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Pembangunan di Indonesia terus dilakukan melalui berbagai program,


namun keberhasilannya belum sepadan dengan investasi karena antara lain
kurang memperhatikan partisipasi masyarakat (Colletta dan Kayam, 1987).
Dengan demikian diperlukan pendekatan-pendekatan yang pelaksanaannya
mengikutsertakan masyarakat. Partisipasi masyarakat dalam pembangunan
merupakan kebutuhan dasar seperti halnya kebutuhan sandang, pangan,
papan, pendidikan, kesehatan dan transportasi ( Sumardi dan Evers, 1982).
FAO (1991) menegaskan bahwa partisipasi masyarakat adalah hak azasi,
sehingga masyarakat harus diberi kesempatan untuk berpartisipasi dalam
melaksanakan pembangunan. Kesempatan tersebut perlu diberikan karena
tujuan pembangunan adalah untuk meningkatkan taraf hidup masyarakat
sesuai dengan yang mereka inginkan. Masyarakat sendiri yang akan
merasakan dan menilai apakah pembangunan tersebut berhasil atau tidak.
Maka agar tujuan pembangunan sesuai dengan yang diharapkan oleh
masyarakat dan pemerintah diperlukan persepsi yang sama antar individu
yang terlibat dalam pembangunan.

1. Persamaan persepsi diperlukan mulai dari apa yang harus ditempuh,


bagaimana implementasinya, monitoring dan evaluasi. Akhirnya pendekatan
partisipatif disadari mutlak diperlukan dalam mencapai keberhasilan
pembangunan.

2. Menyadari pentingnya partisipasi masyarakat dalam pembangunan, telah


terbit berbagai buku pedoman untuk melibatkan partisipasi masyarakat dalam
pembangunan. Misalnya Direktorat Jenderal Pembangunan Pedesaan (1995)
telah menerbitkan panduan untuk fasilitator tingkat desa tentang
Perencanaan Partisipatif Pembangunan Masyarakat Desa (P3MD) .
Sedangkan untuk Pengembangan Dataran Tinggi Nusa Tenggara diterbitkan
oleh Studio Drya Media (1994). Khusus di bidang pertanian telah terbit buku
panduan umum (FAO,1990) dan buku panduan untuk pertanian di lahan
kering hasil kerja sama dengan International Institute of Rural Reconstruction
((FAO dan IIRI,1995) . Pedoman khusus untuk pengembangan usahatani di
lahan rawa telah disusun oleh Mundy dan Muchtar (1996). Inti dari semua
buku pedoman tersebut adalah bahwa dalam melaksanakan pembangunan
terlebih dahulu perlu diawali dengan penerapan metode Participatory Rural
Appraisal (PRA).

Pembangunan mempunyai arti yang luas, termasuk membuat kebijakan yang


umumnya diperlukan segera untuk menanggapi isu-isu aktual yang sedang
berkembang. Agar kebijakan yang diterapkan dapat diimplementasikan
sesuai dengan isu yang ada, kebijakan tersebut juga harus dibuat melalui
partisipasi masyarakat. Untuk kepentingan tersebut, Bechstedt (1998) telah
menyusun tahapan dan prinsip-prinsip yang harus dilakukan oleh peneliti
dalam menerapkan metode PRA.

Dengan telah diterbitkannya berbagai buku pedoman tentang PRA dimana


satu dengan lainnya saling melengkapi , dirasakan perlu adanya satu metode
PRA yang utuh/lengkap. Tulisan ini mengemukakan metode PRA hasil
ramuan dari metode yang telah dikemukakan dan pengalaman penulis dalam
menerapkan metode PRA. Uraian tulisan meliputi empat hal yaitu: 1) kegiatan
yang perlu dilaksanakan sebelum melakukan PRA ( Pra - Implementasi
PRA). 2) tahapan dan pinsip-prinsip metode PRA.

3) Peningkatkan partisipasi masyarakat melalui pendekatan struktural dan

4) Peningkatkan partisipasi masyarakat melalui pendekatan kultural.


Informasi ini penting untuk menunjang keberhasilan pembangunan sekaligus
sebagai usaha terus mensosialisasikan metode PRA sebagai kebutuhan
dalam mewujudkan keberhasilan pembangunan.

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Dalam bab sebelumnya kita berbicara tentang beberapa masalah utama


mata pencaharian para petani miskin, dampak lokal dari struktur nasional dan
supra-nasional serta kebijakan, dan berbagai tanggapan ekonomi kolektif.
Dalam bab ini kita akan mempertimbangkan konteks lokal sosial, budaya,
administratif dan politik di mana tanggapan ini dibuat. Kita akan fokus pada
peluang dan kendala yang dihadapi dalam proses mengatasi masalah
kehidupan. Tentu saja, sebagai salah satu peneliti tingkat desa menyatakan
itu "politik, perdagangan dan budaya diramu bersama-sama". Kita telah
melihat bagaimana beberapa kegiatan ekonomi dapat menyatukan orang
dalam konteks sosial yang lebih luas, dan bagaimana lainnya, eksternal
berasal, strategi ekonomi dapat memiliki efek untuk mencegah, membatasi
atau demobilisasi tindakan kolektif petani miskin.

Untuk batas tertentu petani miskin merasakan fenomena ekonomi (seperti


kebijakan kredit bank, penentuan harga, harga dijamin, beras premi, dll)
sebagai fenomena politik. Selain itu, beberapa factor sosial budaya yang
dirasakan oleh petani dari awal untuk menjadi masalah sosial besar dan
bukan hanya masalah sekunder ditemui di sepanjang jalan. Fokus utama
kami akan keterkaitan antara faktor-faktor ini, dan dinamis terakhir sejarah
mereka. Dikatakan bahwa kelemahan banyak analisis sebelumnya telah
menjadi membaca terlalu statis dan satu-dimensi potensi tertentu, nilai-nilai
lembaga atau bagian dari populasi. Hal ini dapat mengakibatkan salah tempat
optimisme atau pesimisme, dan untuk yang tidak perlu atas penilaian
kekuatan dan kelemahan dari berbagai partisipan.

Memang, ini adalah salah satu pelajaran dari pengalaman   


 ˜!" 

Studi kami menunjukkan ketidaktepatan prematur merancang sebuah neraca


"rintangan dan keterbatasan" "untuk partisipasi, di satu sisi, dan" faktor
pendukung dan potensi ", di sisi lain garis-garisnya tidak begitu jelas.
Mengingat ketidakpastian yang melekat dari upaya partisipatif, ada kesulitan
besar dalam generalisasi dan memprediksi baik titik di mana uang muka
dapat dilakukan, resistensi ini dapat ditemui, atau metode metode yang
mereka dapat diatasi.

Lembaga sosial atau unit administratif lokal seperti kelompok tani, lembaga-
lembaga sektor komersial swasta, agama atau keluarga akan diperiksa, tidak
begitu banyak sebagai entitas diskrit, melainkan dalam hal keterkaitan
ekonomi, budaya dan politik. Kita akan membahas hubungan antara resmi
dan sektor non-resmi dan antara lembaga proses informal dan formal (baik
legal dan ilegal). Termasuk menyembunyikan proses, penyembunyian rutin
pengambilan keputusan, sengaja dari pelaksanaan kekuasaan dan pengaruh.
Kita akan melihat kedua material dan fisik, dan juga kendala lebih budaya
dan ideologis: hukum dan peraturan, nilai-nilai tradisional, banding dan
nasihat. Sepanjang kita akan mengacu dan menilai kembali perbedaan yang
sering dibuat antara faktor-faktor yang berasal "eksternal" dari dan yang
berasal "internal" ke lingkungan sosial dan budaya langsung keberadaan
petani miskin '.

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Pada bagian ini presentasi mengikuti hirarki naik tingkat formal administrasi,
dari desa ke kecamatan, dan kabupaten ke provinsi. Ini akan menjadi jelas,
bagaimanapun, bahwa realitas pelaksanaan kekuasaan di tingkat lokal tidak
berarti hal ini hirarki formal. Laporan ini tidak menangani secara langsung
pertanyaan-pertanyaan dari sifat negara ˜c$%&'(Sebaliknya kita
memeriksa dan gejala manifestasi kekuasaan negara: kadang-kadang dalam
bentuk kekuasaan lokal yang, jika tidak selalu secara formal atau tanpa
kontradiksi, mungkin dianggap sebagai elemen penting yang merupakan
kekuasaan negara di pedesaan.

 

Ketika sebuah fase 'Bina Lingkungan "berpikir dan kebijakan' dimulai sekitar
25 tahun yang lalu, sering kali ada anggapan bahwa" masyarakat desa "tidak,
memang, ada. Pandangan 'didorong oleh" pendekatan komunitas studi "ilmu
sosial . komunitas monograf ini-vil lages telah "pemimpin" - biasanya trio yang
terdiri dari kepala desa, kepala sekolah dasar, dan biarawan senior, yang,
diperkirakan, bisa didorong untuk bertindak sebagai agen "pembangunan"
dalam kepentingan "masyarakat". Ada harapan dan persatuan
exhortationsthat solidaritas masyarakat dan dapat ditentukan. Namun ini
dimana saat peningkatan populasi dan migrasi ke tanah baru telah
mengakibatkan pembentukan desa baru dan perluasan dari "alam vil-lages"
ke dalam pengelompokan terus menerus rumah tangga dibagi menjadi unit
admin-administratif, sekolah daerah tangkapan, dll ini tidak selalu tumpang
tindih atau sesuai dengan pola komunitas yang lebih tua. Lebih penting lagi,
fenomena ini bertepatan dengan peningkatan percepatan dalam diferensiasi
sosial ekonomi dan birokratisasi di daerah pedesaan. Ini akan menjadi suatu
kesalahan untuk membesar-besarkan tingkat otonomi desa dan homogenitas
pada jaman dulu, tetapi tetap memungkinkan untuk dem-onstrate yang
tingkat tertentu otonomi dalam pengetahuan dan pengambilan keputusan,
kemandirian (istilah sudah usang pada bagian dari perencana pembangunan
tertentu), kerja sama dan egalitarianisme relatif ada yang kontras starkly
dengan realitas saat ini. Ini mungkin lebih nyata di daerah yang berbeda
budaya regional dari Utara dan Timur Laut, karena dalam sikap dan di desa-
desa yang lebih nuklir dan lebih lama didirikan terletak jauh dari pusat politik,
serta di desa-desa dimana aristokrasi penduduk atau pejabat luar yang
kurang . Tanpa berusaha untuk membangun semacam kenangan awal, kita
dapat menyarankan bahwa sebelum penetrasi pertama modal kolonial, dan
berlanjut lama setelah dalam beberapa wilayah ulang, ada asosiasi seluruh
komunitas untuk diri mereka sendiri, untuk mereka,. Vn sosial reproduksi.
Mereka termasuk eksternal, atau "horisontal" hubungan antar-desa, serta
jaringan antar-rumah tangga berdasarkan kekerabatan dan lingkungan.
Mereka terlibat berbagai bentuk pertukaran timbal balik dan redistributif
(misalnya, tenaga kerja untuk pertanian, dan tugas-tugas reproduksi
domestik, penyatuan tenaga kerja untuk komunal agama, finansial sehingga
¬ dan tugas irigasi) dan kolektif pengambilan keputusan dan tindakan. Dalam
kasus terakhir, aparat desa eksternal yang ditunjuk paling dominan adalah
berorientasi desa. n Selain itu, diferensiasi sosial berdasarkan usia, jenis
kelamin, pangkat ritual, dan status nakleng (singkat, "orang kuat") telah! dari
berat yang lebih besar daripada kekayaan dan kontrol atau akses ke alat-alat
produksi. Dalam penelitian kami, kami menemukan bahwa pengalaman dan
bentuk-bentuk kerjasama lokal dari masa lalu, ketika kontras dengan
sekarang, memungkinkan petani miskin untuk menilai sejauh mana dan
kualitas perubahan terkini dan menarik selektif pada nilai-nilai yang lebih tua
dan praktek, mengubah mereka, karena mereka lakukan, dalam rangka
memenuhi tantangan saat ini.

Di banyak desa besar merupakan minoritas kecil rumah tangga, sekitar 5


tetapi tidak lebih dari 10 persen, memiliki tingkat tertentu kekayaan, kontrol
atas sumber daya, dan memiliki prestise yang lebih besar dan kekuatan,
semua yang membedakan mereka dari mayoritas. Rumah tangga ini meliputi
(sering pada orang yang sama) pemilik tanah besar, pedagang komoditi,
penjaga toko, pejabat desa, guru, penggilingan padi dan rentenir yang
berasal dari keunggulan mereka dan koneksi eksternal serta aliansi. Mereka
adalah peran "menghubungkan" massa penduduk desa dengan struktur
negara dan pasar. Dasar untuk ini adalah kemampuan mereka untuk
mengumpulkan desa "surplus" melalui sewa, upah, harga eceran, menangani
komoditas dan bunga. Pada saat yang sama mereka mempertahankan posisi
mengendalikan mereka sebagai anggota komite desa (komite administrasi,
kuil dan komite sekolah, negara baru memulai kelompok tani, dll).

Dari sudut pandang administrasi kabupaten kepala desa dan kecamatan


adalah sangat penting. Mereka busur bertanggung jawab untuk
mengidentifikasi dan memecahkan masalah penduduk desa. Tapi gugatan
umum oleh masyarakat miskin adalah bahwa masalah mereka tidak
diidentifikasi, apalagi disampaikan dan dibahas dalam pertemuan bulanan
antara kepala desa dan pejabat kabupaten. Bahkan pesan resmi dan
instruksi dari pertemuan ini tidak sepenuhnya ditransmisikan ke desa,
sehingga menghambat penilaian dan kontribusi terhadap proyek-proyek
resmi. Para kepala desa sekarang didukung oleh sebuah komite desa yang
kemungkinan akan didominasi oleh lapisan atas desa. Di beberapa desa
adalah wajib untuk hadir di bawah hukuman denda 50 baht. Rapat seni
biasanya dikendalikan oleh komunitas, khususnya kepala desa.
pengumuman resmi dibaca kadang-kadang selama dua jam.

Ada juga kasus-kasus ekstrim di mana perbedaan kepentingan, bersama


dengan sejarah antagonisme, mengakibatkan menyalahgunakan kantor
kepala desa dan hukum, bahkan sampai mengancam desa miskin, atau
pemimpin mereka, dengan kematian. Dalam kasus seperti kemauan dan
kemampuan otoritas hip-nya untuk menegakkan hukum dan hak-hak warga
negara yang paling penting. Semua terlalu sering, bagaimanapun, "adalah
kata kepala itu hukum Tapi ada juga banyak yang warga desa miskin dapat
melakukan., Dan telah dilakukan, dalam hukum untuk menyatakan diri dan
mencari ganti rugi.

Selama periode 1974-76, ada banyak contoh di mana kepala desa


berhadapan, mengkritik dan mencela untuk perilaku mereka, yang
menyebabkan pemecatan mereka dari kantor dan pengusiran dari komunitas
oleh tekanan sosial. Penduduk desa mungkin, tentu saja, mengusulkan
mereka sendiri untuk pemilihan kantor kepala desa dan, dalam waktu yang
berlaku kendala sosial dan tekanan, memilih calon pilihan mereka. Sifat
berpotensi menguntungkan kantor adalah sedemikian rupa sehingga uang
dalam jumlah besar dapat dikeluarkan oleh seorang calon kaya di
kampanyenya. Non-voting dapat menjadi ekspresi penolakan untuk
berpartisipasi pada syarat-menguntungkan. Dalam satu kasus seorang
kepala disebut oleh suara-tidak miskin A! "Kepala 30% 0" karena ia telah
dipilih oleh hanya 30% dari pemilih. Di daerah Chachoengsao, empat
anggota kelompok petani miskin terpilih kepala desa hanya tiga tahun setelah
kelompok ini I. didirikan ini. Hati-hati direncanakan dalam rangka untuk
memajukan bunga: petani miskin dan merupakan akibat langsung dari
pengorganisasian mereka Satu wa:.. sudah terlihat sebagai lawan yang
berpotensi sukses untuk kantor kepala Kecamatan Masyarakat miskin
menyatakan bahwa sebelumnya "kata hukum wa kepala desa, kata-kata kita
tidak berat ". Tapi setelah datang bersama-sama dan mengembangkan rasa
percaya diri mereka mengatakan bahwa. "bahkan orang-orang dengan hanya
empat tahun di sekolah berbicara".
Tingkat kecamatan.

Sebuah kecamatan (Tambon) tingkat administrasi pedesaan telah menjadi


mantan sejak tahun-tahun awal abad ini. Camat (kamnan) dipilih oleh dan
dari antara kepala desa dari 10-20 ¬ administrasi desa administratif terdiri
dari kecamatan. Dalam beberapa tahun terakhir beberapa pejabat
pemerintah non-terpilih (terutama di bidang pertanian dan pembangunan)
telah diposting ke tingkat kecamatan. Lembaga dewan kecamatan atau
perakitan (sapha Tambon) mulai mengambil makna baru dan untuk
menunjukkan janji yang lebih besar pada tahun 1975 saat. untuk pertama
kalinya, dana pusat yang dialokasikan untuk proyek-proyek pembangunan
daerah yang akan memberikan upah tenaga kerja di setiap kecamatan.
Skema seperti terus, dengan variasi, sampai saat ini. The 1982-86 'Nasional
Ekonomi dan Sosial Kembangkan Rencana pemerintah memberi penekanan
dan kekuatan baru (struktur tujuan, baru dan pendanaan) ke Tambon sapha
dalam rangka. "Untuk mendesentralisasikan kekuasaan administratif, untuk
mendorong daerah untuk dapat mengatur dirinya sendiri, pada prinsip
menghormati keinginan orang-orang di setiap kecamatan untuk meletakkan
dasar-dasar sistem demokrasi dari pertolongan iklan bagi mayoritas rakyat
Negara, dengan pengalaman pemerintahan sendiri, orang-orang akan datang
untuk menyadari hak dan kewajiban mereka ... " Secara khusus busur
Tambon sapha sekarang berwenang untuk mengembangkan rencana
ekonomi dan sosial jangka panjang untuk lokalitas mereka sendiri. Pada saat
tahun-tahun sebelumnya, proyek kecamatan diharuskan untuk sesuai dengan
rencana pembangunan tingkat provinsi. Dalam beberapa kasus, Tambon
sapha memiliki sesedikit satu minggu untuk menanggapi arahan resmi.
Namun dewan masih belum memiliki sumber independen pendapatan atau
kemerdekaan sebagai badan hukum yang berbeda.''. Peran direvisi dan
potensi dari Tambon sapha tampaknya menawarkan langkah awal menuju
tingkat yang lebih besar partisipasi rakyat. Bagi pemerintah setidaknya itu
merupakan hal terpenting dalam kebijakan partisipasi mereka.

