The British Society for the Philosophy of Science

Is There Anthropological Evidence That Logic Is Culturally Relative?: Remarks on Bloor,

Jennings, and Evans-Pritchard
Author(s): Timm Triplett
Source: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 45, No. 2 (Jun., 1994), pp.
749-760
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The British Society for the
Philosophy of Science
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/687696
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Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 45 (1994), 749-760 Printed in Great Britain

DISCUSSION

Is There Anthropological Evidence

Logic Is Culturally Relative?:
Remarks on Bloor, Jennings, an
Evans-Pritchard

ABSTRACT

Logical relativism is the view that a logical proposition is know

collectively endorsed in some culture. This striking and contr
defended by David Bloor and Richard C. Jennings. They cite in its support
distinctive reasoning practices among the Azande as described by E. E. Evans-
Pritchard. Jennings has challenged my critique of Bloor's logical relativism,
claiming that my analysis is based on misunderstandings of Bloor and Evans-
Pritchard. I argue that Jennings' clarifications of Bloor do nothing to support the
thesis of logical relativism, and that a direct examination of Evans-Pritchard's
evidence suggests that the Azande reason just as we do.

1 The Thesis of Logical Relativism

2 Jennings' Defense of Bloor
3 The Alleged Difference between Zande Logic and Western Logic: An Examination
of the Evidence from Evans-Pritchard
4 Conclusion

I THE THESIS OF LOGICAL RELATIVISM

Is there any reason to suppose that our knowledge of the p

culturally relative? That is a question raised by the wo
Knowledge and Social Imagery [1976], he appears to maint
yes. This answer implies that a proposition rejected as a l
one culture can be embraced by another culture and,
constitute legitimate knowledge in that culture. Such a v
extraordinary one-a particularly radical example of ep
ism. It is a striking departure from the traditional concept
are universal and constitute paradigmatic examples of

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 750 Timm Triplett

priori.' What reasons does Bloor give for

relative? Are those reasons persuasive?
(Triplett [1988]), I assessed Bloor's argu
nothing to establish the thesis of logical
In a response to that article, Richard C.
misunderstood some of Bloor's distinct
anthropological work of E. E. Evans-Pr
witchcraft lore were used by Bloor as the
logic. I will argue that Jennings has not o
and that a direct examination of Evans-Pritchard's Zande source material
supports my claim that the Azande do not possess an alternative logic.
First, some remarks on the thesis of logical relativism and distinct theses i
can be confused with. Logical relativism is a form of epistemological relativism
which, as Bloor and Jennings understand and defend it, is the claim tha
something counts as knowledge just in case it is collectively agreed upon.2
Presumably, idiosyncratic beliefs of a particular individual do not necessarily
count as knowledge; the belief must be accepted within a culture as a whole
and perhaps even have some institutional role to play. In contrast to the
traditional conception of knowledge, which requires a truth condition an
allows that a culture may possess false beliefs, this relativist conception
maintains that there is no extra-cultural perspective from which to adjudicat
knowledge-claims. All such claims are made within a particular culture, and if
one culture judges another's claims to be error or superstition or nonsense
that judgement is just one more culture-bound claim. To believe that there is
some transcultural perspective from which to resolve this cultural disagree-
ment is to have a mistaken notion about what human communities can mean
when they speak of knowledge and truth.
Epistemological relativism is itself controversial. Some philosophers are
willing to accept its claims in some areas of inquiry. Perhaps, for example,
there is no transcultural truth that can ground ethical or aesthetic judge-
ments. But logical relativism-the claim that even propositions expressing
logical relations and inferences are known if and only if collectively agreed
upon within a culture-is resisted even by many relativists, and is strongly
rejected by traditionalists, who maintain that our knowledge of logic is
1 Although there have been other challenges to this traditional conception, Bloor's is perhaps the
most radical. He goes beyond other sociologists of knowledge such as Karl Mannheim in his
insistence that sociology can explain not only political and social systems of thought, but even
logical and mathematical knowledge (see Bloor [1976], p. 74; cf. Mannheim [1936], p. 43).
Bloor is more radical than epistemological naturalists such as W. V. Quine in his suggestion that
knowledge can be reduced to what is 'collectively endorsed' (Bloor [1976], p. 3). Indeed, Quine
himself has a trenchant dismissal of a view close to if not identical with Bloor's (Quine [1963],
p. 387).
2 Bloor's commitment to a collective-agreement analysis of knowledge is not always consistent
and clear. But it is suggested strongly enough in his work to merit a response. I detail ambiguities
in Bloor's analysis of knowledge in Triplett [1986], pp. 440-5, and [1988], passim.

