Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

NORMA A. ABDULLA, G.R. NO. 150129

Petitioner,
Present:

- versus - PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CARPIO MORALES, and
Respondent. GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:

April 6, 2005
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Convicted by the Sandiganbayan[1] in its Crim. Case No. 23261 of the

crime of illegal use of public funds defined and penalized under Article 220
of the Revised Penal Code, or more commonly known as technical
malversation, appellant Norma A. Abdulla is now before this Court on
petition for review under Rule 45.

Along with Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, appellant was charged
under an Information which pertinently reads:
 That on or about November, 1989 or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Jolo, Sulu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused: NORMA A. ABDULLA and
NENITA P. AGUIL, both public officers, being then the President and
cashier, respectively, of the Sulu State College, and as such by reason of
their positions and duties are accountable for public funds under their
administration, while in the performance of their functions, conspiring and
confederating with MAHMUD I. DARKIS, also a public officer, being
then the Administrative Officer V of the said school, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without lawful authority, apply for
the payment of wages of casuals, the amount of FORTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P40,000.00), Philippine Currency, which amount was
appropriated for the payment of the salary differentials of secondary
school teachers of the said school, to the damage and prejudice of public
service.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Appellants co-accused, Nenita Aguil and Mahmud Darkis, were both

acquitted. Only appellant was found guilty and sentenced by the
Sandiganbayan in its decision[2] dated August 25, 2000 (promulgated on
September 27,2000), as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Mahmud Darkis

and Nenita P. Aguil are hereby acquitted of the crime charged. The cash
bond posted by each of the said accused for their provisional liberty are
hereby ordered returned to each of them subject to the usual auditing and
accounting procedures.

Accused Norma Abdulla is hereby convicted of the crime charged

and is hereby meted a fine of three thousand pesos, pursuant to the second
paragraph of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. She is further
imposed the penalty of temporary special disqualification for a period of
six (6) years. She shall also pay the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.
 Upon motion for reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan amended
appellants sentence by deleting the temporary special disqualification
imposed upon her, thus:

Premises considered, the decision of this Court dated August 25,

2000, is hereby amended to the effect that the penalty of temporary special
disqualification for six (6) years is hereby cancelled and set aside. Hence,
the last paragraph of said decision shall read as follows:

Accused Abdulla is hereby convicted of the crime

charged and is hereby meted a fine of three thousand pesos,
pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code. She shall also pay the costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.[3]

Still dissatisfied, appellant, now before this Court, persistently pleas

innocence of the crime charged.

The record shows that the prosecution dispensed with the

presentation of testimonial evidence and instead opted to mark in evidence
the following exhibits:

EXHIBITS DESCRIPTION

A Audit Report which is denominated as Memorandum of

Commission on Audit, Region IX, Zamboanga City, from
the Office of the Special Audit Team, COA, dated May 8,
1992, consisting of nine (9) pages;

B Certified Xerox copy of a letter from the Department of

Budget and Management through Secretary Guillermo N.
Carague to the President of the Sulu State College dated
October 30, 1989;

C Certified copy of the DBM Advice of Allotment for the Year

1989;

C-1 The entry appearing in Exhibit C which reads: Purpose

release partial funding for the conversion of 34 Secondary
 School Teacher positions to Instructor I items; Fund Source
lump-sum appropriation authorized on page 370 of RA 6688
and the current savings under personal services;

D Manifestation filed by accused Norma Abdulla herself dated

November 24, 1997 consisting of two (2) pages appearing
on pages 225 to 226 of the record;

E Motion filed by the accused through Atty. Sandra Gopez

dated February 9, 1998 found on pages 382-a and 382-b of
the records of this case; and

F Prosecutions Opposition to the motion marked as Exhibit E

dated February 11, 1998, consisting of three (3) pages,
appearing in pages 383 to 385 of the record.[4]

Thereafter, the prosecution immediately made its Formal Offer of

Evidence, and, with the admission thereof by the court, rested its case.

The defense proceeded to adduce its evidence by presenting four (4)

witnesses, namely, accused Mahmud Darkis, who was the Administrative
Officer of Sulu State College, Jolo, Sulu; accused Nenita Aguil, the Cashier
of the same College; appellant Norma Abdulla herself, who was the College
President; and Gerardo Concepcion, Jr., Director IV and Head of the
Department of Budget and Management, Regional Office No. 9, Zamboanga
City.

The undisputed facts, as found by the Sandiganbayan itself:

The evidence on record xxx show that the request for the
conversion of thirty-four (34) secondary school teachers to Instructor I
items of the Sulu State College, through its former president, accused
Abdulla, was approved by the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM); that consequent to the approval of the said request, was the
allotment by the DBM of the partial funding for the purpose of paying the
salary differentials of the said thirty-four (34) secondary school teachers
in the amount of forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) sourced from the lump
sum appropriation authorized on page 370 of R.A. 6688 [should be page
396 of RA 6688 (General Appropriations Act January 1 December 31,
1989)] and the current savings under personal services of said school
 (Exhibits `B, `C and `C-1; Exhibit `18, pp. 32-35; tsn, hearing of
September 22, 1998, pp. 6 to 25 and 26); that out of the thirty-four (34)
secondary school teachers, only the six (6) teachers were entitled and paid
salary differentials amounting to P8,370.00, as the twenty-eight (28)
teachers, who were occupying Teacher III positions, were no longer
entitled to salary differentials as they were already receiving the same
salary rate as Instructor I (Exhibit `A, p. 4, par. 1; Exhibits `1 to `6,
inclusive; Exhibit `14-A; tsn, hearing of September 22, 1998, pp. 6 to 8;
tsn, hearing of September 23, 1998, pp. 10-11); and that the amount of
P31,516.16, taken from the remaining balance of the P40,000.00
allotment, was used to pay the terminal leave benefits of the six (6) casuals
(Exhibits `D and `E; Exhibits `7 to `12, inclusive; tsn, hearing of
September 22, 1998, pp. 13 and 34; tsn, hearing of September 23, 1998,
p. 13).

Accused Abdulla was able to sufficiently justify the payment of

the salary differentials of only six (6), out of the thirty-four (34) teachers,
when she testified that out of the thirty-four (34) teachers, twenty-eight
(28) were already holding the position of Secondary School Teacher III
receiving the salary of Instructor I; and that the remaining six (6) were still
holding Secondary Teacher II positions and therefore receiving a salary
lower than that of Instructor I so they were paid salary differentials (tsn,
hearing of September 23, 1998, pp. 8, 10 and 11). In fact, the notarized
audit investigation report (Exhibit `A, p. 4, 1st par.) and the Joint
Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao (Exhibit `14-a),
also point that said act of the accused is justified.

In this recourse, appellant questions the judgment of conviction

rendered against her, claiming that the Sandiganbayan erred:

XXX ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN INVOKING THE

PRESUMPTION OF UNLAWFUL INTENT DESPITE EVIDENCE TO
THE CONTRARY.

II

XXX ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE

PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE THAT PETITIONER
 COMMITTED TECHNICAL MALVERSATION UNDER ARTICLE
220 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

The Court grants the appeal.

So precious to her is the constitutional right of presumption of
innocence unless proven otherwise that appellant came all the way to this
Court despite the fact that the sentence imposed upon her by the
Sandiganbayan was merely a fine of three thousand pesos, with no
imprisonment at all. And recognizing the primacy of the right, this Court,
where doubt exists, has invariably resolved it in favor of an accused.
In a judgment of acquittal in favor of two (2) accused charged of
murder in People vs. Abujan,[5] the Court wrote:

We are enraged by the shocking death suffered by the victim and

we commiserate with her family. But with seeds of doubt planted in our
minds by unexplained circumstances in this case, we are unable to accept
the lower courts conclusion to convict appellants. We cannot in
conscience accept the prosecutions evidence here as sufficient proof
required to convict appellants of murder. Hence, here we must reckon
with a dictum of the law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus. All doubts must
be resolved in favor of the accused. Nowhere is this rule more compelling
than in a case involving the death penalty for a truly humanitarian Court
would rather set ten guilty men free than send one innocent man to the
death row. Perforce, we must declare both appellants not guilty and set
them free.

Similarly, the Court had to acquit an accused charged of rape

in People vs. De Jesus[6] on ground of reasonable doubt, to wit:
With seeds of doubt planted in our minds by the conduct of
proceedings on record, we are unable to accept the lower courts
conclusion to convict appellant. His conviction is founded on the sole
testimony of Agnes, but though a credible witness despite her mental
retardation, she showed unnecessary dependence on her mother when
identifying the father of her child. Maternal coaching taints her
testimony. That her mother had to be ordered by the judge to go outside
the courtroom impresses us as significant. We are unable to accept as
sufficient the quantum of proof required to convict appellant of rape based
on the alleged victims sole testimony. Hence, here we must fall back on
 a truism of the law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus. All doubts must be
resolved in favor of the accused.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated May 26, 2000, of the

Regional Trial Court of Camiling, Tarlac, Branch 68, is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Appellant RUBEN LUMIBAO is ACQUITTED of the
charge of rape on reasonable doubt.

The Courts faithful adherence to the constitutional directive imposes

upon it the imperative of closely scrutinizing the prosecutions evidence to
assure itself that no innocent person is condemned and that conviction flows
only from a moral certainty that guilt has been established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. In the words of People vs. Pascua[7]:
Our findings in the case at bar should not create the mistaken
impression that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses should
always be looked at with askance. What we are driving at is that every
accused is presumed innocent at the onset of an indictment. But, it has
often happened that at the commencement of a trial, peoples minds,
sometimes judges too, would have already passed sentence against the
accused. An allegation, or even any testimony, that an act was done
should never be hastily accepted as proof that it was really done. Proof
must be closely examined under the lens of a judicial microscope and only
proof beyond reasonable doubt must be allowed to convict. Here, that
quantum of proof has not been satisfied.

We shall now assay appellants guilt or innocence in the light of the

foregoing crucibles.

In her first assigned error, appellant contends that the prosecution

failed to adduce evidence to prove criminal intent on her part. When she
raised this issue in her Motion for Reconsideration before the
Sandiganbayan, that court, invoking Section 5 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, ruled in a Resolution[8]promulgated on September 17, 2001, as
follows:

Anent the allegation of the movant/accused that good faith is a

valid defense in a prosecution for malversation as it would negate criminal
 intent on the part of the accused which the prosecution failed to prove,
attention is invited to pertinent law and rulings of the Supreme Court on
the matter.

Sec. 5(b) of the Rule 131, Rules of Court, provides, `That an

unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent. Hence, dolo may be
inferred from the unlawful act. In several cases (Tria, 17 Phil. 303;
Ballesteros, 25 Phil. 634; Sia Tioan, 54 Phil. 52; Cueto, 38 Phil. 935;
Cubelo, 106 Phil. 496), the Supreme Court ruled that `When it has been
proven that the appellants committed the unlawful acts alleged, it is
properly presumed that they were committed with full knowledge and
with criminal intent, `and it is incumbent upon them to rebut such
presumption. Further, the same court also ruled that when the law plainly
forbids an act to be done, and it is done by a person, the law implies the
guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the
meaning of the law which he had violated (State vs. McBrayer, 98 NIC
619; Sing Cong Bieng and Co Kong, 30 Phil. 577, 580; Hermenigildo
Bautista, CA 40 O.G. 5th Supp. 139). If the act is criminal, then criminal
intent is presumed (Francisco y Martin, CA 53 O.G. 1450).

In the case at bar, inasmuch as the prosecution had proved that a

criminal act was committed by the accused under Article 220 of the
Revised Penal Code, criminal intent was presumed. The accused did not
present any evidence to prove that no such criminal intent was present
when she committed the unlawful act of technical malversation. Hence,
the presumption that the unlawful act of the accused was done with
criminal intent had been satisfactorily proven by the prosecution (Sec.
5[b], Rule 131).

The Court must have to part ways with the Sandiganbayan in its
reliance on Section 5 (b) of Rule 131 as basis for its imputation of criminal
intent upon appellant.

For sure, the procedural rule relied upon does not apply at all to this
case. Indeed, clear it is from its very language that the disputable
presumption of the existence of unlawful or criminal intent presupposes the
commission of an unlawful act. Thus, intent to kill is presumed when the
victim dies because the act of killing clearly constitutes an unlawful
act. In People vs. Gemoya,[9] the Court held:
 The intent to kill is likewise presumed from the fact of death,
unless the accused proves by convincing evidence that any of the
justifying circumstances in Article 11 or any of the exempting
circumstances in Article 12, both of the Revised Penal Code, is present.

In fact, in a Resolution penned by Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. in People

vs. Delim, [10] the Court en banc categorically stated:

If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor,

intent to kill is conclusively presumed. (Emphasis supplied).

Similarly, intent to gain or animus lucrandi is presumed when one is

found in possession of stolen goods precisely because the taking of anothers
property is an unlawful act. So it is that in People vs. Reyes,[11] the Court
held:

Accused-appellants contention that the animus lucrandi was not

sufficiently established by the prosecution is devoid of merit. Animus
lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established
through the overt acts of the offender. Although proof of motive for the
crime is essential when the evidence of the robbery is circumstantial,
intent to gain or animus lucrandi may be presumed from the furtive taking
of useful property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances
reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator. The intent to gain
may be presumed from the proven unlawful taking. In the case at bar,
the act of taking the victims wristwatch by one of the accused Cergontes
while accused-appellant Reyes poked a knife behind him sufficiently gave
rise to the presumption.

The presumption of criminal intent will not, however, automatically

apply to all charges of technical malversation because disbursement of
public funds for public use is per se not an unlawful act. Here, appellant
cannot be said to have committed an unlawful act when she paid the
obligation of the Sulu State College to its employees in the form of terminal
leave benefits such employees were entitled to under existing civil service
laws. Thus, in a similar case,[12] the Court reversed a conviction for technical
malversation of one who paid out the wages of laborers:

There is no dispute that the money was spent for a public purpose
payment of the wages of laborers working on various projects in the
municipality. It is pertinent to note the high priority which laborers wages
enjoy as claims against the employers funds and resources.

In the absence of any presumption of unlawful intent, the burden of

proving by competent evidence that appellants act of paying the terminal
leave benefits of employees of the Sulu State College was done with criminal
intent rests upon the prosecution.

The Court notes the odd procedure which the prosecution took in
discharging its undertaking to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable
doubt. As it is, the prosecution did not present any single witness at all, not
even for the purpose of identifying and proving the authenticity of the
documentary evidence on which it rested its case. The prosecution definitely
failed to prove unlawful intent on the part of appellant.

Settled is the rule that conviction should rest on the strength of

evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. The
weakness of the defense does not relieve it of this responsibility. And
when the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of establishing the guilt
of an accused, an accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf. A
judgment of conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty. It
is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence must be
duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of
reason and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment. There must be moral certainty in an unprejudiced mind that it
was accused-appellant who committed the crime. Absent this required
quantum of evidence would mean exoneration for accused-appellant.[13]

The Sandiganbayans improper reliance on Sec. 5(b) of Rule 131 does

not save the day for the prosecutions deficiency in proving the existence of
criminal intent nor could it ever tilt the scale from the constitutional
presumption of innocence to that of guilt. In the absence of criminal intent,
this Court has no basis to affirm appellants conviction.

x x x. This calls to mind the oft-repeated maxim `Actus non facit

reum, nisi mens sit rea, which expounds a basic principle in criminal law
that a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act
complained of be innocent. Thus, to constitute a crime, the act must,
except in certain crimes made such by statute, be accompanied by a
criminal intent. It is true that a presumption of criminal intent may arise
from proof of the commission of a criminal act; and the general rule is that
if it is proved that the accused committed the criminal act charged, it will
be presumed that the act was done with criminal intention and that it is for
the accused to rebut this presumption. But it must be borne in mind that
the act from which such presumption springs must be a criminal act In
the case at bar, the act is not criminal. Neither can it be categorized
as malum prohibitum, the mere commission of which makes the doer
criminally liable even if he acted without evil intent.[14]

The second assigned error refers to the failure of the prosecution to

prove the existence of all the essential elements of the crime of technical
malversation defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, which are:

1. That the offender is a public officer;

2. That there is public fund or property under his administration;

3. That such public fund or property has been appropriated by law or

ordinance;

4. That he applies the same to a public use other than that for which
such fund or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance.[15]

Appellant contends that the prosecution was unable to prove the

second and third elements of the crime charged. [16] She argued that the
public funds in question, having been established to form part of savings,
had therefore ceased to be appropriated by law or ordinance for any specific
purpose.
 The Court finds merit in appellants submission.

As found by the Sandiganbayan no less, the amount of forty thousand

pesos (P40,000.00) originally intended to cover the salary differentials of
thirty four (34) secondary school teachers whose employment status were
converted to Instructor I, were sourced from the lump sum appropriation
authorized on page 370 (should be page 396) of R.A. 6688 and the current
savings under personal services of said school.[17]

The pertinent portions of RA 6688 are reproduced hereunder:

K.2 Sulu State College

For general administration, administration of personnel benefits,

salary standardization, higher education and secondary education
services, including locally-funded project as indicated hereunder..P
17,994,000

New Appropriations, by Function/Project

Current Operating
Expenditures
-----------------------------------
Maintenance
and Other
Personal Operating
Services Expenses Capital Outlays Total
-------------------- ------------------- ------------------- -------------------

A. Functions

1. General Administration
and Support Services P 1,605,000 P 1,196,000 P P 2,801,000

2. Administration of
Personnel Benefits 608,000 608,000

3. Salary Standardization 57,000 57,000

4. Higher Education Services 1,967,000 577,000 2,544,000

5. Secondary Education
Services 2,636,000 736,000 3,372,000
------------------ ----------------- -----------------
 Total, Functions 6,873,000 2,509,000 9,382,000
------------------ ----------------- -----------------

B. Locally-Funded Project

1. Acquisition and
Improvements of Lands,
Construction,
Rehabilitation or
Renovation of Buildings
and Structures, and
Acquisition of Equipment 8,612,000 8,612,000
------------------ ----------------- ------------------ -----------------
Total New Appropriations,
Sulu State College P 6,873,000 P 2,509,000 P 8,612,000 P17,994.000
========== ========== ========== ==========

xxx xxx xxx

New Appropriations, by Object of Expenditures

(In Thousand Pesos)

A. Functions/Locally-Funded Project

Current Operating Expenditures

Personal Services

Total Salaries of Permanent Personnel 4,148

Total Salaries and Wages of Contractual and Emergency Personnel 146

Total Salaries and Wages 4,294

Other Compensation

Honoraria and Commutable Allowances 185

Cost of Living Allowances 1,292
Employees Compensation Insurance Premiums 44
Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 35
Medicare Premiums 18
Merit Increases 20
Salary Standardization 37
Bonuses and Incentives 511
Others 437

Total Other Compensation 2,579

O1 Total Personal Services 6,873

The Court notes that there is no particular appropriation for salary

differentials of secondary school teachers of the Sulu State College in RA
6688. The third element of the crime of technical malversation which
requires that the public fund used should have been appropriated by law, is
therefore absent. The authorization given by the Department of Budget and
Management for the use of the forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) allotment
for payment of salary differentials of 34 secondary school teachers is not an
ordinance or law contemplated in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court has unequivocably ruled in Parungao vs.

Sandiganbayan[18] that in the absence of a law or ordinance appropriating
the public fund allegedly technically malversed (in that case, the absence of
any law or ordinance appropriating the CRBI fund for the concreting of
Barangay Jalung Road), the use thereof for another public purpose (there,
for the payment of wages of laborers working on projects other than the
Barangay Jalung Road) will not make the accused guilty of violation of Article
220 of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant herein, who used the remainder of the forty thousand pesos
(P40,000.00) released by the DBM for salary differentials, for the payment of
the terminal leave benefits of other school teachers of the Sulu State College,
cannot be held guilty of technical malversation in the absence, as here, of
any provision in RA 6688 specifically appropriating said amount for payment
of salary differentials only. In fine, the third and fourth elements of the crime
defined in Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code are lacking in this
case. Acquittal is thus in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the

appealed decision and resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
23261 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and appellant ACQUITTED of the
crime charged against her. The cash bond posted by appellant for her
provisional liberty, if any, is ordered returned to her subject to the usual
auditing and accounting procedures.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 197522 September 11, 2013

ELISEO V. AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PO1 LEO T. DANGUPON, 1ST LT. PHILIP FORTUNO, CPL.
EDILBERTO ABORDO, SPO3 GREGARDRO A. VILLAR, SPO1 RAMON M. LARA, SPO1 ALEX
L. ACAYLAR, and PO1 JOVANNIE C. BALICOL, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 is the Decision2 dated June 30, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 110110 which affirmed the Resolution3 dated November 27, 2008
of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in I.S. No. 2002-414, upholding the provincial prosecutor’s
dismissal of the criminal complaint for murder filed by petitioner Eliseo V. Aguilar against
respondents.

The Facts

Petitioner is the father of one Francisco M. Aguilar, alias Tetet (Tetet). On April 10, 2002, he filed a
criminal complaint4 for murder against the members of a joint team of police and military personnel
who purportedly arrested Tetet and later inflicted injuries upon him, resulting to his death. The
persons charged to be responsible for Tetet’s killing were members of the Sablayan Occidental
Mindoro Police Force, identified as respondents SPO3 Gregardro A. Villar (Villar), SPO1 Ramon M.
Lara (Lara), SPO1 Alex L. Acaylar (Acaylar), PO1 Leo T. Dangupon (Dangupon), and PO1 Jovannie
C. Balicol (Balicol), and members of the Philippine Army, namely, respondents 1st Lt. Philip
Fortuno5 (Fortuno) and Cpl. Edilberto Abordo (Abordo).6

In the petitioner’s complaint, he averred that on February 1, 2002, between 9:00 and 10:00 in the
morning, at Sitio Talipapa, Brgy. Pag-asa, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro (Sitio Talipapa), Tetet was
arrested by respondents for alleged acts of extortion and on the suspicion that he was a member of
the Communist Party of the Philippines/National People’s Army Revolutionary Movement. Despite
his peaceful surrender, he was maltreated by respondents. In particular, Tetet was hit on different
parts of the body with the butts of their rifles, and his hands were tied behind his back with a black
electric wire. He was then boarded on a military jeep and brought to the Viga River where he was
gunned down by respondents.7 Petitioner’s complaint was corroborated by witnesses Adelaida
Samillano and Rolando Corcotchea who stated, among others, that they saw Tetet raise his hands
asa sign of surrender but was still mauled by armed persons. 8 A certain Dr. Neil Bryan V. Gamilla
(Dr. Gamilla) of the San Sebastian District Hospital issued a medical certificate dated February 1,
2002,9 indicating that Tetet was found to have sustained two lacerated wounds at the frontal area, a
linear abrasion in the anterior chest and five gunshot wounds in different parts of his body. 10

In defense, respondents posited that on February 1, 2002, they were engaged in an operation –
headed by Chief of Police Marcos Barte (Barte)and Fortuno – organized to entrap a suspected
extortionist (later identified as Tetet) who was allegedly demanding money from a businesswoman
named Estelita Macaraig (Macaraig). For this purpose, they devised a plan to apprehend Tetet at
Sitio Talipapa which was the place designated in his extortion letters to Macaraig. At about 11:00 in
the morning of that same day, Tetet was collared by Sgt. Ferdinand S. Hermoso (Hermoso) while in
the act of receiving money from Macaraig’s driver, Arnold Magalong. Afterwards, shouts were heard
from onlookers that two persons, who were supposed to be Tetet’s companions, ran towards the
mountains. Some members of the team chased them but they were left uncaught. Meanwhile, Tetet
was handcuffed and boarded on a military jeep. Accompanying the latter were Dangupon, Fortuno,
Abordo, Barte, and some other members of the Philippine Army (first group). On the other hand,
Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol were left behind at Sitio Talipapa with the instruction to pursue
Tetet’s two companions. As the first group was passing along the Viga River, Tetet blurted out to the
operatives that he would point out to the police where his companions were hiding. Barte stopped
the jeep and ordered his men to return to Sitio Talipapa but, while the driver was steering the jeep
back, Tetet pulled a hand grenade clutched at the bandolier of Abordo, jumped out of the jeep and,
from the ground, turned on his captors by moving to pull the safety pin off of the grenade. Sensing
that they were in danger, Dangupon fired upon Tetet, hitting him four times in the body. The first
group brought Tetet to the San Sebastian District Hospital for treatment but he was pronounced
dead on arrival.11

Among others, the Commission on Human Rights investigated Tetet’s death and thereafter issued a
Final Investigation Report12 dated October 3, 2002 and Resolution13 dated October 8, 2002,
recommending that the case, i.e., CHR CASE NR. IV-02-0289, "be closed for lack of sufficient
evidence." It found that Tetet’s shooter, Dangupon, only shot him in self-defense and added that
"Dangupon enjoys the presumption of innocence and regularity in the performance of his official
duties, which were not sufficiently rebutted in the instant case." 14

Likewise, the Office of the Provincial Director of the Occidental Mindoro Police Provincial Command
conducted its independent inquiry on the matter and, in a Report dated September 21, 2002,
similarly recommended the dismissal of the charges against respondents. Based on its investigation,
it concluded that respondents conducted a legitimate entrapment operation and that the killing of
Tetet was made in self-defense and/or defense of a stranger.15

The Provincial Prosecutor’s Ruling

In a Resolution16 dated March 10, 2003, 1st Asst. Provincial Prosecutor and Officer-in-Charge
Levitico B. Salcedo of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Occidental Mindoro (Provincial
Prosecutor) dismissed petitioner’s complaint against all respondents for lack of probable cause. To
note, Barte was dropped from the charge, having died in an ambush pending the investigation of the
case.17

The Provincial Prosecutor held that the evidence on record shows that the shooting of Tetet by
Dangupon "was done either in an act of self-defense, defense of a stranger, and in the performance
of a lawful duty or exercise of a right of office." 18 He further observed that petitioner failed to submit
any evidence to rebut Dangupon’s claim regarding the circumstances surrounding Tetet’s killing. 19

In the same vein, the Provincial Prosecutor ruled that Villar, Acaylar,Lara, and Balicol could not be
faulted for Tetet’s death as they were left behind in Sitio Talipapa unaware of what transpired at the
Viga River. As to the alleged maltreatment of Tetet after his arrest, the Provincial Prosecutor found
that these respondents were not specifically pointed out as the same persons who mauled the
former. He added that Hermoso was, in fact, the one who grabbed/collared Tetet during his
apprehension. The Provincial Prosecutor similarly absolved Fortuno and Abordo since they were
found to have only been in passive stance. 20 Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter via a petition
for review21 to the DOJ.
 The DOJ Ruling

In a Resolution22 dated November 27, 2008, the DOJ dismissed petitioner’s appeal and thereby,
affirmed the Provincial Prosecutor’s ruling. It ruled that petitioner failed to show that respondents
conspired to kill/murder Tetet. In particular, it was not established that Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and
Balicol were with Tetet at the time he was gunned down and, as such, they could not have had any
knowledge, much more any responsibility, for what transpired at the Viga River. 23 Neither were
Barte, Fortuno, and Abordo found to have conspired with Dangupon to kill Tetet since their presence
at the time Tetet was shot does not support a conclusion that they had a common design or purpose
in killing him.24 With respect to Dangupon, the DOJ held that no criminal responsibility may be
attached to him since his act was made in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of an
office under Article 11(5) of the Revised Penal Code25 (RPC).26 Lastly, the DOJ stated that
petitioner’s suppositions and conjectures that respondents salvaged his son are insufficient to
overturn the presumption of innocence in respondents’ favor. 27

Unperturbed, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari28 with the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision29 dated June 30, 2011, the CA dismissed petitioner’s certiorari petition, finding no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ in sustaining the Provincial Prosecutor’s ruling. It
found no evidence to show that Tetet was deliberately executed by respondents. Also, it echoed the
DOJ’s observations on respondents’ presumption of innocence. 30

Hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

Petitioner builds up a case of extralegal killing and seeks that the Court resolve the issue as to
whether or not the CA erred in finding that the DOJ did not gravely abuse its discretion in upholding
the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint against respondents.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is partly granted.

