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Procedia Engineering 134 (2016) 40 – 47

9th International Scientific Conference Transbaltica 2015

A New Approach to the Identification of Rail Risk

at Level Crossing
Eva Nedeliakováa*, Jana Sekulováa, Ivan Nedeliakb
a
University of Žilina, Univerzitná 1, 01026 Žilina, Slovakia
b
Railway company Cargo Slovakia, a.s. Hviezdoslavova 31, 01002 Žilina, Slovakia

Abstract

The safety of level crossings represents current worldwide issue. Research team from The University of Žilina in the Slovak
Republic during the cooperation with experts from railway undertakings dealt with this topic through creating new methodology
for level crossings monitoring. This article deals with safety on selected level crossings in the Slovak Republic which were
monitored under extensive research. It contains partial results of research, which is focused on impact of risks, non-compliance
with safety rules and critical places on users of transport services. Quantity of the accidents and incidents at level crossings is
alarming. Contribution appeals to the necessity of implementation of measures that lead to increased safety due to elimination of
incidents and accidents. The article provides new view on issue on the relevant sections. The goal is to point out the new
approach of complex monitoring of the cause of the accident at level crossings. Scientific research characterised in this article is
focused on creating innovative electronic program for monitoring the risk utilizing new calculations for level crossing lock
indicators affecting the railway transport safety. This electronic program could be used within level crossings with various kinds
of security.

© 2016
© 2016 The
TheAuthors.
Authors.Published
Publishedbyby
Elsevier Ltd.Ltd.
Elsevier This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of Transbaltica 2015.
Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of Transbaltica 2015
Keywords: rail safety; accidents and incidents; locking time; level crossing security equipment.

* Corresponding author
E-mail address: eva.nedeliakova@fpedas.uniza.sk

1877-7058 © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of Transbaltica 2015
doi:10.1016/j.proeng.2016.01.036
 Eva Nedeliaková et al. / Procedia Engineering 134 (2016) 40 – 47 41

1. Introduction

Distinction of all the risks, which may arise at level crossing plays a vital role in this enormously actual problem.
Correct identification of all risks affects the safety of railway transport in a significant way (Directive 2008/110/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council, 2008). The risk of formation of accident at level crossing is an
occurrence probability function of a specific event and its consequences (Bartošová et al. 2008: 5).
In a worldwide measure, scientific researches document at the intersection of rail and road infrastructure 400
deaths at average in European Union and 300 deaths at average in the USA every year. That’s why the research of
transport system at level crossings in Slovak Republic requires very high attention. Slovak Republic within a
worldwide survey is in the top 15 countries in which occurred the most serious accidents at level crossings (VEGA
1/0188/13).
Up to now realised studies, which were handled with the cooperation of infrastructure manager of Slovak
Republic and carriers, often provided too general information without a more systematic view of the actual
intersection of the rail and road infrastructure and without purposeful measure suggestions on eliminating the risks.
Approach characterised in this article complements mentioned studies, but also brings innovative view on the solved
problem.