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 Is There Anthropological Evidence that Logic Is Culturally Relative? 751

knowledge of what is necessary and universal. Hellenic, Arabic and Western

European cultures have all recognized the syllogistic mood AAA (Barbara) as
valid, AEA as invalid. Validity and invalidity are functions of inherent relations
among the ideas expressed; they are not the result of the mere fact of cultural
belief. For the traditionalist, an argument that is known to be valid in the West
cannot be known to be a fallacy in the Sudan.
Bloor goes even further than abstractly stating the possibility of logical
relativism when he suggests that the Azande do in fact possess a system of
logical knowledge and reasoning that is incompatible with, but an equally
legitimate alternative to, the logical system of the Western tradition.
Epistemological relativism must not be confused with the uncontroversial
thesis that social and institutional structures can have a significant effect on
what is collectively believed within a given society. I have argued that Bloor is
sometimes unclear about whether he means to be defending the sociology of
belief (which we may define as the study that attempts to explain why certain
socially significant beliefs and ideologies arose in particular societies at
particular times) or a relativistic version of the sociology of knowledge (which
maintains that knowledge can be entirely explained as a social product:
collective belief entails knowledge).3
In Triplett [1988], my main concern was to show that Bloor has given us no
reason to think logical relativism true. I argued that Bloor seems to mistake
considerations which in fact only support conclusions about the sociology of
belief for those which would support his relativistic version of the sociology of
knowledge, and that Bloor's example of Zande reasoning, far from providing
evidence that Zande logic is different from Western logic, in fact shows the
Azande to be reasoning in the traditional Aristotelian manner.

2 JENNINGS' DEFENSE OF BLOOR

Jennings' defense of Bloor consists of two distinct points. First, he argu

fail to understand a significant distinction Bloor makes between 'the
psychology of reasoning' and 'the institutional framework of thought'.
Second, referring to the work of Evans-Pritchard, he challenges my contention
that Zande logic is no different from traditional Western logic.
Before I proceed to address these points, a general remark about Jennings'
approach is in order. In much of his discussion, Jennings simply presupposes
the truth of logical relativism. Since he does not discuss 'logical relativism' per
se, this is not immediately obvious. But his extensive references to the
'naturalistic analysis' of logic and knowledge reveal the extent to which his

Triplett [1986]. The discipline named (perhaps misleadingly) the 'sociology of knowledge' is not
necessarily relativistic in its theoretical assumptions, and many practitioners have explicitly
disavowed relativism (e.g. Stark [1958]). Bloor has referred to his own approach as the 'strong
programme in the sociology of knowledge' (Bloor [1976], p. 5).

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752 Timm Triplett

discussion presupposes relativism. For the

by Jennings to be nothing more than the r
knowledge is what is collectively agreed
scientific truths or the truths of mathem
p. 276).
This presupposition of logical relativis
clarification of a passage in which Bloo
reasoning' with the 'institutional framewo
confusing. Jennings does help to clarify w
But his clarificatory point simply takes for
thesis. Jennings notes Bloor's relativistic eq
belief, and then goes on to make the point
important distinction between (1) our 'nat
all the lines of thought our minds are natu
what Bloor had called 'the psychology
framework we are born to and in which
culturation which lines of thought a
(Jennings [1989], p. 277). There are many d
natural proclivities can go, but 'not all
indeed, not all can be simultaneously m
conflicting directions' (p. 2 77). It is at that
framework of thought takes over, selecting
acceptable and others as unacceptable, le
cultures will have different and incompati
There is an almost Freudian aspect to this
natural proclivities is reigned in by the su
but does it present an accurate descripti
provides no evidence that it does. (It is of
distinction between beliefs that are unique
that are widely accepted enough in a soc
beliefs of the society as a whole. Evans-
distinction between Zande beliefs, as we sha
he accepts the specific Freudian-like explan
by Jennings.)
And of course, it is one thing for Jennin
Bloor, quite another to show that the distin
difference in aspects of rational thinking.
argue for the significance of the distincti
Jennings could provide solid evidence t
reasoning as natural individual proclivit
frameworks, leading to identifiably distinc
different cultures, nothing yet follows tha
remains open for the traditionalist to claim