At the outset, it is observed that the Provincial Prosecutor’s ruling, as affirmed on appeal by the DOJ
and, in turn, upheld on certiorari by the CA, may be dissected into three separate disquisitions: first ,
the lack of probable cause on the part of Dangupon, who despite having admitted killing the victim,
was exculpated of the murder charge against him on account of his interposition of the justifying
circumstances of self-defense/defense of a stranger and fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a
right of an office under Article 11(5) of the RPC; second , the lack of probable cause on the part of
Fortuno and Abordo who, despite their presence during the killing of Tetet, were found to have no
direct participation or have not acted in conspiracy with Dangupon in Tetet’s killing; and third , the
lack of probable cause on the part of Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol in view of their absence during
the said incident. For better elucidation, the Court deems it apt to first lay down the general
principles which go into its review process of a public prosecutor’s probable cause finding, and
thereafter apply these principles to each of the above-mentioned incidents in seriatim.
A. General principles; judicial
review of a prosecutor’s
probable cause determination.

A public prosecutor’s determination of probable cause – that is, one made for the purpose of filing an
information in court – is essentially an executive function and, therefore, generally lies beyond the
pale of judicial scrutiny. The exception to this rule is when such determination is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion and perforce becomes correctible through the extraordinary writ of certiorari . It is
fundamental that the concept of grave abuse of discretion transcends mere judgmental error as it
properly pertains to a jurisdictional aberration. While defying precise definition, grave abuse of
discretion generally refers to a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction." Corollary, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross so as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law.31 To note, the underlying principle behind the courts’ power to review a public
prosecutor’s determination of probable cause is to ensure that the latter acts within the permissible
bounds of his authority or does not gravely abuse the same. This manner of judicial review is a
constitutionally-enshrined form of check and balance which underpins the very core of our system of
government. As aptly edified in the recent case of Alberto v. CA: 32

It is well-settled that courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors
and the DOJ on the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal
informations, unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. The rationale behind the general rule rests on the principle of separation of
powers, dictating that the determination of probable cause for the purpose of indicting a suspect is
properly an executive function; while the exception hinges on the limiting principle of checks and
balances, whereby the judiciary, through a special civil action of certiorari , has been tasked by the
present Constitution " to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

In the foregoing context, the Court observes that grave abuse of discretion taints a public
prosecutor’s resolution if he arbitrarily disregards the jurisprudential parameters of probable cause.
In particular, case law states that probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information,
exists when the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. It does not mean "actual and positive
cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. Rather, it is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief and, as such, does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction; it is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged.33 As pronounced in Reyes v. Pearl bank Securities, Inc.: 34

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime
has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts
and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no
technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed , and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there
is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. 35 (Emphasis supplied)

Apropos thereto, for the public prosecutor to determine if there exists a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed, and that the suspect is probably guilty of the same, the elements of the
crime charged should, in all reasonable likelihood, be present. This is based on the principle that
every crime is defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the most, no criminal
offense.36

With these precepts in mind, the Court proceeds to assess the specific incidents in this case.

B. Existence of probable cause on

the part of Dangupon.

Records bear out that Dangupon admitted that he was the one who shot Tetet which eventually
caused the latter’s death. The Provincial Prosecutor, however, relieved him from indictment based
mainly on the finding that the aforesaid act was done either in self-defense, defense of a stranger or
in the performance of a lawful duty or exercise of a right of office, respectively pursuant to
paragraphs 1, 2, and 5, Article 1137 of the RPC. The DOJ affirmed the Provincial Prosecutor’s
finding, adding further that Dangupon, as well as the other respondents, enjoys the constitutional
presumption of innocence.

These findings are patently and grossly erroneous.

Records bear out facts and circumstances which show that the elements of murder – namely: (a)
that a person was killed; (b) that the accused killed him; (c) that the killing was attended by any of
the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 24838 of the RPC; and (d) that the killing is not
parricide or infanticide39 – are, in all reasonable likelihood, present in Dangupon’s case. As to the
first and second elements, Dangupon himself admitted that he shot and killed Tetet. Anent the third
1âwphi1

element, there lies sufficient basis to suppose that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended
Tetet’s killing in view of the undisputed fact that he was restrained by respondents and thereby,
rendered defenseless.40 Finally, with respect to the fourth element, Tetet’s killing can neither be
considered as parricide nor infanticide as the evidence is bereft of any indication that Tetet is related
to Dangupon.

At this juncture, it must be noted that Dangupon’s theories of self-defense/defense of a stranger and
performance of an official duty are not clear and convincing enough to exculpate him at this stage of
the proceedings considering the following circumstances: (a) petitioner’s version of the facts was
corroborated by witnesses Adelaida Samillano and Rolando Corcotchea who stated, among others,
that they saw Tetet raise his hands as a sign of surrender but was still mauled by armed
persons41 (hence, the presence of unlawful aggression on the part of Tetet and the lack of any
sufficient provocation on the part of Dangupon, 42 the actual motive of Tetet’s companions,43 and the
lawfulness of the act44 are put into question);(b) it was determined that Tetet was handcuffed 45 when
he was boarded on the military jeep (hence, the supposition that Tetet was actually restrained of his
movement begs the questions as to how he could have, in this state, possibly stole the grenade from
Abordo); and (c) petitioner’s evidence show that Tetet suffered from lacerations and multiple gunshot
wounds,46 the shots causing which having been fired at a close distance 47 (hence, the reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel48Tetet’s supposed unlawful aggression, and
whether the injury committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or
the lawful exercise of such right49 are, among others, also put into question). Given the foregoing,
Dangupon’s defenses are better off scrutinized within the confines of a criminal trial.

To add, neither can the dismissal of the murder charge against Dangupon be sustained in view of
his presumption of innocence. Jurisprudence holds that when the accused admits killing the victim,
but invokes a justifying circumstance, the constitutional presumption of innocence is effectively
waived and the burden of proving the existence of such circumstance shifts to the accused. 50 The
rule regarding an accused’s admission of the victim’s killing has been articulated in Ortega v.
Sandiganbayan, to wit:51

Well settled is the rule that where the accused had admitted that he is the author of the death of the
victim and his defense anchored on self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove this justifying
circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. To do so, he must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for the accused himself had admitted the
killing. The burden is upon the accused to prove clearly and sufficiently the elements of self-defense,
being an affirmative allegation, otherwise the conviction of the accused is inescapable. 52(Emphasis
and underscoring supplied) Therefore, due to the ostensible presence of the crime charged and
considering that Dangupon’s theories of self-defense/defense of a stranger and lawful performance
of one’s duty and the argument on presumption of innocence are, under the circumstances, not
compelling enough to over come a finding of probable cause, the Court finds that the DOJ gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing the case against Dangupon. Consequently, the reversal of the CA
ruling with respect to the latter is in order.

C. Existence of probable cause on

the part of Fortuno and
Abordo.

In similar regard, the Court also finds that grave abuse of discretion tainted the dismissal of the
charges of murder against Fortuno and Abordo.

To elucidate, while petitioner has failed to detail the exact participation of Fortuno and Abordo in the
death of Tetet, it must be noted that the peculiar nature of an extralegal killing negates the former an
opportunity to proffer the same. It is of judicial notice that extralegal killings are ordinarily executed in
a clandestine manner, and, as such, its commission is largely concealed from the public view of any
witnesses. Notably, unlike in rape cases wherein the victim – albeit ravaged in the dark – may
choose to testify, and whose testimony is, in turn, given great weight and credence sufficient enough
for a conviction,53 the victim of an extralegal killing is silenced by death and therefore, the actual
participation of his assailants is hardly disclosed. As these legal realities generally mire extralegal
killing cases, the Court observes that such cases should be resolved with a more circumspect
analysis of the incidental factors surrounding the same, take for instance the actual or likely
presence of the persons charged at the place and time when the killing was committed, the manner
in which the victim was executed (of which the location of the place and the time in which the killing
was done may be taken into consideration), or the possibility that the victim would have been easily
overpowered by his assailants (of which the superior number of the persons detaining the victim and
their ability to wield weapons may be taken into consideration).

In the present case, the existence of probable cause against Fortuno and Abordo is justified by the
circumstances on record which, if threaded together, would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
man to believe that they were also probably guilty of the crime charged. These circumstances are as
follows: (a) Fortuno and Abordo were with Dangupon during the time the latter killed Tetet 54 in an
undisclosed place along the Viga River; (b)Tetet was apprehended, taken into custody and boarded
on a military jeep by the group of armed elements of which Fortuno and Abordo belonged to; 55 (c) as
earlier mentioned, Tetet was handcuffed56 when he was boarded on the military jeep and, in effect,
restrained of his movement when he supposedly stole the grenade from Abordo; and (d) also, as
previously mentioned, Tetet suffered from lacerations and multiple gunshot wounds, 57 and that the
shots causing the same were fired at a close distance. 58 Evidently, the confluence of the above-
stated circumstances and legal realities point out to the presence of probable cause for the crime of
murder against Fortuno and Abordo. Hence, the dismissal of the charges against them was – similar
to Dangupon – improper. As such, the CA’s ruling must also be reversed with respect to Fortuno and
Abordo.

D. Lack of probable cause on the

part of Villar, Lara, Acaylar,
and Balicol.

The Court, however, maintains a contrary view with respect to the determination of lack of probable
cause on the part of Villar, Lara, Acaylar and Balicol.

Records are bereft of any showing that the aforementioned respondents – as opposed to Dangupon,
Fortuno, and Abordo – directly participated in the killing of Tetet at the Viga River. As observed by
the DOJ, Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol were not with Tetet at the time he was shot; thus, they
could not have been responsible for his killing. Neither could they be said to have acted in
conspiracy with the other respondents since it was not demonstrated how they concurred in or, in
any way, participated towards the unified purpose of consummating the same act. It is well-settled
that conspiracy exists when one concurs with the criminal design of another, indicated by the
performance of an overt act leading to the crime committed. 59 Therefore, finding no direct
participation or conspiracy on the part of Villar, Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol, the Court holds that the
DOJ did not gravely abuse its discretion in affirming the Provincial Prosecutor’s dismissal of the
charges against them. In this respect, the CA’s Decision must stand.

As a final word, the Court can only bewail the loss of a family member through the unfortunate
course of an extralegal killing. The historical prevalence of this deplorable practice has even led to
the inception and eventual adoption of the Rules on Amparo60 to better protect the sacrosanct right
of every person to his life and liberty and not to be deprived of such without due process of law.
Despite the poignancy natural to every case advanced as an extralegal killing, the Court, as in all
courts of law, is mandated to operate on institutional impartiality – that is, its every ruling,
notwithstanding the sensitivity of the issue involved, must be borne only out of the facts of the case
and scrutinized under the lens of the law. It is pursuant to this overarching principle that the Court
has dealt with the killing of Tetet and partly grants the present petition. In fine, the case against
Dangupon, Fortuno, and Abordo must proceed and stand the muster of a criminal trial. On the other
hand, the dismissal of the charges against Villar,Lara, Acaylar, and Balicol is sustained.

WHEREFORE , the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated June 30, 2011 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110110 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The Resolution dated March
10, 2003 of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Resolution dated November 27, 2008 of the
Department of Justice in I.S. No. 2002-414 are NULLIFIED insofar as respondents PO1 Leo T.
Dangupon, 1st Lt. Philip Fortuno, and Cpl. Edilberto Aborado are concerned. Accordingly, the
Department of Justice is DIRECTED to issue the proper resolution in order to charge the above-
mentioned respondents in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C.
TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on
behalf of the respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas,
Jr. (respondents), duly opposed2 by the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez
(petitioner).

By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the unexpected departure of former Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his potential
successor. In his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether the first
paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of
Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two (2) representatives from each House
of Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.

On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision, disposing the same in the
following manner:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar
Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to
reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its
proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

This disposition is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

On July 31, 2012, following respondents’ motion for reconsideration and with due regard to Senate
Resolution Nos. 111,3 112,4 113,5 and 114,6 the Court set the subject motion for oral arguments on
August 2, 2012.7 On August 3, 2012, the Court discussed the merits of the arguments and agreed, in
the meantime, to suspend the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July
17, 2012 Decision which decreed that it was immediately executory. The decretal portion of the
August 3, 2012 Resolution8 reads:

WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to submit their respective MEMORANDA within ten
(10) days from notice. Until further orders, the Court hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second
paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Court’s July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads: "This
disposition is immediately executory."9

Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and respondents filed their respective memoranda. 10

Brief Statement of the Antecedents

In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise of
appointing members of the Judiciary has always been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and
legislative branches of the government. Like their progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos
Constitution11 and the 1935 Constitution12vested the power to appoint the members of the Judiciary
in the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. It was during these
times that the country became witness to the deplorable practice of aspirants seeking confirmation of
their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate themselves with the members of the legislative body. 13

Then, under the 1973 Constitution,14 with the fusion of the executive and legislative powers in one
body, the appointment of judges and justices ceased to be subject of scrutiny by another body. The
power became exclusive and absolute to the Executive, subject only to the condition that the
appointees must have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.

Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political
pressure and partisan activities,15 the members of the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to
create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President.

Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment
process, and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section 8,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution in this wise:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one (1) representative to sit in
the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio members.16 Pursuant to the constitutional provision that
Congress is entitled to one (1) representative, each House sent a representative to the JBC, not
together, but alternately or by rotation.

In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially altered. An eighth member
1âwphi1

was added to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in
the JBC, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.17

In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each.18 It has been the situation since then.

Grounds relied upon by Respondents

Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss the
petition on the following grounds: 1] that allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC
would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature; 2] that the failure of the Framers to make
the proper adjustment when there was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain
oversight; 3] that two representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention of the Framers
to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the rationale of the Court in declaring a
seven-member composition would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is not exactly
correct.

While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of the third and fourth
grounds listed by respondents, still, it finds itself unable to reverse the assailed decision on the
principal issues covered by the first and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the
conclusion arrived at, with respect to the first and second grounds, carries greater bearing in the final
resolution of this case.

As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them jointly.

Ruling of the Court

The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited and defined and by which those powers are distributed among
the several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic.19 The
Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on one suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the
principles and the framework upon which government and society were to operate. Thus, in the
interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly relies on the basic postulate that the
Framers mean what they say. The language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been
deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every word employed in the Constitution must be
interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate against disobedience
and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says, according to its text, compels acceptance and bars
modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it.

For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to justify
constitutional construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular
letter "a" to describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers intended
that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the
Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions.

A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed adjusted as to
be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. One example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a
tie in the presidential election shall be broken "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately."20 Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee to replace
the Vice-President to be confirmed "by a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately."21 Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be revoked or continued by the
Congress, voting separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members." 22 In all these
provisions, the bicameral nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly, the corresponding
adjustments were made as to how a matter would be handled and voted upon by its two Houses.

Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to
their decision to shift to a bicameral form of the legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents
cannot just lean on plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear that the
Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC
because it was not in the exercise of its primary function – to legislate. JBC was created to support
the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a
contributory non-legislative function.
The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be discerned. Congress has two (2)
Houses. The need to recognize the existence and the role of each House is essential considering
that the Constitution employs precise language in laying down the functions which particular House
plays, regardless of whether the two Houses consummate an official act by voting jointly or
separately. Whether in the exercise of its legislative23 or its non-legislative functions such as inter
alia, the power of appropriation,24 the declaration of an existence of a state of war, 25 canvassing of
electoral returns for the President and Vice-President,26 and impeachment,27 the dichotomy of each
House must be acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay between these two Houses.
In all these instances, each House is constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to
its nature and with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other chamber; and 2) in
consonance with the principle of checks and balances, as to the other branches of government.

In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their
participation in the JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the
JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3)
representatives from the major branches of government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman
(representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive
Department), and a representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative Department). The
total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature,
not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch
of government.

On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong, from the Second District of
Maguindanao, submitted his well-considered position28 to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:

I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one representative of Congress in the JBC in
accordance with Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution x x x.

The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need any further interpretation.
Perhaps, it is apt to mention that the oft-repeated doctrine that "construction and interpretation come
only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."

Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council, with one vote each, is to
negate the principle of equality among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution.

In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the Council should adopt the rule of single
representation of Congress in the JBC in order to respect and give the right meaning to the above-
quoted provision of the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also a JBC Consultant,
submitted to the Chief Justice and ex-officio JBC Chairman his opinion,29 which reads:

8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the creation of the JBC is
intended to curtail the influence of politics in Congress in the appointment of judges, and the
understanding is that seven (7) persons will compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of two
votes for Congress runs counter to the intendment of the framers. Such interpretation actually gives
Congress more influence in the appointment of judges. Also, two votes for Congress would increase
the number of JBC members to eight, which could lead to voting deadlock by reason of even-
numbered membership, and a clear violation of 7 enumerated members in the Constitution.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera opined:

As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision, the JBC is composed of seven (7)
representatives coming from different sectors. From the enumeration it is patent that each category
of members pertained to a single individual only. Thus, while we do not lose sight of the bicameral
nature of our legislative department, it is beyond dispute that Art. VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987
Constitution is explicit and specific that "Congress" shall have only "xxx a representative." Thus, two
(2) representatives from Congress would increase the number of JBC members to eight (8), a
number beyond what the Constitution has contemplated. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a
former JBC consultant, is worth reiterating. 31 Thus:

A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that the composition of the JBC
reflects the Commission’s desire "to have in the Council a representation for the major elements of
the community." xxx The ex-officio members of the Council consist of representatives from the three
main branches of government while the regular members are composed of various stakeholders in
the judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio
member as representing one co-equal branch of government. xxx Thus, the JBC was designed to
have seven voting members with the three ex-officio members having equal say in the choice of
judicial nominees.

xxx

No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress in the JBC and the exercise by
Congress of its legislative powers under Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the
Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial branches of government, is
constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in the matter of its representative in the JBC. On
the other hand, the exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the Senate and the House
of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct bodies in furtherance of Congress’ role under
our constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the
two Houses of Congress as they relate inter se, no such dichotomy need be made when Congress
interacts with the other two co-equal branches of government.

It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three governmental branches to assign the
same weight to considerations that any of its representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees
to the judiciary. The representatives of the Senate and the House of Representatives act as such for
one branch and should not have any more quantitative influence as the other branches in the
exercise of prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and principle of equality
among the three branches support this conclusion. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]

The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the
JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the
Senate or the House of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire
Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity.

From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is entitled to one full
vote. This pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2),
between two representatives of Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in
the voting process, it is clearly against the essence of what the Constitution authorized. After all,
basic and reasonable is the rule that what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly.
To permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is clearly a constitutional
circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the Court. Succinctly put, when the Constitution
envisioned one member of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that this
representation carries with him one full vote.

It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect, has more influence over the
JBC simply because all of the regular members of the JBC are his appointees. The principle of
checks and balances is still safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular members of the
JBC is subject to a stringent process of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, which is
composed of members of Congress.

Respondents’ contention that the current irregular composition of the JBC should be accepted,
simply because it was only questioned for the first time through the present action, deserves scant
consideration. Well-settled is the rule that acts done in violation of the Constitution no matter how
frequent, usual or notorious cannot develop or gain acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or
laches, because once an act is considered as an infringement of the Constitution it is void from the
very beginning and cannot be the source of any power or authority.

It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a
law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is
inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine
of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized.
They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated
in Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation: 32

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity
and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a
statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue
burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a
declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the
acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it. 33

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior
official actions are nonetheless valid.

Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the Constitution which was ratified by the direct
action of the Filipino people, it cannot correct what respondents perceive as a mistake in its
mandate. Neither can the Court, in the exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the Constitution,
read into the law something that is contrary to its express provisions and justify the same as
correcting a perceived inadvertence. To do so would otherwise sanction the Court action of making
amendment to the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.

In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the rule of casus
omissus "a case omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted."34 "The principle proceeds from a
reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under its power of interpretation supply the
omission even though the omission may have resulted from inadvertence or because the case in
question was not foreseen or contemplated." 36 "The Court cannot supply what it thinks the legislature
would have supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that would be judicial
legislation."37
Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.

The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard the Constitution
against usurpation. The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers in the sphere granted by the
Constitution itself. Judicial activism should never be allowed to become judicial exuberance. 38 In
cases like this, no amount of practical logic or convenience can convince the Court to perform either
an excision or an insertion that will change the manifest intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope
of congressional representation in the JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which
was not included in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional mandate, the Court cannot
craft and tailor constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal
or reasonable the proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the Court declines.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is hereby DENIED.

The suspension of the effects of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17, 2012
Decision of the Court, which reads, "This disposition is immediately executory," is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

DIESEL CONSTRUCTION CO., G.R. No. 154885

INC.,
Petitioner,

- versus -

UPSI PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC.,

Respondent.

x------------------------------------------------x
UPSI PROPERTY HOLDINGS, INC., G.R. No. 154937
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
DIESEL CONSTRUCTION CO., INC. Promulgated:
and FGU INSURANCE CORP.,
Respondents. March 24, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case
 Before the Court are these petitions for review under Rule 45 separately
interposed by Diesel Construction Co., Inc. (Diesel) and UPSI Property Holdings,
Inc. (UPSI) to set aside the Decision[1] dated April 16, 2002 as partly modified in a
Resolution[2] of August 21, 2002, both rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 68340, entitled UPSI Property Holdings, Inc. v. Diesel
Construction Co., Inc., and FGU Insurance Corporation. The CA Decision
modified the Decision dated December 14, 2001 of the Arbitral Tribunal of the
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) in CIAC Case No. 18-2001,
while the CA Resolution granted in part the motion of Diesel for reconsideration and
denied a similar motion of UPSI.
The Facts

The facts, as found in the CA Decision under review, are as follows:

On August 26, 1995, Diesel, as Contractor, and UPSI, as Owner, entered into a
Construction Agreement[3] (Agreement) for the interior architectural construction
works for the 14th to 16th floors of the UPSI Building 3 Meditel/Condotel Project
(Project) located on Gen. Luna St., Ermita, Manila. Under the Agreement, as
amended, Diesel, for PhP 12,739,099, agreed to undertake the Project, payable by
progress billing.[4] As stipulated, Diesel posted, through FGU Insurance Corp.
(FGU), a performance bond in favor of UPSI.[5]

Inter alia, the Agreement contained provisions on contract works and Project
completion, extensions of contract period, change/extra works orders, delays, and
damages for negative slippage.

