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b. Public v private international law; propriety of the application of norms of public international
law to private persons
OPINION OF THE COURT
SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
542 U. S. ____ (2004)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NOS. 03-339 AND 03-485
JOSE FRANCISCO SOSA, PETITIONER
03–339 v.
HUMBERTO ALVAREZ-MACHAIN et al.
UNITED STATES, PETITIONER
03–485 v.
HUMBERTO ALVAREZ-MACHAIN et al.
on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
[June 29, 2004]
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court.
The two issues are whether respondent Alvarez-Machain’s allegation that the Drug
Enforcement Administration instigated his abduction from Mexico for criminal trial in the United
States supports a claim against the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA or
Act), 28 U. S. C. §1346(b)(1), §§2671–2680, and whether he may recover under the Alien Tort
Statute (ATS), 28 U. S. C. §1350. We hold that he is not entitled to a remedy under either
statute.
I Ninth Circuit held that, because “the DEA had no authority to effect Alvarez’s arrest and
We have considered the underlying facts before, United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U. S.
655 (1992). In 1985, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Enrique
Camarena-Salazar, was captured on assignment in Mexico and taken to a house in
Guadalajara, where he was tortured over the course of a 2-day interrogation, then murdered.
Based in part on eyewitness testimony, DEA officials in the United States came to believe that
respondent Humberto Alvarez-Machain (Alvarez), a Mexican physician, was present at the
house and acted to prolong the agent’s life in order to extend the interrogation and torture. Id., at
657.
In 1990, a federal grand jury indicted Alvarez for the torture and murder of Camarena-Salazar,
and the United States District Court for the Central District of California issued a warrant for his
arrest. 331 F. 3d 604, 609 (CA9 2003) (en banc). The DEA asked the Mexican Government for
help in getting Alvarez into the United States, but when the requests and negotiations proved
fruitless, the DEA approved a plan to hire Mexican nationals to seize Alvarez and bring him to
the United States for trial. As so planned, a group of Mexicans, including petitioner Jose
Francisco Sosa, abducted Alvarez from his house, held him overnight in a motel, and brought
him by private plane to El Paso, Texas, where he was arrested by federal officers. Ibid.
Once in American custody, Alvarez moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his
seizure was “outrageous governmental conduct,” Alvarez-Machain, 504 U. S., at 658, and
violated the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. The District Court agreed,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed, and we reversed, id., at 670, holding that the fact of Alvarez’s forcible
seizure did not affect the jurisdiction of a federal court. The case was tried in 1992, and ended at
the close of the Government’s case, when the District Court granted Alvarez’s motion for a
judgment of acquittal.
In 1993, after returning to Mexico, Alvarez began the civil action before us here. He sued
Sosa, Mexican citizen and DEA operative Antonio Garate-Bustamante, five unnamed Mexican
civilians, the United States, and four DEA agents. 331 F. 3d, at 610. So far as it matters here,
Alvarez sought damages from the United States under the FTCA, alleging false arrest, and from
Sosa under the ATS, for a violation of the law of nations. The former statute authorizes suit “for
… personal injury … caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U. S. C. §1346(b)(1).
The latter provides in its entirety that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.” §1350.
The District Court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss the FTCA claim, but awarded
summary judgment and $25,000 in damages to Alvarez on the ATS claim. A three-judge panel of
the Ninth Circuit then affirmed the ATS judgment, but reversed the dismissal of the FTCA claim.
266 F. 3d 1045 (2001).
A divided en banc court came to the same conclusion. 331 F. 3d, at 641. As for the ATS claim,
the court called on its own precedent, “that [the ATS] not only provides federal courts with
subject matter jurisdiction, but also creates a cause of action for an alleged violation of the law of
nations.” Id., at 612. The Circuit then relied upon what it called the “clear and universally
recognized norm prohibiting arbitrary arrest and detention,” id., at 620, to support the conclusion
that Alvarez’s arrest amounted to a tort in violation of international law. On the FTCA claim, the
detention in Mexico,” id., at 608, the United States was liable to him under California law for the
tort of false arrest, id., at 640–641.
We granted certiorari in these companion cases to clarify the scope of both the FTCA and the
ATS. 540 U. S. 1045 (2003). We now reverse in each.
II
The Government seeks reversal of the judgment of liability under the FTCA on two principal
grounds. It argues that the arrest could not have been tortious, because it was authorized by 21
U. S. C. §878, setting out the arrest authority of the DEA, and it says that in any event the
liability asserted here falls within the FTCA exception to waiver of sovereign immunity for claims
“arising in a foreign country,” 28 U. S. C. §2680(k). We think the exception applies and decide on
that ground.
A
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The FTCA “was designed primarily to remove the sovereign immunity of the United States
from suits in tort and, with certain specific exceptions, to render the Government liable in tort as
a private individual would be under like circumstances.” Richards v. United States, 369 U. S. 1, 6
(1962); see also 28 U. S. C. §2674. The Act accordingly gives federal district courts jurisdiction
over claims against the United States for injury “caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”
§1346(b)(1). But the Act also limits its waiver of sovereign immunity in a number of ways. See
§2680 (no waiver as to, e.g., “[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent
transmission of letters or postal matter,” “[a]ny claim for damages caused by the imposition or
establishment of a quarantine by the United States,” or “[a]ny claim arising from the activities of
the Panama Canal Company”).
Here the significant limitation on the waiver of immunity is the Act’s exception for “[a]ny claim
arising in a foreign country,” §2680(k), a provision that on its face seems plainly applicable to the
facts of this case. In the Ninth Circuit’s view, once Alvarez was within the borders of the United
States, his detention was not tortious, see 331 F. 3d, at 636–637; the appellate court suggested
that the Government’s liability to Alvarez rested solely upon a false arrest claim. Id., at 640–641.
Alvarez’s arrest, however, was said to be “false,” and thus tortious, only because, and only to the
extent that, it took place and endured in Mexico.[Footnote 1] The actions in Mexico are thus
most naturally understood as the kernel of a “claim arising in a foreign country,” and barred from
suit under the exception to the waiver of immunity.
Notwithstanding the straightforward language of the foreign country exception, the Ninth
Circuit allowed the action to proceed under what has come to be known as the “headquarters
doctrine.” Some Courts of Appeals, reasoning that “[t]he entire scheme of the FTCA focuses on
the place where the negligent or wrongful act or omission of the government employee
occurred,” Sami v. United States, 617 F. 2d 755, 761 (CADC 1979), have concluded that the
foreign country exception does not exempt the United States from suit “for acts or omissions
occurring here which have their operative effect in another country.” Id., at 762 (refusing to apply
§2680(k) where a communiqué sent from the United States by a federal law enforcement officer
resulted in plaintiff’s wrongful detention in Germany).[Footnote 2] Headquarters claims “typically
involve allegations of negligent guidance in an office within the United States of employees who
cause damage while in a foreign country, or of activities which take place within a foreign
country.”Cominotto v. United States, 802 F. 2d 1127, 1130 (CA9 1986). In such instances, these
courts have concluded that §2680(k) does not bar suit.
The reasoning of the Ninth Circuit here was that, since Alvarez’s abduction in Mexico was the
direct result of wrongful acts of planning and direction by DEA agents located in California,
“Alvarez’s abduction fits the headquarters doctrine like a glove.” 331 F. 3d, at 638.
“Working out of DEA offices in Los Angeles, [DEA agents] made the decision to kidnap Alvarez
and … gave [their Mexican intermediary] precise instructions on whom to recruit, how to seize
Alvarez, and how he should be treated during the trip to the United States. DEA officials in
Washington, D. C., approved the details of the operation. After Alvarez was abducted according
to plan, DEA agents supervised his transportation into the United States, telling the arrest team
where to land the plane and obtaining clearance in El Paso for landing. The United States, and
California in particular, served as command central for the operation carried out in Mexico.” Id.,
at 638–639.
Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that Alvarez’s claim did not “aris[e] in” a foreign country.
The potential effect of this sort of headquarters analysis flashes the yellow caution light. “[I]t
will virtually always be possible to assert that the negligent activity that injured the plaintiff
[abroad] was the consequence of faulty training, selection or supervision—or even less than
that, lack of careful training, selection or supervision—in the United States.”Beattie v. United
States, 756 F. 2d 91, 119 (CADC 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Legal malpractice
claims, Knisley v. United States, 817 F. Supp. 680, 691– 693 (SD Ohio 1993), allegations of
negligent medical care, Newborn v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 2d 145, 148–149 (DC 2002),
and even slip-and-fall cases, Eaglin v. United States, Dept. of Army, 794 F. 2d 981, 983–984
(CA5 1986), can all be repackaged as headquarters claims based on a failure to train, a failure
to warn, the offering of bad advice, or the adoption of a negligent policy. If we were to approve
the headquarters exception to the foreign country exception, the “ ‘headquarters claim’ [would]
become a standard part of FTCA litigation” in cases potentially implicating the foreign country
exception. Beattie, supra, at 119 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The headquarters doctrine threatens to
swallow the foreign country exception whole, certainly at the pleadings stage.
The need for skepticism is borne out by two considerations. One of them is pertinent to cases
like this one, where harm was arguably caused both by individual action in a foreign country as
well as by planning in the United States; the other is suggested simply because the harm
occurred on foreign soil.
B
Although not every headquarters case is rested on an explicit analysis of proximate causation,
this notion of cause is necessary to connect the domestic breach of duty (at headquarters) with
the action in the foreign country (in a case like this) producing the foreign harm or injury. It is
necessary, in other words, to conclude that the act or omission at home headquarters was
sufficiently close to the ultimate injury, and sufficiently important in producing it, to make it
reasonable to follow liability back to the headquarters behavior. Only in this way could the
behavior at headquarters properly be seen as the act or omission on which all FTCA liability
must rest under §2675. See, e.g., Cominotto, supra, at 1130 (“[A] headquarters claim exists
where negligent acts in the United States proximately cause harm in a foreign
country”); Eaglin, supra, at 983 (noting that headquarters cases require “a plausible proximate
nexus or connection between acts or omissions in the United States and the resulting damage
or injury in a foreign country”).
Recognizing this connection of proximate cause between domestic behavior and foreign harm
or injury is not, however, sufficient of itself to bar application of the foreign country exception to a
claim resting on that same foreign consequence. Proximate cause is causation substantial
enough and close enough to the harm to be recognized by law, but a given proximate cause
need not be, and frequently is not, the exclusive proximate cause of harm. See, e.g., 57A Am.
Jur. 2d §529 (2004) (discussing proper jury instructions in cases involving multiple proximate
causes); Beattie, supra, at 121 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]n the ordinary case there may
be several points along the chain of causality” pertinent to the enquiry). Here, for example,
assuming that the direction by DEA officials in California was a proximate cause of the
abduction, the actions of Sosa and others in Mexico were just as surely proximate causes, as
well. Thus, understanding that California planning was a legal cause of the harm in no way
eliminates the conclusion that the claim here arose from harm proximately caused by acts in
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Mexico. At most, recognition of additional domestic causation under the headquarters doctrine Ohio); Cameron v. Vandergriff, 53 Ark. 381, 13 S. W. 1092 (1890) (Arkansas law applied where
leaves an open question whether the exception applies to the claim. a blasting of a rock in Indian territory inflicted injury on plaintiff in Arkansas).

C The application of foreign substantive law exemplified in these cases was, however, what
Congress intended to avoid by the foreign country exception. In 1942, the House Committee on
the Judiciary considered an early draft of the FTCA that would have exempted all claims “arising
Not only does domestic proximate causation under the headquarters doctrine fail to eliminate
in a foreign country in behalf of an alien.” H. R. 5373, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., §303(12). The bill
application of the foreign country exception, but there is good reason to think that Congress
was then revised, at the suggestion of the Attorney General, to omit the last five words. In
understood a claim “arising in” a foreign country in such a way as to bar application of the
explaining the amendment to the House Committee on the Judiciary, Assistant Attorney General
headquarters doctrine. There is good reason, that is, to conclude that Congress understood a
Shea said that
claim “arising in a foreign country” to be a claim for injury or harm occurring in a foreign country.
28 U. S. C. §2680(k). This sense of “arising in” was the common usage in state borrowing
statutes contemporary with the Act, which operated to determine which State’s statute of “[c]laims arising in a foreign country have been exempted from this bill, H. R. 6463, whether or
limitations should apply in cases involving transjurisdictional facts. When the FTCA was passed, not the claimant is an alien. Since liability is to be determined by the law of the situs of the
the general rule, as set out in various state statutes, was that “a cause of action arising in wrongful act or omission it is wise to restrict the bill to claims arising in this country. This seems
another jurisdiction, which is barred by the laws of that jurisdiction, will [also] be barred in the desirable because the law of the particular State is being applied. Otherwise, it will lead I think to
domestic courts.” 41 A. L. R. 4th 1025, 1029, §2 (1985). These borrowing statutes were typically a good deal of difficulty.” Hearings on H. R. 5373 et al. before the House Committee on the
restricted by express terms to situations where a cause of action was time barred in the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 35 (1942).
State “where [the] cause of action arose, or accrued, or originated.” 75 A. L. R. 203, 211 (1931)
(emphasis in original). Critically for present purposes, these variations on the theme of “arising
The amended version, which was enacted into law and constitutes the current text of the foreign
in” were interpreted in tort cases in just the same way that we read the FTCA today. A
country exception, 28 U. S. C. §2680(k), thus codified Congress’s “unwilling[ness] to subject the
commentator noted in 1962 that, for the purposes of these borrowing statutes, “[t]he courts
United States to liabilities depending upon the laws of a foreign power.” United
unanimously hold that a cause of action sounding in tort arises in the jurisdiction where the last
States v. Spelar, 338 U. S. 217, 221 (1949). See also Sami v. United States, 617 F. 2d, at 762
act necessary to establish liability occurred”; i.e., “the jurisdiction in which injury was received.”
(noting Spelar’s explanation but attempting to recast the object behind the foreign country
Ester, Borrowing Statutes of Limitation and Conflict of Laws, 15 U. Fla. L. Rev. 33, 47.
exception); Leaf v. United States, 588 F. 2d 733, 736, n. 3 (CA9 1978).

There is, moreover, specific reason to believe that using “arising in” as referring to place of
harm was central to the object of the foreign country exception. Any tort action in a court of the
United States based on the acts of a Government employee causing harm outside the State of
the district court in which the action is filed requires a determination of the source of the
substantive law that will govern liability. When the FTCA was passed, the dominant principle in
choice of law analysis for tort cases was lex loci delicti: courts generally applied the law of the
place where the injury occurred. See Richards v. United States, 369 U. S., at 11–12 (“The
general conflict-of-laws rule, followed by a vast majority of the States, is to apply the law of the
place of injury to the substantive rights of the parties” (footnote omitted)); see also Restatement
(First) of Conflict of Laws §379 (1934) (defendant’s liability determined by “the law of the place of
wrong”);[Footnote 3] id., §377, Note 1 (place of wrong for torts involving bodily harm is “the
place where the harmful forcetakes effect upon the body” (emphasis in original)); ibid. (same
principle for torts of fraud and torts involving harm to property).[Footnote 4] For a plaintiff injured
in a foreign country, then, the presumptive choice in American courts under the traditional rule
would have been to apply foreign law to determine the tortfeasor’s liability. See, e.g., Day &
Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U. S. 3 (1975) (per curiam) (noting that Texas would apply
Cambodian law to wrongful-death action involving explosion in Cambodia of an artillery round
manufactured in United States); Thomas v. FMC Corp., 610 F. Supp. 912 (MD Ala. 1985)
(applying German law to determine American manufacturer’s liability for negligently designing
and manufacturing a Howitzer that killed decedent in Germany); Quandt v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
317 F. Supp. 1009 (Del. 1970) (noting that Italian law applies to allegations of negligent
manufacture in Kansas that resulted in an airplane crash in Italy); Manos v. Trans World Airlines,
295 F. Supp. 1170 (ND Ill. 1969) (applying Italian law to determine American corporation’s
liability for negligent manufacture of a plane that crashed in Italy); see
also, e.g., Dallas v. Whitney, 118 W. Va. 106, 188 S. E. 766 (1936) (Ohio law applied where
blasting operations on a West Virginia highway caused property damage in
The object being to avoid application of substantive foreign law, Congress evidently used the
modifier “arising in a foreign country” to refer to claims based on foreign harm or injury, the fact
that would trigger application of foreign law to determine liability. That object, addressed by the
quoted phrase, would obviously have been thwarted, however, by applying the headquarters
doctrine, for that doctrine would have displaced the exception by recasting claims of foreign
injury as claims not arising in a foreign country because some planning or negligence at
domestic headquarters was their cause.[Footnote 5] And that, in turn, would have resulted in
applying foreign law of the place of injury, in accordance with the choice-of-law rule of the
headquarters jurisdiction.
Nor, as a practical matter, can it be said that the headquarters doctrine has outgrown its
tension with the exception. It is true that the traditional approach to choice of substantive tort law
has lost favor, Simson, The Choice-of-Law Revolution in the United States: Notes on Rereading
Von Mehren, 36 Cornell Int’l L. J. 125, 125 (2003) (“The traditional methodology of place of
wrong … has receded in importance, and new approaches and concepts such as governmental
interest analysis, most significant relationship, and better rule of law have taken center stage”
(footnotes omitted)).[Footnote 6] But a good many States still employ essentially the same
choice of law analysis in tort cases that the First Restatement exemplified. Symeonides, Choice
of Law in the American Courts, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 4–5 (2003) (“Ten states continue to adhere
to the traditional method in tort conflicts”); see, e.g., Raskin v. Allison, 30 Kan. App. 2d 1240,
1242, 1241, 57 P. 3d 30, 32 (2002) (under “traditional choice of law principles largely reflected in
the original Restatement,” Mexican law applied to boating accident in Mexican waters because
“the injuries were sustained in Mexican waters”).

