
The recital in the document of sale by Don
Manuel to Martinez proves nothing against
the plaintiffs, either according to the
former law or according to the new Code
and the claim of the appellant to the
contrary can not be sustained.
Waiving all questions as to the sufficiency
to the showing of due diligence by the
defendant, and as to the failure to procure
the affidavits of the proffered witnesses,
the motion must be denied on the ground
that such evidence is not "of such a
character as to probably change the
result."
The court finds that the mother of the
plaintiffs bought the land from Don Pablo
Garcia. Evidence that Bonifacio did not
own it would be immaterial. Such
evidence would merely strengthen the
decision of the court. It would not
overthrow it.
it isIcertain that evidence was introduced
showing that the purchase was made from
Don Pablo, because the court has so
found. We must presume that this was
done without objection on the part of the
defendant, for no exceptions relating to
the matter appear in the record.
The motion for a new trial is denied and
the judgment of the court below affirmed,
and after the expiration of twenty days,
reckoned from the date of this decision,
judgment shall be rendered accordingly,
and the case is returned to the court
below for compliance therewith.
TAN, JR. vs. CA, GR 136368, JAN. 16
2002;
FACTS: On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a
consideration of P59,200 executed a deed
of absolute sale over the property in
question in favor of spouses Jose
Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal.
Simultaneous with the execution of this
deed, the same contracting parties
entered into another agreement
whereunder Tan was given one (1) year
within which to redeem or repurchase the
property. Tan failed to redeem the
property until his death on January 4,
1988.
On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before
the RTC at Davao City a suit against the
Magdangals for reformation of instrument
alleging that while Tan and the
Magdangals denominated their agreement
as deed of absolute sale, their real
intention was to conclude an equitable
mortgage.
RTC rendered judgment finding for Tan,
portion of which reads:
1) The Deed of Absolute Sale is, in
accordance with the true intention of the
parties, hereby declared and reformed an
equitable mortgage;
2) The plaintiff is ordered to pay the
defendants within 120 days after the
finality of this decision P59,200 plus
interest at the rate of 12% per annum
from May 2, 1988, the date the complaint
was filed, until paid;
On Sept. 28, 1995, CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC in toto. Both parties
received the decision of the appellate
court on Oct. 5, 1995. On March 13, 1996,
the clerk of court of the appellate court
entered in the Book of Entries of
Judgement the decision and issued the
corresponding Entry of Judgment which,
on its face, stated that the said decision
has on Oct. 21, 1995 become final and
executory.
Magdangals filed in the RTC a Motion for
Consolidation and Writ of Possession
alleging that the 120-day period of
redemption of the petitioner has expired.
On June 10, 1996, the RTC allowed the
petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It
ruled that the 120-day redemption period
should be reckoned from the date of Entry
of Judgment in the CA or from March 13,
1996. The redemption price was deposited
on April 17, 1996.
ISSUE: What rule should govern the
finality of judgment favorably obtained in
the trial court by the petitioner?
HELD:
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to
the case at bar, the rule that governs
finality of judgment is Rule 51 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Its sections 10
and 11 provide:
SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and
final resolutions. If no appeal or motion
for new trial or reconsideration is filed
within the time provided in these Rules,
the judgment or final resolution shall
forthwith be entered by the clerk in the
book of entries of judgments. The date
when the judgments or final resolution
becomes executory shall be deemed as
the date of its entry. The record shall
contain the dispositive part of the
judgment or final resolution and shall be
signed by the clerk, with a certificate that
such judgment or final resolution has
become final and executory.
SEC.11. Execution of judgment.
Except where the judgment or final order
or resolution, or a portion thereof, is
ordered to be immediately executory, the
motion for its execution may only be filed
in the proper court after its entry.
The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
however, amended the rule on finality of
judgment by providing in section 1, Rule
39 as follows:
Section 1. Execution upon
judgments or final orders. Execution shall
issue as a matter of right, on motion,
upon a judgment or order that disposes of
the action or proceeding upon the
expiration of the period to appeal
therefrom if no appeal has been duly
perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and
finally resolved, the execution may
forthwith be applied for in the court of
origin, on motion of the judgment obligee,
submitting therewith certified true copies
of the judgment or judgments or final
order or orders sought to be enforced and
of the entry thereof, with notice to the
adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the
same case, when the interest of justice so
requires, direct the court of origin to issue
the writ of execution.
SC hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should
not be given retroactive effect in this case
as it would result in great injustice to the
petitioner.
Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to
redeem the subject lot and this right is a
substantive right. Petitioner followed the
procedural rule then existing as well as
the decisions of this Court governing the
reckoning date of the period of
redemption when he redeemed the
subject lot.
Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was
changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of
Procedure which if applied retroactively
would result in his losing the right to
redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to
reconcile the retroactive application of this
procedural rule with the rule of fairness.
Petitioner cannot be penalized with the
loss of the subject lot when he faithfully
followed the laws and the rule on the
period of redemption when he made the
redemption.
HEIRS OF SIMON VS. CHAN, GR
157147, FEB. 23, 2011;
FACTS: In 11 July 1997 the City
Prosecutor of Manila filed a criminal case
in the Metro politan Trial Court of Manila
charging Eduardo Simon of violating BP22.
Sometime in December 1996, Simon
issued to Elvin Chan a Landbank check
with a declared amount of P336,000. The
accuse did not have sufficient fund in his
account to fund the check he issued,
contrary to the information he had given
to the respondent.
Despite notice insufficiency of his account
s funds, the petitioner failed to pay the
respondent the value of the check within 5
days after receiving the notice. Three
years later on 3 August 2000, Elvin Chan
commenced in the MTC in Pasay City a
Civil Action for the collection of the
principal amount of P 336,000.00.
On 17 August 2000, Simon filed an urgent
Motion to Dismiss with application to
change plaintiff’s attachmnent bond for
damages on the ground of litis pendentia
as a consequence of the pendency of
another action between parties for the
same ca use.
The plaintiff countered the argument of
Simon by pointing out he did not make
any allegation as to the exact amount of
his claim in the criminal case, consitituting
an implied right to initiate civil action.
The Plaintiff also cited Rule 11 1 Section
2, exception to file separate civil action
during the pendency of a criminal case
under Art. 31, 32, 33, 34, and 2177 of the
CCP. The case falls under Art. 33 of the
CCP.
On 23 October 2000, the MCTC in Pasay
City granted Simon s urgent Motion to
Dismiss with application to charge
plaintiffs attachment bond for damages.
On 31 July 2001, the RTC of Pasay City
upheld MCTCs dismissal of Chan s initiated
Civil Case.
Chan appealed to the CA by petition for
review with the following issue; Whether
or not the RTC erred in the dismissal of his
case on the ground of litis pendetia.
The CA overturened the decision of the
RTC with following legal basis; Though the
CA recognized that civil case cannot
anymore initiated following the filling of a
criminal case, the following case falls
under the exception under Rule 111 sec.
2.
The case remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings. Simon appealed to
the Supreme Court for petition for review.
ISSUES
1. W/N Chan’s Civil action to recover the
amount of the bounced check as an
independent civil action.
2. W/N new Supreme Court circular
pertaining to BP22 can be applied
retroactively?
HELD: The SC set aside the decision
promulgated by the Court of Appeals on
Jun e 25, 2002.
Furthermore, the SC reinstate the decision
rendered on October 23, 2000 by the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, in
Pasay City.
The SC applied new rule on BP22
specifically, the criminal action for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall
be deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, and no
reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed or recognized.
The aforequoted provisions of the Rules of
Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan
commenced Civil Case No. 915-00 on
August 3, 2000, are nonetheless
applicable. It is axiomatic that the
retroactive application of procedural laws
does not violate any right of a person who
may feel adversely affected, nor is it
constitutionally objectionable.
