CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY  Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the
ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to
1. Beltran v People
Doctrine: In a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein
petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void
for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his
marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void
Emergency Recit: Husband Beltran filed a petition for nullity of
marriage in the ground of psychological incapacity. Wife Beltran alleged
that husband beltran cohabited with his mistress. Wife Beltran then filed
a criminal complaint for concubinage against husband beltran and
mistress. Husband Beltran filed a Motion to defer criminal proceedings;
however, it was denied by RTC. Husband Beltran argued that the
pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed
a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. SC
affirmed RTC decision.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and Charmaine E. Felix were
married for 24 years.
 Petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity.
 In wife’s Answer to the said petition, she alleged that it was
petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a
certain woman named Milagros Salting.
 Charmaine then filed a criminal complaint for concubinage
under Art 334 of RPC against petitioner and his paramour.
The prosecutor’s office found probable cause and ordered the
filing of an Information against them.
 Petitioner then filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including
the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case.
 Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for
declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial
question to the determination of the criminal case.
 Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the motion. MR was
also denied.
 Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari before RTC Makati,
which was also denied. MR was also denied.
 Petitioner then filed the instant petition for review.
 Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for nullity
of marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article
36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should
merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage
filed against him by his wife. Petitioner contends that if the
petition for nullity of his marriage has been granted, then he
cannot be convicted of the crime of concubinage since he was
never before a married man.
ISSUE: W/N the criminal case should be suspended
HELD: No.
 The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed.
 The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of
petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to the
concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of
the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it
must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same
facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined.
 In a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein
petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring his
marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case
of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final
judgment declaring his marriage void.
 With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted
of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be declared
null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent
pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is
not a defense.
the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent
courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
2. Vera Neri v People, 203 SCRA 750 (1991)
DOCTRINES
1. For either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must
be given prior to the filing of a criminal complaint. Also, while
the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted without the
offended spouse's complaint, once the complaint has been
filed, the control of the case passes to the public prosecutor.
2. Pari delicto does not apply to criminal cases. It is consent
which bars the institution of the criminal proceedings.
EMERGENCY RECIT
Dr. Jorge charged his wife Ruby and her lover Eduardo with adultery.
The latter were convicted. Upon appeal, however, Dr. Jorge executed
several documents pardoning the two. These, however, cannot warrant
the dismissal of the criminal case, since these documents were made
already after the filing of the criminal case. Furthermore, these
documents could not bar Dr. Jorge from filing the criminal case because
there was no showing in these documents that he consented the illicit
affair.
FACTS
 Ruby Vera Neri is married to Dr. Jorge Neri.
 One day, Ruby, along with companions Linda Sare and a
certain Jabunan, were in the condominium of the Sps. Neri at
Mines View Park Condominium, Baguio. Their unit had a sala
and a master’s bedroom downstairs
o At around 7pm, Eduardo Arroyo arrived at the
condominium. He then went to the master's
bedroom where Ruby and Linda were. On Ruby's
request, Linda left the master's bedroom, leaving
the two. About 45 minutes later, Eduardo came up
and told Linda that she could already come down.
 Sometime thereafter, Dr. Jorge surprised his wife while she
was looking at some photographs in their bedroom in their
house in Makati. Ruby then turned pale and started for the
door.
o Struck by this unusual behavior, Dr. Jorge started
looking around the dressing room and he came
upon a Kodak envelope with film negatives inside.
He took the negatives for printing. the photographs
showed his wife in intimate bedroom poses with
another man, both of them half-naked.
o A few days later, Dr. Jorge confronted her with
these photographs. It was at this point that Ruby
admitted that Eduardo was her lover and that they
went to bed during the time that they were in
Baguio.
 Dr. Jorge filed a complaint against Ruby and Eduardo for
adultery. The latter were then criminally charged in court for
the said crime.
RTC:
 Convicted Ruby and Eduardo.
CA:
NOTE: During the proceedings here, Dr. Jorge filed an
affidavit of desistance, stating that “he pardons Ruby and
Eduardo, and that he filed the complaint out of pure
misunderstanding”. In another civil case where Dr. Jorge and
Ruby are also parties, they entered into a compromise
agreement containing the same statements made in the
affidavit.
 Affirmed the RTC.
SC:
NOTE: The current case is a motion for reconsideration of an
SC decision. Now, during the proceedings here, on May 14,
1991, Dr. Jorge filed a manifestation, praying that the case
against Ruby and Eduardo be dismissed as he had "tacitly
 consented" to his wife's infidelity. This manifestation was
signed on August 23, 1991.
 Affirmed the RTC.
 Ruby and Eduardo filed motions for reconsideration of the SC
decision, alleging that:
1. Dr. Jorge’s affidavit of desistance casts doubt on
his credibility as a witness;
2. Ruby’s right against self-incrimination was violated
when she admitted to Dr. Jorge her affair;
3. Dr. Jorge married another woman while this case
was pending; thus, he should be held in pari delicto,
precluding him from filing the complaint; and
4. The case should be dismissed, or they should at
least be granted a new trial, by virtue of the
documents filed by Dr. Jorge.
 NOTE: During all these proceedings, Dr. Jorge had married
another woman.
ISSUES
1. WON the case should be dismissed, or at least a new trial be
held? [relevant]
2. WON Dr. Jorge’s is precluded from filing the complaint due to
pari delicto? [relevant]
3. WON Dr. Jorge’s affidavit of desistance casts doubt on his
credibility?
4. WON Ruby’s right against self-incrimination was violated?
HELD:
1. NO.
 People v. Follantes: Recantation by witnesses of the
prosecution does not necessarily entitle the accused to a new
trial. x x x Recanting testimony is exceedingly unreliable, and
it is the duty of the court to deny a new trial where it is not
satisfied that such testimony is true.
o In this case, the truthfulness of Dr. Jorge’s
recantation in his manifestation is doubtful.
 He had 2 occasions to make the claim
that he consented to the affair: (1) the
compromise agreement; and (2) his
affidavit. These 2 documents, however,
merely stated that he had pardoned Ruby
and Eduardo, and that the complaint was
filed out of "pure misunderstanding". The
same did not state that Dr. Jorge knew of
the adulterous relations at the time he
filed the complaint.
 Furthermore, while the manifestation
was made in May 1991, it was signed
only in August of that year.
 People v. Infante: For either consent or pardon to benefit the
accused, it must be given prior to the filing of a criminal
complaint.
o Sec. 5, Rule 110: While the crime of adultery cannot
be prosecuted without the offended spouse's
complaint, once the complaint has been filed, the
control of the case passes to the public prosecutor.
o In the present case, the documents were executed
only after the trial court had already convicted Ruby
and Eduardo.
2. NO.
 People v. Guinucud (the case cited by Ruby and Eduardo)
refers not to pari delicto, but to consent, as that which bars the
institution of the criminal proceedings. In the present case, no
such acquiescence can be implied. Ruby did not enter into
any agreement with Dr. Jorge allowing each other to cohabit
with others. Dr. Jorge promptly filed his complaint after
discovering the illicit affair.
 Moreover, pari delicto is not found in the Revised Penal Code,
but only in the Civil Code, which relates only to contracts with
illegal consideration. he case at bar does not involve any
illegal contract.
3. NO.
 Aguirre v. People: Findings of fact of the lower court, including
its conclusions on credibility of witnesses, are generally not
disturbed.
o In this case, therefore, the SC should not disturb the
finding of the RTC that Dr. Jorge is a credible
witness.
4. NO.
 Gamboa v. Cruz: The right against self-incrimination in
custodial investigation attaches upon the start of an
investigation, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information.
o In the present case, Dr. Jorge was not an
investigating officer conducting a custodial
interrogation. Hence, Ruby cannot claim that her
admission should have been rejected.
3. TIBONG v. PEOPLE | GR No. 191000 | Acts of Lasciviousness
DOCTRINE: While rape and acts of lasciviousness have the same
nature, they are fundamentally different. For in rape, there is the intent
to lie with a woman, whereas in acts of lasciviousness, this element is
absent.
ER: Tibong was charged with attempted rape of AAA but contends that
his actions did not merit an attempt of rape since there was no
commencement of insertion of organs (see Perez v. CA as cited here).
SC found guilty of attempted rape since acts constituted an intent to
pursue carnal knowledge.
FACTS:
 Tibong was indicted for attempted rape against AAA, an 18yo,
3rd civil degree relative of Tibong
 AAA lived at the house owned by Tibong’s parents where she
was boarding. She occupied a room at the 3-bedroom
basement. One of the rooms was occupied by Tibong and his
wife. The third bedroom was unoccupied
 Tibong arrived home when AAA was sleeping.
 AAA woke up to someone undressing her and saw Tibong
wearing only briefs and crouching over on top of her bed and
pulling down her garments
 AAA tried to resist but Tibong mashed her breasts and told
her to lie down. Tibongtold AAA that they will watch a “bold”
movie
 Tibong then went to the CD player to insert a CD. AAA found
the opportunity to escape.
 Tibong denied the following facts stating that he was drinking
the entire time and came home drunk
 RTC: guilty of attempted rape
 CA: affirmed
 Tibong cites Perez v. CA which held that “the acts of
embracing and kissing her, mashing her breasts, inserting his
hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while
admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute
attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner actually
commenced to force his penis into the complainant’s sexual
organ”
ISSUE: Whether Tibong is guilty of attempted rape
HELD: YES.
 Tibong’s acts, as narrated by AAA, far from being mere
obscene or lewd, indisbutably show that he intended to have,
and was bent on comnsummating, carnal knowledge of AAA.
 Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt
to commit a felony when the offender commences its
commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all the
acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.
 Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon
the other person of either sex, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in the preceding article [referring to Article 335 on
rape], shall be punished by prision correccional.
 While rape and acts of lasciviousness have the same nature,
they are fundamentally different. For in rape, there is the intent
to lie with a woman, whereas in acts of lasciviousness, this
element is absent.
4. People v Javier
Doctrine:
  Well-settled is the rule that physical resistance need not be
established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the
victim and the latter submits herself against her will to the
rapists embrace because of fear for life and personal safety.
 The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and
need not be overpowering or irresistible when applied. For
rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation
be so great or be of such character as could not be resisted -
it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient
to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.
 Even assuming that the prosecution failed to prove the use of
force, the accused cannot be convicted of qualified seduction.
It is only when the complaint for rape contains allegations for
qualified seduction that the accused may be convicted of the
latter in case the prosecution fails to prove the use of force by
the accused. To do otherwise would be violating the
constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to be
informed of the accusation against him. The accused charged
with rape cannot be convicted of qualified seduction under the
same information. Then, too, rape and qualified seduction are
not identical offenses.
Facts:
Julia Javier, in one afternoon, was grabbed by Amado Javier, her father.
She shouted for help, but nobody came to her rescue from neighbors
who was about 60 meters away. Amado boxed her abdomen resulting
to her unconsciousness. When she regained consciousness, she felt
pain in her vagina which was bleeding and wet with some sticky fluids.
She cried but was warned by the accused that should she make an
outcry and report the incident to her mother, he will kill her. Out of fear,
and knowing that accused has a handgun, she held her outcry. Amado
repeated the sexual assault by applying the same force and intimidation.
Out of fear, she kept the incident to herself until she felt some unusual
pain in her body and when she can no longer manage said situation, she
finally broke her silence by going to her grandmother. She was asked by
her grandmother, Librada, about the author of her pregnancy, she
answered that it was her father, Amado.
On cross-examination, Julia admitted that she had a sweetheart and
were engaged for one year already prior to the incident. Her sweetheart,
Michael Apduhan, pays her a visit at times but on Saturday afternoon
only with her mother around. She alleged that there was no occasion
that she met her sweetheart alone for either her mother is around in the
house or went out with her sweetheart with her barkada during disco
dances on the eve of fiestas.
Julia gave birth to a baby boy and was held under supervision of DSWD.
Amado denied all allegations against him and that the same was
engineered by Librada who despised him.
