G.R. No. 146111. February 23, 2004. People of The Philippines, Appellee, vs. Rolendo GAUDIA at "LENDOY" or "DODO", Appellant

4/5/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 423
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Gaudia
*
G.R. No. 146111. February 23, 2004.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROLENDO

GAUDIA @ “LENDOY” or “DODO”, appellant.
Criminal Law; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites; The ruling case

law is that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a
conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other
rational hypothesis except that of guilt.–Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the
Revised Rules of Court, conviction may be based on circumstantial
evidence provided three requisites concur: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The ruling case law is that
for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all
circumstances must be
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* EN BANC.
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VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 521
People vs. Gaudia
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
Same; Witnesses; It is hoary jurisprudence that mere relationship to
one of the parties, without a showing of any other improper motive, is not
sufficient basis to impair the credibility of the witness.–First, appellant’s
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000169e9474b091ed00872003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/16
attempt to discredit the testimony of Mik cannot succeed. It is true that Mik
is a relative by affinity of Amalia Loyola. It is hoary jurisprudence,
however, that mere relationship to one of the parties, without a showing of
any other improper motive, is not sufficient basis to impair the credibility of
the witness. In the case at bar, appellant cannot impute any ill motive for
Mik to testify adversely against him.
Same; Rape; Child Witnesses; Words and Phrases; Studies show that
children, particularly very young children, make the “perfect victims” of
rape; Certainly, children have more problems in providing accounts of
events because they do not understand everything they experience;
Moreover, children have a limited vocabulary; It must also be considered
that there is no actual counterpart for the word “rape” in Visayan
parlance.– Next, appellant tried to capitalize on the fact that Remelyn never
made any statement that he sexually molested her. This is a specious
argument. Remelyn had told her mother, “Crazy Lendoy forced me.”
Remelyn was 3 1/2 years old at the time. At such an infantile age, she could
not be expected to have a comprehension of the concept of rape. Studies
show that children, particularly very young children, make the “perfect
victims”. They naturally follow the authority of adults as the socialization
process teaches children that adults are to be respected. The child’s age and
developmental level will govern how much she comprehends about the
abuse and therefore how much it affects her. If the child is too young to
understand what has happened to her, the effects will be minimized because
she has no comprehension of the consequences. Certainly, children have
more problems in providing accounts of events because they do not
understand everything they experience. They do not have enough life
experiences from which to draw upon in making sense of what they see,
hear, taste, smell and feel. Moreover, they have a limited vocabulary. The
fact that Remelyn called appellant “Buang” or crazy shows that he did
something which she knew was not right or proper. By saying “iya kong
lugos,” Remelyn clearly conveyed that he forced her to do something bad.
With her limited comprehension, the child could not have a perfect way of
relating that she had been sexually abused. Finally, it must also be
considered that there is no actual counterpart for the word “rape” in Visayan
parlance.
522
People vs. Gaudia
Same; Same; Witnesses; Hearsay; Offers of Compromise; Res Inter

Alios Acta Principle; A witness can only testify on facts which are based on
his personal knowledge or perception; Following the principle of res inter
alios acta alteri nocere non debet, the actions of the accused’s parents in
offering to compromise cannot prejudice the accused, since he was not a
party to the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the
offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the victim.–Similarly,