The reason is simply that, as a general
rule, no vested right may attach to, or
arise from, procedural laws. Any new rules
may validly be made to apply to cases
pending at the time of their promulgation,
considering that no party to an action has
a vested right in the rules of procedure,
except that in criminal cases, the changes
do not retroactively apply if they permit or
require a lesser quantum of evidence to
convict than what is required at the time
of the commission of the offenses,
because such retroactivity would be
unconstitutional for being ex post facto
under the Constitution.
Furthermore, for litis pendentia to be
successfully invoked as a bar to an action,
the concurrence of the following requisites
is necessary, namely: (a) there must be
identity of parties or at least such as
represent the same intere st in both
actions; (b) there must be identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
reliefs being founded on the same facts;
and, (c) the identity in the two cases
should be such that the judgment that
may be rendered in one would, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res
judicata in respect of the other.
Absent the first two requisites, the
possibility of the existence of the third
becomes nil. A perusal of Civil Case No.
01-0033 and Criminal Case No. 275381
ineluctably shows that all the elements of
litis pendentia are attendant.
First of all, the parties in the civil action
involved in Criminal Case No. 275381 and
in Civil Case No. 915-00, that is, Chan and
Simon, are the same. Secondly, the
information in Criminal Case No. 275381
and the complaint in Civil Case No. 915-00
both alleged that Simon had issued
Landbank Check No. 0007280 worth
P336,000.00 payable to cash, thereby
indicating that the rights asserted and the
reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts
upon which the reliefs sought were
founded, were identical in al l respects.
And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in
one case would necessarily bar the other
by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be
recovering twice upon the same claim.
It is clear, therefore, that the MeTC in
Pasay City properly dismissed Civil Case
No. 915-00 on the ground of litis
pendentia through its decision dated
October 23, 2000; and that the RTC in
Pasay City did not err in affirming the
MeTC.
MONTANES vs. CIPRIANO, OCT. 22,
2012;
FACTS: On April 8, 1976, respondent
married Socrates Flores. On January 24,
1983, during the subsistence of the said
marriage, respondent married Silverio V.
Cipriano.
In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of
Muntinlupa a Petition for the Annulment of
her marriage with Socrates on the ground
of the latter’s psychological incapacity as
defined under Article 36 of the Family
Code. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of
Muntinlupa, declared the marriage of
respondent with Socrates null and void.
Said decision became final and executory
on October 13, 2003. On May 14, 2004,
petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez,
Silverio’s daughter from the first
marriage, filed with the MTC of San Pedro,
Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against
respondent.
Lourdes Cipriano alleged that her first
marriage was already declared void ab
initio in 2003. Thus, there was no more
marriage to speak of prior to her marriage
to Silverio on January 24, 1983.
The prosecution argued that the crime of
bigamy had already been consummated
when respondent filed her petition for
declaration of nullity.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent on the
ground that both wedding were governed
by the Civil Code, and not the Family
Code, hence, no judicial declaration of
absolute nullity as a condition precedent
to contracting a subsequent marriage.
ISSUE: W/N the declaration of nullity of
respondent's first marriage in 2003
justifies the dismissal of the Information
for bigamy filed against her?
HELD: NO. The retroactive application of
procedural laws is not violative of any
right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected.
The reason is that as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws.
In the case at bar, respondent’s clear
intent is to obtain a judicial declaration
nullity of his first marriage and thereafter
to invoke that very same judgment to
prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He
cannot have his cake and eat it too.
Otherwise, all that an adventurous
bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40
of the Family Code, contract a subsequent
marriage and escape a bigamy charge by
simply claiming that the first marriage is
void and that the subsequent marriage is
equally void for lack of a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of the first.
A party may even enter into a marriage
license and thereafter contract a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a
declaration of nullity of the first on the
assumption that the first marriage is void.
Such scenario would render nugatory the
provision on bigamy
2. Scope and applicability;
Rule 128, Section 2;
The rules of evidence shall be the same in
all courts and in all trials and hearings,
except as otherwise provided by law or
these rules.
Rule 143;
These rules shall not apply to land
registration, cadastral and election cases,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings,
and other cases not herein provided for,
except by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and
convenient.
DEL ROSARIO AND SONS LOGGING
ENT. INC. vs. NLRC, 136 SCRA 669,
MAY 31, 1985;
FACTS: (P) Del Rosario & Sons entered
into a "Contract of Services" with (PR)
Calinar Security Agency to supply the
former with security guards at the rate of
P300.00 per month.
Paulino Mabuti, et., al. filed a Complaint
against the Security Agency and (P), for
underpayment of salary, non-payment of
living allowance, and 13th month pay.
It their answer, they deny the complaint
due to lack of cause of action, no ER-EP
relationship and the agency averred that it
could not comply because of the
inadequacy of the contract of services.
The LA dismissed that complaint, no ER-
EP relationship but ordered the agency to
pay them.
The Agency appealed to the NLRC, which
modified the Decision of the LA by holding
that (P) is liable to pay complainants,
jointly and severally, with the Security
Agency on the ground that (P) is an
indirect employer Labor Code.
MR sought by (P) is denied, this petition
was instituted contending that NLRC erred
in giving due course to the appeal despite
the fact that it was not under oath and the
required appeal fee was not paid; in
holding it jointly and severally liable with
the Security Agency; and in refusing to
give due course to its MR.
HELD: Affirmed
The formal defects in the appeal of the
Security Agency were not fatal defects.
The lack of verification could have been
easily corrected by requiring an oath. The
appeal fee had been paid although it was
delayed. (Panes vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.)
In Acda vs. MOLE, [1982], payment of the
appeal fee is "by no means a mere
technicality but is an essential
requirement in the perfection of an
appeal."However, where as in this case,
the fee had been paid, unlike in the Acda
case, although payment was delayed, the
broader interests of justice and the
desired objective of resolving
controversies on the merits demanded
that the appeal be given course as, in
fact, it was so given by the NLRC. Besides,
it was within the inherent power of the
NLRC to have allowed the late payment of
the appeal fee.
Moreover, as provided for by Article 221
of the Labor Code "in any proceeding
before the Commission or any of the Labor
Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing
in Courts of law or equity shall not be
controlling and it is the spirit and intention
of this Code that the Commission and its
members and the Labor Arbiters shall use
every and an reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily
and objectively and without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, all in
the interest of due process."
SASAN, JR., vs. NLRC, GR 176240,
OCTOBER 17, 2008;
FACTS: (R) E-PCIBank entered into a
Contract for Services with HI, to hire and
assign workers to E-PCIBank to perform
janitorial/messengerial and maintenance
services. (P’s) Rolando Sasan, Sr. et., al.
were among those employed and assigned
to E-PCIBank at its branch in Visayas.
(P’s) filed with the NLRC in Cebu separate
complaints against E-PCIBank and HI for
illegal dismissal, with claims for payments.
Several conciliation hearings were
scheduled but not to avail, hence LA
ordered them to submit their position
papers.
In their position papers, (P’s) claimed that
they had become regular employees of E-
PCIBank and that their dismissal by HI
was null and void because the latter had
no power to do so since they had become
regular employees of E-PCIBank.
E-PCIBank averred that they are not liable
because it entered into a Contract for
Services with HI, it was HI that paid
petitioners’ wages, monitored petitioners’
daily time records (DTR) and uniforms,
and exercised direct control and
supervision over the petitioners and that
therefore HI has every right to terminate
their services legally.
HI asserted that E-PCIBank was one of its
clients, (P’s) were its employees. The
Contract for Services between HI and E-
PCIBank expired on 15 July 2000. E-
PCIBank no longer renewed said contract
with HI and, instead, bidded out its
janitorial requirements to two other job
contractors. HI designated petitioners to
new work assignments, but the latter
refused to comply with the same.
Petitioners were not dismissed by HI,
whether actually or constructively, thus,
petitioners’ complaints before the NLRC
were without basis.
On 7 January 2002, LA finding that HI was
not a legitimate job contractor on the
ground that it did not possess the required
substantial capital. HI is a labor-only
contractor and the real employer of
petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held
liable to petitioners.