Banyak sedikit akan tergantung pada komitmen dan kemampuan pemerintah,


kementerian, departemen dan pejabat untuk mengejar tujuan yang
dinyatakan dalam arti penuh. Sebanyak atau lebih akan tergantung pada
realitas lokal kekuasaan dan pengaruh. Proyek ini dianggap potensi dan
keterbatasan Tambon sapha baik dari perspektif umum dan dari pengalaman
di daerah penelitian lapangan. Sebuah dewan kecamatan terdiri dari kamnan,
seorang sekretaris yang adalah seorang guru, kepala setiap desa di
kecamatan, seorang ahli atau orang yang memenuhi syarat
(phusongkhunawut) dari setiap desa, dan sejumlah pejabat tingkat
kabupaten, termasuk Pejabat Distrik, ex officio, dan beberapa Tambon kali
pertanian dan pengembangan petugas. Di sini kita perlu mempertimbangkan
baik proses formal dan informal dan hubungan dalam dan di luar panitia;
hubungan dengan baik tingkat yang lebih tinggi dan konstituensi desa. Kita
dapat mencatat di awal bahwa Tambon sapha adalah yang utama penciptaan
dan tanggung jawab sangat besar dan kuat De Administrasi Daerah
Departemen Dalam Negeri. Di masa lalu, departemen pemerintah lainnya
dan proyek tidak menggunakan komite sebagai lembaga lokal. Misalnya,
Departemen Komunitas Pembangunan telah cenderung mendukung
Pembangunan Desa Com komite, meskipun fakta bahwa, kata-kata m salah
seorang penduduk desa, beberapa dari "ada dalam nama saja". Selain itu,
ada norma dilihat dalam pertolongan iklan yang mengharuskan setiap unit
administrasi harus berusaha untuk mengendalikan dan mengatur unit
bawahan sebanyak mungkin, sehingga dalam praktek dewan menjadi badan
pelaksana dari pemerintah atau administrasi bukan demokratis organ untuk
mengartikulasikan kebutuhan dan keinginan masyarakat ke arah "ke atas".
Kemudian kita akan membahas ketergantungan yang besar pada metode
birokrasi dan mentalitas dan ketergantungan pada struktur resmi, terutama di
tingkat kabupaten. Dalam banyak kasus hal ini diklaim bahwa Pejabat Distrik
atau utusannya "membuat semua keputusan". Anggota dewan hanya
menandatangani nama mereka untuk proyek yang dimulai pada tingkat resmi
yang sesuai dengan, keinginan nilai-nilai dan tujuan lembaga resmi, begitu
banyak sehingga sementara proyek yang melibatkan Relawan Desa De-
pagar mungkin mendapatkan persetujuan seketika, dukungan dari sebuah
pelatihan kejuruan internasional proyek dapat berlangsung dua tahun.
Kantor kamnan, atau kepala kecamatan, adalah sangat penting. Dengan
bantuan kepala desa mereka adalah "mata dan telinga" Kantor trict ¬ Dis.
Kantor kamnan membawa kekuasaan besar dan tanggung-sibility. jumlah
besar uang sekarang ditangani oleh dewan dan keputusan mengenai alokasi
uang ini dapat dibuat tanpa menempatkan tender. Kantor-Pemegang menarik
perhatian semua intercuts luar yang ingin terlibat dalam daerah setempat,
baik untuk perdagangan, com ¬ Merce, ekstraksi sumber daya alam,
pekerjaan konstruksi, proyek-proyek pembangunan, masalah hukum dan
ketertiban atau keamanan, atau kampanye politik Provinsi atau pemilihan
Majelis Nasional.

Untuk tingkat lebih rendah, peringatan yang sama berlaku untuk kecamatan
kepala untuk kepala desa, yaitu, bahwa mereka tidak semua inheren
bertentangan dengan kepentingan masyarakat miskin. Tetapi kamnan ini
mungkin individu yang jauh lebih kaya dan lebih kuat, terkait dengan
kepentingan luar yang mungkin konflik dengan kepentingan warga desa
miskin, ia juga akan dikaitkan dengan baik untuk pejabat dan penduduk desa
kaya atau ke minoritas atas strata desa. Peluang untuk keuntungan
berlimpah dan menguntungkan ilegal, terlepas dari ini, sejauh mana hukum
atau secara resmi ditoleransi sumber pendapatan, yang mengakibatkan
pengaruh dan prestise, cukup besar

Pentingnya contoh terakhir ini, dalam konteks yang diuraikan di atas, tidak
hanya untuk mendokumentasikan contoh lain dari disesalkan "korupsi".
signifikansi terletak dalam mengungkap hubungan struktural, baik formal
maupun informal, di antara mereka dengan keputusan-keputusan kekuasaan,
dan dalam kenyataan bahwa, dalam hal ini, warga desa itu sendiri dirasakan
koneksi ini. Mereka dengan demikian meningkatkan pengetahuan dan
pemahaman tentang struktur politik lokal. Dalam kasus yang sebanding mana
kamnan yang dikenal sangat en ¬ gaged dalam ekstraksi kayu ilegal, sikap
penduduk desa miskin yang digambarkan oleh ungkapan seperti "kamnan
monyet" dan "monyet 'Aku" "mengacu pada tainbon sapha); di sini , "monyet"
adalah julukan derogatoryerring merujuk pada kegiatan hutan ilegal.

Seperti dalam kasus lain begitu banyak pertanyaan tentang informasi dan
komunikasi sangat relevan. Penduduk desa, terutama yang miskin, sering
tidak tahu tujuan dari Tambon sapha, maupun identitas anggotanya. "Aku
bicara, Anda mendengarkan" dianggap modus dewan dari munication com ¬.
Informasi lengkap dan penjelasan dihindari; penduduk desa sehingga
terhambat dari belajar tentang prosedur dewan. Petunjuk Ensu ¬ ing dari
dewan sering mengambil bentuk "ini dan itu proyek akan terjadi, Anda akan
pergi dan sekop bumi pada ini dan itu hari untuk upah begitu banyak per
hari", kadang-kadang tidak ada upah yang diusulkan.

Namun, sejumlah pemimpin petani miskin "merasa bahwa potensi dewan


kecamatan untuk menyelidiki dan membahas kebutuhan lokal dan masalah-
masalah tersebut memang cukup. Pengalaman dari dua orang local di mana
para petani miskin telah menghabiskan beberapa tahun membangun
organisasi mereka sendiri mandiri merupakan indikasi dari upaya untuk
menjamin partisipasi yang lebih besar pada istilah mereka sendiri.

Dalam kasus Yasothorn, kelompok petani, dihadapkan dengan kepentingan


pribadi yang kuat, pada awalnya telah berusaha untuk mendapatkan anggota
perwakilan terpilih menjadi Tambon sapha. Ketika mereka menyadari
kerugian dari representasi nority mereka secara khusus dipilih menurun,
status minoritas dan berhasil dinegosiasikan status pengamat. Dengan cara
ini, mereka memiliki akses ke informasi tertentu dan mendapatkan hak untuk
berbicara tapi tidak untuk memilih. Mereka dihindari berpartisipasi dalam
proses pengambilan keputusan yang seimbang yang mereka rasakan tidak
menguntungkan semua anggotanya dan akan cenderung kurang percaya
padakepemimpinan mereka sendiri di mata anggota. Salah satu anggota
berkomentar bahwa "orang baik tidak dapat bertahan di Tambon sapha".
Dalam kasus Chachoengsao, penduduk menyimpulkan bahwa sapha
Tambon uang tidak digunakan untuk proyek-proyek yang berhubungan
dengan kebutuhan warga desa. Selain itu tidak ada rapat dewan biasa atau
sedang berlangsung kegiatan dewan. Sebagai konsekuensi langsung dari
desa 'pengalaman dalam diri organisasi, dan partisipasi dari beberapa kepala
desa di ganizations atau ¬, ada mayoritas pada komite Tambon sapha yang
lebih responsif terhadap desa miskin kebutuhan. Untuk pertama kalinya,
mereka mampu memastikan pertemuan rutin bulanan yang menganalisa isu-
isu lokal dan masalah secara terus menerus. Selain itu, kemungkinan muncul
dari sukses pencalonan calon baru untuk kantor keamanan.

 $)

Distrik (amphur), yang kemungkinan akan terdiri dari 10 atau lebih sub
kecamatan, dalam banyak arena yang paling penting bagi pelaksanaan
kewenangan daerah dan pelaksanaan rencana pembangunan daerah. Untuk
petani miskin pengalaman paling langsung dari administrasi negara dan
pendidikan, dari. representasi politik, dan dari pabrik dan komoditas dealer
biasanya terbatas pada tingkat kabupaten. Namun, untuk periode singkat
pada tahun 1974-75 petani miskin memiliki kemungkinan asosiasi regional
dan nasional. Sejak saat itu ada sejumlah onstrations dem provinsi di seluruh
permohonan pemerintah pada harga komoditas. Dalam beberapa kasus ini
adalah pemerintah yang secara langsung dikritik (seperti dalam Mium beras
pra atau kegagalan dijamin skema harga), pada orang lain, pedagang beras
atau pedagang komoditas. Beberapa petani miskin telah di terlibat dalam
demonstrasi dan telah belajar dari kesulitan dan keterbatasan tindakan
tersebut, dan juga kebutuhan, akhirnya, untuk Di tingkat kabupaten
ditemukan perwakilan dari berbagai menteri Departemen Pertanian,
Koperasi, Pengembangan, Tanah, Kehutanan, Bea Cukai, Pendidikan, dan
untuk merekrut perwira militer dan polisi cer ¬ lebih otonom. Lebih penting
adalah kabupaten iklan ministraticn per se, termasuk pejabat Kecamatan dan
berbagai Deputi, dan dalam beberapa tahun terakhir, Deputi Pertahanan dan
Pencegahan Komando Operasi Keamanan Internal (ISOC), yang
bertanggung jawab atas paramiliter, pertahanan diri dan keamanan lainnya
organisasi. pejabat senior sering ditransfer - di satu wilayah proyek ada lima
perwira dalam lima tahun Kabupaten; pejabat senior mungkin tidak permanen
didirikan. Di wilayah Utara dan Timur Laut dipelajari dalam ketidaktahuan
tentang proyek-proyek kami yang berbeda Thailand dialek ditemukan menjadi
hambatan yang signifikan dalam saluran komunikasi, tidak hanya antara
kabupaten dan aparat desa miskin tapi juga kadang-kadang antara panitia
masyarakat dan v '"Pelanggan" (kadang-kadang "godfather") dari agen lokal
yang lebih kecil dan lebih dan klien di tingkat desa dan kabupaten. jaringan
informal mereka persahabatan dan hubungan dengan pejabat kabupaten
sering kali merupakan kelompok yang sangat berpengaruh.

Setiap kabupaten akan memiliki satu atau lebih wakil terpilih (s) di Majelis
Provinsi (sapha cangwat) yang mengontrol anggaran tertentu destined untuk
digunakan dalam lokal. Satu atau lebih anggota terpilih (s) dari Majelis
Nasional dapat berhubungan dengan kabupaten, meskipun tidak selalu
menjadi konstituensi parlemen. Seringkali, perwakilan wakil dipilih dari
kelompok kepentingan komersial yang disebut pada agen komersial dan lokal
sering "bos suara" mereka (hua kaneen) pada saat pemilihan. dana pribadi
lebih dari satu atau dua juta baht mungkin dihabiskan pada kampanye.
Adalah penting untuk menekankan bahwa dalam setiap kasus hampir tidak
ada bentuk tetap dari organisasi partai politik di tingkat kabupaten atau di
bawah.

Hal ini sering mengatakan bahwa penduduk desa "tidak memiliki kepentingan
dalam politik". Sejauh ini benar, maka harus berhubungan dengan
pengalaman mereka sering tidak puas dengan perwakilan politik. Kita harus
menemukan pendapat luas bahwa "politisi hanya tertarik pada petani miskin
kami untuk mendapatkan terpilih", bahwa mereka hanya muncul sebelum
suatu pemilu, pemogokan murah di sekitar, dan telah dijamin sebagai
keuntungan banyak untuk diri mereka jarang dapat dilihat lagi. Pengalaman
ini memberi sumbangan terhadap harapan rendah atau bergantung pada
representasi yang potensial. Ada pengecualian, bagaimana ¬ pernah.
Sebagai contoh, dalam beberapa kasus persaingan faksi di tingkat yang lebih
tinggi untuk mendorong lebih banyak perhatian positif kepada para pemilih
suatu daerah. Sebuah kelompok yang lebih besar dari 'petani, bahkan salah
satu yang eschews klientalis sikap dan perilaku, lebih mungkin untuk
diperhitungkan. Demikian pula, kelompok yang lebih banyak petani au ¬
tonomous 'dapat memilih untuk mencari saluran patronase sadar dan hati-
hati. Ada juga wakil yang, karena alasan integritas pribadi dan kepedulian
masyarakat yang demokratis untuk ongkos wel ¬, menjadikan tugasnya untuk
mengkritik contoh limbah, inefisiensi, kerahasiaan delay, dan korupsi. Ada
orang-orang yang tetap berhubungan dengan pemilihan ¬ tor dan bahkan
mendukung demonstrasi mereka. Dalam dua provinsi dimana studi lapangan,
beberapa anggota dewan provinsi dengan catatan tersebut telah bertemu
dengan kematian mereka hanya beberapa tahun sebelumnya di tangan
orang-orang bersenjata secara anonim. Pihak berwenang menganggap
kematian ¬ fraksi dalam pertempuran antara "kelompok kepentingan",
mereka sering muncul, bagaimanapun, adalah motivasi politik: Dalam dua
kasus dimaksud, petani miskin percaya bahwa mereka dihasilkan dari oposisi
demokratis dengan Aktivitas.

Sebuah aspek dari hubungan sosial di tingkat kabupaten dan propinsi, serta
di tingkat kabupaten, yang kami ingin menekankan adalah tumpang tindih
dan saling merasuknya kepentingan ekonomi, politik dan budaya, serta
kombinasi dari formal dan informal, umum dan " pribadi "kegiatan. Sebuah
contoh yang telah disebutkan adalah bahwa wakil dari DPRD ¬ sentative
untuk Samoeng distrik tersebut, di samping kepentingan pribadi di tingkat
provinsi, telah menjadi tembakau pembelian-monopsoni untuk kabupaten: ia
memiliki tanah kabupaten, bersama-sama dengan primer alat transportasi
masuk dan keluar dari kabupaten, dan menjabat sebagai ketua koperasi
pertanian budaya Dia memiliki hubungan erat dengan administrator lokal di
semua tingkatan. Setelah gerakan serikat kredit yang telah ditetapkan
kabupaten-lebar, ia dikalahkan dalam pemilu-Majelis Provinsi. Kekalahan ini
dapat secara langsung, jika tidak seluruhnya, karena tingkat baru kesadaran
sosial dan kepercayaan dibuat dalam proses pengembangan baru, kelompok
yang lebih otonom. Lawannya adalah seorang muda dengan latar belakang
pendidikan nasional daripada komersial. Dia mendapat dukungan besar dari
para guru lokal dan lebih pejabat kabupaten junior. Dia telah berkampanye
melawan beberapa kepentingan lokal dan tampaknya bersedia untuk
membayar lebih daripada layanan bibir dengan ide representasi
demokratis.Tidak tably, ia menghabiskan 5000 baht hanya dalam kampanye
pemilihan. Pemilu ini mencerminkan perubahan dalam kesadaran penduduk
desa yang ada politik Thailand di Samoeng kabupaten.

Dalam banyak kasus pemerintahan kabupaten dan indikator kemungkinan


tertentu com petugas vidual atau bagian di dalamnya, sebuah serius dan
kuat berkomitmen untuk mengamankan kesejahteraan rakyat kepada siapa
mereka bertanggung jawab secara politik. Kita telah melihat bahwa petani
miskin ingin berpartisipasi dalam skema resmi banyak dan menikmati
manfaat yang timbul dari mereka. Salah satu hasil dari representasi masalah
yang tidak proporsional dari kelompok minoritas di tingkat lokal dan dengan
demikian kebutuhan dan kemampuan bilities masyarakat miskin pedesaan
tidak ditekankan, atau undervalued. Stagnan atau sikap budaya juga
birokrasi signifikan bertanggung jawab atas kondisi ini. Halangan utama
lainnya adalah ketidakpercayaan luas hampir semua inisiatif populer dari
proses demokrasi atau takut mobilisasi populer pada isu-isu sosial dan
ekonomi. petani miskin dan kelompok swadaya harus menghadapi rasa takut
nc bahkan ketika tidak ada niat atau keinginan di pihak mereka untuk
konfrontasi, perselingkuhan menghormati resmi atau pribadi. Samoeng
kasus memberikan contoh tampaknya ¬ unneces tingkat sary perlawanan
resmi untuk sebuah inisiatif populer. Sekelompok guru dan penyelenggara
masyarakat, bersama dengan anggota berbagai kelompok petani,
memutuskan untuk mengadakan adil dalam "markas vil lage " kabupaten
untuk mengumpulkan uang untuk athlctics . Biasanya, Kabupaten _ Petugas
diharapkan untuk menjadi ketua komite untuk memberikan wewenang untuk
peristiwa semacam itu. Dalam kasus ini, bagaimanapun, sebuah provinsi
baru sembly Sebagai wakil diundang. Penduduk desa dari seluruh
kabupaten menyewa truk dan bus, dengan biaya yang cukup besar, untuk
mengambil bagian dalam wajar. Tapi sebelum pameran ini juga dapat
dilakukan seorang perwira distrik, mengacungkan pistol dan dengan
dukungan dari polisi, memerintahkan adil untuk menutup dengan alasan
bahwa itu tidak resmi. Panitia tidak bisa adil dan memiliki tugas yang sulit
untuk menahan penduduk desa marah dan kecewa yang mulai berbicara
tentang "membakar Kantor Distrik." Seorang warga berkomentar bahwa dari
waktu itu dan seterusnya "polisi dapat mengharapkan untuk makan hanya di
kamnan rumah itu" ketika mereka datang untuk mengunjungi desa-desa.

