International Review
Volume 9, Number 1 • Spring 2019
Southern California International Review
scir.org
Staff
Editor-in-Chief:
Anna Lipscomb
Editors:
Loleï Brenot
Connor Chapkis
Alina Mehdi
Breana Stanski
Sagar Tiwari
Views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors themselves and do not necessarily
represent those of the editorial board, faculty advisors, or the University of Southern California.
ISSN: 1545-2611
We dedicate this edition of the SCIR to public servants and diplomats
across the world who work tirelessy to promote peace and prosperity in
the face of political crossfire and uncertainty.
Contents
1. An Analysis on the Sources of Tension Between the African Union and the 11
International Criminal Court
Aisha Hamdulay
3. A Decade of Insurgency 44
Orienting the Kashmire Insurgency of the 1990s at Five Levels of Conflict
Elena Ortiz
Dear Reader,
It is with great pleasure that I introduce to you the seventeenth edition of the Southern
California International Review (SCIR). This semester’s issue continues our mission of
providing a platform for undergraduate scholars of international affairs to deliver their work
to a larger, global audience.
We were incredibly fortunate to have dozens of submissions for this issue. Our editors spent
staunch hours examining undergraduate research from all across the country and throughout
the world. Of the many impressive submissions, the following five were outstanding for their
original ideas and fresh perspectives on globalization topics. As you read this journal, you
will understand why.
In the creation of this issue, the SCIR is extremely appreciative of the support of the University
of Southern California’s School of International Relations, Director Patrick James, Associate
Director Linda Cole, and the rest of the faculty and staff that give us the guidance we need to
steadily grow. I also extend our thanks to Ms. Robin Friedheim for her generous scholarship
that provides the foundation upon which our endeavor thrives.
As new global forces and challenges continue to shape national and international discourses,
it is imperative that world leaders maintain their commitments to transparency and unity.
This is a theme that resonates throughout the articles in this edition. The first article in
this issue takes a look at the tensions between the African Union and the International
Criminal Court. The next article seeks to explain public support for the harmonization
of European welfare systems in post-communist countries. Another article analyzes the
Kashmir insurgency of the 1990s at five levels of conflict. The fourth article examines
the Europeanization of European defense and explores its implications on the future of
transatlantic relations. The final article brings to light the role of Japanese conglomerate
fisheries in aggravating the bluefin tuna overfishing crisis.
I would like to thank you, the reader, since without you, we are nothing. Remember, the
content of this journal is just one part of a much larger dialogue.
Warm regards,
Anna Lipscomb
Editor-in-Chief
An Analysis on the Sources of Tension Between the
African Union and the International Criminal Court
Aisha Hamdulay
Tensions between the African Union (AU) and the International Criminal Court (ICC)
erupted with claims that the ICC is biased against Africa following the arrest of Sudanese
President Al-Bashir. This paper analyzes these tensions: firstly, by looking at the relationship
between the ICC and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC); secondly, by exploring
the implications of the non-universality of the Rome Statute; and lastly, by examining the
case dynamics of the ICC. It takes a look at how cases have been referred to the court as well
as the roles of the Prosecutor and the UNSC, finding that there is an inherent Afrocentric
focus in the workings of the court. It then further explores how this impacts peacebuilding
and the conflict between peace and justice in relation to Africa and the ICC. In conclusion,
suggestions on how to move forward and resolve the tensions are provided.
Introduction
The Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court (ICC),
represented a new dawn in the field of international criminal justice, which was widely
welcomed by African states. It was adopted in July 1998 and enforced in July 2002, after 60
states ratified it. Currently, 123 states are party to the Rome Statute; 33 of which are Afri-
can, representing the largest regional grouping of states.1 Although there was initially great
support from African states towards the ICC, tensions formed once the ICC went into
practice. With the high number of African cases taken on by the court, claims of the ICC
being “Afrocentric” began to surface. However, it was the warrant of arrest issued upon
President Hassan Al-Bashir of Sudan which revealed the strong tensions between the ICC
and the African Union (AU), the regional body of African states.2
This paper analyzes the sources of tension between the ICC and the AU. It argues
that the main source of tension stems from the claim that the ICC has been biased in its
prosecution of African leaders and ultimately is used as a tool to advance a pro-Western
and neo-colonial agenda.
To analyze the strain between the AU and the ICC, the paper begins by provid-
1 Gwen P. Barnes, "The International Criminal Court's Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms: The Indictment of President
Omar Al Bashir," Fordham International Law Journal 34 (2010): 1584.
2 Lutz Oette, "Peace and Justice, or Neither?: The Repercussions of the Al-Bashir Case for International Criminal Justice in
Africa and Beyond," Journal of International Criminal Justice 8, no. 2 (2010): 345.
Aisha hamdulay is a class of 2018 "Justice and Transformation" Honors student from the
Department of Political Studies at the University of Cape Town. She has an undergraduate
degree in International Relations and Environmental & Geographical Science, also from the
University of Cape Town.
12 Aisha Hamdulay
ing context behind the buildup of tensions which erupted following the issuing of the
arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir. After this analysis, the dynamics of the UNSC-ICC
relationship are briefly discussed, followed by an examination of the non-universality of
the Rome Statute. It will then examine claims that the ICC is biased against African states
and leaders by studying case statistics from the ICC, proving that a bias does exist. It will
then demonstrate that the prioritization of justice over peace by the ICC has further led to
tension, lastly providing suggestions on how to relieve these tensions.
Context
In 2002, the Rome Statute successfully received the required 60 ratifications that
allowed it to enter into force.3 From the onset, there was broad support from African states
towards the establishment of the ICC. 33 out of 123 states currently signed on to the Rome
Statute are African, representing the largest regional grouping of states within the ICC As-
sembly of State Parties.4
The tragedy of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 was a significant factor influencing
African states’ support of the court, after which many African states felt strongly about the
need for a body to prosecute international war crimes in the attempt to deter such atrocities
from occuring again. Furthermore, they acknowledged the need for such a body, particu-
larly in consideration of states in which the domestic legal systems were too incompetent to
deal with international war crimes.5
The initial faith that African states had in the court was shaken when powerful
states such as Russia and China resisted signing the Rome Statute. Although not signing
would essentially exclude them from jurisdiction, it would still afford them power with-
in the court due to their permanent membership status on the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC).6 African states thus raised objections about how this caused power to
be focused on weaker and middle level states in the international community; however,
no tangible action was taken to counter this.7 This reveals that there were already existing,
underlying tensions present from the onset, significant to broader tensions related to the
advancement of Western and neocolonial agendas.
As mentioned earlier, these issues only came to light properly following the first
warrant of arrest for a head of state, issued to President Hassan Al-Bashir of Sudan in 2009.
This sparked a great uproar from African states, accusing the ICC of being biased against
3 Barnes, "The International Criminal Court's Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms,” 1588.
4 Ibid., 1589.
5 Tim Murithi, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court: An Embattled Relationship?” Cape Town: Institute
of Justice and Reconciliation (2013): 7.
6 Ibid., 2.
7 Rowland J.V. Cole, “Africa's relationship with the international criminal court: More political than legal," Melbourne Journal
of International Law 14 (2013): 688.
In summation, the AU Peace and Security Council requested the UNSC to use its powers to
defer the arrest, on the basis that it would disrupt the ongoing process for peace in Sudan.
The fear was that this would possibly causing an eruption of conflict as Al-Bashir was a key
party in the relationship between armed militia and political parties.14
Between 2009 and 2011, the AU request was ignored by the UNSC, which initiated
great tension between the two parties.15 In 2010, a second warrant of arrest was issued by
8 Barnes, "The International Criminal Court's Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms,” 1592.
9 Ibid., 1590.
10 Cole, “Africa's relationship with the international criminal court,” 685.
11 Barnes, "The International Criminal Court's Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms,” 1593.
12 Ibid., 1594.
13 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), Article 16, 17 July 1998, ac-
cessed March 28, 2019, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3a84.html.
14 Murithi, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court,” 3.
15 Charles C. Jalloh, Dapo Akande, and Max du Plessis, "Assessing The African Union Concerns About Ar-
ticle 16 Of The Rome Statute Of The International Criminal Court," African Journal Of Legal Studies 4, no. 1 (2011): 2,
doi:10.1163/170873811x563947.
the ICC, implying to the AU that their calls would not be heeded.
Additionally in 2011, the ICC Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo initiated proceedings
against Kenyan leaders in its post-election violence before allowing for the option of domes-
tic legal proceedings.16 These heightened tensions propagated the AU in 2012 to formally
command all its member states not to abide by the ICC instructions to arrest Al-Bashir, or
otherwise risk sanctions being imposed.17 The AU was making a bold statement by showing
the ICC that it would not stand for neo-colonial regimes exploiting Africa once again.
It is necessary to know the manner and sequence in which things played out in
order to understand why the AU took such a bold stance. Currently, the AU command still
stands, despite a number of countries having withdrawn from the Rome Statute and ten-
sions still very much present.18 This paper will demonstrate that many of the causes of this
tension are revealing of pre-existing patterns concerning Western domination and subtle
reinforcements of neo-colonialism.
16 Cole, “Africa's relationship with the international criminal court,” 683.
17 Jalloh, Akande, and du Plessis, "Assessing The African Union Concerns About Article 16 Of The Rome Statute Of The
International Criminal Court," 5.
18 Ibid.
19 Leslie Vinjamuri, “The International Criminal Court and the Paradox of Authority,” Law and Contemporary Problems 79
(2016): 279.
20 Ian Johnstone, “Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument,” European Journal of International Law
14, no. 3 (2003): 437-480.
21 United Nations, “United Nations Security Council," accessed April 13, 2018, http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/functions.
shtml.
22 Oette, "Peace and Justice, or Neither?” 352.
23 Murithi, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court.”
24 Charles C. Jalloh, “Regionalizing International Criminal Law?” International Criminal Law Review 9, no. 3 (2009): 446.
25 Vinjamuri, “The International Criminal Court and the Paradox of Authority.”
26 Vinjamuri, “The International Criminal Court and the Paradox of Authority,” 277.
27 Murithi, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court,” 2.
28 International Criminal Court, "Preliminary examinations," accessed April 14, 2018, https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/pe.aspx.
29 International Criminal Court, "Situations under Investigation," accessed April 14, 2018, https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situ-
ation.aspx.
30 International Criminal Court, "Cases," accessed April 14, 2018, https://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.
31 Jalloh, Akande, and du Plessis, "Assessing The African Union Concerns About Article 16 Of The Rome Statute Of The
International Criminal Court."
32 International Criminal Court, "Cases," accessed April 14, 2018, https://www.icc-cpi.int/cases.
39 Chandra Lekha Sriram and Stephen Brown, "Kenya in the Shadow of the ICC: Complementarity, Gravity and Impact,"
International Criminal Law Review 12, no. 2 (2012): 17.