The NLRC modified the LA’s ruling, took
into consideration the documentary
evidence presented by HI for the first time
on appeal and declared HI as a highly
capitalized venture with sufficient
capitalization, which cannot be considered
engaged in "labor-only contracting.
Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of
the NLRC that HI was a legitimate job
contractor and that it did not illegally
dismiss petitioners.
(P’s) object to the acceptance and
consideration by the NLRC of the evidence
presented by HI for the first time on
appeal. In our jurisprudence is already
replete with cases allowing the NLRC to
admit evidence, not presented before the
LA, and submitted to the NLRC for the first
time on appeal.
Technical rules of evidence are not binding
in labor cases. Labor officials should use
every reasonable means to ascertain the
facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, all in
the interest of due process.
The submission of additional evidence
before the NLRC is not prohibited by its
New Rules of Procedure. Rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law or equity are
not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC
and labor arbiters are directed to use
every and all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily
and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law and procedure all in
the interest of substantial justice. In
keeping with this directive, it has been
held that the NLRC may consider
evidence, such as documents and
affidavits, submitted by the parties for the
first time on appeal.
The above provision explicitly mandates
that when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original
document itself. Notably, certified true
copies of these documents, acceptable
under the Rules of Court33 were furnished
to the petitioners. Even assuming that
petitioners were given mere photocopies,
again, we stress that proceedings before
the NLRC are not covered by the technical
rules of evidence and procedure as
observed in the regular courts. Technical
rules of evidence do not apply if the
decision to grant the petition proceeds
from an examination of its sufficiency as
well as a careful look into the arguments
contained in position papers and other
documents.
The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain one's
side. It is also an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. It is not the denial of the
right to be heard but denial of the
opportunity to be heard that constitutes
violation of due process of law. Petitioners
herein were afforded every opportunity to
be heard and to seek reconsideration of
the adverse judgment against them. They
had every opportunity to strengthen their
positions by presenting their own
substantial evidence to controvert those
submitted by E-PCIBank and HI before the
NLRC, and even before the Court of
Appeals. It cannot win its case by merely
raising unsubstantiated doubt or relying
on the weakness of the adverse parties’
evidence.
DENIED; CA AFFIRMED
ONG CHIA vs. REPUBLIC, 328 SCRA
749, MARCH 27, 2000;
FACTS: (P) was born in China, in 1932, as
a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port
of Manila, since then he has stayed in the
Philippines where he found employment
and started his own business, married a
Filipina, with whom he had four children.
On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed
a verified petition to be admitted as a
Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473,
Petitioner, after stating his qualifications
as required in sec. 2, and lack of the
disqualifications enumerated in sec. 3 of
the law.
During the hearings, petitioner testified as
to his qualifications and presented three
witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So
impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V.
Moran with the testimony of petitioner
that, upon being asked by the court
whether the State intended to present any
witness present any witness against him.
on August 25, 1999, the TC granted the
petition and admitted (P) to Philippine
citizenship. The State, through the OSG,
appealed all the names by which he is or
had been known; (2) failed to state all his
former placer of residence in violation of
C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct
himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during his entire stay in the
Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has no
known lucrative trade or occupation and
his previous incomes have been
insufficient or misdeclared, also in
contravention of §2; and (5) failed to
support his petition with the appropriate
documentary evidence.
CA rendered its decision which reversed
the TC and denied petitioner's application
for naturalization. It ruled that due to the
importance naturalization cases, the State
is not precluded from raising questions not
presented in the lower court and brought
up for the first time on appeal.
(P’s) principal contention is that the CA
erred in considering the documents which
had been annexed by the State to its
appellant's brief and, on the basis of
which, justified the reversal of the TC’s
decision. Not having been presented and
formally offered as evidence, they are
mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any
evidentiary value," 12 so it was argued,
because under Rule 132, §34 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner
failed to note Rule 143 of the Rules of
Court.
Prescinding from the above, the rule on
formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34)
now being invoked by petitioner is clearly
not applicable to the present case
involving a petition for naturalization. The
only instance when said rules may be
applied by analogy or suppletorily in such
cases is when it is "practicable and
convenient." That is not the case here,
since reliance upon the documents
presented by the State for the first time
on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more
practical and convenient course of action
considering that decisions in naturalization
proceedings are not covered by the rule
on res judicata. 14 Consequently, a final
favorable judgment does not preclude the
State from later on moving for a
revocation of the grant of naturalization
on the basis of the same documents.
Petitioner claims that as a result of the
failure of the State to present and formally
offer its documentary evidence before the
trial court, he was denied the right to
object against their authenticity,
effectively depriving him of his
fundamental right to procedural due
process. 15 We are not persuaded.
Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting
the admission of evidence which has not
been formally offered is to afford the
opposite party the chance to object to
their admissibility. 16 Petitioner cannot
claim that he was deprived of the right to
object to the authenticity of the
documents submitted to the appellate
court by the State. He could have included
his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the
brief he filed with the Court of Appeals
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED and the instant petition is
hereby DENIED.
3. Admissibility of evidence ( Rule
128, sec. 3 and 4 )
Section 3. Admissibility of evidence. —
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant
to the issue and is not excluded by the law
of these rules.
Section 4. Relevancy; collateral
matters. — Evidence must have such a
relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence.
Evidence on collateral matters shall not be
allowed, except when it tends in any
reasonable degree to establish the
probability or improbability of the fact in
issue.
a. Requisites;
1. That it is relevant to the issue; and
2. That it is competent that that is, that it
does not belong to that class of evidence
which is excluded by the law or Rules of
Evidence.
i. Relevant;
BSB GROUP INC., VS. GO, GR 168644,
FEB. 16, 2010;
FACTS: (P), BSB Group presided by its
herein representative, Ricardo Bangayan
(Bangayan). (R) Sally Go, is Bangayan’s
wife, who was employed in the company
as a cashier. In 2002, Bangayan filed a
complaint for estafa and/or qualified theft
against respondent, alleging that several
checks issued by the company’s
customers were indorsed by respondent
who deposited the same to her personal
banking account maintained at Security
Bank.
Respondent entered a negative plea, the
trial ensued. The respondent allegedly
encashed the checks and deposited the
amounts to her personal account, the
prosecution moved for the issuance of
subpoena duces tecum /ad testificandum
against the managers or records
custodians of Security Bank Divisoria as
well as of the Metrobank, the trial court
granted the motion and issued the
corresponding subpoena.
(R) filed a motion to quash the subpoena
addressed to Metrobank, noting to the
court that in the complaint-affidavit filed
with the prosecutor, there was no mention
made of the said bank account, to
which(R) allegedly deposited the proceeds
of the supposed checks. Interestingly,
while respondent characterized the
Metrobank account as irrelevant to the
case, she, in the same motion,
nevertheless waived her objection to the
irrelevancy of the Security Bank account
mentioned in the same complaint-
affidavit, inasmuch as she was admittedly
willing to address the allegations.
(P) opposing (R’s) move, argued account
on the ground that the complaint-affidavit
showed that there were two checks which
respondent allegedly deposited in an
account with the said bank. To this, (R)
filed a supplemental motion to quash,
invoking the absolutely confidential nature
of the Metrobank account under the
provisions of RA 1405. The trial court did
not sustain respondent; hence, it denied
the motion to quash for lack of merit.
The prosecution was able to present the
testimony ofMarasigan, the representative
of Security Bank. Marasigan’s testimony
sought to prove that between 1988 and
1989, (R) was able to run away with the
checks issued to the company by its
customers, endorse and credit the
corresponding amounts to her personal
deposit account with Security Bank.
In the course of the testimony, the subject
checks were presented to Marasigan for
identification and marking as the same
checks received by respondent, endorsed,
and then deposited in her personal
account with Security Bank. But before
the testimony could be completed, (R)
filed a Motion to Suppress, seeking the
exclusion of Marasigan’s testimony and
accompanying documents, bearing on the
subject Security Bank account. This time
respondent invokes, in addition to
irrelevancy, the privilege of confidentiality
under R.A. No. 1405.