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Equally to the point is that in at least some cases that the Court of Appeals’s approach would
treat as arising at headquarters, not the foreign country, even the later methodologies of choice
point to the application of foreign law. The Second Restatement itself, encouraging the general
shift towards using flexible balancing analysis to inform choice of law,[Footnote 7] includes a
default rule for tort cases rooted in the traditional approach: “[i]n an action for a personal injury,
the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the
parties, unless … some other state has a more significant relationship … to the occurrence and
the parties.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §146 (1969); see also id.,
Comment e (“On occasion, conduct and personal injury will occur in different states. In such
instances, the local law of the state of injury will usually be applied to determine most issues
involving the tort”). In practice, then, the new dispensation frequently leads to the traditional
application of the law of the jurisdiction of injury. See, e.g., Dorman v. Emerson Elec. Co., 23
F. 3d 1354 (CA8 1994) (applying Canadian law where negligent saw design in Missouri caused
injury in Canada); Bing v. Halstead, 495 F. Supp. 517 (SDNY 1980) (applying Costa Rican law
where letter written and mailed in Arizona caused mental distress in Costa
Rica); McKinnon v. F. H. Morgan & Co., 170 Vt. 422, 750 A. 2d 1026 (2000) (applying Canadian
law where a defective bicycle sold in Vermont caused injuries in Quebec).
In sum, current flexibility in choice of law methodology gives no assurance against applying
foreign substantive law if federal courts follow headquarters doctrine to assume jurisdiction over
tort claims against the Government for foreign harm. Based on the experience just noted, the
expectation is that application of the headquarters doctrine would in fact result in a substantial
number of cases applying the very foreign law the foreign country exception was meant to avoid.
[Footnote 8]
Before concluding that headquarters analysis should have no part in applying the foreign
country exception, however, a word is needed to answer an argument for selective application of
headquarters doctrine, that it ought to be permitted when a State’s choice of law approach would
not apply the foreign law of place of injury. See In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation,
580 F. Supp. 1242, 1254 (EDNY 1984) (noting that the purpose of the exception did not apply to
the litigation at hand because foreign law was not implicated). The point would be well taken, of
course, if Congress had written the exception to apply when foreign law would be applied. But
that is not what Congress said. Its provision of an exception when a claim arises in a foreign
country was written at a time when the phrase “arising in” was used in state statutes to express
the position that a claim arises where the harm occurs; and the odds are that Congress meant
simply this when it used the “arising in” language.[Footnote 9] Finally, even if it were not a
stretch to equate “arising in a foreign country” with “implicating foreign law,” the result of
accepting headquarters analysis for foreign injury cases in which no application of foreign law
would ensue would be a scheme of federal jurisdiction that would vary from State to State,
benefiting or penalizing plaintiffs accordingly. The idea that Congress would have intended any
such jurisdictional variety is too implausible to drive the analysis to the point of grafting even a
selective headquarters exception onto the foreign country exception itself. We therefore hold that
the FTCA’s foreign country exception bars all claims based on any injury suffered in a foreign
country, regardless of where the tortious act or omission occurred.
III
Alvarez has also brought an action under the ATS against petitioner, Sosa, who argues (as
does the United States supporting him) that there is no relief under the ATS because the statute
does no more than vest federal courts with jurisdiction, neither creating nor authorizing the
courts to recognize any particular right of action without further congressional action. Although
we agree the statute is in terms only jurisdictional, we think that at the time of enactment the
jurisdiction enabled federal courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of
nations and recognized at common law. We do not believe, however, that the limited, implicit
sanction to entertain the handful of international law cum common law claims understood in
1789 should be taken as authority to recognize the right of action asserted by Alvarez here.
A
Judge Friendly called the ATS a “legal Lohengrin,” IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F. 2d 1001, 1015
(CA2 1975); “no one seems to know whence it came,” ibid., and for over 170 years after its
enactment it provided jurisdiction in only one case. The first Congress passed it as part of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, in providing that the new federal district courts “shall also have
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case
may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.” Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §9(b), 1 Stat. 79.[Footnote 10]
The parties and amici here advance radically different historical interpretations of this terse
provision. Alvarez says that the ATS was intended not simply as a jurisdictional grant, but as
authority for the creation of a new cause of action for torts in violation of international law. We
think that reading is implausible. As enacted in 1789, the ATS gave the district courts
“cognizance” of certain causes of action, and the term bespoke a grant of jurisdiction, not power
to mold substantive law. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 81, pp. 447, 451 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A.
Hamilton) (using “jurisdiction” interchangeably with “cognizance”). The fact that the ATS was
placed in §9 of the Judiciary Act, a statute otherwise exclusively concerned with federal-court
jurisdiction, is itself support for its strictly jurisdictional nature. Nor would the distinction between
jurisdiction and cause of action have been elided by the drafters of the Act or those who voted
on it. As Fisher Ames put it, “there is a substantial difference between the jurisdiction of courts
and rules of decision.” 1 Annals of Cong. 807 (Gales ed. 1834). It is unsurprising, then, that an
authority on the historical origins of the ATS has written that “section 1350 clearly does not
create a statutory cause of action,” and that the contrary suggestion is “simply frivolous.” Casto,
The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of
Nations, 18 Conn. L. Rev. 467, 479, 480 (1986) (hereinafter Casto, Law of Nations); Cf. Dodge,
The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations on Text and Context, 42 Va. J.
Int’l L. 687, 689 (2002). In sum, we think the statute was intended as jurisdictional in the sense
of addressing the power of the courts to entertain cases concerned with a certain subject.
But holding the ATS jurisdictional raises a new question, this one about the interaction
between the ATS at the time of its enactment and the ambient law of the era. Sosa would have it
that the ATS was stillborn because there could be no claim for relief without a further statute
expressly authorizing adoption of causes of action. Amici professors of federal jurisdiction and
legal history take a different tack, that federal courts could entertain claims once the jurisdictional
grant was on the books, because torts in violation of the law of nations would have been
recognized within the common law of the time. Brief for Vikram Amar et al. as Amici Curiae. We
think history and practice give the edge to this latter position.
1
“When the United States declared their independence, they were bound to receive the law of
nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement.” Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199, 281 (1796)
(Wilson, J.). In the years of the early Republic, this law of nations comprised two principal
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elements, the first covering the general norms governing the behavior of national states with
each other: “the science which teaches the rights subsisting between nations orstates, and the
obligations correspondent to those rights,” E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations, Preliminaries §3
(J. Chitty et al. transl. and ed. 1883) (hereinafter Vattel) (footnote omitted), or “that code of public
instruction which defines the rights and prescribes the duties of nations, in their intercourse with
each other,” 1 James Kent Commentaries *1. This aspect of the law of nations thus occupied the
executive and legislative domains, not the judicial. See 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England 68 (1769) (hereinafter Commentaries) (“[O]ffenses against” the law of nations
are “principally incident to whole states or nations”).
The law of nations included a second, more pedestrian element, however, that did fall within
the judicial sphere, as a body of judge-made law regulating the conduct of individuals situated
outside domestic boundaries and consequently carrying an international savor. To Blackstone,
the law of nations in this sense was implicated “in mercantile questions, such as bills of
exchange and the like; in all marine causes, relating to freight, average, demurrage, insurances,
bottomry … ; [and] in all disputes relating to prizes, to shipwrecks, to hostages, and ransom
bills.” Id., at 67. The law merchant emerged from the customary practices of international traders
and admiralty required its own transnational regulation. And it was the law of nations in this
sense that our precursors spoke about when the Court explained the status of coast fishing
vessels in wartime grew from “ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago,
and gradually ripening into a rule of international law … .” The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677,
686 (1900).
There was, finally, a sphere in which these rules binding individuals for the benefit of other
individuals overlapped with the norms of state relationships. Blackstone referred to it when he
mentioned three specific offenses against the law of nations addressed by the criminal law of
England: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. 4
Commentaries 68. An assault against an ambassador, for example, impinged upon the
sovereignty of the foreign nation and if not adequately redressed could rise to an issue of war.
See Vattel 463–464. It was this narrow set of violations of the law of nations, admitting of a
judicial remedy and at the same time threatening serious consequences in international affairs,
that was probably on minds of the men who drafted the ATS with its reference to tort.
2
Before there was any ATS, a distinctly American preoccupation with these hybrid international
norms had taken shape owing to the distribution of political power from independence through
the period of confederation. The Continental Congress was hamstrung by its inability to “cause
infractions of treaties, or of the law of nations to be punished,” J. Madison, Journal of the
Constitutional Convention 60 (E. Scott ed. 1893), and in 1781 the Congress implored the States
to vindicate rights under the law of nations. In words that echo Blackstone, the congressional
resolution called upon state legislatures to “provide expeditious, exemplary, and adequate
punishment” for “the violation of safe conducts or passports, … of hostility against such as are in
amity, … with the United States, … infractions of the immunities of ambassadors and other
public ministers … [and] “infractions of treaties and conventions to which the United States are a
party.” 21 Journals of the Continental Congress 1136–1137 (G. Hunt ed. 1912) (hereinafter
Journals of the Continental Congress). The resolution recommended that the States “authorise
suits … for damages by the party injured, and for compensation to the United States for damage
sustained by them from an injury done to a foreign power by a citizen.” Id., at 1137; cf. Vattel
463–464 (“Whoever offends … a public minister … should be punished … , and … the state
should, at the expense of the delinquent, give full satisfaction to the sovereign who has been
offended in the person of his minister”). Apparently only one State acted upon the
recommendation, see First Laws of the State of Connecticut 82, 83 (J. Cushing ed. 1982) (1784
compilation; exact date of Act unknown), but Congress had done what it could to signal a
commitment to enforce the law of nations.
Appreciation of the Continental Congress’s incapacity to deal with this class of cases was
intensified by the so-called Marbois incident of May 1784, in which a French adventurer,
Longchamps, verbally and physically assaulted the Secretary of the French Legion in
Philadelphia. See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 Dall. 111 (O. T. Phila. 1784).[Footnote 11]
Congress called again for state legislation addressing such matters, and concern over the
inadequate vindication of the law of nations persisted through the time of the constitutional
convention. See 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 25 (M. Farrand ed. 1911)
(speech of J. Randolph). During the Convention itself, in fact, a New York City constable
produced a reprise of the Marbois affair and Secretary Jay reported to Congress on the Dutch
Ambassador’s protest, with the explanation that “the federal government does not appear … to
be vested with any judicial Powers competent to the Cognizance and Judgment of such Cases.”
Casto, Law of Nations 494, and n. 152.
The Framers responded by vesting the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over “all Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls.” U. S. Const., Art. III, §2, and the
First Congress followed through. The Judiciary Act reinforced this Court’s original jurisdiction
over suits brought by diplomats, see 1 Stat. 80, ch. 20, §13, created alienage jurisdiction, §11
and, of course, included the ATS, §9. See generally Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over
International Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N. Y. U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1, 15–
21 (1985) (discussing foreign affairs implications of the Judiciary Act); W. Casto, The Supreme
Court in the Early Republic 27–53 (1995).
3
Although Congress modified the draft of what became the Judiciary Act, see generally Warren,
New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 49 (1923), it
made hardly any changes to the provisions on aliens, including what became the ATS, see
Casto, Law of Nations 498. There is no record of congressional discussion about private actions
that might be subject to the jurisdictional provision, or about any need for further legislation to
create private remedies; there is no record even of debate on the section. Given the poverty of
drafting history, modern commentators have necessarily concentrated on the text, remarking on
the innovative use of the word “tort,” see, e.g., Sweeney, A Tort only in Violation of the Law of
Nations, 18 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 445 (1995) (arguing that “tort” refers to the law of
prize), and the statute’s mixture of terms expansive (“all suits”), see, e.g., Casto, Law of Nations
500, and restrictive (“for a tort only”), see, e.g., Randall, supra, at 28–31 (limiting suits to torts,
as opposed to commercial actions, especially by British plaintiffs).[Footnote 12] The historical
scholarship has also placed the ATS within the competition between federalist and antifederalist
forces over the national role in foreign relations. Id., at 22–23 (nonexclusiveness of federal
jurisdiction under the ATS may reflect compromise). But despite considerable scholarly attention,
it is fair to say that a consensus understanding of what Congress intended has proven elusive.
Still, the history does tend to support two propositions. First, there is every reason to suppose
that the First Congress did not pass the ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the
shelf for use by a future Congress or state legislature that might, some day, authorize the
creation of causes of action or itself decide to make some element of the law of nations
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actionable for the benefit of foreigners. The anxieties of the preconstitutional period cannot be “But there can be no doubt that the company or individuals who have been injured by these acts
ignored easily enough to think that the statute was not meant to have a practical effect. Consider of hostility have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United States; jurisdiction being
that the principal draftsman of the ATS was apparently Oliver Ellsworth,[Footnote 13] previously expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for a tort only, in violation of the
a member of the Continental Congress that had passed the 1781 resolution and a member of laws of nations, or a treaty of the United States … .” Id., at 59.
the Connecticut Legislature that made good on that congressional request. See generally W.
Brown, The Life of Oliver Ellsworth (1905). Consider, too, that the First Congress was attentive
Although it is conceivable that Bradford (who had prosecuted in the Marbois incident, see
enough to the law of nations to recognize certain offenses expressly as criminal, including the
Casto, Law of Nations 503, n. 201) assumed that there had been a violation of a treaty, 1 Op.
three mentioned by Blackstone. See An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the
Atty. Gen., at 58, that is certainly not obvious, and it appears likely that Bradford understood the
United States, §8, 1 Stat. 113–114 (murder or robbery, or other capital crimes, punishable as
ATS to provide jurisdiction over what must have amounted to common law causes of action.
piracy if committed on the high seas), and §28, id., at 118 (violation of safe conducts and
assaults against ambassadors punished by imprisonment and fines described as “infract[ions of]
the law of nations”). It would have been passing strange for Ellsworth and this very Congress to B
vest federal courts expressly with jurisdiction to entertain civil causes brought by aliens alleging
violations of the law of nations, but to no effect whatever until the Congress should take further
Against these indications that the ATS was meant to underwrite litigation of a narrow set of
action. There is too much in the historical record to believe that Congress would have enacted
common law actions derived from the law of nations, Sosa raises two main objections. First, he
the ATS only to leave it lying fallow indefinitely.
claims that this conclusion makes no sense in view of the Continental Congress’s 1781
recommendation to state legislatures to pass laws authorizing such suits. Sosa thinks state
The second inference to be drawn from the history is that Congress intended the ATS to legislation would have been “absurd,” Reply Brief for Petitioner Sosa 5, if common law remedies
furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations. had been available. Second, Sosa juxtaposes Blackstone’s treatise mentioning violations of the
Uppermost in the legislative mind appears to have been offenses against ambassadors, law of nations as occasions for criminal remedies, against the statute’s innovative reference to
see id., at 118; violations of safe conduct were probably understood to be actionable, ibid., and “tort,” as evidence that there was no familiar set of legal actions for exercise of jurisdiction under
individual actions arising out of prize captures and piracy may well have also been the ATS. Neither argument is convincing.
contemplated. Id., at 113–114. But the common law appears to have understood only those
three of the hybrid variety as definite and actionable, or at any rate, to have assumed only a very
The notion that it would have been absurd for the Continental Congress to recommend that
limited set of claims. As Blackstone had put it, “offences against this law [of nations] are
States pass positive law to duplicate remedies already available at common law rests on a
principally incident to whole states or nations,” and not individuals seeking relief in court. 4
misunderstanding of the relationship between common law and positive law in the late 18th
Commentaries 68.
century, when positive law was frequently relied upon to reinforce and give standard expression
to the “brooding omnipresence”[Footnote 14] of the common law then thought discoverable by
4 reason. As Blackstone clarified the relation between positive law and the law of nations, “those
acts of parliament, which have from time to time been made to enforce this universal law, or to
facilitate the execution of [its] decisions, are not to be considered as introductive of any new rule,
The sparse contemporaneous cases and legal materials referring to the ATS tend to confirm
but merely as declaratory of the old fundamental constitutions of the kingdom; without which it
both inferences, that some, but few, torts in violation of the law of nations were understood to be
must cease to be a part of the civilized world.” 4 Commentaries 67. Indeed, Sosa’s argument is
within the common law. In Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (No. 1,607) (S. C. 1795), the District
undermined by the 1781 resolution on which he principally relies. Notwithstanding the
Court’s doubt about admiralty jurisdiction over a suit for damages brought by a French privateer
undisputed fact (per Blackstone) that the common law afforded criminal law remedies for
against the mortgagee of a British slave ship was assuaged by assuming that the ATS was a
violations of the law of nations, the Continental Congress encouraged state legislatures to pass
jurisdictional basis for the court’s action. Nor is Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. Cas. 942 (No. 9, 895)
criminal statutes to the same effect, and the first Congress did the same, supra, at 23.[Footnote
(Pa. 1793), to the contrary, a case in which the owners of a British ship sought damages for its
15]
seizure in United States waters by a French privateer. The District Court said in dictum that the
ATS was not the proper vehicle for suit because “[i]t cannot be called a suit for a tort only, when
the property, as well as damages for the supposed trespass, are sought for.” Id., at 948. But the Nor are we convinced by Sosa’s argument that legislation conferring a right of action is needed
judge gave no intimation that further legislation would have been needed to give the District because Blackstone treated international law offenses under the rubric of “public wrongs,”
Court jurisdiction over a suit limited to damages. whereas the ATS uses a word, “tort,” that was relatively uncommon in the legal vernacular of the
day. It is true that Blackstone did refer to what he deemed the three principal offenses against
the law of nations in the course of discussing criminal sanctions, observing that it was in the
Then there was the 1795 opinion of Attorney General William Bradford, who was asked
interest of sovereigns “to animadvert upon them with a becoming severity, that the peace of the
whether criminal prosecution was available against Americans who had taken part in the French
world may be maintained,” 4 Commentaries 68.[Footnote 16] But Vattel explicitly linked the
plunder of a British slave colony in Sierra Leone. 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 57. Bradford was uncertain,
criminal sanction for offenses against ambassadors with the requirement that the state, “at the
but he made it clear that a federal court was open for the prosecution of a tort action growing out
expense of the delinquent, give full satisfaction to the sovereign who has been offended in the
of the episode:
person of his minister.” Vattel 463–464. Cf. Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International Law:
The Comparative and Historical Context, 52 DePaul L. Rev. 433, 444 (2002) (observing that a
“mixed approach to international law violations, encompassing both criminal prosecution … and