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 Is There Anthropological Evidence that Logic Is Culturally Relative? 753

found are not logical incompatibilities, or, if such incompatibilities are clearly
found, that one or both cultures are just mistaken about what constitutes good
reasoning. Here Jennings' initial assumption of logical relativism, and a
resurfacing of the ambiguity between the sociology of belief and a relativistic
form of the sociology of knowledge, vitiate his argument.
This ambiguity, which, as I have noted, infects Bloor's argument, reappears
in the following passage in Jennings:
What different groups accept as knowledge is to be explained in naturalistic
terms, in terms of the psychological and sociological nature of people. Whatever
kind of knowledge it is, and whether we accept it or not, its acceptance is to be
studied as a natural phenomenon ([1989], p. 277).

Merely to insist that we investigate why a certain culture accepts a claim as

knowledge still leaves open whether that claim is in fact an item of knowledge.
It is surely an important (and uncontroversial) role for investigators into the
sociology of ideas and beliefs to seek sociological explanations why a culture
accepts certain beliefs and rejects others. But such a methodological stance
does not yet entail relativism. It is one thing to look for cultural reasons why a
society accepted as an item of knowledge the proposition that a flat Earth is the
center of the universe. It is quite another to maintain that a society in fact knew
this propostion simply in virtue of its being a collective belief of that society.
The effect of Jennings' emphasis here on a culture's acceptance of something as
knowledge blurs the distinction that needs to be made between sociological
explanations of cultural beliefs and the relativistic thesis of the sociology of
knowledge.
So Bloor and Jennings need, first, to make clear that they mean to defend a
relativistic sociology of knowledge and not just the sociology of belief, and,
second, to go beyond their presupposition of logical relativism and explain why
any distinction to be made between individual and institutional reasoning
supports relativism. And it seems entirely fair to ask for a positive argument for
logical relativism from Bloor or Jennings. The thesis is a controversial one.
Aristotle understood the acceptance of certain logical truths to be a
prerequisite for all scientific knowledge. Logicians from Leibniz to Bertrand
Russell and beyond have claimed that the propositions of logic are necessary
truths known a priori. Even those who have recently challenged this
traditional conception of logic do not as a rule go on to equate knowledge of
logical truths with collective belief. Given the radical nature and general
nonacceptance of the thesis of logical relativism, Bloor and Jennings owe us
some positive reason for thinking it true.
Nevertheless, one of my own major criticisms of Bloor was that he was just
wrong to claim that Zande logic is different from Western logic. I shall turn
now to Jennings' response to this criticism of Bloor.
My claim was that, far from there being the radical difference Bloor thought
he found between Zande and Western methods of reasoning, the evidence