TC denied the motion. MR Denied.
CA reversed and set aside.
(R) claimed that the money represented
by the Security Bank account was neither
relevant nor material to the case, because
nothing in the criminal information
suggested that the money deposited was
the subject matter of the case.
She advanced the notion that the term
"cash money" stated in the Information
was not synonymous with the checks she
was purported to have stolen from
petitioner and deposited in her personal
banking account. Thus, the checks which
the prosecution had Marasigan identify, as
well as the testimony itself of Marasigan,
should be suppressed by the trial court at
least for violating respondent’s right to
due process. More in point, respondent
opined that admitting the testimony of
Marasigan, as well as the evidence
pertaining to the Security Bank account,
would violate the secrecy rule under R.A.
No. 1405.29
In its reply, (P) asserted the sufficiency of
the allegations in the criminal Information
for qualified theft, as the same has
sufficiently alleged the elements of the
offense charged. It posits that through
Marasigan’s testimony, the Court would be
able to establish that the checks involved,
copies of which were attached to the
complaint-affidavit filed with the
prosecutor, had indeed been received by
respondent as cashier, but were,
thereafter, deposited by the latter to her
personal account with Security Bank.
Petitioner held that the checks
represented the cash money stolen by
respondent and, hence, the subject matter
in this case is not only the cash amount
represented by the checks supposedly
stolen by respondent, but also the checks
themselves.
ISSUE: W/N the testimony of Marasigan
and the accompanying documents are
irrelevant to the case, and whether they
are also violative of the absolutely
confidential nature of bank deposits and,
hence, excluded by operation of R.A. No.
1405?
Fundamental is that in all criminal
prosecutions, that the acts of the offense
must be established with unwavering
exactitude and moral certainty because
this is the critical and only requisite to a
finding of guilt.
Theft is present when a person, with
intent to gain but without violence against
or intimidation of persons or force upon
things, takes the personal property of
another without the latter’s consent. It is
qualified when and as alleged in the
instant case, it is committed with abuse of
confidence. The prosecution of this offense
necessarily focuses on the existence of the
following elements: (a) there was taking
of personal property belonging to another;
(b) the taking was done with intent to
gain; (c) the taking was done without the
consent of the owner; (d) the taking was
done without violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon
things; and (e) it was done with abuse of
confidence. In turn, whether these
elements concur in a way that overcomes
the presumption of guiltlessness, is a
question that must pass the test of
relevancy and competency in accordance
with Section 334 Rule 128 of the Rules of
Court.
Thus, whether these pieces of evidence
sought to be suppressed in this case, the
testimony of Marasigan, as well as the
checks purported to have been stolen and
deposited in (R’s) Security Bank account
are relevant, is to be addressed by
considering whether they have such direct
relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence.
Petitioner is mistaken.
In theft, the act of unlawful taking
connotes deprivation of personal property
of one by another with intent to gain, and
it is immaterial that the offender is able or
unable to freely dispose of the property
stolen because the deprivation relative to
the offended party has already ensued
from such act of execution.
Theft, however, is not of such character.
Thus, for our purposes, as the Information
in this case accuses respondent of having
stolen cash, proof tending to establish that
respondent has actualized her criminal
intent by indorsing the checks and
depositing the proceeds thereof in her
personal account, becomes not only
irrelevant but also immaterial and, on that
score, inadmissible in evidence.
As to Marasigan’s testimony, it is
conceded that while the fundamental law
has not bothered with the triviality of
specifically addressing privacy rights
relative to banking accounts, there,
nevertheless, exists in our jurisdiction a
legitimate expectation of privacy
governing such accounts. The source of
this right of expectation is statutory, and
it is found in R.A. No. 1405,39 otherwise
known as the Bank Secrecy Act of 1955.
What indeed constitutes the subject
matter in litigation in relation to Section 2
of R.A. No. 1405 has been pointedly and
amply addressed in Union Bank of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals,50 in which
the Court noted that the inquiry into bank
deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405
must be premised on the fact that the
money deposited in the account is itself
the subject of the action.
In sum, we hold that the testimony of
Marasigan on the particulars of
respondent’s supposed bank account with
Security Bank and the documentary
evidence represented by the checks
adduced in support thereof, are not only
incompetent for being excluded by
operation of R.A. No. 1405. They are
likewise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch
as they do not appear to have any logical
and reasonable connection to the
prosecution of respondent for qualified
theft. We find full merit in and affirm
respondent’s objection to the evidence of
the prosecution. The Court of Appeals
was, therefore, correct in reversing the
assailed orders of the trial court.
ii. Competent
 Examples of law and rules
excluding evidence.
b. Multiple, conditional, curative
admissibility;
PRATS & CO. vs. PHOENIX
INSURANCE CO. 52 PHIIL. 807,
FEBRUARY 21, 1929;
Prats & Co., for the purpose of recovering
from the Phoenix Insurance of Hartford,
Connecticut, the sum of P117,800.60, by
reason of a loss alleged to have been
sustained by the (P) from a fire.
The (D), Pheonix Insurance admitted the
insurance of the policy of insurance but
alleged that the fire had been set by the
(P) and that the (P) had submitted under
oath to the (D) a fraudulent claim of loss.
TC absolved the (D) from the complaint
with respect to the obligation created by
the policy, but ordered the (D) to pay the
(PL) upon account of moneys received
from salvage sales, conducted by the (D),
of remnants of the insured stock. (PL)
appealed.
The (D) has sufficiently established two
defenses, first, that the fire was set by
the connivance of the (PL) for the purpose
of defrauding the insurer; and secondly,
that the (PL), after the fire, submitted to
the (D) a fraudulent claim supported by
the false proof, in violation of the terms of
the policy.
Of these defenses the trial judge
sustained the second but passed the first
without express finding.
On July 10, 1923, Francisco Prats, Elias
Hanna and Isidro Bejar registered two
mercantile partnerships, engaging in
mercantile business. The articles of
copartnership of these two entities were
the same except in the firm names. Prats
& Co. should be an importing firm, while
Hanna, Bejar & Co. should engage in retail
businss.
A fire occurred at 95 Plaza Gardenia,
which destroyed the building and ruined
its contents, the amount realized from the
salvage of the stock being P11,731.93.
In June preceeding the fire, 9 policies
were taken out by Prats in the name of
Hanna, Bejar & Co. on merchandise stored
at 95 Plaza Gardenia. At the time these
policies were taken out the valuation of
the goods then in said store could not
have been more than P68,753.
On June 28, 1924, Prats procured from
the agent of the defendant in this case
policy of insurance No. 600217 in the
amount of P200,000 on merchandise
stored in the same place. The nine policies
already procured had been taken out, but
when Prats applied to the agent of the
defendant for the P200,000 policy last
above mentioned, the agent told him that
if Hanna or Bejar had any interest in the
stock to be insured the policy could not be
issued for the reason that the (D) would
not be able to obtain reinsurance for any
part of the policy, owing to the bad
reputation of Hanna and Bejar.
At the request of Prats & Co.; and Prats at
the same time assured the agent that
Hanna and Bejar were not partners in
Prats & Co.
On August 11, 1924 Prats took out an
additional policy for P50,000 in the name
of Prats & Co. on the same stock. Prats,
caused the first nine policies which had
been taken out in the name of Hanna,
Bejar & Co. to be indorsed to Prats & Co.,
thereby making this firm the sole insured
firm with respect to this stock of
merchandise.
It now appears that the twenty-two cases
of silk covered by this marine policy were
fictitious, as no such purchase of silk had
been made by Prats & Co. in France or
elsewhere. This fact was offered in
evidence by the defendant, as tending to
reveal a scheme by which the plaintiff
would be able to mislead the defendant as
to the quantity of goods stored in the
bodega. This item of proof, though
circumstantial in its nature, was
undoubtedly competent and should have
been admitted by the trial court.