appellant’s charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the
parents of the appellant to Amalia, and by the appellant himself to Amalia’s
husband should not have been taken against him by the trial court, even if
sustained, will not exculpate him. To be sure, the offer of compromise
allegedly made by appellant to Amalia Loyola’s husband is hearsay
evidence, and of no probative value. It was only Amalia who testified as to
the alleged offer, and she was not a party to the conversation which
allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A witness can only
testify on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or perception.
The offer of compromise allegedly made by the appellant’s parents to
Amalia may have been the subject of testimony of Amalia. However,
following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, the
actions of his parents cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a
party to the said conversation, nor was it shown that he was privy to the
offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the victim. They cannot
be considered as evidence against appellant but we reiterate that these errors
are not enough to reverse the conviction of the appellant.
Same; Same; Right to be Informed; Pleadings and Practice; Where the
Information merely described the rape victim as a “minor” and did not
allege that she was below seven years old, the accused was therefore
charged with simple rape only.–We now review the penalty of death
imposed upon appellant. In the case at bar, the Information states that
appellant, “by means of force and intimidation . . . willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously (had) carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against
her will to her damage and prejudice.” (emphasis ours) The Information did
not allege that Remelyn was below seven years old when she was violated.
Appellant was therefore charged with simple rape, under Section 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (the Death
Penalty Law). Upon its passage, R.A. No. 7659 introduced seven new
attendant circumstances, which when present, will transform the crime to
qualified rape, punishable by death. We again stress that these new attendant
circumstances must be properly pleaded in the information to justify the
imposition of the death penalty. The facts stated in the body of the
information determine the crime for which the accused stands charged and
for which he must be tried. The main purpose of requiring all the elements
of a crime to be set out in the information is to enable the accused to
suitably prepare his defense. It would be a denial of the right of the accused
to be informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a
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People vs. Gaudia
denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of

its qualified form punishable with death, although the attendant
circumstance qualifying the offense and resulting in capital punishment was
not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned.
AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Digos, Davao del Sur, Br. 19.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for appellant.
PUNO, J.:
There can be no greater violation of a person’s right to feel safe and

secure than the crime of rape. When one commits such a horrible act
on another, he degrades not only that person’s body; more
importantly, he defiles that person’s mind. When the victim is a little
child, the act and the perpetrator himself assume a bestiality beyond
the comprehension of normal human beings. Yet, the law must apply
equally upon saints and sinners alike, even to the most salacious
ruffian. 1
Before us is the Decision dated 10 July 2000 of Branch 19 of the
Regional Trial Court
2
of Digos, Davao del Sur, finding appellant
Rolendo Gaudia guilty of the crime of rape, meting upon him the
penalty of death, and ordering him to pay to private complainant
Remelyn Loyola the amounts of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
as moral damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary
damages, and costs of suit.
The Information filed against the accused-appellant reads as
follows:
“That on or about March 24, 1997 at about 6:30 o’clock in the evening, in
the Municipality of Hagonoy, Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, by
means of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor,
against her will to her damage and prejudice.”
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1 Written by RTC Judge Hilario I. Mapayo.

2 Also known by the name “Lendoy” or “Dodo”.
524

People vs. Gaudia
The prosecution presented Remelyn’s mother, Amalia Loyola, as its

primary witness. Amalia testified that on 24 March 1997, she left her
3 4
two children Remelyn (3 1/2 years old) and Kimberly (1 year old)
at their house in Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del Sur to gather pigs’ food
at Bulatukan. At the time, her husband was working in Tulunan,
South Cotabato. At about 4:00 in the afternoon, Amalia returned
home and could not find Remelyn. She went to fetch water and
proceeded to a neighbor to ask about the whereabouts of Remelyn.
Nobody could provide her any information. On her way home, she
shouted and called out Remelyn’s name. At about 6:00 p.m., Amalia
heard Remelyn calling out to her, “Ma, I am here,” from a grove of
5
ipil-ipil trees. Amalia rushed toward the place, but was met by
Remelyn at the mango trees, some thirty (30) meters from their
6
house. She found Remelyn crying, naked, nagbakaang (walking
with her legs spread apart) and with fresh and dried blood on her
body. Ipil-ipil leaves clung to her forehead. Blood was oozing from
her private organ. Amalia brought Remelyn home and washed her.
Upon closer inspection, she found a 7whitish mucuslike substance
coming from Remelyn’s private organ.
The following day, 2 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to
the house of a certain Tiya Coring, a quack doctor, for treatment.
Among the people present in the premises were the relatives and
8
parents of the appellant. The quack doctor found both dried blood
and fresh blood oozing in Remelyn’s vagina, and told 9
Amalia,
“Hoy! Amalia, your daughter was being (sic) raped.” At about
10:00 a.m., Tulon Mik, a neighbor, came and informed Amalia that
10
he had seen the appellant pass by her house and take Remelyn. At
this point, the parents of appellant told Amalia, “Mal, let us talk
about this matter, we will just settle this, we are willing to pay the
11
amount of P15,000.00, for the crime that my son committed.”
_______________
3 TSN, 5 January 1998, p. 4. According to Amalia Loyola, Remelyn was born on 9