40 Vinjamuri, "The International Criminal Court and the Paradox of Authority."
41 International Criminal Court, “Ms Fatou Bensouda,” accessed March 29, 2019, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/otp/who-s-
who/Pages/Fatou-Bensouda.aspx.
42 International Criminal Court, "Preliminary examinations."
43 Ibid.
Impacts on Peacebuilding: Conflict between Politics and Law, and Peace and
Justice
The relationship between politics and the judicial authority of the courts is an-
other driver of tension. The ICC prioritizes legal justice, while the AU prioritizes peace or,
perhaps, politics.47
The case of Uganda in 2005 demonstrates this, when President Museveni referred
the conflict between the Lord’s Resistance Army and his government to the ICC. Here, he
used the ICC to avoid messy prosecution of his own government officials in the conflict.
In 2006, Museveni participated in peace talks with the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA). Because he felt they were becoming constructive, he then feared that arrest war-
rants from the ICC would hinder progress made in the peace talks and provoke the LRA.
This subsequently led to him urging the ICC to drop charges. However, the ICC rejected
the request, as the ICC and UNSC did with the AU’s request to defer Al-Bashir’s arrest.
This angered Museveni and he challenged and criticized the ICC thereafter.48
In this case, Museveni prioritized peace. One can assume that he would never
institute legal proceedings on his own until he felt it would not impact peace processes,
due to the aftermath it might have on the conflict. Even so, eventual legal proceedings of
rebel groups within a peaceful state could cause peace to be disrupted again. This is often
the case with many of the other African conflicts under the jurisdiction of the ICC as well.
However, from a legal justice point of view, the ICC would view it as the state
44 United Nations, "Peace And Security," Un.org, accessed 2019, https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/peace-and-
security/.
45 International Criminal Court, "Cases."
46 "Global Conflict Tracker Council on Foreign Relations," Council on Foreign Relations, accessed April 9, 2018.
47 Vinjamuri, “The International Criminal Court and the Paradox of Authority,” 285.
48 Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, "The ICC Arrest Warrants for the Lords Resistance Army Leaders and Peace Prospects for Northern
Uganda," Journal of International Criminal Justice 4, no. 1 (2006): 179-87.
49 Murithi, “The African Union and the International Criminal Court.”
continent should, at the very least, have a permanent seat to counter the great power
imbalance. It would be valuable for a commission to be formed under one of the offices
of the United Nations to review and analyze the relationship between the UNSC and ICC
and the allegations of a Pro-Western agenda being advanced. This commission should al-
low for make recommendations to be made based on its findings.
If the current imbalance of power is not addressed within the UNSC, then the
neo-colonial and pro-Western agenda will prevail, never allowing for an African state to
ever counter this system of bias. As they have with the ICC, African states must continue
to stand their ground and stand together, or risk continuing to be taken advantage of by
structural power.
United Nations. "United Nations Security Council." Accessed April 13, 2018. http://www.
un.org/en/sc/about/functions.shtml.
UN General Assemply. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended
2010, Article 16, 17 July 1998. Accessed March 28, 2019. https://www.refworld.org/
docid/3ae6b3a84.html.
Vinjamuri, Leslie. “The International Criminal Court and the Paradox of Authority.” Law
and Contemporary Problems 79 (2016): 275.
In 2017, the European Commission released the Special Eurobarometer 467 Future of Europe
Report, which focused on social issues. When asked about the harmonization of European
welfare policies, Central and Eastern European populations were among the most supportive.
With the fall of communism and the 2004, 2007, and 2013 enlargements of the European
Union (EU), Central and Eastern European countries experienced a profound restructuring
of their welfare states. However, few prior academic studies have examined the evolution of
welfare attitudes in these countries, particularly in relation to the idea of a European welfare
system. In order to to explain the stronger support for the harmonization of welfare policies
in post-communist countries, this paper examines the support for Europeanization and the
desire for economic utilitarianism. I use a probit model to test these hypotheses and conclude
that both support for the European Union and economic self-interest positively influence the
support for the harmonization of European welfare policies in post-communist countries.
Introduction
Against the emergence of populist parties, a pro-European voice has arisen, call-
ing for the reinforcement of a “Social Europe,” which, according to Habermas, is the only
way to ensure the perpetuation of the supranational institution.1 From the 2017 Special
Eurobarometer Report, we observe that Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries
are the ones most in favour of the harmonization of welfare systems. In this paper, CEE
countries will refer to Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, all of which are members of the European
Union. In order to explain this public support for the harmonization of welfare states in
post-communist countries, I develop two hypotheses. Based on the idea of Europeaniza-
tion, my first argument is that the more citizens favor the European Union, the more they
will tend to support harmonization. Based on the ideas of self-interest and utilitarian-
ism, my second argument is that individuals support harmonization because they seek
economic benefits. I find that both attitudes towards the European Union and economic
self-interest positively influence the support for harmonization of European welfare poli-
1 Jürgen Habermas, “Democracy, Solidarity and the European Crisis,” Roadmap to a Social Europe 4 (2013): 4-14.
Paul Barbarin nicolier is a final year undergraduate student in the dual degree pro-
gram between University College London and Sciences Po Paris. He is pursuing a major in
International Relations.
Between Europeanization and Self-Interest 27
mies under the influence of international financial institutions.10 According to Deacon, this
evolution induced a social cost of rising unemployment and mortality rates.11 The European
Union did little to address this trend, as economic development and integration were pri-
oritized over social considerations.12
Considering the evolution of the welfare state in post-communist countries, Ce-
rami denotes a hybrid character:
10 Zsuzsa Ferge, “A Central European Perspective on the Social Quality of Europe,” in The Social Quality of Europe, eds. Wolf-
gang Beck, Laurent van der Maesen, and Alan Walker (The Hague; Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 165-182.
11 Bob Deacon, “Eastern European welfare states: The impact of the politics of globalization,” Journal of European Social Policy
10, no. 2 (May 2000): 148
12 Noémie Lendvai, “The Weakest Link? EU Accession and Enlargement: Dialoguing EU and Post-Communist Social Policy,”
Journal of European Social Policy 14, no.3 (August 2004): 319–333.
13 Alfio Cerami, “Mechanisms of Institutional Change in Central and Eastern European Welfare State Restructuring,” in
Post-Communist Welfare Pathways: Theorizing Social Policy Transformations in Central and Eastern Europe, eds. Alfio Cerami and
Pieter Vanhuysse (Basingstoke: Plagrave MacMillan, 2009), 51.
14 Noémie Lendvai, “Variety of Post-communist welfare: Europeanisation and emerging welfare regimes in the New EU Mem-
ber States,” Paper for the RC-19 Montreal (August 2009): 1-30.
15 Juraj Draxler and Olaf Van Vliet, “European Social Model: No convergence from the East,” Journal of European Integration
32, no.1 (January 2010) 115–135.
16 Alfio Cerami, “Europeanisation and Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe,” in Européanisation. D'Ouest en Est, eds.
François Bafoil and Tim Beichelt (Paris: Logiques Politiques, L'Harmattan, 2008), 137-168.
Theory
In 2017, the European Commission published a Special Eurobarometer on the fu-
ture of Europe, including a question on the harmonization of national welfare systems. The
results in Figure 1 demonstrate general support by the European public; nonetheless, there
is a clear dominance of post-communist countries among the populations most in favor of
this harmonization. In this paper, I will examine the rationale behind the public support for
a harmonization of European welfare states in post-communist countries and compare it
with other European member states.
17 Daniel Vaughan-Whitehead, EU Enlargement versus Social Europe? The Uncertain Future of the European Social Model
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Pub, 2003).
18 Stefan Svallfors, “Public Attitudes,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State, eds Francis G. Castles, Stephan Leibfried,
Jane Lewis, Herbert Obinger, and Christopher Pierson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 241-251.
their current welfare state than other European populations.19 In this sense, a harmonized
welfare state could result in more generous European welfare states. Furthermore, previous
literature on post-communist welfare states and Europeanization tends to focus on national
policies, omitting personal attitudes. The development of a European sentiment at the in-
dividual level may help explain the support for harmonising welfare states. For if European
ideas influenced CEE states, they can also shape individual preferences.20
This study focuses on the attitudes of post-communist countries because academic
research on CEE countries and Europeanization often differentiates these states from the
rest of the European Union as a cluster group located in a “periphery position.”21 In this
paper, I identify motivations for harmonization specifically for CEE countries and test them
at the European level to highlight differences. Another reason for studying post-commu-
nist attitudes is that it fills in a gap in the growing literature on attitudes towards Social
Europe. Previous research by Mau did not include these countries in his analysis, while
Baute, Meuleman, Abts, and Swyngedouw chose to examine the Belgian National Elec-
tion Study.22,23 Gerhards, Lengfeld, and Häuberer included Poland in their evaluation, but
mentioned the lack of European-level data.24 Additionally, none of these analyses identified
reasons for the support of harmonization specific to post-communist countries.
Previous discussions on Europeanization and CEE welfare states have been limited
to the national level. I expand on existing research by arguing that individuals’ perceptions
of the EU help explain support for harmonization. Mau found that in the EU15, the Euro-
pean identity had a positive influence on the support for a common social policy.25 In order
to determine if his argument holds true for post-communist populations, I re-use Sánchez-
Cuenca’s study of individual preferences for European integration, in which he argues that
citizens with a positive image of the EU and a negative opinion of their national institutions
would support integration.26 In line with this argument, Roosma, Gelissen, and Oorschot
demonstrate that Eastern Europeans are particularly critical towards their national welfare
19 Femke Roosma, John Gelissen, and Wim Oorschot, “The Multidimensionality of Welfare State Attitudes: A European
Cross-National Study,” Social Indicators Research 113, no.1 (2013): 235–255.
20 Cerami, “Europeanisation”, 137-168.
21 Draxler and Van Vliet, “European Social Model,” 131.
22 Steffen Mau, “Democratic demand for a social Europe? Preferences of the European citizenry,” International Journal of Social
Welfare 14, no. 2 (2005): 76–85.
23 Baute, Meuleman, Abts, and Swyngedouw, “Measuring Attitudes,” 353-378.
24 Jürgen Gerhards, Holger Lengfeld, and Julia Häuberer, “Do European citizens support the idea of a European welfare state?
Evidence from a comparative survey conducted in three EU member states,” International Sociology 31, no. 6 (November 2016):
677-700.
25 Mau, “Democratic demand,” 76-85.
26 Igancio Sánchez-Cuenca, “The Political Basis of Support for European Integration,” European Union Politics 1, no. 2 (June
2000): 147-171.
states.27 In this sense, I argue that individuals from post-communist countries with a posi-
tive image of the EU are more likely to support a harmonization of European social policies.
This is expressed in my first hypothesis:
H1: Individuals with a greater support for the European Union will be more
supportive of a harmonization of welfare systems.
H2: Individuals who believe that the European Union improves their stan-
dards of living will be more supportive of the harmonization of European wel-
fare states.