2. Realisation of scientific research

Scientific research realised with the cooperation of the University of Žilina, ŽSR infrastructure manager, railway
carriers of railway company Cargo Slovakia, a.s. and Slovak railway company, a.s., Czestochova University of
Technology Poland, focused on finding the level of obeying the safety at level crossings, was divided into several
phases.
The first phase of the research was a suggestion of electronic program for risk identification at level crossings.
Within this phase there was also realised a pre-research – preparation activities which consisted in personal
observation of events at level crossings for one week before the main research during workdays from 6 a.m. to 6
p.m., collecting data about the intensity of rail and road transport and about the activities of crossing safety devices
into author defined schemes
In this phase, there were monitored further generally valid safety principles at level crossing:
1. Train approaching a level crossing must be noticably and on time signalised to every participant of the road
transport,
2. Every participant of the road transport must in the surroundings and the level crossing adapt his behaviour so
he won’t threaten smooth and safe traffic on the track.
Preparation activities secured the needed information for modifying the author suggested monitoring schemes,
thus eliminating the flaws of the research and securing the needed precision of data.
The second phase of the research was extensive personal monitoring of level crossings and data capture about the
events at crossings into the designed monitoring images. This phase also includes the use of new formulae for
calculations of the traced markers. This phase was realised in the first half of 2013 at workdays from 6 a.m. to
6 p.m. There were monitored 35 crossings on 2 routes n.114 Žilina–Rajec and n.106 Žilina–Čadca. There is only a
part of the research in this article, part which studies in detail the safety at single-line level crossing PZS 2Z in km
1.028, which is located in the city of Žilina on route n.114 Žilina–Rajec and events, which occurred on the crossing.
These data were processed by the authors created electronic program. Examples of resulting data processed by
the program are listed in the Figure 1 and Figure 2.
Output graphs were obtained via execution of detailed analysis, which were derived from mathematical and
statistical methods. These clearly processed graphs are included in the Figures 3, 4 and 5.
In the analysis, authors spread in detail individual measured snapshot times and the amount of monitored items
and events from which were set partial results. These partial results were calculated via newly designed
mathematical formulae for calculating the average time of individual processes and their standard deviation (Slovak
Republic, Government of SR, STN P 34 2651, 1999). For the expansiveness of the research using the originally
author created formulae were selected the most important. Selected partial results are included, compared and
graphically depicted in Figures 4 and 5.
42 Eva Nedeliaková et al. / Procedia Engineering 134 (2016) 40 – 47

Fig. 1. Screenshot of resulting data about the traffic intensity Fig. 2. Screenshot of resulting data on the incidents’
at level crossing processed by the program. at level crossing processed by the program.

Fig. 3. Graphical depiction of measured crossing average locking times by train at a monitored level crossing.

Closing time of single-line level crossing with convergent and divergent segments:

TUP = TSVZ + TSZ + TPRICH + TOBS + TPP + TOZ . (1)

Time necessary for closing the single-line level crossing:

TNUP = TSVZ + TSZ + TOBS + TOZ , (2)

 Eva Nedeliaková et al. / Procedia Engineering 134 (2016) 40 – 47 43

where: TSVZ – activation time of the warning sign; TSZ – barrier closing time; TPRICH – the arrival time of the train head;
TOBS – time occupancy crossings by train; TPP – time after passage of the train; TOZ – barrier opening time; TNUP – time
necessary for closing the level crossing.

ǀĞƌĂŐĞƚŝŵĞƚŽůŽĐŬĐƌŽƐƐŝŶŐƐƚŚĞĂƌƌŝǀĂůŽĨƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŐŝŶŐĂŶĚ dŚĞĂǀĞƌĂŐĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƌŽĂĚǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ
ƚŚĞĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞƚƌĂŝŶĐƌŽƐƐŝŶŐ ǁĂŝƚŝŶŐďĞĨŽƌĞƌĂŝůĐƌŽƐƐŝŶŐůŽĐŬĞĚ
ϳϬ ϲϭ͘ϵϮ
ϲϬ

ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ
ƚƌĂŝŶƐŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶ ϭϬ ϵ͘Ϯϰ
ƚŝŵĞ;ƐĞĐŽŶĚͿ

ϱϬ
ϯϵ͘ϰϭ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ;ƚŽZĂũĞĐͿ
ϰϬ ϴ
Ϯϲ͘ϱϲ ϲ ϱ͘ϯϮ
ϯϬ Ϯϰ͘ϱϮ ϮϮ͘ϱϭ ƚƌĂŝŶƐŝŶŽĚĚ ϯ͘ϵϮ
ϮϬ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ;ƚŽŝůŝŶĂͿ ϰ
ϭϬ Ϯ͘Ϭϰ Ϯ
Ϭ Ϭ
ƚŝŵĞƚŽĂƌƌŝǀĂů ƚŝŵĞĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŽƚĂůƚŝŵĞ ŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶ ŝŶƚŚĞŽĚĚ ƚŽƚĂů
ŽĨƚŚĞƚƌĂŝŶ ƉĂƐƐĞŶŐĞƌŽĨ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ
ŚĞĂĚ ƚƌĂŝŶ ǁĂŝƚŝŶŐƐǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ