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 754 Timm Triplett

presented by Bloor suggested that the Azand

appear to be faced with a contradiction betwe
a 'witchcraft-substance' transmitted via inheritance and their belief that not
all members of a clan can be witches. Bloor's claim of an alternative Zande
logic is based on the apparent lack of concern the Azande show toward what
appears to us to be a contradiction. But, as Bloor himself reports, the Azande
allow that witchcraft-substance is sometimes 'cool' and in such cases does not
make its possessor a witch. I have argued that the hypothesis of 'cool
witchcraft-substance' quite effectively avoids any contradictions in Zande
beliefs and shows the Azande to be engaged in reasoning according to standard
methods such as the use of reductio ad absurdam (Triplett [1988], p. 364).
Jennings acknowledges that 'it is certainly true according to Evans-
Pritchard that the Azande will respond to intimations of such undesirable
consequences of their beliefs in ways that support Triplett's position. But these
are individual responses, not socially instituted responses-they do not
constitute Zande logic but are, rather, natural responses of individuals ... they
do not represent features of established Zande thought, of Zande logic' ([1989],
p. 282).
Jennings thus applies the previously discussed distinction between reason as
natural individual proclivities and reason as institutional frameworks to
different elements of Zande beliefs. His argument specifically amounts to the
claim that Zande beliefs about the transmission of witchcraft-substance and
the frequency of witches within a clan are institutionalized beliefs constituting
features of Zande logic, while the belief about cool witchcraft-substance is
merely an example of the noninstitutionalized 'temporary elaborations of
belief' that are manifestations only of 'natural proclivities of thought'.
But on what basis does Jennings thus classify Zande beliefs? He offers in
support only the remark that 'from what Evans-Pritchard tells us it is clear that
the Azande do not so revise their beliefs' ([1989], p. 282). Thus, we must turn
to the evidence originally presented by Evans-Pritchard.

3 THE ALLEGED DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ZANDE LOGIC AND

WESTERN LOGIC: AN EXAMINATION OF THE EVIDENCE FROM
EVANS-PRITCHARD

I believe that if we look carefully both at the relevant Zande te

Pritchard and at Evans-Pritchard's comments on this text, we
idea that the Azande have an alternative logic is based on
Bloor and Jennings of Evans-Pritchard's comments. We can al
misreading arose.
The evidence begins with the following Zande text (i.e. the w
informant):
If a man has witchcraft-substance in his belly and begets a male c

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 Is There Anthropological Evidence that Logic Is Culturally Relative? 755

also has witchcraft-substance because his father was a witch. It is the same with
women. If a woman has witchcraft-substance in her belly and gives birth to a
female child, the child also has witchcraft-substance because her mother was a
witch. Thus witchcraft does not trouble a person born free from it by entering
into him. (Quoted in Evans-Pritchard [1937], p. 23.)

Note that this text does not itself contain anything logically untoward. Nor is it
contrasted with any other Zande text that elicits what we would call a
contradiction. Indeed, Evans-Pritchard, who is himself no logical relativist,
makes no claim that the Azande have an alternative and equally valid logic.
Rather, a comment of his on this text appears to have provided the basis for
Bloor's inference that they do have such a logic. I believe that Bloor and
Jennings rely rather too much on this one comment and do not take into
account the full context of Evans-Pritchard's discussion.
Here is the Evans-Pritchard comment that inspired Bloor:

To our minds, it appears evident that if a man is proven a witch the whole of his
clan are ipso facto witches, since the Zande clan is a group of persons related
biologically to one another through the male line. Azande see the sense of this
argument but they do not accept its conclusions, and it would involve the whole
notion of witchcraft in contradiction were they to do so. In practice they regard
only close paternal kinsmen of a known witch as witches. It is only in theory that
they extend the imputation to all a witch's clansmen ([193 7], p. 24).

Notice that even here, where Evans-Pritchard has been regarded by Bloor and
Jennings as providing the basis for their claim that the Azande have a different
logic, Evans-Pritchard himself invokes the notion of logical contradiction, and
implies Zande recognition of the threat of contradiction, in explaining why the
Azande do not accept a certain conclusion. Bloor and Jennings want to deny
that the Azande recognize any contradiction here; hence, they must (and
explicitly do) reject Evans-Pritchard's own interpretation. Note also Evans-
Pritchard's distinction between theory and practice. This might provide the
basis for the Bloor's distinction between institutionalized belief and individual
elaborations of belief.
Indeed, Evans-Pritchard immediately goes on to discuss such elaborations:

Further elaborations of belief free Azande from having to admit what appear to us
to be the logical consequences of belief in biological transmission of witchcraft. If
a man is proven a witch beyond all doubt his kin, to establish their innocence,
may use the very biological principle which would seem to involve them in
disrepute. They admit that the man is a witch but deny that he is a member of
their clan. They say he was a bastard, for among Azande a man is always of the
clan of his genitor and not of his pater, and I was told that they may compel his
mother if she is still alive to say who was her lover, beating her and asking, 'What
do you mean by going to the bush to get witchcraft in adultery?' More often they
simply make the declaration that the witch must have been a bastard since they

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 756 Timm Triplett

have no witchcraft in their bodies and that he could not therefore be one of their
kinsmen ([1937], pp. 24-5).