Dependent Variable
My dependent variable is the individual level of support for the harmonization
of social welfare systems. It is measured by answers to the Eurobarometer QC11 question:
“To what extent would you be in favor of or opposed to the harmonization of social welfare
systems within the European Union?” I re-coded the results with 1 for “In favour” and 0 for
“Against” or “Don’t know.”
Independent Variables
My first independent variable is the individual level of support for the European
Union, which I will measure with question D78 of the Eurobarometer: “In general, does the
EU conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very nega-
tive image.” The results were re-coded as 1 for very positive and fairly positive responses,
and 0 for others. My second independent variable is the perception that the standards of
living within the European Union are increasing. I measure it with the QC1T.1 question
of the Eurobarometer studying responses for Standard of Living of EU Citizens as the first
or second main asset of the European Union. The values are 1 for mentioned and 0 for not
mentioned.
Control Variables
Research on welfare attitudes demonstrates the influence of sociodemographic
31 European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 467: The future of Europe – Social Issues, Directorate-General for Communi-
cation (November 2017).
characteristics.32 Therefore, I include gender, sex, age, and employment as individual con-
trol variables. Following the work of Gerhards, Lengfeld, and Häuberer on the influence
of welfare spending on the preference for European social policy, I use social expenditures
(percentage of GDP) as well as GDP per capita as country control variables.33
Method
I will start with a brief descriptive analysis using a scatterplot based on national
means, hoping to discover correlations between my independent variables and support for
harmonization at the European level. I will then study the relationship between dependent
and independent variables at the individual level, in order to test my hypotheses. Consider-
ing the dichotomous aspect of my dependent variable, I will run a probit regression model
which is suited to binary outcomes. The model that I will be using is:
I ran this model three times: first, at the post-communist level; second, for non-
post-communist populations; and third, at the European level to see if I can identify dif-
ferences between these groups. For feasibility reasons, I decided not to utilize a multi-level
analysis, although I use both individual and country variables. Following Steele’s argument,
I take into consideration that the p-values might be too small and the standard errors un-
derestimated, which could impact predictors at the group level (country characteristics).34
Results
Descriptive Analysis
Analyzing countries’ mean scores for the image of the EU and the support for
harmonization, I find that the results from Figure 1 appear to contradict my first hypothesis
as there is no clear pattern of correlation between the image of the EU and the support for
harmonization. Observing the regression line, it even seems that support for harmoniza-
tion declines in countries where the European Union is seen more positively.
In Figure 3, we can observe a positive relationship between the perception that
standards of living are the main asset of the European Union and the support for a harmo-
nization. Interestingly, post-communist countries tend to be concentrated in the upper-
32 Femke Roosma, Wim Oorschot, and John Gelissen, “The Achilles’ heel of welfare state legitimacy: perceptions of overuse
and underuse of social benefits in Europe,” Journal of European Public Policy 23, no.2 (April 2015): 1-20.
33 Gerhards, Lengfeld, and Häuberer, “Do European citizens?” 677-700.
34 Fiona Steele, “Module 5: Introduction to Multilevel Modelling Concepts,” LEMMA (Learnin Environment for Multilevel
Methodology and Applications) (Centre for Multilevel Modelling, University of Bristol, 2008).
right region, while western member states (except Luxembourg and Belgium) are found in
the bottom left corner. Therefore, this plot shows that a stronger perception of the EU as
increasing the standard of living correlates with greater support for harmonization in CEE
countries relative to other European nations.
Although these plots offer an introductory overview, we cannot draw any compre-
hensive conclusions at this point, as other variables might influence the relationship. Next,
I will test my hypotheses at the individual level to observe what motivates citizens from
post-communist countries to be more supportive of harmonization.
36 Philipp Rehm, “Risks and redistribution: An individual-level analysis,” Comparative Political Studies 42, no.7 (July 2009):
855-881.
variable.37 One way of interpreting the coefficients of a probit model is to study the marginal
effects on the probability of an event.38 Therefore, in order to provide more explicit results,
I evaluated the marginal effects using the mfx package in R.39 The analysis was run for all
variables, but I only included the results for my two independent variables (Table 2) to im-
prove the legibility.
Discussion
In this study, I aimed to explain the support for the harmonization of European
welfare states in post-communist countries through two hypotheses: the degree of sup-
port of the European Union and the perception that the EU improves standards of living.
Both were confirmed by the preceding analysis. Therefore, my results align with existing
37 Timothy M. Hagle, “Probit Analysis,” in The SAGE Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods, eds. Michael S. Lewis-
Beck, Alan Bryman, and Tim F. Liao (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 2004).
38 Tim F. Liao, Interpreting Probability Models Logit, Probit, and Other Generalized Linear Models, Sage University Papers
Series. Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, no. 07-101 (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1994), 23.
39 I also tested the margins package in R which showed similar results for Average Marginal Effects.
40 Alan Fernihough, Simple Logit and Probit Marginal Effects in R, no. 201122 (2011).
research on the individual attitudes and support for a social Europe.41 Focusing on indi-
vidual attitudes rather than national policies, this analysis provides a new way of studying
the relationship between Social Europe and post-communist countries. The support for the
harmonization in CEE countries may be viewed as an initial point of reflection for deepen-
ing the integration of these populations into the EU, although the perspective of a harmo-
nization seems unlikely.
Another conclusion builds on the small difference in results when comparing
post-communist populations to other European ones (Columns 2 and 3). In this sense,
we can argue that the image of the EU and economic self-interest are also determinants of
support for the harmonization of welfare states in non-post-communist countries. These
results are of interest if we return to the idea that CEE nations are different from other
European states. In the case of support for harmonization, we should stress the similarities
of these two groups rather than their differences. This could lead to a new approach in the
study of post-communist countries and European welfare states.
My analysis suffers from a number of limitations. First, the values of the pseudo
R-squared are relatively small for the 3 groups. In order to improve the fit of my model, the
model can be extended to other variables which might influence the support for harmoni-
zation, such as the socioeconomic status of individuals or the perceived benefit of the EU as
an independent variable, which would take into account how the individuals’ experiences
in the EU influence their support for harmonization. Secondly, I could have selected more
precise variables to account for the differences across CEE states by using existing typolo-
gies of post-communist welfare regimes. This poses an interesting point for future research
topics aiming to deconstruct the idea of a uniform group. In fact, we can identify varia-
tions in the support for harmonization of welfare policies across post-communist countries
and within them, which creates an interesting opportunity to study the reasons behind the
variation among and within CEE countries.
Conclusion
Considering the peripheral position of CEE countries in academic research on
European welfare states, this essay sought to explain the stronger preference for a harmo-
nized European welfare system among post-communist nations and identify motivations
specific to CEE populations which might explain their support. One explanation for this
preference is a positive vision toward the European Union. Another explanation is utilitar-
ian theory. The two hypotheses in this paper were tested with a probit model and the results
proved to be positive and significant in both cases. In addition, it is important to highlight
that the differences in results between the different groups studied (post-communist and
41 Mau, “Democratic Demand,” 76-85.
non-post-communist countries) appeared relatively weak, which calls into question the re-
current categorization of post-communist countries and populations as separate from other
European nations. In this sense, this paper invites further academic research on the rela-
tionship between CEE welfare systems and the European Union. Although the perspective
of a European welfare system does not appear as a priority in the contemporary agenda of
the supranational organization at present, its broad support, especially in post-communist
countries, provides insight into an alternative route to the current crisis of the European
Union.
Appendix
A.1 National Means of Dependent and Independent Variables
Country Harmonization Image of the EU Standard of Living
Belgium 74% 42% 32%
Bulgaria 83% 58% 36%
Czech Republic 61% 25% 29%
Denmark 48% 46% 16%
Germany 53% 57% 18%
Estonia 74% 47% 27%
Ireland 61% 65% 31%
Greece 77% 31% 15%
Spain 76% 37% 24%
France 58% 40% 16%
Croatia 88% 35% 43%
Italy 69% 35% 13%
Cyprus 83% 40% 22%
Latvia 81% 44% 46%
Lithuania 68% 49% 43%
Luxembourg 70% 60% 27%
Hungary 86% 41% 25%
Malta 59% 49% 34%
Netherlands 60% 51% 20%
Austria 60% 39% 29%
Poland 74% 53% 36%
Portugal 78% 56% 23%
Romania 80% 46% 34%
Slovenia 80% 42% 33%
Slovakia 77% 38% 29%
Finland 55% 38% 18%
Sweden 55% 45% 8%
United Kingdom 47% 38% 23%
Source: Special Eurobarometer 467
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Elena Ortiz
Introduction
The Kashmiri insurgency of 1989-1999 exemplifies one of the darkest and most com-
plex conflicts in South Asian history. Decades of simmering betrayal, injustice, and neglect
erupted into a conflict that involved the Indian government, the Pakistani government, and
external actors in the region, while indiscriminately entangling all levels of Kashmiri society.
The Kashmiri decade of insurgency can be characterized at five different levels of analysis:
the Kashmiri crusade for self-determination against India, the rivalries between Islamist
and secular insurgents, the fight between Pakistani-endorsed militants and Kashmiri seces-
sionists, the ongoing Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan, and the rise of global
jihad.1 The insurgency was defined by how these various sub-conflicts interacted with one
another. Thus, although varying in scale and objective, all five levels of conflict must be
1 The scope of this paper is limited to the insurgency that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s. This is because, although vio-
lence in Kashmir continued beyond 1999, the nature of the conflict had drastically changed by the 2000s. The attacks on the Red
Fort in 2000 and the 9/11 attacks in 2001 symbolize a clear shift in the nature of conflict that must be examined separately.
considered in relation to one another. The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework
that reconciles these coexisting and interacting dynamics in order to understand how the
path of insurgency was forged. To do so, I will first outline the general context and chronol-
ogy of the insurgency as well as examine the key players that dominated the decade. I will
then analyze each layer of conflict and evaluate its role relative to the greater scope of the
overarching insurgency. This piece will incorporate Indian, Pakistani, Kashmiri, and foreign
sources in order to provide a comprehensive blueprint for the nature of the conflict.