Amado questions the credibility of Julia mainly because she has a
sweetheart and used to attend discos and benefit dances which lasted
until midnight. He tries to portray a picture of Julia as an unchaste and
impure woman who was impregnated by her sweetheart at the tender
age of 16.
Issue: W/N Amado Javier is guilty of Rape and guilty of Qualified
Seduction
Held: Yes. Amado is guilty of the such crimes.
 The force and violence required in rape cases is relative and
need not be overpowering or irresistible when applied. For
rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation
be so great or be of such character as could not be resisted -
it is only necessary that the force or intimidation be sufficient
to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.
Amado, being the father, undoubtedly exerted a strong moral
influence over Julia. In rape committed by a father against his
own daughter, the formers moral ascendancy and influence
over the latter may substitute for actual physical violence and
intimidation.
 Well-settled is the rule that physical resistance need not be
established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the
victim and the latter submits herself against her will to the
rapists embrace because of fear for life and personal safety.
Obviously, the use of threat of death by Amado against Julia
constituted sufficient intimidation to cow her into obedience.
Finally, the Court has also ruled that if resistance would
nevertheless be futile because of a continuing intimidation,
then offering none at all would not mean consent to the
assault as to make the victims participation in the sexual act
voluntary.
 Moreover, assuming that the prosecution failed to prove the
use of force by Amado, the latter cannot be convicted of
qualified seduction. It is only when the complaint for rape
contains allegations for qualified seduction that the accused
may be convicted of the latter in case the prosecution fails to
prove the use of force by the accused. To do otherwise would
be violating the constitutional rights of the accused to due
process and to be informed of the accusation against him. The
accused charged with rape cannot be convicted of qualified
seduction under the same information. Then, too, rape and
qualified seduction are not identical offenses. While the two
felonies have one common element which is carnal
knowledge of a woman, they significantly vary in all other
respects. What the trial court should have done was to dismiss
the charges for rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 95-147 and 95-
148, if indeed, in its opinion, the prosecution failed to
sufficiently establish the existence of force and intimidation,
and order instead the filing of the appropriate information. The
Court, however, believes and is fully convinced that Amado is
guilty as well of these two other counts of rape.
5. People v Egan (2002)
DOCTRINE: The sexual abuse which accused-appellant forced upon
Lenie constitutes the lewd design inherent in forcible abduction and is
thus absorbed therein. The indecent molestation cannot form the other
half of a complex crime since the record does not show that the principal
purpose of the accused was to commit any of the crimes against chastity
and that her abduction would only be a necessary means to commit the
same. What we discern from the evidence is that the intent to seduce
the girl forms part and parcel of her forcible abduction and shares equal
importance with the other element of the crime which was to remove the
victim from her home or from whatever familiar place she may be and to
take her to some other. Stated otherwise, the intention of accused-
appellant as the evidence shows was not only to seduce the victim but
also to separate her from her family, especially from her father
Palmones, clearly tell-tale signs of forcible abduction.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Lito, a 36-yo, forcibly abducted 12-yo Lenie. He
was charged with forcible abduction with rape. He contends that such
abduction was within the Manabo rites. The SC court held that such
defense is untenable. Also, since rape was not proven, he is only liable
for forcible abduction. [See doctrine]
FACTS:
 Lito Egan, 36-yo, was an avid admirer of a 12-yo girl named
Lenie T. Camad.
 They were both part of the Manobo indegenious cultural
community in Mindanao.
 On 6 January 1997 Lenie and her cousin Jessica Silona were
fetching water at a deep well.
 At 2PM, Lito appeared from nowhere and forcibly dragged
and pushed Lenie towards Sitio Dalag and threatened to kill
her if she resisted.
 Before leaving the site of the deep well, he likewise terrorized
Jessica by brandishing his hunting knife which forced the girl
to scamper for safety.
 At 5PM, the search for Lenie started going on.
 For their part, Lito and Lenie stayed that same night in a house
in Sitio Dalag.
 The next day, Lito forced Lenie to move to a house in Sitio
Salaysay where Lito allegedly raped Lenie.
 Lenie was then released with help of 3 Datus.
 For 4 months, the datus attempted a customary settlement of
the abduction in accordance with Manobo traditions.
 Lito agreed 2 horses to the family of Lenie in exchange for her
hand in marriage.
 Upon failure to give the horses, the father insisted on the
unconditional return of his daughter to his custody.
 Since the amicable settlement was not realized, the accused
forcibly relocated Lenie to Cabalantian, Kataotao, Bukidnon,
where she was eventually rescued on 15 May 1997.
 Hence, his father filed a complaint before the police.
  During trial, the accused tried to prove that he and Lenie had
actually been living together under Manobo rites in the house
of her father.
 RTC – guilty.
ISSUE: W/N Egan is guilty of forcible abduction with rape? – Forcible
abduction only.
HELD:
 All the elements of forcible abduction were proved in this case.
The victim, who is a young girl, was taken against her will as
shown by the fact that at knife-point she was dragged and
taken by accused-appellant to a place far from her abode. At
her tender age, Lenie could not be expected to physically
resist considering the fact that even her companion, Jessica
Silona, had to run home to escape accused-appellant's wrath
as he brandished a hunting knife. Fear gripped and paralyzed
Lenie into helplessness as she was manhandled by accused-
appellant who was armed and twenty-four (24) years her
senior.
 The evidence likewise shows that the taking of the young
victim against her will was done con miras deshonestas or in
furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. The word lewd is
defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lascivious, lecherous. It
signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral
impurity; or that which is carried on in a wanton manner. Such
lewd designs were established by the prurient and lustful acts
which accused-appellant displayed towards the victim after
she was abducted. This element may also be inferred from
the fact that while Lenie was then a naive twelve (12)-year old,
accused-appellant was thirty-six (36) years old and although
unmarried was much wiser in the ways of the world than she.
 Accused-appellant would however insist that he and Lenie
had been engaged under Manobo rituals to marry each other
and that her companionship was willful and voluntary. Proof
of this, he said, was the alleged dowry of one (1) horse, two
(2) pigs, ten (10) sacks of palay, and P2,000.00, with two (2)
wild horses forthcoming, he had given her father in exchange
for her hand in marriage. In moving from one place to another
to look for the horses which the old man Palmones had
demanded, it was allegedly only his intention to realize his
matrimonial aspiration with Lenie.
 The testimony of the victim negated this contrived posture of
accused-appellant which in reality is simply a variation of the
sweetheart defense. If they were, surely, Lenie would not
have jeopardized their relationship by accusing him of having
held her against her will and molesting her and, on top of it all,
by filing a criminal charge against him. If it had been so, Lenie
could have easily told her father after the latter had
successfully traced their whereabouts that nothing untoward
had happened between her and the accused. Her normal
reaction would have been to cover-up for the man she
supposedly loved and with whom she had a passionate affair.
But, on the contrary, Lenie lost no time in denouncing
accused-appellant and exposing to her family and the
authorities the disgrace that had befallen her. If they had
indeed been lovers, Lenie's father would not have shown so
much concern for her welfare and safety by searching for the
couple for four (4) months, desperately wanting to rescue her
from captivity and seeking the intervention of the datus in
resolving the matter.
 Coming now to the charge of rape, we rule that although the
prosecution has proved that Lenie was sexually abused, the
evidence proffered is inadequate to establish carnal
knowledge.
 Sexual abuse cannot be equated with rape. In the case at bar,
there is no evidence of entrance or introduction of the male
organ into the labia of the pudendum.
 Under the circumstances, the criminal liability of accused-
appellant is only for forcible abduction under Art. 342 of The
Revised Penal Code.
 [See doctrine]
6. People v Shareff Ali El Akhtar | Forcible Abduction
Doctrine: Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the main
objective of the appellant is to rape the victim
ER: Ali forcibly abducted Gina and raped her multiple times in his home
before releasing her. He claims that they were sweethearts. Ali was
charged with the crime of rape. SC ruled that Ali was guilty of 3 counts
of rape and that forcible abduction is deemed absorbed in the crime of
rape if the main objective of Ali was to rape the victim.
Facts:
 Accused was a 30yo married, Libyan national, charged with
the rape of Gina Rozon, 17 yo, a high school graduate
 Gina was on vacation and staying with her aunt. Accused
occupied the ground floor.
 Gina and Accused became friends but Accused then moved.
 Gina was on her way to the Lagro Post Office when she saw
Accused behind her.
 Accused grabbed her hand and pushed her inside a tricycle,
which sped away.
 Accused brought Gina to a house where he made her drink
something that made Gina fall asleep
 Gina woke up naked and having pains in her vagina. Accused
brought her food and drinks (spiked) which made Gina fall
asleep again.
 She would wake up feeling pains in her vagina everytime
(happened 3x).
 She tried to escape multiple times but since Accused was
always there, and Gina was in a weakened state, she was not
able to escape.
 Gina’s relatives were already suspicious of Accused and
decided to visit Accused to ask whether he knew of Gina’s
whereabouts.
 On the 10th day, Gina was allowed to leave but first had to
write love letters to Accused to make it seem that they were
lovers.
 Accused denied these allegations stating that he was Gina’s
lover
 RTC: found him guilty of rape; forcible abduction is absorbed
in the crime of rape if the main objective of the appellant is to
rape the victim
 Accused assails the credibility of Gina considering her
conduct during the alleged abduction wherein she did not
even resist nor shout for help, proving that they were
sweethearts.
Issue: Which crime is the Accused guilty of
Held: Three counts of rape.
While appellant was charged with the crime of Forcible Abduction with
Rape, he was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of
R.A. No. 7659 which provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of woman under any
of the following circumstances:
(1) By using force or intimidation;
(2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
and
(3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented
As to the crime committed by the appellant, we have held that "forcible
abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the main objective of the
appellant is to rape the victim. As can be gleaned from the testimony of
complainant, she was raped by Accused no less than 3x..
Appellant should therefore be held responsible for as many rapes as
were committed by him which were duly proven during trial.
7. People v Fortich
Doctrine: Any subsequent acts of intercourse would be only separate
acts of rape and can no longer be considered separate complex crimes
of forcible abduction with rape.
1. On the evening of March 31, 1983, after attending mass,
sisters Marilou and Maritess Nobleza, together with their
friends Rolly Imperio and Luis Tumang, proceeded to Alta
Tierra Hotel in Carmen Hill using an Isuzu pick-up owned by
latter's mother.
2. After a while the group decided to go home. Suddenly, two
men armed with handguns who were later identified as
appellants emerged from the rear end of the vehicle and fired
a single shot which hit the left side of the pick-up. They
introduced themselves as members of the New People's Army
 (NPA) and ordered the sisters to get inside the vehicle while
Imperio and Tumang were instructed to strip.
3. Gaid thumped Imperio on the head with a .38 caliber revolver
causing him to fall down, while Tumang was hit several times
by Fortich in various parts of the body and momentarily lost
consciousness.
4. Tumang was divested of his wallet and other belongings
5. The accused drove the pick-up, with Marilou and Maritess at
the back seat,
6. All the time, the sisters were consistently threatened with
summary execution. Marilou pleaded for their freedom and
told them to just take the pick-up.
7. At his juncture, Gaid had transferred to the backseat with
Marilou while Maritess was made to sit up in front with Fortich.
Gaid poked his gun at the right side of Marilou's neck and
ordered her to remove her pants under pain of death. Aware
that she was biding her time, he himself removed her pants
with the gun still pointed at her.
8. She implored that she be spared but Gaid, who was
obviously much stronger, forced her legs apart,
positioned himself on top of her, kissed and fondled her,
and succeeded in consummating his bestial act.
9. Maritess, on the other hand, was ravaged by Fortich.
10. The accused switched victims twice before divesting them
of their watches, a handbag containing P15.00 in cash, a shirt,
toilet tissue and toothbrush, and the pick-up's stereo and
tools.
11. They then drove down the highway and left the sisters at a
gasoline station some three kilometers from the city. Unable
to contact the police, the victims proceeded to the Cagayan
de Oro Medical Center (CMC) and submitted themselves to
medical examination.
12. The accused were each charged with two counts of forcible
abduction with rape, one count of robbery with frustrated
homicide and one count of robbery.
