Strategies
Sahand Haji Ali Ahmad, Ph.D
Market Maker’s business model
• Traders obtain liquidity on a bi-lateral and bespoke basis from dealers
• The products are often standardised (e.g. spot) but the OTC nature lies in
the delivery of liquidity
• The market maker’s model is based on ideally having a large symmetric
flow providing him with little risk and a significant spread capture
• The business has a feed forward as higher symmetric volumes and P&L out
of spread capture, leads to Market Maker’s ability to lower the spread
offered and as such to increase his market share while less liquidity and
patchy toxic volume might lead to higher spreads and subsequently less
trade& profit
• P&L is formed of 2 components: Spread capture and Inventory P&L
Venues for Market Makers
• For Fixed Income (FX/Sovereigns/Corps) Market Makers are either banks quoting
directly through GUI and API , or are banks and Trading firms quoting on the ECNs
• For Equities, the market makers usually make markets on Equity
Exchanges(Nasdaq, NYSE, Turquoise Plato of LSE, Euronext, Six Swiss, ….) or
through dark pools of liquidity while Big Blocks are sometimes traded through
brokers through IOI(Indication of Interest)
• For Futures, the major venues are ICE, CME/CBOT/NYMEX
• Different ECNs/Exchanges have different characteristics such as order execution
time(30ms-70ms), latency, data update/reporting frequency(e.g. 20ms for EBS
Live Ultra), reported data, type of orders(Iceberg,…), limits on size of the orders,
settlement, stock tick size, odd-lot trading, block-trading, daily price limit, fees,
type of Auction(continuous/fixing), fragmentation of the market, …
• In equity markets, due to introduction of MiFid2, less volume has to be traded on
Dark pools, so more volume is flowing to Auctions on lit exchanges
Pricing
• Mid price/Spread
• A naïve basic market-making model will combine the prices at various ECNs (FX/FI ECNs
such as EBS(Nex Markets) , Reuters/FXall, NordFx Integral, Hotspot, Fastmatch,
Fxspotstream, Currenex, FX Connect, Tradeweb, NYSE Bonds, MarketAxess, Bloomberg
MTF, Nasdaq espeed, ICAP’s ETC, ICE, LME, CME, ….. ) Based on a linearly weighted
combination and use it as the midprice for the clients
• Some price the mid as a random number based on a normal distribution, with mean
equal to the previous tick midprice
• Spread should be proportional to the risk levels (expected short-term volatility in prices)
• Spread should encourage the clients to trade (should be competitive and set dynamically
to invite hopefully offsetting two-directional volume)
• Spread for bigger trade sizes should be higher (2,5,10,20,50 Mil) in order to compensate
for the excessive risk transferred by these bigger trade sizes
Mid Price with Signal
• Current Mid Price to client should be a weighted average of mid prices
available in the market shifted by an amount equal to expected change of
the price until the (expected) time the trade is exited ( average time of
staying in a trade based on FIFO exit method) so we have
• Skew signal (Skew Tick)
• If based on current flow, the average exit time is 20 Seconds, a few
predictive signals for 20 seconds price change should be used to predict the
20 second price change, which will be subsequently added to the current
mid price derived from orderbooks
• The signals are proprietary and can be based on orderbook, volume, trend,
executed price,… and their interaction, as well as their temporal evolution
Mid Price with Signal
• There are various information used to generate the signals:
• Price action & Technicals
• Volume (& it’s change)
• Orderbook state (& Change in state of the orderbook)
• News sentiment
• Tweet sentiment
• Post-event analysis
• Orderflow (Information in orderflow, based on various client categories and
weighed and aggregated based on their historic trade outcome similar to
Alpha Capture from Analysts’ reports,….)