Indian states such as Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, and Karnataka to seek independence from
India alongside Kashmir. Indira Gandhi, furious by Farooq’s quest to alienate certain states
from India, exploited his naivety by pursuing a campaign to reassert India’s position in
Kashmir. She employed propaganda tools such as portraying Farooq as being “soft” on
Pakistan and as a supporter of Sikh separatism.6 This gave her enough ammunition to oust
him from power in June of 1984 under Operation New Star.7 Gandhi installed G.M. Shah as
the new Chief Minister of Kashmir. This seizure of power by India triggered local outcry in
Kashmir. Protests and social turbulence escalated in 1986, when G.M. Shah was dismissed
for not being able to maintain control of the rising animosity.8 Jagmohan Singh, the Indian
governor of Kashmir at the time, assumed exclusive power of the territory in an attempt to
regain control. Muslims in Kashmir felt particularly alienated by his policies, and therefore
persevered in their strikes and protests against Indian power.9 In 1989, the rumored disap-
pearance of the Prophet’s hair from Srinagar reinforced the deep mistrust and resentment
from Kashmiri Muslims towards India, who they believed had stolen the sacred artifact.10
Rajiv Gandhi, the new Prime Minister of India after Indira’s assassination in 1984, reinstated
Farooq Abdullah as Chief Minister of a coalition between the Indian Congress and the
Kashmiri National Congress. To Kashmiris, Farooq was a traitor for surrendering to the co-
alition and demonstrating that Kashmir’s future was shackled to India’s agenda.11 Kashmiri
demands for self-determination and freedom grew increasingly louder. As they abandoned
their loyalty to the National Congress, a power vacuum was created. This rapidly building
pressure set the stage for insurgency. Although India denies election rigging, Delhi nonethe-
less rigged the provincial elections of 1987 in order to prevent the locally-popular and anti-
Indian Muslim United Front from obtaining government seats.12, 13 Scholar Robert Wirsing
notes that unrigged elections in Kashmiri history are the exception, meaning that the 1987
elections were not the main cause of the rise of separatism.14 The azadi movement had al-
6 Ibid., 226.
7 Ibid., 227.
8 Ibid., 229.
9 Ibid., 230.
10 Paula Newberg, Double Betrayal: Repression and Insurgency in Kashmir (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
1995), 22.
11 Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire, 230.
12 Human Rights in Kashmir (The International Commission of Jurists, 1995), 111, https://www.icj.org/wp-content/up-
loads/1995/01/India-human-righst-in-Kashmir-fact-finding-mission-report-1995-eng.pdf.
13 Rekha Chowdhary, "India's Response to the Kashmir Insurgency," in Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Asia, ed.
Moeed Yusof (United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 46.
14 Robert G. Wirsing, India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: On Regional Conflict and Its Resolution (St. Martin's Press,
1994), 115.
ready existed in Kashmir for decades, just not on a large, organized scale.15 The political
disturbances of the 1980s were significant in popularizing and expanding secessionist senti-
ments by mobilizing the populace. Thus, it is important to distinguish the elections of 1987
as the tipping point and combustion of ultimate causes rooted in a history of injustice, rather
than the sole cause.
After the fraudulent election results came out, thousands of Kashmiris took to the
streets in protest of Delhi’s suffocating power, demanding their right to self-determination.
By 1989, the locally-produced movement had attracted militant organizations that trans-
formed the disturbances into a full-force insurgency. In response, India unleashed a violent
campaign of terror, consisting of mass rape, torture, and destruction, in attempt to suppress
the turbulence. Kashmiris countered the campaign with resilience and an unwavering de-
termination for freedom.16 This locally-driven azadi movement characterized the first half of
the insurgency, at which point external actors took the reins and exploited the circumstances
in the name of greater objectives. This paper will orient these transitions and fluctuations
in relation to the key players involved and their impact on the conflict’s overall nature and
direction.
Key Players
Throughout the decade, over thirty known militant groups were actively involved in
the conflict.17 Each varied in ideology, affiliation, size, and objective, but were united by a
common opposition to India’s military presence in Kashmir.18 Individual organizations fre-
quently factionalized or changed alliances, creating a dense and abstruse matrix of militant
groups in and around Kashmir. The organizations outlined below are not an exhaustive list
of those involved, but represent the key players that steered the insurgency throughout the
decade.
won four— a discrepancy blamed on Indian rigging.21 The party was held together in spirit
of a common goal: to resist Indian control by restoring Islamic unity in Kashmir. However,
the various organizations that comprised the MUF believed in different ultimate objectives
and ranged from being moderate to extreme Islamists. When the party lost momentum after
the 1987 elections, the MUF factionalized into its individual organizations, bidding farewell
to a united, Islamic political movement. The MUF represents a political attempt at Islamic
solidarity in response to India. It was critical during the dawn of the insurgency, evident
by the way it empowered and legitimized the Islamic organizations which it consisted of.
However, it did not endure as a driving force throughout the decade.
Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI)
Jamaat-e-Islami was established in 1941 under Syed Abul Ala-Maududi as the largest
Islamic political party in Pakistan. Its objective in Kashmir was to create a nizam-e-mustafa
(an Islamic-based political system) that reinforced the Muslim identity of Kashmir.22 It di-
rected its mission through a top-down strategy, aiming to Islamize all of Kashmiri society,
beginning with the elites and then advancing to the middle and lower classes. JeI was the
central leader of the Muslim United Front, aiming to institutionalize its socio political vision.
It also worked towards the ultimate objective of uniting Kashmir with Pakistan. Jamaat-i-
Tulba and Hizb-ul Mujahideen, the armed factions of JeI, conducted military action on the
ground in Kashmir.23 However, JeI struggled to achieve widespread support due to its aus-
tere brand of Islam, which was incongruent with local Islamic practices as well as with the
azadi freedom movement.24 Other organizations, such as the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation
Front (JKLF), thus gained greater popular appeal in the early stages of insurgency due to
their emphasis on the unique, national identity of Kashmir.
nationhood that superseded any specific religious affinity. Javed Ahmad Mir, Chief of the
JKLF forces in Kashmir, called the organization a group of “democrats” who believed in the
“coexistence of different religious groups” in Kashmir.26 Its reinforcement of this identity
immensely appealed local communities, enabling it to mobilize Kashmiris through mass
demonstrations, strikes, and violence. JKLF believed an aggressive strategy was the only
means toward freedom from Indian oppression.27 Under the leadership of Amanullah Khan,
the group was conceived in 1964 and attempted to generate several militant and secessionist
uprisings throughout the 1970s; however, it failed to generate significant momentum.28 The
failure throughout the seventies and success in 1989 speaks to the importance of circum-
stances. The vacuum created by the political crash of 1987 engendered an optimal climate
for nationalism to rise and thrive; JKLF became the vector for this nationalism. Its greatest
downfall, however, was a lack of structure. The size of the JKLF swelled during the first few
years of the insurgency, but ultimately the socially-reliant organization lacked the political
institutions and cohesiveness to endure.29 Its collapse by 1994 coincided with the rise of
Islamic organizations that were better established, better supported, and more consolidated
through the advocacy of religious unity.
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HuM)
The rise of the Islamist Hizb-ul-Mujahideen correlated with the decline of the secularist
JKLF around the mid-nineties. It was established in 1989 as a militant wing of JeI in Kashmir
under the leadership of Sheikh Abdul Basit, and depended on support from young, educated
Kashmiri men.30 Its base expanded throughout the insurgency as it adopted various smaller
organizations into its own, such as the integration of Tehrik-e-Jihad-e-Islami in 1991.31 It
inherited its social base from the Jamaaties consisting of both urban and rural support, the
latter being a demographic that the JKLF struggled to recruit.32 The central goal of the or-
ganization was for Kashmir to ultimately join Pakistan in the name of Islamic solidarity. It
received sponsorship from the Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), further consolidat-
ing its strength as an organization.33
26 Edward A. Gargan, "Behind Its Mountain Walls, Kashmir Wages Vicious War,” The New York Times, October 28, 1991,
https://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/28/world/behind-its-mountain-walls-kashmir-wages-vicious-war.html.
27 Newberg, Double Betrayal, 18.
28 Staniland, "Azad and Jihad," 68.
29 Ibid., 69.
30 Sumit Ganguly, The Kashmir Question: Retrospect and Prospect (London: Routledge, 2003), 59, ProQuest Ebook Central.
31 Staniland, "Azad and Jihad," 85.
32 Ibid., 80.
33 Balraj Puri, "Kashmir’s Journey: From Insurgency to Militancy to Terrorism," Asian Affairs 27 (October 28, 2013): 80, http://
asian-affairs.com/Resources/BP5pages.pdf.
Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA)
By the mid-1990s, the local, Kashmiri-driven roots of the insurgency began to give way
to foreign-based jihad groups that capitalized on the region’s potential to become part of a
global jihad movement. Harkat-ul-Ansar, established in 1993, was a major player during this
transition of the insurgency. Receiving strong support from Pakistan, it fought for a merger
between Kashmir and Pakistan.34 The group’s legacy is built around Pan-Islamist ideology
in Kashmir, a vision it violently sought through conducting several attacks against Hindu
establishments, most notably against Nand Rishi’s Holy Shrine in 1995.
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)
Lashkar-e-Taiba was another internationally-sponsored jihadist and fundamentalist
group that participated in the Kashmir insurgency. Supported and funded primarily by
Pakistan, the group had its roots in Afghanistan, reflecting the globalized jihad that Kashmir
became entangled in through the latter part of the insurgent decade.
Hindu-nationalist political organization within India that exploited the Kashmir conflict as
a “war cry” through its anti-Muslim rhetoric and action.40 BJP’s influence in Delhi presented
a barrier to compromise, especially with the Muslim population in Kashmir.
The Indian campaign of terror in Kashmir was miscalculated and counterproduc-
tive. Governor Saxena admitted excessive violence to The New York Times in 1990, but still
claimed they were only violent in instances of “severe provocation.”41 The Indian strategy
was centered on the belief that Kashmiris were Indians who had “gone astray” and could be
worn down with force. India misperceived the insurgency as a cause, rather than a symp-
tom, of political unrest.42 This misconception and underestimation of the Kashmiri iden-
tity, and their uncompromising fight for self-determination, led to the failure of the Indian
campaign. India even offered elections in exchange for Kashmiri acceptance of “territorial
integrity.”43 This reinforces the view that India catastrophically failed to listen to and under-
stand the source of Kashmir outrage, which gravitated around self-determination above all
else. Furthermore, neither the CRPF nor the BSF were adequately trained in handling the in-
surgency. They spoke only a language of violence and lacked knowledge of the conflict’s ori-
gins as well as local culture.44 As Indian-ordered violence prevailed, popular demonstrations
and riots only grew, with thousands of Kashmiris taking to the streets in violent protest.
By July of 1990, over 80% of the Kashmiri population was on strike against Indian troops,
highlighting the unanimity and mass solidarity of the Kashmiri movement.45 Feeding off of
this popular legitimization of violence, the size of and support for insurgent groups began
to swell. Repression bred the rise of nationalism by radically alienating Kashmiris from the
Indian state. Nationalist insurgent groups, such as the JKLF, filled this expanding vacuum
starved of legitimate authority. The JKLF attracted supporters from the Student Liberation
Front and the Kashmir Mujahideen Liberation front, who both consisted of disillusioned
and frustrated Kashmiri youth.46 The 1990 Armed Forces Special Powers Act, complimented
by India’s violent campaign of terror, legitimized the rise of these militant groups. Indeed,
the JKLF became the face of this movement through its strong advocacy for an indepen-
dent and autonomous Kashmir. It became the platform for Kashmiri voices that had been
silenced by decades of physical Indian repression and political neglect.
40 Gargan, "Behind Its Mountain Walls, Kashmir Wages Vicious War.”
41 Barbara Crossette, "Srinagar Journal; In Kashmir's Enchanted Valley, War Breaks Spell," The New York Times, October 5,
1990, www.nytimes.com/1990/10/05/world/srinagar-journal-in-kashmir-s-enchanted-valley-war-breaks-spell.html.