13. RTC Convicted the accused of the charges
From this judgment, appellants interposed the instant appeal.
Issue:
1. WON the aggravating circumstance of use of Motor Vehicle
should be appreciated – No.
2. WON the trial court correctly charged each of the accused
with TWO COUNTS of Forcible abduction with rape
3. WON the other charges are proven – Yes.
Held:
1. No. In the case at bar, the offenses of robbery and forcible abduction
with rape could have been effected even without the aid of a motor
vehicle. In the case of People v. Mil it was held that use of a motor
vehicle is not aggravating where it was not used to facilitate the crime or
that the crime could not have been committed without it. In People v.
Garcia, the use of motor vehicle was deemed aggravating if its use was
merely incidental and was not purposely sought to facilitate the
commission of the offense or to render the escape of the offender easier
and his apprehension difficult.
2. No. In the case of People v. Julian however, it was ruled that when
the first act of rape was committed by appellant, the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape was then consummated. Any subsequent
acts of intercourse would be only separate acts of rape and can no
longer be considered separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with
rape. Accordingly, a modification of trial court's decision is in order.
Hence, each of them shall be charged with Forcible abduction with rape
and three counts of rape
3. Yes. The trial court, however, erred in designating the crime
committed as robbery with frustrated homicide. There is no such crime.
There should have been two separate informations: one for robbery and
another for frustrated homicide. Notwithstanding the erroneous charge
in the information, the Court finds no reason to overturn the conviction
of appellants for the crime of simple robbery.
As regards the injuries suffered by Tumang, we subscribe to the finding
of the lower court that Tumang's credible testimony bolstered by
documentary evidence, such as progress payments and professional
fees for neurological management and craniotomy excision of
depressed fracture, proved that the latter suffered less serious physical
injuries.
With respect to the charge of frustrated homicide, the trial court correctly
observed that the element of intent to kill was not present. It must be
stressed that while Fortich was armed with a handgun, he never shot
Tumang but merely hit him on the head with it. In Mondragon v. People,
it was held that the intent to kill being an essential element of the offense
of frustrated or attempted homicide, said element must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence and with the same degree of certainty as
is required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to
kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to
prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.
The trial court correctly disregarded the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime, uninhabited place, and use of a motor vehicle. The mitigating
circumstance of intoxication, however, was erroneously appreciated in
favor of both appellants.
Thus, the accused are convicted of: Forcible abduction with rape and 3
counts of rape and Robbery
8. Pilapil v Ibay-Somera
Doctrine: Rule that the crime of adultery as well as four other crimes
against chastity cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse, a jurisdictional requirement
it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the
time he initiates the action.
ER: Private respondent (Geiling), a German national filed a complaint
for adultery against Pilapil. Geiling and Pilapil was validly married in
Germany. After 3 yers, Geiling obtained a divorce before the court of
Germany. Subsequently, he filed this criminal case, alleging that during
the time He and Pilapil was married, Pilapil had an afair with the co-
accused Chua. Issue is WON complaint should prosper. SC said no.
The fact that Petitioner and respondent is divorced at the time of the
filing of the complaint means that the court has no jurisdiction. Art. 344
RPC specifically provides that the crime of adultery, as well as four other
crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Since at the time the
complaint is filed, the marriage is already dissolved by divorce, Geiling
is not anymore an offended spouse in contemplation of the law.
FACTS
 Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were
married before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths
at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany.
 After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial
disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a
divorce proceeding against petitioner in German.
 More than five months after the issuance of the divorce
decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married
to said respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain
William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man
named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
 Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order,
seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying
her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main
ground that the court is without jurisdiction „to try and decide
the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot
be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended
spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his
national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint.
ISSUE: WON the criminal complaint should be dismissed – YES.
HELD
 Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of
adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot
be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by
the offended spouse.
 Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended
spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
 initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation
to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.
 This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved
party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather
than go through the scandal of a public trial.
 It is indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established
and, as already demonstrated, such status or capacity must
indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would
be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be
determined by his status before or subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status
existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired
subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of
the case.
 Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the
inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the
commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the
marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the
action by the former against the latter.
 We are convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of
the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as
of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who
initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and
by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse,
at the time of the filing of the complaint.
CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS
1 - Santiago v. People, 764 SCRA 54 (2015)
DOCTRINE: Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous
undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the
information as a co-accused; The second spouse, if indicted in the crime
of bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Nicanor Santos first married Estela Galang in
1974. Then, in 1997, Nicanor Santos married Leonila Santiago
(petitioner). Four years after Santos and Santiago got married, they
faced a criminal information for bigamy. Santos “escaped criminal suit”
(di sinabi pano) and Santiago pleaded not guilty with the affirmative
defense that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio because they did
not have a marriage license and that she had no prior knowledge of the
previous marriage to Galang. The SC found that evidence supports the
fact that Santiago knew of the previous marriage and that there was no
marriage license because Santiago and Santos lied to the solemnizing
officer that they have been cohabiting for 5 years prior to the marriage
(which exempts them from the marriage license requirement). Hence,
Santiago is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as
minimum to four years of prisión correccional as maximum plus
accessory penalties provided by law.
FACTS
 Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29
July 1997, Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced
an Information for bigamy.
 Santiago pleaded not guilty, while her putative husband
escaped the criminal suit.
 Santiago, who was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos
despite the advice of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law
that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone
who was “without responsibility”
 Santiago asserted her affirmative defense that she could not
be included as an accused in the crime of bigamy, because
she had been under the belief that Santos was still single
when they got married.
 Santiago also averred that for there to be a conviction for
bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by
the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their
marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
 Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first
wife, Estela Galang, testified for the prosecution. Galang
alleged that she had met Santiago as early as March and April
1997, on which occasions the former introduced herself as the
legal wife of Santos. Santiago denied this.
 RTC: found that Santiago is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of bigamy
 Galang’s account is more credible
 indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of
Prisión Correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1)
day of Prisión Mayor as maximum.
 CA: affirmed Santiago’s conviction; lack of a marriage license
was a vain attempt to put the validity of her marriage to Santos
in question
ISSUE: W/N Santiago is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
bigamy?
HELD: YES.
 The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code provides: The penalty of prisión mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
 The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint
liability of two persons who marry each other while the
previous marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As
explained in Nepomuceno: In the crime of bigamy, both the
first and second spouses may be the offended parties
depending on the circumstances, as when the second spouse
married the accused without being aware of his previous
marriage. Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the
previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she
be included in the information as a co-accused.
 Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained Santiago’s
knowledge of Santos’s marriage to Galang. Both courts
consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as
shown by the totality of the following circumstances: (1) when
Santos was courting and visiting Santiago in the house of her
in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it
was incredible for a learned person like Santiago to not know
of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more
credible witness compared with Santiago who had various
inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she
had already told Santiago on two occasions that the former
was the legal wife of Santos.
 Given that Santiago knew of the first marriage, the SC concurs
with the ruling that she was validly charged with bigamy.
However, they disagree with the lower court’s imposition
of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which
the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range
of prisión correccional as minimum to prisión mayor as
maximum.
 Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
the penalty for a principal in the crime of bigamy is prisión
mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to
twelve years. Since the criminal participation of Santiago is
that of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the
penalty next lower in degree, prisión correccional, which has
a duration of six months and one day to six years. There being
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty
shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two years,
four months and one day to four years and two months of
imprisonment. Applying ISL, Santiago shall be entitled to a
minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month and
one day to six months imprisonment.
 The evidence on record shows that Santiago and Santos had
only known each other for only less than four years. Thus, it
follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at
least five years prior to their marriage. Santiago and Santos,
however, reflected the exact opposite of this.
 Although the records do not show that they submitted an
affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family
Code, it appears that the two of them lied before the
solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually
cohabited for at least five years before they married each
other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance
of the Certificate of Marriage, in which the solemnizing officer
stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary,
because the marriage was solemnized under Article 34 of the
Family Code.
  The SC thus faces an anomalous situation wherein Santiago
seeks to be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions
of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite
knowing that they had not satisfied the cohabitation
requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in
no less than her marriage contract.
 The SC chastises this deceptive scheme that hides what is
basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape
criminal prosecution. The SC cannot countenance Santiago’s
illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same breath,
adjudge her innocent of the crime. For the SC to do so would
only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage.
 In violation of our law against illegal marriages, Santiago
married Santos while knowing fully well that they had not yet
complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under
Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it will be the
height of absurdity for the SC to allow Santiago to use her
illegal act to escape criminal conviction.
2. - Nollora v. People, (2011)
DOCTRINE: Even if a person is of Muslim faith, he can still be liable for
bigamy if his marriages were not solemnized in accordance with Muslim
laws.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Atilano Nollora married Jesusa Nollora. He then
contracted a subsequent marriage with Rowena. Atilano alleged that he
was a Muslim but when he married Jesus and Rowena he did not even
disclose such fact and he did not comply with the requirements of the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws when he contracted his marriages. A
criminal case for bigamy was filed against him and the SC ruled that he
is guilty of bigamy. The Court found that all the elements of Bigamy are
present in this case. Atilano contracted a subsequent marriage while he
was still validly married. The Court ruled that even if Atilano was indeed
a Muslim, such fact will not be considered in his favor since his marriage
was not solemnized in accordance to Muslim Laws.
FACTS
 A criminal information for Bigamy was filed against Atilano
Nollora and Rowena Geraldino. Atilano Nollora had a first
marriage with Jesusa Nollora. They met in Saudi Arabia and
got married on 1999. While Jesusa was working in a hospital
in Saudi Arabia, she heard news that her husband has
another wife. Jesusa went back to the Philippines.
 It was alleged that Rowena knew about the marriage between
Jesusa and Atiliano since she was there when Atiliano
introduced Jesusa to his parents. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.
admitted having contracted 2 marriages, the first with Jesusa
and the second with Rowena. He, however, claimed that he
was a Muslim convert way back on January 10, 1992, even
before he contracted the first marriage with Jesusa. As a
Muslim convert, he is allegedly entitled to marry 4 wives as
allowed under the Muslim or Islam belief.
 Atiliano presented a certificate of conversion issued by one
Hadji Abdul Kajar Madueño and approved by one Khad
Ibrahim A. Alyamin. He claimed that Jesusa knew that he was
a Muslim convert prior to their marriage because he told this
fact when he was courting her in Saudi Arabia and the reason
why Jesusa filed the instant case was due to hatred having
learned of his second marriage with Rowena.
 In the marriage contract between Atiliano and Jesusa it was
indicated that Atiliano was a Catholic Pentecostal. While in his
marriage contract with Rowena it was indicated that he was a
Catholic. He also indicated that he was 'single' despite his first
marriage to keep said first marriage a secret. The marriage
with Rowena was solemnized under Catholic procedures but
they subsequently married her under the Muslim laws.
 Hadji Abdul Qasar Madueño declared that a Muslim convert
could marry more than one according to the Holy Koran.
However, before marrying his second, third and fourth wives,
it is required that the consent of the first Muslim wife be
secured. Thus, if the first wife is not a Muslim, there is no
necessity to secure her consent.
 He further testified that if a Muslim convert gets married not in
accordance with the Muslim faith, the same is contrary to the
teachings of the Muslim faith. A Muslim also can marry up to
four times but he should be able to treat them equally. He
claimed that he was not aware of the first marriage but was
aware of the second. Since his second marriage with Rowena
was not in accordance with the Muslim faith, he advised
Atilano to re-marry Rowena in accordance with Muslim
marriage celebration, otherwise, he will not be considered as
a true Muslim.
 Both lower courts convicted him of Bigamy.
ISSUE: WON Atiliano was guilty of bigamy
HELD: YES
 The elements of the crime of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
 Here, the elements of bigamy are present. (1) Atiliano is
legally married to Jesusa; (2) Atiliano and Jesusa's marriage
has not been legally dissolved prior to the date of the second
marriage; (3) Atiliano admitted the existence of his second
marriage to Rowena; and (4) Atiliano and Rowena's marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity except for the lack
of capacity of Atiliano due to his prior marriage.