August 1993.
4 Id., at p. 5.
5 Id., at p. 8.
6 Id., at p. 7.
7 Id., at pp. 5-7.
8 TSN, 5 January 1998, p. 19.
9 Id., at p. 8.
10 TSN, 5 January 1998, pp. 14-15, and TSN, 26 February 1998, pp. 4-5.
11 Id., at p. 19.
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People vs. Gaudia
Police officers came and brought Amalia, Remelyn and two

barangay officials (kagawads) to the police precinct
12
of Hagonoy for
investigation. Amalia’s statement was taken.
On 25 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the Hagonoy
Health Center13in Davao del Sur. Dr. Patricio Hernane, the municipal
health officer, conducted a genital examination of Remelyn, and
made the following findings:
GENITAL EXAMINATION:
Absence of Pubic Hair (Tanner Stage I). No contusions are noted on the
external genitalia. Dried blood are (sic) noted on the labia minora. Fresh
hymenal lacerations are noted at 12, 3, 6, 10 o’clock (sic) are noted with
fresh vaginal laceration noted at the posterior commissure but not extending
to the perineum. No lacerations were noted at the anal opening.
Speculum examination is not done because even exposure of the labia
minora make the child cry. (sic)
14
CONCLUSION: Physical virginity lost.
The doctor opined that the lacerations could have been caused15
by the
insertion of a foreign object, such as the penis of a man. On 26
16
March 1997, Amalia executed her affidavit complaint. Amalia
stated therein
17
that Remelyn had told her “Buang Lendoy iya kong
lugos.” (Meaning “crazy lendoy he forced me” in the Visayan
dialect.) Amalia confirmed in her testimony that two weeks after the
incident, Remelyn told her,18
“Ma, Lendoy is crazy, she (sic) brought
me to the ipil-ipil trees.”
The prosecution also presented Tulon Mik, Remelyn’s neighbor
and a barangay kagawad in their area. Mik testified that on 24
March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he and his wife were on their way
home after registering at the COMELEC office. They were in a
hurry as their child was running a fever. Mik saw appellant car-
_______________
12 TSN, 5 January 1998, p. 8.

13 TSN, 8 December 1997, p. 4.
14 Exhibits “A-2” and “A-3” for the prosecution, also Exhibit “1-C” for the
defense, p. 46 of the Original Records.
15 TSN, 8 December 1997, pp. 7-8.
16 Exhibit “B” for the prosecution, p. 5 of the Original Records.
17 Id.
18 TSN, 5 January 1998, p. 9.
526