• Other Assets’ prices/volumes/sentiment/…. (Correlated Assets)
Short-term signals
• Looking at milliseconds or even seconds, the most important price
predictor signal is the orderbook as the price is defined directly based on
the mid of best bid and ask
• Different viewpoints on orderbook modelling:
1) Descriptive model, reproducing stylized facts (like Hawkes [Bacry et al.,
2013], or [Robert and Rosenbaum, 2011] and [Fodra and Pham, 2013])
2) Structural models, typically flow-driven models (see [Cont and De
Larrard, 2013], [Huang et al., 2013] or [Smith et al., 2003])
3) Theoretical models, like [Ro ¸su, 2009], [Bayraktar et al., 2007], [Abergel
and Jedidi, 2011] or [Lachapelle et al., 2013].
A simple Liquidity Imbalance Signal
Market Participants in these equities
Participants and the imbalance at their trades
Observations regarding Imbalance signal
Obvious observations:
• HF market makers and HF prop Traders use market orders to consume liquidity on the
weak side of the book(buying when imbalance is on average 0.6 and selling when it is on
average -0.6)
• HF market makers provide double-sided liquidity (through limit orders) when imbalance
is less intense than -0.5 (consistent with the known fact that HF participant contributing
to stabilize the price with their limit orders)
• HFMM trade far more with limit orders (73%) than with market orders
• Investment banks use more market orders than limit orders
• Orderbook Imbalance is highly correlated with the rate of insertions and cancellations of
limit orders near the mid price
• as market makers, HFMM are expected to earn money by buying and selling when the
mid price does not change much (relying on the bid-ask bounce). On the other hand,
HFPT are typically alternating between intensive buy and sell phases which are based on
price moves
Signal definition and stylized facts
• Orderbook Imbalance is defined as: (Q(b)-Q(s))/ (Q(b)+Q(s)) just
before the next trade occurs, where Q(b) is the quantity on the best
bid and Q(s) is the quantity on the best sell
Signal strength
• Given that these are large tick stocks, for smaller tick stocks (and FX) several price levels need to
be aggregated in order to obtain the same level of prediction for future price moves
• A strong predictive signal as the average mid price move after 10 trades as a function of the
current imbalance
Mean-reversion of imbalance to zero after several
trades
Possibility of imbalance sign change in case of
significant imbalance
• Strong imbalance may imply on a future price change, which in turn can create a
depletion of the “weak side of the order-book which may cause an inversion of
the imbalance, since the queue in second best price level of the order book,
which is now “promoted” to be the first level, could be large. Regressing future
imbalances on the imbalance just before the first trade:
Trade intensity based on Orderbook imbalance
• relationship between the imbalance signal and the trading speed/rate, we observe the
imbalance-conditioned trading rate R+(in the direction of the imbalance) and R-(opposite
direction of the imbalance) for each type of market participant, during all consecutive intervals of
10 minutes
Interpretation and Conclusion
• Previous figures show unbiased estimators for the probability that a
participant of a specific type trades in the direction (respectively, opposite
direction) of the imbalance (or in other words, the relative speed of trading
in the direction/opposite to the imbalance)
• High Frequency Market Makers: the higher the imbalance in the
orderbook, the less they trade. This effect does not seem to be related to
the direction of their trades. It corresponds to an expected behaviour from
market makers
• High Frequency Proprietary Traders: the higher the imbalance, the more
they trade in the similar direction, and the less they trade in the opposite
direction
• Institutional Brokers: do not seem to be influenced by the imbalance. They
trade more with limit orders when the imbalance is intense, this may
derive the price to move in the opposite direction
A simple twist of the signal
• Signal value = The quantity at the best bid divided by the sum of the quantities at
the best bid and asks. As underlined in the paper, this signal has more predictive
power when the tick is large, in the sense the quantities at the best bid and ask
describe better the short term liquidity in the orderbook on large ticks
Twisted signal
• The relationship between the expected price move in the future 20 seconds and
the imbalance is increasing. Sampled every update of the first bid and ask
(quantity or price), the density is rather U-shaped. Major trading venues available
are used and aggregated(Nyse, BATS, NASDAQ and Nyse Arca). We show
expected 20-second P&L if the trade is done when the signal exceeds a
threshold(as a function of the threshold). Saturation mechanism is visible.