42 David P. Fidler and Sumit Ganguly, India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned (London: Routledge, 2009), 81.
43 Ibid., 83.
44 Ibid., 79.
45 Newberg, Double Betrayal, 39.
46 Sumit Ganguly, "Avoiding War in Kashmir," Foreign Affairs Magazine, January 28, 2009, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
asia/1990-12-01/avoiding-war-kashmir.
At this level of analysis, the essence of conflict exists between Indian troops and local
Kashmiri people, represented primarily through the nationalist JKLF. The nationalist move-
ment, however, was a highly decentralized social complex that struggled to sustain itself
without the insurance of institutional backing. The group gradually splintered into other
groups, such as the Students Liberation Front and Al-Umar Mujahideen, further decel-
erating the nationalists’ momentum.47 As the insurgency endured into the mid-1990s, the
Kashmiri response, originally united against Indian troops, began to polarize into secession-
ists on one side and Islamists in favor of joining Pakistan on the other. This added a new
dimension to the insurgency, which will be discussed under conflict level two. The conflict
between nationalism and Indian repression was critical in mobilizing the Kashmiri people
and launching the insurgency. Although this conflict did not endure as the dominant front
throughout the whole insurgency, it set the stage for a long-term conflict that consumed
the decade.
By 1996, the conflict between India and the insurgents reached a stalemate in which
India was unable to militarily defeat its adversaries.48 Although India blamed this on
Pakistan’s propaganda and material support being sent to the insurgents, a military response
was a miscalculated strategy in the first place.49 The decentralized, locally-produced nature
of the insurgency meant that it could not be precisely targeted and eliminated. Despite
the decline in scale of India’s violent counterinsurgency strategy, Delhi continued to exert
pressure and control over the region. For example, in the late 1990s, The New York Times
reported India preventing Kashmiri separatists from leaving Kashmir and continuing other
repressive methods that inhibited the daily lives and freedoms of local Kashmiris.50
streamline aid in the form of weapons, training, and sanctuary to the latter branch of or-
ganizations in order to reinforce the resistance against an autonomous Kashmir.58 Pakistan
was tremendously invested in Kashmir due to the historically-rooted belief that Kashmir
is a fundamental part of Pakistani identity and territory. However, Kashmiri-scholar Vijay
K. Sazawal highlights that despite this belief, Pakistan still fails to recognize that Kashmiris
have their own, unique and independent heritage.59
Before the rise of Islamist organizations, Pakistan supported the JKLF movement
against Indian oppression. Like India, however, Pakistan ultimately worked to curb the azadi
secessionist movement.60 In the early 1990s, Pakistan abandoned its support of the JKLF and
allied with HuM, whose pledges to unite Kashmir and Pakistan were more congruent with
Islamabad’s interests. Pakistan denied providing any form of aid, despite the overwhelming
evidence that it did provide military assistance to insurgent groups.61 Pakistan’s influx of aid
to pro-accession Islamist groups contributed to the decline of nationalists groups, whose
relative power proved unable to compete. The main beneficiaries of Pakistani aid were Hizb-
ul-Mujahideen, Jamaat-e-Islami, and Harkat-ul-Ansar.62 Some organizations, such as JeI,
allied with Pakistan under a true ideological commitment to accession under Pan-Islamist
identity. Others, such as HuM, emphasized the distinctness of the Kashmiri identity and
were not originally pro-accession but joined Pakistan’s sphere in order to gain access to its
resources and support.63 A 1992 confrontation between Pakistan and secessionists is sym-
bolic of this phase of conflict. In February 1992, Pakistani troops and riot police opened fire
against unarmed Kashmiri separatists near the Pakistani border.64 This paroxysm of violence
highlights Pakistan’s commitment to containing separatist activity and energy. Pakistan’s
crusade against Kashmiri separatists has been demonstrated through both first-hand vio-
lence and by empowering pro-Pakistani insurgent groups on the ground. As Miraj-u-Din
Munshi, a scholar from the University of Kashmir, points out, Pakistan’s involvement nei-
ther detracts from nor negates the indigenously Kashmiri genesis of the insurgency.65 The
contribution that Pakistan made to the conflict was one of endurance. It was essential in the
insurgency’s persistence once the initial stand-off between nationalists and Indian troops
was relegated into the conflict’s periphery. Pakistan’s generous aid and support to its selected
militant groups made them significantly harder to suppress and contributed to their promo-
tion to the forefront of the insurgency, overtaking the organic nationalism of groups like the
JKLF.66
These first three levels of conflict examine the insurgency from a ground level by exam-
ining the various stakeholders involved. The first major takeaway is that the insurgency was
organically Kashmiri. In its earliest days, the conflict was defined as a response of Kashmiris
to political instability and violent repression at the hands of India. It was the moment in
which the building pressure from Kashmir’s history of exploitation finally triggered a mobi-
lized reponse. India was the match that ignited this response, Pakistan provided persistence
of the conflict, and Islamists leeched off of unstable circumstances to advance their cause.
Although the latitude of conflict expanded, Kashmiris still remained in the eye of their own
storm in their fight for self-determination.
Secondly, these first three levels of conflict elucidate the countless moving parts of the
insurgency. The constellation of militant groups was in constant flux. Ideologically, insur-
gent groups varied between secular, Islamist, secessionist, and pro-union with Pakistan.
Organizationally, groups that shared any one of these ideologies frequently factionized into
splinter groups, as evident by the formations of the JKLF, MUF, and HuM. The result of this
was a competitive network of individual groups contending for dominance. As militant
groups began to challenge each other, India lost the spotlight as the single enemy of the
insurgency. Pakistan added yet another layer of conflict with its own campaign against se-
cessionists via supporting Islamist organizations in favor of union. Paul Staniland, a scholar
from the University of Chicago, accurately captures the nebulus nature of this network: a
“hazy universe” of various groups.67 This all illustrates a deeply entrenched conflict that
transcends any one of these layers. Each level of conflict was symbiotically related to the
others and contributed to the shifts in dominance of each one, according to different peri-
ods of insurgency. The collapse of political order culminating in the 1987 elections caused
severe repercussions in the Kashmiri social sphere, contributing to the rise of nationalism.
Islamic extremists also capitalized on this societal turbulence and strategically exploited the
institutional weaknesses of the JKLF and nationalist platform by manipulating it into an op-
portunity to advance the Islamist agenda of jihad against India. As Islamist groups began to
separate into those against or for Pakistan, Islamabad began channeling resources into the
latter as a means to ensure its endurance. The interconnectedness is vividly clear. In order
to complete this story of conflict, two final rungs must be added: the ongoing Indo-Pakistani
rivalry that bled into the insurgency and the role of rising global jihad.
66 Fidler and Ganguly, India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, 87.
67 Staniland, "Azad and Jihad," 61.
control in Kashmir. Therefore, Pakistan’s involvement was a response to Indian political and
territorial aggression rather than an offensive proxy war.
However, although Pakistani involvement may have initially been in response to Indian
action, Pakistan adopted a more proactive and offensive objective of annexing Kashmir, sub-
stantiated by their shift in alliance from the pro-independence JKLF to HuM and other mili-
tant Islamists. The latter group of organizations became instruments for Pakistan’s objectives
in Kashmir and were compensated with generous streams of financial and weapons-based
support.74 The problem with both the Indian and Pakistani perspectives is that they are en-
tirely positioned in relation to one another. They viewed the conflict not as the organically
Kashmiri movement that it was, but as an excuse to ignite their own power-driven rivalry.
Both refused freedom to Kashmir due to the sacrifice it would bring to the balance of rela-
tive power. Kashmiris became pawns caught in this crossfire, as the original essence of their
movement was crushed under the silencing weight of Indo-Pakistani power politics.
In 1996, Kashmiri elections were attempted again, supposedly under fairer standards
than last time.75 Regardless, turnout only amounted to 40% due to threats from militant
groups preventing citizens from voting.76 As a result, the Kashmiri National Congress came
to power. Originally a purely Kashmiri party, it ultimately allied with the Indian Congress
in 1986 under Farooq Abdullah. Therefore, these elections saw India infiltrating Kashmir’s
political sphere by representing a political party in the region. In response, Pakistan reignit-
ed anti-Indian insurgent activity, creating a spike in violence around the elections.77 Again,
Pakistan was acting in response to India instead of the organic instability on the ground.
Indian counterinsurgency to this violence became more politically-driven than militarily-
driven, as it initially was during the first stages of the popular insurgency.
By the mid-1990s, as India and Pakistan continued to compete against each other
for Kashmiri control, the original azadi movement of local communities lost its voice. It
became clear that that the political future of Kashmir would be a prisoner to the national
interests of India and Pakistan. The absence of self-determination that initially inspired the
Kashmir insurgency was just the same following their revolt. This lack of progress reflects
how larger forces exploited the region’s vulnerability and crushed the organic Kashmiri
movement.
74 Khalid Mahmood and Moeed Yusof, "Peace Process with India: A Pakistani Perspective," in Peace Process with India: A Paki-
stani Perspective (United States Institute of Peace, 2014), 80.
75 Fidler and Ganguly, India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned, 81.
76 Ibid., 81.
77 Ibid., 82.
Middle East during the Cold War.84 Although the domestic Islamist groups, such as HuM,
had already succeeded in hindering the strength of the secular, nationalist insurgents, the
influx of jihadist groups solidified their overpowerment. They fed off of the existing support
for domestic extremists and translated it into a more radical and global objective for Islam.
Kashmir was thus swept into the current, worldwide struggle of jihad.
As the insurgency went on, Kashmir became increasingly less controlled by the
Kashmiri people, although they were responsible for the initial movement. The azadi cause
for freedom and justice against Indian oppression became diluted as external interests cor-
rupted and exploited the social turbulence of the region. Pakistan leveraged the conflict
as a means to pursue the historic objective of annexing Kashmir, while global jihadist or-
ganizations seized the opportunity to integrate Kashmir into an even broader context. By
the end of the 1990s, the indigenous cause was powerless. Kashmiris did not welcome the
jihadist capitalization of the movement, whose ideals were not congruent with local beliefs.
85
The Kashmiri ability to reclaim their movement was crippled. Not only did hundreds of
thousands of Kashmiris leave the valley, but local power became bound to Islamist militant
organizations affiliated primarily with Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Conclusion
The decade of Kashmiri insurgency was defined by its dynamism. The first level of con-
flict between Kashmiri people and Indian troops was the most organic and foundational
layer. It represented the combustion of ultimate and proximate causes that triggered a vio-
lent grassroots response demanding Kashmiri self-determination. However, as the insur-
gency continued into the 1990s, the movement diverged from its secular, nationalist nature
through the introduction of an Islamic current. The second level of conflict is defined by
the rivalries that were born between militant groups as a greater number of actors were
added to the mix. This represented a major turn in the insurgency away from the united,
local movement against Indian oppression. Although this antagonism still existed from both
militant categories, fighting was now split and broken down between each other and the
greater Indian enemy. The third level of conflict between secessionists and militants in favor
of joining Pakistan expanded the distance between the reality of the conflict and its origins.