Olahraga, yang biasanya aktivitas politik netral, merupakan kesempatan bagi


konfrontasi di desa Udorn. Bank Rice grup · telah membahas pengaturan
untuk memegang kompetensi distrik-lebar KO tition untuk memilih tim
olahraga untuk mewakili daerah di tingkat provinsi. Hanya satu tim harus
dipilih dari setiap daerah, dan di daerah tertentu, dipilih secara otomatis dari
kamnan desa itu. 12.000 baht anggaran provinsi telah ditentukan. Thrcugh-
pemimpin dan juru bicara utama bagi petani untuk membuat representasi ke
Kantor Distrik. Mereka berpendapat bahwa lebih banyak orang akan
berpartisipasi dan mereka atau tim ganized ¬ (sepakbola, basket dan takraw -
semacam voli Asia Tenggara menggunakan bola rotan) dari dua desa
tambahan. Seperti yang terjadi pened, satu menang dan desa-desa terpilih
untuk mewakili subdis trict. Para petani membayar semua biaya karena
anggaran provinsi tidak akan datang untuk inisiatif ini tidak ortodoks.
Peristiwa ini Pada bagian sebelumnya kita meneliti beberapa struktur penting
dalam pengambilan keputusan dan pengendalian di tingkat lokal, terutama di
tingkat kabupaten dan kabupaten otonom mana bentuk-bentuk lain dari
kegiatan dan organisasi miskin bertemu dengan perlawanan. Di antara
bentuk-bentuk yang kita miliki, agak datar, kontrol sosial yang disebut, kita
lihat di sini khusus untuk satu set kontrol proses yang berhubungan dan
intimidation.18 Mereka harus menekankan azas berukuran karena mereka
yang berulang, lagi dan lagi dalam kelompok kasus studi sejarah kita.
termasuk dalam definisi surveilans (pengacara panjang) dalam bentuk (haa
khao), fitnah (rai sai pai sii), dan tuduhan atau tuduhan (khlao haa). Ini harus
dibuat jelas bahwa tidak peduli seberapa pra valent fenomena ini mungkin,
kita tidak mengacu pada iklan yang "normal" pengawasan administratif dan
peraturan, atau untuk kasus-kasus di mana "menuduh" (orang-orang pada
akhir penerimaan proses ini) adalah melanggar hukum.

Bahasa yang digunakan dalam seperti "tuduhan" memiliki kosakata yang


benar - individual (s) atau kelompok (s) yang "sedang memecah belah",
mereka "menghasut kebencian" (misalnya, terhadap orang kaya) dan
"sengketa menyebabkan", mereka "memobilisasi orang" (dari pemerintah),
atau "mengkritik pemerintah", dan akhirnya, mereka "komunis". Beberapa
tindakan atau pernyataan bahwa bahasa tersebut mengacu pada pir apa
dalam pedoman pelatihan formal seperti yang dituduhkan. "Komunis"
kegiatan. Mereka termasuk: menuntut hak dari pemerintah, mendesak orang
lain untuk menuntut hak mereka dan untuk menolak perilaku menindas atau
rusak pada bagian pejabat atau pemimpin setempat; melakukan survei tidak
resmi; "berbuat baik" untuk kepentingan mereka sendiri; menerima rendah
dibayar atau rendah status pekerjaan saat berhak mendapatkan gaji yang
lebih tinggi, dan tidak menanggapi dengan marah saat diprovokasi.

bentuk khusus dari organisasi dapat menjadi tersangka: negosiasi terdaftar


berhubungan atau kelompok yang berusaha koordinasi supra-lokal;
pertemuan larut malam, dan bentuk non-hirarkis organisasi (misalnya panitia
dengan seorang ketua tidak). Penggunaan beberapa kata modern, banyak
dari uang sewa cur dalam ilmu jurnalisme atau sosial dan bahkan dalam
wacana resmi, adalah ulang garded mencurigakan bila digunakan oleh petani
miskin, misalnya, "Struktur", "mekanisme", "konkret", "abstrak", "analisis",
"kritik", "massal". "Kesadaran", dll secara tidak resmi terorganisir proyek self-
help (seperti koperasi produksi, pemasaran, tabungan kesehatan, kelompok
pendidikan informal, dll) dapat dikenakan biaya. Seperti disebutkan
sebelumnya, pupuk pupuk di skema perbankan desa, di bawah naungan ell
cstablishcd organisasi Kristen, dirujuk. sebagai "komunis pupuk" oleh o senior
(Iicial, sebuah proyek self-help " ac persiapan herbal cused" cuci otak "dari
obat-obatan.

tuduhan ia membuat dalam berbagai konteks. Pertama, ada biaya aktual


yang berkisar dari sindiran relatif lemah, sindiran, rumor, dan mengolesi,
untuk bentuk yang lebih kuat pencemaran nama baik dan fitnah. Anonymous
selebaran mungkin pasokan. peringatan Private dapat diberikan kepada atau
tentang orang tertentu atau kelompok, oleh orang-orang dengan otoritas atau
yang mengklaim hubungan dengan orang itu. Peringatan atau dugaan dapat
dilakukan dalam pertemuan-pertemuan publik. laporan langsung dari
intimidasi oleh pejabat, kata kepala desa, dapat digunakan - secara paralel
dengan tuduhan yang lebih langsung menurut sumber-sumber resmi kurang -
misalnya, "Saya punya nama (nomor yang benar) 'eppositionists', dan
beberapa dari mereka hadir di pertemuan ", atau" Kecamatan pejabat
memiliki nama cn daftar Anda, Anda mungkin juga pergi dan memberikan diri
".
Kedua, ada negara laws.t konteks formal ginning Sejak menjadi monarki
konstitusional. Pada 1932, berbagai bentuk pena legislatif proscribing
kegiatan komunis telah hampir terus-menerus berlaku. Definisi luas dari
ilegalitas berdasarkan hukum memiliki efek membatasi jangkauan kebebasan
politik. Pernah ditemukan selama pra Komunis Aktivitas Act tahun 1979
memungkinkan penahanan tanpa pengadilan untuk 480 hari (maksimum
normal adalah 91 hari). undang-undang terkait lainnya termasuk UU
Hubungan Perburuhan 1975, yang tidak termasuk pekerja pedesaan dari
hukum perburuhan dan hak serikat buruh untuk keempat jenis organisasi.
Ada juga hukum dan keputusan yang memberikan kekuasaan luas dan militer
khusus pada waktu tertentu dan tempat. Selain konteks formal adalah daerah
yang kurang didefinisikan wacana, yang berkontribusi pada iklim gagasan
dan sikap tentang bahaya kepada masyarakat dan dominasi institusi dominan
diringkas dalam slogan "bangsa, religional dan monarki´.

Ada konteks organisasi formal yang / atau kekuatan ideologis dan paramiliter
lebih atau kurang langsung, yang beroperasi di tingkat desa. Pertama, ada
Desa busur Pramuka (selanjutnya VS). The VS didirikan pada 1971 oleh
Police20 Patroli Perbatasan dan telah diberikan oleh mereka dalam
koordinasi dengan Departemen Dalam Negeri dan Departemen tangani
secara lokal Ed. Sejak tahun 1972 mereka telah bertindak di bawah
perlindungan kerajaan. Pada pertengahan 1980-an ada sekitar tiga juta
anggota berusia 14 ke atas, laki-laki dan perempuan, tanpa batas usia atas.
Meskipun bernama Pramuka Desa, banyak unit juga ada di perkotaan. Dalam
lima tahun pertama mereka merekrut 500.000 pramuka, dan pada tahun 1976
lebih dari satu juta dalam satu tahun.

Anggota, direkrut dalam kelompok reguler bernomor. Pejabat lokal


mendorong penduduk desa untuk bergabung dan mungkin menyindir bahwa
penolakan untuk bergabung dapat diartikan sebagai ketidaksetiaan dan
kurangnya patriotisme. Banyak petani miskin dan keluarga mereka adalah
anggota, tetapi mereka tidak diwakili dalam proporsi mereka bersnum,
apalagi di antara para anggota terkemuka yang melakukan sesi pelatihan.
Beberapa keraguan relawan bersedia di tempat pertama. Satu kepala diamati
membuat daftar nama lima puluh dalam menanggapi permintaan resmi untuk
merekrut dari desa. Di sisi lain, patronase kerajaan dan presentasi kepada
anggota kerajaan selendang hitungan ¬ ac untuk orang tnany bergabung
dengan antusiasme beberapa.

Pramuka Desa kerajaan didanai oleh hibah, langganan swasta, dan sering
dari pembangunan dana-.inistrative lokal dan Eden pedesaan. . Dalam
'tingkat ocal mereka disponsori oleh pejabat dari segala jenis (pendidikan,
administrasi, polisi, militer) dan pemilik tanah setempat, pedagang, bankir,
dan politisi - dengan kata lain lingkungan dari "struktur kekuasaan kkal" yang
telah ditentukan. pemuka agama juga ambil bagian, bahkan media roh, tetapi
terutama para biksu, yang berpartisipasi dalam upacara pelatihan. tujuan
yang jelas meliputi: untuk memerangi pemberontakan komunis, menghindari
dan mencegah perselisihan perburuhan, dan mengumpulkan informasi
tentang orang "yang berniat untuk membahayakan Loyalitas negara ke
negara (phakdirar), dan slogan." Bangsa, Agama, Monarki ", sangat
ditekankan. The udomkan kata (ideologi) yang sering digunakan dalam arti
yang positif seperti dalam pernyataan bahwa VS" telah bersatu ideologi
bangsa "atau" Desa Pramuka dapat bersatu pada satu kesempatan ketika
ada potensi yang jelas appropr udomkan, yang 6 Oktober 1976 (Desa Scout
Centre, 1979). Pada kesempatan itu disebut, mereka berparade secara
massal, dengan pedang tradisional Thailand, untuk bergabung dengan Patroli
Perbatasan Polisi, polisi kota dan "Red Gaur" unit (lihat di bawah) untuk
menyerang mahasiswa menduduki Universitas Thammasat di Bangkok.

VS tumpang tindih dalam keanggotaan, dan ideologi, dengan berbagai


kelompok paramiliter. Satu kelompok, Relawan untuk Pembangunan dan
Pencegahan dan Pemberantasan, pertama kali muncul di Chiangmai, modal
utara, pada tahun 1976 dan 1978 kelompok memiliki lebih dari 1.000
anggota, hampir secara eksklusif berpendidikan, VS laki-laki, satu-satunya
kota. Mereka menggambarkan diri mereka sebagai "kelompok senior untuk
Pramuka Desa". Mereka dilatih di sebuah biara kerajaan, diberikan
kekuasaan penangkapan, dan khusus tanggung jawab utama untuk
mengumpulkan intelijen ¬ politik (Muecke, 1980:427).

Beberapa paramiliter Pertahanan Angkatan Sukarelawan (selanjutnya VDF),


dengan berbagai nama, dan terkait dengan kebijakan yang berbeda dan unit
militer atau fraksi, telah ada sejak tahun 1960-an. Pada tahun 1980 mereka
diperkirakan jumlah 52.000 (Bungo, 1980). Sebuah kelompok paramiliter
kemudian, 'mendirikan Thailand Relawan Pertahanan Nasional (yang tannic
pongkan chat), pada tahun 1978, dan saat ini tampaknya yang paling
dinamis. Hal ini disponsori oleh Komando Operasi Keamanan Internal (ISOC)
dan didasarkan pada Divisi Sipil di Departemen Pertahanan kuat dari trasi
sipil ¬ Adrrunis Daerah Negeri. Tentara, polisi dan pejabat sipil berpartisipasi
dalam pelatihan, dan sponsor tambahan (termasuk sumbangan dari senjata
dan uang) berasal dari anggota lokal ¬ struktur kekuasaan legislatif. Mereka
menerima sekitar 10-20 hari pelatihan, pada akhir yang beberapa dapat
menerima senjata. Mereka dibagi ke dalam "perlindungan pembangunan pro
dan kontrol" dan "pembelaan diri" unit, bertanggung jawab untuk bekerja
dengan polisi dan formasi militer. Ruang lingkup kegiatan VDF potensial atau
direkomendasikan adalah sangat luas: dari berbagai bentuk tindakan
ekonomi dan sosial, medis dan bantuan darurat, dengan politik. pendidikan,
pengumpulan intelijen dan peran militer yang lebih.

Di samping, dan tumpang tindih dengan, fungsi pemantauan VS dan VDF


secara khusus dilatih "perang psikologis opera inisiatif ', yang membawa
kartu identitas khusus dan diberi hak istimewa, bukan hadiah uang tunai, dan
informan lainnya, yang dibayar oleh. Hasil Beberapa penduduk dilihat pola
kooptasi di mana pemerintah "pendukung" dikirim untuk pelatihan pertama,
diikuti oleh penduduk dianggap penting, maka setiap kelompok didorong
untuk melaporkan di sisi lain.

Penting tema atau fungsi, yang ditemukan dalam berbagai organisasi lokal
seperti, adalah pengumpulan intelijen, informasi, dan pengawasan, dengan
unsur-unsur pekerja dari pelecehan, provokasi dan intimidasi - sindrom klasik
main hakim sendiri. Hal ini dapat memiliki efek pada kelompok petani miskin
'untuk membatasi kebebasan manuver, menyebabkan penurunan bership
dan pengurangan atau penarikan dukungan resmi atau toleransi. Alasan
umum diberikan untuk tidak mengangkat suara dalam protes terhadap
penyalahgunaan kekuasaan oleh penguasa setempat adalah "kita takut
ditembak di kepala". Efek yang mungkin dialami paling segera dan secara
pribadi oleh anggota terkemuka atau penasehat dari kelompok self-help, tapi
akhirnya oleh kolektif secara keseluruhan. Sejumlah besar kelompok
menganggap ini masalah serius yang dihadapi dalam pengelolaan kegiatan
mereka.

Namun, efek dari "menggunakan orang untuk memerangi orang-orang"


sebagai salah satu penduduk desa berkata, jauh dari benar-benar
melumpuhkan. Untuk satu hal tampak bahwa masyarakat miskin, meskipun
yang terlibat, akan dicegah dari berpartisipasi pada skala sepadan mengingat
biaya waktu dan uang. Kecurigaan bahwa orang yang tidak bersedia untuk
bergabung dengan "komunis" (Muecke, 1980:423) sehingga mungkin
rebound, karena sebagian besar masih anggota non ¬. Ada keterbatasan lain
dan karakteristik dari diri sendiri. Artikel cenderung habis, dan kemudian
beberapa anggota, tidak icast para pelatih, menunjukkan bunga riil, sehingga
skema direncanakan sampai mati; kegiatan mungkin tidak meluas jauh
melewati pelatihan langka dan sesi induksi; relawan ¬ sukarela telah
menyumbangkan waktu, uang dan materi , sering dalam waktu singkat dan
pada pertanian kali merepotkan; keluhan terbuat dari sikap superior dan
perilaku pelatih, akhirnya, "boredorci 'adalah salah satu kritik yang paling
luas.

Karena penolakan untuk bergabung dapat diartikan sebagai tanda


ketidaksetiaan kepada negara, beberapa anggota akan sadar diri
menjauhkan diri dari tujuan resmi kelompok. Misalnya, mereka mungkin
bersikeras pada diskusi serius yang pertanyaan definisi resmi "keamanan
nasional", "id emies ¬ orang", Peserta dll dalam sebuah studi melaporkan
kasus berteriak en thusiastic di klimaks dari upacara VS, abjuring musuh
bangsa, agama, dan monarki, bukan sebagai komunit (seperti dalam penulis
¬ liturgi ized) tetapi sebagai (sajak baik) thutcarit tidak jujur. Informer dapat
diundang untuk berpartisipasi lebih penuh dalam kegiatan kelompok itu
"untuk memastikan mereka mendapatkan cerita yang benar." Ketika diminta
untuk memberikan informasi, orang mungkin mencoba untuk memberitahu
mereka "... tentang kondisi keras orang miskin." Cara lain adalah
humourously "menyerah" untuk tuduhan itu dengan mengatakan "baik, jika
kita menggunakan inisiatif kita sendiri, untuk mendirikan organisasi kita
sendiri ¬ tion dalam mengejar kehidupan kita, diskusi antara 'Komunis' cara
hirarkis, mengkritik pejabat yang korup, dll, baik biarlah. "

Satu pekerja konstruksi berkomentar bahwa "mengetahui bahwa anda


sedang diamati membuat Anda bekerja untuk jujur dan mudah". Tapi yang
paling penting, jika individu dan kelompok dapat mengatur untuk terus
bekerja tidak terpengaruh, maka mereka kekuatan pribadi atau kolektif dan
reputasi untuk memberikan substansi dan legitimasi publik sations accu ¬
bantahan tersebut. Beberapa kelompok menemukan bahwa terdakwa
memiliki penurunan intensitas wacana dari waktu ke waktu dan masalah
kurang. Tapi kendala, sanksi potensial, tetap, bahkan jika diadakan di
penundaan; kebebasan terbatas aksi panggung.
Selain jenis organisasi paramiliter di tingkat desa, ada sejumlah unit lainnya
yang muncul dalam sepuluh tahun terakhir busur lebih langsung dan represif
yang mulai atau ¬ tol dikemas oleh beberapa kalangan resmi. Ini termasuk
"Merah Gaurs" (Daeng krathing - Gaur adalah sejenis kerbau liar),
sekelompok tentara bayaran awalnya disponsori oleh ISOC, dan digunakan di
kota-kota dan desa-desa untuk menjaga tugas (misalnya, pada lokasi
konstruksi jalan) di daerah terpencil daerah. Pada tahun 1980 mereka 25.000
anggota diharapkan (Bungo, 1980). Ada juga "Rangers" (dikenal, setidaknya
lokal, seperti pa-tahan, phran tahan: " hutan diers sol, prajurit pemburu").
Mereka tampaknya sekitar 13 000 digit (Far East Economic Review Ern,
1983). Mereka beroperasi dalam unit relatif otonom, meskipun untuk
beberapa derajat diintegrasikan ke dalam formasi militer reguler. Rangers
telah dilaporkan sebagai bertanggung jawab untuk nomor beries ¬
merampok, penculikan, dan. tindak terorisme dalam beberapa tahun terakhir
(CGRS, 1981: Vo1.8, No.2, 1982: vol.5, No.3). Lebih perkembangan terakhir,
skala tidak jelas, adalah penampilan sejak akhir 1981 dari "regu maut" (juga
dikenal di beberapa daerah sebagai "unit pembunuh pemburu," "unit
pemburu kejam", "kematian skuad unit neraka" ) yang ditetapkan oleh pihak
polisi propinsi untuk mengejar penjahat dan pembangkang tanpa proses
hukum. Ada indikasi bahwa unit ini telah menyebabkan beberapa kematian
dan penghilangan (CGRS, 1982: vol.6,, No.4 1983: Vo1.7, No.1). Walaupun
skala yang lebih kecil ini memiliki kesamaan dengan praktek menyamar dari
"penyelamatan" di Filipina. Syarat Thailand KEB, yang dapat diterjemahkan
sebagai "kehancuran" atau "save".

Konteks akhir pengawasan dan intimidasi "sindrom adalah pola yang lebih
umum dari kekerasan dan pembunuhan di daerah pedesaan Sebagai contoh,
di provinsi kabupaten Uthaithani, di mana studi kasus ini sebagai ¬ sociated
proyek ini dilakukan, tingkat pembunuhan pada tahun 1984.
penurunan tahun 1970 - empat kali av sudah tinggi nasional EraGen ¬ 25 per
100.000 per tahun dan.