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compensation to those injured through a civil suit, would have been familiar to the founding
generation”). The 1781 resolution goes a step further in showing that a private remedy was
thought necessary for diplomatic offenses under the law of nations. And the Attorney General’s
Letter of 1795, as well as the two early federal precedents discussing the ATS, point to a
prevalent assumption that Congress did not intend the ATS to sit on the shelf until some future
time when it might enact further legislation.
In sum, although the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action, the
reasonable inference from the historical materials is that the statute was intended to have
practical effect the moment it became law. The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been
enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the
modest number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.
IV
We think it is correct, then, to assume that the First Congress understood that the district
courts would recognize private causes of action for certain torts in violation of the law of nations,
though we have found no basis to suspect Congress had any examples in mind beyond those
torts corresponding to Blackstone’s three primary offenses: violation of safe conducts,
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. We assume, too, that no development in
the two centuries from the enactment of §1350 to the birth of the modern line of cases beginning
with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (CA2 1980), has categorically precluded federal courts
from recognizing a claim under the law of nations as an element of common law; Congress has
not in any relevant way amended §1350 or limited civil common law power by another statute.
Still, there are good reasons for a restrained conception of the discretion a federal court should
exercise in considering a new cause of action of this kind. Accordingly, we think courts should
require any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the
features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized. This requirement is fatal to
Alvarez’s claim.
A
A series of reasons argue for judicial caution when considering the kinds of individual claims
that might implement the jurisdiction conferred by the early statute. First, the prevailing
conception of the common law has changed since 1789 in a way that counsels restraint in
judicially applying internationally generated norms. When §1350 was enacted, the accepted
conception was of the common law as “a transcendental body of law outside of any particular
State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute.” Black and White Taxicab &
Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U. S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes,
J., dissenting). Now, however, in most cases where a court is asked to state or formulate a
common law principle in a new context, there is a general understanding that the law is not so
much found or discovered as it is either made or created. Holmes explained famously in 1881
that
“in substance the growth of the law is legislative … [because t]he very considerations which
judges most rarely mention, and always with an apology, are the secret root from which the law
draws all the juices of life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient for the
community concerned.” The Common Law 31–32 (Howe ed. 1963).
One need not accept the Holmesian view as far as its ultimate implications to acknowledge that
a judge deciding in reliance on an international norm will find a substantial element of
discretionary judgment in the decision.
Second, along with, and in part driven by, that conceptual development in understanding
common law has come an equally significant rethinking of the role of the federal courts in
making it. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938), was the watershed in which we denied
the existence of any federal “general” common law, id., at 78, which largely withdrew to havens
of specialty, some of them defined by express congressional authorization to devise a body of
law directly, e.g., Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U. S. 448 (1957) (interpretation of
collective-bargaining agreements); Fed. Rule Evid. 501 (evidentiary privileges in federal-
question cases). Elsewhere, this Court has thought it was in order to create federal common law
rules in interstitial areas of particular federal interest. E.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods,
Inc., 440 U. S. 715, 726–727 (1979).[Footnote 17] And although we have even assumed
competence to make judicial rules of decision of particular importance to foreign relations, such
as the act of state doctrine, see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 427
(1964), the general practice has been to look for legislative guidance before exercising
innovative authority over substantive law. It would be remarkable to take a more aggressive role
in exercising a jurisdiction that remained largely in shadow for much of the prior two centuries.
Third, this Court has recently and repeatedly said that a decision to create a private right of
action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great majority of cases.Correctional
Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U. S. 61, 68 (2001); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 286–
287 (2001). The creation of a private right of action raises issues beyond the mere consideration
whether underlying primary conduct should be allowed or not, entailing, for example, a decision
to permit enforcement without the check imposed by prosecutorial discretion. Accordingly, even
when Congress has made it clear by statute that a rule applies to purely domestic conduct, we
are reluctant to infer intent to provide a private cause of action where the statute does not supply
one expressly. While the absence of congressional action addressing private rights of action
under an international norm is more equivocal than its failure to provide such a right when it
creates a statute, the possible collateral consequences of making international rules privately
actionable argue for judicial caution.
Fourth, the subject of those collateral consequences is itself a reason for a high bar to new
private causes of action for violating international law, for the potential implications for the
foreign relations of the United States of recognizing such causes should make courts particularly
wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches in managing
foreign affairs. It is one thing for American courts to enforce constitutional limits on our own State
and Federal Governments’ power, but quite another to consider suits under rules that would go
so far as to claim a limit on the power of foreign governments over their own citizens, and to hold
that a foreign government or its agent has transgressed those limits. Cf. Sabbatino, supra, at
431–432. Yet modern international law is very much concerned with just such questions, and apt
to stimulate calls for vindicating private interests in §1350 cases. Since many attempts by
federal courts to craft remedies for the violation of new norms of international law would raise
risks of adverse foreign policy consequences, they should be undertaken, if at all, with great
caution. Cf. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2d 774, 813 (CADC 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (expressing doubt that §1350 should be read to require “our courts [to] sit in
judgment of the conduct of foreign officials in their own countries with respect to their own
citizens”).
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The fifth reason is particularly important in light of the first four. We have no congressional explaining to say now that federal courts must avert their gaze entirely from any international
mandate to seek out and define new and debatable violations of the law of nations, and modern norm intended to protect individuals.
indications of congressional understanding of the judicial role in the field have not affirmatively
encouraged greater judicial creativity. It is true that a clear mandate appears in the Torture Victim
We think an attempt to justify such a position would be particularly unconvincing in light of
Protection Act of 1991, 106 Stat. 73, providing authority that “establish[es] an unambiguous and
what we know about congressional understanding bearing on this issue lying at the intersection
modern basis for” federal claims of torture and extrajudicial killing, H. R. Rep. No. 102–367, pt.
of the judicial and legislative powers. The First Congress, which reflected the understanding of
1, p. 3 (1991). But that affirmative authority is confined to specific subject matter, and although
the framing generation and included some of the Framers, assumed that federal courts could
the legislative history includes the remark that §1350 should “remain intact to permit suits based
properly identify some international norms as enforceable in the exercise of §1350 jurisdiction.
on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary international
We think it would be unreasonable to assume that the First Congress would have expected
law,” id., at 4, Congress as a body has done nothing to promote such suits. Several times,
federal courts to lose all capacity to recognize enforceable international norms simply because
indeed, the Senate has expressly declined to give the federal courts the task of interpreting and
the common law might lose some metaphysical cachet on the road to modern realism. Later
applying international human rights law, as when its ratification of the International Covenant on
Congresses seem to have shared our view. The position we take today has been assumed by
Civil and Political Rights declared that the substantive provisions of the document were not self-
some federal courts for 24 years, ever since the Second Circuit decided Filartiga v. Pena-
executing. 138 Cong. Rec. 8071 (1992).
Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (CA2 1980), and for practical purposes the point of today’s disagreement
has been focused since the exchange between Judge Edwards and Judge Bork in Tel-
B Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2d 774 (CADC 1984), Congress, however, has not only
expressed no disagreement with our view of the proper exercise of the judicial power, but has
responded to its most notable instance by enacting legislation supplementing the judicial
These reasons argue for great caution in adapting the law of nations to private rights. Justice
determination in some detail. See supra, at 34 (discussing the Torture Victim Protection Act).
Scalia, post, p. 1 (opinion concurring in part and concurring in judgment) concludes that caution
is too hospitable, and a word is in order to summarize where we have come so far and to focus
our difference with him on whether some norms of today’s law of nations may ever be While we agree with Justice Scalia to the point that we would welcome any congressional
recognized legitimately by federal courts in the absence of congressional action beyond §1350. guidance in exercising jurisdiction with such obvious potential to affect foreign relations, nothing
All Members of the Court agree that §1350 is only jurisdictional. We also agree, or at least Congress has done is a reason for us to shut the door to the law of nations entirely. It is enough
Justice Scalia does not dispute, post, at 2, 7, that the jurisdiction was originally understood to be to say that Congress may do that at any time (explicitly, or implicitly by treaties or statutes that
available to enforce a small number of international norms that a federal court could properly occupy the field) just as it may modify or cancel any judicial decision so far as it rests on
recognize as within the common law enforceable without further statutory authority. Justice recognizing an international norm as such.[Footnote 19]
Scalia concludes, however, that two subsequent developments should be understood to
preclude federal courts from recognizing any further international norms as judicially enforceable
C
today, absent further congressional action. As described before, we now tend to understand
common law not as a discoverable reflection of universal reason but, in a positivistic way, as a
product of human choice. And we now adhere to a conception of limited judicial power first We must still, however, derive a standard or set of standards for assessing the particular claim
expressed in reorienting federal diversity jurisdiction, see Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. Alvarez raises, and for this case it suffices to look to the historical antecedents. Whatever the
64 (1938), that federal courts have no authority to derive “general” common law. ultimate criteria for accepting a cause of action subject to jurisdiction under §1350, we are
persuaded that federal courts should not recognize private claims under federal common law for
violations of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance among
Whereas Justice Scalia sees these developments as sufficient to close the door to further
civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when §1350 was enacted.
independent judicial recognition of actionable international norms, other considerations
See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153, 163–180, n. a (1820) (illustrating the specificity
persuade us that the judicial power should be exercised on the understanding that the door is
with which the law of nations defined piracy). This limit upon judicial recognition is generally
still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms
consistent with the reasoning of many of the courts and judges who faced the issue before it
today. Erie did not in terms bar any judicial recognition of new substantive rules, no matter what
reached this Court. See Filartiga, supra, at 890 (“[F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has
the circumstances, and post-Erie understanding has identified limited enclaves in which federal
become—like the pirate and slave trader before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all
courts may derive some substantive law in a common law way. For two centuries we have
mankind”); Tel-Oren, supra, at 781 (Edwards, J., concurring) (suggesting that the “limits of
affirmed that the domestic law of the United States recognizes the law of nations.
section 1350’s reach” be defined by “a handful of heinous actions—each of which violates
See, e.g., Sabbatino, 376 U. S., at 423 (“[I]t is, of course, true that United States courts apply
definable, universal and obligatory norms”); see also In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights
international law as a part of our own in appropriate circumstances”);[Footnote 18] The Paquete
Litigation, 25 F. 3d 1467, 1475 (CA9 1994) (“Actionable violations of international law must be of
Habana, 175 U. S., at 700 (“International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory”). And the determination whether a norm is
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
sufficiently definite to support a cause of action[Footnote 20] should (and, indeed, inevitably
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination”); The Nereide, 9 Cranch 388, 423
must) involve an element of judgment about the practical consequences of making that cause
(1815) (Marshall, C. J.) (“[T]he Court is bound by the law of nations which is a part of the law of
available to litigants in the federal courts.[Footnote 21]
the land”); see also Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U. S. 630, 641 (1981)
(recognizing that “international disputes implicating … our relations with foreign nations” are one
of the “narrow areas” in which “federal common law” continues to exist). It would take some