People vs. Gaudia
19
19
rying a small girl in his arms. He identified the little girl as
Remelyn Loyola, daughter of Amalia Loyola. Appellant and
20
Remelyn were on their way toward the ipil-ipil trees.
The next morning, 25 March 1997, at about 7:00 a.m., a neighbor
informed Mik that Remelyn had been raped. He proceeded to the
house of the quack doctor where Amalia brought Remelyn for
examination. Amalia confirmed to Mik that Remelyn had been
raped. Mik told Amalia that appellant committed the crime. Mik
21
then informed Barangay Official Rodrigo Malud and the other
tanods of the incident. They were instructed to locate the appellant.
They passed to the police the information that appellant was in
Barangay Mahayahay. The policemen came and took appellant for
22
investigation.
The appellant, ROLENDO GAUDIA, interposed the defense of
alibi. He averred that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m., he went
to the Barangay Center to register at the COMELEC for the National
Elections. With him was Totong Loyola, the brother-in-law of
Amalia Loyola. They finished at 5:00 p.m., left and repaired to the
house of Catalina Cabano, appellant’s aunt, to ask for vinegar for
their kinilaw (a dish composed of raw fish steeped in vinegar). They
found Daylen Cabano, the small grandchild of Catalina, alone at her
house. Daylen was crying, hence, they brought her with them as they
proceeded to the place where Catalina was collecting tuba
23
(fermented coconut wine). It was appellant who carried Daylen.
They reached Catalina’s place after 5:00 p.m. Thereafter, they went
to the house of appellant. Dodo Malon and appellant’s parents were
in the house. At around 9:00 p.m., Totong and Dodo Malon left,
after partaking of the kinilaw. Appellant stayed home. The following
morning (25 March 1997), appellant and Dodo Milon went to the
river to fish. At about 12:00 noon, appellant repaired to the house of
his aunt, Victoria Gayod, in Mahayahay to drink tuba. He was
24
located by the police and investigated. He claimed that it was
Daylen and not the victim Remelyn whom he was carrying.
_______________
19 Exhibit “D” for the prosecution, p. 6 of the Original Records.

20 TSN, 26 February 1998, pp. 4-5.
21 Id., at p. 9.
22 Id., at p. 7.
23 Id., at pp. 6-10.
24 Id., at p. 10.
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People vs. Gaudia
As corroborative witness, appellant presented Alex “Totong”

Loyola. Totong testified that on 24 March 1997, at about 4:00 p.m.,
they registered as voters in the barangay. After registering, they went
home to appellant’s house, but again left to get vinegar from his aunt
Catalina Cabano, for their kinilaw. In Catalina’s house, they found
her drunk husband, her 10-year old daughter, and her 3-year old
25
grandchild Daylen. Catalina’s daughter directed them to the place
where she was gathering tuba. As Daylen was crying, appellant
carried her on their way to Catalina. It was then about 4:00 p.m.
After Catalina finished gathering tuba, the four of them–appellant,
Totong, Catalina and Daylen, left together and repaired to Catalina’s
house for the vinegar. Appellant and Totong returned to appellant’s
26
house where they spent the night. Totong woke up at 6:00 a.m. the
following day, and left appellant’s house. Totong came to know of
27
appellant’s arrest the following day.
Catalina Cabano also corroborated appellant’s story. She relates
that on 24 March 1997, she was gathering tuba, at a place around 2
kilometers from her house. She left Maritess, her youngest child and
28
Daylen, her grandchild, at her house. At about 5:30 p.m., appellant
and Totong arrived. Appellant was carrying Daylen. They waited for
Catalina to finish gathering tuba until 6:00 p.m. Appellant and
Totong went to the former’s house, had a drinking spree, and then
parted ways at about 6:30 p.m. That night, according to Catalina, she
talked to Tulon Mik at the premises near the house. Mik was looking
for Remelyn. At that time, appellant was already at the house of
Catalina’s younger sister, which is located across the river, about 4
29
kilometers away.
After trial, the trial court found that there was sufficient
circumstantial evidence to convict appellant for the crime of rape
with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was below seven
years of age. Appellant was sentenced to death and ordered to
indemnify the victim the sums of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
as moral damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary
damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
_______________
25 TSN, 16 July 1999, p. 7.