Tasked to oversee Diesels work progress were: Grace S. Reyes Designs, Inc. for
interior design and architecture, D.L. Varias and Associates as Construction
Manager, and Ryder Hunt Loacor, Inc. as Quantity Surveyor. [6]

Under the Agreement, the Project prosecution proper was to start on August 2, 1999,
to run for a period of 90 days or until November 8, 1999. The parties later agreed to
move the commencement date to August 21, 1999, a development necessitating the
corresponding movement of the completion date to November 20, 1999.
Of particular relevance to this case is the section obliging the contractor, in case of
unjustifiable delay, to pay the owner liquidated damages in the amount equivalent
to one-fifth (1/5) of one (1) percent of the total Project cost for each calendar day of
delay.[7]

In the course of the Project implementation, change orders were effected and
extensions sought. At one time or another, Diesel requested for extension owing to
the following causes or delaying factors: (1) manual hauling of materials from the
14th to 16th floors; (2) delayed supply of marble; (3) various change orders; and (4)
delay in the installation of shower assembly. [8]

UPSI, it would appear, disapproved the desired extensions on the basis of the
foregoing causes, thus putting Diesel in a state of default for a given contract
work. And for every default situation, UPSI assessed Diesel for liquidated damages
in the form of deductions from Diesels progress payments, as stipulated in the
Agreement.[9]

Apparently irked by and excepting from the actions taken by UPSI, Diesel,
thru its Project manager, sent, on March 16, 2000, a letter notice to UPSI stating that
the Project has been completed as of that date. UPSI, however, disregarded the
notice, and refused to accept delivery of the contracted premises, claiming that
Diesel had abandoned the Project unfinished. Apart therefrom, UPSI withheld
Diesels 10% retention money and refused to pay the unpaid balance of the contract
price.[10]

It is upon the foregoing factual backdrop that Diesel filed a complaint before
the CIAC, praying that UPSI be compelled to pay the unpaid balance of the contract
price, plus damages and attorneys fees. In an answer with counterclaim, UPSI denied
liability, accused Diesel of abandoning a project yet to be finished, and prayed for
repayment of expenses it allegedly incurred for completing the Project and for a
declaration that the deductions it made for liquidated damages were proper. UPSI
also sought payment of attorneys fees.[11]

After due hearing following a protracted legal sparring, the Arbitral Tribunal
of the CIAC, on December 14, 2001, in CIAC Case No. 18-2001, rendered judgment
for Diesel, albeit for an amount lesser than its original demand. To be precise, the
CIAC ordered UPSI to pay Diesel the total amount of PhP 4,027,861.60, broken
down as follows: PhP 3,661,692.60, representing the unpaid balance of the contract
price; and PhP 366,169 as attorneys fees. In the same decision, the CIAC dismissed
UPSIs counterclaim[12]and assessed it for arbitration costs in the amount of PhP
298,406.03.[13]

In time, UPSI went to the CA on a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R.

SP No. 68340. Eventually, the appellate court rendered its assailed Decision
dated April 16, 2002, modifying that of the CIAC, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED

and the questioned Decision is MODIFIED in this wise:

a. The claim of [UPSI] for liquidated damages is GRANTED to

the extent of PESOS: ONE MILLION THREE HUNDRED NINE
THOUSAND AND FIVE HUNDRED (P1,309,500.00) representing
forty-five (45) days of delay at P29,100 per diem;
b. We hold that [Diesel] substantially complied with the
Construction Contract and is therefore entitled to one hundred percent
(100%) payment of the contract price. Therefore, the claim of [Diesel] for
an unpaid balance of PESOS: TWO MILLION FOUR HUNDRED
FORTY-ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY TWO and
SIXTY FOUR centavos (P2,441,482.64), which amount already includes
the retention on the additional works or Change Orders, is GRANTED,
minus liquidated damages. In sum, [UPSI] is held liable to [Diesel] in the
amount of PESOS: ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED THIRTY ONE
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY TWO and sixty four centavos
(P1,131,982.64), with legal interest until the same is fully paid;
c. The parties are liable equally for the payment of arbitration
costs;
d. All claims for attorneys fees are DISMISSED; and
e. Since there is still due and owing from UPSI an amount of
money in favor of Diesel, respondent FGU is DISCHARGED as surety
for Diesel.
Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Therefrom, Diesel and UPSI each sought reconsideration. On August 21, 2002, the
CA issued its equally assailed Resolution denying reconsideration to UPSI, but
partially granting Diesels motion, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of [Diesel] is

partially GRANTED. The liquidated damages are hereby reduced to
P1,146,519.00 (45 days multiplied by P25,478.20 per diem). However, in
accordance with the main opinion, We hold that [UPSI] is liable to
[Diesel] for the total amount of P3,661,692.64, representing the unpaid
balance of the contract price plus the ten-percent retention, from which
the liquidated damages, must, of course, be deducted. Thus, in sum, as
amended, We hold that petitioner is still liable to respondent Diesel in the
amount of P2,515,173.64, with legal interest until the same is fully paid.

The main opinion, in all other respects, STANDS.

SO ORDERED.[15]

Hence, these separate petitions are before us.

Per its Resolution of March 17, 2003, the Court ordered the consolidation of
the petitions.

The Issues

In its petition in G.R. No. 154885, Diesel raises the following issues:

1. Whether or not the [CA] has the discretion, indeed the jurisdiction,
to pass upon the qualifications of the individual members of the
CIAC Arbitral Tribunal and declare them to be non-technocrats and
not exceptionally well-versed in the construction industry
warranting reversal and nullification of the tribunals findings.
2. Whether or not the [CA] may intervene to annul the findings of a
highly specialized agency, like the CIAC, on the ground that
essentially the question to be resolved goes to the very heart of the
substantiality of evidence, when in so doing, [CA] merely
substituted its own conjectural opinion to that of the CIAC Arbitral
Tribunals well-supported findings and award.
 3. Whether or not the [CA] erred in its findings, which are contrary
to the findings of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal.[16]

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 154937, UPSI presents the following issues:
I

Whether or not portion of the Decision dated April 16, 2002 of the
Honorable [CA] denying additional expenses to complete the unfinished
and abandoned work of [Diesel], is null and void for being contrary to
clean and convincing evidence on record.

II

Whether or not portion of the Decision x x x of the [CA] finding delay of

only forty five (45) days is null and void for being not in accord with
contractual stipulations upon which the controversy arise.

III

Whether or not the resolution of the Honorable Court of Appeals denying

the herein petitioners motion for reconsideration and partially granting the
respondents motion for reconsideration is likewise null and void as it does
not serve its purpose for being more on expounding than rectifying
errors.[17]
The issues shall be discussed in seriatim.

The Courts Ruling

We resolve to modify the assailed CA Decision.

First Issue

Diesel maintains that the CA erred in its declaration that it may review the CIACs
decision considering the doctrine on the binding effect of conclusions of fact of
highly specialized agencies, such as the CIAC, when supported by substantial
evidence.

The above contention is erroneous and, as couched, misleading.

As is noted, the CA, in its assailed resolution, dismissed as untenable Diesels
position that the factual findings of the CIAC are binding on and concludes the
appellate court. The CA went to clarify, however, that the general rule is that factual
conclusions of highly specialized bodies are given great weight and even finality
when supported by substantial evidence. Given this perspective, the CA was correct
in holding that it may validly review and even overturn such conclusion of facts
when the matter of its being adequately supported by substantial evidence duly
adduced on record comes to the fore and is raised as an issue.

Well-established jurisprudence has it that [t]he consequent policy and practice

underlying our Administrative Law is that courts of justice should respect the
findings of fact of said administrative agencies, unless there is absolutely no
evidence in support thereof or such evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently
insubstantial.[18]
There can be no serious dispute about the correctness of the CAs above
posture. However, what the appellate court stated later to belabor its point strikes the
Court as specious and uncalled for. Wrote the CA:

This dictum finds greater application in the case of the CIAC because x x
x as pointed out by petitioner in its Comment, the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction relied upon by [Diesel] is diluted by the indubitable fact that
the CIAC panel x x x is not at all composed of technocrats, or persons
exceptionally well-versed in the construction industry. For instance, its
chair x x x is a statistician; another member, x x x a former magistrate, is
a member of the Bar. Doubtless, these two are preeminent in their fields,
and their competence and proficiency in their chosen professions are
unimpeachable. However, when it comes to determining findings of fact
with respect to the matter before Us, the said panel which they partly
comprise cannot claim to have any special advantage over the members
of this Court.[19]

The question of whether or not the findings of fact of the CIAC are supported
by substantial evidence has no causal connection to the personal qualifications of the
members of the arbitration panel. Surely, a persons undergraduate or postgraduate
degrees, as the case may be, can hardly be invoked as the sole, fool proof basis to
determine that persons qualification to hold a certain position. Ones work
experiences and attendance in relevant seminars and trainings would perhaps be the
more important factors in gauging a persons fitness to a certain undertaking.

Correlatively, Diesel, obviously having in mind the disputable presumption of

regularity, correctly argues that highly specialized agencies are presumed to have
the necessary technical expertise in their line of authority. In other words, the
members of the Arbitral Tribunal of the CIAC have in their favor the presumption
of possessing the necessary qualifications and competence exacted by law. A party
in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke such legal
presumption to establish a fact in issue. One need not introduce evidence to prove
that the fact for a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed. [20]
To set the records straight, however, the CA did not cast aspersion on the
competence let alone the bona fides of the members of the Arbitral Tribunal to
arbitrate. In context, what the appellate court saidin reaction to Diesels negative
commentary about the CAs expertise on construction mattersis that the said
members do not really enjoy a special advantage over the members of the CA in
terms of fleshing out the facts from the evidence on record.

In any event, the fact remains that the CA stands justified in reviewing the
CIAC decision.

Second and Third Issues

The next two issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.

Diesel submits that the CA, in reaching its decision, substituted its own conjectural
opinion to that of the CIACs well-grounded findings and award.

Even as Diesels submission has little to commend itself, we deem it prudent to

address its concern by reviewing the incongruent determinations of the CIAC and
CA and the factual premises holding such determinations together.

As it were, the CA reduced the award for unpaid balance of the contract cost from
PhP 3,661,692.60, as earlier fixed by the CIAC, to PhP 2,441,482.64, although it
would consider the reduction and revert to the original CIAC figure. Unlike the
CIAC which found the award of liquidated damages to be without basis, the CA was
of a different disposition and awarded UPSI PhP 1,309,500, only to reduce the same
to PhP 1,146,519 in its assailed resolution. Also, the CA struck out the CIAC award
of PhP 366,169 to Diesel for attorneys fees. Additionally, the CIACs ruling making
UPSI alone liable for the costs of arbitration was modified by the CA, which directed
UPSI and Diesel to equally share the burden.

The CIAC found Diesel not to have incurred delay, thus negating UPSIs
entitlement to liquidated damages. The CA, on the other hand, found Diesel to have
been in delay for 45 days.

In determining whether or not Diesel was in delay, the CIAC and CA first turned on
the question of Diesels claimed entitlement to have the Project period extended, an
excusable delay being chargeable against the threshold 90-day completion
period. Both were one in saying that occurrence of certain events gave Diesel the
right to an extension, but differed on the matter of length of the extension, and on
the nature of the delay, that is, whether the delay is excusable or not. The CA deemed
the delay, and the resulting extension of 14 days, arising from the manual hauling of
materials, as undeserved. But the CIAC saw it otherwise for the reason that
Frederick W. Crespillo, the witness UPSI presented to refute the allegation of
Diesels entitlement to time extension for the manual hauling of materials, was
incompetent to testify on the issue. As CIAC observed, Crespillo lacked personal
knowledge of the real situation at the worksite.
The CIACs reasoning, however, is flawed, assuming that the onus rested on UPSI,
instead of on Diesel, to prove that the delay in the execution of the Project was
excusable. Diesel explained that there was no place for its own hoisting machine at
the Project site as the assigned location was being used by the General Contractor,
while the alternative location was not feasible due to power constraint. Moreover,
Diesel could not use the site elevator of the General Contractor as its personnel were
only permitted to use the same for one hour every day at PhP 600 per hour.

The provisions in the Agreement on excusable delays read:

2.3 Excusable delays: The Contractor shall inform the owner in a
timely manner, of any delay caused by the following:

2.3.a Acts of God, such as storm, floods or earthquakes.

 2.3.b Civil disturbance, such as riots, revolutions, insurrection.
2.3.c Any government acts, decrees, general orders or regulations limiting
the performance of the work.
2.3.d Wars (declared or not).
2.3.e Any delays initiated by the Owner or his personnel which are clearly
outside the control of the Contractor.

2.3.1 Delays caused by the foregoing shall be excusable. A new schedule

or adjustments in contract time shall be negotiated with the Owner. As
time is of the essence of this agreement, all other delays shall not be
excusable.[21]
As may be noted, a common thread runs among the events listed above, that is, the
delaying event is unforeseeable and/or its occurrence is beyond the control of Diesel
as contractor. Here, the lack of a location to establish Diesels own hoisting machine
can hardly be tagged as a foreseeable event. As the CA aptly observed:

[U]nder the terms of the contract, it is Diesel that would formulate the
schedule to be followed in the completion of the works; therefore, it was
encumbent upon Diesel to take into account all factors that would come
into play in the course of the project. From the records it appears that the
General Contractor x x x had been in the premises ahead of Diesel; hence
it would have been a simple matter for Diesel to have conferred with the
formers officer if the use of its equipment would be viable. Likewise, it
would not have been too much trouble for Diesel to have made a prior
request from UPSI for the use of its freight elevator in the face of the
denial thereof, it could have made the necessary remedial measures x x x.
In other words, those delays were foreseeable on the part of Diesel, with
the application of even ordinary diligence. But Diesel did all of those when
construction was about to commence. Therefore, We hold that the delays
occasioned by Diesels inability to install its hoisting machine x x x [were]
attributable solely to Diesel, and thus the resultant delay cannot be charged
against the ninety-day period for the termination of the construction.[22]

There can be no quibbling that the delay caused by the manual hauling of
materials is not excusable and, hence, cannot validly be set up as ground for an
extension. Thus, the CA excluded the delay caused thereby and only allowed Diesel
a total extension period of 85 days. Such extension, according to that court,
effectively translated to a delay of 45 days in the completion of the project. The CA,
in its assailed decision, explained why:
 7. All told, We find, and so hold, that [Diesel] has incurred in
delay. x x x However, under the circumstances wherein UPSI was
responsible for some of the delay, it would be most unfair to charge Diesel
with two hundred and forty (240) days of delay, so much so that it would
still owe UPSI, even after liquidated damages have eaten up the retention
and unpaid balance, the amount of [P4,340,000.00]. Thus, based on Our
own calculations, We deem it more in accord with the spirit of the
contract, as amended, x x x to assess Diesel with an unjustifiable delay of
forty-five (45) days only; hence, at the rate of 1/5 of one percent as stated
in the contract, [or at P1,309,500.00], which should be deducted from the
total unpaid balance of [P2,441,482.64], which amount already includes
the retention on the additional works or Change Orders.[23]

The CA, in its questioned resolution, expounded on how it arrived at the figure
of 45-day delay in this wise:
7. x x x We likewise cannot give Our assent to the asseveration of
[Diesel] that Our calculations as to the number of days of delay have no
basis. For indeed, the same was arrived at after taking a holistic view of
the entire circumstances attendant to the instant case. x x x

But prescinding from the above, the basis for Our ruling should not
be hard to discern. To disabuse the mind of [Diesel] that the forty-five day
delay was plucked from out of the blue, allow Us to let the records speak.
The records will show that while the original target date for the completion
x x x was 19 November 1999 x x x, there is a total of eighty-five (85) days
of extension which are justifiable and sanctioned by [UPSI], to wit: thirty
(30) days as authorized on 27 January 2000 by UPSIs Construction
Manager x x x; thirty (30) days as again consented to by the same
Construction Manager on 24 February 2000 x x x; and twenty-five (25)
days on 16 March 2000 by Rider Hunt and Liacom x x x. The rest of the
days claimed by Diesel were, of course, found by Us to be unjustified in
the main opinion. Hence, the project should have been finished
by February 12, 2000. However, by 22 March 2000, as certified to by
Grace S. Reyes Designs, Inc. the project was only 97.56% finished,
meaning while it was substantially finished, it was not wholly finished.
By 25 March 2000, the same consultant conditionally accepted some
floors but were still punch listed, so that from 12 February 2000 to 25
March 2000 was a period of forty-one (41) days. Allowing four (4) more
days for the punch listed items to be accomplished, and for the general
 cleaning mentioned by Grace S. Reyes Designs, Inc., to be done, which to
Us is a reasonable length of time, equals forty-five (45) days.

This is why We find the [conclusion] made by the CIAC, x x x that

there was no delay whatsoever in the work done by [Diesel], too patently
absurd for Us to offer Our unconditional assent.[24]

Aside from the fact that the CA seemingly assumed contradictory positions in
the span of two paragraphs, its holding immediately adverted to above is patently
erroneous. The CA completely failed to factor in the change orders of UPSI to
Dieselthe directives effectively extending the Project completion time at the behest
of UPSI.

Section V of the Agreement on the subject Change Orders reads:

V. CHANGES IN SCOPE OF WORK AND EXTRA WORK

Any changes or extra work in the SCOPE OF WORK

recommended by the INTERIOR DESIGNER/ARCHITECT or directed
and approved by the OWNER shall be presented to the CONTRACTOR.
Within the shortest time possible, the CONTRACTOR x x x shall also
inform the OWNER if such changes shall require a new schedule and/or
revised completion date.

The Parties shall then negotiate mutually agreeable terms x x x. The

CONTRACTOR shall not perform any change order or extra work until
the covering terms are agreed upon [in writing and signed by the
parties].[25]

Pursuant thereto, UPSI issued Change Order (CO) Nos. 1 to 4 on February 3,

2, 8, and 9, 2000 respectively. Thereafter, Diesel submitted a Schedule of
Completion of Additional Works[26] under which Diesel committed to undertake CO
No. 1 for 30 days from February 10, 2000; CO No. 2 for 21 days from January 6,
2000; CO No. 3 for 15 days, subject to UPSIs acceptance of Diesels proposal; and
CO No. 4 for 10 days after the receipt of the items from UPSI.
 The CIAC found that the COs were actually implemented on the following
dates:

CO No. 1 February 9 to March 3, 2000

CO No. 3 February 24 to March 10, 2000
CO No. 4 March 16 to April 7, 2000[27]

Hence, as correctly held by the CIAC, UPSI, no less, effectively moved the
completion date, through the various COs, to April 7, 2000.

Moreover, as evidenced by UPSIs Progress Report No. 19 for the period

ending March 22, 2000, Diesels scope of work, as of that date, was already 97.56%
complete.[28]Such level of work accomplishment would, by any rational norm, be
considered as substantial to warrant full payment of the contract amount, less actual
damages suffered by UPSI. Article 1234 of the Civil Code says as much, If the
obligation had been substantially performed in good faith, the obligor may recover
as though there had been a strict and complete fulfillment, less damages suffered by
the obligee.

The fact that the laborers of Diesel were still at the work site as of March 22,
2000 is a reflection of its honest intention to keep its part of the bargain and complete
the Project. Thus, when Diesel attempted to turn over the premises to UPSI, claiming
it had completed the Project on March 15, 2000, Diesel could no longer be
considered to be in delay. Likewise, the CIAC cited the Uniform General Conditions
of Contract for Private Construction (CIAP Document 102), wherein it is stated that
no liquidated damages for delay beyond the completion time shall accrue after the
date of substantial completion of the work.[29]

In all, Diesel cannot be considered as in delay and, hence, is not amenable

under the Agreement for liquidated damages.

As to the issue of attorneys fees, Diesel insists that bad faith tainted UPSIs act
of imposing liquidated damages on account of its (Diesels) alleged delay. And, this
prompted Diesel to file its petition for arbitration. Thus, the CIAC granted Diesel an
award of PhP 366,169 as attorneys fees. However, the CA reversed the CIAC on the
award, it being its finding that Diesel was in delay.

The Court resolves to reinstate the CIACs award of attorneys fees, there being
sufficient justification for this kind of disposition. As earlier discussed, Diesel was
not strictly in delay in the completion of the Project. No valid reason, therefore,
obtains for UPSI to withhold the retention money or to refuse to pay the unpaid
balance of the contract price. Indeed, the retention and nonpayment were, to us, as
was to the CIAC, resorted to by UPSI out of whim, thus forcing the hand of Diesel
to sue to recover what is rightfully due. Thus, the grant of attorneys fees would be
justifiable under Art. 2208 of the Civil Code, thus:

Article 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and

expenses of litigation x x x cannot be recovered, except:

xxxx

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim.

And for the same reason justifying the award of attorneys fees, arbitration
costs ought to be charged against UPSI, too.

Fourth Issue

UPSI urges a review of the factual basis for the parallel denial by the CIAC
and CA of its claim for additional expenses to complete the Project. UPSI states that
the reality of Diesel having abandoned the Project before its agreed completion is
supported by clear and convincing evidence.

The Court cannot accord the desired review. It is settled rule that the Court,
not being a trier of facts, is under no obligation to examine, winnow, and weigh anew
evidence adduced below. This general rule is, of course, not absolute. In Superlines
Transportation Company, Inc. v. Philippine National Construction Company, the
Court enumerated the recognized exceptions to be:

x x x (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making
its findings the [CA] went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are
contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when
the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main
and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings
of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted
by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.[30] (Emphasis supplied.)

In the instant case, the factual findings of the CIAC and CA, with regard to
the completion of the Project and UPSIs entitlement to recover expenses allegedly
incurred to finish the Project, do not fall under any one of these exceptions. As things
stand, the factual findings of the CIAC and CA are supported by evidence presented
during the hearing before the Arbitral Tribunal. Consider what the CIAC wrote:
This Tribunal finds overwhelming evidence to prove that
accomplishment as of the alleged period of takeover was 95.87% as
of March 3, 2000 and increased to 97.56% on March 15, 2000 based on
Progress Report # 18. x x x This is supported by the statement of [UPSIs]
witness, Mr. Crespillo x x x where he conceded that such admissions and
statements bound [UPSI, the Owner]. By that time, [Diesel] had
substantially completed the project and only needed to correct the items
included in the punchlist.[31]

The CA seconded what the CIAC said, thus:

6. Neither are We prepared to sustain UPSIs argument that

Diesel left the work unfinished and pulled-out all of its workmen from the
project. This claim is belied by the assessment of its own Construction
 Manager in Progress Report No. 19 for the period ending 22 March 2000,
wherein it was plaintly stated that as of that period, with respect to Diesel,
there were still twenty-three laborers on site with the project 97.56%
complete x x x. This indicates that the contracted works of Diesel were
substantially completed with only minor corrections x x x, thus
contradicting the avowal of UPSI that the work was abandoned in such a
state that necessitated the engagement of another contractor for the project
to be finished. It was therefore not right for UPSI to have declined the
turn-over and refused the full payment of the contract price, x x x.[32]

Given the 97.56% work accomplishment tendered by Diesel, UPSIs theory of

abandonment and of its having spent a sum to complete the work must fall on its
face. We can concede hypothetically that UPSI undertook what it characterized as
additional or rectification works on the Project. But as both the CIAC and CA held,
UPSI failed to show that such additional or rectification works, if there be any, were
the necessary result of the faulty workmanship of Diesel.

The Court perceives of no reason to doubt, much less disturb, the coinciding
findings of the CIAC and CA on the matter.

The foregoing notwithstanding and considering that Diesel may only be

credited for 97.56% work accomplishment, UPSI ought to be compensated, by way
of damages, in the amount corresponding to the value of the 2.44% unfinished
portion (100% 97.56% = 2.44%). In absolute terms, 2.44% of the total Project cost
translates to PhP 310,834.01. This disposition is no more than adhering to the
command of Art. 1234 of the Civil Code.

The fifth and sixth issues have already been discussed earlier and need not
detain us any longer.

WHEREFORE, Diesels petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED and

UPSIs Petition is DENIED with qualification. The assailed Decision dated April 16,
2002 and Resolution dated August 21, 2002 of the CA are MODIFIED, as follows:

(1) The award for liquidated damages is DELETED;

(2) The award to Diesel for the unpaid balance of the contract price of PhP
3,661,692.64 is AFFIRMED;
 (3) UPSI shall pay the costs of arbitration before the CIAC in the amount of
PhP 298,406.03;
(4) Diesel is awarded attorneys fees in the amount of PhP 366,169; and
(5) UPSI is awarded damages in the amount of PhP 310,834.01, the same to
be deducted from the retention money, if there still be any, and, if necessary, from
the amount referred to in item (2) immediately above.

In summary, the aggregate award to Diesel shall be PhP 3,717,027.64. From

this amount shall be deducted the award of actual damages of PhP 310,834.01 to
UPSI which shall pay the costs of arbitration in the amount of PhP 298,406.03.

FGU is released from liability for the performance bond that it issued in favor
of Diesel.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

ARSENIA B. GARCIA, G.R. No. 157171

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES, and
TINGA, JJ.