 As to the defense that Atiliano was a Muslim, Granting Atiliano
cannot deny that both marriage ceremonies were not
conducted in accordance with the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws, or Presidential Decree No. 1083. Article 13 (2) of the
Code of Muslim Personal Laws states that "in case of a
marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized
not in accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Family
Code shall apply." Regardless of Atiliano’s professed religion,
he cannot claim exemption from liability for the crime of
bigamy.
 Atiliano’s asserted in his marriage certificate with Rowena that
his civil status is "single." Moreover, both of Atiliano's
marriage contracts do not state that he is a Muslim. Although
the truth or falsehood of the declaration of one's religion in the
marriage certificate is not an essential requirement for
marriage, such omissions are sufficient proofs of Atiliano’s
liability for bigamy. Atiliano's false declaration about his civil
status is thus further compounded by these omissions.
3 – Teves v. People, 656 SCRA 307 (2011)
Doctrine: Parties to a void marriage are required to secure a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void before they can be
allowed to marry again and not be liable for bigamy.
Emergency Recit: Cenon was married to Thelma on 26 Nov. 1992. He
contracted another marriage with Edita on 10 Dec. 2001 while his
marriage with Thelma was still subsisting. On 27 June 2006, the RTC
declared that Cenon’s marriage with Thelma is null and void. The SC
said that the declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is first
required before contracting a second or subsequent marriage. Here,
such declaration of the nullity of the previous marriage was only decided
with finality on 27 June 2006 or 5 years after his second marriage to
Edita. It cannot retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage which was
on 10 Dec. 2001. Hence, the SC declared Cenon guilty of the crime of
bigamy.
FACTS
 26 Nov. 1992 – Cenon Teves and Thelma contracted
marriage. After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad and
would only come home to the PH for vacations.
 In 2002 – Thelma was informed that her husband had
contracted marriage with Edita. As per the Certificate of
Marriage she secured from NSO, it indicated that the said
marriage took place on 10 Dec. 2001 in Bulacan.
 Thelma’s uncle filed a complaint for bigamy against Cenon,
and Cenon was charged with bigamy in an Information.
 27 June 2006 – During the pendency of the criminal case for
bigamy, the RTC of Caloocan rendered a decision declaring
the marriage of Cenon and Thelma null and void on the
ground that Thelma is physically incapacitated to comply with
her essential marital obligations under Art. 36 of the Family
Code, which decision became final.
 15 Aug. 2007 – RTC of Bulacan rendered a decision finding
Cenon guilty of bigamy. CA affirmed.
  Cenon claims that since his previous marriage was declared
null and void, there is in effect no marriage at all, and thus,
there is no bigamy to speak of. He differentiates a valid or
voidable marriage from a marriage null and void ab initio, and
posits that:
o Valid or voidable marriage requires a judicial
dissolution before on can validly contract a second
marriage,
o But a void marriage need not be judicially
determined
ISSUE: W/N Cenon is guilty of bigamy
HELD: YES
Cenon’s contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of
the declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family
Code has settled that a declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
is now explicitly required. Parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first
secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they
can be allowed to marry again. With that, the person who marries again
cannot be charged with bigamy.
In this case, all the elements of the crime of bigamy are present. Cenon
was legally married to Thelma on 26 Nov. 1992; he contracted a second
marriage with Edita on 10 Dec. 2001; at the time of his second marriage
with Edita his marriage with Thelma was legally subsisting; finality of the
decision declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only
on 27 June 2006 or about 5 years after his second marriage to Edita;
and finally, the second or subsequent marriage with Edita has all the
essential requisites for validity.
 The crime of bigamy was committed by Cenon on 10
December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage with
Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration
of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be
made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage. Hence,
Cenon is guilty of the crime of bigamy.
4 – Morigo v. People (2004)
DOCTRINES:
(1) The elements of bigamy are as follows: (1) the offender has
been legally married; (2) the first marriage has not been
legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively
dead; (3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the
subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been
for the existence of the first.
(2) The declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio retroacts
to the date of the celebration of the first marriage.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete became
sweethearts and later got married while Lucia in the Philippines. Lucio
then left for Canada where she worked and there, she obtained a divorce
decree. Lucio, on the other hand, married Maria Lumbago and
subsequently filed a complaint for the judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage with Lucia. Meanwhile, a case for bigamy was filed against
Lucio. The RTC found Lucio guilty of bigamy and this was affirmed by
the CA. The SC reversed the lower courts, ruling that there was no
actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the
marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing
officer. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of and the first element
of bigamy is absent.
FACTS:
 Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the
Catalina Tortor at Bohol for a period of 4 years.
 In 1984, Lucia received a card from Lucio from Singapore and
after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts. Lucia
returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work
there. While in Canada, they maintained constant
communication.
 In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and she got
married to Lucio. In the same year, Lucia went back to
Canada for work, leaving Lucio behind.
 A year later, Lucia obtained a divorce decree in the Ontario
Court.
 Lucio then married Maria Lumbago and subsequently, he filed
a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the
RTC on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took
place. Meanwhile, a complaint for bigamy was filed against
Lucio.
 Lucio moved for the suspension of the arraignment on the
ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his
marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy
case.
RTC (bigamy case)
 Lucio was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Want of a
valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of
bigamy.
RTC (declaration of nullity case)
 Declared the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio
since no marriage ceremony actually took place.
CA (bigamy case)
 Affirmed the RTC. The subsequent declaration of nullity of
Lucio’s marriage to Lucia could not acquit Lucio. The reason
is that what is sought to be punished by Art. 349 of the RPC
is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first
marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the fact that the first
marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense
in a bigamy case.
ISSUE: WON Lucio Morigo committed bigamy?
HELD: NO.
 The elements of bigamy are as follows:
a. The offender has been legally married;
b. The first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or
in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse has not been judicially declared
presumptively dead;
c. He contracts a subsequent marriage; and
d. The subsequent marriage would have been valid
had it not been for the existence of the first.
 In the present case, the trial court found that there was no
actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and
Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a
mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that
the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Arts. 3 and 4
of the Family Code.
 The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the
accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia.
Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle
of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the
two were never married “from the beginning.” The contract of
marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Therefore, Lucio must
be acquitted of the instant charge.
5. - Arthur Te v. CA and Liliana
DOCTRINE: The outcome of [a] civil case for annulment of petitioner’s
marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination
of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because
all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Engr. Te contracted two marriages. His first wife
filed a criminal complaint (Fiscal) and an administrative complaint
(PRC). He sought to have the first marriage annulled. During pendency
of the proceedings, he sought to suspend the PRC proceedings and
have the Bigamy case dismissed in the RTC where it was later filed. SC
said nullity or annulment of marriage is immaterial; the act sought to be
punished has already been committed.
FACTS
 Te and Choa (first wife) got married.
 Later, Te and Santella (second wife) got married.
 Aggrieved, first wife filed
o A criminal complaint for Bigamy against Te with the
Prosecutor’s Office
o An administrative complaint against Te with the
PRC (Te is an Engineer)
 An information was later filed by the Fiscal charging Te of
Bigamy with the RTC
  In response, Te
o CIVIL | Filed a civil complaint for annulment of
marriage based on
 Her concealment of pregnancy by
another man at the time of their marriage
 Psychological incapacity
o CRIMINAL |after Prosecution’s presentation of
evidence, filed a Motion for Demurrer to Evidence
o ADMINISTRATIVE | Filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings (prejudicial question)
 Civil case—by the time it reached SC, it was already
terminated (but the SC decision didn’t really say what
happened)
 RTC and PRC: MOTION DENIED
 CA: R65 Certiorari on the two motions DENIED
ISSUE: WON RTC and PRC should have suspended (PRC) / dismissed
(RTC) the case of bigamy
HELD: NO.
 The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s
marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal
case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at
the time the second marriage is contracted.
 The ruling in People vs. Mendoza that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage which is
void ab initio is overturned.
 ADMIN (Prejudicial question) | Neither did the filing of said civil
case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the
administrative proceedings before the PRC Board. As
discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves
a civil and a criminal case. We have previously ruled that there
is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative
and the other is civil.
 CRIM (Demurrer) | he grant or denial of a demurrer to
evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and
its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence
of a grave abuse of such discretion.
 In this case, the CA did not find any grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the trial court, which based its denial of the
demurrer on two grounds: first, the prosecution established a
prima facie case for bigamy against the petitioner; and
second, petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer were
insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been held
that the appellate court will not review in a special civil action
for certiorari the prosecution’s evidence and decide in
advance that such evidence has or has not yet established
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
1. Bautista v Pangilinan
EMERGENCY RECIT: Petitioners Bautista and Alcantara were the
Editor and Assistant Editors of the tablod Bandera. Two articles were
published by the tabloid degrading the reputation and honor of Sharon
Cuneta-Pangilinan, which were written by co-accused Ampoloquio (see
facts for the verbatim remarks). Petitioners filed a demurrer to evidence
claiming that the prosecution failed to establish malice. Hence, the
articles were not libelous. RTC granted the demurrer. CA reversed the
order and ordered the trial court to receive evidence of petitioners.
SC granted the petition. Although in libel cases, the wordings of Art. 360
of the Revised Penal Code, the author or editor of a book or pamphlet,
or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or
serial publication, indicate that they shall be responsible for the
defamation contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author
thereof. The liability which attaches to petitioners is, thus, statutory in
nature.
By virtue of Article 360 would have made petitioners Bautista and
Alcantara, being the Editor and Assistant Editor, respectively, of
Bandera Publishing Corporation, answerable with Ampoloquio, for the
latter’s alleged defamatory writing, as if they were the authors thereof.
When an alleged libelous article is published in a newspaper, such fact
alone sufficient evidence to charge the editor or business manager with
the guilt of its publication.
However, due to procedural defect that the petition for certiorari was not
taken by the State particularly the OSG, but it was private respondents
who filed with respect to the criminal aspect of the case. This violates
petitioner’s right to double jeopardy.
DOCTRINE: The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or
business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication,
shall be responsible for the defamation contained therein to the same
extent as if he were the author thereof.
FACTS
Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City filed two (2)
informations with the RTC Mandaluyong City, against Pete G.
Ampoloquio, Jr. (Ampoloquio), and petitioners Bautista and Alcantara,
for the crime of libel, committed by publishing defamatory articles
against respondent Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan in the tabloid Bandera.
In the tabloid, the following remarks are made in order to ridicule and
dishonor respondent Sharon. Some of the imputable statements are
quoted:
“Sharon Cuneta, the mega-taba singer-actress, I’d like to
believe, is really brain-dead. Mukhang totoo yata yung
sinasabi ng kaibigan ni Pettizou Tayag na ganyan siya.
Hayan at buong ingat na sinulat namin yung interview sa
kaibigan ng may-ari ng Central Institute of Technology at ni
isang side comment ay wala kaming ginawa and all
throughout the article, we’ve maintained our objectivity, pero
sa interview sa aparadoric singer-actress in connection with
an album launching, ay buong ningning na sinabi nitong she’s
supposedly looking into the item that we’ve written and most
probably would take some legal action....
XXX
Dios mio perdon, what she gets to see are those purportedly
biting commentaries about her katabaan and kaplastikan but
she has simply refused to acknowledge the good reviews
we’ve done on her.
XXX
Going back to this seemingly disoriented actress who’s
desperately trying to sing even if she truly can’t, itanggi mo na
hindi mo kilala si Pettizou Tayag gayung nagkasama raw kayo
ng tatlong araw sa mother’s house ng mga Aboitiz sa Cebu
more than a month ago, in connection with one of those
political campaigns of your husband.”
In another published tabloid, another imputing remarks were also made
in the verbatim:
NABURYONG SA KAPLASTIKAN NI SHARON ANG
MILYONARY[A]NG SUPPORTER NI KIKO!