26 Id., at pp. 4-7.
27 Id., at pp. 9-10.
28 TSN, 16 July 1999, pp. 11-13.
29 Id., at p. 15.
528

People vs. Gaudia
30
30
In his Brief to the Court, appellant assigned the following errors in
the judgment of the trial court:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT, ROLANDO (sic) GAUDIA DESPITE THE FACT THAT
HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
EVEN GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT ACCUSED-

APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED, THE TRIAL
COURT STILL ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF
DEATH DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO STATE
WITH CERTAINTY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF AGE IN
THE INFORMATION.
We convict appellant for simple rape, and not for qualified rape.
Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court,
conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence provided three
requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The ruling case law is that for
circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent
31
and with every
other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
The first circumstantial evidence against the appellant is the
testimony of prosecution witness Tulon Mik that at 4:00 p.m. on 24
March 1997, he saw him carrying Remelyn toward the direction of
32
the ipil-ipil grove, some 130 meters from her house. As a neighbor
and relative of Remelyn’s stepfather, Mik had sufficient familiarity
with the child Remelyn. The possibility that he could have been
mistaken in identifying the victim is nil.
The second circumstantial evidence against the appellant is
Amalia’s testimony that Remelyn emerged naked from the same
_______________
30 Rollo, pp. 37-45.

31 People v. Gallarde, 325 SCRA 835 (2000).
32 TSN, 26 February 1998, p. 11.
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People vs. Gaudia
ipil-ipil grove, with ipil-ipil leaves clinging to her forehead.

Remelyn was crying and walking with her legs spread far apart.
Remelyn’s private organ was bleeding and excreting a white mucus-
33
like substance.
The third circumstantial evidence against appellant is Remelyn’s
statement to her mother that it was appellant who had brought her to
34 35
the ipil-ipil grove and forced her to do something against her will.
There is no question that Remelyn was violated. After examining
Remelyn, Dr. Patricio Hernane, the Municipal Health Officer of
Hagonoy, found her to have a broken hymen, as well as fresh
vaginal lacerations.
From these, the culpability of the appellant can be inferred with
moral certainty. All the aforementioned circumstances have been
indubitably proven, both by the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by the prosecution, and by the inability of the
appellant to discredit their veracity.
The attempt of appellant to discredit the circumstantial evidence
against him is futile. Appellant contends, first, that Tulon Mik’s
testimony is weak, on the ground that Mik is a relative of the
36
husband of Amalia. He also questions the credibility of Mik
because of his failure to confront appellant when he saw him
carrying Remelyn. Neither did Mik inform Amalia about what he
saw when Amalia was looking for Remelyn. Appellant insists that it
was Daylen whom he carried and not Remelyn. Second, he stresses
the fact that Remelyn did not make any categorical statement that he
sexually molested her. Third, he maintains that the accusation of
flight against him is false. Fourth, he avers that the offer of
compromise by his parents as tendered to Amalia Loyola should not
37
be taken against him, while the offer of compromise he allegedly
made to Amalia’s husband, as relayed by Amalia in her testimony,
38
should be excluded as evidence for being hearsay. Finally, he
_______________
33 TSN, 5 January 1998.

35 TSN, 5 January 1998, p. 9.
36 TSN, 5 January 1998, p. 6, as quoted in p. 7 of Appellant’s Brief, p. 38, Rollo.
37 Sec. 28, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
38 Sec. 36, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
530

People vs. Gaudia
submits that inconsistencies in the testimony of Alex Loyola and