Now it is easy to see how this can be called an individual elaboration of belief.
In the face of a theory about the transmission of witchcraft that appears to
implicate them, individuals plead that theirs is a special case and that the
theory does not implicate them if the whole story is told. They do not challenge
the theory itself. Hence they are not contributing to general witchcraft lore and
theory here; they are improvising in order to get themselves off the hook. Still,
it is instructive to note that, in so proceeding, they operate in what we would
consider to be an understandably logical fashion: they evade what looks like
the logical consequence by in effect denying one of the premises that would
implicate them, namely the premise that this witch is one of their kinsmen. We
recognize this as logical reasoning, and the best explanation of their going to
this trouble would seem to be that they recognize it too.
In his next paragraph, Evans-Pritchard introduces and discusses the issue of
cool witchcraft-substance:

Also Zande doctrine includes the notion that even if a man is the son of a witch
and has witchcraft-substance in his body he may not use it. It may remain
inoperative, 'cool' as the Azande say, throughout his lifetime, and a man can
hardly be classed as a witch if his witchcraft never functions. In point of fact,
therefore, Azande generally regard witchcraft as an individual trait and it is
treated as such in spite of its association with kinship ([1937], p. 2 5).

As we have seen, Jennings' challenge to my traditional logical account of

Zande reasoning depends on his claim that the explanation in terms of cool
witchcraft-substance is a matter of individual, temporary elaboration and not
institutionalized belief. But it hardly appears that this is so. The claim about
cool witchcraft-substance appears to be as institutionalized as anything Evans-
Pritchard reports about the Azande. First, Evans-Pritchard explicitly refers to it
as a doctrine. Second, just as it is easy to see how the reasoning in the bastardy
example is an individual elaboration designed to defend specific individuals
without challenging or altering Zande witchcraft doctrine, so it is easy to see
that the claim that witchcraft-substance can be cool is general, not specific. It
adds something to the Zande account of the nature and causes of witchcraft.
Jennings' claim that this is a mere individual elaboration has no foundation in
anything Evans-Pritchard reports about the cool witchcraft-substance
hypothesis. Perhaps Jennings was misled into assuming that, since Evans-
Pritchard had been discussing individual elaborations of belief in the previous
paragraph, he was continuing such a discussion here. But both the nature of
the cool witchcraft-substance claim and Evans-Pritchard's description of it as a
doctrine override any such inference based on Evans-Pritchard's manner of
organizing his discussion.
The cool witchcraft-substance doctrine allows the Azande to retain the basic

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 Is There Anthropological Evidence that Logic Is Culturally Relative? 757

biological principle that witchcraft is transmitted through inherited character-

istics while avoiding the unwanted conclusion that everyone in a clan might
be a witch. Logical contradiction is also avoided. The institutional reasoning
here is quite as comprehensible in terms of traditional logic as is the individual
reasoning in the bastardy example.
There remains one phrase in Evans-Pritchard's account that is puzzling
given my readings of him and of Zande reasoning about witchcraft. Referring
to the contradiction between the apparent implication of the Zande text that all
same-sexed kinsmen of a known witch must be witches and the Zande denial
that witchcraft is in fact this extensive, Evans-Pritchard writes that:

Azande do not perceive the contradiction as we perceive it because they have no

theoretical interest in the subject, and those situations in which they express
their interest in witchcraft do not force the problem upon them. A man never
asks the oracles... whether a certain man is a witch. He asks whether at the
moment this man is bewitching him ... A Zande is interested in witchcraft only
as an agent on definite occasions and in relation to his own interest, and not as
permanent condition of individuals ([1937], pp. 25-6).