Juga perlu diperhatikan adalah distribusi legal dan ilegal luas dan kepemilikan
senjata api di Thailand dan keberadaan sejumlah besar orang yang bersedia
untuk bertindak sebagai "tangan pistol", yaitu untuk melakukan pembunuhan
atas nama orang lain, sering untuk biaya kecil yang akan bervariasi sesuai
dengan pangkat atau kepentingan korban. Sebagian besar pembunuhan
yang disebutkan dalam bab ini adalah penembakan, jarak pendek oleh pihak
ketiga, sering dengan senjata militer, termasuk M 16 'dan senapan otomatis
AK47 ¬ matic. Para korban biasanya dipilih dengan cermat, tetapi ada
fenomena pembunuhan massal kurang diskriminatif. Sebuah kasus yang
sering ditemui peluncuran sebuah granat tangan (juga banyak tersedia) ke
kerumunan di sebuah kuil yang adil, menyebabkan beberapa kematian dan
luka-luka banyak.

Sejumlah besar kasus yang dilaporkan, secara resmi dan dalam pers, yang
akan membalas dendam pembunuhan atau hasil dari sebuah perseteruan
pribadi antara kelompok politik saingan dan kepentingan komersial. Sebagai
contoh, dalam waktu dua bulan sebelum ¬ ing pemilihan Majelis Nasional
pada bulan April 1983, 20 kandidat dan canvassers kampanye telah
terbunuh, hampir semua dengan menembak (Bangkok Post, 17 April 1983).
Sangat sering itu adalah kritik keras dari bunga dan malpraktik dibunuh
(apakah reporter koran provinsi, guru, pekerja konstruksi, anggota terpilih
majelis nasional atau propinsi, dll). Tidak jarang tangan disewa diidentifikasi
sebagai anggota (atau off-tugas) dari salah satu organisasi resmi atau
setengah resmi telah kita bahas. Dalam banyak kasus ada concertn
investigasi pembunuhan-gate sedikit atau ada kegagalan untuk
menghasilkan, biaya jauh lebih sedikit tersangka dan tahanan,. Beberapa
kematian ditempatkan di perawatan berdarah dari "melanggar hukum"
pembunuhan, 21 yaitu, pembunuhan.
Kasus yang paling jelas pembunuhan sistematis pemimpin populer di 1974-5
kampanye kekerasan terhadap para pemimpin Petani 'berat Fed Thailand
(lihat Bab 3). Dalam hal ini, kekerasan yang dilakukan terhadap orang-orang
reformasi organisasi non-kekerasan dan demokratis. Sejak periode itu, pola
pembunuhan selektif sebanding populer di tingkat desa pemimpin, pemimpin
buruh, wartawan, pembangunan. Pekerja, aktivis mahasiswa dapat dilihat.
Dokumentasi ini pembunuhan masih jauh dari selesai. Satu sumber utama,
sebuah kelompok hak asasi manusia yang tidak berhati-hati untuk
melaporkan kasus-kasus yang belum baik dalam ¬ vestigated dan didirikan,
percaya jumlah sebenarnya dari pembunuhan tersebut lebih tinggi daripada
yang laporan (CGRS, 1982: jilid No 6,. 4). Mengacu pada pembunuhan
spesies sebelas dalam periode enam bulan di 1981-2, mengatakan kelompok
yang 'sebagian besar insiden disebabkan oleh pejabat lokal tertentu atau
orang berpengaruh lebih baik berhubungan dengan para pejabat "(CGRS,
1982: vol.6, No.2).

Dapat dikatakan bahwa fenomena kekerasa contrib pedesaan utes apa


pekerja konstruksi telah disebut "iklim ketakutan" di mana serangan
kekerasan atau kematian oleh pembunuhan, bukan pejabat hanya tegura
finansial atau penangkapan, adalah mungkin, akhir sanksi. Ada setan link
strable antara hukuman fisik ekstrem dan budaya, psikologis dan hukum yang
lebih luas. Dengan cara ini, dan peringatan innucndos mungkin.
berpengalaman sebagai intimidasi.

fitur Counter-partisipatif organisasi pembangunan daerah pada bagian


sebelumnya kita menganalisis fitur lingkungan sosial dan politik lokal dan
konteks kekuasaan mereka. Ini adalah konteks di mana kebutuhan kelompok
petani miskin 'untuk mengelola dan mengoperasikan kendala spesifik ex
eksternal tentang bagaimana mereka dapat mengelola dan apa yang bisa
mereka capai. Pada bagian ini kita akan meninjau karakteristik khusus
internal untuk pengembangan organisasi formal dan metode. Pemilihan dan
penilaian yang dibuat dari perspektif petani miskin itu sendiri. Pandangan ini
muncul dari pengalaman pekerjaan mereka dan mendiskusikan bersama-
sama sebelum dan studi penelitian. Organisasi rating positif disahkan oleh
petani miskin yang merupakan anggota dari organisasi berfokus pada apa
pun materi dan manfaat ekonomi yang bisa diperoleh, terutama akses
terhadap kredit dan pupuk, biaya input yang lebih rendah dibandingkan
dengan pasar ritel, dan teknis informasi dan saran. penilaian negatif lebih
banyak dan beragam. Beberapa tema penting yang dapat diringkas sebagai
berikut:

‡ sering kurangnya koordinasi dan kerjasama pada dan antara


oiciallevels dan lembaga
‡ terkonsentrasikannya tujuan birokrasi dan priorities, norma, dan
mentalitas;
‡ dominasi antara kepemimpinan tingkat desa, anggota strata
minoritas atas dan kelompok kepentingan
‡ pengecualian dari mayoritas rumah tangga miskin dari
keanggotaan dalam kelompok-kelompok yang dianggap
menguntungkan, seperti Kelompok Petani skema credit union,
dll
‡ kurangnya keterlibatan berkelanjutan dan substansial anggota
dalam proses pengambilan keputusan, diskusi, monitoring dan
evalu asi kegiatan kelompok
‡ jangkauan terbatas dan ruang lingkup kegiatan ini, yang tidak
relevan dari beberapa kegiatan, lebih khusus, mereka yang
bersifat non-ekonomi pengumpulan yang korup),(Rural
Employment Generation Program) menjadi baik, pada tiga
tingkatan (desa kepala, keamanan) Sangat luas baru-baru ini
dan sekarang pengembangan dan promosi revivalis moral
(tanah kebajikan Buddhis, tanah emas).
salah satu contoh dari penanaman budaya birokrasi dan praktek. Mereka
adalah gejala drive untuk standardisasi, yang dapat dilihat sebagai lain fonn
kontrol. Thcy juga mencakup bentuk pendaftaran dan peraturan, dan tabung
resmi , serta bentuk imbalan atau kompensasi: tunjangan harian, ditoleransi
penggunaan pribadi dana publik, biaya dan persentase, misalnya "hutan
sukarelawan perlindungan" menerima 50 persen dari ini denda yang
diajukan. Mereka termasuk gaya dan penjadwalan resmi pertemuan bersama
baris reaucratic: biasanya dalam jam resmi dan pada hari-hari kerja resmi;
pejabat berbicara sangat formal melalui mikrofon sebelum penonton dengan
sedikit atau tidak ada komunikasi dua arah. Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa
aturan-aturan dan prosedur tersebut tidak disesuaikan agar sesuai dengan
prioritas lokal dengan kebutuhan mereka budaya dan praktis dan bahwa
tujuan resmi dilayani daripada kebutuhan dan kepentingan petani miskin dan
buruh tak bertanah.

Anggota minoritas ini dapat menggunakan posisi mereka untuk memajukan


kepentingan mereka. Mereka sering bisa menggabungkan pendidikan
modem mereka dengan kemampuan untuk memanfaatkan nilai-nilai
tradisional lebih dan hubungan a'uthority, superioritas dan perintah.
Kita sekarang dapat mulai untuk melihat lebih jelas beberapa kendala penting
partisipasi yang melibatkan pengaturan prioritas, mengekspresikan
kebutuhan baru dan isu-isu secara terus menerus, dan monitoring dan
menilai kegiatan kelompok. Dihadapi oleh kendala tersebut, anggota
kelompok ini.

jika mereka tidak puas, akan tetap pasif dan hormat. Mereka skeptis, dan
mungkin diandalkan mereka pribadi tetapi tidak sama meningkat. Pada
gilirannya ini memungkinkan kepemimpinan, dan anggota kuat dan kaya
untuk mengejar tertandingi mereka jika adil, keuntungan. Ini juga
menghilangkan dari pandangan dan pengawasan, dari akuntabilitas kolektif
dan kontrol, kegiatan yang bersifat korup dan ilegal. Oleh karena itu mungkin
tidak akan pernah diketahui mengapa, atau bahkan, sekarung biaya pupuk
lebih dari seharusnya, atau mengapa orang tertentu menerima kontrak
bangunan; atau apa ukuran dari anggaran ini dan apakah itu sah untuk
menggunakannya dalam cara tertentu.
Dalam kasus di mana para petani miskin telah ditarik terjebak Dalam
organisasi resmi menetapkan yang tidak melayani kepentingan mereka atau
kebutuhan paling mendesak, ini "partisipasi" (dalam arti resmi) sering dinilai
sebagai pengalihan, dan bahkan secara sistematis demobiiizing. Singkatnya,
itu sering dianggap buang-buang waktu, uang dan usaha. Beberapa kali
keterlibatan tersebut adalah sukarela, setidaknya pada awalnya, meskipun
konsekuensi sosial tidak bergabung dalam sering merupakan faktor
menghambat. Pemimpin Satu petani miskin 'menjalani pelatihan untuk
sebuah proyek "sukarelawan" yang melibatkan tiga "seminar" - lima hari di
desa, maka sembilan hari di kota provinsi, dan lima lagi hari di desa. Dalam
kasus ini biaya nya tidak dibayar, juga tidak kehilangan nya laba.
Sekali lagi, penting untuk dicatat bahwa banyak contoh dapat ditemukan,
beberapa dari mereka dalam wilayah proyek, dukungan resmi, baik formal
maupun informal, untuk beberapa organisasi lebih otonom dan inisiatif
masyarakat miskin pedesaan. Dukungan ini dapat berasal dari individu
pejabat atau dari lembaga resmi tertentu atau departemen.

proyek ini mengidentifikasi meresap sikap negatif, dan bahkan bermusuhan,


untuk upaya-upaya tersebut pada partisipasi yang lebih besar berasal dari
dalam memimpin organisasi tingkat desa resmi dan tingkat yang lebih tinggi
diasosiasikan. Beberapa cara sikap seperti disajikan, dan dapat menjadi
bentuk-bentuk materi pemaksaan dan kontrol sudah didiskusikan. Mereka
juga dapat ditemukan sampai batas tertentu di non-resmi, organisasi non
pemerintah. Dalam satu kasus sekelompok pekerja pembangunan non-resmi
dan pemimpin petani miskin diundang untuk mengunjungi proyek sebuah
organisasi non-pemerintah lama-didirikan didukung oleh lembaga
internasional. Setelah banyak formalitas, sebuah spontan mulai antara
pengunjung dan petani miskin lokal. Diskusi beralih ke masalah hubungan
penyewa-tuan tanah. Pada titik ini, seorang pejabat senior yang mewakili
LSM, bersikeras membawa diskusi berakhir dan ditujukan para pengunjung
dengan kata-kata: "Anda telah mendorong mereka cukup´ Pada satu sisi, dan
lebih jarang, merupakan bentuk ekstrem intimidaticn. Dihitung kurangnya
dukungan kerjasama dan bahan lebih umum. tanpa memaksakan gagasan
federasi. Inisiatif ini bertemu dengan perlawanan besar, kering dituduh
"politik" dan tidak yang telah dipertimbangkan atau diizinkan oleh rencana
resmi dan peraturan.

Pengalihan usaha dan kooptasi juga dapat berasal dari lembaga "sektor
swasta". Dalam Chachoengsaocase, penduduk desa telah tiga kali
ditawarkan tanah lokal untuk pembangunan sekolah menengah, pusat
kesehatan, dan departemen jalan raya. depot, masing-masing. Mereka
kebanyakan anggota salah satu self-help kelompok-kelompok yang
dijelaskan di atas. Dengan berpartisipasi dalam proses perencanaan mereka
berharap untuk diperlukan manfaat ekonomi dan sosial lokal. Dalam hal
mereka adalah pedagang lokal yang berhasil mengalihkan skema ke daerah.

model skema pemukiman kembali di daerah yang sama para pendatang baru
yang pada awalnya diperlukan untuk membangun rumah-rumah mereka
dalam gaya yang seragam "modern" tetapi keputusan mereka untuk
menggunakan bahan bangunan lama menang. Ruang rapat besar, terbuat
dari dinding bambu dan beratap dengan rumput, adalah perlu dibangun
dengan kayu keras, dan untuk desain copy-buku. Melakukan ini menghina
dan boros didukung oleh Rotary Club plak provinsi yang akhirnya menghiasi
dinding di atas platform. penyesuaian benar-benar bertentangan dengan
keputusan komite permukiman .

trict dengan memusatkan sumber daya pada satu desa yang akan digunakan
sebagai contoh dari "developmenC mengunjungi pejabat senior. Dalam hal ini
pembangunan desa yang melibatkan beberapa tahap. Upaya pertama dan
paling terlihat adalah membangun pagar bambu di sekitar setiap plot rumah.
Tujuan dari ini adalah dua kali lipat dari sudut pandang Kantor Distrik.
Pertama, memberikan penampilan dari "peradaban", bukan dari "berantakan"
desa. Kedua, meningkatkan kontrol atas penduduk desa oleh dinas dan
aparat desa - karena memungkinkan untuk identifikasi mudah rumah petak
dan penduduk. Praktek ini 'lebih ditingkatkan dengan pembangunan dan
tanda-tanda nama di depan rumah masing-masing. Pagar-bangunan
dilakukan dengan desakan konstan kamnan, yang mengancam untuk tidak
memberikan pelayanan hukum, seperti menerbitkan kartu identitas, kepada
siapa pun yang menolak untuk mematuhi. Warga desa sendiri harus
memberikan materiah seperti kayu, bambu dan kuku. Ini biaya yang cukup
terlibat, karena kekurangan bahan-bahan lokal yang tersedia. Meskipun
beberapa menggerutu, sebagian besar bagian depan jalan itu berpagar, tapi
bagian belakang rumah tidak. Di sebuah desa di dekatnya, namun, dengan
tradisi kuat organisasi diri, maka diputuskan untuk mengambil sikap umum
terhadap pagar membangun kecuali kamnan yang disediakan bahan, karena
dirasakan bahwa pagar tidak memberikan manfaat nyata dan bahwa, dalam
hal apapun, mereka akan segera jatuh ke dalam rusak.
Tugas pertama adalah untuk masing-masing kelompok untuk memberikan
"sukarela sukarelawan untuk mengunjungi beberapa desa di provinsi
tetangga yang telah memenangkan kompetisi regional tahun sebelumnya.
Para relawan harus memberikan ongkos 70 baht bus. Hanya setengah
disajikan sendiri. Setelah diskusi beberapa kamnan setuju untuk membayar
sisa biaya menyewa bus. ini terutama terdiri dari cara merawat komite menilai
dan bagaimana menangkap perhatian mereka, misalnya, dengan memilih
seorang gadis cantik untuk menyambut para hakim. Selama kunjungan ke
desa, penduduk desa memberikan sambutan yang ramah dan menunjukkan
kelompok yang
"Internal" masalah organisasi petani miskin sejauh ini dalam bab ini kita telah
meneliti kendala ditempatkan pada ekspresi-diri dan self-organisasi
masyarakat miskin yang berasal lingkup sosial mereka sendiri. Kita sekarang
akan mengalihkan perhatian kami ke beberapa keterbatasan dan kesulitan
yang lebih Hinternal "untuk kegiatan sosial dan budaya sehari-hari
masyarakat miskin pedesaan, terutama karena mereka mempengaruhi
pendidikan dan presesi tenaga kerja. Selanjutnya, kita akan membahas isu-
isu gender, wewenang dan kepemimpinan Tujuannya adalah. untuk
menekankan tema yang dianggap bermasalah dalam proses pencarian ulang
kolaboratif. Kurangnya pendidikan atau keaksaraan sering dibesarkan
sebagai masalah, terutama kurangnya kefasihan dalam bahasa standar dan
pengetahuan" keterampilan akuntansi dasar. Pengetahuan teknis yang tepat
dan socialjpolitical juga dianggap penting dan ini mengangkat masalah
relevansi pendidikan formal.

menawarkan empat tahun pertama pendidikan dasar wajib. Hampir semua


anak menyelesaikan tahap ini, meskipun banyak yang harus repear satu
tahun atau lebih dan penyelesaiannya ‡ ada jaminan keaksaraan melanjutkan
atau numerasi. Pada tahun 1978 hanya sedikit lebih dari setengah dari
semua anak menyelesaikan tiga tahun terakhir pendidikan dasar, di bawah
satu sepertiga menyelesaikan tiga tahun pertama, dan setengah angka ini
tiga tahun terakhir kation ¬ edu sekunder, hanya 3,5 per universitas dihadiri
persen.

Meskipun ada kecenderungan terus menuju ketentuan pendidikan yang lebih


besar ada bias terus mendukung kelas-kelas sosial tertentu dan daerah atas
orang lain, kota di negara dan Bangkok selama seluruh negara. Jadi pada
1973-74, 74 persen dari mahasiswa berasal dari keluarga pengusaha atau
pejabat pemerintah; 13 persen dari keluarga pekerjaan lain dan hanya 6
persen dari latar belakang pertanian (dari semua kelas). Dari semua tidak
kurang dari 59 persen berasal dari Bangkok (kurang lebih persen dari
populasi) dan hanya 8 persen dari Kortheast (sekitar 34 persen dari populasi
Banyak ofIicial "pembangunan" berpikir dan pelatihan dimulai dengan
gagasan dasar dari pedesaan. kebodohan. nilai-nilai tersebut dapat
diinternalisasi, sehingga menimbulkan rasa ketidaktahuan yang melekat atau
kurangnya kemampuan. Hal ini diakui menjadi masalah di banyak kelompok
petani miskin '. Untuk beberapa kesulitan yang diatasi sebagai anggota
kelompok yang lebih berpartisipasi dalam diskusi dan tanggung jawab
diasumsikan. Upaya yang dilakukan untuk menekankan sejarah lokal, untuk
menilai, beradaptasi dengan atau mengubah nilai-nilai sebelumnya dan
bentuk hubungan komunitas dan pengalaman.