Cabano should not be counted against him on the ground that any
finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the prosecution’s
evidence.
We reject appellant’s arguments.
First, appellant’s attempt to discredit the testimony of Mik cannot
succeed. It is true that Mik is a relative by affinity of Amalia Loyola.
It is hoary jurisprudence, however, that mere relationship to one of
the parties, without a showing of any other improper motive,
39
is not
sufficient basis to impair the credibility of the witness. In the case
at bar, appellant cannot impute any ill motive for Mik to testify
adversely against him.
Appellant questions the failure of Mik to challenge him why he
was carrying Remelyn. Also, he assails Mik for failing to inform
Amalia Loyola of such a sight. Mik had an explanation for the
inadvertence. He said his own child was down with a fever, and he
40
and his wife were hurrying home. For this same reason, he
revealed the fact that he saw appellant carrying Remelyn toward the
ipil-ipil grove only when he learned of Remelyn’s fate. But
thereafter, he lost no time in reporting the matter to the barangay
41
chairman. As a barangay kagawad, he also assisted 42
in the pursuit
and arrest of appellant at Barangay Mahayahay. These subsequent
actions strengthen Mik’s credibility.
The trial court accorded more credence to Mik’s narration of the
events over the testimonies of Cabano and Loyola. It is a
cornerstone of our jurisprudence that the trial judge’s evaluation of
the testimony of a witness and its factual findings are accorded not
only the highest respect, but also finality, unless some weighty
circumstance has been ignored or misunderstood which could alter
the result of the judgment rendered. In the case at bar, there is no
irregularity in the assessment of evidence by the lower court. It
granted utmost credibility to Mik’s testimony. Given the direct
opportunity to observe the witness on the stand, the trial judge was
in a vantage position to assess his demeanor and determine if
_______________
39 People vs. Antonio, 303 SCRA 414 (1999).

40 TSN, 26 February 1998, p. 11.
41 Id., at p. 6.
42 Id., at p. 7.
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People vs. Gaudia
43
43
he was telling the truth or not. The trial court found Mik’s
testimony more worthy of credence over those of Catalina and
Loyola. We have no reason to reverse its findings.
Next, appellant tried to capitalize on the fact that Remelyn never
made any statement that he sexually molested her. This is a specious
argument. Remelyn had told her mother, “Crazy Lendoy forced
44
me.” Remelyn was 3 1/2 years old at the time. At such an infantile
age, she could not be expected to have a comprehension of the
concept of rape. Studies show that children, particularly very young
children, make the “perfect victims”. They naturally follow the
authority of adults as the socialization process teaches children that
adults are to be respected. The child’s age and developmental level
will govern how much she comprehends about the abuse and
therefore how much it affects her. If the child is too young to
understand what has happened to her, the effects will be minimized
because she has no comprehension of the consequences. Certainly,
children have more problems in providing accounts of events
because they do not understand everything they experience. They do
not have enough life experiences from which to draw upon in
making sense of what they see, hear, taste, smell and feel. Moreover,
45
they have a limited vocabulary. The fact that Remelyn called
appellant “Buang” or crazy shows that he did something which she
knew was not right or proper. By saying “iya kong lugos,” Remelyn
clearly conveyed that he forced her to do something bad. With her
limited comprehension, the child could not have a perfect way of
relating that she had been sexually abused. Finally, it must also be
considered that there is no actual counterpart for the word “rape” in
Visayan parlance.
Appellant’s charge that the trial court erred when it ruled that he
fled arrest, even if correct, is not pivotal to his guilt. There are
enough pieces of circumstantial evidence to convict him. Neither
_______________
43 People vs. Manalo, G.R. Nos. 144989-90, 31 January 2003, 396 SCRA 573;
People vs. Glabo, 371 SCRA 567 (2001); People vs. Navida, 346 SCRA 821 (2000);
People vs. Valla, 323 SCRA 74 (2000); People vs. Lopez, 302 SCRA 669 (1999).
45 Goldstein, Seth L., “The Sexual Exploitation of Children, A Practical Guide to
Assessment, Investigation and Intervention, 2nd Edition,” CRC Press LLC: 1999.
532

People vs. Gaudia
will it affect the penalty or the award of damages rendered against