HONORABLE COURT OF Promulgated:

APPEALS and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, March 14, 2006
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition seeks the review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 24547[1] that affirmed the conviction of petitioner by
the Regional TrialCourt[2] of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 54, for violation of
Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646.[3]

Based on the complaint-affidavit of Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the

1995 senatorial elections, an information dated March 30, 1998, was filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, charging Herminio R. Romero, Renato R. Viray,
Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and petitioner, with violation of Section
27(b). The information reads:

That on or about May 11, 1995, which was within the canvassing
period during the May 8, 1995 elections, in the Municipality of Alaminos,
Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Election Officer Arsenia B.
Garcia, Municipal Treasurer Herminio R. Romero, Public School District
 Supervisor Renato R. Viray, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Member-
Secretary, respectively, of the Municipal Board of Canvassers
of Alaminos, Pangasinan, tabulators Rachel Palisoc and Francisca de
Vera, conspiring with, confederating together and mutually helping each
other, did, then and there, willfully, and unlawfully decrease[d] the votes
received by senatorial candidate Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from six
thousand nine hundred ninety-eight (6,998) votes, as clearly disclosed in
the total number of votes in the one hundred fifty-nine (159) precincts of
the Statement of Votes by Precincts of said municipality, with Serial Nos.
008417, 008418, 008419, 008420, 008421, 008422 and 008423 to one
thousand nine hundred twenty-one (1,921) votes as reflected in the
Statement of Votes by Precincts with Serial No. 008423 and Certificate of
Canvass with Serial No. 436156 with a difference of five thousand
seventy-seven (5,077) votes.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

In a Decision dated September 11, 2000, the RTC acquitted all the accused
for insufficiency of evidence, except petitioner who was convicted as follows:
xxx
5. And finally, on the person of ARSENIA B. GARCIA, the
Court pronounces her GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of
the crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b)
for decreasing the votes of Senator Pimentel in the total
of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881, considering that this
finding is a violation of Election Offense, she is thus
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as
maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next degree
lower which is SIX (6) MONTHS; however,
accused ARSENIA B. GARCIA is not entitled to probation;
further, she is sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold
public office and she is also deprived of her right of suffrage.

The bailbond posted by her is hereby ordered cancelled, and the

Provincial Warden is ordered to commit her person to the Bureau of
Correctional Institution for Women, at Metro Manila, until further orders
from the court.

No pronouncement as to costs.
 IT IS SO ORDERED.[5]

Petitioner appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with

modification the RTC Decision, thus,
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, increasing the minimum
penalty imposed by the trial court from six (6) months to one (1) year.

SO ORDERED.[6]

The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this appeal assigning the following as errors of the appellate court:
I
ON THE FIRST AND SECOND GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY THE
RESPONDENT COURT, NAMELY, THAT IT COULD NOT HAVE
BEEN SECRETARY VIRAY WHO DECREASED THE VOTES OF
COMPLAINANT PIMENTEL SINCE HE MERELY RELIED ON
WHAT THE PETITIONER DICTATED, AND THAT IT COULD NOT
HAVE ALSO BEEN THE TABULATORS BECAUSE PETITIONER
WAS THE ONE WHO READ THE ADDING [MACHINE] TAPE.

II
ON THE THIRD GROUND, NAMELY, THAT PETITIONER DID NOT
PRODUCE THE TAPES DURING THE TRIAL BECAUSE IF
PRODUCED, IT IS GOING TO BE ADVERSE TO HER.

III
ON THE FOURTH GROUND, NAMELY, THAT THE PETITIONER
WAS THE ONE WHO ENTERED THE REDUCED FIGURE OF 1,921 IN
THE CERTIFICATE OF CANVASS (COC), Exh. 7, WHEN THE DUTY
WAS THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE BOARD.

IV
THE REDUCTION OF THE VOTES OF CANDIDATE PIMENTEL
WAS CLEARLY NOT WILLFUL OR INTENTIONAL.[7]
 Petitioner contends that (1) the Court of Appeals judgment is erroneous, based
on speculations, surmises and conjectures, instead of substantial evidence; and (2)
there was no motive on her part to reduce the votes of private complainant.

Respondent on the other hand contends that good faith is not a defense in the
violation of an election law, which falls under the class of mala prohibita.

The main issue is, Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646,
classified under mala in se or mala prohibita? Could good faith and lack of criminal
intent be valid defenses?

Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal
Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in
se, even if they are punished by a special law. [8] Accordingly, criminal intent must
be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts
are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they
are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been
violated.[9] Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons
of public policy.[10]

Section 27(b) of Republic Act No. 6646[11] provides:

SEC. 27. Election Offenses.- In addition to the prohibited acts and
election offenses enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, as amended, the following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxx
(b) Any member of the board of election inspectors or board of
canvassers who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a
candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses, after
proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct votes or deduct such
tampered votes.
xxx

Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se.[12] For otherwise,
even errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be
punishable.Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited
amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be
the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors. However,
intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate
is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.

Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an
act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. [13] Thus, whoever
invokes good faith as a defense has the burden of proving its existence.

Records show that the canvassing of votes on May 11, 1995 before the Board
of Canvassers of the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan was conducted as
follows:
1. After the votes in the 159 precincts of
the municipality of Alaminos were tallied, the results thereof were
sealed and forwarded to the Municipal Board of Canvassers for
canvassing;
2. The number of votes received by each candidate in each precinct was
then recorded in the Statement of Votes with appellant, in her capacity
as Chairman, reading the figures appearing in the results from the
precincts and accused Viray, in his capacity as secretary of the Board,
entering the number in the Statements of Votes as read by the
appellant. Six Statements of Votes were filled up to reflect the votes
received by each candidate in the 159 precincts of
the Municipality of Alaminos, Pangasinan.
3. After the number of votes received by each candidate for each
precincts were entered by accused Viray in the Statements of Votes,
these votes were added by the accused Palisoc and de Vera with the
use of electrical adding machines.
4. After the tabulation by accused Palisoc and de Vera, the corresponding
machine tapes were handed to appellant who reads the subtotal of votes
received by each candidate in the precincts listed in each Statement of
Votes. Accused Viray [then] records the subtotal in the proper column
in the Statement of Votes.
5. After the subtotals had been entered by accused Viray, tabulators
accused Palisoc and de Vera added all the subtotals appearing in all
Statement of Votes.
 6. After the computation, the corresponding machine tape on which the
grand total was reflected was handed to appellant who reads the same
and accused Viray enters the figure read by appellant in the column for
grand total in the Statement of Votes.[14]

Neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the Statement of

Votes (SOV) for each precinct, nor of the number of votes entered as subtotals of
votes received in the precincts listed in SOV Nos. 008417 to 008422 was raised as
an issue.

At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the addition of

the subtotals to arrive at the grand total of votes received by each candidate for all
159 precincts in SOV No. 008423.[15] The grand total of the votes for private
complainant, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, was only 1,921 instead of 6,921, or 5,000
votes less than the number of votes private complainant actually received. This error
is also evident in the Certificate of Canvass (COC) No. 436156 signed by petitioner,
Viray and Romero.[16]

During trial of this case, petitioner admitted that she was indeed the one who
announced the figure of 1,921, which was subsequently entered by then accused
Viray in his capacity as secretary of the board.[17] Petitioner likewise admitted that
she was the one who prepared the COC (Exhibit A-7), though it was not her duty. To
our mind, preparing the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an intention to
perpetuate the erroneous entry in the COC.[18]

Neither can this Court accept petitioners explanation that the Board of
Canvassers had no idea how the SOV (Exhibit 6) and the COC reflected that private
complainant had only 1,921 votes instead of 6,921 votes. As chairman of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers, petitioners concern was to assure accurate, correct
and authentic entry of the votes.Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and
fidelity to her trust deserves not only censure but also the concomitant sanctions as
a matter of criminal responsibility pursuant to the dictates of the law. [19]

The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by
private complainant, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any senatorial
candidate does not relieve petitioner of liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No.
6646. The mere decreasing of the votes received by a candidate in an election is
already punishable under the said provision.[20]

At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual conclusions of the
appellate court. The Court has consistently held that factual findings of the trial
court, as well as of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and may not be
reviewed on appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial court and the
appellate court on the matter coincide.[21]

Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the

members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any
error on their part would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The
Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of
votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election
documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized. [22]

In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998. [23]

As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private
complainant of 6,921 votes and statement of his actual votes received of 6,998 is a
difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy may be validly attributed to mistake or error
due to fatigue. However, a decrease of 5,000 votes as reflected in the Statement of
Votes and Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot be allowed to remain on
record unchallenged, especially when the error results from the mere transfer of
totals from one document to another.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of

the Court of Appeals sustaining petitioners conviction but increasing the minimum
penalty in her sentence to one year instead of six months is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

BENJAMIN JESALVA, G.R. No. 187725

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
NACHURA,
- versus - PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. January 19, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review[1] on Certiorari under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[2]dated October 17, 2008, which affirmed with modification the
decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, dated
November 18, 1997, finding petitioner Benjamin Jesalva alias Ben
Sabaw[4] (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.

The Facts
 On September 11, 1992, the Chief of Police of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, filed a
criminal complaint[5] for Frustrated Murder against petitioner. Four days thereafter,
or on September 15, 1992, the complaint was amended, charging petitioner with the
crime of Murder, as the victim Leticia Aldemo[6] (Leticia) died on September 14,
1992.[7] After conducting a hearing on the bail application of petitioner, the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, on December 18, 1992,
granted him bail.[8] On January 11, 1993, the MTC recommended the filing of
Murder against petitioner, and then ordered the transmittal of the records of the case
to the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon.[9]

Thus, petitioner was charged with the crime of Murder in an

Information[10] dated January 26, 1993, which reads:

That on or about the 9th day of September, 1992 in the Municipality

of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength, with treachery and
evident premeditation with the use of motor vehicle and during night time,
did then and there [wilfully], unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
manhandle and use personal violence upon [Leticia] Aldemo, inflicting
upon the latter serious and mortal wounds which directly caused her death
shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of her legal heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

When arraigned on March 1, 1993, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty to the
offense charged.[11] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. In the course of the trial,
two varying versions arose.

Version of the Prosecution

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are essentially summarized by

the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as follows:
 In the evening of September 8, 1992, witness Gloria Haboc,
together with the victim Leticia Aldemo, Benjamin Jesalva (petitioner),
Elog Ubaldo,[12] Jo Montales and Romy Paladin were at Nenas place
playing mahjong. A certain Mrs. Encinas and Atty. Alibanto were also
there. At about 10 oclock that night, Glorias group left Nenas place and
boarded the Isuzu panel of petitioner. With the exception of Jo Montales,
the group proceeded to Bistro Christina to eat and drink. While Gloria had
softdrink, Leticia drank two (2) bottles of beer, and the rest consumed beer
and [F]undador until 11:30 in the evening.

After they ate and drank, the group, with the exception of Elog Ubaldo
who flagged down a tricycle, once again boarded petitioners Isuzu panel
as it was usually petitioner who drove them home. The victim Leticia
Aldemo was seated at the front seat. Petitioner dropped Romy Paladin at
his house first, followed by Gloria, who resided some 20 meters away
from Leticias house.While at Glorias house, petitioner wanted to drink
some more but Gloria told him to defer it until the next day because the
stores were already closed. Gloria then gave Leticia three (3) sticks of
barbecue and accompanied her and petitioner at the gate. After petitioner
and Leticia boarded the Isuzu [panel], the former immediately accelerated
his car and went to the direction of 6th Streetinstead of
towards 7th Street where Leticias house was situated.

At about 12:20 early morning of September 9, 1992, the group of SPO1

Edgardo Mendoza (SPO1 Mendoza) of the Sorsogon PNP Mobile Patrol
Section chanced upon petitioners Isuzu [panel] in St. Rafael Subdivision
in [Our Ladys Village] OLV, Pangpang, Sorsogon. The police patrol team
approached the vehicle and SPO1 Mendoza focused a flashlight at the
front portion of the vehicle to check what was going on. There, SPO1
Mendoza saw petitioner whom he knew since childhood seated in front of
the wheel so he called out his name. Instead of heeding his call, however,
petitioner did not respond, immediately started the engine and sped away
toward Sorsogon town proper which is directly opposite his place of
residence which is Ticol, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
At about the same time that night, Noel Olbes, a driver for the MCST Sisters
holding office at the Bishops Compound in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, was also in
OLV Pangpang. While he was walking from a certain Leas house, he saw a
woman naked from the waist down and lying on her belly on the
highway. Her jeans and [panty] were beside her. Because it was raining,
Olbes pitied her so he carried her and her things to the shed some 10 meters
 away. As he was doing so, a tricycle being driven by Eduardo De Vera
focused its headlight in his direction. De Vera called out, What is
that?Because he received no response from Noel Olbes, he decided to bring
his passenger home first and just come back to check the site later.

Meanwhile, upon reaching the shed, Olbes noticed that the woman was
bleeding that he even got stained with her blood. Afraid that he might be
implicated, he hurriedly left the woman at Hazelwood such that when De
Vera came back, he no longer found Olbes. De Vera then proceeded to the
police station to report the incident to [SPO1] Balaoro.

De Vera, SPO1 Balaoro and SPO1 Sincua eventually returned to comb the
area but to no avail. On their way back at about 1:15 oclock (sic) in the
morning, they met Lt. Caguia talking with Noel Olbes. De Vera lost no
time in identifying him to be the man he saw with the woman. At this
point, Olbes admitted the allegation but professed innocence. He admitted
he left the woman in Hazelwood where the police found her.

Eventually, Olbes was investigated by the police and was not released
until the next day. However, because the evidence pointed to petitioner as
the last person seen with the victim, a search for him was conducted. He
surrendered at one (1) oclock in the afternoon accompanied by Fiscal Jose
Jayona, his first cousin.[13]

The prosecution highlighted that, per testimony of Gloria Haboc, Leticia

disclosed to her that petitioner was courting Leticia. However, Leticia told petitioner
that they should just remain as friends because she was already married, and that she
loved her handsome husband.[14] Moreover, the prosecution asseverated that, at
around 12:20 a.m. of September 9, 1992, while conducting patrol in St. Rafael
Subdivision, [15] together with other police officers, Senior Police Officer 1 Edgardo
Mendoza (SPO1 Mendoza), by using his flashlight, saw petitioner on board his
vehicle alone. Upon sight, petitioner immediately started his vehicle and drove
toward the town proper of Sorsogon, which was directly opposite his residence in
Ticol, Sorsogon, disregarding SPO1 Mendozas calls. [16] Lastly, at about 1:00 p.m.
of September 9, 1992, petitioner, together with his first cousin Fiscal Jose Jayona
(Fiscal Jayona), went to the police station, wherein he voluntarily intimated to SPO4
William Desder (SPO4 Desder) that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle. [17] At about
1:20 p.m. of September 9, 1992, SPO2 Enrique Renoria, together with other police
officers, Fiscal Jayona, and petitioner inspected the place, which petitioner identified
as the place where he and Leticia sat. They found bloodstains thereat.[18]

After the prosecution presented twelve (12) witnesses, the defense moved for
leave of court to file demurrer to evidence. On February 21, 1994, the defense filed
before the RTC, Branch 51, its Demurrer to Evidence, [19] which the RTC, Branch
51, denied in its Order[20] dated July 8, 1994. On August 11, 1994, the defense filed
a Motion[21] for Reconsideration of the Order dated July 8, 1994 and Inhibition of
Presiding Judge, which the prosecution opposed. The Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Branch 51, voluntarily inhibited himself from taking any further action in the
case;[22] hence, the case was re-raffled to the RTC, Branch 52. Acting on the pending
Motion for Reconsideration of the defense, the Presiding Judge of the RTC, Branch
52, denied the same and set the reception of evidence of the defense. [23]

Version of the Defense

In his relatively short stint on the witness stand, petitioner denied that he killed
Leticia. He testified that he did not have any reason to kill her, and that he had many
reasons why he should not kill her.[24] The prosecution manifested that it would not
conduct a cross-examination on the person of petitioner as his testimony was
tantamount to pure denial.[25] To prove that there was a broken chain of
circumstantial evidence, the defense presented, as witness, Eduardo de Vera. The
CA narrated:

12. Eduardo de Vera declared that on September 9, 1992 at about

12:30 a.m., he was driving his tricycle en route to OLV, Pangpang,
Sorsogon; upon reaching the junction of the national road or highway, he
saw a man and a woman three meters from the edge of the road; he stopped
his tricycle and focused the headlight of his tricycle towards the two; he
saw the woman leaning on the left arm of the man while the man was on
a squatting position; he asked them what is that? and did not get any
response; that the man was hiding his face and saw little blood on the
clothes of the woman; he saw the woman with clothes, a polo shirt and
pants; he decided to bring home his passenger home (sic) first and then
returned to the scene but found no one there; he reported the matter to
[SPO1] Balaoro, who immediately accompanied him to the place; they
 searched for the man and woman but they could not find them; they
checked the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital but nobody had been brought
there; then they proceeded back to the junction and later to the Sorsogon
town proper; upon reaching Barangay Tugos, they saw [Lt.] Caguia
talking with a man, whom he (De Vera) recognized as the man with the
woman; [Lt.] Caguia directed the man to go to Police Sub-Station 1; at the
police Sub-Station 1, he came to know the name of the man Noel Olbes;
he saw bloodstains on Olbes arms, hands, face and nose; the police
interrogated him about it and he replied that he just helped the woman.

On cross-examination, he admitted that he has known [petitioner]

for a longtime; and he has good relationship with him; [petitioner] was his
bondsman in Criminal Case No. 95-3989 for illegal possession of firearms
and because of this, he is indebted to him and he thus wants to repay his
gratitude to [petitioner]; [petitioner] requested him to be a witness in the
case.[26]

Relative to the subsequent events, the CA summarized the testimonies of

SPO1 Eduardo Balaoro and Noel Olbes (Olbes), as follows:

6. SPO1 Eduardo Balaoro essayed that at around 1:00 a.m. of

September 9, 1992, Eduardo De Vera reported to him at the Police Sub-
Station 1 that he saw a man, who was in squatting position, and a woman,
who had blood on the upper right breast of her clothes, lean[ing] against
the man and that after De Vera brought his tricycle passenger home, he
returned to the site but he could not find the two anymore; upon receiving
the report, he (SPO1 Balaoro), together with SPO1 Sincua and De Vera,
proceeded to the diversion road, at the junction going to the hospital and
Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon to investigate; they searched the place and
went to the hospital but found nothing; on their way back, at around 1:15
[a.m.] they saw Noel Olbes talking with Lt. Caguia at Barangay Tugos;
De Vera pointed to Olbes as the man he saw with the woman at the
crossing so they brought him to Police Sub-Station 1 for investigation;
Olbes told them that he saw the woman lying on the side of the road so he
tried to lift her up but when he saw the tricycle (De Veras) he became
afraid as he might be implicated in the crime so he brought her to
Hazelwood, which is five meters away from the highway; at 2:25 a.m. the
patrol team found Leticia Aldemo, whom they found naked from the waist
down; at the garage of Hazelwood; they found the long pants of the victim
lying beside her and noted that her panty was still on one of her knees; the
 victims body appeared to have been laid down; they did not find any blood
in the garage except where the victims body was found outside the garage,
they saw the other pair of shoes of a woman and thick bloodstains; he
(SPO1 Balaoro) brought Olbes to Balogo station and entrusted him to their
investigator.

7. Noel Olbes testified that he is a driver for the MCST Sisters who
are holding office at the Bishops Compound in Sorsogon, Sorsogon; that
on September 8, 1997, he went out with his friends Danny, Oca and Ely
in Almendras to drink a bottle of gin; at around 6:30 p.m. he went to
downtown Sorsogon and roamed around until 10:30 p.m.; then he went to
Bahay Kainan and at about 11:00 or 11:30 p.m., he went to Pena Fast Food
and took a bottle of beer; upon the invitation of Lea, he went inside Pena
and drank another bottle of beer; he brought Lea to her home at OLV,
Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon; from Leas house, he walked and upon
reaching the junction of OLV, he saw a woman lying on her belly naked
from the waist down; the woman was just uttering guttural sound; her
jeans and panty were just lying beside her; taking pity on the woman and
since it was raining that night, he carried the woman to a nearby shed in
order that she would not be run over by motor vehicles; he also took the
panty and the jeans to the shed; he noticed that a tricycle stopped for a
while and focused its headlight on them and proceeded on its way; when
he laid down the woman in the shed, he noticed that she was bleeding and
he was stained with her blood; after seeing the blood, he got scared and
left; he walked towards the Sorsogon town proper and after about forty-
five minutes, two policem[e]n apprehended him and brought him to the
police station for investigation; while being investigated, he was not
apprised of his constitutional rights and made to sign the police blotter; he
was detained as he was a suspect for the injuries of the victim; after 7 or
8 hours, he was released; and he executed a Sworn Statement and affirmed
its contents.[27]

Dr. Antonio Dioneda, Jr.[28] and Dr. Wilhelmino Abrantes (Dr. Abrantes) testified
on the injuries suffered by Leticia, which eventually caused her death:

9. Dr. Antonio Dionedas testified that he encountered on September 9,

1992 a patient by the name of Leticia Aldemo, who was in comatose state;
she sustained the following injuries (1) severe cerebral contusion; (2) 2.5
cm punctured wound, occipital area (3) .5 cm punctured wound, parietal
left area[;] (4) multiple contusion hematoma antero lateral aspect deltoid
 left area[;] (5) contusion hematoma 3rd upper left arm; (6) contusion
hematoma left elbow[;] (7) abrasion left elbow[;] (8) hematoma, 3rd left
thigh[;] (9) abrasion right knee[;] (10) multiple confluent abrasion right
foot[;] (11) contusion hematoma right hand[;] (12) abrasion right elbow[;]
(13) contusion hematoma right elbow[;] and (14) skull-segmented fracture
parietal bone with separation.

He explained that the punctured wound in the occipital area (lower back
of the skull) was caused by a pebble which they recovered from said area;
the punctured wound on the parietal left area was caused by a sharp object
and may have been secondary to a fall on a rough surface; the first three
findings could also have been caused by the punch made by the
perpetrator; the fourth finding could have been caused by a blunt
instrument or a punch or a strong grip; the fifth and the sixth findings
could have been caused also by some of the above-mentioned means; the
eighth finding could have been caused by a fall or rubbing on a hard
object; the ninth finding could have been caused by a blunt instrument or
a fist blow while the tenth finding could have been caused by a fall on a
rough object and the knee rubbing on a rough object; the eleventh finding
could have been due to a fall or by being dragged; the twelfth finding
could be caused by a blunt instrument or by a fall or by fist blow and the
thirteenth finding could also be caused by a fall or fist blow.

He stated [that] the victim died despite the operation he performed

on her.

xxxx

14. Dr. Wilhelmino Abrantes He explained the different kinds of

injuries sustained by the victim. In addition, he stated that since there were
wounds sustained by the victim in the dorsum part of the foot and
sustained injuries on both knees, upper portion of the back of the hand,
the victim could have been thrown off while unconscious.[29]

The RTCs Ruling

On November 18, 1997, the RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution, finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence, not of
the crime of Murder, but of Homicide. The RTC ratiocinated that, in the absence of
any direct evidence or testimonies of eyewitnesses, treachery was not established,
and that evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength were not duly proven.
Thus, the RTC disposed of the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused

Benjamin Jesalva alias Ben Sabaw guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code
and considering that there was no aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances attendant thereto and taking into consideration the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court hereby sentences the accused to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay death indemnity of the sum
of P50,000.00 to the legal heirs of the victim, plus P42,755.45 for
compensatory damages plus P50,000.00 by way of moral damages
and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees (People v. Aguiluz, March 11, 1992).

SO ORDERED.[30]

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. [31]

The CAs Ruling

On October 17, 2008, the CA pertinently held, among others, that petitioner could
not point to Olbes as the culprit because, when Eduardo de Vera saw the former
holding on to Leticia in a squatting position, Olbes was in the act of lifting her in
order to bring her to the nearby shed. The CA opined that, if any misdeed or omission
could be attributed to Olbes, it was his failure to bring Leticia to a nearby hospital,
because his fear of being implicated in the crime clouded his better judgment. Thus:

All told, We find that the prosecutions evidence suffice to sustain the
accused-appellants conviction for homicide.

As to the award of attorneys fees, We find the award of P10,000.00 by the

trial court meritorious, the records reveal that services of private
prosecutor was engaged.
 Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable
by reclusion temporal. With the attendant mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender of accused-appellant, the penalty reclusion
temporal is imposed in its minimum period. Accordingly, accused-
appellant Benjamin J. Jesalva should suffer the indeterminate penalty of
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as
maximum and SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as
minimum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial

Court of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 dated November 18, 1997 in
Criminal Case No. 3243 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to
the penalty.

Accused-appellant Benjamin J. Jesalva is sentenced to serve the

indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor, as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[32]

Undaunted, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, [33] which the CA,
however, denied in its Resolution[34] dated April 7, 2009 for lack of merit.