Jennings interprets Evans-Pritchard as saying here that the Azande 'do n

perceive a contradiction' in this situation (Jennings [1989], p. 283). And thi
'no-perceived-contradiction' interpretation is necessary for Jennings'
Bloor's claim that the Azande have an alternative logic. Jennings is her
adopting Bloor's account of contradiction, according to which a contradictio
is something that arises from a problem in social practice (Jennings [1989], p
283-4). A contradiction exists because a culture identifies something as
unacceptable in its set of beliefs. And since the Azande allegedly ident
nothing unacceptable with regard to their witchcraft beliefs, there is
contradiction. It is just this Bloorean concept of contradiction, of course, tha
a version of logical relativism and that the traditionalist would dispute. Wh
indeed, should we give up the traditional view that people reject certai
propositions because they are contradictory, in favor of the radical view th
the propositions are contradictory because people reject them? Jennin
provides no argument; he again merely adopts the 'naturalistic' point of vie
My present concern, however, is not with the presupposition of log
relativism but with whether Zande logic is in fact different from ours. Bloor
Jennings claim that it is, because what our culture perceives as a contradic
is not perceived to be one by the Azande. And it can appear as though Evan
Pritchard is supporting this 'no-perceived-contradiction' claim in the passag
quoted above.
But it can only appear so if one misreads Evans-Pritchard and ignores the
larger context of his remark. Note that he does not say that the Azande do n
perceive a contradiction simpliciter. He says that they do not perceive
contradiction as we perceive it. Thus it is consistent with this passage to ar

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 758 Timm Triplett

that the Azande perceive a contradiction in

perceive it as we do, perhaps because it lac
would for us. And it is clear from what Ev
the Azande do see a contradiction loom
Otherwise we have no explanation for the
elaboration and the doctrine of cool wit
bastardy elaboration may well be a ma
institutional reasoning, it is clearly explica
contradiction, as I have noted. And as Evan
this elaboration 'use the very biological pr
them in disrepute' ([193 7], p. 24). It thus
the level of individual reasoning.)
On Jennings' interpretation, Evans-Pritc
incompatible claims when he says in th
Azande perceive no contradiction and earlier that the Azande refuse to
conclude that all kin are witches because such a conclusion 'would involve the
whole notion of witchcraft in contradiction' (Evans-Pritchard [193 7], p. 24).
A careful reading of what Evans-Pritchard actually says negates any need to
interpret him as making such incompatible claims. (Even if such an
incompatibility were established, on what grounds could Jennings assert that
Evans-Pritchard really means to assert one claim and not the other?)
And when we look at the larger context of Evans-Pritchard's remark, we can
confirm that he is not intending to make the 'no-perceived-contradiction'
claim. It is clear that his point in this passage is to emphasize the practical
nature of the Azande and their relative lack of interest in theory. Given this
basic point, his remark about perceiving the contradiction is best interpreted as
meaning that the Azande do not take the interest we-or at least the
inquisitive anthropologists among us-would take in working out the
consequences of theoretical difficulties generated by doctrinal conflicts. (For
reasons to be noted below, Evans-Pritchard may be a bit unfair to the Azande
in portraying them as generally a practical society with little interest in theory,
if this is meant as a contrast with Western societies.)
Evans-Pritchard's claim that the Azande take 'no' theoretical interest in
these consequences must be considered something of a rhetorical exagg
ration. It is clear from Evans-Pritchard's own detailed observations that the
Azande do show some interest. It would appear that Evans-Pritchard's o
further interest in the details of these theoretical dilemmas was not matched
such interest among the Azande, and that this led to his comments on the
practical bent. My reading of Evans-Pritchard on this matter does require
correction of one of his statements, but it is quite modest: simply substitu
'little theoretical interest' for 'no theoretical interest' in the paragraph qu
above. This is a far cry from the wholesale revisionism required by Jennin
interpretation, according to which Evans-Pritchard must be read as makin