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Thus, Alvarez’s detention claim must be gauged against the current state of international law, under Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U. S. C. §1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics
looking to those sources we have long, albeit cautiously, recognized. Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), that now provide damages remedies for such violations. It would
create an action in federal court for arrests by state officers who simply exceed their authority;
and for the violation of any limit that the law of any country might place on the authority of its
“[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision,
own officers to arrest. And all of this assumes that Alvarez could establish that Sosa was acting
resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to
on behalf of a government when he made the arrest, for otherwise he would need a rule broader
the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have
still.
made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works
are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the
law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.” The Paquete Alvarez’s failure to marshal support for his proposed rule is underscored by the Restatement
Habana, 175 U. S., at 700. (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987), which says in its discussion of
customary international human rights law that a “state violates international law if, as a matter of
state policy, it practices, encourages, or condones … prolonged arbitrary detention.” Id., §702.
To begin with, Alvarez cites two well-known international agreements that, despite their moral
Although the Restatement does not explain its requirements of a “state policy” and of
authority, have little utility under the standard set out in this opinion. He says that his abduction
“prolonged” detention, the implication is clear. Any credible invocation of a principle against
by Sosa was an “arbitrary arrest” within the meaning of the Universal Declaration of Human
arbitrary detention that the civilized world accepts as binding customary international law
Rights (Declaration), G. A. Res. 217A (III), U. N. Doc. A/810 (1948). And he traces the rule
requires a factual basis beyond relatively brief detention in excess of positive authority. Even the
against arbitrary arrest not only to the Declaration, but also to article nine of the International
Restatement’s limits are only the beginning of the enquiry, because although it is easy to say
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant), Dec. 19, 1996, 999 U. N. T. S. 171,[Footnote
that some policies of prolonged arbitrary detentions are so bad that those who enforce them
22] to which the United States is a party, and to various other conventions to which it is not. But
become enemies of the human race, it may be harder to say which policies cross that line with
the Declaration does not of its own force impose obligations as a matter of international law. See
the certainty afforded by Blackstone’s three common law offenses. In any event, the label would
Humphrey, The UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in The International
never fit the reckless policeman who botches his warrant, even though that same officer might
Protection of Human Rights 39, 50 (E. Luard ed. 1967) (quoting Eleanor Roosevelt calling the
pay damages under municipal law. E.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U. S. ___ (2004).[Footnote 28]
Declaration “ ‘a statement of principles … setting up a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations’ ” and “ ‘not a treaty or international agreement … impos[ing] legal
obligations’ ”).[Footnote 23] And, although the Covenant does bind the United States as a matter Whatever may be said for the broad principle Alvarez advances, in the present, imperfect
of international law, the United States ratified the Covenant on the express understanding that it world, it expresses an aspiration that exceeds any binding customary rule having the specificity
was not self-executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the federal courts. we require.[Footnote 29] Creating a private cause of action to further that aspiration would go
See supra, at 33. Accordingly, Alvarez cannot say that the Declaration and Covenant themselves beyond any residual common law discretion we think it appropriate to exercise.[Footnote 30] It is
establish the relevant and applicable rule of international law. He instead attempts to show that enough to hold that a single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer of
prohibition of arbitrary arrest has attained the status of binding customary international law. custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary
international law so well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy.
Here, it is useful to examine Alvarez’s complaint in greater detail. As he presently argues it, the
claim does not rest on the cross-border feature of his abduction.[Footnote 24] Although the ***
District Court granted relief in part on finding a violation of international law in taking Alvarez
across the border from Mexico to the United States, the Court of Appeals rejected that ground of
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
liability for failure to identify a norm of requisite force prohibiting a forcible abduction across a
border. Instead, it relied on the conclusion that the law of the United States did not authorize
Alvarez’s arrest, because the DEA lacked extraterritorial authority under 21 U. S. C. §878, and Reversed.
because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(d)(2) limited the warrant for Alvarez’s arrest to
“the jurisdiction of the United States.”[Footnote 25] It is this position that Alvarez takes now: that
Footnote 1
his arrest was arbitrary and as such forbidden by international law not because it infringed the
prerogatives of Mexico, but because no applicable law authorized it.[Footnote 26]
In the Ninth Circuit’s view, it was critical that “DEA agents had no authority under federal law to
execute an extraterritorial arrest of a suspect indicted in federal court in Los Angeles.” 331 F. 3d,
Alvarez thus invokes a general prohibition of “arbitrary” detention defined as officially
at 640. Once Alvarez arrived in the United States, “the actions of domestic law enforcement set
sanctioned action exceeding positive authorization to detain under the domestic law of some
in motion a supervening prosecutorial mechanism which met all of the procedural requisites of
government, regardless of the circumstances. Whether or not this is an accurate reading of the
federal due process.” Id., at 637.
Covenant, Alvarez cites little authority that a rule so broad has the status of a binding customary
norm today.[Footnote 27] He certainly cites nothing to justify the federal courts in taking his
broad rule as the predicate for a federal lawsuit, for its implications would be breathtaking. His Footnote 2
rule would support a cause of action in federal court for any arrest, anywhere in the world,
unauthorized by the law of the jurisdiction in which it took place, and would create a cause of
action for any seizure of an alien in violation of the Fourth Amendment, supplanting the actions
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See also Couzado v. United States, 105 F. 3d 1389, 1396 (CA11 1997) (“ ‘[A] claim is not barred Footnote 7
by section 2680(k) where the tortious conduct occurs in the United States, but the injury is
sustained in a foreign country’ ”) (quoting Donahue v. United States Dept. of Justice, 751
Under the Second Restatement, tort liability is determined “by the local law of the state which …
F. Supp. 45, 47 (SDNY 1990)); Martinez v. Lamagno, No. 93–1573, 1994 WL 159771, *2, judgt.
has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties,” taking into account “the
order reported at 23 F. 3d 402 (CA4 1994) (per curiam) (unpublished opinion) (“A headquarters
place where the injury occurred,” “the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,” “the
claim exists where negligent acts in the United States proximately cause harm in a foreign
domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties,” and
country”), rev’d on other grounds, 515 U. S. 417 (1995); Leaf v. United States, 588 F. 2d 733,
“the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.” Restatement (Second)
736 (CA9 1978) (“A claim ‘arises’, as that term is used in … 2680(k), where the acts or
of Conflict of Laws §145 (1969).
omissions that proximately cause the loss take place”); cf. Eaglin v. United States, Dept. of
Army, 794 F. 2d 981, 983 (CA5 1986) (assuming, arguendo, that headquarters doctrine is valid).
Footnote 8
Footnote 3
The courts that have applied the headquarters doctrine, believing it to be intimated by our
emphasis, in Richards v. United States, supra, on the place of the occurrence of the negligent
See also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 412 (1969) (“The original Restatement
act, have acknowledged the possibility that foreign law may govern FTCA claims as a function
stated that, with minor exceptions, all substantive questions relating to the existence of a tort
of Richards’s further holding that the whole law of the pertinent State (including its choice-of-law
claim are governed by the local law of the ‘place of wrong.’ This was described … as ‘the state
provisions) is to be applied. See, e.g., Leaf, 588 F. 2d, at 736, n. 3. Some courts have attempted
where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place.’ Since a
to defuse the resulting tension with the object behind the foreign country exception.
tort is the product of wrongful conduct and of resulting injury and since the injury follows the
See, e.g., Sami v. United States 617 F. 2d 755, 763 (CADC 1979) (believing that norm against
conduct, the state of the ‘last event’ is the state where the injury occurred”).
application of foreign law when contrary to forum policy is sufficient to overcome possible
conflict). We think that these attempts to resolve the tension give short shrift to the clear
Footnote 4 congressional mandate embodied by the foreign country exception. Cf. Shapiro, Choice of Law
Under the Federal Tort Claims Act: Richardsand Renvoi Revisited, 70 N. C. L. Rev. 641, 659–
660 (1992) (noting that the Richards rule that the totality of a State’s law is to be consulted may
The FTCA was passed with precisely these kinds of garden-variety torts in mind. See S. Rep.
undermine the object behind the foreign country exception).
No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 31 (1946) (“With the expansion of governmental activities in
recent years, it becomes especially important to grant to private individuals the right to sue the
Government in respect to such torts as negligence in the operation of vehicles”); see Footnote 9
generally Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135, 139–140 (1950) (Congress was principally
concerned with making the Government liable for ordinary torts that “would have been
It is difficult to reconcile the Government’s contrary reading with the fact that two of the Act’s
actionable if inflicted by an individual or a corporation”).
other exceptions specifically reference an “act or omission.” See 28 U. S. C. §2680(a)
(exempting United States from liability for “[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an
Footnote 5 employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation”);
§2680(e) (“Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the Government in
administering [certain portions of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917]”). The Government’s
The application of foreign law might nonetheless have been avoided in headquarters cases if
request that we read that phrase into the foreign country exception, when it is clear that
courts had been instructed to apply the substantive tort law of the State where the federal act or
Congress knew how to specify “act or omission” when it wanted to, runs afoul of the usual rule
omission occurred, regardless of where the ultimate harm transpired. But in Richards v. United
that “when the legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language
States, 369 U. S. 1 (1962), we held that the Act requires “the whole law (including choice-of-law
in another, the court assumes different meanings were intended.” 2A N. Singer, Statutes and
rules) … of the State where the [allegedly tortious federal] act or omission occurred,” id., at 3, 11.
Statutory Construction §46:06, p. 194 (6th ed. 2000).
Given the dominant American choice-of-law approach at the time the Act was passed, that would
have resulted in the application of foreign law in virtually any case where the plaintiff suffered
injury overseas. Footnote 10

Footnote 6 The statute has been slightly modified on a number of occasions since its original enactment. It
now reads in its entirety: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
See also Rydstrom, Modern Status of Rule that Substantive Rights of Parties to a Tort Action
States.” 28 U. S. C. §1350.
are Governed by the Law of the Place of the Wrong, 29 A. L. R. 3d 603, *2 (1970) (“Many courts
are now abandoning the orthodox rule that the substantive rights of the parties are governed by
the law of the place of the wrong”). We express no opinion on the relative merits of the various Footnote 11
approaches to choice questions; our discussion of the subject is intended only to indicate how,
as a positive matter, transjurisdictional cases are likely to be treated today.
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The French minister plenipotentiary lodged a formal protest with the Continental Congress, 27
Journals of the Continental Congress 478, and threatened to leave Pennsylvania “unless the
decision on Longchamps Case should give them full satisfaction.” Letter from Samuel Hardy to
Gov. Benjamin Harrison of Virginia, June 24, 1784, in 7 Letters of Members of the Continental
Congress 558, 559 (E. Burnett ed. 1934). Longchamps was prosecuted for a criminal violation of
the law of nations in state court.
one to frame the law as he himself is pleased to understand it … .” 1 J. Domat, The Civil Law in
its Natural Order 108, (W. Strahan transl. and L. Cushing ed. 1861). A congressional statement
that common law was up to the task at hand might well have fallen short of impressing a
continental readership.
Footnote 16

The Congress could only pass resolutions, one approving the state-court proceedings, 27
Journals of the Continental Congress 503, another directing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to
apologize and to “explain to Mr. De Marbois the difficulties that may arise … from the nature of a
federal union,” 28 Journals of the Continental Congress 314, and to explain to the representative
of Louis XVI that “many allowances are to be made for” the young Nation. Ibid.
Footnote 12
The restriction may have served the different purpose of putting foreigners on notice that they
would no longer be able to prosecute their own criminal cases in federal court. Compare, e.g., 3
Commentaries 160 (victims could start prosecutions) with the Judiciary Act §35. (creating the
office of the district attorney). Cf. 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 41, 42 (1794) (British consul could not himself
initiate criminal prosecution, but could provide evidence to the grand jury.)
Footnote 13
The ATS appears in Ellsworth’s handwriting in the original version of the bill in the National
Archives. Casto, Law of Nations 498, n. 169.
Petitioner says animadversion is “an archaic reference to the imposition of punishment.” Reply
Brief for Petitioner Sosa 4 (emphasis in original). That claim is somewhat exaggerated, however.
To animadvert carried the broader implication of “turn[ing] the attention officially or judicially,
tak[ing] legal cognizance of anything deserving of chastisement or censure; hence, to proceed
by way of punishment or censure.” 1 Oxford English Dictionary 474 (2d ed. 1989). Blackstone in
fact used the term in the context of property rights and damages. Of a man who is disturbed in
his enjoyment of “qualified property” “the law will animadvert hereon as an injury.” 2
Commentaries 395. See also 9 Papers of James Madison 349 (R. Rutland ed. 1975) (“As yet
foreign powers have not been rigorous in animadverting on us” for violations of the law of
nations).
Footnote 17
See generally R. Fallon, D. Meltzer, D. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and
the Federal System ch. 7 (5th ed. 2003); Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal
Common Law, 39 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 383, 405–422 (1964).
Footnote 18