Fig. 4. Graphical comparison of crossing average lock times until the arrival Fig. 5. The average number of road vehicles waiting
of the train head and after passage of the train in even and odd direction. at the locked level crossing.

Activation time of the warning sign to the barrier closing time:

TSVZ = t SVZ − t ZSZ , (3)

where: tSVZ – activation time of the warning sign; tZSZ – time of the start of closing the barrier after the activation of
the warning sign.
Average time of the activation of the warning sign to the barrier closing time:

n
∑ (t SVZ i − t ZSZ i )
i =1
TSVZ p = , (4)
nSVZ

where: t SVZ i – time of the i-th activation of the warning sign; t ZSZ i – barrier closing time for the i-th activation of the
warning sign; nSVZ – number of activations of the warning sign.
Standard deviation of the activation time of the warning sign to the barrier closing time:

∑ ((t SVZ i )
n
2
− t ZSZ i ) − TSVZ p
i =1
σ SVZ = , (5)
nSVZ

where: t SVZ i – i-th activation time of the warning sign; t ZSZ i – barrier closing time for i-th activation of the warning
sign; TSVZ p – average activation time of the warning sign; nSVZ – number of activations of the warning sign.
The comparison of the average time of events at crossing safety device is depicted in Figure 3. Level crossing
average locking times were monitored and standard deviation was calculated.
Average times chronologically based on their mutual linkage are depicted in Figure 3.
44 Eva Nedeliaková et al. / Procedia Engineering 134 (2016) 40 – 47

For searching possible activity improvement reserves of crossing safety devices in the context of time, authors
focused on three largest average times from the total duration of warning calculated from measured values,
graphically depicted in figure 3, and the average activation time of the warning sign, (20 seconds), lock time of the
arrival time of the train head (32.35 seconds) and lock time of the passage of the train (12.41 seconds).

3. Optimisation of the longest selected studied times at level crossing with convergent and divergent segments
without taking into account the direct influence of speed of a train

Activation time of the warning sign is defined by the condition – train coming to a level crossing must be from
the side of the railway transport noticeably and on time sig signalised to every participant of traffic. That’s why this
time cannot be lowered. It forms a value of time by which the longest and the slowest vehicle leaves the level
crossing (the longest – 22 metres, the slowest – 5 km.h–1). (Nedeliaková et al. 2012: 49).
This time can be marked as the shortest converging time. For calculations were used Formulas 6, 7 and 8, where
comparison of crossing average lock time values of arriving of train head to after passage of the train in even and
odd direction is graphically documented in Figure 4.
Level crossing lock time till the arrival of the train head and after passage of the train

TPPP = TPRICH + TPP , (6)

where: TPRICH – level crossing locking time till the arrival of train head; TPP – level crossing locking time after
passage of the train.
Average crossing locking time till the arrival of train head and after the train end passing

∑ [(t KSZi − t PZVLi ) + (t PKVLi − t ZOZi )]

n

i =1
TPPPp = , (7)
n

where: tKSZ – time of the end of closing the barriers before arrival of the i-th train head; tPZVL – time of the passage of
the i-th train head; t PKVL i – time of the passage of the i-th train end; t ZOZ i – time of the start of opening barriers after
the passage of i-th train; n – number of trains.
Standard deviation of the crossing locking time till the arrival of the train head and after the passage of train end

∑ ([(tKSZi − tPZVLi ) + (tPKVLi − tZOZi )]− TPPPp )2

n

i =1
σ PPP = , (8)
n

where: t KSZ i – time of the end of closing the barriers for i-th train; t PZVLi – time of the passage of the i-th train head;
t PKVL i – time of the passage of the i-th train end; t ZOZ i – time of the start of opening the barriers after the passage of
i-th train; TPPPp – average crossing lock time till the arrival of train head and after the passage of train end; n –
number of trains.