Other potential signals
• Intensity of market buy/sell orders ( average time between two
market buy/sell orders)
• Intensity of limit order arrivals
• Average size of buy orders vs. average size of sell orders
• Temporal Evolution of Orderbook across time
• Cross-asset/correlation-based signals
• Imbalance of Trades crossing the spread
• Intensity of order modification/insertion/cancellation as well as it’s
temporal behavior
• Combining Various Layers of Orderbook in a smart way
The Methodology, evidence and tests needed to
establish and prove a signal
Tests helping establish a signal and prove its effectiveness:
• observing the average price profile after the signal (e.g average price chart 100
trades after the signal is triggered)
• Verifying statistical significance of the positive P&L for the trade triggered by the
signal ( Absolute value of T-stat more than 2)
• Regressing expected return for the trade over the signal value
• Calculating correlation of the trade P&L and signal value
How to set the parameter to optimize the signal performance (e.g for orderbook
imbalance we look at the threshold that whenever imbalance exceeds that
threshold , we enter a trade on that side passively/actively , the exit strategy or the
window size we look to exit the trade,…)
• Parameters ( threshold for trade, closing time,…) that optimize:
1. Sharpe ratio (expected return of the trade/volatility of returns)
2. Average P&L per trade
Intensity of the process providing equity liquidity
at the first limit(0.5 tick away from the mid price)
Intensity of the process at the second limit (1.5
ticks away from mid price)
Intensity of process on the second queue given
the length of the first queue
Intensity of the first buy based on the length of
the queue on the first level sell
Price Change in Orderbook after News
• Price changes either due to trade (clearing a level) or due to shift of
quotes(cancelling and replacing at a different price)
• Price is an aggregate of Book effect(quote shifts) and Deal effect(level
clearance)
Spread
• Spread exists due to price uncertainty, transaction costs, holding premium
• Spread offered should be based on the base spread (based on the client classification), as
well as a spread based on upcoming volatility/unpredictability in the prices, Market
Liquidity, client’s credit rating, client’s latency, client’s trading behavior
(spamming/latency arbitrage/… ), ….
• Quoting Large Size Trades to clients: in order to quote a large size trade ( e.g. 100 Million
USDJPY quote), the widening of the spread should be incremental
• It could be based on a fixed rule, progressive based on the size, or be based on AI ( which
previous quotes took the trade, what is the expected minimum quote for profitability,….)
• Just before announcements ( such as NFP,…) spread is widened prohibitively by market
maker and the spread gradually tightens as time passes and volatility subsides
• Spread is also highly based on the tick size, exchanges with smaller tick size obviously
attract more volume and liquidity as market makers can offer narrower spread on these
exchanges
• The effective spread is the actual difference between the bid and offer, including the
direction of any price movements. Whereas the realized spread is found by taking
average bids and offers over a period of time, and finding the difference between them
Spread determination
• Higher turnover is easily achieved by reducing the operating spread – the difference between
market maker’s own buy and sell quotes. However, reducing the operating spread also lowers
income per trading cycle2 . To the contrary, increasing the operating spread increases income per
cycle, but reduces turnover. There is a trade-off between spread and turnover, and the
fundamental question is: what is the optimal operating spread, that will maximize market maker’s
profit from a given security?
• Optimal spread based on turnover : Dynamically changing spread in order to maximize profit (
expected spread * turnover)
• Based on a simple formula: ds= s * volatility * dz for equities, one can conclude that:
spread = 2 * s * vol * sqrt ( average time between two trades)
• Based on option pricing theory, a spread is the price of a straddle, so :
spread = 1.6 * s * vol * sqrt (average time between two trades)
Where: average time between two trades = Average trade size/Volume over the interval
• This means higher the volume and lower the volatility, then lower the fair spread!!!