Hence, this Petition based on the following grounds:

A) THE COURT OF APPEALS AND RTC DECISIONS

CONVICTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE BASED
ON PURELY CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE WERE BOTH NOT IN
ACCORD WITH ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE REQUIRING
THAT SUCH BE ACTED WITH CAUTION AND THAT ALL THE
ESSENTIAL FACTS MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE
HYPOTHESIS OF GUILT; AND

B) THE COURT OF APPEALS, AS WELL AS THE TRIAL COURT,

SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT STATEMENTS MADE BY
PETITIONER IN THE POLICE STATION WERE ADMISSIBLE AS
HE WAS THEN NOT UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
DESPITE SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT HE WOULD
HAVE BEEN DETAINED BY THE POLICE HAD HIS FISCAL-
COMPANION NOT [TAKEN] HIM UNDER HIS CUSTODY.[35]
 Petitioner argues that no evidence was ever introduced as to how, when, and
where Leticia sustained her injuries. No witness ever testified as to who was
responsible for her injuries. He refutes the prosecutions contention that, even if he
took the 6th Street, the same could still lead to the 7th Street, where Leticias house is
located. Petitioner stresses that Olbes should have been considered as a suspect in
this case, considering that he was the last person seen with Leticia when she was still
alive. He avers that the statements he made at the police station are not admissible
in evidence, considering that he was, technically, under custodial investigation, and
that there was no waiver of his right to remain silent.[36] Moreover, petitioner alleges
that the fatal injuries sustained by Leticia, per the testimony of Dr. Abrantes, are
consistent with a fall, thereby suggesting petitioners innocence. Petitioner claims
that the evidence shows that there was more blood in Hazelwood than in the place
where Olbes spotted Leticia, thereby suggesting that something worse than her
jumping out of the vehicle might have happened.[37]

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the OSG,
argues that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court, and that we
accord great respect to factual findings of the trial court especially when affirmed by
the CA. The OSG insists that the CA, affirming the RTCs ruling, did not err in
convicting petitioner on the basis of circumstantial evidence, because the particular
circumstances enumerated by both the RTC and the CA satisfactorily meet the
requirements of the rules and of jurisprudence for conviction. Moreover, the OSG
claims that the statements made by petitioner before SPO4 Desder, in the presence
of Fiscal Jayona, were voluntarily given and were not elicited on custodial
investigation. Lastly, the OSG counters that petitioner was not deprived of his rights
since he was never held for questioning by any police officer upon arriving at the
police station and, besides, he was accompanied by his first cousin, Fiscal Jayona.[38]

Our Ruling

The Petition is bereft of merit.

 Custodial investigation refers to any questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. This presupposes that he is suspected of
having committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or
a confession from him.[39] The rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and direction is
aimed upon a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and to whom the
police would then direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit incriminating
statements.[40] The assailed statements herein were spontaneously made by petitioner
and were not at all elicited through questioning. It was established that petitioner,
together with his cousin Fiscal Jayona, personally went to the police station and
voluntarily made the statement that Leticia jumped out of his vehicle at around 12:30
a.m. of September 9, 1992.[41] The RTC and the CA did not, therefore, err in holding
that the constitutional procedure for custodial investigation is not applicable in the
instant case.

Be that as it may, even without these statements, petitioner could still be

convicted of the crime of Homicide. The prosecution established his complicity in
the crime through circumstantial evidence, which were credible and sufficient, and
which led to the inescapable conclusion that petitioner committed the said crime.
Indeed, when considered in their totality, the circumstances point to petitioner as the
culprit.

Direct evidence of the commission of the crime charged is not the only matrix
wherefrom a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. There are
instances when, although a witness may not have actually witnessed the commission
of a crime, he may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the
perpetrator of a crime as when, for instance, the latter is the person last seen with the
victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the
type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence. In the
absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may resort to adducing circumstantial
evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in secret and under
condition where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted upon
under all circumstances, the guilt of vicious felons who committed heinous crimes
in secret or in secluded places will be hard, if not well-nigh impossible, to prove.[42]

Thus, there can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence

when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and
reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the others, as
the perpetrator of the crime. However, in order that circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz.: (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[43]

We accord respect to the following findings of the CA, affirming those of the
RTC:

After a thorough review of the records of the case, We find that the
circumstantial evidence proved by the prosecution, when viewed in its
entirety, points unerringly to [petitioner] Benjamin Jesalva as the person
responsible for the death of the victim Leticia Aldemo. Truly, the
following combination of the circumstances which comprised such
evidence forms an unbroken chain that points to [petitioner] and no other,
as the perpetrator of the crime, to wit:

1. [Petitioner] Benjamin Jesalva (who was previously courting the

victim Leticia Aldemo, and whom the latter advised to stop as
she was already married) together with Gloria Haboc, and six
other individuals left Nena Ables house at 10 p.m. of
September 8, 1992 after playing mahjong thereat. They rode
in [petitioners] red panel.

2. Benjamin Jesalva, Leticia Aldemo, Gloria Haboc and two others

proceeded to Bistro Christina. [Petitioner], together with other
two male companions, consumed one bottle of Fundador, in
addition to the three bottles of beer. At 11:30 p.m., the group
left the place.
3. After dropping one male companion at his house, Benjamin
Jesalva, together with Leticia Aldemo, proceeded to bring
Gloria Haboc to her home, which was only twenty meters
away from Leticias residence.

4. After staying at Gloria Habocs house for five minutes, and

denied another drink, Benjamin Jesalva immediately
accelerated his vehicle en route to 6th Street instead of
the shorter and direct route, the 7th street, where Leticia
Aldemos house is located;

5. Leticia Aldemo never reached home as testified by her husband

Efren Aldemo;

6. At around 12:20 a.m. of September 9, 1992, the police patrolling

the St. Ra[f]ael Subdivision saw the red panel thereat and
when they approached and beamed a flashlight, they saw
Benjamin Jesalva behind the wheel, who suddenly drove away
in the direction of Sorsogon town proper, opposite to where he
lives. SPO1 Eduardo Mendoza told Benjamin Jesalva (whom
he had known since his teen-age years) to stop but the latter
did not respond or heed his call;

7. At 12:30 oclock (sic) of even date, Noel Olbes saw the body of
Leticia Aldemo sprawled on her belly at the crossing/junction
of OLV, Pangpang Sorsogon, Sorsogon, naked from the waist
down. He lifted her up and brought the body at Hazelwood,
which is about 10 meters away from the highway.

8. The police found the body of the victim at Hazelwood at around

2:15 a.m. of the same day, and brought her to
the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital in comatose condition.

9. The police proceeded to inform the victims sister, who in turn

informed the victims husband of the incident.

10. In the morning of September 9, 1992, the police looked for

Benjamin Jesalva to invite him at the police station but was
not able to find him.
11. At around 1:00 oclock p.m. of September 9, 1992, Benjamin
Jesalva, together with his first cousin, Asst. Prosecutor Jose
Jayona, presented himself at the PNP Sorsogon, Sorsogon
headquarters, where he voluntarily stated that the victim
Leticia Aldemo was his passenger in his vehicle at about 12:30
in the early morning of September 9, 1992 at St. Rafael
Subdivision but upon reaching the crossing of OLV,
Pangpang, Sorsogon, Sorsogon near the Provincial Hospital,
she jumped out of his vehicle. These declarations were
recorded in the police blotter by PO1 Enrique [Renoria] upon
the instruction of SPO4 William Desder, the PNP Sorsogon
Chief Investigator.

12. At about 1:30 p.m. of the same day, a police team, together with
[petitioner] and Asst. Prosecutor Jayona, went to St. Ra[f]ael
Subdivision to conduct an ocular inspection.[Petitioner]
pointed to the police the place where he and the victim spent
their time. The police photographed what appear[ed] to be
bloodstains just two meters away from the place pointed by
[petitioner].
13. Dr. Antonio Dioneda testified that the punctured wound in the
occipital area was caused by a pebble which he recovered from
said area; the punctured wound in the parietal left area was
caused by a sharp object and may have been secondary to a
fall on a rough surface, the cerebral contusion, the punctured
wound in the occipital and in the parietal area could also be
caused by a punch by the perpetrator. As to the multiple
contusion hematoma anterior lateral aspect of the deltoid left
area was caused by a blunt instrument or a punch or a strong
grip; the contusion hematoma on the upper left arm and left
elbow could as well be similarly caused by a blunt instrument
or a punch or a strong grip. As to the abrasion on the right
knee, the same could have been caused by a blunt instrument
or a fist blow. The multiple confluent abrasion[s] on the right
foot could have been caused by a fall on a rough object. The
abrasions on the right elbow could have been caused by a blunt
instrument or by a fall or by a fist blow. The same is true with
the contusion hematoma found on the victims right elbow.[44]
 Petitioners mere denial cannot outweigh the circumstantial evidence clearly
establishing his culpability in the crime charged. It is well-settled that the positive
declarations of a prosecution witness prevail over the bare denials of an accused.
The evidence for the prosecution was found by both the RTC and the CA to be
sufficient and credible, while petitioners defense of denial was weak, self-serving,
speculative, and uncorroborated. Petitioners silence as to the matters that occurred
during the time he was alone with Leticia is deafening. An accused can only be
exonerated if the prosecution fails to meet the quantum of proof required to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. We find that the prosecution
has met this quantum of proof in this case.[45]

All told, we find no reversible error in the assailed CA decision which would
warrant the modification much less the reversal thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the Court of Appeals Decision

dated October 17, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22126, affirming with modification the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, in Criminal
Case No. 3243, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

JUN MUPAS and GIL MUPAS, G.R. No. 172834

Petitioners,

Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Respondent.

Promulgated:

February 6, 2008

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Petitioners Jun and Gil[1] Mupas were found guilty of frustrated homicide in
Criminal Case No. 2314 in the Decision[2] dated 22 November 2002 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Malaoan, La Union, Branch 34. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment

declaring both accused JUN MUPAS and GIL MUPAS @ Banjo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE as defined and
penalized in Art. 249 in relation with Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code, and thereby
sentenced EACH of the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS PRISION CORRECCIONAL as
 Minimum to TEN (10) years PRISION MAYOR as maximum and the accessory
penalties provided for by law and to indemnify jointly the private complainant the
reasonable amount of P5,000.00 for hospital expenses and other miscellaneous
expenses.

The preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused is counted in his favor.

SO ORDERED.[3]
The relevant antecedents are as follows:

The Information[4] for frustrated homicide alleged:

That on or about the 18th day of February 1993, in the Municipality of Bangar,
Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, maul with fist and stones and stab with a knife Rogelio Murao
y Sibayan hitting the latter and inflicting injuries on his face and head thus
performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
Homicide as a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the accused, that was the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to the offended party which saved his life to his damage and
prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]

During the arraignment, petitioners, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge.[6] Thereafter, trial ensued.

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Rogelio Murao (Rogelio),

Flaviano Murao (Flaviano) and Dr. Arsenio B. Martinez (Dr. Martinez).

Rogelio testified that at around 7:30 in the morning of 18 February 1993, he was
walking to school with his companion Eduardo Murao, Jr. when Jun suddenly
stopped and stabbed him using a 29-inch Batangas knife. Meantime, Banjo bodily
restrained him but luckily Rogelio was able to avoid the blow. Next, Banjo and Jun
hurled stones at him and hit him on the leg while Rogelio was running eastward.
Rogelio then flagged down a motorized tricycle but the two assailants continued to
pursue him. While inside the tricycle, Banjo held Rogelio by his neck and punched
him while Jun stabbed him several times. Then, Rogelio alighted from the tricycle
and ran home. Afterwards, his father and mother accompanied him to the
hospital.[7] There, Dr. Martinez attended to Rogelio and issued a medical certificate
containing the following findings:

Cut wound, 2-3 cm. parietal area

Abrasion, maxiliary area, (L)
Contusion, maxiliary area, (L)
Abrasion, lumbar area, (L)

HEALING PERIOD: It may take two weeks to heal.[8]

Prior to the incident, Rogelio recalled that in January of the same year, he had a
misunderstanding with Jun where he and the latter hurled invectives at each other.
Rogelio suspected that this event gave rise to the subject incident. [9]

Flaviano, Rogelios father, testified that on 18 February 1993, Rogelio came home
bleeding from head injuries. Immediately, he brought Rogelio to the Martinez Clinic
in Bangar, La Union. Flaviano reported that he has spent P2,000.00 for Rogelios
medical treatment and P3,000.00 for attorneys fees and transportation.[10]

For the defense, Jun testified that on 18 February 1993, at around 7:30 in the
morning, he was watering the plants in front of Gils house when he accidentally
sprayed water on Rogelio who was passing by. Rogelio scolded him and Jun
immediately apologized. Rogelio then challenged Jun to a fistfight which Jun
accepted. After that, Rogelio ran away, picked up big stones and threw them at Gils
house. Jun gave chase and was able to catch up with Rogelio. They both boarded a
tricycle and continued their fighting inside. One of the passengers of the tricycle,
Josefina Mendoza, pacified the two men. Banjo arrived only when the fighting
ceased.[11]

Afterwards, Jun went home. Then, Rogelio and Flaviano, each armed with a bolo,
arrived and challenged Jun to a fight. However, the two could not enter the house as
the gate was locked.[12]
Gil testified that in the morning of 18 February 1993, at around 7:00, somebody
threw a stone at their house. He went outside the house and saw Jun chasing Rogelio.
He went near them and saw that they had already been pacified by one Ms. Monis.
Afterward, he sent the two men home. Gil also went home and thereat, Rogelio, who
had a stone with him, arrived with his father Flaviano who was carrying a
bolo. Rogelio then challenged Gil and Jun to a fight. [13]

Danilo Olpindo testified that between 7:00 and 8:00 in the morning of 18 February
1993, he was buying soap from Banjos store when a fistfight transpired between
Rogelio and Jun. Rogelio then ran away, picked up a stone and threw it at Jun. After
Rogelio threw another stone at Banjos house, Jun chased him and had a fistfight with
him again. Banjo then came out of the house and asked the two to go home. Danilo
also saw Teresita Monis at the scene trying to pacify the two. [14]

Teresita Monis testified that on that fateful day, she was riding a tricycle when
suddenly, somebody from outside punched one of her co-passengers. She saw an
arm reach inside the tricycle and hit the passenger. Blood started to ooze from the
fellows forehead. Shortly, she had to alight from the tricycle to attend the flag
ceremony at her school.[15]

Josefina Mendoza testified that on said day, she saw Jun box Rogelio. Subsequently,
Banjo went near the two and dispersed them.[16]
Jun and Gil were found guilty as charged and the judgment of conviction was
elevated to the Court of Appeals.

Before the Court of Appeals, Jun and Gil argued that the trial court erred in: (1)
finding Gil guilty of the crime charged despite the prosecutions failure to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) finding Jun guilty of the crime of frustrated
homicide instead of physical injuries only.[17]

Jun and Gil contended that Rogelio had failed to identify with moral certainty that
Gil had been one of those who inflicted the injury on him. They pointed out that
Rogelio had failed to categorically state that Gil and Banjo Mupas are one and the
same person. Moreover, they asserted that in Juns case, the prosecution had failed to
prove intent to kill and as such, he should be convicted only of the crime of physical
injuries.[18]

The Court of Appeals in a Decision[19] dated 23 January 2006, in CA-G.R. CR. No.
27768, affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from convicting accused-

appellants JUN MUPAS and GIL MUPAS alias BANJO MUPAS of the crime
of Frustrated Homicide is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that appellants
are ordered to pay ROGELIO MURAO in the amount of P4,000 as temperate
damages.
SO ORDERED.[20]

After a review of the records of the case, the Court of Appeals concluded that Banjo
Mupas and Gil Mupas are one and the same person. The Court of Appeals observed
that when Banjo posted a bail bond in the case entitled People of the Philippines v.
Jun Mupas and Banjo Mupas, he had made no objection to the caption of the case
and he had even signed his name as Gil Mupas. Secondly, when the Information was
amended to include Gils alias, Banjo did not interpose any objection to the
correction. Lastly, Rogelio had not been able to identify Banjo in court due to the
latters absence at the time of his testimony.[21]
The Court of Appeals likewise held that Jun already performed all the acts of
execution necessary to bring about the death of Rogelio which would have transpired
had it not been for the timely medical intervention. As such, the trial court correctly
found him liable for the crime of frustrated homicide. [22]
Jun and Gil are now before the Court reiterating their assertion that the prosecution
failed to establish Gils identity as one of the perpetrators of the crime and that his
defense of denial was duly supported by clear and convincing evidence.[23] They also
contend that on the assumption that Jun is guilty of having committed a crime, he
should only be convicted of the crime of physical injuries.[24]
There is merit in the petition.

The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has the burden to
overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence
required. In addition, the prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely
on the weakness of the defense. In fact, if the prosecution fails to meet the required
quantum of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its
own behalf. In which case, the presumption of innocence shall prevail and hence,
the accused shall be acquitted. However, once the presumption of innocence is
overcome, the defense bears the burden of evidence to show reasonable doubt as to
the guilt of the accused. Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an
investigation of the whole proof and an inability after such investigation to let the
mind rest each upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded
by the law to convict a criminal charge, but moral certainty is required as to every
proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense. [25]

The trial court solely hinged its judgment of conviction on the victim Rogelios lone
and uncorroborated testimony. While it is true that the testimony of one witness is
sufficient to sustain a conviction if such testimony establishes the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court rules that the testimony of one witness
in this case is not sufficient for this purpose. [26] Apart from Rogelios testimony, the
Court observes that the prosecutions version of events has no leg to stand on.

In his Sworn Statement[27] dated 23 February 1993, Rogelio admitted that he had a
companion with him on that fateful incident named Eduardo Murao, Jr. He also
stated that there were other persons who may have witnessed the assault namely,
Josephine Mendoza, Terisita Mico and one Mario Olpindo, the driver of the
tricycle. On the witness stand, Rogelio likewise testified that there had been others
who may have witnessed the incident including Eduardo Murao, Jr. and Teresita
Monis.[28] Interestingly, Josephine Mendoza testified for the defense that she had
only witnessed a fistfight between Jun and Rogelio while Teresita Monis, also for
the defense, testified that she had only seen a hand reach inside the tricycle to hit
Rogelio.

It appears then that Rogelio had at his disposal many witnesses who could have
supported his allegations but curiously and without any explanation, none of these
so-called witnesses were presented. It is thus Rogelios word against the attestations
of others. Such omission already raises a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
petitioners.

In contrast, the defense was able to present three (3) other witnesses than the
petitioners themselves. In the Courts view, Danilo Olpindo, one of the defense
witnesses, could hardly be called a biased witness contrary to the appellate courts
opinion. He may indeed be Juns second cousin but the appellate court failed to
consider that Danilo is likewise Rogelios third cousin[29] which fact, in the Courts
estimation, cancels the supposed partiality based on kinship.

Danilo Olpindo, Josefina Mendoza together with Jun and Gil are in agreement that
a fistfight occurred between Jun and Rogelio. In addition, Jun admitted that the
fighting continued inside a tricycle. Teresita Monis attested that this latter detail did
occur but was not able to identify whose hand it was that reached in the tricycle and
hit Rogelio.

Juxtaposing the testimonies of the witnesses, it can be safely deduced that a fistfight
occurred only between Jun and Rogelio which continued inside a tricycle. Rogelios
allegations of Banjos participation in the incident and that Jun carried with him a
bolo are uncorroborated and bereft of any proof. Absent proof of Gil alias Banjos
involvement in the incident, his acquittal is in order.

Assuming that Gil alias Banjo had any participation, there is likewise no evidence
that he or Jun had intent to kill Rogelio. Intent to kill is the principal element of
homicide or murder, in whatever stage of commission. Such intent must be proved
in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal
intent of the aggressor.[30]

Although it can be fairly assumed that the injuries suffered by Rogelio were
sustained during the fistfight, it is not conclusive that the same were inflicted
purposely to kill him. For one, if Jun in fact had been carrying a bolo with intent of
killing Rogelio, and if indeed Banjo had conspired with Jun, it is no small wonder
why the wounds inflicted were more superficial than mortal, more mild than grave.
That Rogelio was able to go home shortly after the tricycle incident without being
pursued by his aggressor also shows that Jun and Banjo were not intent on beating
him to death or even leaving him for dead.[31] It is thus wrong to infer that the intent
to kill was present in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact
beyond reasonable doubt.[32] Moreover, Rogelios suggested motive for killing
him, i.e., his previous altercation with Jun, was too weak and shallow a reason to kill
under the circumstances.[33]

Notably, Dr. Martinez, Rogelios attending physician, opined that if Rogelios wound
was left untreated it could lead to his death, but at the same time he also testified
that such wound merely required suturing. He also testified that the wound, which
was only 2-3 cm long and whose depth he did not indicate, could have been caused
by a rough or sharp object not necessarily a knife. And in the medical certificate he
issued, he reported that the wounds sustained by Rogelio would take two (2) weeks
to heal.[34] Dr. Martinez stated as follows:

Q And what did you do when you noticed the wounds on the patient Rogelio
Murao?
A I gave the necessary injections and medicines preliminary in suturing the wound
and treating the wound, sir.

Q What particular kind of injections did you make on the patient?

A Regularly a patient who will undergo the kind of operation [sic] we gave novaine
injection[.] [T]hen after ten minutes we gave the local anesthesia for
suturing, sir.

Q You said that you conducted surgery, what exactly did you do?
A After rushing and preparing the operative area and after giving the novaine
injection [sic] and I will now examine the kind of wound, it was a two to
three cms. long on the parietal area and partially cut and after cleaning the
wound, we put anesthesia and suture the wound, sir.

xxx

Q Particularly this cut wound which you mentioned as the wound on the parietal
area of the patient, what particularly [sic] did you do when you said you
applied surgery, did you do surgery only on the cut wound?
A I referred to injuries, damages tissues, we removed unnecessary tissues, sir.

Q After removing the unnecessary tissues, and cut wound, what did you do?
A I have to suture, sir.

Q And in laymans language, what is meant by suture?

A We used the chromic sutures and followed by the skin suture which is made of
silk, sir.

Q Now, this cut would as you have said doctor, what would be the result of this cut
wound if it was not treated by you?
A Death, sir.

Q How come it would result to death, if you did not treat the cut wound?
A In the first place according to the legal ethics made by Dr. Solis even if there is
slight wound on the head, it is considered serious because the wound on the
head is proximal to the brain, sir. Meaning, usually, it gets in when the
injuries were on the head, sir.[35]
 xxx

Q You also stated that it is a cut wound which must have been caused by a sharp
instrument or bladed edge?
A Sharp edge, sir.

xxx

Q Because it is a cut wound, the tendency was not penetrating wound?

A No, not penetrating wound, sir.

Q The wound is possible to have been caused by a knife or it might have been
caused by any sharp object not necessarily a knife or by any rough or sharp
object?
A Yes, sir.[36]

Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to sustain the
claim that petitioners had any intention to kill Rogelio. When such intent is lacking
but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated homicide but physical injuries
only and in this case, less serious physical injuries considering the attending
physicians opinion that the wounds sustained by Rogelio would take two (2) weeks
to heal.[37]

Although the Information charged petitioners with frustrated homicide, a finding of

guilt for the lesser offense of less serious physical injuries may be made considering
that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former, and since the essential
ingredients of physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the
offense of homicide.[38]

In sum, absent competent proof, Jun should be held liable only for the crime of less
serious physical injuries under Article 265[39] of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. Gil, alias Banjo, must be absolved from any liability for failure of the
prosecution to conclusively prove that he had conspired with Jun in the commission
of the crime or that he had any participation in it.
The Court sustains the appellate courts award of P4,000.00 as temperate damages.
Having suffered actual injuries, Rogelio is likewise entitled to moral
damages.[40] The award of P5,000.00 as moral damages is sufficient under the
circumstances.[41]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED IN PART and the Decision dated 23

January 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CR. No. 27768 is MODIFIED.
Petitioner Jun Mupas is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Less Serious Physical Injuries, and sentenced to suffer a straight prison term of four
(4) months and ten (10) days of arresto mayor in its maximum period, and to
pay Rogelio Murao the amount of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) as temperate
damages, and Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as moral damages.

Petitioner Gil Mupas is ACQUITTED and the bail bond posted for his provisional
liberty is cancelled and released.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 180314 April 16, 2009

NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the Decision1 of the
Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 27483 promulgated on 7 August 2007 which found petitioner
Normallah A. Pacasum guilty of Falsification under Article 171, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code, and its Resolution2 dated 22 October 2007 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion for New Trial/Reception of Newly Discovered Evidence.

On 2 May 2002, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with Falsification of Public
Documents, defined and punished under paragraph 1 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code,
committed as follows:

That on or about August 22-23, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in Cotabato City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused NORMALLAH A.
PACASUM, a high ranking public official being the Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism
in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City, while in the performance of her
official functions, committing the offense in relation thereto, taking advantage of her official position,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified her Employee Clearance3 submitted
to the Office of the Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by imitating
the signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, the Supply officer I of the DOT-ARMM, for the purpose of
claiming her salary for the months of August and September 2000. 4

On 29 May 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking that she be given the
opportunity to file her counter-affidavit during a preliminary investigation in order that her right to due
process would not be violated.5Petitioner further filed an Urgent Motion for Preliminary Investigation
and/or Reinvestigation with a Prayer to Recall or Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest. 6

On 4 May 2004, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for preliminary

investigation/reinvestigation decreeing that petitioner was not deprived of the opportunity to be heard
before the Office of the Ombudsman as she had waived her right to be heard on preliminary
investigation.7

On 16 June 2004, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.8 Thereafter, pre-trial conference was held and the Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial
Order.9 The parties did not enter any admission or stipulation of facts, and agreed that the issues to
be resolved were as follows:
 1. Whether or not accused Normallah Pacasum, being then the Regional Secretary of the
Department of Tourism in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City,
falsified her Employee Clearance, which she submitted to the Office of the Regional
Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by imitating the signature of Laura
Y. Pangilan, the Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM, for purposes of claiming her salary for
the months of August and September 2000;

2. Whether or not the accused took advantage of her official position in order to commit the
crime charged.10

The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Subaida K. Pangilan, 11 former Human
Resource Management Officer V of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); Laura Y.
Pangilan, former Supply Officer of the Department of Tourism, ARMM; 12 and Rebecca A.
Agatep,13 Telegraph Operator, Telegraph Office, Quezon City.