him.
Similarly, appellant’s charge that the offers of compromise

allegedly made by the parents of the appellant to Amalia, and by the
appellant himself to Amalia’s husband should not have been taken
against him by the trial court, even if sustained, will not exculpate
him. To be sure, the offer of compromise allegedly made by
appellant to Amalia Loyola’s husband is hearsay evidence, and of no
probative
46
value. It was only Amalia who testified as to the alleged
offer, and she was not a party to the conversation which allegedly
transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal Jail. A witness can only testify
47
on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or perception.
The offer of compromise allegedly made by the appellant’s parents
48
to Amalia may have been the subject of testimony of Amalia.
However, following
49
the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere
non debet, the actions of his parents cannot prejudice the appellant,
since he was not a party to the said conversation, nor was it shown
that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the
mother of the victim. They cannot be considered as evidence against
appellant but we reiterate that these errors are not enough to reverse
the conviction of the appellant.
Appellant’s defense hardly impresses. It is interesting to note that
appellant and his witnesses claim that it was at around 5:00 p.m.
when appellant carried the child Daylen toward her grandmother
Catalina at the place where she was gathering tuba. Mik testified that
it was around 4:00 p.m. when he saw appellant carrying Remelyn
toward the ipil-ipil grove. Given the 130-meter distance between the
ipil-ipil grove and the houses of appellant and of Amalia Loyola,
appellant could have easily taken Remelyn from her house, raped
her at the ipil-ipil grove, and left her there, all in a matter of a few
minutes. Sometime past 4:00 p.m., he could then have returned to
his house, and together with Alex Loyola, proceeded to the
COMELEC office to register, and did all the subsequent acts he
claims to have done.
_______________
46 Id., at p. 20.
47 Section 36, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court.
48 TSN, 25 January 1998, p. 19.
49 As codified in Section 28, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court.
533
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 533

People vs. Gaudia
The Court also notes the inconsistencies in the testimonies of

Catalina and Loyola. The discrepancies in the witnesses’ narration
as to the time of arrival of appellant at the place where Catalina was
gathering tuba, his time of arrival at his own house, and the time
when Loyola and appellant actually parted ways, are not mere trivial
details which could be forgotten by witnesses because of the passage
of time. To make matters worse, the appellant’s testimony was, at
times, contradicted by his own witnesses. Particularly telling was the
conflict between appellant’s statement that Totong had already left
his house on the night of 24 March 1997 and Totong and Catalina’s
own averments that Totong had stayed the night at appellant’s house.
These contradictory testimonies only made more incredulous
appellant’s tale.
We now review the penalty of death imposed upon appellant. In
the case at bar, the Information states that appellant, “by means of
force and intimidation . . . willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
(had) carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against her
50
will to her damage and prejudice.” (emphasis ours)The
Information did not allege that Remelyn was below seven years old
when she was violated. Appellant was therefore charged with simple
rape, under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659 (the Death Penalty Law). Upon its passage,
R.A. No. 7659 introduced seven new attendant circumstances, which
when present, will transform the crime to qualified rape, punishable
by death. We again stress that these new attendant circumstances
must be properly pleaded in the information to justify the imposition
of the death penalty. The facts stated in the body of the information
determine the crime for which the accused stands charged and for
51
which he must be tried. The main purpose of requiring all the
elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to enable the
accused to suitably prepare his defense. It would be a denial of the
right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and,
consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple
rape and be convicted of its qualified form punishable with death,
although the attendant circumstance qualifying the offense and
resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on
52
which he was arraigned.
_______________
50 Original Records, p. 2. Emphasis ours.

51 People vs. Lim San, 17 Phil. 273 (1910).
52 People vs. David Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 (1997).
534