• In reality the coefficient is between 2.8-3.8
• Massive intraday seasonality as volume has intraday seasonality patterns (highest fx volume for a
pair during market times for the pair and economic news release, highest equity volume at
open/close/other markets open,…)
Spread based on Volatility
• Changes in the business costs, generally attributed to order processing, inventory, cost of carry or
adverse selection, should therefore have an important impact on the evolution of the spread over
time but also the market competition is very important
• In FX one can use a vector autoregressive framework to model changes to five minute indicative
spreads using volatility, interest rate differentials and quote revisions which collectively proxy the
independent effects of information arrival, adverse selection and inventory costs
• The most important factor in determining spread is volatility which is usually predicted based on a
Vector AutoRegressive model(e.g. GARCH,…)
• Lower spread naturally increases volume , which potentially translates into higher profit (if it
compensates for lower spread captured)
• Lower spread increases risk as it makes the market maker’s price possibly the most competitive
leading to a significant one-sided flow of orders specially before important events
• In order to avoid risk, market makers significantly widen the price before volatile market moving
events and during illiquid/low volume periods (e.g. EURNOK during Asian hours)
• In sovereign bond markets, usually the spread is one tick size as the rates don’t change that often
so bid and ask are one tick size apart
Making Market on ECNs
• When making markets on ECNs the spreads are not as fixed as dealing to
clients on API
• Quoted spreads depend on a number of factors which are specific to each
venue: rejection rule, and proportion of Latency Arbitragers
• Spread can also be determined dynamically so as to maximize expected
revenue( spread * volume)
• Usually the designated market makers are subject to maintaining certain
conditions, such as minimum quotation time, maximum allowed spread or
minimum turnover
• Last Look is also accepted on most of the ECNs
• Volume is never available but EBS provides the number of tickets
• Market Microstructure is crucial and has to be utilized optimally ( e.g. EBS
Live Ultra updates every 20 ms, number of execution tickets,….)
Market Impact
• Market impact is very important in:
1. Execution of a large order for allocation purposes
2. Execution of a large order for hedging purposes
3. Arbitraging on the market after potential large client trades (based on accurate
evaluation of the market impact created by client trade)
Much research available regarding market impact of Meta Trades and Child Trades for
Equity but little available for FX. Empirical studies have shown that the influence of the
market impact is transient, that is, it decays within a short time period after each trade
Two main models of market impact are:
• Gatheral, Schied and Slynko (GSS) framework in which the market impact is transient and
strategies have a fuel constraint, i.e., orders are finished before a given date T
• Cartea and Jaimungal (CJ) framework where the market impact is instantaneous and the
fuel constraint on the strategies is replaced by a smooth terminal penalization
There are other market impact models where there is a residual permanent market impact
remaining after the execution
Some Market Impact results
Market Impact
• Market Impact for Meta Orders (rakhlin,…)
• Market Impact for Child Orders (Eisler)
• Market Impact for both (Hawkes process, Lehalle,..)