Ada tradisi busur tions dan sumber-sumber pengetahuan yang bisa ditarik
dari sumber seperti filsafat Buddha, atau pengalaman dan pengetahuan yang
berasal dari bepergian dan bekerja jauh dari desa. Sumber-sumber
tradisional, populer dan alternatif pengetahuan memberikan kontribusi sangat
untuk kembali sumber kelompok partisipatif.
Petani miskin sering menemukan bahwa isu-isu tertentu, perbedaan
interpersonal dan dibiarkan terselesaikan karena kurangnya waktu untuk
diskusi bersama, ini telah menyebabkan akumulasi kesalahpahaman (salah
kecurigaan,, esentment, iri hati, kecemburuan, menyalahkan, dll ) yang
mempengaruhi kegiatan kolektif. Seperti yang telah disebutkan sebelumnya,
mengenali masalah dan kenyataan bahwa masalah ini tidak selalu melekat
dengan lokalitas tertentu atau orang yang dianggap langkah positif dalam
proses mengatasi mereka. Sampai sekarang kami telah disebut "baru"
kesulitan keluar dari situasi berubah. Ada satu set lebih lanjut dari
keterbatasan, bagaimanapun, yang secara kultural lebih mengakar, terutama
sikap dan perilaku pelapisan ulang dengan usia, jenis kelamin kekerabatan,
dan otoritas. Tentu saja dapat dikatakan bahwa mereka juga, dominasi
dominan dan ketertiban sosial masa lalu. Mereka adalah apa yang penting
dalam jangka nilai (sakdina). Perbedaan ini terus diperkuat selektif dalam
wacana budaya dominan atau ideologi.

perbedaan luar biasa dalam status sosial (peringkat aristokrat atau birokrasi,
status yg berhubung dgn pendeta, dll). Seringkali ini menyebabkan
keengganan untuk berbicara, atau mengkritik atau bertentangan senior.
Kecenderungan ini dapat mengakibatkan ketergantungan yang ekstrem pada
pemimpin-bahkan dalam beberapa kelompok self-help lebih sukses. Namun,
nilai banyak desa dan hubungan kekerabatan dan bertetangga, terlihat
memiliki aspek positif. Biasanya itu adalah miskin, namun, tanpa memandang
usia atau jenis kelamin. Pengalaman dari beberapa kelompok menunjukkan
bahwa perempuan belum menikah, dan yang menikah mungkin lebih tua
(manfaat dari umur relatif jika tidak pendidikan "modern"), memiliki
kesempatan yang lebih baik memainkan peran sosial yang lebih luas.
Beberapa orang menyatakan bahwa perempuan menunjukkan kekuatan yang
lebih besar dan kemampuan daripada pria, "meninggalkan lebih awal untuk
pergi ke ladang, dan terus bekerja di AFO rumah kembali mereka". Ada
perjanjian, yang bersifat kritik diri, yang dalam prakteknya pria tidak
mengizinkan perempuan untuk mengambil peran yang lebih besar seperti
partisipasi penuh dalam kegiatan kelompok dan tanggung jawab) bisa
membatasi partisipasi perempuan karena takut mereka! dapat berbicara
pembangunan resmi biasanya termasuk kelompok 'ibu rumah tangga dan
kelompok perempuan muda. ini cenderung untuk membatasi topik tertentu
dan perempuan ke daerah-daerah terbatas aktivitas, dan jadi untuk
meminggirkan perempuan dari isu utama produksi dan organisasi
masyarakat.

Sikap hormat dan kepatuhan terhadap pemimpin terkait dengan gagasan


budaya lama mapan hormat untuk pria. Di luar lingkungan desa, atau
lingkungan petani miskin, sikap-sikap ini kadang-kadang busur terikat dengan
perasaan takut. Kosakata Thailand kaya dalam hal dasar yang berarti
menunjukkan rasa takut dan hormat. Dengan demikian menghormati
pemimpin adalah Salah satu tanggapan terhadap perlakuan yang tidak
memadai isu gender dalam proyek penelitian ini adalah komisioning oleh
UNRISD dari studi lanjutan khusus tentang masalah ini. Lihat Gail Om \
"CDT, 0,1986. Lbis berisi referensi bibliografi untuk bekerja terbaru yang
dilakukan oleh perempuan dan isu-isu perempuan. Lihat juga Noeleen
Heyzer, 1986.

‡ umumnya dianggap menjadi masalah serius dalam kelompok petani miskin.


Hal ini menimbulkan kendala berat dalam kolektif proses pengambilan
keputusan. anggota komite Memimpin mungkin dianggap sebagai "sumeone
mengandalkan pada lebih merupakan perlindungan dari sekedar orang yang
bisa diandalkan, atau sebagai "solusi ajaib" Bahkan salah Keputusan yang
mungkin terpenuhi, mengabaikan atau menekan kembali tanggung-kolektif
untuk memperbaiki atau meninggalkan mereka.
Masalah kepemimpinan menonjol dalam diskusi proyek. Masalah ini dapat
membuat semakin sulit bagi pimpinan kelompok petani miskin untuk bekerja
mendelegasikan atau berbagi dan tanggung jawab dan membangun inti
memperluas anggota berpengalaman. Peran pemimpin dalam banyak kasus
ini adalah satu kompleks diharapkan untuk berpartisipasi tidak hanya dalam
aktivitas petani miskin 'tapi juga dalam kegiatan resmi dan dalam pekerjaan
masyarakat (kesehatan,pelabuhan, kegiatan keagamaan dan pemuda, dll).
Jika mereka tidak berpartisipasi mereka mungkin dianggap sebagai
memecah-belah atau insulliciently publik bersemangat. Dan jika, sebagai
salah satu desa sedih mengemukakan demikian, mereka harus memutuskan
untuk alasan domestik maupun taktis untuk mengadopsi proiile rendah,
sementara melepaskan diri dari semua kegiatan masyarakat, ini juga, akan
menimbulkan kecurigaan resmi. Pada saat yang sama pemimpin petani
miskin 'harus bekerja untuk mengamankan mata pencaharian mereka sendiri.
Semua anggota terkemuka dari kelompok petani miskin 'berbicara masalah
ekonomi yang parah, bahkan krisis, yang disebabkan oleh pengorbanan
waktu dan untuk bekerja bersama. Dalam beberapa kasus hal ini
menyebabkan konflik dalam negeri, strain psikologis, dan dengan demikian
pengunduran diri atau penurunan partisipatif di bagian mereka. Ini juga
afTected efisiensi administrasi dan penurunan waktu yang dihabiskan untuk
menganalisis dan memecahkan masalah. Kadang-kadang, kesalahpahaman
dan ketegangan dalam kelompok, dan kurangnya kerjasama atau
pelanggaran aturan, yang dihasilkan.
masalah-masalah yang dialami rendah dibayar, tetapi penyelenggara
komunitas full-time dan pekerja relawan pembangunan. masalah seperti itu
umumnya tidak cukup dihargai oleh sumber-sumber di luar dukungan, baik
resmi atau tidak resmi. Mandiri, negosiasi otonom diasosiasikan kaum miskin
pedesaan memiliki kebutuhan untuk dukungan luar seperti jaringan informasi,
bantuan hukum dan pertahanan. pemimpin petani miskin yang 'memiliki
pengalaman sosial yang lebih luas dari anggota lainnya dan dengan demikian
berada dalam posisition untuk berkomunikasi dengan dan memobilisasi
potensi "eksternal" sekutu. Ini termasuk pengalaman yang diperoleh sebagai
kepala desa, atau dari bepergian dan kembali berpihak di kuil kota sebagai
anggota ditahbiskan dari Sangha Buddha, atau melalui bekerja di kota dan
pabrik. Beberapa telah diundang untuk mengunjungi negara Asia lainnya
(Bangladesh, Filipina, Sri Lanka) di bawah naungan organisasi agama atau
filantropis yang peduli pembangunan ekonomi dan sosial. Ironis! Y ini juga
dapat memiliki efek negatif menjauhkan pemimpin dari desa, tidak begitu
banyak dalam hal ekonomi, tetapi melalui penggunaan bahasa "baru" dan
akuisisi status baru.
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In the preceding chapter we spoke of some of the major problems of


livelihood of the poor farmers, of the local effects of national and supra-
national structures and policies, and of various collective economic
responses. In this chapter we shall consider local social, cultural,
administrative and political contexts in which these responses are made. We
shall focus on both opportunities and obstacles encountered in the process of
overcoming problems of livelihood. Of course, as one village level researcher
expressed it "politics, commerce and culture are all mixed up together". We
have seen how some economic activities can unite people in wider social
contexts; and how other, externally derived, economic strategies can have
the effect of preventing, limiting or demobilizing the collective actions of poor
farmers.

To some extent poor farmers perceive economic phenomena (such as bank


loan policies, price determination, guaranteed prices, rice premiums, etc.) as
political phenomena. Moreover, some of the more sociocultural factors are
perceived by farmers from the' outset to be major social problems and not
merely secondary problems encountered along the way. Our primary focus
will be the interrelation between these factors, and their recent historical
dynamic. It is argued that a weakness of many previous analyses has been a
too static and one-dimensional reading of the potential of particular agencies,
values or sections of the population. This can lead to misplaced optimism or
pessimism, and to unnecessary

Over and under valuation of the strengths and weaknesses of various

Parties of Indeed, this is one of lessons learned from the experience the
Peasants' Federation of Thailand (see Chapter 3).

Our study shows the inappropriateness of prematurely drawing up a balance


sheet of "obstacles and limitations"" to participation, on the one side, and
"enabling factors and potential", on the other. The lines of

i lines are not so clearly defined. Given the inherent uncertainties of


participatory efforts, there are immense difficulties in generalizing and
predicting either the points at which advances may be made, resistance may
be encountered, or the methods by which they may be overcome.

Social institutions or local administrative units such as farmers' groups, the


private commercial sector, religious or family institutions will be examined, not
so much as discrete entities, but rather in terms of their economic, cultural
and political interconnectedness. We shall consider links between official and
non-official sectors and between formal institutions and informal processes
(both legal and illegal). Included are hidden processes of routine decision-
making, deliberate concealment of the exercise of power and influence. We
shall look at both material and physical, and also more cultural and
ideological constraints: laws and regulations, traditional values, appeals and
exhortations. Throughout we shall refer to and reassess a commonly made
distinction between factors that originate "externally" from and those which
originate "internally" to the immediate social and cultural sphere of the poor
farmers' existence.

The questions we ask of the recent collective experience of poor farmers are
not what form their organizations take, or whether they are official,
semiofficial, spontaneous, legal or illegal. Nor is it only a question of their
technical aims or the extent to which they achieve them, although this is
obviously important. Rather we question the extent to which they benefit the
poorer rural producers, not only economically but also in social, cultural and
political ways.

While particular forms and problems of production varied between the case
studies, a remarkable degree of similarity was found in the political contexts
of production. This permitted us a greater degree of generalization in the
presentation of the material.

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In this section the presentation follows the ascending hierarchy of formal


levels of administration, from village to sub district, and district to province. It
will become apparent, however, that the reality of the exercise of power at the
local level by no means respects this formal hierarchy. This report does not
address directly questions of the nature of the state (see Chapters 2 and 3).
Instead we are examining the manifestations and symptoms of state powers:
sometimes in the form of local powers which, if not always formally or without
contradictions, might be regarded as constituting an important element of
state power in the countryside.

) )

When a phase of 'Community Development" thinking and policies' was


initiated about 25 years ago, there was often an assumption that "village
communities" did, indeed, exist. This view' was fostered by the "community
study" approach of social science monographs. These villages had
'community leaders" - usually a trio consisting of the village headman, the
head of the primary school, and the senior monk, whom, it was thought, could
be encouraged to act as agents of "development" in the interests of the
"community". There were hopes and exhortations that community unity and
solidarity could be established. Yet this was at a.
time when population increase and migration to new lands had resulted in the
formation of many new villages and the expansion of "natural villages" into
continuous agglomerations of households divided into administrative units,
school catchment areas, etc. These did not necessarily overlap or correspond
to older community patterns. More importantly, this phenomenon coincided
with an accelerating increase in socioeconomic differentiation and
bureaucratization in rural areas.

It would be a mistake to exaggerate the level of village autonomy and


homogeneity in earlier times, but it is nevertheless possible to demonstrate
that a certain degree of autonomy in knowledge and decision-making, of self-
reliance (a well-worn term on the part of certain development planners), of
cooperation and relative egalitarianism existed which contrast starkly with
current realities. This was probably truer in the distinct regional cultural areas
of the North and Northeast, for instance, and in the more nuclear and longer
established villages located further from political centre¶s, as well as in
villages where a resident aristocracy or outside officials were lacking. Without
trying to establish some kind of memorial baseline, we can suggest that
before the first penetrations of colonial capital, and continuing long after in
some relgions, there existed associations of entire communities for
themselves, for their own social reproduction. They included external, or
"horizontal" inter-village relations, as well as inter-household networks based
on kinship and neighbor hood. They involved various forms of reciprocal and
redistributive exchanges (for example, labour for agricultural, and domestic
reproduction tasks, pooling labour for communal religious, social and
irrigation tasks) and collective decision-making and action. In the latter case,
externally appointed village officials were predominantly village oriented. !n
addition, social differentiation based on age, gender, ritual rank, and nakleng
(briefly, "strong man") status were of greater weight than wealth and control of
or access to the means of production. In our study we found that the
experiences and forms of local cooperation of the past, when contrasted with
the present, enabled poor farmers to assess the extent and quality of recent
changes and to draw selectively on older values and practices, transforming
them, as they did, in order to meet current challenges.

In a great many villages a small minority of households, about 5 but not more
than 10 per cent, possess a certain degree of wealth, control over resources,
and have greater prestige and power, all of which sets them apart from the
majority. These households include (often in the same person) large
landowners, commodity dealers, shopkeepers, village

officials, teachers, rice millers and moneylenders who derive of their


advantages from their -external- connections and alliances. Theirs is the role
of "linking" the mass of villagers with state and market structures. The basis
for this is their ability to accumulate village "surplus" through rent, wages,
retail prices, commodity dealing and interest. At the same time they maintain
their controlling position as members of village com¬mittees (administrative
committees, temple and school committees, the newer state initiated farmers'
groups, etc.), and through personal patronage (sponsoring religious festivals
and marriages) not to mention economic patronage. Poorer villagers now
often speak of village "society" (sangkhom) from which they are excluded: the
villagers say the rich "don't allow us to participate in 'society' " ("mai hai ruam
sangkhom"). This so¬ciety is often referred to as a "drinking circle"
(sangkhom lao). Further more, I intermarriage may be d at least between
poorer men and the daughters of the well-to-do. Increasingly the "community
leaders" (phunam chumchon) are referred to by the poor as "influence
groups¬(klum ittiphon). Their exclusive social circles reinforce their cohesion
and the -invisibility" or secrecy of their decision- makirl g. Competition
between these groups and individuals may lead to factionalism, which may
place limits on their power. On the other hand this -ncourages selective
cooption of poorer villagers, some of whom.are kinsmen of the rich, as
subordinate clients, which fragments and provides further obstacles to the
poor. The great majority of the poor cannot, in any case, expect to benefit
from the small advantages this type of clientelism provides.

The village temple, with its monks and novices and associated community
rituals, is often the last important "traditional" institution to remain after other
forms of cooperation and collective participation nave been destroyed. But
here, too, new tendencies make themselves felt. Some monks own cars,
have bank accounts and are involved in government schemes. Richer
villagers tend to control the decision-making processes of the temple
congregation, setting compulsory rates of contributions, deciding on and
presiding over expensive festivals or construction projects. Our case studies
revealed instances where resistance to their authority by poorer members of
the congregation, who failed or refused to contribute and attend, was met with
threats of "excommunication" or refusal to arrange proper cremation services.

The position of the poorest, and their ability to organize themselves in more
autonomous ways may depend, in part, on the proportion of such households
in a given village. Thus, in the Samoeng district, where credit dling status
farmers predominated, it was this group that held the overwhelming majority
in the credit union groups, while many of the poor farmers were said to be too
"embarrassed" to join. Where the poor preponderated, everyone would tend
to join, middling farmers as well. At the same time whole villages of mainly
poorer farmers might be "satel¬lites" for richer villages in an economic,
political and social sense. In the Kalasin case a rice bank was organized by
poor farmers in both the karnnan's (subdistrict head) village and the
neighbouring satellite village. Members took a deliberate decision to establish
the rice bank's granary, and to hold their meetings in the poor village. This
had the positive effect of decreasing dependence and increasing freedom
from control and sur¬veillance.

From the point of view of the district administration the village and subdistrict
headmen are of paramount importance. They arc responsible for identifying
and solving the villagers' problems. But a common com¬plaint by the poor is
that their problems are not identified, much less passed on and discussed in
the monthly meetings between headmen and district officials. Even the official
messages and instructions from these meetings are not fully transmitted to
the villagers, thus inhibiting their assessment of and contribution to official
projects. The headmen are now supported by a village committee which is
likely to be dominated by the upper stratum of the village. In some villages
attendance is compulsory under penalty of a 50 baht fine. Meetings art
usually controlled by the conunittee, especially the headmen. Official
announcements are read sometimes for a period of two hours. Proposals are
presented - occasionally by visiting district officials - often without possibilities
for discussion and a simple "yes" or "no" vote is required. Spontaneous
contributions from villagers are limited.

It should be stressed that it is not always the case that the role of the
headman is inherently or universally problematic from the point of view of the
poor farmers. We encountered a wide range of experiences in this respect.
Sometimes poor farmers themselves are elected to the posi¬tion of headman
because of the overwhelming number of poor farmers in a given village, or
because of exceptional personal abilities and qualities. In such cases, the
interest of village officials and the poor are usually not divergent. A significant
number of leaders in the Peasants' Federation were village headmen (see
Chapter 3). Depending on the local situation -that is, type of production,
control ofresources, political and administrative conditions - divergence of
interest and points of tension may be felt to be more internal to the village (for
example, where there are large local landlords and dealers) or more external
(where there are absentee landlords, outside crop purchasers and
moneylenders). In the latter case the interests of the richer, middling and
some poorer farmers may coincide and rich headmen may be capable of
articulating those interests. This is less likely to happen, however, when the
headmen hold a number of other positions such as that of miller, dealer,
shopkeeper, or moneylender. Irrespective of this, poorer farmers may agree
to also join in the headman's rice bank or other such schemes. They may
invite him to be a formal "adviser"" to their own distinct projects; they may
also invite him to their meetings. In the latter case, this may mean holding
additional, more exclusive meetings at which village officials will not be
present. This can result not only from sheer necessity, but also from the
perception of the desirability of participating in various groups at different
levels in order to achieve the greatest possible degree of coalition, and to
avoid unnecessary, misplaced antagonism.