People vs. Gaudia
We now review the damages awarded by the trial court. Time and
again, we have ruled that when there is a finding that rape had been
53
53
committed, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory. If
the death penalty has been imposed, the indemnity should be
P75,000.00; otherwise the victim is entitled to P50,000.00 for each
54
count of rape. Thus, the appellant is ordered to pay the amount of
55
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to Remelyn Loyola.
We affirm the award of moral damages. This is automatically
awarded in rape cases without need of further proof other than the
commission of the crime, as it is assumed that a rape victim has
56
suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award.
We also find the award of exemplary damages made by the lower
court in favor of complainant as proper because complainant has
been correctly granted moral damages and the offense against her
57
was committed with the aggravating circumstance of age.
However, the amount awarded must be reduced to P25,000.00 in
58
line with prevailing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 19, of Digos, Davao del Sur in Criminal Case No.
213(97) is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is found guilty of the
crime of simple rape, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay to complainant Remelyn
Loyola the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages. Costs against the appellant.
_______________
53 People vs. Biong, G.R. Nos. 144445-47, 30 April 2003, 402 SCRA 366; People
vs. Tagud, Sr., 375 SCRA 291 (2002).
54 Id.
55 People vs. Biong, G.R. Nos. 144445-47, 30 April 2003, 402 SCRA 366; People
vs. Invencion, G.R. No. 131636, 5 March 2003, 398 SCRA 592.
56 People vs. Prades, 355 Phil. 150; 293 SCRA 411 (1998).
57 People vs. Tabugoca, G.R. No. 125334, January 28, 1998, 285 SCRA 312.
58 People vs. Umbaa, G.R. Nos. 146862-64, 30 April 2003, 402 SCRA 415;
People vs. Villanueva, G.R. Nos. 146464-67, 15 November 2002, 391 SCRA 718;
People vs. Barcelon, Jr., 389 SCRA 556 (2002); People vs. Lilo, G.R. Nos. 140736-
39, 4 February 2003, 396 SCRA 674; People vs. Francisco, G.R. No. 135200, 351
SCRA 351 (2001).
535
VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 535

People vs. Catbagan
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-

Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Judgment modified.
Notes.–The admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation

of the constitutional provision that the accused shall enjoy the right
to confront the witnesses testifying against him and to cross-
examine them–a conviction based alone on proof that violates the
constitutional right of an accused is a nullity and the court that
rendered it acted without jurisdiction in its rendition. (People vs.
Mamalias, 328 SCRA 760 [2000])
A private certification is hearsay where the person who issued the
same was never presented as a witness, and the same is true of
letters. (Tin vs. People, 362 SCRA 594 [2001])
––o0o––
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G.R. No. 146111. February 23, 2004. People of The Philippines, Appellee, vs. Rolendo GAUDIA at "LENDOY" or "DODO", Appellant

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G.R. No. 146111. February 23, 2004. People of The Philippines, Appellee, vs. Rolendo GAUDIA at "LENDOY" or "DODO", Appellant

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4/5/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 423

520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROLENDO

Criminal Law; Circumstantial Evidence; Requisites; The ruling case

VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 521

People vs. Gaudia

522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Gaudia

Same; Same; Witnesses; Hearsay; Offers of Compromise; Res Inter

offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the victim.–Similarly,

VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 523

People vs. Gaudia

denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted of

AUTOMATIC REVIEW of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

There can be no greater violation of a person’s right to feel safe and

1 Written by RTC Judge Hilario I. Mapayo.

524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The prosecution presented Remelyn’s mother, Amalia Loyola, as its

3 TSN, 5 January 1998, p. 4. According to Amalia Loyola, Remelyn was born on 9

VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 525

Police ofﬁcers came and brought Amalia, Remelyn and two

12 TSN, 5 January 1998, p. 8.

526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

19 Exhibit “D” for the prosecution, p. 6 of the Original Records.

VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 527

As corroborative witness, appellant presented Alex “Totong”

25 TSN, 16 July 1999, p. 7.

528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

EVEN GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT ACCUSED-

30 Rollo, pp. 37-45.

VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 529

ipil-ipil grove, with ipil-ipil leaves clinging to her forehead.

33 TSN, 5 January 1998.

530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

submits that inconsistencies in the testimony of Alex Loyola and

39 People vs. Antonio, 303 SCRA 414 (1999).

VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 531

532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

will it affect the penalty or the award of damages rendered against

Similarly, appellant’s charge that the offers of compromise

VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 533

The Court also notes the inconsistencies in the testimonies of

50 Original Records, p. 2. Emphasis ours.

534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 423, FEBRUARY 23, 2004 535

Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-

Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Notes.–The admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation

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