Subaida K. Pangilan (Pangilan) testified that she was a retired government employee and formerly a
Human Resource Management Officer V of the ARMM which position she held from May 1993 to 28
May 2003. As such, one of her duties was to receive applications for clearance of Regional
Secretaries of the ARMM. She explained that an Employees Clearance was a requirement to be
submitted to the Office of the Regional Director by retiring employees, employees leaving the
country or those applying for leave in excess of thirty days. The person applying for clearance shall
get a copy of the employees clearance and shall accomplish the same by having the different
division heads sign it.

Mrs. Pangilan disclosed that she knew the accused-petitioner – Norma Pacasum – to be the former
Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism (DOT), ARMM. She narrated that in the year 2000,
petitioner submitted the original of an Employees Clearance to her office in compliance with the
memorandum14 dated 8 August 2000 issued by Governor Nur Misuari, directing all officers and
employees to clear themselves of property and money accountabilities before their salaries for
August and September 2000 would be paid. Upon inspection of the Employees Clearance, she
noticed that the signature of Laura Pangilan (Laura) contained in said document was not hers. She
said Laura Pangilan was her daughter-in-law, and that the latter’s signature was very familiar to her.
Mrs. Pangilan immediately photocopied15 the original Employees Clearance with the intention of
sending the same to her daughter-in-law for the purpose of having the latter confirm if the signature
on top of her name in the Employees Clearance was hers. There being no messenger available, she
instead called up Laura to come to her office to verify the signature. Laura, whose office was only a
walking distance away, came and inspected the clearance, and denied signing the same. After she
denied that she signed the clearance, and while they were conversing, the bearer of the Employees
Clearance took said document and left.

Mrs. Pangilan said she did not know the name of the person who took the original of the Employee
Clearance, but said that the latter was a niece and staff member of the petitioner. She said that all
the signatures16 appearing in the Employees Clearance were all genuine except for Laura’s
signature.

The next witness for the prosecution was Laura Y. Pangilan, the person whose signature was
allegedly imitated. Laura testified that presently she was holding the position of Human Resource
Management Officer II of the Department of Tourism - ARMM. Prior to said position, she was the
Supply Officer of the DOT - ARMM from 1994 to January 2001. As such, she issued memorandum
receipts (MR) to employees who were issued government property, and received surrendered office
properties from officers and employees of the DOT - ARMM. She said she knew the accused, as she
was their Regional Secretary of the DOT - ARMM.
Laura recounted that on 9 August 2002, Marie Cris 17 Batuampar, an officemate and niece of
petitioner Pacasum, went to her house with the Employees Clearance of petitioner. Batuampar
requested her to sign in order to clear petitioner of all property accountabilities. She refused to sign
the clearance because at that time, petitioner had not yet turned over all the office properties issued
to her. A few days later, she was called by her mother-in-law to go to the latter’s office and inspect
the Employees Clearance submitted by the representative of petitioner. She went to her mother-in-
law’s office and was shown the Employees Clearance of petitioner. Upon seeing the same, she
denied the signature18 appearing on top of her name. Thereupon, Marie Cris Batuampar, the
representative of petitioner, took the Employees Clearance and left.

Laura revealed she executed a joint complaint-affidavit19 dated 28 August 2001 regarding the instant
case. She issued a certification20 with a memorandum receipt21 dated 23 November 1999,
signed22 by petitioner. The certification attested she did not sign petitioner’s Employees Clearance
because all the office properties issued to petitioner had not been turned over or returned to the
Supply Officer of the DOT - ARMM. Finally, she said that as of 2 January 2005, her last day as
Supply Officer, petitioner had not returned anything.

The last witness for the prosecution, Rebecca A. Agatep, Telegraph Operator, Telegraph Office,
Quezon City, testified that she had been a telegraph operator for nineteen years. On 31 May 2005,
she was at the Telegraph Office in Commission on Audit, Quezon City. She received two
telegrams23 for transmissions both dated 31 May 2005. One was addressed to petitioner and the
other to Marie Cris Batuampar. Upon receiving said documents, she transmitted the documents
through telegram. The telegram addressed to petitioner was received by her relative, Manso Alonto,
in her residence on 1 June 2005, while that addressed to Ms. Batuampar was transmitted to, and
received in, Cotabato City on 1 June 2005. 24

On 4 July 2005, the prosecution formally offered25 its documentary evidence consisting of Exhibits A,
A-1, A-1-a, A-2, A-2-a, A-2-b, A-2-c, A-2-d, A-2-e, A-2-f, A-2-g, A-3, A-3-1, A-4, A-4-a, A-5, A-6, A-7,
A-8, and A-9, to which the accused filed her objections.26 The trial court admitted all the exhibits on
10 August 2005.27

For the defense, petitioner and Atty. Jose I. Lorena, former ARMM Regional Solicitor General, took
the stand.

For her defense, petitioner testified that she was appointed by ARMM Regional Governor Nur
Misuari (Gov. Misuari) as Regional Secretary of the DOT of the ARMM in 1999. She said she was
familiar with the Memorandum dated 8 August 2000 issued by Gov. Misuari directing all ARMM
officers and employees to liquidate all outstanding cash advances on or before 31 August 2000 in
view of the impending expiration of the Governor’s extended term. At first, she said the
memorandum applied to her, she being a cabinet secretary, but later she said same did not apply to
her because she had no cash advances. Only those with cash advances were required to get an
Employees Clearance before they could receive their salaries. She then instructed her staff to work
on her salary.

Petitioner said she did not know where the original of her Employees Clearance was. Neither did she
know if the signature of Laura Pangilan therein had been imitated or forged. She likewise said that
although the Employee Clearance was in her name, she did not cause Laura’s signature to be
affixed thereto.

Petitioner disclosed that she was able to get her salary for the month of August 2000 sometime in
said month, because ARMM Executive Secretary Randolph C. Parcasio told her that she did not
need a clearance before she could get her salary because she was re-appointed.28
Petitioner explained that she has not seen the original of the subject Employees Clearance. 29 When
she first saw the photocopy of the Employees Clearance, the signature of Laura was not there. She
was able to see the photocopy of the Employees Clearance again after this case had been filed with
the Sandiganbayan, already with the alleged signature of Laura. Petitioner said it was not she who
placed or caused Laura’s purported signature to be affixed there.

Petitioner added that the memorandum of Gov. Misuari did not apply to her, because she had no
cash advances and she could receive her salary even without clearance. At that time, she said the
Cashier, Accountant and the Auditor checked her records and found that she had no cash
advances.30 Because she was elsewhere, she instructed her secretary to get her salary. However,
she was informed by her staff that her salary could not be released because the Office of the
Governor required a clearance. Her staff worked on her clearance, the purpose of which was for the
release of her salary for the months of August and September 2000. She was able to get all the
needed signatures except for Laura’s signature. With the refusal of Laura to sign, her staff went to
Executive Secretary Parcasio and explained the situation.

Petitioner denied receiving a telegram from Asst. Special Prosecutor I Anna Isabel G. Aurellano
ordering her to submit to the Office of the Special Prosecutor the original of the Employees
Clearance of the DOT-ARMM issued in her name sometime on 22-23 August 2000.

On cross-examination, petitioner said that prior to her receipt of her salary, she believed that an
Employees Clearance was necessary, and for this reason she had this document prepared by her
staff. She said her Employees Clearance was always in the possession of Marie Cris, her assistant
secretary. It was Marie Cris who showed her the document twice. 31

Atty. Jose I. Lorena, former ARMM Solicitor General, testified that he was familiar with the
Memorandum dated 8 August 2000 issued by Gov. Misuari because the same was the product of
consultation among him, Gov. Misuari and ARMM Executive Secretary Parcasio. He explained that
this memorandum pertained only to outstanding cash advances. He added that an Employees
Clearance was not a requirement and was not sufficient to comply with the directive contained in the
memorandum, because what was required for the purpose of release of salaries was a credit notice
from the Resident Auditors of the Commission on Audit.

On 16 February 2007, the defense formally offered its documentary exhibits 32 consisting of Exhibits 1
to 5, with sub-markings. The prosecution objected to the purpose for which Exhibit 1 was offered.
The trial court admitted all the defense exhibits. 33

On 7 August 2007, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed decision convicting petitioner of the
crime charged in the information. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Normallah A. Pacasum GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged in the Information and, with the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, hereby
sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY OF prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as maximum with the accessories thereof and to pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(₱2,000.00) with costs against the accused. 34

The Sandiganbayan found the signature of DOT-ARMM Supply Officer Laura Y. Pangilan appearing
in the Employees Clearance of petitioner to have been falsified/forged. It did not give much weight
on petitioner’s defense denying she was the one who actually falsified her Employees Clearance by
imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan and that she had no idea about the alleged falsification,
because it was her assistant secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked for her clearance and the
one who submitted the said clearance to the Office of the Regional Governor of the ARMM. The trial
court found said denial unsubstantiated and ruled that while there was no direct evidence to show
that petitioner herself "actually" falsified/forged the signature of Laura Pangilan, there were
circumstances that indicated she was the one who committed the falsification/forgery, or who asked
somebody else to falsify/forge the subject signature in her Employees Clearance. The
Sandiganbayan added that considering it was petitioner who took advantage of and profited from the
use of the falsified clearance, the presumption was that she was the material author of the
falsification. Despite full opportunity, she was not able to rebut said presumption, failing to show that
it was another person who falsified/forged the signature of Laura Pangilan, or that another person
had the reason or motive to commit the falsification/forgery or could have benefited from the same.

The Sandiganbayan likewise did not sustain petitioner’s contention that she did not stand to benefit
from the falsification of her Employees Clearance and from the submission thereof to the Office of
the Regional Governor, because she allegedly had no existing cash advances. She claimed that an
Employees Clearance was not needed to enable her to draw her salary for the months of August
and September 2000 under the 8 August 2000 Memorandum of Gov. Misuari, and that the
presumption that he who benefits from the falsification is presumed to be the author thereof does not
apply to her. The lower court explained that the aforementioned memorandum applied to petitioner,
she being an official of the ARMM. It said that the applicability of said memorandum to petitioner was
even admitted by her when she, in compliance therewith, instructed her staff/assistant secretary to
work for her Employees Clearance to enable her to collect her salary for the month of August 2000.
It said that the fact that she (allegedly) had no existing cash advances did not exempt her from the
coverage of the memorandum, because she must show she had no cash advances and the only
way to do this was by obtaining a clearance.

Petitioner argued that the photocopy of her Employees Clearance had no probative value in proving
its contents and was inadmissible because the original thereof was not presented by the
prosecution. The Sandiganbayan did not agree. It said that the presentation and admission of
secondary evidence, like a photocopy of her Employees Clearance, was justified to prove the
contents thereof, because despite reasonable notices (telegrams) made by the prosecution to
petitioner and her assistant secretary to produce the original of her Employees Clearance, they
ignored the notice and refused to present the original of said document.

On 21 August 2007, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Sandiganbayan35 to which the prosecution filed a Comment/Opposition.36 Subsequent thereto,
petitioner filed a Supplement to Accused’s Motion for Reconsideration & Motion for New
Trial/Reception of Newly Discovered Evidence.37 Petitioner prayed that her motion for new trial be
granted in order that the testimony of Marie Cris Batuampar be introduced, the same being newly
discovered evidence. The prosecution filed its Opposition. 38

On 22 October 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit; and the motion for new trial, because the evidence sought to be
presented did not qualify as newly discovered evidence. 39

On 16 November 2007, the instant petition was filed.

In our Resolution40 dated 27 November 2007, respondent People of the Philippines, through the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), was required to file its Comment on the petition. 41 After two
motions for extension to file comment on the petition, which were granted by this Court, the OSP
filed its Comment dated 18 February 2008.42Petitioner was required43 to file a Reply to the Comment,
which she did on 5 June 2008.44
On 5 August 2008, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition for review on certiorari and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice. They
filed their respective memoranda on 21 November 2008 and on 5 November 2008. 45

Petitioner assails her conviction arguing that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in:

I. Finding that petitioner benefited from the alleged falsification, hence must be deemed the
author thereof, when the evidence on record does not support, but even contradicts, such a
conclusion.

II. Presuming that petitioner had unliquidated cash advances hence was required under the
Misuari Memorandum to submit her Employee’s Clearance to clear herself of these, when
there is no evidence to that effect and the prosecution even admitted so.

III. Not resolving doubt as to the authenticity of the photocopy of the allegedly forged
Employee’s Clearance, in favor of the innocence of the Accused.

IV. In short-circuiting the right of the petitioner to present additional evidence on her behalf,
thus denying her due process.46

Petitioner contends that under the Misuari memorandum dated 8 August 2000, she was not required
to file an Employees Clearance to draw her salary, since what was required under said
memorandum was a Credit Notice from the COA. She further contends that since she was not
required to file said Employees Clearance because she had no cash advances, the signature in her
Employees Clearance was "irrelevant and a non-issue" because what was required was a Credit
Notice.

As to the first contention, we agree with petitioner that under the aforesaid memorandum, what was
required before she could draw her salaries was a Credit Notice from the COA and not an
Employees Clearance. The full text of the Memorandum 47 form the Regional Governor reads:

MEMORANDUM FROM THE REGIONAL GOVERNOR

TO: ALL CONCERNED

SUBJECT: AS STATED

DATE: AUGUST 8, 2000

1. In view of the impending expiration of the extended term of the undersigned, it is hereby
directed that all outstanding cash advances be liquidated on or before August 31, 2000.

2. Effective September 1, 2000, the salaries and other emoluments of all ARMM
officials/employees with unliquidated cash advance shall be withheld until they have settled
their accounts and a corresponding Credit Notice is issued to them by the Commission on
Audit.

3. Due to budgetary and financial constraints brought about by the drastic cut of our budget,
memorandum dated December 01, 1998 is hereby reiterated. Therefore all releases for
financial assistance is hereby suspended effective immediately.
 4. For strict compliance.

PROF. NUR MISUARI

It is clear from said memorandum that what was required from officers/employees who had
unliquidated cash advances was the corresponding Credit Notice issued by the COA after they had
settled their accounts. There was indeed no mention of any Employees Clearance therein. Up to this
point, we agree with petitioner. However, on her contention that the signature of Laura Pangilan in
her Employees Clearance was "irrelevant and a non-issue," we disagree. Whether the signature of
Laura Pangilan was imitated or not is the main issue in this case for falsification.

From the memorandum of Gov. Misuari, the Credit Notice requirement was effective only starting 1
September 2000 and not before. In the case at bar, the information charges petitioner not with failure
to secure a Credit Notice, but with allegedly falsifying her Employees Clearance by imitating the
signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM. The Credit Notice requirement
was therefore irrelevant and a non-issue as regards the release of salaries prior to 1 September
2000.

The questions to be answered are: (1) Was the signature of Laura Pangilan in petitioner’s
Employees Clearance imitated? If yes, (2) Who imitated or caused the imitation of said signature?

On the first query, the same was answered by Laura Pangilan. She said that the signature in
petitioner’s Employees Clearance was not hers. The same was an imitation. When a person whose
signature was affixed to a document denies his/her signature therein, a prima facie case for
falsification is established which the defendant must overcome. 48

Petitioner argues there was no need for her to file an Employees Clearance to draw her salary. She
adds that Atty. Randolph C. Parcasio, Executive Secretary of the ARMM, told her and her secretary,
Marie Cris Batuampar, that she did not need an Employees Clearance because she was re-
appointed.49

These arguments are untenable. There was a need for petitioner to file an Employees Clearance not
only for compliance with the Misuari memorandum but, more importantly, because her term of office
was about to end, since her position was coterminous with the term of Gov. Misuari, the appointing
authority.50 She even admitted that before she received her salary for August, 2000, 51 an Employees
Clearance was necessary.52 Moreover, her claim that Atty. Parcasio told her and her secretary that
she did not need an Employee Clearance to get her salary does not persuade us. In fact, we find her
alleged "re-appointment," when she was working for her Employees Clearance at around August
2000, improbable. How could she have been re-appointed by Gov. Alvarez,53 whom she claims re-
appointed her sometime in the year 2000, when Gov. Misuari was still the Regional Governor of the
ARMM when she had her Employees Clearance prepared sometime in August 2000? Clearly, her
statement that she did not need an Employees Clearance because she was re-appointed does not
inspire belief.

Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for applying the presumption that if a person had in his position
a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby,
he is presumed to be the material author of the falsification. He argues that the Sandiganbayan
overlooked the fact that there was no evidence to prove that petitioner made use of or uttered the
Employees Clearance, because there was no evidence that she submitted it -- if not, at least caused
it to be submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor. To support such claim, she said there were
no "receipt marks" in the Employees Clearance to show that the Office of the Regional Governor
received said documents.
It is to be made clear that the "use" of a falsified document is separate and distinct from the
"falsification" of a public document. The act of "using" falsified documents is not necessarily included
in the "falsification" of a public document. Using falsified documents is punished under Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code. In the case at bar, the falsification of the Employees Clearance was
consummated the moment the signature of Laura Pangilan was imitated. In the falsification of a
public document, it is immaterial whether or not the contents set forth therein were false. What is
important is the fact that the signature of another was counterfeited. 54 It is a settled rule that in the
falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain
or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that in the falsification of a public document, the
principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed.55 Thus, the purpose for which the falsification was made and whether the
offender profited or hoped to profit from such falsification are no longer material.

The records further show that petitioner "used" or uttered the Employees Clearance. The fact that
the same was circulated to the different division heads for their signatures is already considered use
of falsified documents as contemplated in Article 172. The lack of the stamp mark "Received" in the
Employees Clearance does not mean that said document was not received by the Office of the
Regional Governor. We find the certification signed by Atty. Randolph C. Parcasio, Executive
Secretary of Office of the Regional Governor - ARMM, as contained in the Employees Clearance, to
be sufficient proof that the same was submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor. It must be
stressed that the Executive Secretary is part of the Office of the Regional Governor.

Petitioner denies having "actually" falsified her Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of
Laura Pangilan, claiming that she had no knowledge about the falsification because it was her
assistant secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked for her Employees Clearance.

Petitioner’s denial, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated, must certainly fail. Denial, when
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence, which
deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.56 Denial is intrinsically weak, being a negative and self-serving assertion.57

In the case at bar, petitioner did not even present as her witness Marie Cris Batuampar, the person
whom she instructed to work for her Employees Clearance. Her failure to present this person in
order to shed light on the matter was fatal to her cause. In fact, we find that the defense never
intended to present Marie Cris Batuampar as a witness. This is clear from the pre-trial order,
because the defense never listed her as a witness.58 Her attempt to present Ms. Batuampar to help
her cause after she has been convicted is already too late in the day, and Ms. Batuampar’s
testimony, which is supposed to be given, cannot be considered newly discovered evidence as to
merit the granting of her motion for new trial and/or reception of newly discovered evidence.

The lack of direct evidence showing that petitioner "actually" imitated the signature of Laura Pangilan
in her Employees Clearance will not exonerate her. We have ruled that it is not strange to realize
that in cases of forgery, the prosecution would not always have the means for obtaining such direct
evidence to confute acts contrived clandestinely. Courts have to rely on circumstantial evidence
consisting of pieces of facts, which if woven together would produce a single network establishing
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 59 We totally agree with the Sandiganbayan, which
said:

While there is no direct evidence to show that the accused herself "actually" forged the signature of
Laura Pangilan in the Employees Clearance in question, the Court nevertheless finds the following
circumstances, obtaining in the records, to establish/indicate that she was the one who committed
the forgery or who asked somebody else to forge or caused the forgery of the signature of Laura
Pangilan in her Employees Clearance, to wit –

1. that the accused instructed her staff Maricris Batuampar to work for her Employees
Clearance in compliance with the Memorandum of ARMM Regional Governor Nur Misuari
and that the forged signature of Laura Pangilan was affixed on her clearance are strong
evidence that the accused herself either falsified the said signature or caused the same to be
falsified/imitated, and that possession by Maricris of the falsified clearance of the accused is
possession by the accused herself because the former was only acting upon the instructions
and in behalf of the latter;

2. that it was the accused who is required to accomplish and to submit her Employees
Clearance to enable her to collect her salary for the months of August and September 2000
is sufficient and strong motive or reason for her to commit the falsification by imitating the
signature of Laura Pangilan or order someone else to forge it; and

3. that the accused was the only one who profited or benefited from the falsification as she
admitted that she was able to collect her salary for the month of August 2000 after her
falsified Employees Clearance was submitted and approved by the ORG-ARMM and
therefore, she alone could have the motive for making such falsification.

On the basis of the foregoing circumstances, no reasonable and fair-minded man would say that the
accused – a Regional Secretary of DOT-ARMM – had no knowledge of the falsification. It is an
established rule, well-buttressed upon reason, that in the absence of a satisfactory explanation,
when a person has in his possession or control a falsified document and who makes use of the
same, the presumption or inference is justified that such person is the forger or the one who caused
the forgery and, therefore, guilty of falsification. Thus, in People v. Sendaydiego, the Supreme Court
held that –

The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered
it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of
the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely
connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of
committing the forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers. (U.S. v. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453;
People v. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People v. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People v. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338;
People v. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).

In line with the above ruling, and considering that it was the accused who took advantage and
profited in the use of the falsified Employees Clearance in question, the presumption is inevitable
that she is the material author of the falsification. And despite full opportunity, she was not able to
rebut such presumption by failing to show that it was another person who forged or falsified the
signature of Laura Pangilan or that at least another person and not she alone, had the reason or
motive to commit the forgery or falsification, or was or could have been benefited by such
falsification/forgery.60

The circumstances enumerated by the Sandiganbayan, as against the denials of petitioner, convince
us to apply the rule that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession
of, and who has used, a forged document, is the forger and, therefore, guilty of falsification. 61 The
effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to
overcome the prima facie case created, which, if no contrary proof is offered, will thereby prevail. 62 A
prima facie case of falsification having been established, petitioner should have presented clear and
convincing evidence to overcome such burden. This, she failed to do.
Petitioner assails the weight given by the Sandiganbayan to the testimonies of the two Pangilans
when they failed to report the alleged falsification to the police or alert the Office of the Regional
Governor of said falsification, or tried to stop petitioner from getting her salaries.

We do not agree with the petitioner. It is a settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as
well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive
effect.63 The determination of the credibility of witnesses is the domain of the trial court, as it is in the
best position to observe the witnesses’ demeanor.64 The Sandiganbayan has given full probative
value to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. So have we. We find no reason to depart from
such a rule.

Aware that the prosecution failed to present the original from which the photocopy of petitioner’s
Employees Clearance was supposed to have been obtained, she maintains that the Sandiganbayan
should have doubted the authenticity and probative value of the photocopy of the Employees
Clearance.

The Sandiganbayan correctly admitted in evidence the photocopy of the Employees Clearance. We
agree when it ruled:

Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. The purpose of
the rule requiring the production by the offeror of the best evidence if the prevention of fraud,
because if a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it and presents inferior or
secondary evidence in its place, the presumption is that the latter evidence is withheld from the court
and the adverse party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its production would expose and
defeat. Hence, as long as the original evidence can be had, the Court should not receive in evidence
that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that
the original has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. Such photocopies must be
disregarded, being inadmissible evidence and barren of probative weight.

The foregoing rule, however, admits of several exceptions. Under Section 3(b) of Rule 130,
secondary evidence of a writing may be admitted "when the original is in the custody or under the
control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice." And to warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a
writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides as follows:

Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party’s custody or control. – If the document is in the
custody or control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such
notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary
evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.

Thus, the mere fact that the original is in the custody or control of the adverse party against whom it
is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has
done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the
document which may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open
court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in
custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such party has the original of
the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it, or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence
may be admitted.
Here, the accused admitted that her Employees Clearance was always in the possession of her
assistant secretary, [Marie Cris] Batuampar. So the prosecution in its effort to produce the original
copy of the said Employees Clearance of the accused, thru Assistant Special Prosecutor Anna
Isabel G. Aurellano of the Office of the Prosecutor, sent on May 31, 2005 thru the COA Telegraph
Office at Quezon City two (2) telegram subpoenas addressed to accused Normallah Pacasum, and
[Marie Cris] Batuampar ordering them to submit to the Office of the Special Prosecutor on or before
June 8, 2005, the original of the Employees’ Clearance in the name of Normallah Alonto Lucman-
Pacasum for the release of her August and September 2000 salary as DOT Regional Secretary.
Notwithstanding receipt of the said telegram subpoena by her uncle Manso Alonto in her residence
on June 1, 200[5], the accused did not appear before or submit to Assistant Special Prosecutor
Anna Isabel G. Aurellano, the original of the said Employees Clearance, much less offered to
produce the same.