• Market impact for FX
• Market Impact for Equity
Predicting Price move
Predicting price move is critical for the following functions:
• Pricing Mid (contributes to the price skew)
• Pricing Spread ( Wider spread if price is predicted to move significantly)
• Last Look ( trade refused if price move is predicted to be significant
(predicting trade P&L until the average trade exit time e.g 20 seconds) but
usually done within a window of 100-200 ms if a certain threshold in price
move has been hit)
• Hedging/Inventory Management (instead of passive/active hedging when
inventory levels rise, being patient and holding on to Inventory if price
move is predicted to be favorable to the inventory)
• Execution (Very clearly short-term prediction of price move helps directly
increase P&L while executing)
LeHalle’s paper
• Trade arrival dynamics and quote imbalance in a limit order book
• Impact of passive orders on the book ( every order even passive is
expected to have implications on the price move for a while later,
such as 20 seconds later , which should ideally be used in the
prediction of price for 20 seconds later)
Iceberg Order Detection
7.0
3.5
0.0
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2
Time
Transient Impact Temporary Impact Permanent Impact
( ) ( )
Total impact over the trade period
2
METRIC = S + v T + v T
• Where S is the average bid-ask spread, is the volatility, v is the trade rate and T is the
trade duration
• Decomposes the cost into: Instantaneous Impact, Transient Impact, Permanent Impact
14
Usual Challenges to market makers
• Sudden/Unanticipated market price change/volatility: Such as the
outcome of CHF depegging or Brexit vote
• Spamming:In order to reduce transaction costs some traders may
choose to split up a large order into smaller standard size amounts
and hit liquidity on multiple venues simultaneously creating massive
market impact. This reduces the cost for the trader, but exposes
liquidity providers to the risk that the market will run away from them
as they try to exit this position. This activity is referred to as
‘spamming the market’ as The trader may also be accessing the same
underlying source of liquidity on multiple venues if the best price on
the ECNs is offered by the same provider
Usual Challenges to Market Makers
• Latency Arbitrage: Trades originating from Latency arbitrage strategies(
buy-side which takes advantage of connectivity latency differences
between different market makers, and abuses the price provided having
the largest latency) sometimes through aggregators picking up on stale
quotes
• Lack of transparency when streaming through Aggregators: A liquidity
provider streaming into an aggregator, It is potentially the case that the LP
would not be clear on whether he would be pricing $1 million in total, or
just $1 million out of a trade that is in total $50 million. Under the current
industry-wide method, one cannot be sure that someone else is involved
and may move the market
• Clients trading inside an Aggregator of LP’s price streams: Sometimes
clients end up inadvertently picking up on the most stale pricing
(sometimes the best price on their aggregator) hurting the market maker
Current Changes and Future Trends
Market Microstructure is continuously evolving due to continuous changes in the rules and
regulations as well as changes in ECN’s reporting, aggregation logic, matching logic, fees.
Some examples of the current and upcoming changes in Algorithmic Trading for sell-side
are:
• MIFID2:MiFID II will change how asset managers search for dark liquidity, not only by
closing down BCNs(Broker Crossing Networks) and limiting the amount of trading
permitted in dark MTFs(Multilateral trading facility) below the directive’s ‘large-in-size’
(LIS) pre-trade transparency waiver, but also by placing more responsibility on the
buyside for best execution and introducing greater separation between payment for
research and execution services. These changes will expose poor execution quality to
investors like never before, thus concentrating the minds of both brokers and buyside
dealing desks. Buyside firms are taking their obligations under MiFID II very seriously, and
some are viewing best execution as a source of competitive differentiation. Firms are re-
examining their execution benchmarks, making greater use of TCA and examining venue
toxicity levels ever more closely to navigate the dark liquidity landscape effectively ahead
of MiFID II
Current Changes and Future Trends
• MiFID II double volume caps for equities, where now one needs a
respected trading mechanism that can match orders received above
100% of Large In Scale (LIS) thresholds determined per stock by
ESMA, the European Securities and Markets Authority
• MiFID 2 requirement of best execution service means increasingly
more trades have to be handled by SOR(Smart Order Router) so there
is an urge for developing optimal execution strategies on multiple lit
exchanges(through Orderbook or Auction) and dark pools
Current Changes and Future Trends
• Global FX Code(e.g. Principle 17 restricts last look)
• EBS automatic single-ticket execution on the platform for orders of
more than five million of base currency originating from manual
traders, changing the fees for sweep, Select and single-ticket
execution(instead of breaking a large order into smaller trades with
separate tickets)
• EBS providing new analytics such as cost of rejects, reject rates and
last look to help improve internalisation and reduce costs
• EBS showing whether the trade was part of a 50 Million dollar Trade
or a 1 Million Dollar