FREAKOUT pala kay Sharon Cuneta ang isa sa mga loyal
supporters ni Kiko Pangilinan na si Pettizou Tayag, a multi-
millionaire who owns Central Institute of Technology College
in Sampaloc, Manila
XXX
Now, nang makara[t]ing na raw sa Bulacan si Mega
nagtatarang daw ito at binadmouth si Pettizou. Kesyo ang
kulit-kulit daw nito, atribida, mapapel at kung anu-ano pang
mga derogatory words na nakarating siyempre sa
kinauukulan.
Anyhow, if it’s true that Ms. Pettizou has been most financially
supportive of Kiko, how come Sharon seems not to approve
of her?
“She doesn’t want kasi her husband to win as a senator
because when that happens, mawawalan siya ng hold sa
kanya,
XXX
“In public,” our source goes on tartly, “pa kiss-kiss siya. Pa-
embrace-embrace pero kung silang dalawa [na] lang parang
kung sinong sampid kung i-treat niya si Kiko.”
My God Pete, Harvard graduate si Kiko. He’s really intelligent
as compared to Sharon who appears to be brain dead most
of the time.
XXX
Another thing, I guess it’s high time that she goes on a diet
[again]. Jesus, she looks 6’11 crosswise!
XXX
 Kunsabagay, she was only being most consistent. Yang si
Sharon daw ay talagang mega-brat, mega-sungit. But who
does she think she is? Her wealth, dear, would pale in
comparison with the Tayag’s millions. Kunsabagay, she’s
brain dead most of the time.
Petitioners Bautista and Alcantara were Editor and Associate Editor,
respectively, of the publication Bandera, and their co-accused,
Ampoloquio, was the author of the alleged libelous articles which were
published therein.
Petitoners filed a Demurrer to Evidence claiming that the prosecution
failed to establish their participation as Editor and Associate Editor,
respectively, of the publication Bandera; that they were not properly
identified by respondent herself during her testimony; and that the
subject articles written by Ampoloquio were not libelous due to absence
of malice.
RTC granted the Demurrer to Evidence.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA reversed only
insofar as it pertains to the grant of petitioners’ Demurrer to Evidence,
and ordered that the case be remanded to the trial court for reception of
petitioners’ evidence.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N active participation of the Editor and Publisher is
required before they can be held liable for libel.
HELD: NO.
 According to the wordings of Art. 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, the author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor
or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the defamation contained
therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.
The liability which attaches to petitioners is, thus, statutory in
nature.
 Court stressed that an editor or manager of a newspaper, who
has active charge and control over the publication, is held
equally liable with the author of the libelous article. This is
because it is the duty of the editor or manager to know and
control the contents of the paper, and interposing the defense
of lack of knowledge or consent as to the contents of the
articles or publication definitely will not prosper.
 Accordingly, Article 360 would have made petitioners Bautista
and Alcantara, being the Editor and Assistant Editor,
respectively, of Bandera Publishing Corporation, answerable
with Ampoloquio, for the latter’s alleged defamatory writing,
as if they were the authors thereof. When an alleged libelous
article is published in a newspaper, such fact alone sufficient
evidence to charge the editor or business manager with the
guilt of its publication. This sharing of liability with the author
of said article is based on the principle that editors and
associate editors, by the nature of their positions, edit, control
and approve the materials which are to be published in a
newspaper.
 Nevertheless, petitioners could no longer be held liable in
view of the procedural infirmity that the petition for certiorari
was not undertaken by the OSG, but instead by respondent in
her personal capacity. Although the conclusion of the trial
court may be wrong, to reverse and set aside the Order
granting the demurrer to evidence would violate petitioners’
constitutionally-enshrined right against double jeopardy. Had
it not been for this procedural defect, the Court could have
seriously considered the arguments advanced by the
respondent in seeking the reversal of the Order of the RTC.
 Petition Granted. Criminal cases against petitioners
dismissed.
2. Bonifacio v RTC
DOCTRINE: Venue of libel cases where the complaint is a private
individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the
complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense; OR 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first
published.
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published
are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in criminal action,
the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory
article was printed and first published, as evidence or supported by, for
instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of
newspaper, magazines or serial publications.
FACTS:
1. Gimenez filed on behalf of the Yuchengco Family and of Malayan
Insurance Co., a criminal complaint for 13 counts of libel againt
Piccio et al., who are officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition,
Inc. (PEPCI), PEPCI trustees, Monsod, and John Doe, the
administrator of the website: www.pepcoalition.com.
2. PEPCI was formed by large group of disgruntled planholders of
Pacific Plans, Inc (PPI).
3. Decrying PPI’s refusal/inability to honor its obligations under the
educational pre-need plans, PEPCI sought to provide a forum by
which planholders could seek redress for their pecuniary loss under
the policies through www.pepcoalition.com, in addition to other
websites owned by PEPCI.
4. Gimenez alleged that said websites contain numerous (13) articles
which maliciously and recklessly caused to be published by the
accused containing highly derogatory statements and false
accusations against the Yuchengco family, YGC, and Malayan.
5. Prosecutor’s Office: found probable cause and filed the
information.
6. Petitioners filed before RTC-Makati a motion to quash on the
ground that RTC is devoid of jurisdiction because the Information
failed to allege that the libelous articles were printed and first
published in Makati and that the prosecution erroneously laid the
venue in the place where the online article was accessed.
ISSUE: Should the motion to quash be granted?
HELD: Yes. [See Doctrine].
1. The Information herein tried to lay the venue by stating that the
offending article was first published and accessed by the Gimenez
in Makati City.
2. If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first
published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in
the criminal action, the Information must allege with
particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first
published.
3. However, this measure is inapplicable in case of a defamatory
material appearing on a website on the internet because there
would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and
first publication.
4. Chaos would ensue in situations where the website’s author or
writer, a blogger or anyone who posts messages therein could be
sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private
complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.
5. For the court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently
vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the
defamatory article was accessed therein would open the
floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where
the PEPCI website is likewise accessed or capable of being
accessed.
6. These limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons
are hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to
file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of
residence, in which situation there is no need to embark on
a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter
was printed and first published.
7. IN FINE, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners motion to quash the Amended Information.
8. Accordingly, the case may be instituted where the complainant
actually resides, without need of proof where the article was first
published.
3. Tulfo v. People, 2008
DOCTRINE: The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general
every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because
every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and
every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public
capacity, it is not necessarily actionable.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Erwin Tulfo, in his column, wrote about Atty.
Carlos So alleging that the latter had allegedly committed acts of
corruption in the Bureau of Customs’ Intelligence Unit. Tulfo had no
actual evidence to support his claim, as the same was only backed by
the word of an unnamed source. Atty. So filed a libel case against Tulfo
along with the other officers of the news company Remate under Article
360 of the RPC. Tulfo, as a defense, claims that his statements were
privileged as the same were concerning a public officer under Article 354
of the RPC. The court ruled that Tulfo and the officers of Remate are
liable for libel, as Tulfo was not able to substantiate his claims in any
way. Considering this, Tulfo cannot claim the defense under Article 254.
FACTS
 Erwin Tulfo, in his column in Remate, published four articles
in different dates regarding one Atty. Carlos “Ding” So of
Bureau of Customs Intelligence Unit in South Harbor and his
alleged corruption.
 Subsequently, Atty. So filed a libel case against Tulfo and the
editors and president of Remate. He further testified that he
included in his complaint for libel the officers of Remate such
as the publisher, managing editor, city editor, and national
editor because under Article 360 of the RPC they are equally
responsible and liable to the same extent as if they were the
author of the articles. He also testified that “Ding” is his
nickname and that he is the only person in the entire Bureau
of Customs who goes by the name of Atty. Carlos T. So or
Atty. Carlos “Ding” So.
 In his defense, petitioner Tulfo testified that he did not write
the subject articles with malice, that he neither knew Atty. So
nor met him before the publication of the articles. He testified
that his criticism of a certain Atty. So of the South Harbor was
not directed against the complainant, but against a person by
the name of Atty. “Ding” So at the South Harbor.
 Tulfo claimed that it was the practice of certain people to use
other people’s names to advance their corrupt practices. He
also claimed that his articles had neither discredited nor
dishonored the complainant because as per his source in the
Bureau of Customs, Atty. So had been promoted.
 He further testified that he did not do any research on Atty. So
before the subject articles, because as a columnist, he had to
rely on his source, and that he had several sources in the
Bureau of Customs, particularly in the South Harbor. The
other co-accused claimed that none of them edited the
columns of Tulfo and that it is Tulfo’s responsibility to publish
and edit his own work.
 RTC: The trial court convicted Tulfo and his colleagues in
Remate and the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
hence, the petition wherein Tulfo claims for the first time that
the assailed articles are privileged.
ISSUE: WON Tulfo and his co-accused are liable for libel
HELD: YES. They are all liable for libel.
 The supreme court ruled that in order that the publication of a
report of an official proceeding may be considered privileged
under the second paragraph of Article 354 of the RPC, the
following conditions must exist:
(a) That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other
official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of a
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any
other act performed by a public officer in the exercise of his
functions;
(b) That it is made in good faith; and
(c) That it is without any comments or remarks.
 The articles clearly are not the fair and true reports
contemplated by the provision. They provide no details of the
acts committed by the subject, Atty. So. They are plain and
simple baseless accusations, backed up by the word of one
unnamed source. Good faith is lacking, as Tulfo failed to
substantiate or even attempt to verify his story before
publication. Tulfo goes even further to attack the character of
the subject, Atty. So, even calling him a disgrace to his religion
and the legal profession.
 None of the elements of the second paragraph of Art 354 is
present in the articles of Tulfo and his failure to verify the
information on which he based his writings he therefore failed
to meet the test laid down in “reckless disregard test” as laid
down in New York Times vs Sullivan and reiterated in Flor vs
People. Thus, it cannot be argued that they are qualified
privileged communications under the RPC.
 On the other hand, the editors and the president of Remate
were also held liable as laid down in the provision of Article
360 of the RPC which states that: Any person who shall
publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any
defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible
for the same. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or
the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the
defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he
were the author thereof.
 The Court stated that the provision in the RPC does not
provide absence of participation as a defense, but rather
plainly and specifically states the responsibility of those
involved in publishing newspapers and other periodicals.
 It is not a matter of whether or not they conspired in preparing
and publishing the subject articles, because the law simply so
states that they are liable as they were the author.
04. Fermin vs. People 550 SCRA 132 (2008)
DOCTRINE/S: Proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication
of the offending article is not required, if the accused has been
specifically identified as author, editor, or proprietor or printer/publisher
of the publication.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Fermin, as publisher of Gossip Tabloid, was
charged with the crime of libel for the printing and circulation of an article
about Annabelle Rama and Eddie Gutierrez. The article states that the
spouses converted for their personal use the money paid to them by
fellow Filipinos in America in their business of distributing high-end
cookware; that the spouses and their family returned to the Philippines
to evade prosecution in America; and that Annabelle lost the earnings
from their business through irresponsible gambling in casinos. RTC
convicted Fermin. CA affirmed. Before the SC, Fermin claims that she
should be acquitted because she had no hand in the preparation and
publication of the offending article, nor in the review, editing,
examination, and approval of the articles published in Gossip Tabloid.
SC held that knowledge of and participation in the publication of the
offending article is not required, if the accused has been specifically
identified as author, editor, or proprietor or printer/publisher of the
publication. Thus, Fermin’s conviction was upheld.
FACTS
 On complaint of spouses Annabelle Rama and Eddie
Gutierrez, 2 criminal informations for libel were filed against
Cristy Fermin, as publisher, and Bogs Tugas, as editor-in-
chief of Gossip Tabloid, for publicly printing and circulating
Gossip Tabloid, with the following materials:
 “MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO
NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING
ASUNTO DOON SI ANNABELLE”
 IMPOSIBLENG NASA AMERIKA NGAYON SI
ANNABELLE DAHIL SA KALAT DIN ANG
ASUNTO NILA DU’N, BUKOD PA SA
NAPAKARAMING PINOY NA HUMAHANTING SA
KANILA MAS MALAKING PROBLEMA ANG
KAILANGAN NIYANG HARAPIN SA STATES
DAHIL SA PERANG NADISPALKO NILA,
NAGHAHANAP LANG NG SAKIT NG KATAWAN
SI ANNABELLE KUNG SA STATES NGA NIYA
MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA NGAYON PARA LANG
TAKASAN NIYA SI LIGAYA SANTOS AT ANG
SINTENSIYA SA KANYA”
 The subject article narrates that, when Eddie and Annabelle
were living in the States in the 1990’s, they were selling
mamahaling kaldero on commission basis. However, they did
not remit the sale proceeds (which amounted to millions) to
the company because the same were spent by Annabelle in
the casinos. It also states that the couple is indebted to many
Pinoys in the States, which is why it is impossible that
Annabelle would go to the States now for refuge.
