165 PEOPLE VS CITY COURT OF MANILA, BR.
XI  OSG mentioned that the fiscal filed an urgent motion asking that the hearing and
GR NO. L-36342
APRIL 27, 1983
Topic: RULE 117; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; SUPERVENING EVENT
Petitioners: PEOPLE
Respondents: CITY COURT OF MANILA BR. XI AND FRANCISCO GAPAY
Ponente: RELOVA, J.
FACTS:
 This is a petition to review the order of the respondent court dismissing the information
for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide against Gapay on the ground of double
jeopardy. Respondent held that Gapay, who was tried and convicted of reckless
imprudence resulting serious physical injuries, w/c resulted in the victim’s death would
place Gapay in double jeopardy.
 The incident occurred on Oct. 17, 1971. Next day, an information was filed for reckless
imprudent resulting to serious physical injuries against Gapay and on such day, Diolito De
La Cruz died.
 Gapay was then arraigned for said charge and pleaded guilty hence was sentenced to 1
mos and 1 day of arresto mayor and served said sentence.
 Days later, another information was filed for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide
against Gapay to w/c respondent court dismissed due to double jeopardy.
o The respondent court applied People vs Buan, w/c provided that RPC 365 punishes the
negligent state of mind and not the resulting injury and the respondent concluded that
once prosecuted for and convicted of negligence, the accused cannot be prosecuted
again for the same negligence although it attained a different result.
ISSUE – WoN a person prosecuted for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical
injuries and convicted thereof may be prosecuted for reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide if the victim died due to injuries sustained
HELD/RATIO:
 Melo vs People: SC held that where after the 1st prosecution, a new fact supervenes for
w/c the accused is responsible, w/c changes the offense’s character and together w/ the
existing facts at that time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be
considered in double jeopardy if indicted for the 2nd offense to w/c respondent court did
not apply in this case.
 As a rule, that one who has been charged w/ an offense cannot be charged again for the
same offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. But as held in Melo,
the rule of identity does not apply when the 2nd offense was inexistent at the time of the
1st prosecution for the reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused
during 1st prosecution to be convicted for an offense that was inexistent.
 Thus where the accused was charged w/ physical injuries and after conviction the person
dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put in double jeopardy.
o In short, where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together
with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused
cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
 In this case, Diolito died when the 1st information was filed and was arraigned 2 days
later and when the 2nd information was filed, Gapay was already in jeopardy.
arraignment of this case be held in abeyance for there is information that Diolito died
hence said information would have to be amended.
 Be that as it may, the fact that Diolito died 1 day after the accident and Gapay was
arrested and was arraigned a few days later pleaded guilty and was sentenced hence
jeopardy has attached and no new supervening fact after the arraignment and conviction
of Gapay
FALLO: ACCORDINGLY, the order of dismissal of the lower court is affirmed.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
Concurring Opinion; J. Gutierrez Jr.
 Records are inadequate to show that the arraignment, while hasty and suspicious, was
fraudulent to sustain a finding that the State was denied due process.
 Knowing the volume of the case load in the City Court of Manila and the inevitably slow
pace of work even when urgency is dictated by the nature of cases with the Fiscal or
before the various salas, it is most surprising that the accused could have been arraigned
on October 20, 1972 for the charge of serious physical injuries only three days after the
incident, two days after the filing of the information, and two days after the death of the
victim. The accused does not appear to have been a detention prisoner necessitating his
immediate arraignment right after the filing of the information.
 The only sensible conclusion to draw from the above circumstances is that the accused
was hastily made to plead guilty to serious physical injuries to foreclose a charge for
homicide even before it could be filed.
 In such a case, there would be a trifling with the processes of justice and a collusive effort
amounting to fraud or deceit to deprive the State of its authority to prosecute an accused
for the correct offense. While this conclusion is most likely, it remains speculative,
however, because we have a criminal case before us. The records fail to show the results
of the investigation, if any was conducted to ascertain why the assistant city fiscal's
suspicions were not aroused when the case was hurriedly set for arraignment, contrary to
the usual procedures in the Manila City Court. Either the assistant city fiscal was naively
new to the job, or he was hopelessly negligent, or he connived with the accused, in which
case remedial measures are called for.
 At any rate, I concur in the affirmance of the order of dismissal in line with the many
protections that the Constitution and the laws give to the accused in criminal prosecutions.