This layer is closely related to conflict level four, which contextualizes the insurgency within
the historic Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir. Both India and Pakistan misperceived the
conflict as an attack against each other instead of the organic, grassroots freedom movement
produced within Kashmir. These larger power politics further corrupted the original move-
ment. The fifth, final layer to the insurgency was the injection of global jihad. The timing of
the Kashmiri uprising coincided with the rise of international jihadist groups, hailing pri-
marily from Afghanistan, which exploited the Islamic sentiments and social vulnerability
of Kashmir as a prime candidate for extremist success.
The boundaries of each level of conflict are porous and permeate into one another. As
this paper has shown, each layer has a cascading effect on the overarching insurgency by
impacting the developments of other levels of conflict. Further, the coexistence of these five
layers prevented resolution, as each pursued objectives that contradicted those of the others.
The presence of over thirty different groups and actors, each with their own strengths and
weaknesses, prevented any sense of reliable alliances or unity. Today, conflict in Kashmir
endures. The organic, indigenously-produced popular uprising against India that drove
the conflict’s eruption has now completely surrendered its voice to the agendas of external
actors, recycling Kashmir’s role as a pawn in greater power politics.
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London: Routledge, 2009.
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With lingering uncertainty regarding U.S. support for NATO and the terms surrounding
Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union, the remaining EU-27 are taking steps to forge
a closer defense union. In 2018, German Chancellor Angela Merkel endorsed the concept of a
European army, thereby siding with her French counterpart Emmanuel Macron. Some aca-
demics believe that such sentiment marks the beginning of the Europeanization of European
defense and security. This paper explores three questions: What is the ‘Europeanization of
defense’? What might it mean for the future of transatlanticism? Should defense integration
at the European level be considered a panacea or peril for transatlantic partnership? This
paper argues that recently launched initiatives, such as the Permanent Structured Coopera-
tion and the European Defense Fund, are stepping stones rather than evidence for tangible
EU defense integration. However, that is not to suggest that European defense and security
are not being Europeanized. There has been a discernible change in rhetoric which, in turn,
reflects a shift in strategic thinking. Whether the Europeanization of European security and
defense will widen or close the transatlantic rift depends on how it is designed and executed.
Closer cooperation at the European level can give rise to smarter investment in defense, and
thus contribute to fairer burden-sharing. At the same time, Europeanizing defense could lead
to its duplication and fragmentation.
Introduction
In November 2018, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made headlines when she
sided with French President Emmanuel Macron and called for the creation of an EU army.
In her address to the European Parliament, she declared that “Europeans must take [their]
destiny in [their] own hands” and, one day, establish a European army.1 Merkel’s endorse-
ment was certainly not the first of its kind; the French supported a collective army as early
as the 1950s through the infamous Pleven Plan.2 Yet, never before had a German chancel-
lor from the Christian Democratic Union, a deeply transatlanticist party, echoed French
demands for a pan-European army. Though Merkel emphasized that this plan would not
1 Maïa de la Baume and David M. Herszenhorn, “Merkel Joins Macron in Calling for EU Army to Complement NATO,”
Politico EU, November 13, 2018.
2 Léo-Paul Jacob, “The Birth of a European Defense? A European Force,” NATO Association of Canada, July 11, 2017, http://
natoassociation.ca/the-birth-of-a-european-defence-part-ii-a-european-army/.
Defining Europeanization
The term “Europeanization” was first coined by Robert Ladrech in 1994, who
3 Katrin Bennhold and Steven Erlanger, “Merkel Joins Macron in Calling for a European Army ‘One Day,’” The New York
Times, November 13, 2018.
4 Jolyon Howorth, “For a True European Defence Union,” Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, Brussels (2017), 1.
5 Robert Ladrech, “Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France,” Journal of Common Market
Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1 (1994): 69.
6 Ibid., pg. 84.
7 Claudio Radaelli, “Whither Europeanization? Concept Stretching and Substantive Change,” European Integration Online
Papers (EIOP) 4, no. 8 (2000): 3.
8 Andrew Sparrow, “Jean-Claude Juncker Calls for EU Army,” The Guardian, March 08, 2015.
9 Ladrech, “Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions,” 69.
10 Jolyon Howorth, "Strategic autonomy and EU-NATO cooperation: threat or opportunity for transatlantic defence rela-
tions?," Journal of European Integration 40, no. 5 (2018): 534.
11 Petros Violakis, Europeanization and the Transformation of EU Security Policy: Post-Cold War Developments Security and
Defense Policy (Oxford: Routledge, 2018): 4.
12 Howorth, “For a True European Defence Union,” op. cit., pg. 20.
13 Daniel Keohane, “Policy Brief: EU Military Cooperation and National Defense,” The German Marshall Fund of the United
States, January 15, 2018, http://www.gmfus.org/publications/eu-military-cooperation-and-national-defense.
14 Thierry Tardy, “Does European Defense Really Matter? Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Common Security and Defense
Policy,” European Security, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2017): 119.
15 Howorth, “For a True European Defence Union,” 5.
cess to deepen defense cooperation among EU member states who are capable and willing
to do so.”16 Through PESCO, various projects facilitate the joint development of defense
capabilities. At the time of writing, 25 out of the 28 EU member states have acceded to
PESCO, signing on to a list of 20 binding commitments and 17 projects.17
16 European External Action Service, “Fact Sheet: Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO),” EEAS Fact Sheets, last modi-
fied in November 2018, accessed on November 21, 2018, https://cdn5-eeas.fpfis.tech.ec.europa.eu/cdn/ farfuture/wM5QZfo-
VgVbC4zSzD-u--4o8E9TqYoThT3aNfAC6TQA/ mtime:1542983709/sites/eeas/files/pesco_ factsheet_november_2018_en_0.pdf
17 Ibid.
18 Daniela Vincenti, “EU Takes First Steps Towards Military HQ,” EURACTIV, March 6, 2017
19 Ibid.
20 Henry Samuel and Peter Foster, “New EU Army Headquarters Branded Little More Than a Call Center,” The Telegraph, May
20, 2017.
21 European External Action Service, “Fact Sheet: The Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC),” EEAS Factsheets,
last modified in November 2018, accessed on November 21, 2018, https://cdn4-eeas.fpfis.tech.ec. europa.eu/cdn/farfuture/aGK-
F41zrLDLuNeg8csm24scxmjEwj4JBvrRbaLeaY4M/mtime:1542656575/sites/eeas/files/mpcc_factsheet_november_2018.pdf.
22 Staff, “President Macron’s Initiative for Europe: A Sovereign, United, Democratic Europe,” Diplomatie, last modified on
September 26, 2017, accessed on November 22, 2018, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/european-union/
events/article/president-macron-s-initiative-for-europe-a-sovereign-united-democratic-europe.
23 Defense Ministers of Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United King-
dom, “Letter of Intent Concerning the Development of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2),” June 25, 2018.
24 Ibid.
25 Lewis Sanders “Germany Cautious as France Leads European Defense Initiative,” Deutsche Welle, November 08, 2018.
26 Staff, “Finland Wants to Join French-led EI2,” Daily Finland, August 25, 2018.
27 European Commission Press Office, “Press Release: A European Defense Fund,” European Commission Press Release Data-
base, last modified on June 07, 2017, accessed on November 21, 2018, http://europa.eu/rapid/ press-release_IP-17-1508_en.htm.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Staff, “How Much Is Spent on Defense in the EU?” Eurostat: Your Key to European Statistics, last modified on May
18, 2018, accessed on November 22, 2018, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/DDN-20180518-
1?inheritRedirect=true.
31 Howorth, “For a True European Defence Union,” 7.
32 Howorth, “Strategic Autonomy and EU-NATO Cooperation,” 528.
33 Staff, “Seibert: Merkel hat als eine überzeugste Transatlantikerin gesprochen,” N-TV, May 29, 2017, https://www.n-tv.de/
ticker/Merkel-hat-als-eine-ueberzeugte-Transatlantikerin-gesprochen-article19864538.html
The fact that Merkel, a “deeply convinced transatlanticist,” voiced support for
Macron’s plan came as a shock to many.34 Some reports described it as a manifestation
of Merkel’s “pivot to Europe.”35 Merkel first indicated that she no longer saw the United
States as a reliable partner in May 2017, when she declared the “times in which we could
completely depend on other [to be], to a certain extent, over.”36 President Trump’s apathy
towards NATO, continued criticism of the European Union, and perceived disrespect for
transatlantic values has compelled European nations to plan for U.S. withdrawal from the
continent.37 Concerns over U.S. disengagement appear to be the main driver of the Euro-
peanization of defense and security.
This process is also discernible in the emergence of new, radical ideas in the field
of European defense. Lingering uncertainty over U.S. commitment to NATO has raised
questions as to the future of the NATO nuclear-sharing arrangement.38 This inspired a se-
lect few academics and policymakers, such as German MP Kiesewetter and former Polish
Prime Minister Kaczynski, to advocate for the acquisition of a European nuclear deterrent.
39,40
Other examples of such arrangements include an attempt to create an EU intelligence
agency and the rhetoric surrounding a European defense union.41,42
The phenomenon of Europeanization can even be found in official doctrines. The
EU Global Strategy, for example, declares that “as Europeans, we must take greater respon-
sibility for our security. […] An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is
important for Europe’s ability to foster peace and safeguard security within and beyond
its borders.”43 The inclusion of the phrase “strategic autonomy” is particularly telling,
given that it was taboo to use the term in official documents until recently. Furthermore,
Germany’s most recent White Paper echoes the call for European defense integration by
advocating for the Europeanization of defense procurement.44
34 Ibid.
35 Lewis Sanders, “How the World Reacted to Merkel’s Pivot to Europe,” Deutsche Welle, May 29, 2017.
36 Annett Meiritz, Anna Reimann and Severin Weiland, “A Transatlantic Turning Point: What Was Merkel Thinking?” Der
Spiegel, May 29, 2017.
37 Daniel Keohane, “Make Europe Defend Again?”, Carnegie Europe, November 18, 2016, http://carnegieeurope. eu/strategi-
ceurope/66199.
38 Alexandra Marksteiner, “Alternative Futures: Rethinking the European Nuclear Posture,” New Atlanticist, July 18, 2017.
39 Andrea Shalal, “German Lawmaker Says Europe Must Consider Own Nuclear Deterrence Plan,” Reuters, November 16,
2016.
40 Konrad Schuller, “Interview mit PiS Chef Kaczynski,“ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 7, 2017.
41 Philip Kaleta, “Germany Rejects Creating European Intelligence Agency,” Politico EU, May 10, 2017.
42 Roderich Kiesewetter, “Toward a European Defense Union,” Carnegie Europe, April 29, 2016, https://carnegieeurope.eu/
strategiceurope/63489.