 RTC: Convicted both Fermin and Tugas for the crime charged
 CA: Affirmed Fermin’s conviction; but acquitted Tugas on
account of non-participation in the publication of the libelous
article
 Before the SC, Fermin posits that:
  To sustain a conviction for libel, the publisher must
have knowingly participated in or consented to the
preparation and publication of the libelous article.
She claims that she had no hand in the preparation
and publication of the offending article, nor in the
review, editing, examination, and approval of the
articles published in Gossip Tabloid; thus, she is
entitled to an acquittal
 The subject article is not libelous per se and is
covered by the mantle of press freedom, and is
merely in the nature of a fair and honest comment
ISSUE/S and HELD:
Main Issue: Whether Fermin should be acquitted on the ground of
her non-participation in the publication and preparation of the
libelous article. – NO.
 Proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication of
the offending article is not required, if the accused has been
specifically identified as “author, editor, or proprietor” or
“printer/publisher” of the publication, as Fermin and Tugas are
in this case.
 In this case, Fermin was not only the “publisher” of Gossip
Tabloid, but also its “president” and “chairperson” as she
herself admitted. She also testified that she handled the
business aspect of the publication, and assigns editors to take
charge of everything. Obviously, she had full control over the
publication of articles in the said tabloid. Her excuse of lack of
knowledge, consent, or participation in the release of the
libelous article fails to persuade.
 Fermin’s criminal guilt should be affirmed, whether or not she
had actual knowledge and participation, having furnished the
means of carrying on the publication of the article purportedly
prepared by the members of the Gossip Reportorial Team,
who were employees under her control and supervision.
As to Tugas
The CA erred in acquitting Tugas. Tugas cannot feign lack of
participation in the publication of the questioned article. His testimony,
in fact, confirms his actual participation in the preparation and
publication of the controversial article and his approval thereof as it was
written. But, of course, his conviction cannot be reinstated as it would
run afoul his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Minor Issues:
Whether the article is libelous. – YES.
 A libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a
crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary; or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical
person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.
 Here, there is evident imputation of the crime of malversation
(that the complainants converted for their personal use the
money paid to them by fellow Filipinos in America in their
business of distributing high-end cookware); of vices or
defects for being fugitives from the law (that complainants and
their family returned to the Philippines to evade prosecution in
America); and of being a wastrel (that Annabelle lost the
earnings from their business through irresponsible gambling
in casinos). The attribution was made publicly, considering
that Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide circulation. The victims
were identified and identifiable. More importantly, the article
reeks of malice, as it tends to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of the complainants.
Whether Fermin can take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech and of the press. — NO.
 Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made
against public officials in the performance of their official
duties, or against public figures on matters of public interest,
such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of
constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false,
malicious or unrelated to a public officer’s performance of his
duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public
figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability.
 In this case, while complainants are considered public figures
for being personalities in the entertainment business, media
people, including gossip and intrigue writers and
commentators such as Fermin, do not have the unbridled
license to malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately
airing fabricated and malicious comments, whether in
broadcast media or in print, about their personal lives.
Penalty
 The SC issued Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, entitled
Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the
Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases, which expresses a
preference for the imposition of a fine rather than
imprisonment in convictions for libel. Also, if the penalty
imposed is merely a fine but the convict is unable to pay the
same, the RPC provisions on subsidiary imprisonment should
apply. However, the Circular likewise allows the court, in the
exercise of sound discretion, the option to impose
imprisonment as penalty, whenever the imposition of a fine
alone would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work
violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the
imperatives of justice.
 Here, in light of the relatively wide latitude given to utterances
against public figures such as private complainants, and
consonant with Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, the Court
deems it proper to modify the penalty of imprisonment to a
fine in the amount of P6,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency; plus moral damages.
5. Binay v SOJ
6.Guingguing vs People
Doctrine: If the statements made against the public figure are
essentially true, then no conviction for libel can be had.
Emergency Recit: Lim published the criminal cases and photos of Choy
being arrested in Sunday post as a self-defense against Choy. Choy is
a journalist, hence, a punlic figure. RTC and CA held that Lim and
petitioner wwre guilty of Libel. SC reversed.
FACTS
 A criminal complaint for libel filed by Cirse "Choy" Torralba
(Complainant) against Lim and petitioner. Choy was a
broadcast journalist who handled 2 programs aired over a
large portion of Visayas and Mindanao.
 Lim published on a one-page advertisement in Sunday Post,
a weekly publication edited and published by petitioner,
records of criminal cases filed against complainant and the
photographs of the latter being arrested for crimes of estafa,
serious physical injuries, and malicious mischief.
 Choy asserted that he had been acquitted from the cases.
Hence, he sought Lim and petitioner’s conviction for libel. He
also argued that the publication placed him in public contempt
and ridicule and that the publication was designed to degrade
and malign his person and destroy him as a broadcast
journalist.
 Lim, in his defense, claimed that complainant was allegedly
making scurrilous attacks against him and his family over the
airwaves. Since Lim had no access to radio time, he opted for
paid advertisements via newspaper to answer the attacks, as
a measure of self-defense. Lim also argued that complainant,
as a media man and member of the fourth estate, occupied a
position almost similar to a public functionary and should not
be onion-skinned and be able to absorb the thrust of public
scrutiny.
 RTC: Publication libelous. The lower court also declared that
that malice is the most important element of libel and was
present in the case because every defamatory publication
prima facie implies malice on the part of the author and
publisher towards the person subject thereof.
 Also, RTC held that Complainant’s status as a mediaman to
the prosecution of the libel was irrelevant. The publication of
a calumny even against public offices or candidates for public
office is an offense most dangerous to people. Plus,
publication is not a self-defense.
 CA AFFIRMED. CA also asserted that the purpose of self-
defense in libel is to repair, minimize or remove the effect of
the damage caused to him but it does not license the
defendant to utter blow-for-blow scurrilous language in return
for what he received. Once the defendant hits back with equal
or more scurrilous remarks unnecessary for his defense, the
 retaliation becomes an independent act for which he may be
liable.
 Petitioner prays before the SC for reversal of CA ruling.
Petitioner contends that as editor-publisher of the Sunday
Post and as a member of the fourth estate, the lower courts’
finding of guilt against him constitutes an infringement of his
constitutional right to freedom of speech and of the press.
ISSUE: W/N the publication subject matter of the instant case is indeed
libelous.
HELD: No.
 Under our law, criminal libel is defined as a public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead. Thus, the elements of libel are:
(a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another;
(b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person
defamed; and, (d) existence of malice.
 SC has accepted the proposition that the actual malice
standard governs the prosecution of criminal libel cases for
punlic offical and public figures. In Adiong v. COMELEC, the
Court held the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well
include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials.
 In Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, a public figure has
been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments,
fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling
which gives the public a legitimate interest in his doings, his
affairs, and his character, has become a ‘public personage.’
He is, in other words, a celebrity. Obviously to be included in
this category are those who have achieved some degree of
reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an
actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist, or any other
entertainer. The list is broader than this. It includes public
officers, famous inventors and explorers, war heroes and
even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, and no less a
personage than the Grand Exalted Ruler of a lodge. It
includes, in short, anyone who has arrived at a position where
public attention is focused upon him as a person.
 Complainant is a broadcast journalist hosting two radio
programs aired over a large portion of the Visayas and
Mindanao. Considering the definition above, he qualifies as a
public figure.
 Since complainant was a public figure, it was the prosecution
that has the burden to prove actual malice on the part of Lim
and petitioner for the publication. The prosecution must have
established beyond reasonable doubt that the defendants
knew the statements in the advertisement was false or
nonetheless proceeded with reckless disregard as to publish
it whether or not it was true.
 It should proceed that if the statements made against the
public figure are essentially true, then no conviction for libel
can be had. Any statement that does not contain a provably
false factual connotation will receive full constitutional
protection. An examination of the records of this case showed
that the précis of information contained in the questioned
publication were actually true.
 In convicting Lim and petitioner, the lower courts paid
particular heed to Art 354 of the RPC, which provides that
"every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
making it is shown…". We hold that this provision, as applied
to public figures complaining of criminal libel, must be
construed in light of the constitutional guarantee of free
expression, and this Court’s precedents upholding the
standard of actual malice with the necessary implication that
a statement regarding a public figure if true is not libelous. The
provision allows for such leeway, accepting as a defense
"good intention and justifiable motive." The exercise of free
expression, and its concordant assurance of commentary on
public affairs and public figures, certainly qualify as "justifiable
motive," if not "good intention."
7. Macasaet v People, 452 SCRA 255 (2005)
DOCTRINE: The criminal action in cases of written defamations shall be
filed with the RTC where the libelous article is printed and first published
or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Macasaet, et al. were charged by Trinidad with
libel for an article first published in Manila. The latter's complaint stated
that, at the time of first publication, he resided in Marikina. Trinidad,
however, filed the case in Quezon City. The Supreme Court held that
the RTC of Quezon City had no territorial jurisdiction over the offense.
His attempts to cure this defect in 2 instances (first, when he filed his
reply-affidavit during preliminary investigation; and second, when he
attached the affidavit of his lessor a supplemental motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the case) would still warrant the
dismissal of the case since jurisdiction is determined only by the
allegations in the complaint or information.
FACTS
 An Abante article read as follows:
“Humarap sa ilang reporters si Jordan Castillo hindi para magkaroon ng
writeups kundi para ituwid lang ang ilang bagay na baluktot at binaluktot
pang lalo ng isang Toto Trinidad.
Hindi namin naging barkada si Joey Trinidad. Bah, Toto na pala siya
ngayon. Anong palagay niya sa sarili niya, si Direk Toto Natividad siya?
Nakikibuhat lang talaga yang taong yan sa amin sa Liberty Ave. noon.
Ni hindi nga pinapansin ni Tito Alfie yan dahil nga sa amoy-pawis siya
pagkatapos mag-barbell. Kami naka-shower na, si Joey punas lang
nang punas sa katawan niya ng T-shirt niyang siya ring isusuot niya
pagkatapos na gawing pamunas!
Madalas ngang makikain sa amin yan noon. Galit na galit nga ang
mayordoma naming si Manang Hilda noon dahil nagkukulang ang
rasyon namin dahil dagdag pakainin nga yang si Joey. Tamang-tama
nga lang sa amin ang kanin at ulam, pero sinusugod pa niya ang kaldero
para magkayod ng natitirang tutong sa kaldero. Naaawa nga ako
madalas diyan kaya sineshare ko na lang ang pagkain ko sa kanya.
Ewan ko kung anong naisipan ng taong yan at pagsasalitaan pa niya ng
masama si Tito Alfie. Hindi man lang siya tumanaw ng utang na loob na
kahit konti at kahit na sandali ay naitawid ng gutom niya. Hindi ko alam
kung may kunsenya pa ang gangyang klaseng tao, pero sana naman ay
makunsensya ka, Pare!
Madalas nga itinatago ka na nga namin ni Tito Alfie para hindi
mahighblood sa iyo, ganyan pa ang gagawin mo. Napupuyat nga si
Manang Hilda sa pagbabantay sa iyo at hindi makatulog ang matanda
hanggat hindi ka pa umuuwi, magsasalita ka pa ng mga inimbento mo.