Footnote 14 Sabbatino itself did not directly apply international law, see 376 U. S., at 421–423, but neither
did it question the application of that law in appropriate cases, and it further endorsed the
reasoning of a noted commentator who had argued that Erie should not preclude the continued
See Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
application of international law in federal courts. 376 U. S., at 425 (citing Jessup, The Doctrine of
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 Am. J. Int’l L. 740 (1939)).
Footnote 15
Footnote 19
Being consistent with the prevailing understanding of international law, the 1781 resolution is
sensibly understood as an act of international politics, for the recommendation was part of a
Our position does not, as Justice Scalia suggests, imply that every grant of jurisdiction to a
program to assure the world that the new Republic would observe the law of nations. On the
federal court carries with it an opportunity to develop common law (so that the grant of federal-
same day it made its recommendation to state legislatures, the Continental Congress received a
question jurisdiction would be equally as good for our purposes as §1350), see post, at 8, n. 1.
confidential report, detailing negotiations between American representatives and Versailles. 21
Section 1350 was enacted on the congressional understanding that courts would exercise
Journals of the Continental Congress 1137–1140. The King was concerned about the British
jurisdiction by entertaining some common law claims derived from the law of nations; and we
capture of the ship Marquis de la Fayette on its way to Boston, id., at 1139, and he “expresse[d]
know of no reason to think that federal-question jurisdiction was extended subject to any
a desire that the plan for the appointment of consuls should be digested and adopted, as the
comparable congressional assumption. Further, our holding today is consistent with the division
Court of France wished to make it the basis of some commercial arrangements between France
of responsibilities between federal and state courts after Erie, see supra, at 32, 35–36, as a
and the United States.” Id., at 1140. The congressional resolution would not have been all that
more expansive common law power related to 28 U. S. C. §1331 might not be.
Louis XVI wished for, but it was calculated to assure foreign powers that Congress at least
intended their concerns to be addressed in the way they would have chosen. As a French legal
treatise well known to early American lawyers, see Helmholz, Use of the Civil Law in Post- Footnote 20
Revolutionary American Jurisprudence, 66 Tulane L. Rev. 1649 (1992), put it, “the laws ought to
be written, to the end that the writing may fix the sense of the law, and determine the mind to
A related consideration is whether international law extends the scope of liability for a violation
conceive a just idea of that which is established by the law, and that it not be left free for every
of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a
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corporation or individual. Compare Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2d 774, 791–795
(CADC 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (insufficient consensus in 1984 that torture by private
actors violates international law), with Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F. 3d 232, 239–241 (CA2 1995)
(sufficient consensus in 1995 that genocide by private actors violates international law).
Footnote 21
This requirement of clear definition is not meant to be the only principle limiting the availability of
relief in the federal courts for violations of customary international law, though it disposes of this
case. For example, the European Commission argues as amicus curiae that basic principles of
international law require that before asserting a claim in a foreign forum, the claimant must have
exhausted any remedies available in the domestic legal system, and perhaps in other fora such
as international claims tribunals. See Brief for European Commission as Amicus Curiae 24,
n. 54 (citing I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 472–481 (6th ed. 2003)); cf.
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, §2(b), 106 Stat. 73 (exhaustion requirement). We would
certainly consider this requirement in an appropriate case.
Another possible limitation that we need not apply here is a policy of case-specific deference to
the political branches. For example, there are now pending in federal district court several class
actions seeking damages from various corporations alleged to have participated in, or abetted,
the regime of apartheid that formerly controlled South Africa. See In re South African Apartheid
Litigation, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (JPML 2002) (granting a motion to transfer the cases to the
Southern District of New York). The Government of South Africa has said that these cases
interfere with the policy embodied by its Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which
“deliberately avoided a ‘victors’ justice’ approach to the crimes of apartheid and chose instead
one based on confession and absolution, informed by the principles of reconciliation,
reconstruction, reparation and goodwill.” Declaration of Penuell Mpapa Maduna, Minister of
Justice and Constitutional Development, Republic of South Africa, reprinted in App. to Brief for
Government of Commonwealth of Australia et al. as Amici Curiae 7a, ¶ ;3.2.1 (emphasis
deleted). The United States has agreed. See Letter of William H. Taft IV, Legal Adviser, Dept. of
State, to Shannen W. Coffin, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen., Oct. 27, 2003, reprinted in id., at 2a. In
such cases, there is a strong argument that federal courts should give serious weight to the
Executive Branch’s view of the case’s impact on foreign policy. Cf. Republic of
Austria v. Altmann, 541 U. S. ___, ___ (2004) (slip op., at 23–24) (discussing the State
Department’s use of statements of interest in cases involving the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976, 28 U. S. C. §1602 et seq.).
Footnote 22
Article nine provides that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention,” that “[n]o
one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedure as are established by law,” and that “[a]nyone who has been the victim of unlawful
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.” 999 U. N. T. S., at 175–
176.
Footnote 23
It has nevertheless had substantial indirect effect on international law. See Brownlie, supra, at
535 (calling the Declaration a “good example of an informal prescription given legal significance
by the actions of authoritative decision-makers”).
Footnote 24
Alvarez’s brief contains one footnote seeking to incorporate by reference his arguments on
cross-border abductions before the Court of Appeals. Brief for Respondent Alvarez-Machain 47,
n. 46. That is not enough to raise the question fairly, and we do not consider it.
Footnote 25
The Rule has since been moved and amended and now provides that a warrant may also be
executed “anywhere else a federal statute authorizes an arrest.” Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 4(c)(2).
Footnote 26
We have no occasion to decide whether Alvarez is right that 21 U. S. C. §878 did not authorize
the arrest.
Footnote 27
Specifically, he relies on a survey of national constitutions, Bassiouni, Human Rights in the
Context of Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent
Protections in National Constitutions, 3 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 235, 260–261 (1993); a case
from the International Court of Justice, United States v. Iran, 1980 I. C. J. 3, 42; and some
authority drawn from the federal courts, see Brief for Respondent Alvarez-Machain 49, n. 50.
None of these suffice. The Bassiouni survey does show that many nations recognize a norm
against arbitrary detention, but that consensus is at a high level of generality. The Iran case, in
which the United States sought relief for the taking of its diplomatic and consular staff as
hostages, involved a different set of international norms and mentioned the problem of arbitrary
detention only in passing; the detention in that case was, moreover, far longer and harsher than
Alvarez’s. See 1980 I. C. J., at 42, ¶ ;91 (“detention of [United States] staff by a group of armed
militants” lasted “many months”). And the authority from the federal courts, to the extent it
supports Alvarez’s position, reflects a more assertive view of federal judicial discretion over
claims based on customary international law than the position we take today.
Footnote 28
In this case, Sosa might well have been liable under Mexican law. Alvarez asserted such a
claim, but the District Court concluded that the applicable law was the law of California, and that
under California law Sosa had been privileged to make a citizen’s arrest in Mexico. Whether this
was correct is not now before us, though we discern tension between the court’s simultaneous
conclusions that the detention so lacked any legal basis as to violate international law, yet was
privileged by state law against ordinary tort recovery.
Footnote 29
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It is not that violations of a rule logically foreclose the existence of that rule as international law.
Cf. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876, 884, n. 15 (CA2 1980) (“The fact that the prohibition of
torture is often honored in the breach does not diminish its binding effect as a norm of
international law”). Nevertheless, that a rule as stated is as far from full realization as the one
Alvarez urges is evidence against its status as binding law; and an even clearer point against
the creation by judges of a private cause of action to enforce the aspiration behind the rule
claimed.
Footnote 30
Alvarez also cites, Brief for Respondent Alvarez-Machain 49–50, a finding by a United Nations
working group that his detention was arbitrary under the Declaration, the Covenant, and
customary international law. See Report of the United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, U. N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/27, pp. 139–140 (Dec. 17, 1993). That finding is not
addressed, however, to our demanding standard of definition, which must be met to raise even
the possibility of a private cause of action. If Alvarez wishes to seek compensation on the basis
of the working group’s finding, he must address his request to Congress.
Disclaimer: Official Supreme Court case law is only found in the print version of the United
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site or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources.
First Party: Jose Francisco Sosa
Second Party : Humberto Alvarez-Machain, et al.
Official Citation :542 U.S. 692
Granted: November 30, 2003
Argued: March 29, 2004
Decided: June 28, 2004
c. Foreign Element
G.R. No. 72494 August 11, 1989
HONGKONG AND SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
JACK ROBERT SHERMAN, DEODATO RELOJ and THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now
Court of Appeals) dated August 2, 1985, which reversed the order of the Regional Trial Court
dated February 28,1985 denying the Motion to Dismiss filed by private respondents Jack Robert
Sherman and Deodato Reloj.
A complaint for collection of a sum of money (pp. 49-52, Rollo) was filed by petitioner Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as petitioner BANK) against private
respondents Jack Robert Sherman and Deodato Reloj, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-42850
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 84.
It appears that sometime in 1981, Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd. (hereinafter referred
to as COMPANY), a company incorporated in Singapore applied with, and was granted by, the
Singapore branch of petitioner BANK an overdraft facility in the maximum amount of Singapore
dollars 200,000.00 (which amount was subsequently increased to Singapore dollars 375,000.00)
with interest at 3% over petitioner BANK prime rate, payable monthly, on amounts due under
said overdraft facility; as a security for the repayment by the COMPANY of sums advanced by
petitioner BANK to it through the aforesaid overdraft facility, on October 7, 1982, both private
respondents and a certain Robin de Clive Lowe, all of whom were directors of the COMPANY at
such time, executed a Joint and Several Guarantee (p. 53, Rollo) in favor of petitioner BANK
whereby private respondents and Lowe agreed to pay, jointly and severally, on demand all sums
owed by the COMPANY to petitioner BANK under the aforestated overdraft facility.
The Joint and Several Guarantee provides, inter alia, that:
This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder shall be
construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of
the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts of Singapore shall have
jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee. ... (p. 33-A, Rollo).
The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation. Thus, petitioner BANK demanded payment of the
obligation from private respondents, conformably with the provisions of the Joint and Several
Guarantee. Inasmuch as the private respondents still failed to pay, petitioner BANK filed the
above-mentioned complaint.
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On December 14,1984, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss (pp 54-56, Rollo) which
was opposed by petitioner BANK (pp. 58-62, Rollo). Acting on the motion, the trial court issued
an order dated February 28, 1985 (pp, 64-65, Rollo), which read as follows:
In a Motion to Dismiss filed on December 14, 1984, the defendants seek the dismissal of
the complaint on two grounds, namely:
1. That the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint; and
2. That the court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants.
In the light of the Opposition thereto filed by plaintiff, the Court finds no merit in the
motion. "On the first ground, defendants claim that by virtue of the provision in the
Guarantee (the actionable document) which reads —
This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder
shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree
that the courts in Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising
under this guarantee,
the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court finds and
concludes otherwise. There is nothing in the Guarantee which says that the courts of
Singapore shall have jurisdiction to the exclusion of the courts of other countries or
nations. Also, it has long been established in law and jurisprudence that jurisdiction of
courts is fixed by law; it cannot be conferred by the will, submission or consent of the
parties.
On the second ground, it is asserted that defendant Robert' , Sherman is not a citizen
nor a resident of the Philippines. This argument holds no water. Jurisdiction over the
persons of defendants is acquired by service of summons and copy of the complaint on
them. There has been a valid service of summons on both defendants and in fact the
same is admitted when said defendants filed a 'Motion for Extension of Time to File
Responsive Pleading on December 5, 1984.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
A motion for reconsideration of the said order was filed by private respondents which was,
however, denied (p. 66,Rollo).
Private respondents then filed before the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of
Appeals) a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or prayer for a restraining order
(pp. 39-48, Rollo). On August 2, 1985, the respondent Court rendered a decision (p. 37, Rollo),
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition with preliminary injuction is
hereby GRANTED. The respondent Court is enjoined from taking further
cognizance of the case and to dismiss the same for filing with the proper
court of Singapore which is the proper forum. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
The motion for reconsideration was denied (p. 38, Rollo), hence, the present petition.
The main issue is whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the suit.
The controversy stems from the interpretation of a provision in the Joint and Several Guarantee,
to wit:
(14) This guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilites arising hereunder shall be
construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the
Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts in Singapore shall have
jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee. ... (p. 53-A, Rollo)
In rendering the decision in favor of private respondents, the Court of Appeals made, the
following observations (pp. 35-36, Rollo):
There are significant aspects of the case to which our attention is invited. The loan
was obtained by Eastern Book Service PTE, Ltd., a company incorporated
in Singapore. The loan was granted by the Singapore Branch of Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation. The Joint and Several Guarantee was also concluded
in Singapore. The loan was in Singaporean dollars and the repayment thereof also in
the same currency. The transaction, to say the least, took place in Singporean setting
in which the law of that country is the measure by which that relationship of the parties
will be governed.
Contrary to the position taken by respondents, the guarantee agreement compliance
that any litigation will be before the courts of Singapore and that the rights and
obligations of the parties shall be construed and determined in accordance with the
laws of the Republic of Singapore. A closer examination of paragraph 14 of the
Guarantee Agreement upon which the motion to dismiss is based, employs in clear
and unmistakeable (sic) terms the word 'shall' which under statutory construction is
mandatory.
Thus it was ruled that:
... the word 'shall' is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Dizon
vs. Encarnacion, 9 SCRA 714).lâwphî1.ñèt
There is nothing more imperative and restrictive than what the agreement categorically
commands that 'all rights, obligations, and liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed
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ATTY. DELA CRUZ- JD4301

and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the parties did not thereby stipulate that only the
Singapore.' courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in
question operate to divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction is
often defined as the light of a State to exercise authority over persons and things within its
While it is true that "the transaction took place in Singaporean setting" and that the Joint and
boundaries subject to certain exceptions. Thus, a State does not assume jurisdiction over
Several Guarantee contains a choice-of-forum clause, the very essence of due process dictates
travelling sovereigns, ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of other States, and foreign
that the stipulation that "[t]his guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising
military units stationed in or marching through State territory with the permission of the latter's
hereunder shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with
authorities. This authority, which finds its source in the concept of sovereignty, is exclusive within
the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts in Singapore shall have
and throughout the domain of the State. A State is competent to take hold of any judicial matter it
jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee" be liberally construed. One basic
sees fit by making its courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought
principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in International Law: a State does not have jurisdiction
before them (J. Salonga, Private International Law, 1981, pp. 37-38).lâwphî1.ñèt
in the absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the proceedings are in
rem quasi in rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction must be based on some
minimum contacts that will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice (J. As regards the issue on improper venue, petitioner BANK avers that the objection to improper
Salonga, Private International Law, 1981, p. 46). Indeed, as pointed-out by petitioner BANK at venue has been waived. However, We agree with the ruling of the respondent Court that:
the outset, the instant case presents a very odd situation. In the ordinary habits of life, anyone
would be disinclined to litigate before a foreign tribunal, with more reason as a defendant.
While in the main, the motion to dismiss fails to categorically use with exactitude the words
However, in this case, private respondents are Philippine residents (a fact which was not
'improper venue' it can be perceived from the general thrust and context of the motion that
disputed by them) who would rather face a complaint against them before a foreign court and in
what is meant is improper venue, The use of the word 'jurisdiction' was merely an attempt
the process incur considerable expenses, not to mention inconvenience, than to have a
to copy-cat the same word employed in the guarantee agreement but conveys the concept
Philippine court try and resolve the case. Private respondents' stance is hardly comprehensible,
of venue. Brushing aside all technicalities, it would appear that jurisdiction was used loosely
unless their ultimate intent is to evade, or at least delay, the payment of a just obligation.
as to be synonymous with venue. It is in this spirit that this Court must view the motion to
dismiss. ... (p. 35, Rollo).
The defense of private respondents that the complaint should have been filed in Singapore is
based merely on technicality. They did not even claim, much less prove, that the filing of the
At any rate, this issue is now of no moment because We hold that venue here was properly laid
action here will cause them any unnecessary trouble, damage, or expense. On the other hand,
for the same reasons discussed above.
there is no showing that petitioner BANK filed the action here just to harass private respondents.

The respondent Court likewise ruled that (pp. 36-37, Rollo):