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 Is There Anthropological Evidence that Logic Is Culturally Relative? 759

mutually incompatible claims about whether the Azande perceive a contradic-

tion, and what Evans-Pritchard states as a Zande doctrine must be recharac-
terized as a mere nondoctrinal elaboration of belief.
Even if Evans-Pritchard were somehow correct that the Azande literally had
no theoretical interest in this issue, this would provide no aid and comfort to
Jennings. The relativist could not then claim that the Azande have some
alternative and incompatible logical theory; for by hypothesis they have no
interest in theory. Nor could Jennings make anything of his attempt to claim
that the Azande perceive no contradiction where we do perceive one. If we
imagine that the Azande have no interest in theoretical matters, this failure to
perceive a contradiction would be best explained by noting that they do not see
it because they are not looking for it, having interest only in personal and
practical matters and ignoring potential doctrinal conflicts.
But as we have seen, the Azande do in fact have some interest in these
conflicts and make some attempts to resolve them. If they quickly return to
practical considerations without dwelling on the conflicts at enough length to
satisfy a visiting anthropologist, are they any different in this regard from the
typical Westerner? The relativist might retreat to the stance that cultures must
engage in reasoning in their practical affairs, whether or not they possess a
theory about this reasoning, and that we should look not at theory but at how
the Azande actually reason about everyday matters for a vindication of the
claim that Zande reasoning is different from Western reasoning. But all the
evidence from Evans-Pritchard indicates that actual Zande responses, includ-
ing even their hesitations when pressed to explore theoretical implications, are
quite understandable by us and indeed similar to the ways we reason and
rationalize.
For example, the Zande bastardy response cited by Evans-Pritchard surely
has a familiar ring. A line of reasoning that makes one look bad is deflected by
challenging a premise, even though the result of this deflection in effect casts
blame on someone else. This is not entirely admirable, perhaps, but it is a quite
recognizable human reaction. And with respect to institutional beliefs,
consider the many theoretical tensions and out-and-out contradictions that
exist in the religious texts and doctrines, the current politico-economic
conventional wisdoms, of Western cultures.4 If a non-Western anthropologist
plied the typical European or American with questions about such tensions
and contradictions, she might well report back that individuals in these
cultures have a very practical bent, are little concerned with theory and are
interested in doctrinal conflicts only insofar as they impinge on their own lives.
Perhaps the main difference to be discovered between Western and Zande
cultures in this respect is that they do not send anthropologists abroad to pose
vexing questions of us!
4 I owe this point to Lansana Keita. See also Keita [1991] for a related discussion of
ethnophilosophy.

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 760 Timm Triplett

4 CONCLUSION

This direct examination of Evans-Pritchard shows quite clearly, I believe, tha

there is no evidence that Zande logical thought processes are different from
ours. Far from providing evidence of cultural relativism with respect t
reasoning, the data from Evans-Pritchard suggest a culture that is much like
our own in its manner of reasoning and its attitudes toward theory a
practice. And since Jennings adopts a 'naturalistic' point of view which mere
presupposes relativism in the remainder of his article, he provides no
independent grounds for thinking that the thesis of logical relativism is true.
Like Bloor before him, Jennings has given us no good reason to accept this
thesis.

TIMM TRIPLETT

University of New Hampshire

REFERENCES

BLOOR, D. [1976]: Knowledge and Social Imagery, London: Routled

EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. [193 7]: Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among
Clarendon Press.
JENNINGS, R. C. [1989]: 'Zande Logic and Western Logic', The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 40, pp. 2 75-85.
KEITA, L. [1991]: 'Contemporary African Philosophy: The Search for a Method', in
Tsenay Serequeberhan (ed.), African Philosophy, New York: Paragon House.
MANNHEIM, K. [1936]: Ideology and Utopia, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
QUINE, W. V. [1963]: 'Carnap and Logical Truth', in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of
Rudolf Carnap, LaSalle: Open Court.
STARK, W. [1958]: The Sociology of Knowledge, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
TRIPLETT, T. [1986]: 'Relativism and the Sociology of Mathematics: Remarks on Bloor,
Flew, and Frege', Inquiry (Oslo), 29, pp. 439-50.
TRIPLETT, T. [1988]: 'Azande Logic Versus Western Logic?', The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 39, pp. 361-6.

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