Pati nga si Eruel ay madalas mabanas sa iyo, natatandaan mo pa ba,
dahil sa kakulitan mo! Pilit mo kaming binubuyo na sabihin kay Tito Alfie
na tulungan ka rin tulad ng tulong na ibinibigay ni Tito Alfie na pag-
aalaga sa amin. Pero hate na hate ka nga ni Tito Alfie dahil sa
masamang ugali, natatandaan mo pa ba yun? Kaya tiyak ko na imbento
mo lang ang lahat ng pinagsasabi mo para makaganti ka kay Tito Alfie,
ani Jordan sa mga nag-interbyu sa kanyang legitimate writers.
Hindi na siguro namin kailangan pang dagdagan ang mga sinabi ng
sinasabi ni Toto Trinidad na mga barkada niya at kapwa niya kuno
Liberty Boys!”
 Alfie Lorenzo (columnist of Abante), Allen Macasaet
(publisher), Nicolas Quijano (managing editor), Roger Parajes
(editor), and a certain Jordan Castillo were charged by
Trinidad with the crime of libel before the RTC of Quezon City.
 Lorenzo, Macasaet, and Quijano filed a motion to dismiss the
case, on the ground that the RTC of Quezon City had no
territorial jurisdiction. In the complaint, Trinidad stated that, at
the time the article was first published, he resided in Marikina.
The article was first published in Manila.
 Trinidad opposed, claiming that, in his reply-affidavit during
the preliminary investigation, he stated that his residence is in
Quezon City. This affidavit therefore cured the defect in the
complaint.
RTC:
 Dismissed the criminal case.
CA:
(Note: It was the public prosecutor and Trinidad who appealed the
dismissal.)
 Reversed; ruled that the affidavit, as well as the affidavit of his
lessor in Quezon City attached in the supplemental motion for
reconsideration filed before the RTC, cured the defect in the
complaint.
ISSUES
1. WON the RTC of Quezon City has territorial jurisdiction?
[relevant]
2. WON Trinidad had legal personality to appeal the dismissal of
the criminal case?
HELD:
1. NO.
 Art. 360, Revised Penal Code: The criminal action x x x in
cases of written defamations x x x shall be filed x x x with the
[RTC] x x x where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense.
o In this case, the article was printed and first
published in Manila. At that time, Trinidad resided
in Marikina.
 Jurisprudence: Jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is
determined by the allegations of the complaint or information.
In resolving a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction,
the facts contained in the complaint or information should be
taken as they are.
o In this case, therefore, the determination of
territorial jurisdiction shall be limited to only the
allegations in the complaint or information. The
court should not consider the reply-affidavit filed
during preliminary investigation, nor the affidavit of
Trinidad’s lessor.
2. YES.
 Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV, Revised Administrative Code:
The OSG has the function to represent the government in the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings. In such capacity, it only takes over a criminal
case after the same has reached the appellate courts.
o Sec. 9, Rule 41: In appeals by notice of appeal, the
court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the
perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the
expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
o Applied to the case at bar, when the notice of
appeal was filed, it was the RTC which still had
jurisdiction over the case. Thus, the public
prosecutor and Trinidad still had legal personality to
appeal the dismissal.
8. ROBERTO BRILLANTE v CA
DOCTRINE: To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown
to exist: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning
another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed;
and (d) existence of malice.
ER: Brillante was charged with libel for releasing an open letter
addressing the allegations raised by him against Binay. SC ruled that
Brillante is guilty of libel.
FACTS:
 Brillante, then a candidate for the position of Councilor in
Makati, held a press conference at the Makati Sports Club
which was attended by some 50 journalists. In the course of
the press conference,
o Brillante accused Binay of plotting the
assassination of Syjuco
o Accused Binay of terrorism, intimidation and
harassment of the Makati electorate
o Circulated among the journalists copies of an open
letter to President Aquino which discussed in detail
his charges against Binay.
 Several journalists who attended the press conference wrote
news articles about the same.
 Five informations were filed against Brillante by Binay and
Prudente filed four complaints for libel against Brillante
 RTC: guilty of libel on four counts
 Brillante contended that the open letter which he wrote an
caused to be published was not defamatory and was without
malice
 CA: affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether Brillante is guilty of libel
HELD: YES.
 Libel is defined under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code
as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice
or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition,
status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead."
 To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to
exist: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition
concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity
of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.
 There could be no dispute as to the existence of the first three
elements of libel in the cases at bar.
 An allegation made by a person against another is considered
defamatory if it ascribes to the latter the commission of a
crime; the possession of a vice or defect, whether real or
imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him
in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who
is dead.
 The element of publication was likewise established. There is
publication if the defamatory material is communicated to a
third person, i.e., a person other than the person to whom the
defamatory statement refers.
 The determination of Brillante’s culpability for libel hinges on
the question of whether his statements were made with
malice.
 Malice is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender is
prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the
person defamed; it implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm.
 It is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous
remarks made such remarks with knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code states, as a general
rule, that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if true, if no good intention and justifiable
motive is shown. As an exception to the rule, the presumption
of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation
qualifies as privileged communication.
 In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a
qualifiedly privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made
the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make
the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect,
which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it
is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or
a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the
matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection
sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are
made in good faith and without malice.
 In the cases at bar, although the open letter was primarily
addressed to then President Aquino, the communication
thereof was not limited to her alone. It was also published in
several newspapers of general circulation and was thus made
known to the general public. Even if the interest sought to be
protected belongs not just to Brillante but to the public in
general, certainly, the general public does not have the power
to remedy the alleged dangers sought to be prevented by
Brillante in publishing the open letter or in uttering similar
statements during the January 7, 1988 press conference.
Brillante employed the shotgun approach to disseminate the
information which essentially destroyed the reputations of the
complainants. His lack of selectivity is indicative of malice and
is anathema to his claim of privileged communication.
9. Jalandoni v Drilon
Facts:
 Ledesma and his group filed an administrative complaint for
violation of RPC and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
against Jalandoni. News articles were published for two
consecutive days regarding the complaint. It was published in
five major daily newspapers. Exactly one year after, Jalandoni
filed a complaint for libel before the Prov. Prosecutor of Rizal,
for the crime of libel against Ledesma and his group.
  The publications contained allegations that Jalandoni, who
was then the PCGG Commissioner, committed illegal and
unauthorized acts which constitute as graft and corruption
regarding the transactions entered into by Piedras Petroleum
Co., with RCBC.
 IF ASKED, here is the full publication:
My administration will prove that government is not avoidly corrupt —
and that bureaucracy is not necessarily corrupt. Graft and corruption, we
will confront more with action than with words.
— PRESIDENT FIDEL V. RAMOS, Inaugural Address, June 30,
1992
AN URGENT APPEAL TO JUSTICE SECRETARY FRANKLIN
DRILON (and) PCGG CHAIRMAN MAGTANGGOL GUNIGUNDO
Please stop the unauthorized and illegal acts of PCGG officials led
by former Chairman DAVID CASTRO and Commissioner MARIO
JALANDONI which will allow the attempt of hostile vested interest
groups to gain entry into the board of Oriental Petroleum & Minerals
Corporation.
1. The PCGG openly defied Malacañang orders issued by former
Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon on the sale of Oriental
Petroleum shares.
In spite of its claims that the disposal of OPMC shares held by
Piedras Petroleum was approved by the Office of the President,
documented proofs belie the PCGG's statements.
No less than Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon, who was Executive
Secretary at the time PCGG Chairman David Castro sought
approval for the OPMC-Piedras Petroleum deal, thumbed down
Castro's request. Clearly, the sale of OPMC shares held by Piedras
Petroleum to the RCBC-Yuchengco Group for P101 million was
unauthorized and illegal.
2. The PCGG officials involved in the unauthorized and illegal sale
of Oriental Petroleum shares committed grave abuse of authority.
Their acts defrauded government of better prices for Oriental
Petroleum shares which they undervalued and sold to favored
buyers — Pacific Basin and RCBC, both identified with the
Yuchengco group.
At the time the Piedras deal was closed the PCGG as evidenced
by the minutes of the Board Meeting of Piedras Petroleum on
October 31, 1991, with PCGG Commissioner Mario Jalandoni as
acting Chairman, the sale of 2.054 billion OPMC Class A shares
and 789.45 million B shares, OPMC shares were sold for the give-
away price of P0.035/share. This compares with prevailing market
price of P0.042 for A shares and P0.049 for the B shares. This
means that the RCBC-Yuchengco Group already earned P25
million at the time of the transaction.
3. The PCGG proceeded without any legal authority to sell Oriental
Petroleum shares in total violation of the Public Bidding Law and
other government rules and regulations pertaining to the disposal
of government assets.
The PCGG, particularly Commissioner Mario Jalandoni, should be
made to account for the PCGG-Piedras-RCBC transaction as it
was consummated without transparency, in violation of the Public
Bidding Law and without approval from the government.
4. The PCGG last year illegally used Philcomsat cash dividends to
avail itself of an OPMC stock subscription to pay for the
subscription rights of JY Campos and Piedras Petroleum.
Even before the PCGG transacted the questionable Piedras-RCBC
deal, it was sued by a Philcomsat stockholder before the
Sandiganbayan for diverting P76 million in cash dividends. The
anti-graft court ordered the cash dividends deposited in an escrow
account in 1989. However, the funds were used by the PCGG to
pay for subscription rights for OPMC shares.
This case is related to the Piedras deal because the additional
OPMC shares were part of those sold to the RCBC-Yuchengco
Group.
5. The PCGG diverted the proceeds on the authorized sale of
Oriental Petroleum shares in violation of the law requiring proceeds
of the sale of assets by the PCGG going to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
In addition to the litany of illegal transactions entered into by the
PCGG, the officials of the anti-graft body also violated provisions
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, specifically
Section 63, which states that "the following shall serve as source
of funding or appropriations for the implementation of the said law;
b) All receipts from assets recovered and sales of ill-gotten wealth
recovered through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government.
 After this Asst. Prosec. Bautista issued a Memorandum,
which was approved by Prov. Prosec. Castro, recommending
that Ledesma’s group be charged of the crime of libel.
 Sec. Of Justice Franklin Drilon approved the appeal of the
Ledesma’s group thereby ordering the withdrawal of the
information filed.
Issue: W/N Ledesma’s group is guilty of libel?
Held: No.
 The questioned “conclusion” in the open letter
addressed to the stockholders of the OPMC merely stated
the insinuations going on about the deal between
Jalandoni, in his capacity as PCGG Commissioner and
RCBC and the explanation for the press releases
concerning the writer, respondents and the OPMC.
 The question is whether from the fact that the statements were
defamatory, malice can be presumed so that it was incumbent
upon petitioner to overcome such presumption. Under Art.
361 of the Revised Penal Code, if the defamatory
statement is made against a public official with respect to
the discharge of his official duties and functions and the
truth of the allegation is shown, the accused will be
entitled to an acquittal even though he does not prove
that the imputation was published with good motives and
for justifiable ends.
 Moreover, in libel cases against public officials, for liability to
arise, the alleged defamatory statement must relate to
official conduct, even if the defamatory statement is false,
unless the public official concerned proves that the
statement was made with actual malice, that is, with
knowledge that it was false or not. Jalandoni failed to
prove actual malice on the part of the Ledesma’s group.
 Nor did the Court believed that the same was written to cast
aspersion on the good name of Jalandoni. The paid
advertisement merely served as a vehicle to inform the
stockholders of the going-ons in the business world and
only exposed the irregularities surrounding the PCGG
and RCBC deal and the parties involved.
 The interest of society and the maintenance of good
government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public
men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp
incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of
officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile
and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged
with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must
not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon
his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity
of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not
authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less
than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the
common good. Rising superior to any official or set of
officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the
Judiciary — to any or all the agencies of Government — public
opinion should be the constant source of liberty and
democracy.
10. Vasquez v CA (1999)
DOCTRINE: Under Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code, if the
defamatory statement is made against a public official with respect to
the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the
allegation is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even
though he does not prove that the imputation was published with good
motives and for justifiable ends.
EMERGENCY RECIT: Vasquez was charged with libel upon publication
of a newspaper article allegedly imputing the reputation of a Barangay
Chariman. The SC ruled he is not guilty because [See doctrine]
FACTS:
 Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore
Area.