4. Determination of the indicators intensity of road transport

Active and passive safety elements monitored at given level crossings, together with their technical and
technological parameters stated in the risk identification methods, were for the complexity of the research
complemented by the intensity markers of road transport based on Formulas 9, 10 and 11.
Average number of road vehicles waiting during the lock of level crossing:
 Eva Nedeliaková et al. / Procedia Engineering 134 (2016) 40 – 47 45

n
∑ pi
i =1
Pp = , (9)
n

where: pi – number of road vehicles waiting during the i-th lock of level crossing; n – number of level crossing
locks.
Standard deviation of the number of road vehicles waiting during the lock of level crossing:

∑ ( pi − Pp )2
n

i =1
σp = , (10)
n

where: pi – number of road vehicles waiting during the i-th lock of level crossing; Pp – average number of road
vehicles waiting during the lock of level crossing; n – number of level crossing locks.
The average number of road vehicles waiting at the locked level crossing was monitored in even and odd
direction, data is documented in Figure 5.
The intensity of road transport at level crossing was also determined by the average number of road vehicles
which passed the monitored level crossing at workdays from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. based on the Formula (11) which is
graphically depicted in Figure 6.
A fragment of a wide observation of number of vehicles, cyclists and pedestrians is shown in Figure 7.

dŚĞĂǀĞƌĂŐĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƌŽĂĚƚƌĂĨĨŝĐƚŚĂƚƉĂƐĞƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ
ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚĐƌŽƐƐŝŶŐǁĞĞŬĚĂLJĨƌŽŵϲƉŵƚŽϭϴŚŽƵƌƐ
ϰϬϬϬ͘Ϭ
ϯϱϬϬ͘Ϭ
ϯϬϬϬ͘Ϭ
ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ

ϮϱϬϬ͘Ϭ
ϮϬϬϬ͘Ϭ
ϭϱϬϬ͘Ϭ
ϭϬϬϬ͘Ϭ
ϱϬϬ͘Ϭ
Ϭ͘Ϭ
ŝŶƚŚĞĞǀĞŶ ŝŶƚŚĞŽĚĚĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ƚŽƚĂů
ĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ

ǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐƚŚĂƚƉĂƐƐƚŚƌƉŝŐŚƚŚĞĐƌŽƐƐŝŶŐ

Fig. 6. Graphical comparison of the average number of road traffic that passed through Fig. 7. Fragment of the average intensity
the monitored level crossing in even and odd direction from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. of road traffic.
46 Eva Nedeliaková et al. / Procedia Engineering 134 (2016) 40 – 47

n
∑ pVC i
i =1
PVC p = , (11)
n pd

where: pVCi – the number of road vehicles passed through monitored level crossing on i-th workday from 6 a.m. to
6 p.m.; npd – the number of workdays during which was the level crossing monitored.
Basic goal of the railway transport security management is to eliminate the occurrence of human failure
concerning safety due which the risk of the occurrence of an unwanted situation is reduced. For the scientific
research to be complete, all incidents at level crossings were monitored.