Under the circumstances, since there was proof of the existence of the Employees Clearance as
evidenced by the photocopy thereof, and despite the reasonable notices made by the prosecution to
the accused and her assistant secretary to produce the original of said employees clearance they
ignored the notice and refused to produce the original document, the presentation and admission of
the photocopy of the original copy of the questioned Employees Clearance as secondary evidence
to prove the contents thereof was justified. 65

This Court decrees that even though the original of an alleged falsified document is not, or may no
longer be produced in court, a criminal case for falsification may still prosper if the person wishing to
establish the contents of said document via secondary evidence or substitutionary evidence can
adequately show that the best or primary evidence – the original of the document – is not available
for any of the causes mentioned in Section 3, 66 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner claims she was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan severely restricted her time
to present evidence, allowing her only two hearing dates, thus resulting in her failure to present
another important witness in the of person of Atty. Randolph Parcasio. Petitioner was not denied due
process. She was given every opportunity to adduce her evidence. The Sandiganbayan outlined the
proceedings of the case as follows:

After the prosecution rested its case, by agreement of the parties, the initial hearing for the reception
of defense evidence was scheduled on September 19 and 20, 2005 both at 8:30 in the morning.
However, upon motion of the prosecution, the Court, in its Order of September 16, 2005, cancelled
the setting as the handling prosecutor, Pros. Anna Isabel G. Aurellano, had to attend a 5-day
workshop at PHINMA in Tagaytay City on September 19-23, 2005 and scheduled anew the hearing
on November 23 and 24, 2005, both at 8:30 in the morning. However, for failure of the defense
counsel, Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, to appear at the November 23, 2005 hearing despite due notice,
the Court cancelled the November 23 and 24 hearings, and moved the same to March 13 and 14,
2006 both at 8:30 in the morning, and at the same time directed the said defense counsel to show
cause in writing within five (5) days from receipt of the Order why he should not be held in contempt
for his failure to appear despite due notice. In compliance with this Order, Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita,
1awphi1

filed his Explanation and Withdrawal of Appearance, respectively, which were both Noted by the
Court in its Resolution of January 19, 2006.

In view of the absence of the accused in the March 13, 2006 hearing and her continued failure to get
a substitute counsel considering that her counsel, Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, had already withdrawn
from the case since January 16, 2006, the Court cancelled the March 13 and 14, 2006 hearings and
moved the same to July 3 and 4, 2006 both at 8:30 in the morning and designated Atty. Conrado
Rosario of the PAO as counsel de oficio of the accused and directed the accused upon receipt of the
order to immediately confer with said counsel for purposes of preparing for her defense in the case.
On March 20, 2006, the Court issued the following Resolution, which reads:

Accused Normallah L. Pacasum’s letter of February 17, 2006 (received by mail on March 16, 2006)
requesting extension of time to engage the services of counsel is merely NOTED WITHOUT
ACTION as the next hearings are scheduled on July 3 and 4, 2006 and said accused would have
more than ample time to engage the services of counsel of her choice. For this reason, any excuse
from the accused on said settings that she failed to engage the services of counsel or that her
counsel needs more time to prepare will be unacceptable. At all events, this Court, in its Order of
March 13, 2006, had already appointed Atty. Conrado Rosario of the PAO as a counsel de oficio to
represent the accused, with specific orders to the latter to confer with Atty. Rosario and assist him in
preparing for her defense.

On July 3, 2006, upon the manifestation of Atty. Conrado Rosario, counsel for the accused, that
since he was appointed counsel de oficio, the accused has not communicated with him and
therefore he was not ready to present any evidence for the accused, the Court cancelled the hearing
in order to give the defense another opportunity to present its evidence and reset it to July 4, 2006,
the following day as previously scheduled.

On July 4, 2006, the Court issued the following Order, which reads –

"When this case was called for hearing, accused asked for the resetting of the case on the ground
that she just hired a new counsel who thereafter arrived and entered his appearance as Atty.
Napoleon Uy Galit with address at Suite 202 Masonic Building, #35 Matalino St., Diliman, Quezon
City. With the appearance of her new counsel, Atty. Conrado C. Rosario is hereby discharged as
counsel de oficio of the accused.

"As prayed for by the accused, she is given the last chance to present her evidence on October 9
and 10, 2006, both at 8:30 o’clock in the morning. For repeated failure of the accused to
acknowledge receipt of the notices of the Court, her waiver of appearance is hereby cancelled and
she is ordered to personally appear in the scheduled hearings of this case.

SO ORDERED.

On October 6, 2006, the accused thru counsel, Atty. Bantreas Lucman, filed an Entry of
Appearance, Motion For Postponement of October 9 and 10 Hearings stating therein that since his
service as new counsel was just engaged by the accused, and that the accused herself cannot also
attend the said hearing because she is undergoing fasting until October 24, 2006 in observance of
Ramadan, he asked to postpone the settings on October 9 and 10, 2006. At the hearing on October
9, 2006, the Court issued the following, which reads –

"Acting on the Entry of Appearance, Motion for Postponement of October 9 and 10, 2006 Hearing
filed by accused Normallah L. Pacasum, thru counsel, Atty. Bantreas Lucman, finding the same to
be without merit, as this case has been set for hearing several times and the accused has been
given the last chance to present evidence, the Court hereby denies the motion for postponement.

"In this regard, in view of the absence of accused Normallah L. Pacasum in today’s hearing despite
the Order of the Court dated July 4, 2006, canceling her waiver of appearance, and ordering her to
personally appear before this Court, as prayed for by the prosecution, let a Bench Warrant of Arrest
be issued against the said accused. The cash bond posted for her provisional liberty is ordered
confiscated in favor of the government. The accused is given thirty (30) days from notice to explain
in writing why final judgment shall not be rendered against the said bond.
With the Manifestation of Atty. Bantreas Lucman that the defense is not ready to present its
evidence today and tomorrow, the last chance for it to present its evidence, the Court is constraint to
consider the accused’s right to present evidence as waived.

The parties are hereby given thirty (30) days to submit their respective memoranda. Thereafter, the
case shall be deemed submitted for decision.

SO ORDERED.

Subsequently, the accused thru counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above Order
dated October 25, 2006, and Motion to Set Hearing For Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift
Warrant of Arrest dated October 31, 2006.

At the hearing of accused’s motion for reconsideration on November 3, 2006, the Court issued the
following Order, which reads –

"When the ‘Motion To Set Hearing for Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest’ was
called for hearing this morning, only Attorneys Bantuas M. Lucman and Jose Ventura Aspiras
appeared. Accused Normallah L. Pacasum was absent.

In view of the absence of the accused, the Court is not inclined to give favorable action to the Motion
for Reconsideration. It must be stressed that the primordial reason for the issuance of the order
sought to be reconsidered in the presence of the accused in the previous hearing in violation of the
Court’s Order for her to personally appear in the hearings of this case and for her indifference to the
directives of the Court. With the absence anew of the accused, the Court has no alternative but to
deny the Motion.

Moreover, the Court notes the allegation in the Motion that the counsel sought the assurance of the
accused (and she promised) to appear before this Court if the motion will be granted, as if the Court
owes the accused the favor to appear before it. The accused is reminded/advised that the issuance
of the warrant of arrest, she has to voluntarily surrender and appear before the Court or be arrested
and brought to the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied.

SO ORDERED.

Acting on the Omnibus Motion to Hold in Abeyance Consideration of Prosecution’s Memorandum

(And for a Second Look on the Matter of Accused’s Right to Present Defense Evidence) of the
accused dated November 21, 2006, and the prosecution’s Opposition thereto, the Court issued the
following Order, which reads –

"This refers to the Accused "Omnibus Motion to Hold in Abeyance Consideration of Prosecution’s
November 7, 2006 Memorandum (And For a Second Look on the Matter of Accused’s Right to
Present Defense Evidence)" dated November 21, 2006 and the plaintiff’s Opposition thereto dated
November 28, 2006.

"Inasmuch as the accused has already appeared before the Court and posted an additional bond of
P10,000.00 despite the aforesaid opposition of the prosecution, in the interest of justice, the Court is
inclined to reconsider and give favorable action to the motion and grant the accused another and last
opportunity to present here evidence.
"WHEREFORE, the motion is granted and this case is set for hearing for the accused’s last chance
to present and/or complete the presentation of her evidence on February 5 and 6, 2007 both at 8:30
in the morning in the Sandiganbayan Centennial Building in Quezon City.

SO ORDERED.

Thus, despite the initial indifference of the accused to present her defense, the Court gave her
ample opportunity to present her evidence.67

The Sandiganbayan properly dealt with the situation. In fact, we find that the trial court was lenient
with the petitioner. The failure of the defense to present Atty. Parcasio was its own doing. The
defense failed to prepare its witnesses for the case. As proof of this, we quote a portion of the
hearing when petitioner was testifying:

ATTY. ASPIRAS

Q Would you know where (sic) the whereabouts of this Sec. Parcasio would be (sic) at this time?

A He lives in Davao but after what happened to Gov. Misuari, we have not got together with the
other members of the cabinet of Gov. Misuari, but he lives in Davao, sir.

Q Would it be possible, Madame Witness, to request or ask him to testify in this case?

A After this hearing, I will look for Sec. Parcasio just to clear my name, sir.

CHAIRMAN

Not after this hearing, you should have already done that. Because we already gave you enough
opportunity to present your side, right? You should not be telling the Court that only after this
hearing, you will start looking (for) people who will, definitely, clear your name. You should be doing
that months ago, correct?

WITNESS

Yes, your Honors.68

Petitioner was charged with falsifying her Employees Clearance under Article 171, paragraph 1 of
the Revised Penal Code. For one to be convicted of falsification under said paragraph, the followings
elements must concur: (1) that the offender is a public officer, an employee, or a notary public; (2)
that he takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that he falsifies a document by counterfeiting
or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric.

All the foregoing elements have been sufficiently established. There is no dispute that petitioner was
a public officer, being then the Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism of the ARMM, when
she caused the preparation of her Employees Clearance (a public document) for the release of her
salary for the months of August and September 2000. Such being a requirement, and she being a
public officer, she was duty-bound to prepare, accomplish and submit said document. Were it not for
her position and employment in the ARMM, she could not have accomplished said Employees
Clearance. In a falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage
of his official position when (1) he had the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene in the
preparation of the document; or (2) he had official custody of the document which he falsified.69 It
being her duty to prepare and submit said document, she clearly took advantage of her position
when she falsified or caused the falsification of her Employees Clearance by imitating the signature
of Laura Pangilan.lawphil.net

Going now to the penalties imposed on petitioner, we find the same proper. The penalty for
falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
₱5,000.00. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the commission of the felony,
the imposable penalty is prision mayor in its medium period, or within the range of eight (8) years
and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty
to be imposed shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor, while the minimum shall be
taken from within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional or from
six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 27483
dated 7 August 2007 and its resolution dated 22 October 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
BaguioCity

FIRST DIVISION

ANNA LERIMA PATULA, G.R. No. 164457

Petitioner,
Present:

CORONA,C.J.,Chairperson,
-versus- LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR.,JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. April 11, 2012
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In the trial of everycriminal case, a judge must rigidlytest the States evidence
of guilt in order to ensure that such evidenceadheres to the basic rules of
admissibility before pronouncing an accused guilty of the crime charged upon such
evidence. Nothing less is demanded of the judge; otherwise, the guarantee of due
process of law is nullified.The accused need notadduceanythingto rebut evidence
that is discredited for failing the test.Acquittal should then follow.

Antecedents

Petitioner was charged withestafaunder an informationfiled in the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) in DumagueteCitythat averred:

That on or about and during the period from March 16 to 20, 1997 and for
sometime prior thereto, in the City of Dumaguete, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a
 saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City, having
collected and received the total sum of P131,286.97 from several
customers of said company under the express obligation to account for the
proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the said company, but
far from complying with her obligation and after a reasonable period of
time despite repeated demands therefore, and with intent to defraud the
said company, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
fail to deliver the said collection to the said company but instead, did, then
and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply
and convert the proceeds of the sale to her own use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of the said company in the aforesaid amount
of P131,286.97.

Contrary to Art. 315, par 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.[1]

Petitioner pled not guiltyto the offense charged in the information. At pre-
trial, no stipulation of factswas had, and petitioner did not avail herself of plea
bargaining.Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The Prosecutions first witness was Lamberto Go, who testified that he was the
branch manager of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc. (Footluckers) in Dumaguete
City since October 8, 1994; that petitioner was an employee of Footluckers, starting
as a saleslady in 1996 until she became a sales representative; that as a sales
representative she was authorized to take orders from wholesale customers coming
from different towns (like Bacong, Zamboanguita, Valencia, Lumbangan and
Mabinay in Negros Oriental, and Siquijor), and to collect payments from them; that
she could issue and sign official receipts of Footluckers for the payments, which she
would then remit; that she would then submit the receipts for the payments for
tallying and reconciliation; that at first her volume of sales was quite high, but later
on dropped, leading him to confront her; that she responded that business was slow;
that he summoned the accounting clerk to verify; that the accounting clerk
discovered erasures on some collection receipts; that he decided to subject her to an
audit by company auditor Karen Guivencan; that he learned from a customer of
petitioners that the customers outstanding balance had already been fully paid
although that balance appeared unpaid in Footluckers records; and that one night
later on, petitioner and her parents went to his house to deny having misappropriated
any money of Footluckers and to plead for him not to push through with a case
against her, promising to settle her account on a monthly basis; and that she did not
settle after that, but stopped reporting to work.[2]

On March 7, 2002, Gos cross examination, re-direct examination and re-

crossexamination were completed.

The only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan,
whomFootluckers employed as its store auditor since November 16, 1995 until her
resignation on March 31, 2001. She declared that Go had requested her to audit
petitioner after some customers had told him that they had already paid their
accounts but the office ledger had still reflected outstandingbalances for them; that
she first conducted her audit by going to the customers in places from Mabinay to
Zamboanguitain Negros Oriental, and then in Siquijor; thatshe discovered in the
course of her audit that the amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts in
the possession of around 50 customers varied from the amounts written on the
duplicate copies of the receipts petitioner submitted to the office; that upon
completing her audit, she submittedto Go a written report denominated as List of
Customers Covered by Saleswoman LERIMA PATULA w/ Differences in Records
as per Audit Duly Verified March 16-20, 1997 marked as Exhibit A; and that based
on the report, petitioner had misappropriated the total amount ofP131,286.92.[3]

During Guivencans stint as a witness, the Prosecution marked the ledgers of

petitioners various customers allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits B to YYand
their derivatives, inclusive. Each of the ledgers had a first column that contained the
dates of the entries, a second that identified the invoices by the number, a third that
statedthe debit, a fourth that noted the credit (or the amounts paid), and a fifth that
summed the balances (debit minus credit).Only 49 of theledgerswere formally
offered and admitted by the RTC because the 50thledger could no longer be found.

In the course of Guivencansdirect-examination,petitioners counsel interposed

a continuing objection on the ground that the figuresentered in Exhibits B to YYand
their derivatives, inclusive, were hearsay because the persons who had made the
entries were not themselves presented in court.[4]With that, petitioners counsel did
not anymore cross-examine Guivencan, apparently regarding her testimony to be
irrelevant because she thereby tended to prove falsification, an offense not alleged
in the information.
 TheProsecution thenformally offered its documentary exhibits, including
Exhibits B to YYand their derivatives (like the originals and duplicates of the
receipts supposedly executed and issued by petitioner), inclusive, the confirmation
sheets used by Guivencan in auditing the accounts served by petitioner, and
Guivencans so-called Summary (Final Report) of Discrepancies.[5]

After the Prosecution rested its case, the Defense decided not to file a
demurrer to evidence although it had manifested the intention to do so, and instead
rested itscase.The Prosecution and Defense submitted their respective memoranda,
and submitted the case for decision.[6]

On January 28, 2004, the RTC, stating that inasmuch as petitioner had opted
not to present evidence for her defense the Prosecutions evidence remained
unrefuted and uncontroverted,[7]rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty
of estafa, to wit:

Wherefore, in the light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the

Court finds ANNA LERIMA PATULA guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315 par (1b) of the Revised Penal Code
and accordingly, she is hereby sentenced to suffer an INDETERMINATE
PENALTY of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
minimum to 18 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum
with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to indemnify private
complainant the amount of P131,286.92 with interest at 12% per annum
until fully paid and to pay the costs.

Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure, the cash bail put up by the accused shall be effective only until
the promulgation of this judgment.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, butthe RTC denied the motion
on May 7, 2004.[9]

Issues
 Insisting that the RTCs judgment grossly violated [her] Constitutional and
statutory right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her
because, while the charge against her is estafa under Art. 315, par. 1 (b) of the
Revised Penal Code, the evidence presented against her and upon which her
conviction was based, was falsification, an offense not alleged or included in the
Information under which she was arraigned and pleaded not guilty, and that said
judgment likewise blatantly ignored and manifestly disregarded the rules on
admission of evidence in that the documentary evidence admitted by the trial court
were all private documents, the due execution and authenticity of which were not
proved in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
petitioner has directly appealed to the Court via petition for review on certiorari,
positing the following issues, to wit:

1. WHETHER THE ACCUSED OR ANY ACCUSED FOR THAT

MATTER , CHARGED OF ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE CAN BE CONVICTED UPON OR BY
EVIDENCE OF FALSIFICATION WHICH IS EVEN (SIC) NOT
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION.

2. WHETHER THE ACCUSEDS CONSTITUTIONAL AND

STATUTORY RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND
CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HER WAS VIOLATED
WHEN SHE WAS CONVICTED UPON OR BY EVIDENCE OF
FALSIFICATION CONSIDERING THAT THE CHARGE AGAINST
HER IS ESTAFA THROUGH MISAPPROPRIATION UNDER ART.
315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN

ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE, EXHIBITS B TO YY-YY-2, ALL
PRIVATE DOCUMENTS, THE DUE EXECUTION AND
AUTHENTICITY OF WHICH WERE NOT PROVED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SEC. 20, RULE 132 OF THE SAID REVISED
RULES ON EVIDENCE ASIDE FROM THE FACT THAT SAID
EXHIBITS TEND TO PROVE FALSIFICATION BY THE ACCUSED,
A CRIME NEITHER CHARGED NOR ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION.

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN

ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF KAREN GUIVENCAN DESPITE
THE OBJECTION THAT SAID TESTIMONY WHICH TRIED TO
PROVE THAT THE ACCUSED FALSIFIED EXHIBITS B TO YY-YY-
2INCLUSIVE VIOLATED THE ACCUSEDS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE
ACCUSATION AGAINST HER, FOR BEING IRRELEVANT AND
IMMATERIAL SINCE THE CHARGE AGAINST THE ACCUSED
IS ESTAFA UNDER ART. 315, PAR. 1 (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE.

5. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN

CONCLUDING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
REMAINS UNREFUTED AND UNCONTROVERTED DESPITE
ACCUSEDS OBJECTION THAT SAID EVIDENCE IS IMMATERIAL
AND IRRELEVANT TO THE CRIME CHARGED.

6. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENSES NOT CROSS-

EXAMINING KAREN GUIVENCAN FOR THE REASON THAT HER
TESTIMONY IS IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT AS IT TENDED
TO PROVE AN OFFENSE NOT CHARGED IN INFORMATION
RESULTED IN THE ADMISSION OF SAID TESTIMONY AS BEING
UNREFUTED AND UNCONTROVERTED, AND WHETHER OR
NOT THE DEFENSES OBJECTION WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED
WAIVED IF THE DEFENSE CROSS-EXAMINED SAID WITNESS.
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
RULING THAT EXHIBIT A, WHICH IS THE LIST OF CUSTOMERS
COVERED BY SALESWOMAN LERIMA PATULA WITH
DIFFERENCE IN RECORD IS NOT HEARSAY AND SELF-
SERVING.[10]

The foregoing issues are now restatedas follows:

1. Whether or not the failure of the information for estafa to allege the
falsification of the duplicate receipts issued by petitioner to her
customersviolated petitioners right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation;

2. Whether or not the RTC gravely erred in admitting evidence of the

falsification of the duplicate receiptsdespite the information not
alleging the falsification;
 3. Whether or not the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their
derivatives, inclusive) were admissible as evidence of petitioners
guilt for estafaas chargeddespite their not being duly
authenticated;and
4. Whether or not Guivencanstestimony onthe ledgers and receipts
(Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) to prove
petitioners misappropriation or conversion wasinadmissible for
being hearsay.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

I
Failure of information to allege falsification
did not violate petitioners right to be informed
of thenatureand cause of the accusation

Petitioner contends that the RTC grossly violated her Constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation when: (a) it held that the
information did not have to allege her falsification of the duplicate receipts, and (b)
when it convicted her of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Codeby relying on the evidence on falsification.

The contentionof petitioner cannot be sustained.

The Bill of Rights guaranteessome rightsto every person accused of a crime,

among them the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, viz:

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal

offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed

innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard
by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
 the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, the rule then in effect when the
information was filed in the RTC, contained the following provisions on the proper
manner of alleging the nature and cause of the accusation in the information, to wit:

Section 8.Designation of the offense. Whenever possible, a complaint

or information should state the designation given to the offense by the
statute, besides the statement of the acts or omissions constituting the
same, and if there is no such designation, reference should be made to the
section or subsection of the statute punishing it. (7)
Section 9.Cause of accusation. The acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language
without repetition, not necessarily in the terms of the statute defining the
offense, but in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable
the court to pronounce proper judgment. (8)
The importance of the proper manner of alleging the nature and cause of the
accusation in the informationshould never be taken for granted by the State. An
accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not clearly charged in the
complaint or information. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in
the complaint or information would be violative of the Constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.[11] Indeed, the accused cannot be
convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless the crime is alleged or necessarily
included in the information filed against him.

The crime of estafacharged against petitioner was defined and penalized by

Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised Penal Code, viz:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud

another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period

to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over
12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties
which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and

medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does
not exceed 12,000 pesos;

3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision

correccional in its minimum period if such amount is over 200 pesos but
does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does

not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud
be committed by any of the following means:
xxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of
another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by
the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or
to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money,
goods, or other property.

xxx

The elements of the offense charged were as follows:

(a) That the offender received money, goods or other personal property
in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the
same;
 (b) That the offender misappropriated or converted such money, goods
or other personal property, or denied his part in its receipt;

(c) That the misappropriation or conversion or denial was to the

prejudice of another; and

(d) That the offended party made a demand on the offender for the
delivery or return of such money, goods or other personal
property.[12]

According to the theory and proof of the Prosecution, petitioner misappropriated or

converted the sums paid by her customers, and later falsified the duplicates of the
receipts before turning such duplicates to her employer to show that the customers
had paid less than the amounts actually reflected on the original receipts. Obviously,
she committed the falsification in order to conceal her misappropriation or
conversion. Considering that the falsificationwas not an offense separate and distinct
from the estafacharged against her, the Prosecution could legitimately prove her acts
of falsification as its means of establishing her misappropriation or conversion as an
essential ingredient of the crime duly alleged in the information. In that manner, her
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was not
infringed or denied to her.

We consider it inevitable to conclude that the information herein completely

pleaded the estafa defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), Revised
Penal Codewithin the context of the substantive lawand the rules. Verily, there was
no necessity for the information to allege the acts of falsification by petitioner
because falsification was not an element of the estafacharged.

Not surprisingly,the RTC correctly dealt in its decision with petitioners

concern thuswise:

In her Memorandum, it is the contention of [the] accused that [the]

prosecutions evidence utterly fails to prove the crime charged. According
to the defense, the essence of Karen Guivencans testimony is that the
accused falsified the receipts issued to the customers served by her by
changing or altering the amounts in the duplicates of the receipts and
therefore, her testimony is immaterial and irrelevant as the charge is
misappropriation under Art. 315, paragraph (1b) of the Revised Penal
Code and there is no allegation whatsoever of any falsification or
alteration of amounts in the [i]nformation under which the accused was
arraigned and pleaded NOT GUILTY. Accused, thus, maintains that the
testimony of Karen Guivencan should therefore not be considered at all as
it tended to prove an offense not charged or included in the [i]nformation
and would violate [the] accuseds constitutional and statutory right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. The Court
is not in accord with such posture of the accused.

It would seem that the accused is of the idea that because the
crime charged in the [i]nformation is merely [e]stafa and not [e]stafa
[t]hru [f]alsification of documents, the prosecution could not prove
falsification. Such argumentation is not correct. Since the information
charges accused only of misappropriation pursuant to Art. 315, par.
(1b) of the Revised [P]enal Code, the Court holds that there is no
necessity of alleging the falsification in the Information as it is not an
element of the crime charged.
Distinction should be made as to when the crimes of Estafa and
Falsification will constitute as one complex crime and when they are
considered as two separate offenses. The complex crime of Estafa
Through Falsification of Documents is committed when one has to
falsify certain documents to be able to obtain money or goods from
another person. In other words, the falsification is a necessary means
of committing estafa. However, if the falsification is committed to
conceal the misappropriation, two separate offenses of estafa and
falsification are committed. In the instant case, when accused
collected payments from the customers, said collection which was in
her possession was at her disposal. The falsified or erroneous entries
which she made on the duplicate copies of the receipts were contrived
to conceal some amount of her collection which she did not remit to
the company xxx.[13]

II
Testimonial and documentary evidence,being hearsay,
did not prove petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt
 Nonetheless, in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this
burden, the Prosecutions duty is to prove each and every element of the crime
charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for any other
crime necessarily included therein.[14] The Prosecution must further prove the
participation of the accused in the commission of the offense.[15]In doing all these,
the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its
success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof
placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed. [16]Conversely, as to his
innocence, the accused has no burden of proof,[17]that he must then be acquitted and
set free should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his
favor.In other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the accused is
inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not discharged
its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in
identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it.