There have also been extreme cases where divergence of interest, together
with a history of antagonisms, resulted in headmen abusing their office and
the law, even to the extent of threatening poor villagers, or their leaders, with
death. In such cases the willingness and ability of hip-her authorities to
uphold the law and the rights of the citizen are absolutely crucial. All too often,
however, "the headman's word is law. But there is also much that poorer
villagers can do, and have done, within the law to assert themselves and seek
redress.
During the 1974-76 period, there were numerous instances where headmen
were confronted, criticized and denounced for their behaviour, which led to
their dismissal from office and expulsion from the commu¬nity by social
pressure. Villagers may, of course, propose their own can¬didate for election
to the office of village headman and, within prevailing social constraints and
pressure, vote for the candidate of their choice. The potentially lucrative
nature of the office is such that large sums of money may be spent by a
wealthy candidate on his campaign. Non-voting can be an expression of
refusal to participate on such -disadvantageous terms. In one case a
headman was referred to by the non-voting poor a! "headman 30%0"
because he had been elected by only 30% of th( electorate. In the
Chachoengsao area, four members of poor farmers groups were elected
headmen just three years after these groups were firs established. This was
carefully planned in order to advance the interest: of the poorer farmers and
was a direct result of their organizing. One wa: already seen as a potentially
successful contender for office of subdistric head. The poor claimed that
previously "the word of the headmen wa law, our words had no weight"". But
after coming together and developing their self-confidence they said that
"even people with only four years of schooling spoke up".

The subdistrict level

A sub district (tambon) level of rural administration has been in existence


since the early years of this century. The sub district head (kamnan) is
elected by and from among the headmen of 10-20 administrative villages
comprising the subdistrict. In recent years some nonelected government
officials (especially in agriculture and development) have been posted to the
subdistrict level. The institution of a sub district council or assembly (sapha
tambon) began to take on new meaning and to show greater promise in 1975
when. for the first time, central funds were allocated for local development
projects that would provide wage labour in each sub district. Such schemes
have continued, with variations, until the present. The 1982-86 'National
Economic and Social Development Plan gave considerable emphasis and
new powers (new structure, purpose and funding) to the sapha tambon in
order

"to decentralize administrative power, to encourage localities to be able to


govern themselves, on the principle of respecting the wishes of the people in
each sub district...laying the foundations of a democratric system of
administration for the majority of the people of the country...with experience of
self-government, the people will come to realize their rights and duties..."

In particular the sapha tambon arc now authorized to develop longer term
economic and social plans for their own locality. At times, in previous years,
sub district projects were required to correspond with province level
development plans. In some cases the sapha tambon had as little as one
week to respond to official directives. Yet the council still has no independent
source of revenue or independence as a distinct legal entity.''

The revised role and potentialities of the sapha tambon seem to offer a
preliminary step towards a greater degree of popular participation. For the
government at least it is the cornerstone of their participation policy.

Much will depend on the commitment and abilities of governments, ministries,


departments and officials to pursue the stated aims in the full¬est sense. As
much or more will depend on local realities of power and influence. The
project considered the potential and limitations of the sapha tambon from both
a general perspective and from the experiences in the field research areas.

A subdistrict council is composed of the kamnan, a secretary who is a


teacher, the headman of each village in the subdistrict, an expert or qualified
person (phusongkhunawut) from each village, and a number of district level
officials, including the District Officer, ex officio, and some¬times tambon
agricultural and development officers. Here we need to consider both formal
and informal processes and relationships within and beyond the committee;
its relations with both higher levels and the village constituency. We may note
at the outset that the sapha tambon is prima¬rily the creation and
responsibility of the very large and powerful De¬partment of Local
Administration of the Ministry of the Interior. In the past, other government
departments and projects have not used the committee as its local agency.
For example, the Department of Commu¬nity Development has tended to
favour the Village Development Com¬mittees, despite the fact that, m one
villager's words, some of these "exist in name only". Furthermore, there is a
discernible norm within the ad¬ministration which requires that each
administrative unit should try to control and regulate subordinate units as
much as possible, so that in practice the council becomes an implementing
agency of the government or administration rather than a democratic organ
for articulating the people's needs and wishes in an "upward" direction. Later
we shall discuss the considerable reliance on bureaucratic methods and
mentalities and dependence on official structures, especially at the district
level. In many cases it is claimed that the District Officer or his delegate
"makes all the decisions". Council members merely sign their names to
projects initiated at official levels which correspond to the values, wishes and
purposes of official agencies, so much so that while a project involving Village
De-fence Volunteers may get immediate approval, endorsement of a
voca¬tional training project may take two years.

The office of kamnan, or subdistrict head, is of crucial importance. With the


help of village headmen they are the "eyes and ears" of the Dis¬trict Office.
The office of kamnan carries considerable power and respon-sibility. Large
sums of money are now handled by the council and decisions on the
allocation of this money may be made without putting out to tender. The
office-holder attracts the attention of all outside intercuts wishing to become
involved in the locality, whether for trade, commerce, extraction of natural
resources, construction work, development projects, matters of law and order
or security, or political campaigning for the Provincial or National Assembly
elections.

To a lesser extent, the same caveats apply to subdistrict heads as to village


headmen, namely, that they are not all inherently antagonistic to the interests
of the poor. But the kamnan is likely to be a much wealthier and more
powerful individual, linked to outside interests which may con-flict with the
interests of the poorer villagers; he will also be associated with well-to-do
officials and wealthy villagers or to the minority upper stratum of the village.
Opportunities for lucrative illegal gains abound and, quite apart from this, the
extent of legal or officially tolerated sources of income, which lead to influence
and prestige, are considerable. An indication of this arc the large sums of
money which candidates for the office of kamnan are prepared to dispense on
campaigning for office; sums of several 100,000 baht are frequently spent on
such campaigns. Large sums are also spent on "campaigning" for other local
offices, in¬cluding that of subdistrict medica.l. officer. This parallels the
practice in most national Assembly elections of channeling election funds
through the kamnan. Some kamnan, or former kamnan, go on to seek
election to provincial and even national assemblies.

A powerful kamnan may be able to nominate members of the sub district


council without fear of being opposed. lie may also be able to determine the
use of development funds for purposes other than those proposed by
villagers or even decided in council. For example, in one project area money
earmarked for construction of a dam was used to build a temple compound
wall. Another example, also from the project's field studies, illustrates the
possibilities of illegal abuse of funds. The sum of 40,000 baht was budgeted
for the construction of a well. The actual labour cost was 4,000 bah; and the
headman submitted an account for 7,000 baht. Some of the poorer villagers
discovered that the unspent sums had been misappropriated.

The importance of this last example, in the context outlined above, is not just
to document another instance of deplorable "corruption". Its significance lies
in uncovering the structural connections, both formal and informal, among
those with decision- making powers, and in the fact that, in this case, the
villagers themselves perceived these connections. They thereby increased
their knowledge and understanding of local political structures. In a
comparable case where a kamnan was known to be en¬gaged in illegal
timber extraction, the attitudes of the poorer villagers were depicted by such
expressions as "monkey kamnan" and "monkey 'I" "referring to the sapha
tainbon); here, "monkey" is a derogatoryerring epithet referring to illegal forest
activities.

As in so many other instances the question of information and communication


is highly relevant. Villagers, especially the poorer ones, often do not know the
purpose of the sapha tambon, nor the identity of its members. "I talk, you
listen" is considered the council's mode of communication. Detailed
information and explanation is avoided; villagers are thus impeded from
learning about council procedures. Instructions ensuing from the council often
take the form "such and such a project will take place; you will go and shovel
earth on such and such a day for a wage of so much per day"; sometimes no
wages are proposed.

However, a number of poor farmers' leaders felt that the potentialities of the
subdistrict council for investigating and discussing local needs and problems
were considerable. The experience of two localities in which the poorer
farmers had already spent several years developing their own self-reliant
organizations is indicative of efforts to secure greater participation on their
own terms.

In the Yasothorn case, the farmers' group, faced with powerful vested
interests, had sought at first to get representative members elected to the
sapha tambon. When they realized the disadvantages of their minority
representation they specifically declined elected, minority status and
successfully negotiated observer status. In this way, they had access to
certain information and gained the right to speak out but not to vote. They
avoided participating in an imbalanced decision-making process which they
felt did not benefit all its members and would be likely to discredit their own
leadership in the eyes of the members. One member commented that "a
good man could not survive in that sapha tambon". In the Chachoengsao
case, villagers concluded that sapha tambon money was not being used for
projects which corresponded with villagers' needs. Moreover there were no
regular council meetings or on-going council activities. As a direct
consequence of villagers' experience in self- organization, and the
participation of some village headmen in such organizations, there was a
majority on the sapha tambon committee which was more responsive to the
poorer villagers' needs. For the first time, they were able to ensure regular
monthly meetings which analysed local issues and problems on a continual
basis. Furthermore, the possibility arose of successfully nominating a new
candidate for the office of kamnan.

$ % $

The district ˜amphur), which is likely to consist of 10 or more subdistricts,


is in many ways the most important arena for the local exercise of power and
the implementation of local development plans. For most poor farmers direct
experience of state administration and education, of . political
representatives, and of millers and commodity dealers is usually restricted to
the district level. Nonetheless, for a brief period in 1974-75 poor farmers
experienced the possibilities of regional- and national-level association.
Since then there have been a number of province-wide dem-
onstrations to petition the government on commodity prices. In some cases it
is the government which is directly criticized (as on the rice premium or the
failure of guaranteed price schemes); in others, the rice dealers or commodity
merchants. Some poorer farmers have been involved in these
demonstrations and have learned of the difficulties and limitations of such
action, and also of the need, ultimately, for small-scale local organizations,
which represent their interests, to be linked on a larger and wider scale.

At the district level are found the representatives of the various ministerial
Departments for Agriculture, Cooperatives, Development, Land, Forestry,
Excise, Education, as well as the military recruiting officer and the more
autonomous police. More important is the district administraticn per se,
including the District Officer and various Deputies, and in recent years, the
Deputy for Defence and Suppression of the Internal Security Operations
Command (ISOC), in charge of paramilitary, self-defence and other security
organizations. The senior officials are transferred frequently - in one project
area there had been five District Officers in five years; the less senior
officers may be permanently established. In the North and northeastern
regions studied in our project ignorance of different Thai dialects was
found to be a significant obstacle in channels of communication, not only
between district officials andpoorer villagers but also occasionally
between community organizers and villagers. The higher degree of
education among the upper stratum of villagers (that is; knowledge of
Central Thai, and "bureaucratic" language) gives, them a strategic advantage
in this respect.

At the district level we find large scale landowners, merchants, millers,


contractors and owners of transportation who are linked vertically with
provincial- and national-level activities, wholesalers, exporters, and both
national and transnational companies. They are, in many cases, the
'"patrons" (sometimes "godfathers") of smaller and more localised agents and
clients at village and subdistrict levels. Their informal networks of friendship
and association with district officials often constitute strongly influential groups.

Each district will have one or more elected representative(s) on the


Provincial Assembly ˜sapha cangwat) which controls certain budgets destined
for use in the locality. One or more elected member(s) of the National
Assembly may be associated with a district even though it may not
necessarily be a parliamentary constituency. Frequently, these represen-
tatives are elected from the commercial interest groups referred to above
and their local commercial agents are often their "vote bosses" ˜
#  at election time. Personal funds of more than one or two million ÷aht
may be spent on campaigning. It is important to stress however that there
are virtually no forms of permanent political party organization at the district
level or below.

It is often said that villagers "have no interest in politics". In so far as


this is true, it must be related to their often unsatisfactory experience with
political representatives. We certainly found widespread opinion that
"politicians are only interested in us poor farmers in order to get elected", that
they only appear before an election, strike bargains all around, and having
secured as much advantage for themselves as possible are seldom
seen again. These experiences contribute to the low degree of hope in or
reliance upon such potential representation. There are exceptions, how-
ever. For example, in some cases factional competition at higher levels
encourages more positive attention on the electors of a locality. A larger
!#/ ()one which eschews clientelistic attitudes $)(
 # likely to be taken into account. Similarly, a more autonomous
farmers' group may choose to seek out channels of patronage in a
conscious and cautious manner. There are also representatives who, for
reasons of personal integrity and democratic concern for public welfare,
make it their duty to criticize instances of waste, inefficiency, delay,
secrecy and corruption. There are those who stay in touch with the electors
and even support their demonstrations. In two provinces where field studies
were conducted, several provincial assembly members with such records
had met their deaths only a few years previously at the hands of
anonymous gunmen. Authorities ascribe such deaths to factional infighting
between "interest groups"; they often appear, however, to be politically
motivated: In the two cases referred to, poor farmers were convinced that
they resulted from opposition to democratic activities.

An aspect of social relations at the district and provincial levels, as well as at


the subdistrict level, which we wish to stress is the overlapping and
interpenetration of economic, political and cultural interest, and also the
combination of formal and informal, public and "private" activities. An
example already referred to is that of the Provincial Assembly representative
for the Samoeng district who, in addition to private interests at the
provincial level, had been the tobacco-purchasing monopsonist for the
district: he owned district lands, together with the primary means of
transport in and out of the district, and served as chairman of the agri-
cultural cooperative. He had close ties with the local administrators on all
levels. After the district-wide credit union movement was established, he was
defeated in an election to the Provincial-Assembly. This defeat can be
directly, if not totally, attributed to the new degree of social awareness and
self-confidence created in the course of the development of new, more
autonomous groups. His opponent was a younger man with an educa-
tional rather than commercial background. He had great support from the
local teachers and more junior district officials. He had campaigned against
some of the local vested interests and appeared willing to pay more than
just lip service to the idea of democratic representation. Notably, he spent a
mere 5,000 ÷aht on his election campaign. This election reflected a change
in the existing political awareness of Thai villagers in the Samoeng district.

In many cases the district administration and perhaps certain indi-


vidual officers or sections within it, are seriously and energetically com-
mitted to securing the welfare of the people for whom they are politically
responsible. We have seen that the poorer farmers wish to participate in
many official schemes and to enjoy the benefits that result from them.
One problem results from the disproportionate representation of minority
interest groups at the local level and thus the particular needs and capa-
bilities of the rural poor are not emphasized, or are undervalued. Stagnant
cultural or bureaucratic attitudes are also significantly responsible for this
condition. Another major obstacle is the pervasive mistrust of almost all
popular initiatives of the democratic process or the fear of popular
mobilization on social and economic issues. Poor farmers and self-reliant
groups have had to face such fear even when there was nc intention or
desire on their part for confrontation, disloyalty, or personal disrespect to
officials.

The Samoeng case provided an example of an apparently unnecessary


degree of official resistance to a popular initiative. A group of teachers
and community organizers, together with members of various farmers'
groups, decided to hold .a fair in the district "headquarters village" in order to
raise money for ~athlctics. Normally,_ the District Officer is expected to be
chairman of the organizing committee in order to lend authority to such an
event. In this case, however, the new Provincial Assembly representative was
invited. Villagers from all over the district hired trucks and buses, at considerable
expense, to take part in the fair. But before the fair could get underway a district
official, brandishing a handgun and with police support, ordered the fair to close
on the grounds that it was not officially sanctioned. The fair committee could
not prevail and had a difficult task restraining the angry and disappointed
villagers who began talking of "burning down the District Office". One villager
commented that from then onwards "the police can expect to eat only in the
iamnan's house" when they come to visit the villages.

Sport, which is usually a politically neutral activity, was another


occasion for a confrontation in the Udorn village. The rice bank group ° had
discussed arrangements for holding a district-wide knockout competition to
select sporting teams to represent the district at the provincial level. Only
one team was to be selected from each subdistrict, and in this
particular area, was chosen automatically from the iamnan's village. A
provincial budget of 12,000 ÷aht had been earmarked. Thrcugh their main
leader-and spokesman the farmers made representations to the District
Office. They argued that more villagers should participate and they or-
ganized teams (football, basketball and #(  a kind of southeast Asian
volleyball using a rattan ball) from two additional villages. As it happened, one
of these villages won and was chosen to represent the subdistrict. The
farmers paid all the expenses since the provincial budget was not
forthcoming for this unorthodox initiative. These incidents were social
dramas involving hundreds of people. They illustrate attitudes of mind and
patterns of behaviour and social control which are important precisely
because they are so commonplace and routine. Moreover, in a situation
where there is so little room for popular initiatives, these instances provided
opportunities for self-assertion.
In the preceding section we examined some crucial structures of
decision-making and control at the local level, especially at the subdistrict
and district levels where autonomous forms of activity and organization of
the rural poor are met with resistance. Among the forms we have, rather
blandly, termed social control, we refer here specifically to a related set of
processes of surveillance and intimidation.18 They must be emphasized
because they recurred,-again and again in the histories of our case study
groups. included in the notion of surveillance ˜peng long) are informing ˜haa
ihao), defamation ˜sai rai pai sii), and accusation or allegation ˜ihlao haa).
It should be made clear that no matter how prevalent these phenomena
may be, we are not referring to "normal" administrative supervision and
regulation, nor to cases where the "accused" (those at the receiving end of
these processes) are in breach of the law.

The language used in such "accusations" has a precise vocabulary -


individual(s) or group(s) are "being divisive", they are "inciting hatred" (for
example against the rich) and "causing strife"; they are "mobilizing the
people" (against the government), or "criticizing the government"; and
finally, they are "communist".

Some of the actions or statements that such language refers to appear


in official training manuals as alleged. "communist" activities. They
include: demanding rights from the government, urging others to demand
rights and to resist oppressive or corrupt behaviour on the part of officials
or local notables; conducting unofficial surveys; "doing good deeds" for
their own sake; accepting lowly paid or low-status work when qualified to
obtain higher pay; and not responding in anger when provoked. .
Certain forms of organization may be suspect: unregistered associations
or groups which seek supra-local coordination; late night meetings; and
non-hierarchical forms of organization (for example a committee with no
chairperson). The use of some modern words, many of which are current
in journalism or social science and even in official discourse, are regarded
as suspicious when used by poor farmers; for example,"structures",
"mechanisms", "concrete", "abstract", "analysis", "criticism", "mass".
"consciousness", etc. Unofficially organized self-help projects (such as
cooperative production, marketing, medical savings, informal education
groups, etc.) may incur such allegations. As noted earlier, the fertilizer in a
village fertilizer bank scheme, under the auspices of a ~e‡ellcstablishcd
Christian organization, was referred . to as "communist fertilizer" by a senior
o(Iicial; a self-help herbal medicine project was accused of preparing "brain-
washing" drugs.

he accusations are made in a variety of contexts. First, there are the


actual accusations which range from relatively weak innuendos, insinuations,
rumours and smearing, to stronger forms of vilification and
defamation. Anonymous leaflets may be circulated. Private warnings may be
given to or about a specific person or group, by people with authority or who
claim connections with such persons. Warnings or accusations may be made
in public meetings. Indirect statements of intimidation by officials, say a
village headman, may be used - in parallel with more direct accusations by less
official sources - for example, "I have the names of (a precise number of)
'eppositionists', and some of them are present at this meeting", or "the
District Officer has your names cn a list, you might as well go and give
yourselves up".