The finding of the trial court in the effect
that the plaintiff had submitted false proof
in the support of his claim is also well
founded. That conclusion appears to have
been based upon three items of proof, and
with respect to at least two of these, we
think that the conclusion of his Honor was
correctly drawn. These two facts are,
first, that the (PL) had submitted a claim
for jewelry lost in the fire as of a value of
when the rule value of said jewelry was
about P600; and, secondly, that the (PL)
had sought to recover from the insurance
company the value of goods which had
been withdrawn by it from the bodega
prior to the fire.
The other point relied upon by his Honor
to sustain the conclusion that the (PL) had
attempted to deceive the (D) to the extent
of the loss was at least competent in its
general bearing on the good faith of the
(PL), even if, as is probably true, not
alone sufficient to constitute a breach of
the same stipulations.
The point is this: After the fire the plaintiff
presented to the adjuster certain cost
sheets and copies of supposed invoices in
which the prices and expenses of
importation of a quantity of goods were
stated at double the true amount. The
adjuster soon discovered the artificial
nature of these documents, and, with his
consent, they were withdrawn by Prats
and subsequently destroyed.
At the hearing Prats stated that these
documents had been fabricated in order
that they might be exhibited to intending
purchasers of the goods a ruse which is
supposed to have been entirely innocent
or at least not directed against the
insurer. But a question naturally arises as
to the purpose which these documents
might have been made to serve if the fire,
as doubtless intended by its designers,
had been so destructive as to remove all
vestiges of the stock actually involved.
In the course of long experience we have
observed that justice is most effectively
and expeditiously administered in the
courts where trivial objections to the
admission of proof are received with least
favor. The practice of excluding evidence
on doubtful objection to its materiality or
technical objection to the form of the
questions should be avoided.
In a case of any intricacy it is impossible
for a judge of first instance, to know with
any certainty whether testimony is
relevant or not; and where there is no
indication of bad faith on the part of the
attorney offering the evidence, the court
may as a rule safely accept the testimony
upon the statement of the attorney that
the proof offered will be connected later.
Moreover, it must be remembered that in
the heat of the battle over which he
presides a judge of first instance may
possibly fall into error in judging of the
relevancy of proof where a fair and logical
connection is in fact shown. When such a
mistake is made and the proof is
erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court,
upon appeal, often finds itself
embarrassed and possibly unable to
correct the effects of error without
returning the case for a new trial.
On the other hand, the admission of proof
in a court of first instance, even if the
question as to its form, materiality, or
relevancy is doubtful, can never result in
much harm to either litigant, because the
trial judge is supposed to know the law.
In this connection it should be
remembered that many of the technical
rules of evidence which are often invoked
in our courts were originally worked out in
England and the United States, where the
jury system prevails. They have little
pertinence to a system of procedure, like
ours, in which the court is judge both of
law and facts, and in which accordingly it
is necessary for the court to know what
the proof is before it rules upon the
propriety of receiving it. Apart from these
considerations is the circumstance
mentioned above that the time consumed
in the trial on such collateral points is
generally many times greater than would
be consumed if the questionable
testimony should be admitted for what it
is worth. What has been said above finds
special relevancy in this case in view of
the action of the trial court in refusing to
consider the proof referred to in the
opinion showing that the plaintiff, while
engaged in assembling its stock, procured
maritime insurance upon a fictitious
importation of silk. We earnestly
commend the maintenance of liberal
practice in the admission of proof.
Our examination of the case leads to the
conclusion that the result reached by the
trial court was correct.
The appealed decision will therefore be
affirmed, and it is also ordered, with costs
against the appellant.
PEOPLE VS. YATCO, ET. AL., 97 PHIL
940, NOVEMBER 28, 1955;
EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE;
EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION;
ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE OF
DECLARANT’S GUILT. — Under the rule of
multiple admissibility of evidence, even if
an accused’s confession may not be
competent as against his co-accused,
being hearsay as to the latter, or to prove
conspiracy between them without the
conspiracy being established by other
evidence, the confession is nevertheless,
admissible as evidence of the declarant’s
own guilt (U.S. v. Vega, 43 Phil., 41;
People v. Bande, 50 Phil., 37; People v.
Buan, 64 Phil., 296), and should be
admitted as such.
RULE ON ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE.
— The practice of excluding evidence of
doubtful objections to its materiality or
technical objections to the form of the
question should be avoided. In a case of
any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of
first instance, in the early stages of the
development of the proof, to know with
any certainty whether testimony is
relevant or not; and where there is no
indication of bad faith on the part of the
attorney offering the evidence, the court
may as a rule safety accept the testimony
upon the statement of the attorney that
the proof offered will be connected later."
(Prats & Co. v. Pheonix Insurance Co., 52
Phil., 807, 816-817.) At any rate, in the
final determination and consideration of
the case, the trial Court should be able to
distinguish the admissible from the
inadmissible, and reject what, under the
rules of evidence, should be excluded.
There is greater reason to adhere to such
policy in criminal cases where questions
arises as to admissibility of evidence for
the prosecution, for the unjustified
exclusion of evidence may lead to the
erroneous acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the charges, from which the
People can no longer appeal.
FACTS: Juan Consunji, Alfonso
Panganiban, and another whose identity is
still unknown, were charged with having
conspired together in the murder of Jose
Ramos. In several hearings the
prosecution had been presenting its
evidence, while the prosecution was
questioning one of its witnesses, Atty.
Arturo Xavier of the NBI, in connection
with the making of a certain extra-judicial
confession by defendant Juan Consunji to
the witness, counsel for the other
defendant Alfonso Panganiban interposed
a general objection to any evidence on
such confession on the ground that it was
hearsay and therefore incompetent as
against the other accused Panganiban.
The Court below ordered the exclusion of
the evidence objected to, but on an
altogether different ground: that the
prosecution could not be permitted to
introduce the confessions of defendants
Juan Consunji and Alfonso Panganiban to
prove conspiracy between them, without
prior proof of such conspiracy by a
number of definite acts, conditions, and
circumstances.
The prosecution moved for a
reconsideration, but again the motion was
denied.
We believe that the lower Court
committed a grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the complete exclusion of the
prosecution’s evidence on the alleged
confessions of the accused Juan Consunji
at the stage of the trial when the ruling
was made.
Section 14, Rule 123, Rules of Court, is
specific as to the admissibility of the
extrajudicial confession of an accused
freely and voluntarily made, as evidence
against him.
SEC. 14. Confession. — The
declaration of an accused expressly
acknowledging the truth of his guilt as to
the offense charged, may be given in
evidence against him.
Under the rule of multiple admissibility of
evidence, even if Consunji’s confession
may not be competent as against his co-
accused Panganiban, being hearsay as to
the latter, or to prove conspiracy between
them without the conspiracy being
established by other evidence, the
confession of Consunji was, nevertheless,
admissible as evidence of the declarant’s
own guilt (U. S. v. Vega, 43 Phil. 41;
People v. Bande, 50 Phil. 37; People v.
Buan, 64 Phil. 296), and should have been
admitted as such.
It is particularly noteworthy that the
exclusion of the proffered confessions was
not made on the basis of the objection
interposed by Panganiban’s counsel, but
upon an altogether different ground,
which the Court issued motu-proprio.
Panganiban’s counsel objected to
Consunji’s confession as evidence of the
guilt of the other accused Panganiban, on
the ground that it was hearsay as to the
latter. But the Court, instead of ruling on
this objection, put up its own objection to
the confessions — that it could not be
admitted to prove conspiracy between
Consunji and Panganiban without prior
evidence of such conspiracy by a number
of indefinite acts, conditions,
circumstances, etc. and completely
excluded the confessions on that ground.
By so doing, the Court overlooked that the
right to object is a mere privilege which
the parties may waive; and if the ground
for objection is known and not reasonably
made, the objection is deemed waived
and the Court has no power, on its own
motion, to disregard the evidence (Marella
v. Reyes, 12 Phil., 1).
Wherefore, the order excluding the
confessions of the accused Juan Consunji
and Alfonso Panganiban is annulled and
set aside and the Court below is directed
to proceed with the trial in accordance
with law and this opinion Costs against
respondents Juan Consunji and Alfonso
Panganiban.