43 European External Action Service, “Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe | A Global Strategy for the Euro-
pean Union’s Foreign and Security Policy,” 2016, 19.
44 Ministry of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany, “2016 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of
the Bundeswehr,” 49, 129.
Panacea or Peril?
The presidency of Donald Trump has strained transatlantic relations, to say the
least. Some journalists have even gone so far as to publish eulogies for the transatlantic
partnership.45 While it may be premature to declare the transatlantic alliance as deceased,
it is undeniable that transatlanticism is wavering. U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Iran nuclear deal, the imposition of tariffs by the
United States on EU imports, and President Trump’s countless diplomatic blunders have
caused European allies to grow resentful and disenchanted.
That is not to suggest that the United States and Europe have not had to grapple
with major disagreements in the past. For instance, Germany’s and France’s refusal to
support the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003 showcases this. Deep-rooted differences in
strategic thinking underlie the recent estrangement.46 In the words of political scientist
Robert Kagan: “Americans are from Mars; Europeans are from Venus.”47
However, something about this episode of divergence seems different: the very
basis and necessity of the transatlantic alliance is being called into question and the trans-
atlantic rift appears wider than ever before. In this context, it is worth discussing how the
Europeanization of European defense and security might affect transatlantic relations. Is it
a panacea or is it perilous? Is it an opportunity or a threat?
Literature Review
The scholarly community has yet to reach a consensus on the issue. Some, such
as Sven Biscop, believe that defense integration and strategic autonomy are the answers to
Europe’s metaphorical prayers.48 Europeanization would not only bolster EU security but
also strengthen the transatlantic partnership.49 Others, such as Luke Coffey, are convinced
that defense integration on the European level will do more harm than good.50 The follow-
ing section will further explore the existing literature on the topic and shed light on the
45 James Taub, “RIP the Transatlantic Alliance, 1945-2018,” Foreign Policy, May 11, 2018.
46 Kristian L. Nielsen, “Continued Drift But Without the Acrimony: US-European Relations Under Barack Obama,” Journal of
Transatlantic Studies 11, no. 1 (2013): 83-108.
47 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003): 3.
48 Sven Biscop, “Letting Europe Go Its Own Way: The Case for Strategic Autonomy,” Foreign Affairs, July 6, 2018.
49 Ibid.
50 Luke Coffey, “EU Defense Integration: Undermining NATO, Transatlantic Relations and Europe’s Security,” The Heritage
Foundation, June 6, 2013.
debate therein.
In a backgrounder published by the Heritage Foundation, Coffey argues that
defense integration, in the form of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP),
will undermine NATO, weaken the transatlantic partnership, and threaten European
security.51 Assuming continued integration, NATO would be relegated to a second-tier
priority; resources would be directed away from it, as the six non-allied EU member
states (Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden) would likely veto the use of
EU assets in NATO operations.52,53 With a defense arrangement of its own, EU-NATO
cooperation may become increasingly difficult since the United States may be decoupled
from Europe and may lose influence regarding European security matters.54 However, if
left to fend for itself, the European Union might not be able to guarantee the security of its
citizens. Bureaucratic inertia in Brussels could seriously dampen the EU’s military effec-
tiveness.55 Coffey concludes by urging the United States to oppose EU defense integration
and the CSDP.56 However, Coffey’s arguments contain flaws. In addition to being overly
deterministic, he asserts that “each Euro spent on the CSDP is one less that can be spent
on NATO,” approaching organizational interaction as though it were a zero-sum game.57
This argument fails to acknowledge that the Europeanization of defense and security can
be designed in such a way as to harmonize with NATO doctrines and operations.
In his article on the CSDP, Thierry Tardy makes a similar, albeit more nuanced,
argument. He states that the “European Union might not be the most appropriate instru-
ment of the defense of Europe.”58 To support his claim, Tardy points to persisting diver-
gences in strategic cultures and institutional preferences across the EU member states.59
On the spectrum of opinions, Howorth occupies the center. In order to stabi-
lize its neighborhood and become a major player in the realm of international security,
Europe must become strategically autonomous.60 This means it must develop its capacities
in all areas and end its dependency on the United States.61 Nevertheless, it is imperative
not to have two security entities in the same space.62 Competition and rivalry would be
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Tomáš Valášek, “A New Transatlantic Security Bargain,” Carnegie Europe, May 23, 2017, http://carnegieeurope.
eu/2017/05/23/new-transatlantic-security-bargain-pub-70050.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Biscop, “Letting Europe Go Its Own Way.”
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Howorth, “Strategic Autonomy and EU-NATO Cooperation.”
Europe would be able to bring crisis management, soft power competencies, and high-
intensity combat capabilities to the table. The European Union could become a champion
of the comprehensive approach to defense and security.
In this context, the importance of interoperability among the EUMS and with
NATO is emphasized. EU member states should view defense integration as a way to fill
gaps within NATO and procure capabilities that are too expensive for individual countries
to procure. Duplication must be avoided at all costs, unless it is to provide the operational
structure to support missions that correspond solely with the security interests of the Eu-
ropean Union, not with those of the United States. Managing the influx of migrants from
the MENA region and securing the Union’s external borders would fall into this category,
but deterring hybrid threats emanating from Russia and countering terrorism would not.
However, no matter how genuine the transatlanticist ambitions of European lead-
ers are or how tightly the integrative initiatives are aligned with NATO, the Europeaniza-
tion of defense and security will shift the priorities of European governments. To side with
Howorth, two equal security entities cannot inhabit the same space. If Macron’s European
Intervention Initiative were to succeed and produce a common strategic culture, it may
contradict NATO doctrine in one aspect or another, which could lead to the fragmenta-
tion of the alliance.
The end of U.S. primacy and the emergence of a powerful, unified actor—namely,
the European Union—may have a similar effect. If both the United States and Europe
have the ability to launch and command operations unilaterally, identifying threats that
jeopardize the interests of NATO, as opposed to those of the United States or European
Union individually, would become increasingly difficult, as common threat perception is a
prerequisite for coalition fighting.
Perhaps the most perilous side effect of the European quest for strategic autono-
my is the image that it conveys. NATO’s deterrence policy is centered around the threat of
U.S. involvement and the nuclear-sharing arrangement. By publicly advocating strategic
emancipation from the United States, European leaders are implying that the United States
can no longer be counted on. This creates a perception, be it real or imagined, of a split
alliance. NATO’s adversaries may be led to believe that an attack on a NATO ally would
not necessarily precipitate American intervention, thereby lowering the costs of taking the
offensive. For example, Russian President Vladimir Putin is in favor of a European army,
perhaps because of its potential to widen the transatlantic rift.73
Conclusion
European actors are currently grappling with a set of dichotomous objectives.
73 Staff, “Natural That Europe Should Want an Army, Says Russia’s Putin,” Reuters, November 11, 2018.
74 Alice Pannier, “Macron’s European Intervention Initiative: More Questions Than Answer,” European Leadership Network,
November 23, 2017.
Works Cited
Bennhold, Katrin and Steven Erlanger. “Merkel Joins Macron in Calling for a Euro-
pean Army ‘One Day.’” The New York Times, November 13, 2018.
Biscop, Sven. “Letting Europe Go Its Own Way: The Case for Strategic Autonomy.”
Foreign Affairs, July 6, 2018.
Coffey, Luke. “EU Defense Integration: Undermining NATO, Transatlantic Rela-
tions and Europe’s Security.” The Heritage Foundation, June 6, 2013.
De La Baume, Maïa and David M. Herszenhorn. “Merkel Joins Macron in Calling
for EU Army to Complement NATO.” Politico EU, November 13, 2018.
Defense Ministers of Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. “Letter of Intent Concerning
the Development of the European Intervention Initiative (EI2).” June 25, 2018.
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Kayleigh Svensson
Countless fishery studies have made it evident that developing fisheries are quickly depleting
the ocean of its limited resources. Tuna is particularly vulnerable to powerful fisheries—spe-
cifically the Atlantic and Pacific bluefin tuna. This high-priced species is exploited primarily
by Japan’s commercial fisheries to feed their country, in addition to those around the rest of
the world. In this review, I have compiled the data and results from several fishery studies,
as well as from a number of bluefin stock assessment reports and fishery trends such as from
the International Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific
Ocean (ISC), the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), and the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). Such reports uncover the abusive practices
of Japanese conglomerate seafood distributors. Japan’s destructive bluefin trade, including
their trend of noncompliance with catch quota guidelines, demonstrates their manifest role in
the decline of this important Marine Migratory Species. The fate of bluefin tuna rests in the
hands of Japan’s decision makers.
publication, including reviews by both National Geographic and The New York Times.4,5
Fortunately, the virality of this (potential) impending fisheries collapse set some gears into
motion, including a push for more research centers, wildlife refuges, and Marine Protect-
ed Areas (MPAs) in several of the most heavily fished waters.6
Figure 1: Regression extrapolation showing the projected global collapse of marine taxa in 2048.
(Figure 3A from Worm et al. 2006).7
4 John Roach, “Seafood May Be Gone by 2048, Study Says,” National Geographic, November 2, 2006, https://www.nationalgeo-
graphic.com/animals/2006/11/seafood-biodiversity/.
5 Cornelia Dean, "Study Sees ‘Global Collapse’ of Fish Species," The New York Times, November 3, 2006, https://www.nytimes.
com/2006/11/03/science/03fish.html.
6 Worm, "Impacts of Biodiversity Loss," 2006.
7 Ibid.
8 Andre M. Boustany, Robyn Matteson, Michael Castleton, Charles Farwell, and Barbara A. Block, "Movements of pacific
bluefin tuna (Thunnus orientalis) in the Eastern North Pacific revealed with archival tags," Progress in Oceanography 86, no. 1-2
(2010): 94-104.
9 Ibid.
10 Refers to a mass fishing technique (illegal in most countries) that trails a large non-anchored gill-net for miles to trap fish.
seine vessels.11 This explains why MMS population sizes seem to be exceedingly pliant
to fishing technology advancements aimed to maximize catch efficiency.12 Today, 48%
of MMS are categorized as either Threatened, Near Threatened, or Data Deficient. From
1954 to 2006, the global MMS population declined by over 60%.13,14
11 Danielle Hall, "Smithsonian Ocean," Ocean Portal | Smithsonian, May 09, 2018.
12 Ibid.
13 Ben Lascelles, Giuseppe Notarbartolo Di Sciara, Tundi Agardy, Annabelle Cuttelod, Sara Eckert, Lyle Glowka, Erich Hoyt
et al., "Migratory marine species: their status, threats and conservation management needs," Aquatic Conservation: Marine and
Freshwater Ecosystems 24, no. S2 (2014): 111-127.
14 Maria José Juan-Jordá, Iago Mosqueira, Andrew B. Cooper, Juan Freire, and Nicholas K. Dulvy, "Global population trajec-
tories of tunas and their relatives," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108, no. 51 (2011): 20650-20655, doi:10.1073/
pnas.1107743108.