In the case of Polytrade Corporation vs. Blanco, G.R. No. L-27033, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA
187, it was ruled:
... In a conflict problem, a court will simply refuse to entertain the case if it is not authorized
by law to exercise jurisdiction. And even if it is so authorized, it may still refuse to entertain
... An accurate reading, however, of the stipulation, 'The parties agree to sue and be sued
the case by applying the principle of forum non conveniens. ...
in the Courts of Manila,' does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or
defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties merely consented to be sued in Manila.
Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the However, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the principle
venue are totally absent therefrom. We cannot read into that clause that plaintiff and of forum non conveniensdepends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed
defendant bound themselves to file suits with respect to the last two transactions in to the sound discretion of the trial court (J. Salonga, Private International Law, 1981, p.
question only or exclusively in Manila. For, that agreement did not change or transfer 49).lâwphî1.ñèt Thus, the respondent Court should not have relied on such principle.
venue. It simply is permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as
tribunals to which they may resort. They did not waive their right to pursue remedy in the
Although the Joint and Several Guarantee prepared by petitioner BANK is a contract of
courts specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio non praesumitur.
adhesion and that consequently, it cannot be permitted to take a stand contrary to the
stipulations of the contract, substantial bases exist for petitioner Bank's choice of forum, as
This ruling was reiterated in the case of Neville Y. Lamis Ents., et al. v. Lagamon, etc., et al., discussed earlier.
G.R. No. 57250, October 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 740, where the stipulation was "[i]n case of
litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested in the Court of Davao City." We held:
Lastly, private respondents allege that neither the petitioner based at Hongkong nor its Philippine
branch is involved in the transaction sued upon. This is a vain attempt on their part to further
Anent the claim that Davao City had been stipulated as the venue, suffice it to say that a thwart the proceedings below inasmuch as well-known is the rule that a defendant cannot plead
stipulation as to venue does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or any defense that has not been interposed in the court below.
defendant under Section 2 (b), Rule 4, Rules of Court, in the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words in the agreement which would indicate that the place named is the only
venue agreed upon by the parties.
15
Conflicts of LAW – SESSION 1
ATTY. DELA CRUZ- JD4301
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the respondent Court is hereby REVERSED and the decision of
the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED, with costs against private respondents. This decision
is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 122191. October 8, 1998]
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA
and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set
aside the Resolution[1] dated September 27, 1995 and the Decision [2] dated April 10, 1996 of the
Court of Appeals[3] in CA-G.R. SP No. 36533,[4] and the Orders[5] dated August 29, 1994[6] and
February 2, 1995[7] that were issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. Q-93-18394.[8]
The pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise to the instant petition, as stated in the
questioned Decision[9], are as follows:
On January 21, 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight Attendant for its
airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. x x x
On April 27, 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff went to a disco
dance with fellow crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both
Saudi nationals.Because it was almost morning when they returned to their hotels,
they agreed to have breakfast together at the room of Thamer. When they were in te
(sic) room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly after he did, Thamer attempted to rape
plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several security personnel heard her cries for
help and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police came and arrested Thamer and
Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA officials
interrogated her about the Jakarta incident. They then requested her to go back to
Jakarta to help arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal
Officer Sirah Akkad and base manager Baharini negotiated with the police for the
immediate release of the detained crew members but did not succeed because
plaintiff refused to cooperate. She was afraid that she might be tricked into
something she did not want because of her inability to understand the local
dialect. She also declined to sign a blank paper and a document written in the local
dialect. Eventually, SAUDIA allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from
the Jakarta flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the
Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of
detention.Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDI (sic). In
September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was
already behind her, her superiors requested her to see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal
Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought her to
the police station where the police took her passport and questioned her about the
Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on her to make
a statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she agreed to do
so did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch the afternoon flight out
of Jeddah.
One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few
minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to board
the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy, the
Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA.When she did, a certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office
brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a document written in
Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case against Thamer and
Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear before the court on
June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah once
again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did so
after receiving assurance from SAUDIAs Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that the
investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.
In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on June
27, 1993.Nothing happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge interrogated
plaintiff through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one hour of
interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane was about to
take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take flight. At
the Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of Mr. Yahya
Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the crew
quarters, until further orders.
On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same court
where the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision, translated to
her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes. Only
then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with Thamer and
Allah, for what happened in Jakarta.The court found plaintiff guilty of (1) adultery; (2)
going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and
(3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition. [10]
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner
SAUDIA. Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She then asked the Philippine Embassy
in Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal. Meanwhile, to pay for her upkeep, she worked
on the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah continued to serve in the international
flights.[11]
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against
her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before her return to Manila, [12] she was
terminated from the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed of the cause.
On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a Complaint [13] for damages against SAUDIA, and
Khaled Al-Balawi (Al- Balawi), its country manager.
On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus Motion To Dismiss [14] which raised the
following grounds, to wit: (1) that the Complaint states no cause of action against Saudia; (2)
16
Conflicts of LAW – SESSION 1
ATTY. DELA CRUZ- JD4301
that defendant Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3) that the claim or demand set forth in
the Complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (4) that the trial
court has no jurisdiction to try the case.
On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition (To Motion to Dismiss) [15] Saudia filed
a reply[16] thereto on March 3, 1994.
On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended Complaint [17] wherein Al-Balawi was dropped
as party defendant. On August 11, 1994, Saudia filed its Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint[18].
The trial court issued an Order [19] dated August 29, 1994 denying the Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint filed by Saudia.
From the Order of respondent Judge[20] denying the Motion to Dismiss, SAUDIA filed on
September 20, 1994, its Motion for Reconsideration [21] of the Order dated August 29, 1994. It
alleged that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try the case on the basis of Article 21 of
the Civil Code, since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. On
October 14, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition[22] (To Defendants Motion for Reconsideration).
In the Reply[23] filed with the trial court on October 24, 1994, SAUDIA alleged that since its
Motion for Reconsideration raised lack of jurisdiction as its cause of action, the Omnibus Motion
Rule does not apply, even if that ground is raised for the first time on appeal. Additionally,
SAUDIA alleged that the Philippines does not have any substantial interest in the prosecution of
the instant case, and hence, without jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
Respondent Judge subsequently issued another Order[24] dated February 2, 1995, denying
SAUDIAs Motion for Reconsideration. The pertinent portion of the assailed Order reads as
follows:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed,
thru counsel, on September 20, 1994, and the Opposition thereto of the plaintiff
filed, thru counsel, on October 14, 1994, as well as the Reply therewith of
defendant Saudi Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel, on October 24, 1994,
considering that a perusal of the plaintiffs Amended Complaint, which is one for the
recovery of actual, moral and exemplary damages plus attorneys fees, upon the
basis of the applicable Philippine law, Article 21 of the New Civil Code of the
Philippines, is, clearly, within the jurisdiction of this Court as regards the subject
matter, and there being nothing new of substance which might cause the reversal
or modification of the order sought to be reconsidered, the motion for
reconsideration of the defendant, is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order[26] with the Court of Appeals.
Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution with Temporary Restraining
Order[27] dated February 23, 1995, prohibiting the respondent Judge from further conducting any
proceeding, unless otherwise directed, in the interim.
In another Resolution[28] promulgated on September 27, 1995, now assailed, the appellate
court denied SAUDIAs Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated
February 18, 1995, to wit:
The Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED,
after considering the Answer, with Prayer to Deny Writ of Preliminary Injunction
(Rollo, p. 135) the Reply and Rejoinder, it appearing that herein petitioner is not
clearly entitled thereto (Unciano Paramedical College, et. Al., v. Court of
Appeals, et. Al., 100335, April 7, 1993, Second Division).
SO ORDERED.
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this Honorable Court the instant Petition [29] for
Review with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order dated October 13, 1995.
However, during the pendency of the instant Petition, respondent Court of Appeals
rendered the Decision[30] dated April 10, 1996, now also assailed. It ruled that the Philippines is
an appropriate forum considering that the Amended Complaints basis for recovery of damages
is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of respondent Court. It
further held that certiorari is not the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to Dismiss, inasmuch
as the petitioner should have proceeded to trial, and in case of an adverse ruling, find recourse
in an appeal.
On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition for Review with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order[31] dated April 30, 1996, given due course by this Court. After both
parties submitted their Memoranda,[32] the instant case is now deemed submitted for decision.
Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues:
I
The trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try Civil Case No. Q-93-18394 based on Article 21
of the New Civil Code since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
inasmuch as this case involves what is known in private international law as a conflicts
problem.Otherwise, the Republic of the Philippines will sit in judgment of the acts done by
another sovereign state which is abhorred.
II.
Leave of court before filing a supplemental pleading is not a jurisdictional requirement. Besides,
the matter as to absence of leave of court is now moot and academic when this Honorable Court
required the respondents to comment on petitioners April 30, 1996 Supplemental Petition For
Review With Prayer For A Temporary Restraining Order Within Ten (10) Days From Notice
Thereof.Further, the Revised Rules of Court should be construed with liberality pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 1 thereof.
III.
Petitioner received on April 22, 1996 the April 10, 1996 decision in CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533
entitled Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Hon. Rodolfo A. Ortiz, et al. and filed its April 30, 1996
Supplemental Petition For Review With Prayer For A Temporary Restraining Order on May 7,
1996 at 10:29 a.m. or within the 15-day reglementary period as provided for under Section 1,
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. Therefore, the decision in CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533 has
not yet become final and executory and this Honorable Court can take cognizance of this case.
[33]
17
Conflicts of LAW – SESSION 1
ATTY. DELA CRUZ- JD4301
From the foregoing factual and procedural antecedents, the following issues emerge for
our resolution:
I.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR
AND TRY CIVIL CASE NO. Q-93-18394 ENTITLED MILAGROS P. MORADA V.
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES.
II.
WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN
THE CASE PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD GOVERN.
Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must be settled at the
outset. It maintains that private respondents claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant
case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti
commissi rule.[34]
On the other hand, private respondent contends that since her Amended Complaint is
based on Articles 19[35] and 21[36] of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of
domestic law.[37]
Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this case, there is no dispute that the interplay
of events occurred in two states, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia.
As stated by private respondent in her Amended Complaint[38] dated June 23, 1994:
2. Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES or SAUDIA is a foreign airlines
corporation doing business in the Philippines. It may be served with summons and
other court processes at Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc., 3rd Floor,
Cougar Building, 114 Valero St., Salcedo Village, Makati, Metro Manila.
xxxxxxxxx
6. Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government,
the Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of
detention.Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDIA. In
September 1990, defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
7. On January 14, 1992, just when plaintiff thought that the Jakarta incident was
already behind her, her superiors requested her to see MR. Ali Meniewy, Chief
Legal Officer of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. When she saw him, he brought
her to the police station where the police took her passport and questioned her
about the Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply stood by as the police put pressure on
her to make a statement dropping the case against Thamer and Allah. Not until she
agreed to do so did the police return her passport and allowed her to catch the
afternoon flight out of Jeddah.
8. One year and a half later or on June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a few
minutes before the departure of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was not allowed to
board the plane and instead ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah to see Mr.
Meniewy, the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a certain Khalid of the
SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi court where she was asked to sign a
document written in Arabic. They told her that this was necessary to close the case
against Thamer and Allah. As it turned out, plaintiff signed a notice to her to appear
before the court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.
9. Shortly afterwards, defendant SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to report to Jeddah
once again and see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for further investigation. Plaintiff did
so after receiving assurance from SAUDIAs Manila manager, Aslam Saleemi, that
the investigation was routinary and that it posed no danger to her.
10. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer brought plaintiff to the same Saudi court on
June 27, 1993. Nothing happened then but on June 28, 1993, a Saudi judge
interrogated plaintiff through an interpreter about the Jakarta incident. After one
hour of interrogation, they let her go. At the airport, however, just as her plane was
about to take off, a SAUDIA officer told her that the airline had forbidden her to take
that flight. At the Inflight Service Office where she was told to go, the secretary of
Mr. Yahya Saddick took away her passport and told her to remain in Jeddah, at the
crew quarters, until further orders.
11. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal officer again escorted plaintiff to the same
court where the judge, to her astonishment and shock, rendered a decision,
translated to her in English, sentencing her to five months imprisonment and to 286
lashes. Only then did she realize that the Saudi court had tried her, together with
Thamer and Allah, for what happened in Jakarta.The court found plaintiff guilty of
(1) adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing, and listening to the music in violation of
Islamic laws; (3) socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.
12. Because SAUDIA refused to lend her a hand in the case, plaintiff sought the
help of the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah. The latter helped her pursue an appeal
from the decision of the court. To pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic
flights of defendant SAUDIA while, ironically, Thamer and Allah freely served the
international flights.[39]
Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element,
we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could present a conflicts case.
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of
two or more states is said to contain a foreign element.The presence of a foreign element is
inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to
the geographic limits of their birth or conception.[40]
The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. [41] The foreign element may
simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign
domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties situated in
another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form.[42]
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent
Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign
corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight
stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders,
particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a
conflicts situation to arise.
We thus find private respondents assertion that the case is purely domestic,
imprecise. A conflicts problem presents itself here, and the question of jurisdiction [43] confronts
the court a quo.
18
Conflicts of LAW – SESSION 1
ATTY. DELA CRUZ- JD4301
After a careful study of the private respondents Amended Complaint, [44] and the Comment
thereon, we note that she aptly predicated her cause of action on Articles 19 and 21 of the New
Civil Code.
On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code provides;
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice give everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith.
On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damages.
Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of Appeals,[45] this Court held that:
The aforecited provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept
of torts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number
of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in
the statutes.
Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its
provisions. Thus, we agree with private respondents assertion that violations of Articles 19 and
21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal forum.
Based on the allegations[46] in the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the Rules of
Court on jurisdiction[47] we find that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. [48] Its authority to try and hear the case is provided
for under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is hereby amended to read as follows:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
xxxxxxxxx
(8) In all other cases in which demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds
One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items exceeds Two hundred Thousand pesos
(P200,000.00).(Emphasis ours)
xxxxxxxxx
And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Courtthe venue, Quezon City,
is appropriate:
SEC. 2 Venue in Courts of First Instance. [Now Regional Trial Court]
(a) x x x x x x x x x
(b) Personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff
or any of the plaintiff resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in
favor of the RTC Quezon City assuming jurisdiction.Paramount is the private interest of the
litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite obvious. Relative advantages and
obstacles to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient
forum, vex, harass, or oppress the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or
disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of
forum should rarely be disturbed.[49]
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in
the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private
respondent now) to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where
she no longer maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental
unfairness to her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and
inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of forum of the plaintiff (now
private respondent) should be upheld.
Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties
herein. By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private respondent
has voluntary submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court.
The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions [50] praying for the
dismissal of Moradas Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex Abundante
Cautelam dated February 20, 1995. What is very patent and explicit from the motions filed, is
that SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has
effectively submitted to the trial courts jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the Amended
Complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.
As held by this Court in Republic vs. Ker and Company, Ltd.:[51]
We observe that the motion to dismiss filed on April 14, 1962, aside from disputing
the lower courts jurisdiction over defendants person, prayed for dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that plaintiffs cause of action has prescribed. By
interposing such second ground in its motion to dismiss, Ker and Co., Ltd. availed
of an affirmative defense on the basis of which it prayed the court to resolve
controversy in its favor. For the court to validly decide the said plea of defendant
Ker & Co., Ltd., it necessarily had to acquire jurisdiction upon the latters person,
who, being the proponent of the affirmative defense, should be deemed to have
abandoned its special appearance and voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction
of the court.
Similarly, the case of De Midgely vs. Ferandos, held that:
When the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting
to the jurisdiction of the court. If his motion is for any other purpose than to object to
the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he thereby submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. A special appearance by motion made for the purpose of
19
Conflicts of LAW – SESSION 1
ATTY. DELA CRUZ- JD4301
objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person will be held to be a general
appearance, if the party in said motion should, for example, ask for a dismissal of
the action upon the further ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter.[52]
Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. Thus, we find that the trial court has jurisdiction over the case and that its exercise thereof,
justified.
As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer
two important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of
the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen
legal system regulate the situation.[53]
Several theories have been propounded in order to identify the legal system that should
ultimately control. Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance both
notions of justice and predictability, they do not always do so. The forum is then faced with the
problem of deciding which of these two important values should be stressed. [54]
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a
certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as characterization, or the doctrine of
qualification. It is the process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question
specified in a conflicts rule.[55] The purpose of characterization is to enable the forum to select
the proper law.[56]
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or
operative fact.[57] An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a test or connecting
factor or point of contact. Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as
property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of
the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing.[58]
Note that one or more circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the
determination of the applicable law.[59] These test factors or points of contact or connecting
factors could be any of the following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or
his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be
situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved;
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place
where a contract has been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort
committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of
performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be
exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their
agreement, the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or
done. The lex forithe law of the forumis particularly important because, as we have
seen earlier, matters of procedure not going to the substance of the claim involved
are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the content of the
otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for the
reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law;
and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal
relationships of the ship and of its master or owner as such. It also covers
contractual relationships particularly contracts of affreightment.[60] (Underscoring
ours.)
After a careful study of the pleadings on record, including allegations in the Amended
Complaint deemed submitted for purposes of the motion to dismiss, we are convinced that there
is reasonable basis for private respondents assertion that although she was already working in
Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an
investigation of the charges she made against the two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on
her person while they were in Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for
very serious charges, including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.
There is likewise logical basis on record for the claim that the handing over or turning over
of the person of private respondent to Jeddah officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its
duties as employer. Petitioners purported act contributed to and amplified or even proximately
caused additional humiliation, misery and suffering of private respondent. Petitioner thereby
allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and prosecution of private respondent under the guise
of petitioners authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she
reposed upon it. As purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and
imprisonment of private respondent was wrongful. But these capped the injury or harm allegedly
inflicted upon her person and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable as claimed, to
provide compensation or redress for the wrongs done, once duly proven.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the connecting
factor or point of contact could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci
actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines
could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This
is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a
Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner
would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, act with justice, give her
her due and observe honesty and good faith. Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she
claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no
moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the
fatality of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of
complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it
is not without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.
Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi,
modern theories and rules on tort liability [61] have been advanced to offer fresh judicial
approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability,
we find here an occasion to apply the State of the most significant relationship rule, which in our
view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of this case.
In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their
relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred;
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence,
20
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ATTY. DELA CRUZ- JD4301
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where
the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.[62]
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged
in the Philippines. There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina
national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of
international air carriage. Thus, the relationship between the parties was centered here,
although it should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law violations. From the
record, the claim that the Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter in this
dispute,[63] raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in
our view, has been properly established.
Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complaint of and
the place having the most interest in the problem, we find, by way of recapitulation, that the
Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount application to and control in the resolution
of the legal issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent Regional Trial
Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate
venue is in Quezon City, which could properly apply Philippine law. Moreover, we find untenable
petitioners insistence that [s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of
pleading and proving the applicable Saudi law on the matter. [64] As aptly said by private
respondent, she has no obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
since her cause of action is based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. In
her Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings she never alleged that Saudi law should
govern this case.[65] And as correctly held by the respondent appellate court, considering that it
was the petitioner who was invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, thus the burden
was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of Saudi Arabia is.[66]
Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent appellate court in upholding the trial
courts denial of defendants (herein petitioners) motion to dismiss the case. Not only was
jurisdiction in order and venue properly laid, but appeal after trial was obviously available, and
the expeditious trial itself indicated by the nature of the case at hand. Indubitably, the Philippines
is the state intimately concerned with the ultimate outcome of the case below not just for the
benefit of all the litigants, but also for the vindication of the countrys system of law and justice in
a transnational setting. With these guidelines in mind, the trial court must proceed to try and
adjudge the case in the light of relevant Philippine law, with due consideration of the foreign
element or elements involved. Nothing said herein, of course, should be construed as prejudging
the results of the case in any manner whatsoever.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. Civil Case No. Q-
93-18394 entitled Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabia Airlines is hereby REMANDED to
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
d. Laws of extraterritorial application
G.R. No. 139868
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner,
- versus -
CANDELARIA GUERSEY-
DALAYGON, Respondent.
Promulgated: June 8, 2006
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who
have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill
(Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to
Richard, who was also designated as executor. [1] The will was admitted to probate before the
Orphans Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. Phillips as executor due
to Richards renunciation of his appointment.[2] The court also named Atty. Alonzo
Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as
ancillary administrator.[3]
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two
children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin.
On October 12, 1982, Audreys will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No.
9625.[4] As administrator of Audreys estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and
appraisal of the following properties: (1) Audreys conjugal share in real estate with
improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued
at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current account in Audreys name with a cash balance
of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.[5]
On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire
estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which
he left to Kyle.[6] The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphans Court of Ann
Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in
turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena &
Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator.
Richards will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 138, docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888. [7] Atty. Quasha was appointed as
ancillary administrator on July 24, 1986.[8]
On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to
declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.[9]Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project
of partition of Audreys estate, with Richard being apportioned the undivided interest in the
Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current
21
Conflicts of LAW – SESSION 1
ATTY. DELA CRUZ- JD4301
account; and Kyle, the undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in A/G Interiors,
Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.[10]
The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order
dated February 12, 1988.[11] The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the
Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new
title in the joint names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey ( undivided interest) and Kyle
( undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333 shares to the
Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank to release
the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs.[12]
Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the
names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.[13]
Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a
project of partition wherein 2/5 of Richards undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated
to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richards three children. This was opposed by
respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, a legacy passes to the
legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy.[14] Since
Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to
respondent.
The trial court found merit in respondents opposition, and in its Order dated December
6, 1991, disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial
court also adjudicated Richards entire undivided interest in the Makati property to respondent.[15]
On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended
complaint for the annulment of the trial courts Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988,
issued in Special Proceeding No. 9625.[16] Respondent contended that petitioner willfully
breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the
distribution of Audreys estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that since Audrey
devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to
him, and not merely thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and
interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now
pertain to respondent.
Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondents allegations. Petitioner contended that
he acted in good faith in submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special
Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no knowledge of the State of Marylands laws on testate and
intestate succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the best interests of the
surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just
shares. Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are already final and
executory, and cannot be set aside.
On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial courts
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625. [17] The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12,
1998 and April 7, 1988 are hereby ANNULLED and, in lieu thereof, a new
one is entered ordering:
(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey ONeill Guersey
in favor of the estate of W. Richard Guersey; and
(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of
the Makati City Registry and the issuance of a new title in the name of the
estate of W. Richard Guersey.
SO ORDERED.[18]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution
dated August 27, 1999.[19]
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging
that the CA gravely erred in not holding that:
A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION
FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE DECEASED AUDREY GUERSEY,
ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR, ARE VALID AND
BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY
IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN NO LONGER BE ANNULLED.
B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH,
DID NOT COMMIT FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF
AUDREY ONEIL GUERSEYS ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT
NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS EMPLOYED BY
[HIM] IN PROCURING SAID ORDERS.[20]
Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12,
1988 and April 7, 1988 can no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is
conclusive upon the administration as to all matters involved in such judgment or order, and will
determine for all time and in all courts, as far as the parties to the proceedings are concerned, all
matters therein determined, and the same has already been executed.[21]
Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an
ancillary administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he
was not aware of the relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition was made in
accordance with Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on the part of respondent
with regard to the terms of Aubreys will, stating that as early as 1984, he already apprised
respondent of the contents of the will and how the estate will be divided. [22]
Respondent argues that petitioners breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary
administrator of Aubreys estate amounted to extrinsic fraud.According to respondent, petitioner
was duty-bound to follow the express terms of Aubreys will, and his denial of knowledge of the
laws of Maryland cannot stand because petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm
and it was his duty to know the relevant laws.
Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of
partition because she was not a party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubreys will
bequeathing entirely her estate to Richard only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in
Special Proceeding No. M-888 for the settlement of Richards estate.
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Conflicts of LAW – SESSION 1
ATTY. DELA CRUZ- JD4301
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of
the estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it
becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.[23] However, in exceptional
cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
[24]
Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar,[25] the Court ruled that a party interested in a probate proceeding
may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his
control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.[26]
The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the
issuance of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law
is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. An
annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the ground that a judgment is void
for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud. [27] For fraud to
become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual, [28] and must be
brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.[29]
In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of
the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondents
cause and found that petitioners failure to follow the terms of Audreys will, despite the latters
declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the
Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner should have
distributed Aubreys estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also found that
petitioner was prompted to distribute Audreys estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order
to equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guerseys adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.
Petitioner contends that respondents cause of action had already prescribed because
as early as 1984, respondent was already well aware of the terms of Audreys will, [30] and the
complaint was filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack of immediate
action by saying that she had no opportunity to question petitioners acts since she was not a
party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the project of
partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the estate of Richard that
she was prompted to seek another counsel to protect her interest.[31]
It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based
on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent
act/s. Respondents knowledge of the terms of Audreys will is immaterial in this case since it is
not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioners failure to introduce in evidence the pertinent
law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission, alleged to have
been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should be counted from
the time of respondents discovery thereof.
Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richards estate, the
opposition thereto, and the order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special
Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in 1991.[32] Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the
assailed orders to lapse into finality since it was only through Special Proceeding No. M-888 that
she came to comprehend the ramifications of petitioners acts. Obviously, respondent had no
other recourse under the circumstances but to file the annulment case. Since the action for
annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed.
Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
[33]
the Court stated that man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive new
schemes to fool the unwary.
There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of
B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one the effect of which prevents a party from
hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court,
or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment itself, but
to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission
of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act
of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial
of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting
fully his side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been
prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on
him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of
a compromise; or where the defendant never had any knowledge of the suit,
being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney
fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar
cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or
hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to
set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and
fair hearing.[34]
The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.[35]
Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audreys estate. As such, he occupies a
position of the highest trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence
and act in entire good faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or
insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of
prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises in
similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be judged.[36]
Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estate according
to the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence
the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, must be
upheld.
It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled
in Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was
shown, among others, that at the time of Audreys death, she was residing in the Philippines but
is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was
executed and probated before the Orphans Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was
duly authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the
Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the Orphans Court of Baltimore City on
September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and
the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audreys will, especially with regard as
to who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as
provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to
the law of the country where it is situated.
23
Conflicts of LAW – SESSION 1
ATTY. DELA CRUZ- JD4301
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that capacity to succeed is governed by
the law of the nation of the decedent.
As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will
Proved Outside the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.When a will is thus allowed, the
court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will
annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to
all the estate of the testator in the Philippines. Such estate, after the
payment of just debts and expenses of administration, shall be
disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate
upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in
cases of estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants
of another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)
While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them; [37]however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of
Audreys estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State
of Maryland.[38]
Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State
of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the
same as the Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied
Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of Audreys will. The obvious result was that
there was no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the
evidence presented.
Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The
Court cannot accept petitioners protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that
Philippine laws apply when as early as the reprobate of Audreys will before the trial court in
1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of
Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, with
a big legal staff and a large library.[39] He had all the legal resources to determine the applicable
law.It was incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with
reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately,
petitioner failed to perform his fiduciary duties.
Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial
court failed to consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12,
1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as Audreys heirs, and distributing Audreys
estate according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced
respondent and deprived her of her full successional right to the Makati property.
In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,[40] the Court held that when the rule
that the negligence or mistake of counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid to
justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit
exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the court has the power to except
a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.
The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary
administrator of Audreys estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by
petitioner was prompted by his concern over Kyle, whom petitioner believed should equally
benefit from the Makati property. The CA correctly stated, which the Court adopts, thus:
In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities,
defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta invokes the principle which presumes the law
of the forum to be the same as the foreign law (Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30,
38) in the absence of evidence adduced to prove the latter law (Slade
Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions in the light
of the foregoing principle, however, it appears that the defendant lost sight
of the fact that his primary responsibility as ancillary administrator was to
distribute the subject estate in accordance with the will of Audrey
ONeill Guersey. Considering the principle established under Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as the citizenship and the avowed
domicile of the decedent, it goes without saying that the defendant was also
duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter.
The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the
national law of Audrey ONeill Guersey during the proceedings before the
court a quo. While there is claim of good faith in distributing the subject
estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to put
his actuations in a different light as indicated in a portion of his direct
examination, to wit:
xxx
It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of
Audrey ONeill Guersey was prompted by defendant Alonzo
H. Anchetasconcern that the subject realty equally benefit the plaintiffs
adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.
Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas action
appears to have breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary
administrator of the subject estate. While such breach of duty admittedly
cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary circumstances,
the fiduciary nature of the said defendants position, as well as the
resultant frustration of the decedents last will, combine to create a
circumstance that is tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo
H. Anchetas omission to prove the national laws of the decedent and to
follow the latters last will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the subject
orders without a fair submission of the real issues involved in the case.
[41]
(Emphasis supplied)
This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total
disregard of the law as a result of petitioners abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It
does not rest upon petitioners pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under the
circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent was thus excluded from enjoying full rights to
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Conflicts of LAW – SESSION 1
ATTY. DELA CRUZ- JD4301
the Makati property through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioners omission was
beyond her control. She was in no position to analyze the legal implications of petitioners
omission and it was belatedly that she realized the adverse consequence of the same. The end
result was a miscarriage of justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to
provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their rights.[42]
The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888
noted the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:
Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the
Public General Laws of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, all property of a
decedent shall be subject to the estate of decedents law, and upon his
death shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the
legal title for administration and distribution, while Section 4-408 expressly
provides that unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a
legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the
property which is the subject of the legacy. Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title
1, on the other hand, declares that a personal representative is a fiduciary
and as such he is under the general duty to settle and distribute the estate
of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the estate of
decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is
reasonable under the circumstances.[43]
In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1)
Audreys conjugal share in the Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3)
64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to
Richard upon Audreys death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his entire estate to
respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to
Kyle. When Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then passed on
to respondent. This, of course, assumes the proposition that the law of the State
of Maryland which allows a legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate of the testator in the
property which is the subject of the legacy, was sufficiently proven in Special Proceeding No.
9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof in view of the ruling
in Bohanan v. Bohanan.[44] Therein, the Court took judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite
failure to prove the same. The Court held, viz.:
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court
below and we have found that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the
motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for withdrawal of P20,000 as her share,
the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada Laws, was
introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See
pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance).
Again said law was presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted
by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the case on January 23,
1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance,
Vol. 1).
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not
dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada.
Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the
pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada
Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such
law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.
In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record
before the CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the
same in disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richards estate, not to mention that
petitioner or any other interested person for that matter, does not dispute the existence or
validity of said law, then Audreys and Richards estate should be distributed according to their
respective wills, and not according to the project of partition submitted by
petitioner.Consequently, the entire Makati property belongs to respondent.
Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang,[45] wrote:
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have
substantially the same force and effect in the probate court as if the testator
stood before the court in full life making the declarations by word of mouth
as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the law in the
creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished
to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that
instrument, permitted them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in
favor of the testator's having meant just what he said.
Honorable as it seems, petitioners motive in equitably distributing Audreys estate
cannot prevail over Audreys and Richards wishes.As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:[46]
x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system
of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter
alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national Law.
Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.[47]
Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were
American citizens who owned real property in the Philippines, although records do not show
when and how the Guerseys acquired the Makati property.
Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire
and exploit lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to
operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by
them. In Republic v. Quasha,[48] the Court clarified that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946,
which re-opened to American citizens and business enterprises the right in the acquisition of
lands of the public domain, the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of natural
resources of the Philippines, does not include the acquisition or exploitation of private
agricultural lands. The prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to
the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired
by hereditary succession and when the transfer was made to a former natural-born citizen, as
provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986
Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to
lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was
made by a former natural-born citizen.
In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. [49] In this case, since
the Makati property had already passed on to respondent who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if
any, that attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property is now
25
Conflicts of LAW – SESSION 1
ATTY. DELA CRUZ- JD4301

inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino
hands has been achieved. Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage
dated August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
with petitioner herein.
Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an
official of the court. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.

Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, G. R. No. 183622
Petitioner, Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as
Present:
administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION, (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.
- versus - PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ. On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A.

Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with
LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Promulgated:
Respondent. the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.
February 8, 2012

The two cases were subsequently consolidated.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis

pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an
x--------------------------------------------------x
interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the
RESOLUTION
estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for

bigamy was filed against petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and
SERENO, J.:
docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.

Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision [1] and
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner
Resolution[2] regarding the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando
contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on
B. Catalan.
12 December 1959.

The facts are as follows:

26
Conflicts of LAW – SESSION 1
ATTY. DELA CRUZ- JD4301
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy. [3] The trial court ruled
that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not
recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action
with the trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It
considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner
for the crime of bigamy.
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married to
Eusebio Bristol.
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the
Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private
respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage
between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando.
Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal
to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration.[4]
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have
been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition for letters
of administration may have been filed by an uninterested person, the defect was cured by the
appearance of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted that, to determine who has a better
right to administer the decedents properties, the RTC should have first required the parties to
present their evidence before it ruled on the matter.
On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that
petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. She should have instead filed a petition for review rather
than a petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition for Certiorari was filed within the
fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA
allowed the Petition and continued to decide on the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:
As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the
case. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there
must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same
interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the two
cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one
would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
other. A petition for letters of administration is a special proceeding. A
special proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the status or
right of a party, or a particular fact. And, in contrast to an ordinary civil
action, a special proceeding involves no defendant or respondent. The only
party in this kind of proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant. Considering
its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration can hardly be
barred by a similar pending petition involving the estate of the same
decedent unless both petitions are filed by the same person. In the case at
bar, the petitioner was not a party to the petition filed by the private
respondent, in the same manner that the latter was not made a party to the
petition filed by the former. The first element of litis pendentia is wanting.
The contention of the petitioner must perforce fail.
Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render
nugatory the provision of the Rules requiring a petitioner for letters of
administration to be an interested party, inasmuch as any person, for that
matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the estate sought to be
administered, could be appointed as administrator for as long as he files his
petition ahead of any other person, in derogation of the rights of those
specifically mentioned in the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition
for letters of administration. As a spouse, the petitioner would have been
preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a
marriage certificate, like any other public document, is only prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had
27
Conflicts of LAW – SESSION 1
ATTY. DELA CRUZ- JD4301
been charged with bigamy and was acquitted has not been disputed
by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a
second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been
dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by a judgment rendered in a proper proceedings. The deduction of
the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case
negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B.
Catalan has not been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt
from the petitioner to deny the findings of the trial court. There is
therefore no basis for us to make a contrary finding. Thus, not being an
interested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the
dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the trial court is in
place.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision. [6] She alleged that the reasoning of the
CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the
other hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her
acquittal of the crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.
Hence, this Petition.
At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the
finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio
Bristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows
that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of the findings
of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA
held that petitioner was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando.
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No.
2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction
recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was
established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[7] wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce
in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. xxx
We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,[8] to wit:
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same
case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided
they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of
Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino
citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van
Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her
right to inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by
the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we
stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of
Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by
Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized
in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated
in Garcia v. Recio,[9] to wit:
28
Conflicts of LAW – SESSION 1
ATTY. DELA CRUZ- JD4301
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign
judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by
the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act
of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.
However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of
May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected,
not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered in
the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was
admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in
evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to
object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of
the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family
Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine
personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization
is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and
civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive
countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to
the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine
personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce
law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of
a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the
original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of
Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long
time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine
courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise
of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party
who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those
are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving
the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the
burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls
squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot
take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution,
and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in
the negative. (Emphasis supplied)
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of
Orlandos divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and
the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further
reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she
has the preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise,
letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next
of kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,[10] in which we said:
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce
decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo
to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records
show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court
laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1)
an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having
legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in
the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.
29
Conflicts of LAW – SESSION 1
ATTY. DELA CRUZ- JD4301

With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly e. Forum non conveniens as a ground for courts to desist from exercising jurisdiction
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage
Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which [G.R. No. 141536. February 26, 2001]
purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said
law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of GIL MIGUEL T. PUYAT, petitioner, vs. RON ZABARTE, respondent.
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
DECISION
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for
further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry PANGANIBAN, J.:
Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis
supplied)
Summary judgment in a litigation is resorted to if there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact, other than the amount of damages. If this verity is evident from the pleadings and
the supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file with the court, the moving party is
entitled to such remedy as a matter of course.
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to

ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B.
The Case
Catalan.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
challenging the August 31, 1999 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the
GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 67 in Civil Case No. 64107; and the January
20, 2000 CA Resolution[2] which denied reconsideration.
Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case
The assailed CA Decision disposed as follows:
be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is AFFIRMED." [3]
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED. The Facts

The facts of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows: [4]

It appears that on 24 January 1994, [Respondent] Ron Zabarte commenced [an action] to
enforce the money judgment rendered by the Superior Court for the State of California, County
of Contra Costa, U.S.A. On 18 March 1994, [petitioner] filed his Answer with the following
special and affirmative defenses:

xxxxxxxxx

8) The Superior Court for the State of California, County of Contra Costa[,] did not properly
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of and over the persons involved in [C]ase #C21-
00265.