4. Collateral Matters;
 General Rule;
 Exception;
5. Admissibility and weight of
evidence;
HEIRS OF LOU SCRA RDES SAEZ
SABANPAN vs. CORMOSPA, 408 SCRA
692, AUGUST 12, 2003;
FACTS: The admissibility of evidence
should be distinguished from its probative
value. Just because a piece of evidence is
admitted does not ipso facto mean that it
conclusively proves the fact in dispute.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review2 under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
set aside the August 7, 2001 Decision and
the February 27, 2002 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals3 (CA) in CA-GR SP No.
60645. The dispositive portion of the
assailed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Decision
dated 22 June 2000 rendered by Branch
18 of the Regional Trial Court of Digos,
Davao del Sur, REVERSING and SETTING
ASIDE the Decision of the Municipal Trial
Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Su[r]."4
The assailed Resolution5 denied
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA summarized the factual
antecedents of the case as follows:
"A [C]omplaint for unlawful detainer with
damages was filed by [petitioners] against
[respondents] before the Santa Cruz,
Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court.
"The [C]omplaint alleged that Marcos Saez
was the lawful and actual possessor of Lot
No. 845, Land 275 located at Darong, Sta.
Cruz, Davao del Sur with an area of 1.2
hectares. In 1960, he died leaving all his
heirs, his children and grandchildren.
"In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was
working in the land of Oboza was
terminated from his job. The termination
of his employment caused a problem in
relocating his house. Being a close family
friend of [Marcos] Saez, Francisco
Comorposa approached the late Marcos
Saez's son, [Adolfo] Saez, the husband of
Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem. Out
of pity and for humanitarian consideration,
Adolfo allowed Francisco Comorposa to
occupy the land of Marcos Saez. Hence,
his nipa hut was carried by his neighbors
and transferred to a portion of the land
subject matter of this case. Such transfer
was witnessed by several people, among
them, Gloria Leano and Noel Oboza.
Francisco Comorposa occupied a portion of
Marcos Saez' property without paying any
rental.
"Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii,
U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession
by the respondents who likewise did not
pay any rental and are occupying the
premises through petitioners' tolerance.
"On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was
made upon the respondents to vacate the
premises but the latter refused to vacate
the same and claimed that they [were]
the legitimate claimants and the actual
and lawful possessor[s] of the premises. A
[C]omplaint was filed with the barangay
office of Sta. Cruz[,] Davao del Sur, but
the parties failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement. Thus, the corresponding
Certificate to File Action was issued by the
said barangay and an action for unlawful
detainer was filed by petitioners against
respondents.
"Respondents, in their Answer, denied the
material allegations of the [C]omplaint
and alleged that they entered and
occupied the premises in their own right
as true, valid and lawful claimants,
possessors and owners of the said lot way
back in 1960 and up to the present time;
that they have acquired just and valid
ownership and possession of the premises
by ordinary or extraordinary prescription,
and that the Regional Director of the
DENR, Region XI has already upheld their
possession over the land in question when
it ruled that they [were] the rightful
claimants and possessors and [were],
therefore, entitled to the issuance of a
title.
"The Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz,
Davao del Sur rendered judgment in favor
of petitioners but the Regional Trial Court
of Digos, Davao del Sur, on appeal,
reversed and set aside the said decision. x
x x"6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
the CA upheld the right of respondents as
claimants and possessors. The appellate
court held that -- although not yet final --
the Order issued by the regional executive
director of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) remained
in full force and effect, unless declared
null and void. The CA added that the
Certification issued by the DENR's
community environment and natural
resources (CENR) officer was proof that
when the cadastral survey was conducted,
the land was still alienable and was not
yet allocated to any person.
According to the CA, respondents had the
better right to possess alienable and
disposable land of the public domain,
because they have sufficiently proven
their actual, physical, open, notorious,
exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted
possession thereof since 1960. The
appellate court deemed as self-serving,
and therefore incredible, the Affidavits
executed by Gloria Leano Saez, Noel
Oboza and Paulina Paran.
Hence, this Petition.7
The Issue
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise
the following issues for the Court's
consideration:
"I
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its
discretion and [err] in sustaining the
ruling of the Regional Trial Court giving
credence to the Order dated 2 April 1998
issued by the regional executive director?
"II
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its
discretion and err in sustaining the
Regional Trial Court's ruling giving weight
to the CENR Officer's Certification, which
only bears the facsimile of the alleged
signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda and,
[worse], it is a new matter raised for the
first time on appeal?
"III
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its
discretion and err in holding that the land
subject matter of this case has been
acquired by means of adverse possession
and prescription?
"IV
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its
discretion, and err in declaring that,
'neither is there error on the part of the
Regional Trial Court, when it did not give
importance to the affidavits by Gloria
Leano Saez, Noel [Oboza], and Paulina
Paran for allegedly being self serving?'"8
To facilitate the discussion, the fourth and
the third issues shall be discussed in
reverse sequence.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
The DENR Order of April 2, 1998
Petitioners claim that the reliance of the
CA upon the April 2, 1998 Order issued by
the regional director of the DENR was
erroneous. The reason was that the Order,
which had upheld the claim of
respondents, was supposedly not yet final
and executory. Another Order dated
August 23, 1999,9 issued later by the
DENR regional director, allegedly held in
abeyance the effectivity of the earlier one.
Under the Public Land Act,10 the
management and the disposition of public
land is under the primary control of the
director of lands11 (now the director of
the Lands Management Bureau or LMB),12
subject to review by the DENR
secretary.13 As a rule, then, courts have
no jurisdiction to intrude upon matters
properly falling within the powers of the
LMB.
The powers given to the LMB and the
DENR to alienate and dispose of public
land does not, however, divest regular
courts of jurisdiction over possessory
actions instituted by occupants or
applicants to protect their respective
possessions and occupations.14 The
power to determine who has actual
physical possession or occupation of public
land and who has the better right of
possession over it remains with the
courts.15 But once the DENR has decided,
particularly through the grant of a
homestead patent and the issuance of a
certificate of title, its decision on these
points will normally prevail.16
Therefore, while the issue as to who
among the parties are entitled to a piece
of public land remains pending with the
DENR, the question of recovery of
possession of the disputed property is a
matter that may be addressed to the
courts.
Second Issue:
CENR Officer's Certification
Petitioners contend that the CENR
Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a sham
document, because the signature of the
CENR officer is a mere facsimile. In
support of their argument, they cite
Garvida v. Sales Jr.17 and argue that the
Certification is a new matter being raised
by respondents for the first time on
appeal.
We are not persuaded.
In Garvida, the Court held:
"A facsimile or fax transmission is a
process involving the transmission and
reproduction of printed and graphic matter
by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and
representing the shade or tone of each
area by a specified amount of electric
current. x x x"18
Pleadings filed via fax machines are not
considered originals and are at best exact
copies. As such, they are not admissible in
evidence, as there is no way of
determining whether they are genuine or
authentic.19
The Certification, on the other hand, is
being contested for bearing a facsimile of
the signature of CENR Officer Jose F.
Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not
the same as that which is alluded to in
Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to
a facsimile signature, which is defined as a
signature produced by mechanical means
but recognized as valid in banking,
financial, and business transactions.20
Note that the CENR officer has not
disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the
DENR regional director has acknowledged
and used it as reference in his Order dated
April 2, 1998:
"x x x. CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda, in a
'CERTIFICATION' dated 22 July 1997,
certified among others, that: x x x per
records available in his Office, x x x the
controverted lot x x x was not allocated to
any person x x x."21
If the Certification were a sham as
petitioner claims, then the regional
director would not have used it as
reference in his Order. Instead, he would
have either verified it or directed the
CENR officer to take the appropriate
action, as the latter was under the
former's direct control and supervision.