Secondly, there is the formal context of state laws.t' Since the beginning
of the constitutional monarchy .in 1.932, various forms of legislation
proscribing communist activities have been almost continuously in force. The
broad definitions of illegality under these laws have had the effect of
restricting a wide range of political liberties. The current Prevention of
Communist Activities Act of 1979 allows for detention without trial for up to
480 days (normal maximum is 91 days). Other relevant legislation
includes the 1975 Labour Relations Act, which excludes rural workers
from the labour laws and the right to forth trade union type of
organizations. There are also laws and decrees which give the military wide
and special powers in certain times and places. In addition to this formal
context there is a less defined area of discourse, which contributes to a
climate of ideas and attitudes about dangers to society and to dominant
institutions summed up in the slogan "nation, religion and monarchy" ˜$
 %# 

There is a context of official organizations of a more or less directly


ideological and/or paramilitary nature, which operates at the village level.
First, there arc the Village Scouts (henceforth VS). The VS were founded in
1971 by the Border Patrol Police20 and have been administered by them in
coordination with the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Education.
Since 1972 they have acted under royal patronage. In the mid-1980s there
were some three million members aged 14 and over, male and female, with no
upper age limit. Although named Village Scouts, many units also exist in
urban areas. In the first five years they recruited 500,000 scouts, and in 1976
over one million in a single year. Members ,are recruited periodically in
numbered cohorts. Local officials encourage villagers to join and may
insinuate that refusal to join can be interpreted as disloyalty and lack of
patriotism. Many poor farmers and their families are members, but they are
not represented proportionally to their numbers,, even less among the leading
members who conduct training sessions. Some are undoubtedly unwilling
volunteers in the first place. One headman was observed making up a list of
fifty names in response to an official request for recruits from his village. On
the other hand, royal patronage and the royal presentation of scarves to
members certainly account for tnany people joining with some enthusiasm.

Village Scouts are funded by a royal grant, private subscriptions, and


frequently from local adn-.inistrative and rural development funds. At the
'.ocal level they are sponsored by officials of all kinds (educational,
administrative, police, military) and local landowners, traders, bankers, and
politicians - in other words the milieu of "kcal power structures" identified
earlier. Religious figures also take part, even spirit mediums, but especially
monks, who participate in the training ceremonies. Explicit purposes include:
fighting communist insurgency, avoiding and preventing labour disputes, and
gathering information about people "who intend harm to the country'.
Loyalty to the state ˜phai irar), and the slogan "Nation, Religion,
Monarchy", are stressed. The word u omian (ideology) is frequently used
in a positive sense as in the statement that VS "have the united ideology of
the nation" or "Village Scouts were able to unite on one occasion when
there was a clear potential appropriate to their u omian, namely 6
October 1976 (Village Scout Centre, 1979). On the occasion referred to, they
paraded en masse, with traditonal Thai swords, to join Border Patrol Police,
municipal police and "Red Gaur" units (see below) to attack students
occupying Thammasat University in Bangkok.

VS overlap in membership, as well as in ideology, with various


paramilitary groups. One such group, Volunteers for Development and the
Prevention and Suppression of Crime, first appeared in Chiangmai, the
northern capital, in 1976; and by 1978 the group had over 1,000 members,
almost exclusively educated, male VS, in that city alone. They described
themselves as a "group senior to Village Scouts". They trained in a royal
monastery, were given powers of arrest, and specific responsibility for political
intelligence gathering (Muecke, 1980:427).
Several paramilitary Volunteer Defence Forces (henceforth VDF), with
various names, and linked with different policies and military units or
fractions, have been in existence since the 1960s. In 1980 they were estimated
to number 52,000 (Bunge, 1980). A later paramilitary group,'the Thai National
Defence Volunteers ˜ # %
#  $  6 set up in 1978, and
currently seems to be the most dynamic. It is sponsored by the Internal
Security Operations Command (ISOC) and is based on a Division of Civil
Defence in the powerful Department of Local Adrrunistration of the Ministry of
the Interior. Army, police, and civil officials participate in training, and
additional sponsorship (including donations of weapons and money) comes
from members of the local power structure. They receive approximately 10-
20 days training, at the end of which some may receive weapons. They are
divided into "development protection and control" and "self-defence" units,
responsible for cooperating with police and military formations. The
potential or recommended scope of VDF activities is very wide: from various
forms of economic and social action, medical and emergency relief, to political.
education, intelligence gathering and more military roles.

In addition to, and overlapping with, the surveillance functions of VS


and VDF there are specially trained "psychological warfare operatives', who
carry special identity cards and are given privileges instead of cash
rewards, and other informers, who are paid according to results. Some
villagers discerned a pattern of co-optation in which government "supporters"
are sent first for training, followed by villagers thought to be critical; then later
each cohort being encouraged to report on the other.

An important theme or function, which is found in a variety of such local


organizations, is intelligence gathering, informing, and surveillance, with the
attendant elements of harassment, provocation, and intimidation - the
classic vigilante syndrome. It can have the effect on poor farmers groups of
restricting freedom of manoeuvre, causing a decline in membership and
a decline or withdrawal of official support or tolerance. A reason commonly
given for not raising voices in protest against abuses of power by local
authorities is "we're afraid of being shot in the head". The effects are likely to
be experienced most immediately and personally by leading members or
advisers of self-help groups, but ultimately by the collective as a whole. A
large number of groups regarded this as a serious problem encountered in
the management of their activities.

However, the effects of "using the people to fight the people" as one
villager put it, are far from totally disabling. For one thing it appears that
the rural poor, though involved, would be prevented from participating on a
commensurate scale given the costs in time and money. Suspicion that
people who do not volunteer to join are "communist" (Muecke,
1980:423) might therefore rebound, since the majority are still non-
members. There are other limitations and self-defeating characteristics.
Budgets tend to run out, and then few members, not icast the trainers,
show any real interest, thus planned schemes die out; activities may not
extend much beyond infrequent training and induction sessions; volunteers
have to contribute time, money and materials, often at short notice and at
agriculturally inconvenient times; complaints are made of the superior
attitudes and behaviour of trainers; finally, "boredorci' is one of the most
widespread criticisms.

Since refusal to join may be interpreted as a sign of disloyalty to the


state, some members will self-consciously distance themselves from the
official purposes of the group. For example, they may insist on serious
discussions which question official definitions of "national security", "en-
emies of the people", etc. Participants in one case study reported the en-
thusiastic shouting at the climax of a VS ceremony, abjuring the enemies
of the nation, religion, and monarchy, not as # (as in the author-
ized liturgy) but as the (nicely rhyming) $ dishonest ones. Infor-
mers may be invited to participate more fully in a group's activities "to
make sure they get the story right". When asked to give information, a
villager may attempt to inform them "...about the harsh conditions of the
poor". Another ploy is to humourously "capitulate" to the accusations by
saying "well, if using our own initiative, setting up our own organization in
pursuit of our livelihood, discussing amongst ourselves in a non
hierarchical way, criticizing corrupt officials, etc. is 'communist', well then so be
it".

One development worker commented that "knowing you're being watched


keeps you working honestly and straightforwardly". But most importantly, if
individuals and groups can manage to continue working undeterred, then their
personal or collective strength and reputation can provide a public
refutation of the substance and legitimacy of such accusations. A
number of groups found that the intensity of such accusatory discourse
diminished over time and became less of a problem. But the constraints, the
potential sanctions, remain, even if held in abeyance; freedom of action is stilt
limited.

In addition to the paramilitary type of organization at the village level,


there are a number of other units that have emerged in the past ten years
which arc more directly repressive and which were initiated or tolcrated by
some official circles. These include the "Red Gaurs" ˜irathing aeng - a gaur
is a kind of wild buffalo), a mercenary group initially sponsored by ISOC, and
which is used in towns and villages for guard duties (for example, on road
construction sites) in remote areas. In 1980 they had an estimated 25,000
members ( Bunge, 1980). There are also the "Rangers" (known, locally at
least, as   %   % 2 "forest soldiers, hunter soldiers"). They
apparently number some 13,000 (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1983). They
operate in relatively autonomous units, though integrated to some degree
into regular military formations. Rangers are reported as having been
responsible for a number of robberies, kidnappings, and. acts of terrorism in
recent years (CGRS, 1981:Vo1.8,No.2; 1982:Vol.5,No.3). A more recent
development, the scale of which is not yet clear, is the appearance since late
1981 of "death squads" (also known in some localities as "hunter killer
units", "ruthless hunter units", "death squad infernal units") set up by
provincial police authorities to pursue criminals and dissidents without due
process of law. There are indications that these units have been responsible
for a number of deaths and disappearances (CGRS, 1982:Vol.6,No.4;
1983:Vo1.7,No.1). Although on a considerably smaller scale this bears a
resemblance to the undercover practice of "salvaging" in the Philippines. The
Thai term is ie÷, which can be translated as "culling" or "salvaging".

The final context of the 'surveillance and intimidation" syndrome is a more


general pattern of violence and homicide in rural areas. For example in
the district of Uthaithani province, in which the project's associated case
study was conducted, the homicide rate in 1984 ± greatly .decreased from
the 1970s - was four times the already high national average of 25 per
100,000 per anum.

Also noteworthy is the widespread legal and illegal distribution and


possession of firearms in Thailand, and the existence of a large number of
people willing to act as "gun hands"; that is to say, to carry out killings on
behalf of others, often for quite a small fee which will vary according to the
rank or importance of the victim. Most of the killings referred to in this
chapter are shootings, at close range, and by such a third party, and
frequently with military weapons such as the M 16 'and AK47 automatic
rifles. The victims are usually carefully selected, but there is also a
phenomenon of less discriminate mass murders. A typical case would be
the throwing of a hand grenade (also widely available) into a crowd at a
temple fair,: causing several deaths and many injuries. '

A large number of cases are reported, officially and in the press, to be


revenge killings or the result of private feuding between rival political and
in
commercial interest groups. For example the two months preceding the
National Assembly elections in April 1983, 20 candidates and campaign
canvassers were killed, nearly all by shooting ˜angioi Post, 17 April
1983). Very often it is the outspoken critic of vested interests and
malpractices who is killed (whether provincial newspaper reporter,
teacher, development worker, elected member of national or provincial
assembly, etc.). Not infrequently the hired hand is identified as a member
(on or off-duty) of one of the official or semi-official organizations we have
discussed. In many of these cases there is little concertn to investigate
the killings or there is a failure to produce, much less charge and
convict, suspects. Some of these deaths are therefore placed in the
category of "extrajudicial" killings;21 that is, homicides which are initiated,
permitted, or tolerated by organs of the state, other than judicial exe-
cutions or deaths 'caused in the course of military engagements.

The clearest case of systematic assassination of popular leaders is the


campaign of violence in 1974-5 against leaders of the Farmers' Fed-
eration of Thailand (see Chapter 3). In that case, violence was perpetrated
against people who were non-violently and democratically organizing for
reform. Since that period, a comparable pattern of selective
assassinations of village level popular leaders, labour leaders, journalists,
development .workers, student activists can be discerned. The
documentation on these assassinations is far from complete. One major
source, a human rights group which is careful not to report cases which
have not been well investigated and established, believes the real number of
assassinations of this kind to be higher than those it reports (CGRS, 1982:
Vol.6,No.4). Referring to eleven assassinations of this type in a six month
period in 1981-2, the group states that 'most of these incidents were
attributable to certain local officials or influential people well-connected with
these officials" (CGRS, 1982: Vol.6,No.2).

It may be argued that this phenomenon of rural violence contributes to


what some development workers have termed a "climate of fear" in which
violent attacks or death by assassination, rather than mere official rebuke or
arrest, is a possible, ultimate sanction. There is a demonstrable link
therefore between extreme physical sanctions and the more widespread
cultural, psychological and legal ones. In this way innucndos and warning
experienced as intimidation.

+70 ! !  )#


 8

In the preceding sections we analysed features of the local social and


political environment and their contexts of power. These are contexts

in which poor farmers' groups have to operate and which set specific
external constraints on how they can organize and what they can achieve.

In this section we shall review certain characteristics internal to official


development organization and method. The selection and assessment is
made from the viewpoint of poor farmers themselves. These views arise from
their experience of working and discussing together before and dur= ing this
research study. '

Positive assessment of official organizations by poor farmers who were


members of these organizations focused on whatever material and economic
benefits were obtainable, particularly access to credit and fertilizer, lower
cost-of inputs compared with retail markets, and technical information and
advice. Negative assessments were more numerous and varied. Some
important themes may be summarized as follows:

O the bewildering array of new projects, with their jargon, acronyms <lnd
roles; the: frequent lack of coordination and cooperation at and
between oOiciallevels and agencies;
O the preponderance of bureaucratic purposes and p'riorities, norms
and mentalities; ex officio control of committees;
O the predominance, among village-level leadership, of members of
minority upper strata and interest groups;
O the exclusion of the majority of poorer households from membership
in groups that are considered beneficial, such as the Farmers'
Groups, credit union schemes, etc,;
O the lack of a continuous and substantial involvement of members in
the decision-making processes, discussions, monitoring and evalu-
ation of group activities;
O the limited range and scope of these activities; the irrelevance of
some of these activities, more specifically, those of a non-economic
nature; and thl': repeated failure to achieve even limited objc:ctives;
the positive discouragement by officials and l~actership, whether in
principle or in praclice, of the extension of activities (to incl'Jde wider
issues and problems) and of relationship to other groups;

the costs to members, in terms of time, effort and money, of in,

volvement in projects of limited advantage to the1'!1 (especially those


less directly or not at all concerned with agricultural development),
and so the diversionary efTect of such involvemellt; and the often
negative, sometimes hostile, attitudes and actions on the part of of-
ficials and leadership tow<lrds the more actonomous efforts of the
poorer farmers to articulate their ideas and to organize them'selves as
distinct groups or as members of official groups.

There has been a proliferation in recent years of olTicial projects at


the local level and a corresponding plethora of committees and volunteer
office-holders. Villagers often have a sense of being bombarded by a
barrage of new acronyms and roles. In some cases villagers will, however
sceptically, try to make the most of the opportunities presented and to
deri ',Ie what advantage they can.   some instances the new structures
exist only on paper. Specific rural development schemes are scathingly
criticized hy turning their acronyms into sardonic puns, so that ro' po' cha'
(Accelerated Rural Development) becomes ruam phuai ihan chug

gathering of the corrupt); or io'so' cho' (Rural Employment


Generation Programme) becomes either iin saam chon eai, (i.e. be on
the take) at three levels (village head, iamnan, and amphur official), or
Iwong sin chaat (cheat the life out of the nation). The recent and now
very widespread community development and moral revivalist campaign
known as phaen in thamm phaen inthong (land of Buddhist virtue,
land of gold) becomes phaen in tho' phaen in thae (land of
desperation). A villager's view of land reform ˜ian phatilup thi in) or
perhaps "reform" in a general sense ˜ian phatilup) is indicated in the
pun ian phat phat lup [up (patting and stroking, mollifying).

This proliferation of new official "titles" is but one example of the


inculcation of bureaucratic culture and practices. They are symptoms of
a drive for standardization, which can be seen as another fonn of
control. Thcy also include forms of registration and regulations, and
official jargon, as well as forms of remuneration or compensation: daily
allowances, tolerated private use of public funds, fees and percentages;
for example "forest protection volunteers" receive 50 per cent of the
fines that are imposed. They include style and scheduling of meetings
along official bureaucratic lines: usually in official hours and on official
working days; officials speaking very formally through microphones
before an audience with little or no two-way communication. It was
indicated that such rules and procedures were not adjusted to suit local
priorities with their cultural and practical requirements and that official
purposes are served rather than the needs and interests of the poorer
farmers and landless workers.

Members of this minority are able to use their positions to advance


their interests. They are often able to combine their modem education
with an ability to make use of more traditional values and relationships
of a'uthority, superiority and command. Poor fanners are exciuded from
fuller participation by the distinct and often financially demanding social,
practices of this social milieu, for example: exclusive marriage choices,
forms of speech, dress, transport; patterns of display and consumption
(for example, "drinking circles"), travelling to towns, socializing amongst
themselves and with urban, official or com:nercial strata. In the last
analysis, such leadership may resort to more coerciv~ measures. This
may be through the mediation of official laws and law-enforcers or
through less formal and even illegal means.

We can now begin to see more clearly some of the crucial constraints
on participation which involve the setting of priorities, expressing new
needs and issues on a continuing basis, and monitoring and assessing
group activities. Faced by such constraints, members of these groups,
eyen if they are discontented, are likely to remain passive and
deferential. Their scepticism, and perhaps their reli:lnce on personal but
unequal relationships, increases. In turn this permits the leadership, and
stronger and wealthier members to pursue unchallenged their
"legitimate", if unfair, advantages. It also removes from sight and scrutiny,
from collective accountability and control, activities of a corrupt and illegal
nature. Thus it may never be known why, or even that, a sack of fertilizer
costs more than it should; or why a particular person received the
building contract; or what the size of the budget was and whether it was
legitimate to use it in a certain way.

In cases where poorer farmers had been drawn into, or caught up In ,


officially instituted organizations which did not serve their interests or
most urgent needs, this "participation" (in the official sense) was often
assessed as diversionary, and even systematically demobiiizing. In short,
it was often considered to be a waste of time, money and effort. Some-
times such involvement was voluntary, at least at first, though apprehen-
sion of the social consequences of not joining in was often a constraining
factor. There are cases too where members and even "leaders" are
simply designated by headmen and others. We also recorded examplc~
of members of poor farmers' groups being quite deliberately coopted by
local powerholders in order to gain" popular" support and information
about the activities of villagers, and to prevent and undermine
autonomous, non-official initiatives. It is true that in the case of many
official groups little time or effort is demanded, or even permitted, and
indeed this can be part of the problem. In many cases, however, time
spent in what are considered to be irrelevant kinds of meetings and
"training" can be demanding. One poor farmers' leader underwent
training for a "volunteer" project which involved three "seminars" - five
days in the village, then nine days in the provincial town, and a further
five days in the village. In this case his expenses were not paid, nor was
his loss of earnings compensated. However, when this same farmer
readily sacrificed his time and energy to poor farmers' projects, he met
with hostility (in the form of the *politicar' insinuati:ms discussed above)
from the officials who had requisitioned his labour for the "volunteer"
scheme. He contrasted these attitudes with some bitterness ..

Once again, it is important to note that numerous examples can be


found, some of them within the project areas, of official support, whether
formal or informal, for some of the more autonomous organizations and
initiatives of the rural poor. This support may come from individual officers
or from certain official institutions or departments which may not.

necessarily be those represented at the district level. Despite such


examples, the project identified a pervasive negative, and even
hostile, attitude to such efforts at greater participation originating from
within the leadership of official village-level organizations and their
higher level associates.