5. Suggestions of obligatory measures for increasing the safety resulted from research results

New approach towards the risk identification at level crossings lies in creating an electronic program of risk
identification at level crossings in accordance with complex observation of active and passive safety elements. For
the needs of the research, there were suggested new formulae for calculating average duration of particular
processes and their standard deviations.
The research was supplemented by observation of the intensity of traffic. Based on the correct identification of all
risks we can derived conclusions for the needed measures for their elimination and increase of safety. For practical
service were suggested three basic fields of measures for increasing the safety concerning technical modifications of
level crossing, informativeness of public and co-financing the maintenance and reconstruction of level crossings by
railway and road transport. (Nedeliaková et al. 2012: 87)
Authors show only a fragment of suggestions, because they are aimed for particular level crossing. Authors
consider observing each level crossing particularly and in specific conditions of crossing infrastructure as a major
fact. For example technical modifications of level crossing mentioned as an example of observation in article
concerning following aspects:
1. Modification of divergent segment in odd direction to Žilina for decreasing the value of average excess lock
time of the level crossing by train which represents disproportionate high value graphically depicted in
figure 4.
2. Through level crossing passes from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. on average a total of 949 pedestrians a day. Thus was
suggested to build a pavement alongside the road together with warning crossing security device with barriers
particularly for pedestrians. Pedestrians can move more safely on a road preferentially for them and they don’t
cross railway track near level crossing or road for road vehicles.
3. Were suggested during research found average daily intensity from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m. a total of 3775 vehicles,
installing camera system for monitoring incidents at level crossing connected to police.
4. Modernisation of reflex materials on current crossing security devices for traffic at night and during winter,
when is visibility decreased.
5. Extending of barriers, so that pedestrians can’t cross when the level crossing is closed.
6. Building of a grade-separated crossing of communications is the most expensive economic solution but the
most acceptable concerning safety.
Measures concerning informativeness of public contain informativeness about safety measures of behaviour at
level crossings and their surroundings, execution of basic enlightenment about the risks and possible consequences
at level crossings (Nedeliaková, Dolinayová and Nedeliak 2012: 38). Enlightenment can be executed to wide public
through media, but as well as personally to traffic participants at level crossing by placing information tables which
would contain information about the possible risks and their consequences (Nedeliak, Kendra 2009: 4). A law on the
obligatory driver courses focused on the safety, risks and consequences of breaking the rules at level crossings
should be created, especially, for bus and truck drivers (Poliaková et al. 2012: 254).
 Eva Nedeliaková et al. / Procedia Engineering 134 (2016) 40 – 47 47

6. Conclusions

In worldwide studies, including the Slovak Republic is nowadays extensive space devoted to the issue of safety at
level crossings. Methodologies currently used by the infrastructure manager of Slovak Republic disregard some
aspects of risks formation which lead to creating space for accident and incidents. These deficiencies can be
eliminated by using innovative methods, which was characterized in a contribution and highlights a new view on the
said issue. The authors proposed the implementation of the above methodology in the regulations of managers of
infrastructures in accordance with the principles of interoperability.
The innovative character of scientific research characterized by the authors of this contribution consists in
determining the effective tool for increasing security which is supported by methods of calculating the average
crossing locking time, influencing on the safety of railway operations.
The results of the research showed that these times can influence reactions of pedestrians and drivers road vehicles
of negative way. Therefore is threatened the basic idea of safety management, which monitors the effect of a human
factor to the rise of accidents. Current technologies used in practice not used fully kinetic component of the train, which
clearly affects the crossing locking time, as shown by the results of research. By removing the waiting time occurs to
reduce the potential risks at level crossings. The substantial fact is the finding that every single rail crossing is located
in specific conditions, and therefore is necessary to monitor each one separately.
Clear benefit of research for the practical operation is detection of emerging risks at level crossings, which are
created by the interaction of technical, technological and human factors. For these risks were based on research
determined the practical arrangements that focus on prevention, technical adjustments level crossings and
introduction of new technologies into the operation of transport simultaneously. Nowadays the new methodology is
verified in real conditions of railway operations in cooperation with foreign experts. (Slovak Republic, Railways of
Slovak Republic, Ž1, 2005).
Authors of the contribution simultaneously point to the necessity of a wider debate so serious problem, such as
the threat of accident and incidents at level crossings. The proposed method is simple, applicable in the conditions of
any track section operated by different infrastructure managers.

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