Petitioners' claim that the Certification was
raised for the first time on appeal is
incorrect. As early as the pretrial
conference at the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), the CENR Certification had already
been marked as evidence for respondents
as stated in the Pre-trial Order.22 The
Certification was not formally offered,
however, because respondents had not
been able to file their position paper.
Neither the rules of procedure23 nor
jurisprudence24 would sanction the
admission of evidence that has not been
formally offered during the trial. But this
evidentiary rule is applicable only to
ordinary trials, not to cases covered by
the rule on summary procedure -- cases in
which no full-blown trial is held.25
Third Issue:
Affidavit of Petitioners' Witnesses
Petitioners assert that the CA erred in
disregarding the Affidavits of their
witnesses, insisting that the Rule on
Summary Procedure authorizes the use of
affidavits. They also claim that the failure
of respondents to file their position paper
and counter-affidavits before the MTC
amounts to an admission by silence.
The admissibility of evidence should not
be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of
whether certain pieces of evidence are to
be considered at all, while probative value
refers to the question of whether the
admitted evidence proves an issue.26
Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight
depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of
evidence.27
While in summary proceedings affidavits
are admissible as the witnesses'
respective testimonies, the failure of the
adverse party to reply does not ipso facto
render the facts, set forth therein, duly
proven. Petitioners still bear the burden of
proving their cause of action, because
they are the ones asserting an affirmative
relief.28
Fourth Issue:
Defense of Prescription
Petitioners claim that the court a quo
erred in upholding the defense of
prescription proffered by respondents. It
is the former's contention that since the
latter's possession of the land was merely
being tolerated, there was no basis for the
claim of prescription. We disagree.
For the Court to uphold the contention of
petitioners, they have first to prove that
the possession of respondents was by
mere tolerance. The only pieces of
evidence submitted by the former to
support their claim were a technical
description and a vicinity map drawn in
accordance with the survey dated May 22,
1936.29 Both of these were discredited by
the CENR Certification, which indicated
that the contested lot had not yet been
allocated to any person when the survey
was conducted.30 The testimony of
petitioners' witnesses alone cannot prevail
over respondents' continued and
uninterrupted possession of the subject lot
for a considerable length of time.
Furthermore, this is an issue of fact that
cannot, as a rule, be raised in a petition
for review under Rule 45.31
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and
the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CALAMBA STEEL CENTER INC., vs.
CIR, GR 151857, APRIL 28, 2005;
FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic
corporation engaged in manufacturing
industrial and household appliances.
Petitioner company filed a amended
corporate annual income tax return on
June 4, 1996.
It continued to report quarterly payments
for the second and third quarters of 1995.
On April 10, 1997, it filed for a refund
representing excess or unused creditable
withholding taxes for 1995 (not the
previous year 1996). For petitioner
company’s side it presented documentary
and testimonial evidence while
Respondent presented the revenue officer
who conducted the examination of
petitioner’s claim and found petitioner
liable for deficiency value added tax.
The CA denied the claim for refund stating
that there was no evidence other than
that presented before the CTA was
adduced to prove the excess tax
payments made in 1995.
ISSUE: W/N the CA gravely erred while
requiring petitioner to submit its 1996
annual income tax return to support its
claim for refund, ignored the existence of
the tax return extant on the record the
authenticity opposed by the CIR—YES
HELD:
The truth or falsity of the contents of or
entries in the 1996 final adjustment return
which has not been formally offered in
evidence and examined is a question of
fact.
As a general rule, courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of records in other cases tried or
pending before the same judge, the rule
admits of exceptions, as when reference
to such records is sufficiently made
without objection from the opposing
parties.
Admissibility is one thing and weight is
another. To admit evidence and not to
believe it are not incompatible with each
other. Mere allegations by petitioner of the
figures in its 1996 final adjustment return
are not sufficient proof of the amount of
its
refund entitlement. They do not even
constitute evidence adverse to
respondent.
Indeed, "[a]dmissibility x x x is one thing,
weight is another."33 "To admit evidence
and not to believe it are not incompatible
with each other x x x."34 Mere allegations
by petitioner of the figures in its 1996 final
adjustment return are not a sufficient
proof of the amount of its refund
entitlement. They do not even constitute
evidence35 adverse to respondent,
against whom they are being
presented.36
While it seems that the "[non-production]
of a document which courts almost
invariably expect will be produced
‘unavoidably throws a suspicion over the
cause,’"37 this is not really the conclusion
to be arrived at here. When petitioner
purportedly filed its administrative claim
for a tax refund on April 10, 1997, the
deadline for filing the 1996 final
adjustment return was not yet over.
Hence, it could not have attached this
return to its claim.
For reasons unknown even to this Court,
petitioner failed to offer such return as
evidence during the trial phase of this
case. For its negligence, petitioner "cannot
be allowed to seek refuge in a liberal
application of the [r]ules"38 by giving it a
blanket approval of the total refund it
claims. "While in certain instances, we
allow a relaxation in the application of the
rules, we never intend to forge a weapon
for erring litigants to violate the rules with
impunity. The liberal interpretation and
application of rules apply only in proper
cases of demonstrable merit and under
justifiable causes and circumstances."39
It would not be proper to allow petitioner
to simply prevail and compel a refund in
the amount it claims, without affording
the government a reasonable opportunity
to contest the former’s allegations.40
Negligence consisting of the unexplained
failure to offer the exhibit should not be
rewarded with undeserved leniency.
Petitioner still bears the burden of proving
the amount of its claim for tax refund.
After all, "[t]ax refunds are in the nature
of tax exemptions"41 and are to be
construed strictissimi juris against the
taxpayer.
Finally, even in the absence of a final
adjustment return or any claim for a tax
refund, respondent is authorized by law to
examine any book, paper, record or other
data that may be relevant or material to
such inquiry.42 Failure to make an
assessment of petitioner’s proper tax
liability or to contest the return could be
errors or omissions of administrative
officers that should never be allowed to
jeopardize the government’s financial
position.
Verily, "the officers of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue should receive the
support of the courts when these officers
attempt to perform in a conscientious and
lawful manner the duties imposed upon
them by law."43 Only after it is shown
that "if something is received when there
is no right to demand it, and it was duly
delivered through mistake, the obligation
to return it arises."44
In brief, we hold that petitioner is entitled
to a refund; however, the amount must
still be proved in proper proceedings
before the CTA.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby
PARTLY GRANTED, and the assailed
Decision SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals
for the proper and immediate
determination of the amount to be
refunded to petitioner on the basis of the
latter’s 1996 final adjustment return. No
pronouncement as to costs.
TATING vs. MARCELLA, GR 155208,
MARCH 27, 2007;
FACTS: The present case arose from a
controversy involving a parcel of land
Negros Occidental. The subject lot was
owned by Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating
as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of
Title.
Daniela sold the subject property to her
granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena
Lazalita Tating. The contract of sale was
embodied in a duly notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor
of Nena. Subsequently, title over the
subject property was transferred in the
name of Nena. She declared the property
in her name for tax purposes and paid the
real estate taxes due thereon for the
years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and
1988. However, the land remained in
possession of Daniela.
Daniela executed a sworn statement
claiming that she had actually no intention
of selling the property; the true
agreement between her and Nena was
simply to transfer title over the subject
property in favor of the latter to enable
her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the
subject property for the purpose of
helping her defray her business expenses;
she later discovered that Nena did not
secure any loan nor mortgage the
property; she wants the title in the name
of Nena cancelled and the subject
property reconveyed to her.
Daniela died leaving her children as her
heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad, Julio,
Carlos and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela
and was represented by herein petitioner.
Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela
died they discovered the sworn statement
she executed and they are demanding
from Nena the return of their rightful
shares over the subject property as heirs
of Daniela. Nena did not reply. Efforts to
settle the case amicably proved futile.
Carlos and Felicidad, represented by her
son Salvador, filed a complaint with the
RTC Negros Occidental against Nena
praying for the nullification of the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her
favor, cancellation of the TCT issued in the
name of Nena, and issuance of a new title
and tax declaration in favor of the heirs of
Daniela.