Some of the ways in which such attitudes are expressed, and may
become material forms of coercion and control have already been dis-
cussed. They may also be found to some extent in non-official, non-
governmental organizations. In one case a group of non-official
development workers and poor farmers' leaders were invited to visit
the project of a long-established non-governmental organization
supported by an international agency. After many formalities, a
spontaneous dialogue began between the visitors and local poor
farmers. Discussion turned to problems of tenant-landlord relations. At
this point, a senior official representing the NGO, insisted on bringing
the discussion to an end and addressed the visitors with these words:
"You have stimulated them quite enough, it's time to go nov/'.

Poor farmers frequemly meet with a range of antagonism. At one


end, and more rarely, are the extreme forms of intimidaticn referred to
earEer. Calculated lack of cooperation and material support are more
common. The head teacher may refuse the use of school buildings for
evening meetings. Access to official channels of information, advice or
material aid may be blocked. Attempts may be made to set up rival or-
ganizations or to incorporate the more autonomous organizations into
more official ones (as in the case of the Credit Union in Samoeng dis-
cussed in Chapter 4). The Yasothorn Farmers' Group's experience of
trying to extend and develop forms of cooperation and coordination be-
tween the district's groups is matched in many other cases. They pre-
sented their initiative within the format of an officially recognized
organization, without any imposing ideas of federation. The initiative
met with substantial resistance, arid was accused of being "political"
and of not having been envisaged or permitted by official plans and
regulations.

Diversion of effort and co-optation may also stem from theactivities of


"private sector" agencies. In the Chachoengsaocase, villagers had
three times offered local land for the construction of a secondary
school, a medical centre, and a highway department. depot,
respectively. They wcre mostly members of one of the self-help groups
described above. By participating in the planning process they hoped
for mu~h needed economic and social benefits for the locality. In eaeh
case they were':outbid~ by a local merchant who managed to divert
the schemes to areas where he would stand to benefit economically and
improve his personal social standing and official connections.

I n the model resettlement scheme in the same area the new settlers
were at first required to build their houses in a uniform "modern" style but
their decision to use old building materials prevailed. The large meeting
hall, made of bamboo walls and roofed with grasses, was required to be
rebuilt with hardwood, and to a copy-book design. This insulting and
wasteful undertaking was supported by the provincial Rotary Club whose
plaque eventually adorned the wall above the platform. This "cosmetic"
adjustment completely contradicted the decision of the settlers'
comm.ittee. It was imposed in order to meet the requirements of the
sponsoring foundation for a proper location for the opening ceremony on
the 200th anniversary of the founding of Bangkok and the reigning
dynasty. For this same purpose the village children were instructed in
polite, upper-register forms of social address, so that they might properly
greet and speak to visiting dignitaries.

I n this case the villagers assert.ed themselves on one small issue,


but. could not. prevail against insistent outside interests which they
perceived to be at best. irrelevant and at worst contrary to their own
material interests and cultural preferences. This may be an example of a
relatively "soft." form of social control, but we have seen how other
groups met with more int.imidating and coercive opposition. Attacks on
the reputation of the leadership of self-help groups, negative insinuations
as to t.heir patriotism, legality and purpose, are frequently made during
official meetings, incIud:ng those of the ideological and/or paramilitary
kind. It is not surprising therefore that some members of self-r..elp groups
see these organizations as ways in which "the people are set against the
people~ and that the issuing of firearms to selected members is seen as
a means of further protecting established interest groups, and not as a
means of "community defence", as is claimed.

The following account of an officially instigated ~project~ is from the


Uthaithani case study. was launched and encouraged within the official
discourse of "development" and ~participation". It illustrates "a number of
the criticisms raised above: bureau,:ratic" standardization, cooptation of
village leaders, marginal, if any, relevance to local needs. It also
introduces a new theme of increasing importance, namely,
competitiveness.

At the instigation of the District Office, the iam nan entered the village for
a provincial competition. The normal practice is for each dis y the
construction of awnings and name signs at the front of each house.
The fenCe-building was effected by the constant exhortations of the
iamnan, who threatened to withhold statutory services, such as issuing
identity cards, to anyone who refused to comply. Villagers themselves
had to provide materiah such as wood, bamboo and nails. This
involved considerable expense, due to the shortage of locally available
materials. Despite some grumbling, most of the road frontage was
fenced, but the backs of houses were not. In a nearby village,
however, with a stronger tradition of selforganization, it was decided to
take a common stand against fence building unless the iamnan
provided the materials, since it was felt that the fences provided no
tangible benefit and that, in any case, they would soon fall into
disrepair. This united stand taken at the regular meeting of villagers to
discuss their rice bank and ether community matters raised the
confid~nce of individuals to resist the scheme.

The non-material side of the preparations for the competition was


to set up eight development groups ˜ um phattalUla). At a village
meeting, the iamnan divided the. village into groups and appointed
group heads to each one. -The iamnan relayed orders via these
leaders, which often placed them in an uncomfortable position since'
they were not naturalleaders and his orders were considered by the
group members to be whimsical. The first duty was for each group to
provide several "volunteers" to visit a village in the neighbouring
province that had won the previous year's regional competition. The
volunteers had to provide the ° ÷aht bus fare. Only half presented
themselves. After some discussion the iamnan agreed to pay the
remainder of the bus hire fee. In his wel-

. coming . speech, the District Officer offered advice on how to win a


competition - this consisted mainly of how to take good care of the
judging committee and how to catch their attention, for example, by
selecting a pretty girl to welcome the judges. During the visit to the
village, the villagers provided a hospitable welcome and showed the
group the

trict to concentrate its resources on a single village which is to be used


as an example of "developmenC to visiting senior officials. In this
'case, village development involved a number of stages. The first and
most visible effort was to build bamboo fences around each house
plot. The purpose of this is twofold from the point of view of the District
Office. First, it gives the appearance of "civilization" ˜ihwam
rungreuang), not of a "messy" ˜ieeia) village. (Fines were suggested
for leaving cattle dung on main village paths!) Second, it enhances
control over villagers by district and village officials - expressed as
"poiihro'ng ngait' (literally, "ease of administration"), since it allows for
easy identification of house plots and residents. This 'practice is
further enhanced b exemplary houses that had been selected for their
cleanliness and conformity with official standards.

At the meeting which followed the fence building project, the District
Agricultural Extension Officer spoke of his admiration for the manner in which
the village had "developed" almost overnight. The material effect was less
enthusiastically appreciated by some villagers, who in the past would have
been able to cut across each other's land but now had to walk longer
distances because of the fencing. The principal benefit went to the iam nan,
who came 'second in the annual award ceremony r ih"'aam ii
ihwaam cho'÷" or "merit points") for which he received an undisclosed sum
of money from the provincial administration. Had he been awarded first
place, he would have received a gold medal and a revolver. Subsequently,
his uncharacteristic burst of enthusiasm for village "development" waned.
Indeed, this burst had surprised many villagers who had grown accustomed
to his concern for his own private business affairs. The following year the
fences fell into disrepair.

"Internal" problems of poor farmers' organizations

So far in this chapter we have examined the constraints placed on the


self-expression and self-organization of the rural poor which originate
HoutsideH their own social sphere. We shall now turn our attention to some
limitations and difficulties which are more Hinternal" to the everyday social
and cultural activities of the rural poor, especially as they affect education
and the labour precess. Next, we shall consider issues of gender, authority
and leadership. The aim is to emphasize themes that were perceived to be
problematic in the course of the collaborative research.

Lack of education or literacy was frequently raised as a problem,


especially a lack of fluency in the standard "Central" Thai language (for
northerners and north easterners)," and knowledge" of basic accounting
skills. Appropriate technical and socialjpolitical knowledge were also
considered important and this raised the problem of the relevance of formal
education.

All villages - with the important exception of many ethnic minority


villages in mountainous and forest areas - have access to schools which
offer the first four years of compulsory primary education. Nearly all
children complete this stage, though many have to repear one or more
years and completion is ·no guarantee of continuing literacy or
numeracy. In 1978 only slightly more than half of all children completed
the last three years of primary education; under one-third completed the
first three years, and half this number the last three years of secondary
education; only 3.5 per cent attended university.

While there is a steady trend towards greater educational provisions


there is a continuing bias favouring certain social classes and regions
over others, towns over the country and Bangkok over the rest of the
country. Thus in 1973-74, 74 per cent of university students came from
families of businessmen or government officials; 13 per cent from
families of other employment and only 6 per cent from agricultural
backgrounds (of all classes). Of all of these not fewer than 59 per cent
came from Bangkok (approximately to per cent of the population) and
only 8 per cent from the Kortheast (approximately 34 per cent of the
population). Even with improved access to education the problem of
content remains; 8. content which, as numerous critical educationalists
attest, reflects an educational culture which encourages a bureaucratic
outlook <md, in the Thai phrase, the desire to be "masters over others"
˜pen cao ihan nai ihan). Comprehensive changes in the content and
purpose of education are unlikely to occur without even greater social
and economic changes preceding and accompanying educational
change in the larger scciety.2Z

One effect, if not purpose, of many dominant. educational systems -


and Thailand is no exception - is to ignore or disr!llsS as irrelevant, at
least to discredit, many pre-eyjsting traditional and popular forms of
knowledge and skills and with them, powers of decision-making and re-
sponsibility. Much ofIicial "development" thinking and training starts with
a baseline notion of rural . ignorance. Such values can be internalized,
thus giving rise to a sense of inherent ignorance or lack of ability. This
was recognized to be a problem in many of the poor farmers' groups. To
some extent the difficulties were overcome as more group members
participated in discussions and assumed responsibilities. Efforts were
made to emphasize local history, to assess, adapt to or transform earlier
values and forms of community relations and experience. Even on this
seemingly innocuous ground, some groups met with resistance. In the
Udorn case an evening self-education class had to be discontinued

22 "Education and Popular Participation" was the topic of one of the


special issue papers produced by the project.

after insinuations were made of subversive activity. (Why should a poor


farmer need a blackboard in his bouse?) There arc of course other traditions
and sources of knowledge to be drawn from, sources such as Buddhist
philosophy, or the experience and knowledge derived from travelling and
working away from the village. These traditional, popular and alternative
sources of knowledge contributed profoundly to the resources of the
participatory group.

Changes in types and relations of production, and diminishing control


over them, have had deep social implications in the labour process. [n
earlier, more subsistence-oriented periods of peasant life there had beeil
greater uniformity of labour processes. greater collective participation in
production, fewer distinctions between" economically" as opposed to socially
and culturally productive tasks, Great value had been attached to visits
between households, talking at length among groups iil working places or
during frequent domestic and temple ceremonies.

T aday there is an intensification of work of purely economic kind, There


is a new division oflabour and there are more varied and numerous
productive activities, labour processes and locations. This has had a socially
fragmenting effect, separating households or neighhours, reducing the time,
eneq~y and willingness of people to meet together regularly, to take on
positions of leadership and t.o engage in unpaid labour. Poor farmers often
find that certain issues, interpersonal differences and CODDicts are left
unresolved due to a lack of time for joint discussion, This has led to an
accumulation of misunderstandings (misplaced suspicions, ,esentment,
envy, jealousy, blame, etc.) which affect collective activity. As was mentioned
earlier, recognizing the problems and the fact that these problems are not
necessarily inherent to particular localities or ciasses of people is held to be
a positive step in the process of overcoming them, .

Until now we have referred to "new" difficulties ansmg out of a changing


situation. There is a further set of limitations, however, which are culturally
more deep-rooted, notably attitudes and behaviour relining to age, gender,
kinship and authority. Of course it may be argued that they, too, have been
"externally" derived - produced'in and by the dominant culture and social
order of earlier times. They are what critical intellectuals term feudal
˜sai ina) values. These differences continue to be selectively reinforced in
dominant cultural discourse or ideology. In any case they have been
internalized and practised as part of village-level or peasant culture. For
example, respect for and deference to elders is emphasized at all levels of
Thai society. They are overridden only in cases

after insinuations were made of subversive activity. (Why should a poor


farmer need a blackboard in his bouse?) There arc of course other traditions
and sources of knowledge to be drawn from, sources such as Buddhist
philosophy, or the experience and knowledge derived from travelling and
working away from the village. These traditional, popular and alternative
sources of knowledge contributed profoundly to the resources of the
participatory group.

Changes in types and relations of production, and diminishing control


over them, have had deep social implications in the labour process. [n
earlier, more subsistence-oriented periods of peasant life there had beeil
greater uniformity of labour processes. greater collective participation in
production, fewer distinctions between" economically" as opposed to socially
and culturally productive tasks, Great value had been attached to visits
between households, talking at length among groups iil working places or
during frequent domestic and temple ceremonies.

T aday there is an intensification of work of purely economic kind, There


is a new division oflabour and there are more varied and numerous
productive activities, labour processes and locations. This has had a socially
fragmenting effect, separating households or neighhours, reducing the time,
eneq~y and willingness of people to meet together regularly, to take on
positions of leadership and t.o engage in unpaid labour. Poor farmers often
find that certain issues, interpersonal differences and CODDicts are left
unresolved due to a lack of time for joint discussion, This has led to an
accumulation of misunderstandings (misplaced suspicions, ,esentment,
envy, jealousy, blame, etc.) which affect collective activity. As was mentioned
earlier, recognizing the problems and the fact that these problems are not
necessarily inherent to particular localities or ciasses of people is held to be
a positive step in the process of overcoming

them, .

Until now we have referred to "new" difficulties ansmg out of a changing


situation. There is a further set of limitations, however, which are culturally
more deep-rooted, notably attitudes and behaviour relining to age, gender,
kinship and authority. Of course it may be argued that they, too, have been
"externally" derived - produced'in and by the dominant culture and social
order of earlier times. They are what critical intellectuals term feudal
˜sai ina) values. These differences continue to be selectively reinforced in
dominant cultural discourse or ideology. In any case they have been
internalized and practised as part of village-level or peasant culture. For
example, respect for and deference to elders is emphasized at all levels of
Thai society. They are overridden only in cases of exceptional differences
in social status (aristocratic or bureaucratic rank, sacerdotal status, etc).
Often this results in an unwillingness to speak out, or to criticize or
contradict seniors. This tendency can lead to extreme dependence on
leaders-even within some of the more successful self-help groups.
However, many village values and relations of kinship and
neighbourliness, are seen to have positive aspects. Usually it is the
poor, however, regardless of age or gender, who ha ve no voice.

That the issue of gender was only gradually raised and developed in
the course of the project reflects not only the large preponderance of
men engaged in the discussions but also the very ~normality" of the
prevailing cultural definitions of women. By comparison with many other
Asian societies Thai women have a relatively high status and degree of
involvement in production and community life. However, many cultural
definitions of women encourage notions that they are weak, morally in-
ferior, and that they are individually and socially subordinate to men.

The experience of some groups showed that unmarried women, and


perhaps older married ones (benefitting from relative age if not "modern"
education), had a better chance of playing a larger social role. Some
men claimed that women showed greater strength and ability than men,
"leaving earlier to go to the fields, and continuing to work in the home
afo:er their return". There was agreement, of a self-critical nature, that in
practice men did not permit women to take on larger roles such as full
participation in group activities and responsibilities. It ;s a bitter iron)", to
say the least, that in the light of the difIicu!ties poor farmers have in
making themselves heard outside their own sphere, a poor farmers'
committee could restrict the participation of women for fear they may
speak teo much.23 Official development schemes usually include'
housewives' groups and young women's groups. These tend to restrict
the participation of women to limited areas of activity, and so to
marginalize women from major issues of production and community
organization.

Attitudes of deference and compliance towards leaders are linked


with long-established cultural notions of proper respect for men. Outside
the village sphere, or milieu of poor farmers, these attitudes arc
sometimes bound with feelings of fear. The Thai vocabulary is rich in
terms whose basic meaning suggests fear and respect. Thus, deference
to leaders is

23 One response to the inadequate treatment of the issue of gender


in this research project was the commissioning by UNRISD of a
follow-up study specifically on this issue. See Gail O m\"cdt, .1986.
lbis contains bibliographical references to recent work done by
women and on wo men's issues. See also Noeleen Heyzer, 1986.

commonly perceived to be a serious problem within poor farmers' groups, not


least hy the caders themsc\ves. This raises severe obstacles within collective
decision-making processes. Leading committee members might be regarded
as "sumeone to rely on" ˜thii phoeng), more a refuge than just a reliable
person, or as a "magical solution" ˜yaa wiset). Even wrong decisions might
be complied with, ignoring or suppressing collective responsibility for
correcting or abandoning them.

Problems of leadership featured prominently in the discussions of the


project. The energy and quality of work of a small number of poor farmers'
leaders.- in some ca.ses just one or two individuals - and associated
\'olunteers or development workers were judged, in almost all cases, to be
crucial for the successful self-organization of the rural poor.

These problems can make it increasingly difficult for the leadership of


poor farmers' groups to delegate or share work and responsibility and to build
up an expanding core of experienced members. There arc many ways in
which local leadership is exposed, isolated and made vulnerable. They are
the prime targets for all forms of external opposition. At one extreme we have
documented instances of assassinations and of ambushes that led to
serious, sometimes fatal, wounding from guns and grenades. On a more
normal scale there are forms of surveillance, informing, accusation and
intimidation referred to earlier. Mail may be intercept.ed and travel restricted,
for example, by carefully timed official visits and requests.

The role of a leader in many of these cases is a complex one. Leaders


are expected to participate not only in poor farmers' activities but also in
official NvolunteerH activities and in community work (health, ~port, religious
and youth activities, etc.). If they do not participate they may be regarded as
divisive or insulliciently public-spirited. And if, as one villager ruefully put it,
they should decide for domestic or tactical reasons to adopt a low proiile,
<,.nd temporarily disengage from all community activities, this too, would
arouse official suspicion. At the same time poor farmers' leaders have to
work to secure their own livelihood. All leading members of poor farmers'
groups spoke of severe economic problems, even of crises, caused by the
sacrifice of time and efTort to collective work. In some cases this led to
domestic conflicts, psychological strains, and thus to resignation or
decreasing participatory efTorts on their part. This also afTected
administrative efficiency and decreased the time spent on analysing and
solving problems. Occasionally, misunderstandings and tensions within
groups, and a lack of cooperation or infringement of rules, resulted.

any of these problems were ii1so experienced by lowly paid but full-
time community organizers and volunteer development workers. Such
problems were generally inadequately appreciated by outside sources of
support, whether official or unofficial. Self-reliant, autonomous associ-
ations of the rural poor have a need for outside support such as networks
of information, legal aid and defence. Many poor farmers' leaders have
much wider social experience than other members and thus are in a posi-
tion to communicate with and mobilize potential "external" allies. This
includes experience gained as village headmen, or from travelling and re-
siding in city temples as ordained members of the Buddhist sangha, or
through work in cities and factories. A few have been invited to visit other
Asian countries (Bangladesh, Philippines, Sri Lanka) under the auspices

. of religious or philanthropic organizations concerned with economic and


social development. Ironical!y this can also have the negative effect of
distancing leaders from the villagers, not so much in economic terms, but
through the use of a "new" language and the acquisition of a new status.