 Sometime in April 1986, he and some 37 families from the
area went to see then National Housing Authority (NHA)
General Manager Lito Atienza regarding their complaint
against their Barangay Chairman, Jaime Olmedo.
  After their meeting with Atienza and other NHA officials,
petitioner and his companions were met and interviewed by
newspaper reporters at the NHA compound concerning their
complaint.
 The next day, the following news article appeared in the
newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa:
o Nananawagan kahapon kay pangulong Corazon
Aquino ang 38 mahihirap na pamilya sa Tondo
Foreshore Area na umanoy inagawan ng lupa ng
kanilang barangay chairman sa pakikipagsabwatan
sa ilang pinuno ng National Housing Authority sapul
1980.
o Sinabi nila na nakipagsabwatan umano si
Chairman Jaime Olmedo ng barangay 66, Zone 6,
Tondo Foreshore Area sa mga project manager ng
NHA upang makamkam ang may 14 na lote ng lupa
sa naturang lugar.
o x x x Pawang lupa ng gobyerno ang mga lupa at
ilegal man na patituluhan, nagawa ito ni Olmedo sa
pakikipagsabwatan sa mga project manager at
legal officers ng NHA, sabi ni Vasquez.
o Sinabi rin ng mga pamilya na protektado ng dating
pinuno ng city hall ng Maynila, MHS Minister
Conrado Benitez, at ilang pinuno ng pulisya ang
barangay chairman kaya nakalusot ang mga
ginawa nitong katiwalian.
o Bukod sa pagkamkam ng mga lupaing gobyerno,
kasangkot din umano si Olmedo sa mga ilegal na
pasugalan sa naturang lugar at maging sa mga
nakawan ng manok. x x x
 Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for
libel against petitioner alleging that the latters statements cast
aspersions on him and damaged his reputation.
ISSUE: W/N Vasquez is guilty of libel – No.
HELD:
 To find a person guilty of libel under Art. 353 of the Revised
Penal Code, the following elements must be proved: (a) the
allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning
another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person
defamed; and (d) existence of malice.
 In this case, there is no doubt that the first three elements are
present. The statements that Olmedo, through connivance
with NHA officials, was able to obtain title to several lots in the
area and that he was involved in a number of illegal activities
(attempted murder, gambling and theft of fighting cocks) were
clearly defamatory. There is no merit in his contention that
landgrabbing, as charged in the information, has a technical
meaning in law.
 The question is whether from the fact that the statements were
defamatory, malice can be presumed so that it was incumbent
upon petitioner to overcome such presumption.
 [See doctrine]
 In this case, contrary to the findings of the trial court, on which
the Court of Appeals relied, petitioner was able to prove the
truth of his charges against the barangay official.
 It was error for the trial court to hold that petitioner only tried
to prove that the complainant [barangay chairman] is guilty of
the crimes alluded to; accused, however, has not proven that
the complainant committed the crimes. For that is not what
petitioner said as reported in the Ang Tinig ng Masa. The fact
that charges had been filed against the barangay official, not
the truth of such charges, was the issue.
 In denouncing the barangay chairman in this case, petitioner
and the other residents of the Tondo Foreshore Area were not
only acting in their self-interest but engaging in the
performance of a civic duty to see to it that public duty is
discharged faithfully and well by those on whom such duty is
incumbent. The recognition of this right and duty of every
citizen in a democracy is inconsistent with any requirement
placing on him the burden of proving that he acted with good
motives and for justifiable ends.
 For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no
liability can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the
public official concerned proves that the statement was made
with actual malice that is, with knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
11. Rogelio Pader v. People
Doctrine: In determining where defamatory words would
fall(slight/grave), not only the the sense, grammatical significance and
accepted ordinary meaning would be considered but also the special
circumstances of the case, the antecedents or relationship between the
party and offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the
offender at the time he uttered the defamatory words.
Facts:
 On April 20, 1995, Atty. Benjamin Escolangco was conversing
with his political leaders at the terrace of his house when
Petitioner Rogelio Pader appeared at the gate and shouted
“PUTANG INA MO atty. Escolango. NAPAKAWALANG HIYA
MO.”
 Escolangco was dumbfounded and embarrassed. He was a
candidate for vice mayor for morong, bataan at that time.
 Atty. Escolangco filed a complaint against petitioner for grave
oral defamation, to which petitioner pleaded not guilty.
 MTC: Found petitioner guilty of grave oral defamation.
 RTC: Affirmed the decision of MTC.
 CA: Affirmed RTC but with modification as to penalty
imposed. ( From 1 month and 1 day - 1 year naging 4months
and 1 day)
Issue: WON petitioner is guilty of grave oral defamation
Held: NO. Although the words uttered were defamatory, it was only
slight. The Court does not agree with the Trial Court in arriving at its
decision when it considered that the defamation was done to destroy
Atty. Escolango’s reputation since the parties were political opponents.
The trial court failed to appreciate the fact that the parties were also
neighbors, that Petitioner was drunk at the time he uttered the words,
and the fact that petitioner’s anger was instigated by what Atty.
Escolango did when petitioner’s father died.(walang mention kung ano
ginawa) In which case, the oral defamation was not of serious or
insulting nature.
The expression “PUTANG INA MO” is a common utterance in the dialect
that is often employed, not really to slander but to rather express anger
or displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates
one's expression of profanity. We do not find it seriously insulting that
after a previous incident involving his father, a drunk Rogelio Pader on
seeing Atty. Escolango would utter words expressing anger. Obviously,
the intention was to show his feelings of resentment and not necessarily
to insult the latter. Being a candidate running for vice mayor, occasional
gestures and words of disapproval or dislike of his person are not
uncommon.
THEREFORE, Rogelio Pader is only guilty of slight oral defamation and
his penalty is only a fine of 200PHP.
12. Noel Villanueva vs. People and Yolanda Castro
FACTS:
1. The accused Villanueva (a municipal councilor) went to the
Vice-Mayor’s office (herein private complainant) for the
application for monetized leaves.
2. The petitioner’s application was not immediately acted upon
by the petitioner for no reason. This inaction on the part of the
petitioner resulted to a barrage of insults from Villanueva.
3. The petitioner uttered the following "Ibuatdaka ken,
inabudakakengawang, e baling masukulnaku." (I will lift you
from there and I will throw you out of the window and I don’t
care if I will go to jail), "Magmaliniska, enaka man malinis,
garapalka." "Balamumansanaskangmalutu, pero king
kilubularanka, tiktakkarinat" (You are pretending to be clean
and honest yet you are not clean and honest, you are corrupt.
You are like red apple, you are worm infested inside and
extremely dirty).
4. Villanueva also made a “dirty finger” to the private respondent.
These circumstances prompted Castro to file a criminal case
of grave oral defamation and slander by deed against
Villanueva.
 5. The MCTC ruled in favor of private respondent, RTC and CA
also ruled in favor of the PR, with some modifications as to
the penalty.
ISSUE: WON Villanueva is guilty of grave oral defamation and slander
by deed
RULING:
As to the grave oral defamation, It is our considered view that
the slander committed by petitioner can be characterized as slight
slander following the doctrine that uttering defamatory words in the heat
of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party,
constitutes only a light felony.
In fact, to be denied approval of monetization of leave without
valid justification, but as an offshoot of a political dissension may have
been vexing for petitioner and may have been perceived by him as
provocation that triggered him to blow his top and utter those
disparaging words. In hindsight, to be denied monetization of leave
credits must have stirred upon the petitioner a feeling akin to begging
for money that he was legally entitled to. This oppressive conduct on the
part of complainant must have scarred petitioner’s self-esteem, too, to
appear as begging for money. But again, this is not an excuse to resort
to intemperate language no matter how such embarrassment must have
wreaked havoc on his ego.
As to the slander by deed; Pointing a dirty finger ordinarily
connotes the phrase "Fuck You," which is similar to the expression
"Puta" or "Putang Ina mo," in local parlance. Such expression was not
held to be libelous in Reyes v. People,38where the Court said that: "This
is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed,
not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is
seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a
reflection on the virtues of a mother." Following Reyes, and in light of
the fact that there was a perceived provocation coming from
complainant, petitioner’s act of pointing a dirty finger at complainant
constitutes simple slander by deed, it appearing from the factual milieu
of the case that the act complained of was employed by petitioner "to
express anger or displeasure" at complainant for procrastinating the
approval of his leave monetization. While it may have cast dishonor,
discredit or contempt upon complainant, said act is not of a serious
nature. Petitioner is guilty of slight oral defamation and simple slander
by deed.
Yes, complainant was then a Vice-Mayor and a lady at that,
which circumstances ordinarily demanded respect from petitioner. But,
it was, likewise, her moral obligation springing from such position to act
in a manner that is worthy of respect. In the case at bar, complainant’s
demeanor of refusing to sign the leave monetization of petitioner, an
otherwise valid claim, because of a political discord smacks of a conduct
unbecoming of a lady and a Vice-Mayor at that. Moreover, it appears
that she had, indeed, thrown a bottle of coke at petitioner, which
actuation reveals that she, too, had gone down to petitioner’s level.
Holding an esteemed position is never a license to act capriciously with
impunity. The fact that there was a squabble between petitioner and
complainant, both high-ranking local public officials, that a verbal brawl
ostensibly took place, speaks very poorly of their self-control and public
relations. For this, they both deserve to be censured and directed to
conduct themselves in a more composed manner and keep their pose
as befits ranking officials who officially deal with the public. To be worthy
of respect, one must act respectably, remembering always that courtesy
begets courtesy.
In a similar fashion, considering that petitioner and
complainant belong to warring political camps, occasional gestures and
words of disapproval or dislike are among the hazards of the job.
Considering this political reality and the fact that the Court of Appeals
concluded, based on evidence on records, that petitioner himself was a
victim of complainant’s indiscretion, her claim for damages and
attorney’s fees must, likewise, fail. Akin to the principle that “he who
comes to court must have clean hands,” each of the parties, in the case
at bar, must bear his own loss.
Ratio:
There is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature. The
gravity of the oral defamation depends not only (1) upon the expressions
used, but also (2) on the personal relations of the accused and the
offended party, and (3) the circumstances surrounding the case. Indeed,
it is a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall
under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense,
grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them
separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case,
antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the
offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the
time.
In our previous rulings, we held that the social standing and
position of the offended party are also taken into account and thus, it
was held that the slander was grave, because the offended party had
held previously the Office of Congressman, Governor, and Senator and
was then a candidate for Vice-President, for which no amount of
sophistry would take the statement out of the compass of grave oral
defamation. However, we have, likewise, ruled in the past that uttering
defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on
the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony. In the
case at bar, as a public official, petitioner, who was holding the position
of Councilor at that time, is hidebound to be an exemplar to society
against the use of intemperate language particularly because the
offended party was a Vice-Mayor. However, we cannot keep a blind eye
to the fact that such scathing words were uttered by him in the heat of
anger triggered by the fact, as found by the Court of Appeals, that
complainant refused, without valid justification to approve the
monetization of accrued leave credits of petitioner. In a manner of
speaking, she sowed the wind that reaped the storm.
Slander by deed is a crime against honor, which is committed by
performing any act, which casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon
another person. The elements are (1) that the offender performs any act
not included in any other crime against honor, (2) that such act is
performed in the presence of other person or persons, and (3) that such
act casts dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the offended party.
Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes slander by deed of a
serious nature or not, depends on the social standing of the offended
party, the circumstances under which the act was committed, the
occasion, etc. It is libel committed by actions rather than words. The
most common examples are slapping someone or spitting on his/her
face in front of the public market, in full view of a crowd, thus casting
dishonor, discredit, and contempt upon the person of another.
In a similar fashion, considering that petitioner and complainant
belong to warring political camps, occasional gestures and words of
disapproval or dislike are among the hazards of the job. Considering this
political reality and the fact that the Court of Appeals concluded, based
on evidence on records, that petitioner himself was a victim of
complainant’s indiscretion, her claim for damages and attorney’s fees
must, likewise, fail. Akin to the principle that “he who comes to court
must have clean hands,” each of the parties, in the case at bar, must
bear his own loss.