In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud
or misrepresentation attended the
execution of the subject Deed of Absolute
Sale. She also denied having received the
letter of her uncle, Carlos.
Trial ensued. On November 4, 1998, the
RTC rendered judgment with the following
dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendant,
and hereby declaring the document of sale
dated October 14, 1969 executed between
Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating and Nena
Lazalita Tating as NULL and VOID
Nena filed an appeal with the CA. On
February 22, 2002, the CA rendered its
Decision affirming the judgment of the
RTC.
Hence, herein petition for certiorari
anchored on the ground that the CA "has
decided the instant case without due
regard to and in violation of the applicable
laws and Decisions of this Honorable Court
and also because the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, which it has affirmed,
is not supported by and is even against
the evidence on record.
As to the merits of the case, petitioner
contends that the case for the private
respondents rests on the proposition that
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October
14, 1969 is simulated because Daniela’s
actual intention was not to dispose of her
property but simply to help petitioner by
providing her with a collateral.
Petitioner asserts that the sole evidence
which persuaded both the RTC and the CA
in holding that the subject deed was
simulated was the Sworn Statement of
Daniela. However, petitioner argues that
said Sworn Statement should have been
rejected outright by the lower courts
considering that Daniela has long been
dead when the document was offered in
evidence, thereby denying petitioner the
right to cross-examine her.
Petitioner also contends that while the
subject deed was executed on October 14,
1969, the Sworn Statement was
purportedly executed only on December
28, 1977 and was discovered only after
the death of Daniela in 1994.18
Petitioner argues that if the deed of sale is
indeed simulated, Daniela would have
taken action against the petitioner during
her lifetime.
Petitioner further asserts that the RTC and
the CA erred in departing from the
doctrine held time and again by the
Supreme Court that clear, strong and
convincing evidence beyond mere
preponderance is required to show the
falsity or nullity of a notarial document.
Petitioner also argues that the RTC and
the CA erred in its pronouncement that
the transaction between Daniela and
petitioner created a trust relationship
between them because of the settled rule
that where the terms of a contract are
clear, it should be given full effect.
SC: The Court finds for the petitioner.
The CA and the trial court ruled that the
contract of sale between petitioner and
Daniela is simulated. A contract is
simulated if the parties do not intend to be
bound at all (absolutely simulated) or if
the parties conceal their true agreement
(relatively simulated).
The primary consideration in determining
the true nature of a contract is the
intention of the parties. Such intention is
determined from the express terms of
their agreement as well as from their
contemporaneous and subsequent acts.
In the present case, the main evidence
presented by private respondents in
proving their allegation that the subject
deed of sale did not reflect the true
intention of the parties thereto is the
sworn statement of Daniela. The Trial
court admitted the said sworn statement
as part of private respondents’ evidence
and gave credence to it. The CA also
accorded great probative weight to this
document.
There is no issue in the admissibility of the
subject sworn statement. However, the
admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. The
admissibility of evidence depends on its
relevance and competence while the
weight of evidence pertains to evidence
already admitted and its tendency to
convince and persuade. Thus, a particular
item of evidence may be admissible, but
its evidentiary weight depends on judicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided
by the rules of evidence.
It is settled that affidavits are classified as
hearsay evidence since they are not
generally prepared by the affiant but by
another who uses his own language in
writing the affiant’s statements, which
may thus be either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them.
Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of
the opportunity to cross-examine the
affiant. For this reason, affidavits are
generally rejected for being hearsay,
unless the affiants themselves are placed
on the witness stand to testify thereon.
The Court finds that both the trial court
and the CA committed error in giving the
sworn statement probative weight.
Since Daniela is no longer available to
take the witness stand as she is already
dead, the RTC and the CA should not have
given probative value on Daniela’s sworn
statement for purposes of proving that the
contract of sale between her and
petitioner was simulated and that, as a
consequence, a trust relationship was
created between them.
Private respondents should have
presented other evidence to sufficiently
prove their allegation that Daniela, in fact,
had no intention of disposing of her
property when she executed the subject
deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in all
civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to
prove the material allegations of his
complaint and he must rely on the
strength of his evidence and not on the
weakness of the evidence of the
defendant.
Aside from Daniela’s sworn statement,
private respondents failed to present any
other documentary evidence to prove their
claim. Even the testimonies of their
witnesses failed to establish that Daniela
had a different intention when she entered
into a contract of sale with petitioner.
In the present case, however, the
evidence clearly shows that petitioner
declared the property for taxation and
paid realty taxes on it in her name.
Petitioner has shown that from 1972 to
1988 she religiously paid the real estate
taxes due on the said lot and that it was
only in 1974 and 1987 that she failed to
pay the taxes thereon. While tax receipts
and declarations and receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are not, in themselves,
incontrovertible evidence of ownership,
they constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the
property.
The voluntary declaration of a piece of
property for taxation purposes manifests
not only one’s sincere and honest desire
to obtain title to the property and
announces his adverse claim against the
State and all other interested parties, but
also the intention to contribute needed
revenues to the Government.
Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership. On the
other hand, private respondents failed to
present even a single tax receipt or
declaration showing that Daniela paid
taxes due on the disputed lot as proof that
she claims ownership thereof. The only
Tax Declaration in the name of Daniela,
which private respondents presented in
evidence, refers only to the house
standing on the lot in controversy. Even
the said Tax Declaration contains a
notation that herein petitioner owns the
lot (Lot 56) upon which said house was
built.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner
that if the subject Deed of Absolute Sale
did not really reflect the real intention of
Daniela, why is it that she remained silent
until her death; she never told any of her
relatives regarding her actual purpose in
executing the subject deed; she simply
chose to make known her true intentions
through the sworn statement she
executed on December 28, 1977, the
existence of which she kept secret from
her relatives; and despite her declaration
therein that she is appealing for help in
order to get back the subject lot, she
never took any concrete step to recover
the subject property from petitioner until
her death more than ten years later.
It is true that Daniela retained physical
possession of the property even after she
executed the subject Absolute Deed of
Sale and even after title to the property
was transferred in petitioner’s favor. In
fact, Daniela continued to occupy the
property in dispute until her death in 1988
while, in the meantime, petitioner
continued to reside in Manila.
However, it is well-established that
ownership and possession are two entirely
different legal concepts. Just as
possession is not a definite proof of
ownership, neither is non-possession
inconsistent with ownership.
The first paragraph of Article 1498 of the
Civil Code states that when the sale is
made through a public instrument, the
execution thereof shall be equivalent to
the delivery of the thing which is the
object of the contract, if from the deed the
contrary does not appear or cannot clearly
be inferred. Possession, along with
ownership, is transferred to the vendee by
virtue of the notarized deed of
conveyance. Thus, in light of the
circumstances of the present case, it is of
no legal consequence that petitioner did
not take actual possession or occupation
of the disputed property after the
execution of the deed of sale in her favor
because she was already able to perfect
and complete her ownership of and title
over the subject property.

As to Daniela’s affidavit dated June 9,

1983, submitted by petitioner, which
confirmed the validity of the sale of the
disputed lot in her favor, the same has no
probative value, as the sworn statement
earlier adverted to, for being hearsay.
Naturally, private respondents were not
able to cross-examine the deceased-
affiant on her declarations contained in
the said affidavit.

However, even if Daniela’s affidavit of

June 9, 1983 is disregarded, the fact
remains that private respondents failed to
prove by clear, strong and convincing
evidence beyond mere preponderance of
evidence that the contract of sale between
Daniela and petitioner was simulated. The
legal presumption is in favor of the validity
of contracts and the party who impugns
its regularity has the burden of proving its
simulation.
Since private respondents failed to
discharge the burden of proving their
allegation that the contract of sale
between petitioner and Daniela was
simulated, the presumption of regularity
and validity of the October 14, 1969 Deed
of Absolute Sale stands.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
64122, affirming the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Negros
Occidental, Branch 60, in Civil Case No.
278-C, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
The complaint of the private respondents
is DISMISSED.