15 Boustany et al., “Movements of pacific bluefin tuna,” 2010.
16 Itaru Ohta, and Harumi Yamada, "Formation of a Pacific Bluefin Tuna Fishing Ground on Their Spawning Grounds around
the Ryukyu Islands: Implication of a Relationship with Mesoscale Eddies," Biology and Ecology of Bluefin Tuna, 2015, 123-36,
doi:10.1201/b18714-10.
17 Boustany et al., “Movements of pacific bluefin tuna.” 2010.
18 Ibid.
19 “Stock Assessment of Pacific Bluefin Tuna 2014,” ISC, accessed March 26, 2019, https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/species/
fish/Atlantic_bluefin_tuna/pdfs/PBF_2014_Exec_Summary_4_04-17.pdf.
20 Analia Murias, "Maximum Bluefin Tuna Length and Weight Set," FIS - Suppliers - Company Details, June 24, 2013,https://
www.fis.com/fis/worldnews/worldnews.asp?l=e&country=0&special=&monthyear=&day=&id=61731&ndb=1&df=0.
21 ISC, "Stock Assessment of Pacific Bluefin Tuna 2014.”
Figure 2: The age-specific yearly mean of mortalities from 2002-2011 (dashed), 2007-2009
(solid black line) and 2009-2011 (gray line) for the Pacific bluefin tuna (figure 7 from the 2014
ISC stock assessment report).24
22 Ibid
23 Shuhei Uematsu, Current Situation of Pacific Bluefin Tuna and Stock Management, Tokyo: World Wildlife Fund (WFF), July
2014.
24 ISC, “Stock Assessment of Pacific Bluefin Tuna 2014.”
25 Juan-Jorda et al., "Global Population Trajectories."
26 Refers to the estimated historical biomass of a marine population before fishing commenced.
27 Ibid.
28 "Stock Assessment of Pacific Bluefin Tuna (Thunnus Orientalis) in the Pacific Ocean in 2018,” ISC, last modified July 24,
2018, http://isc.fra.go.jp/pdf/ISC18/ISC_18_ANNEX_14_Pacific_Bluefin_Tuna_Stock_Assessment_2018_FINAL.pdf.
If we consider how innovative and efficient the Japanese fisheries have become
in satisfying the high demand for this species, the 98.4% drop in bluefin stock reported
by the ISC is not surprising.29 The coastal waters of Japan’s Ryukyu islands, spanning a
mere 200 miles, are major spawning grounds for bluefin that contribute to over 70% of
the species’ recruitment.30,31 In 2015, it was revealed that over 90% of Japanese industry
catches comes from these coastal waters.32 The fishing industries take advantage of the
spawning behaviors of bluefin, leading to an increase in juvenile catch.33 Indeed, in the
waters around the Ryukyu islands, bluefin tuna rise to the surface to spawn between the
months of May and July.34 Because of their increased vulnerability, scientists encourage
strict regulations of Japanese fisheries when the fish spawn.35 However, almost all fisheries
remain open; in fact, most industries increase their fishery efforts during the spawn peri-
od.36 Some even use illegal spotter planes to locate the fish during spawn and migration,
and guide purse seine vessels to high density areas.37 In addition, Japanese vessels illegally
deploy long range drift-nets, some being over 90 km long.38 Given that the high spawn
waters of the Ryukyu islands span a mere 322 km, this is an unsustainable practice.39
29 Ibid.
30 Ohta and Yamada, “Pacific Bluefin Tuna Fishing Ground.”
31 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The Japanese Fishing Industry: Prospects and Problems, approved for release May 15, 2000,
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T01098A000500030001-8.pdf.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Boustany, “Movements of pacific bluefin tuna.”
35 Ibid
36 Carl Safina, "Regulators Are Pushing Bluefin Tuna to the Brink," Yale E360, December 8, 2008, https://e360.yale.edu/
features/regulators_are_pushing_bluefin_tuna_to_the_brink.
37 David K. Loomis et al., “An Analysis of Spotter Plane Use in the ABT Fishery,” National Marine Fisheries Service Highly
Migratory Species Division, May 4, 1999.
38 S. LaBudde, Stripmining the Seas. A Global Perspective on Drift Net Fisheries, Honolulu: Earthtrust, 1989.
39 Ibid.
40 Nick Peck, "The Fishing Industry and the Environment in Japan," Academia.edu - Share Research, 2015.
41 Karim Zarrouki, "Sector Trend Analysis–Fish Products in Japan," Global Analysis Report, 2017.
42 Justin McCurry, "Japan to Exceed Bluefin Tuna Quota amid Warnings of Commercial Extinction," The Guardian, April 24,
2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/24/japan-criticised-exceed-bluefin-tuna-fishing-quota
undesirable.43 In the mid 1900s, few bluefin fishermen existed, as members of the low-
est classes were often times the only tuna buyers. Until the late 1940s, most of the tuna
caught (usually as bycatch) was allocated to Japanese cat food.44 However, there was a
significant increase in bluefin catch in 1949. It seems that it was not until after WWII
and the increase of Western influence, presence, and culture in Japan that the Japa-
nese developed a taste for this fish.45,46 Today, Japan prioritizes the bluefin trade. The
country uses over 200,000 fishing vessels—which in total value at over $14 billion — to
maximize the catch needed to meet the country’s growing demand for the fish. This
is especially in consideration of Japan’s rapidly aging population. Studies have shown
that older populations cultivate a higher demand for healthy foods.47 By 2020, it is
anticipated that 30% of Japan will be over 65 years of age, which would make them the
country with the oldest population.48 This does not bode well for bluefin tuna, as the
fish is advertised as a powerhouse of vitamins and antioxidants.49,50
Charles Clover, a British environmental journalist, reported that this conglomerate dis-
creetly stores over 20,000 tons of bluefin each year for post-extinction trade.56 During one
of the few occasions in which the corporation was confronted for their unsustainable ac-
tions, Mitsubishi denied its role in the species decline, arguing that the CPUE reductions
documented within its fishing waters were merely natural ecosystem fluxes.57 Juan-Jordá
et. al.’s earlier-mentioned finding directly negates Mitsubishi’s argument, as a CPU decline
of this scale is rarely a natural flux.58,59 It seems to be only a matter of time before Japan’s
continued exploitation of tuna leads to extinction. If this extinction occurs, Mitsubishi
will eventually run out of frozen fish, at which point Japan might enter an economic tail-
spin.60
56 Ibid
57 Ibid
58 Ibid
59 Juan-Jorda et al., "Global Population Trajectories."
60 "Can Tuna Prices Predict Japan's GDP Growth?"
61 "Western & Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC)," WCPFC Harvest Strategy and Reference Points | WCPFC,
https://www.wcpfc.int/.
62 "The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)." The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC).
https://www.iattc.org/homeeng.htm.
63 Thomas K. Wilderbuer and Chang Ik Zhang, "Evaluation of the Population Dynamics and Yield Characteristics of Alaska
Plaice, Pleuronectes Quadrituberculatus, in the Eastern Bering Sea," NeuroImage, May 07, 1999.
64 The End of the Line.
65 Ibid.
why Japan opposes some Western initiatives for nature conservation; the Japanese govern-
ment strongly lobbied against a proposed international ban on bluefin during a delegate
sushi dinner with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES)
in March 2010.66 Japan’s representatives must have been compelling, because CITES voted
to deny all proposed bans on the bluefin fishing trade.67 Scientists and conservationists
worry that without strict regulations or strong quota enforcement, several MMS species
such as the bluefin will go extinct.68
Figure 3: VARDL progression simulating the economical implications that a ban on blue-
fin would have on albacore, bigeye and yellowfin tuna (Figure 2 from Ishida et al. 2015).71
66 Neal Lineback and Mandy Lineback Gritzner,"Geography in the News: Bluefin Tuna Decline – National Geographic Blog,"
National Geographic Blog, November 15, 2013, https://blog.nationalgeographic.org/2013/11/15/geography-in-the-news-bluefin-
tuna-decline/.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Takashi Ishida, "The Impact of Regulating Bluefin Tuna Exports on the Japanese Tuna Market," Journal of Food Research 4,
no. 4 (2015): 103, doi:10.5539/jfr.v4n4p103.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
(VARDL) model. He merged a few tuna datasets into a matrix that he manipulated with
various regulatory parameters, in order to find the interspecies relationship between fluxes
in supply and price.72 As shown in the Figure 3, Ishida found statistically significant results
proving that the bluefin tuna market is not linked to the markets of the other tuna species.
This therefore nullifies Japan’s argument that regulating the bluefin trade would impact the
export economy of the other three tuna species.73
Another fisheries simulation study by Costello et al. in 2016 aggregates the
output data of 4,713 fisheries using a simulation-based matrix (similar to Ishida’s VARDL
model) known as the Pella-Tomlinson growth model.74,75 As shown in Figure 4, the study
predicts both the short and long term effects of three fishing policies— Business As Usual
(BAU),76 Fishing to Maximise Supply Yield (FMSY),77 and Rights-Based Fishery Man-
agement (RBFM)78— on fluxes in catch rate, population, and biomass.79 The simulation
shows a continued fishery divergence and collapse under BAU, and a slow rate population
recovery under FMSY.80 The RBFM policy, however, was proven to be extremely effective,
allowing for both species recovery and a high fishery profit.82 The study’s projection indi-
cates that with appropriate reform efforts, species recovery could be seen within 10 years.83
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 D. Ransom Hardison, William C. Holland, H. Taiana Darius, Mireille Chinain, Patricia A. Tester, Damian Shea, Alex K.
Bogdanoff, James A. Morris, Harold A. Flores Quintana, Christopher R. Loeffler, Dayne Buddo, and R. Wayne Litaker, "Investiga-
tion of Ciguatoxins in Invasive Lionfish from the Greater Caribbean Region: Implications for Fishery Development," Plos One 13,
no. 6 (2018), doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0198358.
85 Hardison et al., “Investigation of Ciguatoxins.”
86 Ibid.
87 U.S. Department of Commerce and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, "Filleting the Lion," NOAA's
National Ocean Service, June 10, 2010, https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/news/weeklynews/june10/eatlionfish.html.
88 Amy McDermott, "Invasive Lionfish Are Delicious - but Is It Safe to Eat Them?" Oceana, June 21, 2017, https://oceana.org/
blog/invasive-lionfish-are-delicious-—-it-safe-eat-them-6.
89 Trevor Corson, The Story of Sushi.
destruction that the impending bluefin fisheries collapse poses.90,91,92 The Japanese fishing
industry should not have been able to exceed their bluefin catch allowance to the extent
that they had in 2004.93 Japan’s continued evasiveness of these quotas is inexcusable, and is
arguably the major inhibitor of bluefin recovery today.94 Further exchange and discussion
of research on this topic encourage greater transparency and media attention on the blue-
fin fisheries industry, bringing to light the extent to which the irresponsible commercial
activities of certain parties threaten the existence of this remarkable species.
bean Region: Implications for Fishery Development.” Plos One 13, no. 6 (2018).
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