9) The Judgment on Stipulations for Entry in Judgment in Case #C21-00265 dated December
12, 1991 was obtained without the assistance of counsel for [petitioner] and without sufficient

30
Conflicts of LAW – SESSION 1
ATTY. DELA CRUZ- JD4301
notice to him and therefore, was rendered in clear violation of [petitioners] constitutional rights to
substantial and procedural due process.
10) The Judgment on Stipulation for Entry in Judgment in Case #C21-00265 dated December
12, 1991 was procured by means of fraud or collusion or undue influence and/or based on a
clear mistake of fact and law.
11) The Judgment on Stipulation for Entry in Judgment in Case #C21-00265 dated December
12, 1991 is contrary to the laws, public policy and canons of morality obtaining in the Philippines
and the enforcement of such judgment in the Philippines would result in the unjust enrichment of
[respondent] at the expense of [petitioner] in this case.
12) The Judgment on Stipulation for Entry in Judgment in Case #C21-00265 dated December
12, 1991 is null and void and unenforceable in the Philippines.
13) In the transaction, which is the subject matter in Case #C21-00265, [petitioner] is not in any
way liable, in fact and in law, to [respondent] in this case, as contained in [petitioners] Answer to
Complaint in Case #C21-00265 dated April 1, 1991, Annex B of [respondents] Complaint dated
December 6, 1993.
14) [Respondent] is guilty of misrepresentation or falsification in the filing of his Complaint in this
case dated December 6, 1993. Worse, [respondent] has no capacity to sue in the Philippines.
15) Venue has been improperly laid in this case.
(Record, pp. 42-44)
On 1 August 1994, [respondent] filed a [M]otion for [S]ummary [J]udgment under Rule 34
of the Rules of Court alleging that the [A]nswer filed by [petitioner] failed to tender any
genuine issue as to the material facts. In his [O]pposition to [respondents] motion,
[petitioner] demurred as follows:
2) [Petitioner] begs to disagree[;] in support hereof, [he] wishes to mention that in his Answer
with Special and Affirmative Defenses dated March 16, 1994 [petitioner] has interposed that the
Judgment on Stipulations for Entry in Judgment is null and void, fraudulent, illegal and
unenforceable, the same having been obtained by means of fraud, collusion, undue influence
and/or clear mistake of fact and law. In addition, [he] has maintained that said Judgment on
Stipulations for Entry in Judgment was obtained without the assistance of counsel for [petitioner]
and without sufficient notice to him and therefore, was rendered in violation of his constitutional
rights to substantial and procedural due process.
The [M]otion for [S]ummary [J]udgment was set for hearing on 12 August 1994 during
which [respondent] marked and submitted in evidence the following:
Exhibit A - x x x Judgment on Stipulation For Entry In Judgment of the Supreme
Court of the State of California[,] County of Contra Costa[,]
signed by Hon. Ellen James, Judge of the Superior Court.
Exhibit B - x x x Certificate of Authentication of the [O]rder signed by the Hon. Ellen
James, issued by the Consulate General of the Republic of
the Philippines.
Exhibit C - [R]eturn of the [W]rit of [E]xecution (writ unsatisfied) issued by the
sheriff/marshall, County of Santa Clara, State of California.
Exhibit D - [W]rit of [E]xecution
Exhibit 'E' [P]roof of [S]ervice of copies of [W]rit of [E]xecution, [N]otice of [L]evy,
[M]emorandum of [G]arnishee, [E]xemptions from
[E]nforcement of [J]udgment.
Exhibit F - Certification issued by the Secretary of State, State of California that
Stephen Weir is the duly elected, qualified and acting
[c]ounty [c]lerk of the County of Contra Costa of the State of
California.
Exhibit G - Certificate of [A]uthentication of the [W]rit of [E]xecution.
On 6 April 1995, the court a quo issued an [O]rder granting [respondents] [M]otion for [S]ummary
[J]udgment [and] likewise granting [petitioner] ten (10) days to submit opposing affidavits, after
which the case would be deemed submitted for resolution (Record, pp. 152-153). [Petitioner]
filed a [M]otion for [R]econsideration of the aforesaid [O]rder and [respondent] filed
[C]omment. On 30 June 1995, [petitioner] filed a [M]otion to [D]ismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and forum-non-conveniens (Record, pp. 166-
170). In his [O]pposition to the [M]otion (Record, pp. 181-182) [respondent] contended that
[petitioner could] no longer question the jurisdiction of the lower court on the ground that [the
latters] Answer had failed to raise the issue of jurisdiction. [Petitioner] countered by asserting in
his Reply that jurisdiction [could] not be fixed by agreement of the parties. The lower court
dismissed [his] [M]otion for [R]econsideration and [M]otion [to] [D]ismiss (Record, pp. 196-198),
x x x.
The RTC[5] eventually rendered its February 21, 1997 Decision,[6] which disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering [petitioner] to pay [respondent] the
following amounts:
1. The amount of U.S. dollars $241,991.33, with the interest of legal rate from October 18, 1991,
or its peso equivalent, pursuant to the [J]udgment of [S]tipulation for [E]ntry in [J]udgment dated
December 19, 1991;
2. The amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees;
3. To pay the costs of suit.
The claim for moral damages, not having been substantiated, it is hereby denied.[7]
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Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals held that petitioner was estopped from
assailing the judgment that had become final and had, in fact, been partially executed. The CA
also ruled that summary judgment was proper, because petitioner had failed to tender any
genuine issue of fact and was merely maneuvering to delay the full effects of the judgment.
Citing Ingenohl v. Olsen,[8] the CA also rejected petitioners argument that the RTC should
have dismissed the action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment, on the ground of forum
non conveniens. It reasoned out that the recognition of the foreign judgment was based on
comity, reciprocity and res judicata.
Hence, this Petition.[9]
Issue
In his Memorandum, petitioner submits this lone but all-embracing issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted in a manner x x x contrary to law when it affirmed the
Order of the trial court granting respondents Motion for Summary Judgment and rendering
judgment against the petitioner.[10]
In his discussion, petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling in this wise:
1. That his Answer failed to tender a genuine issue of fact regarding the following:
(a) the jurisdiction of a foreign court over the subject matter
(b) the validity of the foreign judgment
(c) the judgments conformity to Philippine laws, public policy, canons of morality,
and norms against unjust enrichment
2. That the principle of forum non conveniens was inapplicable to the instant case.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Question: Summary Judgment
Petitioner vehemently insists that summary judgment is inappropriate to resolve the case
at bar, arguing that his Answer allegedly raised genuine and material factual matters which he
should have been allowed to prove during trial.
On the other hand, respondent argues that the alleged genuine issues of fact raised by
petitioner are mere conclusions of law, or propositions arrived at not by any process of natural
reasoning from a fact or a combination of facts stated but by the application of the artificial rules
of law to the facts pleaded.[11]
The RTC granted respondents Motion for Summary Judgment because petitioner, in his
Answer, admitted the existence of the Judgment on Stipulation for Entry in Judgment. Besides,
he had already paid $5,000 to respondent, as provided in the foreign judgment sought to be
enforced.[12] Hence, the trial court ruled that, there being no genuine issue as to any material
fact, the case should properly be resolved through summary judgment. The CA affirmed this
ruling.
We concur with the lower courts. Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt
disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, and not a genuine issue as
to any material fact. By genuine issue is meant a question of fact that calls for the presentation
of evidence. It should be distinguished from an issue that is sham, contrived, set in bad faith and
patently unsubstantial.[13]
Summary judgment is resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out litigations and useless
delays. When affidavits, depositions and admissions on file show that there are no genuine
issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to pierce the allegations in the pleadings and to
obtain immediate relief by way of summary judgment. In short, since the facts are not in dispute,
the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by applying the law to the material facts.
Petitioner contends that by allowing summary judgment, the two courts a quo prevented
him from presenting evidence to substantiate his claims. We do not agree. Summary judgment is
based on facts directly proven by affidavits, depositions or admissions. [14] In this case, the CA
and the RTC both merely ruled that trial was not necessary to resolve the case. Additionally and
correctly, the RTC specifically ordered petitioner to submit opposing affidavits to support his
contentions that (1) the Judgment on Stipulation for Entry in Judgment was procured on the
basis of fraud, collusion, undue influence, or a clear mistake of law or fact; and (2) that it was
contrary to public policy or the canons of morality.[15]
Again, in its Order[16] dated November 29, 1995, the trial court clarified that the opposing
affidavits were for [petitioner] to spell out the facts or circumstances [that] would constitute lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of and over the persons involved in Case No. C21-00265,
and that would render the judgment therein null and void. In this light, petitioners contention that
he was not allowed to present evidence to substantiate his claims is clearly untenable.
For summary judgment to be valid, Rule 34, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, requires (a)
that there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages;
and (b) that the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.[17] As mentioned earlier, petitioner admitted that a foreign judgment
had been rendered against him and in favor of respondent, and that he had paid $5,000 to the
latter in partial compliance therewith. Hence, respondent, as the party presenting the Motion for
Summary Judgment, was shown to be entitled to the judgment.
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The CA made short shrift of the first requirement. To show that petitioner had raised no
genuine issue, it relied instead on the finality of the foreign judgment which was, in fact, partially
executed. Hence, we shall show in the following discussion how the defenses presented by
petitioner failed to tender any genuine issue of fact, and why a full-blown trial was not necessary
for the resolution of the issues.
Jurisdiction
Petitioner alleges that jurisdiction over Case No. C21-00265, which involved partnership
interest, was vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission, not in the Superior Court of
California, County of Contra Costa.
We disagree. In the absence of proof of California law on the jurisdiction of courts, we
presume that such law, if any, is similar to Philippine law. We base this conclusion on the
presumption of identity or similarity, also known as processual presumption. [18] The Complaint,
[19]
which respondent filed with the trial court, was for the enforcement of a foreign judgment. He
alleged therein that the action of the foreign court was for the collection of a sum of money,
breach of promissory notes, and damages.[20]
In our jurisdiction, such a case falls under the jurisdiction of civil courts, not of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The jurisdiction of the latter is exclusively over
matters enumerated in Section 5, PD 902-A,[21] prior to its latest amendment. If the foreign court
did not really have jurisdiction over the case, as petitioner claims, it would have been very easy
for him to show this. Since jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in a complaint, he only
had to submit a copy of the complaint filed with the foreign court. Clearly, this issue did not
warrant trial.
Rights to Counsel and to Due Process
Petitioner contends that the foreign judgment, which was in the form of a Compromise
Agreement, cannot be executed without the parties being assisted by their chosen lawyers. The
reason for this, he points out, is to eliminate collusion, undue influence and/or improper exertion
of ascendancy by one party over the other. He alleges that he discharged his counsel during the
proceedings, because he felt that the latter was not properly attending to the case. The judge,
however, did not allow him to secure the services of another counsel. Insisting that petitioner
settle the case with respondent, the judge practically imposed the settlement agreement on
him.In his Opposing Affidavit, petitioner states:
It is true that I was initially represented by a counsel in the proceedings in #C21-00625. I
discharged him because I then felt that he was not properly attending to my case or was not
competent enough to represent my interest. I asked the Judge for time to secure another
counsel but I was practically discouraged from engaging one as the Judge was insistent that I
settle the case at once with the [respondent]. Being a foreigner and not a lawyer at that I did not
know what to do. I felt helpless and the Judge and [respondents] lawyer were the ones telling
me what to do. Under ordinary circumstances, their directives should have been taken with a
grain of salt especially so [since respondents] counsel, who was telling me what to do, had an
interest adverse to mine. But [because] time constraints and undue influence exerted by the
Judge and [respondents] counsel on me disturbed and seriously affected my freedom to act
according to my best judgment and belief. In point of fact, the terms of the settlement were
practically imposed on me by the Judge seconded all the time by [respondents] counsel. I was
then helpless as I had no counsel to assist me and the collusion between the Judge and
[respondents] counsel was becoming more evident by the way I was treated in the Superior
Court of [t]he State of California. I signed the Judgment on Stipulation for Entry in Judgment
without any lawyer assisting me at the time and without being fully aware of its terms and
stipulations.[22]
The manifestation of petitioner that the judge and the counsel for the opposing party had
pressured him would gain credibility only if he had not been given sufficient time to engage the
services of a new lawyer. Respondents Affidavit[23] dated May 23, 1994, clarified, however, that
petitioner had sufficient time, but he failed to retain a counsel. Having dismissed his lawyer as
early as June 19, 1991, petitioner directly handled his own defense and negotiated a settlement
with respondent and his counsel in December 1991. Respondent also stated that petitioner,
ignoring the judges reminder of the importance of having a lawyer, argued that he would be the
one to settle the case and pay anyway. Eventually, the Compromise Agreement was presented
in court and signed before Judge Ellen James on January 3, 1992. Hence, petitioners rights to
counsel and to due process were not violated.
Unjust Enrichment
Petitioner avers that the Compromise Agreement violated the norm against unjust
enrichment because the judge made him shoulder all the liabilities in the case, even if there
were two other defendants, G.S.P & Sons, Inc. and the Genesis Group.
We cannot exonerate petitioner from his obligation under the foreign judgment, even if
there are other defendants who are not being held liable together with him. First, the foreign
judgment itself does not mention these other defendants, their participation or their liability to
respondent. Second, petitioners undated Opposing Affidavit states: [A]lthough myself and these
entities were initially represented by Atty. Lawrence L. Severson of the Law Firm Kouns,
Quinlivan & Severson, x x x I discharged x x x said lawyer. Subsequently, I assumed the
representation for myself and these firms and this was allowed by the Superior Court of the
State of California without any authorization from G.G.P. & Sons, Inc. and the Genesis Group.
[24]
Clearly, it was petitioner who chose to represent the other defendants; hence, he cannot now
be allowed to impugn a decision based on this ground.
In any event, contrary to petitioners contention, unjust enrichment or solutio indebiti does
not apply to this case. This doctrine contemplates payment when there is no duty to pay, and the
person who receives the payment has no right to receive it.[25] In this case, petitioner merely
argues that the other two defendants whom he represented were liable together with him. This is
not a case of unjust enrichment.
We do not see, either, how the foreign judgment could be contrary to law, morals, public
policy or the canons of morality obtaining in the country. Petitioner owed money, and the
judgment required him to pay it. That is the long and the short of this case.
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In addition, the maneuverings of petitioner before the trial court reinforce our belief that his
claims are unfounded. Instead of filing opposing affidavits to support his affirmative defenses, he
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order allowing summary judgment, as well as a Motion
to Dismiss the action on the ground of forum non conveniens. His opposing affidavits were filed
only after the Order of November 29, 1995 had denied both Motions. [26] Such actuation was
considered by the trial court as a dilatory ploy which justified the resolution of the action by
summary judgment. According to the CA, petitioners allegations sought to delay the full effects
of the judgment; hence, summary judgment was proper. On this point, we concur with both
courts.
Second Question: Forum Non Conveniens
of the parties based on foreign laws or contracts. The parties needed only to perform their
obligations under the Compromise Agreement they had entered into.
Under Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment in an
action in personam rendered by a foreign tribunal clothed with jurisdiction is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title.
[29]
Also, under Section 5(n) of Rule 131, a court -- whether in the Philippines or elsewhere --
enjoys the presumption that it is acting in the lawful exercise of its jurisdiction, and that it is
regularly performing its official duty. [30] Its judgment may, however, be assailed if there is
evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of
law or fact. But precisely, this possibility signals the need for a local trial court to exercise
jurisdiction. Clearly, the application of forum non coveniens is not called for.

Petitioner argues that the RTC should have refused to entertain the Complaint for
enforcement of the foreign judgment on the principle of forum non conveniens.He claims that the
trial court had no jurisdiction, because the case involved partnership interest, and there was
difficulty in ascertaining the applicable law in California. All the aspects of the transaction took
place in a foreign country, and respondent is not even Filipino.
The grounds relied upon by petitioner are contradictory. On the one hand, he insists that
the RTC take jurisdiction over the enforcement case in order to invalidate the foreign judgment;
yet, he avers that the trial court should not exercise jurisdiction over the same case on the basis
of forum non conveniens. Not only do these defenses weaken each other, but they bolster the
finding of the lower courts that he was merely maneuvering to avoid or delay payment of his
obligation.

We disagree. Under the principle of forum non conveniens, even if the exercise of WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and
jurisdiction is authorized by law, courts may nonetheless refuse to entertain a case for any of the Resolution AFFIRMED. Double costs against petitioner.
following practical reasons: SO ORDERED.

1) The belief that the matter can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main
aspects of the case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their
residence there;

2) The belief that the non-resident plaintiff sought the forum[,] a practice known as forum
shopping[,] merely to secure procedural advantages or to convey or harass the defendant;

3) The unwillingness to extend local judicial facilities to non-residents or aliens when the docket
may already be overcrowded;

4) The inadequacy of the local judicial machinery for effectuating the right sought to be
maintained; and

The difficulty of ascertaining foreign law.[27]

None of the aforementioned reasons barred the RTC from exercising its jurisdiction. In the
present action, there was no more need for material witnesses, no forum shopping or
harassment of petitioner, no inadequacy in the local machinery to enforce the foreign judgment,
and no question raised as to the application of any foreign law.

Authorities agree that the issue of whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on
the basis of the above-mentioned principle depends largely upon the facts of each case and on
the sound discretion of the trial court. [28] Since the present action lodged in the RTC was for the
enforcement of a foreign judgment, there was no need to ascertain the rights and the obligations

34