Did the Prosecution adduce evidence that proved beyond reasonable doubt the
guilt of petitioner for the estafa charged in the information?

To establish the elements of estafaearlier mentioned, the Prosecution

presented the testimonies of Go and Guivencan, and various documentsconsisting
of: (a) the receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her customers upon their
payment, (b) the ledgers listing the accounts pertaining to each customer with the
corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for each of the payments, and (c) the
confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself.[18]The ledgers and receipts
were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives,
inclusive.

On his part, Go essentially described for the trial court the various duties of
petitioner as Footluckers sales representative. On her part, Guivencan conceded
having no personal knowledge of the amounts actually received by petitioner from
the customersor remitted by petitioner to Footluckers.This means that persons other
than Guivencan prepared Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive,and that
Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found in the receipts supposedly
issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footluckers corresponding to each
customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers.
Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries effectively
deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test the veracity and
reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioners misappropriation or conversion
through cross-examination by petitioner. The denial of that opportunity rendered
theentire proof of misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus unreliable and
untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of the accused.

To elucidate why the Prosecutions hearsay evidence was unreliable and

untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made toSection 36
of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those
facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her
own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal
knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial
evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft ofpersonal
knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her
testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently
testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial source of her
information.

In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another
person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived the
information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be examined and
cross-examined. The weight of such testimony thendepends not upon theveracity of
the witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the information to the
witness without oath. The information cannot be tested because the declarant is not
standing in court as a witness andcannot, therefore, be cross-examined.

It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter
into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to reconcile any
contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any ambiguities; and that she
entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she was told so, and leaves the burden
entirely upon the dead or absent author.[19] Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony
rests mainly on the ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant.[20] The testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of
justice, but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-
examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same. [21]

Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is
offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes
the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as evidence only
when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of cross-examination. However,
if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted
but without reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not
apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard
the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to
prove that the complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused
uttered those words.[22] This kind of utterance ishearsay in character but is not legal
hearsay.[23]The distinction is, therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was
made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted
in the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies. [24]

Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule
that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration.
Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to cross-
examine the originaldeclarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the transaction
or occurrence.[25]If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the
declarant is not in court.[26]It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the
adverse partys witness,

being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, is
essential to the administration of justice.

To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to

establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguardinga partys right to cross-examine
her adversarys witness,the Rules of Court offers two solutions. The firstsolution is to
require that allthe witnesses in a judicial trial or hearing be examined only in
courtunder oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court formalizes
this solution,viz:
 Section 1. Examination to be done in open court. - The examination
of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and
under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or
the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally. (1a)

The secondsolution is to require that all witnesses besubject to the cross-

examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Courtensuresthis solutionthusly:

Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the

termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined
by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or
connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his
accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse,
and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)

Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept relevant
to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the 1987 Constitution,which
guarantees that: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall xxx enjoy the right
xxx to meet the witnesses face to face xxx, the rule requiring the cross-examination
by the adverse party equally applies to non-criminal proceedings.

We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon
serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to
its not being given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being
subjected to cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the perception,
memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon
whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.[27]

Based on the foregoing considerations, Guivencans testimony as well as

Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely rejected as proof
of petitioners misappropriation or conversion.

III
 Lack of their proper authentication rendered
Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
inadmissible as judicial evidence

Petitioner also contends that the RTC grossly erred in admitting as evidence
Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, despite their being private
documents that were not duly authenticated as required by Section 20, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court.

Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Courtdistinguishes between a public

document and a private document for the purpose of their presentation in
evidence, viz:

Section 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their

presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last

wills and testaments, and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents

required by law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private.

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the

documents may be presented as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of
its official or sovereign character, or because it has been acknowledged before a
notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the
formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing
authorized by law, is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in
order to be presented as evidence in court.In contrast, a private document is any other
writing, deed, or instrument executed by a private person without the intervention of
a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement
is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public
document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires
authentication in the manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its
acceptance as evidence in court. The requirement of authentication of a private
document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document is
an ancient one within the context of Section 21, [28] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court;
(b) when the genuineness and authenticity of an actionable document have not been
specifically denied under oath by the adverse party; [29](c) when thegenuineness and
authenticity of the document

have been admitted;[30] or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine. [31]

There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private

documents because private individuals executed or generated them for private or
business purposes or uses. Considering that none of the exhibits came under any of
the four exceptions, they could not be presented and admitted as evidence against
petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to their authentication in the
manner provided in Section20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,viz:

Section 20. Proof of private documents. Before any private

document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution
and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or

handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it

is claimed to be.

The Prosecutionattempted to have Go authenticate the signature of petitioner

in various receipts, to wit:

ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Now, these receipts which you mentioned which do not tally with the original
receipts, do you have copies of these receipts?
A. Yes, I have a copy of these receipts, but its not now in my possession.
Q. But when asked to present those receipts before this Honorable Court, can you
assure this

(Next Page)

ATTY ABIERA (continuing):

Honorable Court that you will be able to present those receipts?
A. Yes.
Q. You are also familiar with the signature of the accused in this case, Anna
Lerima Patula?
A. Yes.
Q. Why are you familiar with the signature of the accused in this case?
A. I used to see her signatures in the payroll and in the receipts also.
Q. Okay, I have here a machine copy of a receipt which we would present this,or
offer the same as soon as the original receipts can be presented, but for
purposes only of your testimony, Im going to point to you a certain
signature over this receipt number FLDT96 20441, a receipt from
Cirila Askin, kindly go over the signature and tell the Honorable
Court whether you are familiar with the signature?
A. Yes, that is her signature.
INTERPRETER:
Witness is pointing to a signature above the printed word collector.

(Next Page)

ATTY. ABIERA:
Q. Is this the only receipt wherein the name, the signature rather, of the
accused in this case appears?
A. That is not the only one, there are many receipts.
ATTY. ABIERA:
In order to save time, Your Honor, we will just be presenting the original
receipts Your Honor, because its quite voluminous, so we will just
forego with the testimony of the witness but we will just present the
same using the testimony of another witness, for purposes of
identifying the signature of the accused. We will request that this
signature which has been identified to by the witness in this case be
marked, Your Honor, with the reservation to present the original copy
and present the same to offer as our exhibits but for the meantime, this
is only for the purposes of recording, Your Honor, which we request the
same, the receipt which has just been identified awhile ago be marked
as our Exhibit A You Honor.
COURT:
Mark the receipt as Exhibit A.
 ATTY. ABIERA:
And the signature be bracketed and be marked as Exhibit A-1.

(Next Page)

COURT:
Bracket the signature &mark it as Exh. A-1. What is the number of that receipt?

ATTY. ABIERA:
Receipt No. 20441 dated August 4, 1996 the statement that: received from Cirila
Askin.[32]
xxx

As the excerpts indicate, Gos attempt at authentication of the signature of petitioner

on the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 (a document that was marked
as Exhibit A, while the purported signature of petitioner thereon was marked as
Exhibit A-1) immediately fizzled out after the Prosecution admitted that the
document was a meremachinecopy, not the original. Thereafter, as if to soften its
failed attempt, the Prosecution expressly promised to produce at a later date the
originalsof the receipt with serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and other receipts.
But that promise was not even true, because almost in the same breath the
Prosecution offered to authenticate the signature of petitioner on the
receiptsthrougha different witness (though then still unnamed). As matters turned
out in the end, the effort to have Go authenticate both themachinecopy of the
receiptwith serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 and the signature of petitioner on that
receipt was wasteful because the machine copy was inexplicablyforgotten and was
no longer evenincluded in the Prosecutions Offer of Documentary Evidence.

It is true that the original of the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No.
20441was subsequentlypresented as Exhibit Bthrough Guivencan. However,the
Prosecution did not establishthat the signature appearing on Exhibit B was the same
signature that Go had earliersought to identify to be the signature of petitioner
(Exhibit A-1) on the machine copy (Exhibit A). This is borne out by the fact that the
Prosecution abandoned Exhibit A as the marking nomenclature for the machine
copyof the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 for all intents and
purposes of this case, and used the same nomenclature to referinstead toan entirely
differentdocument entitled List of Customers covered by ANA LERIMA PATULA
w/difference in Records as per Audit duly verified March 16-20, 1997.

In her case, Guivencans identification of petitioners signature on two receipts

based alone on the fact that the signatures contained the legible family name of
Patula was ineffectual, and exposed yet another deep flaw infecting the documentary
evidence against petitioner. Apparently, Guivencan could not honestly identify
petitioners signature on the receipts either because she lacked familiarity with such
signature, or because she had not seen petitioner affix her signature on the receipts,
as the following excerpts from her testimony bear out:

ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

Q. There are two (2) receipts attached here in the confirmation sheet,
will you go over these Miss witness?
A. This was the last payment which is fully paid by the customer. The
other receipt is the one showing her payment prior to the last
payment.
COURT:
Q. Where did you get those two (2) receipts?
A. From the customer.
Q. And who issued those receipts?
A. The saleswoman, Miss Patula.
ATTY. ZERNA:
We pray, Your Honor, that this receipt identified be marked as Exhibit B-
3, receipt number 20441.

(Next Page)

COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. ZERNA:
The signature of the collector be marked as
Q. By the way, there is a signature above the name of the collector,
are your familiar with that signature? (shown to witness)
A. Yes.
Q. Whose signature is that?
A. Miss Patula.
Q. How do you know?
 A. It can be recognized because of the word Patula.
Q. Are you familiar with her signature?
A. Yes.
ATTY. ZERNA:
We pray that the signature be bracketed and marked as Exhibit B-3-a
COURT:
Mark it.
ATTY. ZERNA:
The other receipt number 20045 be marked as Exhibit B-4 and the
signature as Exhibit B-4-a.
COURT:
Mark it.[33]

xxx

ATTY. ZERNA:
Q. Ms. Witness, here is a receipt colored white, number 26603 issued to
one Divina Cadilig. Will you please identify this receipt if this
is the receipt of your office?
A.Yes.
Q.There is a signature over the portion for the collector. Whose signature
is this?
A.Ms. Patula.
Q.How do you know that this is her signature?
A.Because we can read the Patula.[34]

We also have similar impressions of lack of proper authentication as to the ledgers

the Prosecution presented to prove the discrepancies between the amountspetitioner
hadallegedly received from the customers and the amounts she had actually remitted
to Footluckers. Guivencanexclusively relied on the entries of the unauthenticated
ledgersto support her audit report on petitioners supposed misappropriation or
conversion, revealing her lack of independent knowledge of the veracity of the
entries, as the following excerpts of her testimony show:
ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. What is your basis of saying that your office records showed that
this Cecilia Askin has an account of P10,791.75?
ATTY. DIEZ:
The question answers itself, You Honor, what is the basis, office record.
COURT:
Let the witness answer.
WITNESS:
A. I made the basis on our ledger in the office. I just copied that and
showed it to the customers for confirmation.

ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

Q. What about the receipts?
COURT:
Make a follow-up question and what was the result when you copied that
amount in the ledger and you had it confirmed by the customers,
what was the result when you had it confirmed by the
customers?
WITNESS:
A. She has no more balance but in our office she has still a balance
of P10,971.75.
ATTY. ZERNA to witness:
Q. Do you have a-whats the basis of saying that the balance of this
customer is still P10,971.75

(Next Page)

ATTY. ZERNA (continuing):

[i]n your office?
COURT:
That was already answered paero, the office has a ledger.
Q. Now, did you bring the ledger with you?
A. No, Maam.[35]

(Continuation of the Direct Examination of

Karen Guivencan on August 13, 2002)

ATTY. ZERNA to witness:

Q. Okay, You said there are discrepancies between the original and the
duplicate, will you please enlighten the Honorable Court on
that discrepancy which you said?
A. Like in this case of Cirila Askin, she has already fully paid. Her
ledger shows a zero balance she has fully paid while in the
original

(Next page)

WITNESS (continuing):
 [r]eceipt she has a balance of Ten Thousand Seven hundred Ninety-
one Pesos and Seventy-five Centavos (10,791.75).
COURT:
Q. What about the duplicate receipt, how much is indicated there?
A. The customer has no duplicate copy because it was already forwarded
to the Manila Office.
Q. What then is your basis in the entries in the ledger showing that it has
already a zero balance?
A. This is the copy of the customer while in the office, in the original
receipt she has still a balance.
xxx
ATTY. ZERNA:
The confirmation sheet ---

COURT:
The confirmation sheet was the one you referred to as the receipt in your
earlier testimony? Is that what you referred to as the receipts,
the original receipts?
A. This is what I copied from the ledger.
Q. So where was that(sic) original receipt which you said showed that that
particular customer still has a balance of Ten Thousand
something?
A. The receipt is no longer here.
Q. You mean the entry of that receipt was already entered in the
ledger?

A. Yes.[36]

In the face of the palpable flaws infecting the Prosecutions evidence, it should come
as no surprise that petitioners counsel interposed timely objections. Yet, the RTC
mysteriously overruled the objections and allowedthe Prosecutionto present the
unauthenticated ledgers, as follows:

(Continuation of the Direct Examination of

Witness Karen Guivencan on September 11, 2002)

ATTY. ZERNA:
 CONTINUATION OF DIRECT-EXAMINATION

Q Ms. Witness, last time around you were showing us several ledgers.
Where is it now?
A It is here.
Q Here is a ledger of one Divina Cadilig. This Divina Cadilig, how much
is her account in your office?
ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please before the witness will proceed to answer the
question, let me interpose our objection on the ground that
this ledger has not been duly identified to by the person who
made the same. This witness will be testifying on hearsay
matters because the supposed ledger was not identified to by
the person who made the same.
COURT:
Those ledgers were already presented in the last hearing. I think they were
already duly identified by this witness. As a matter of fact, it
was she who brought them to court

(Next Page)

COURT (cont.):
because these were the ledgers on file in their office.
ATTY. DIEZ
That is correct, Your Honor, but the person who made the entries is not
this witness, Your Honor. How do we know that the entries
there is (sic) correct on the receipts submitted to their office.
COURT:
Precisely, she brought along the receipts also to support that. Let the
witness answer.
WITNESS:
A Its the office clerk in-charge.
COURT:
The one who prepared the ledger is the office clerk.
ATTY. ZERNA:
She is an auditor, Your Honor. She has been qualified and she is the
auditor of Footluckers.
COURT:
I think, I remember in the last setting also, she testified where those entries
were taken. So, you answer the query of counsel.
xxx
 ATTY. DIEZ:
Your Honor please, to avoid delay, may I interpose a continuing
objection to the questions profounded(sic) on those ledgers
on the ground that, as I have said, it is hearsay.

COURT:
Okey(sic). Let the continuing objection be noted.

Q (To Witness) The clerk who allegedly was the one who prepared the
entries on those ledgers, is she still connected with
Footluckers?

A She is no longer connected now, Your Honor,

COURT:
Alright proceed.

(Next Page)

ATTY. ZERNA:
Your Honor, these are entries in the normal course of business. So,
exempt from the hearsay rule.
COURT:
Okey(sic), proceed.[37]

The mystery shrouding the RTCs soft treatment of the Prosecutions flawed
presentation was avoidable simply by the RTC adhering to the instructions of the
rules earlier quoted, as well as withSection 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court,which contains instructions on how to prove the genuineness of a handwriting
in a judicial proceeding, as follows:

Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The

handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to
be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write,
or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has
acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also
be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with
 writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the
judge. (Emphases supplied)
If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the
execution or signing of the documents,the Prosecution surely did not
authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives conformably with the
aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, were
inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence. That was the onlyfair and just
result, as the Court held in Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Philippine Nails and
Wires Corporation:[38]

On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.,

contends that Jeanne Kings testimony was hearsay because she had
no personal knowledge of the execution of the documents supporting
respondents cause of action, such as the sales contract, invoice, packing
list, bill of lading, SGS Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy. Petitioner
avers that even though King was personally assigned to handle and
monitor the importation of Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation, herein
respondent, this cannot be equated with personal knowledge of the facts
which gave rise to respondents cause of action. Further, petitioner asserts,
even though she personally prepared the summary of weight of steel billets
received by respondent, she did not have personal knowledge of the
weight of steel billets actually shipped and delivered.

At the outset, we must stress that respondents cause of action is

founded on breach of insurance contract covering cargo consisting of
imported steel billets. To hold petitioner liable, respondent has to prove,
first, its importation of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued
at P67,156,300.00, and second, the actual steel billets delivered to and
received by the importer, namely the respondent. Witness Jeanne King,
who was assigned to handle respondents importations, including their
insurance coverage, has personal knowledge of the volume of steel billets
being imported, and therefore competent to testify thereon. Her testimony
is not hearsay, as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.However, she is not qualified to testify on the shortage
in the delivery of the imported steel billets. She did not have personal
knowledge of the actual steel billets received. Even though she
prepared the summary of the received steel billets, she based the
summary only on the receipts prepared by other persons. Her
 testimony on steel billets received was hearsay. It has no probative
value even if not objected to at the trial.

On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to properly

authenticate respondents documentary evidence. Under Section 20, Rule
132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in
evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person who executed
it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any
person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its
execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to
whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed
execution thereof. In this case, respondent admits that King was none
of the aforementioned persons. She merely made the summary of the
weight of steel billets based on the unauthenticated bill of lading and
the SGS report. Thus, the summary of steel billets actually received
had no proven real basis, and Kings testimony on this point could not
be taken at face value.

xxx Under the rules on evidence, documents are either public or

private. Private documents are those that do not fall under any of the
enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.Section 20of
the same law, in turn, provides that before any private document is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved
either by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or
by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker. Here, respondents documentary exhibits are private
documents. They are not among those enumerated in Section 19, thus,
their due execution and authenticity need to be proved before they
can be admitted in evidence.With the exception concerning the
summary of the weight of the steel billets imported, respondent
presented no supporting evidence concerning their authenticity.
Consequently, they cannot be utilized to prove less of the insured
cargo and/or the short delivery of the imported steel billets. In sum,
we find no sufficient competent evidence to prove petitioners liability.

That the Prosecutions evidence was left uncontested because petitioner

decided not to subject Guivencan to cross-examination, and did not tender her
contrary evidencewas inconsequential. Although the trial court had overruled the
seasonable objections to Guivencans testimony bypetitioners counsel due to the
hearsay character, it could not be denied thathearsay evidence, whether objected to
or not, had no probative value.[39]Verily, the flaws of the Prosecutions evidence were
fundamental and substantive, not merely technical and procedural, and were defects
that the adverse partys waiver of her cross-examination or failure to rebutcould not
set right or cure. Nor did the trial courts overruling of petitioners objections imbue
the flawed evidence with any virtue and value.

Curiously, the RTC excepted the entries in the ledgers from the application of
the hearsay rule by also terselystating that the ledgers were prepared in the regular
course of business.[40]Seemingly, the RTC applied Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, to wit:

Section 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time
of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify,
who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima
facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

This was another grave error of the RTC.The terse yet sweeping mannerof
justifying the application of Section 43 was unacceptable due to the need to show
the concurrence of the several requisites before entries in the course of business
could be excepted from the hearsay rule. The requisites are as follows:

(a) The person who made the entry must be dead or unable to testify;

(b) The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to
which they refer;

(c) The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;

(d) The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the

performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral, or
religious;

(e) The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business
or duty.[41]

The Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to establish her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The Court reiterates that in the trial of every criminal case,
a judge must rigidly test the States evidence of guilt in order to ensure that such
evidence adhered to the basic rules of admissibility before pronouncing an accused
guilty of the crime charged upon such evidence. The failure of the judge to do so
herein nullified the guarantee of due of process of law in favor of the accused, who
had no obligation to prove her innocence. Heracquittal should follow.

IV
No reliable evidence on damage

Conformably with finding the evidence of guilt unreliable, the Court declares
that the disposition by the RTC ordering petitioner to indemnify Footluckers in the
amount of P131,286.92 with interest of 12% per annum until fully paid was not yet
shown to be factually founded. Yet, she cannot now be absolved of civil liability on
that basis. Heracquittal has to bedeclared as without prejudice to the filing of a civil
action against her for the recovery of any amount that she may still owe to
Footluckers.

WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE ANDREVERSESthe decision

convicting ANNA LERIMA PATULAof estafa as charged, and ACQUITS her
for failure of the Prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, without
prejudice to a civil action brought against her for

the recoveryof any amount still owing in favor of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 134121. March 6, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWIN ALCODIA

y SIMON, accused-appellant.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Death, like a thief in the night, strikes at the most unexpected time. Ryan
Feria, a 17-year old engineering student of the University of Baguio, was bound
for home at San Felipe, Zambales when he boarded Victory Liner Bus No. 729
on October 3, 1996. It was to be his last journey.
Assailed in this appeal is the Decision dated January 20, 1998 of the
[1]

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Tarlac, Tarlac in Criminal Case No.
9396 finding accused-appellant Edwin Alcodia guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of deceased Feria the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P119,700.00 as actual
damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and costs.
In the Information dated November 5, 1996, accused-appellant was
[2]

charged with the crime of murder committed as follows:

That on or about October 3, 1996 at around 10:15 in the morning, in the Municipality
of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused did then and there, with malice aforethought and with
deliberate intent to take the life of Ryan V. Feria, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, suddenly unexpectedly and treacherously attack the latter with a knife
(balisong 29) wounding him several times on his chest and was brought to the Tarlac
Provincial Hospital, Tarlac, Tarlac, for treatment but later on pronounced dead by the
hospital authorities.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial

[3]

on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented as its witnesses Arnold

Salvador, Dominador Sarmiento, Dr. Benjamin Fabie, Esminda Feria and SPO2
Reynaldo Jarabejo. Accused-appellant, alone, took the witness stand for the
defense.
Salvador testified that on October 3, 1996, at around 10:15 oclock in the
morning, he was selling chicharon inside Victory Liner Bus No. 729, then
parked at the Siesta Bus Stop, San Roque, Tarlac, Tarlac. Within his view was
[4]

accused-appellant who was seated at the 4th row of the bus. He tarried while
[5]

waiting for the other passengers to board the vehicle.Thereupon, he noticed

Feria boarding the bus. While Feria was still at the first rung of the bus
doorsteps, he suddenly stood up, held Ferias neck and stabbed him three (3)
times with a balisong. Feria managed to get off the bus and ran towards the
[6]

parking space where he fell down. Accused-appellant chased Feria but

[7]

Sarmiento, a security guard, stopped him, ordered him to raise his hand and
took the balisong. [8]

Sarmiento corroborated Salvadors testimony. He recounted that on the said

date and time, he was making rounds at the Siesta Victory Liner Terminal. He [9]

posted himself three (3) meters away from Bus No. 729 to inform the
passengers that it would be leaving soon. He then saw accused-
[10]

appellant. The latter approached Feria and stabbed him. Feria fell from the
[11]

bus when accused-appellant released him. Somehow Feria was able to run a
few meters away from accused-appellant but he collapsed on the concrete
pavement. When he (Sarmiento) saw accused-appellant chasing the victim, he
blocked his path. While aiming his gun at accused-appellant, Sarmiento
[12]

ordered him to raise his hand and thereafter took the balisong from him. He
gave the balisong to SPO2 Jarabejo who brought accused-appellant to the
police station for investigation. [13]

SPO2 Jarabejo testified that on October 3, 1996, at around 10:15 oclock in

the morning, he was directing traffic at San Roque Junction, Tarlac, Tarlac. A [14]

tricycle driver informed him that there was a commotion at the Victory Liner
Terminal, prompting him to rush to the place. When he reached the terminal,
[15]

Sarmiento turned over to him accused-appellant as well as the balisong he

used. Jarabejo brought accused-appellant to the Police Station.
[16] [17]

Feria was rushed to the Tarlac Provincial Hospital. Dr. Fabie, a resident
pathologist of the Tarlac Provincial Hospital, testified that he performed an
autopsy on Ferias cadaver. His Autopsy Report shows that the victim sustained
three (3) stab wounds on the chest and left shoulder, thus:

1. 3 x 2 cms. (stab wound) at the supra aspect of glenoid left shoulder (non-
penetrating wound);

2. 3 x 2 cms, 3 cms. (stab wound) below stab wound No. 1;

3. 3 x 2 cms. (stab wound) left side of the sternum second intercostal space.

Dr. Fabie affirmed the Medico-Legal Certificate dated October 4, 1986

stating that the cause of Ferias death was Hypovolemic shock due to acute
blood loss and cardiac tamponade resulting from stab wounds of the thorax,
lungs and heart.
Esminda Feria testified that her son was 17 years of age and a second year
Electronics and Communication Engineering student at the University of
Baguio. She said she spent P119,700.00 for his hospitalization, wake and
burial, including miscellaneous expenses. [18]

Accused-appellant presented a different story. He testified that he was one

of the passengers of Victory Liner Bus No. 729 on October 3, 1996. He was [19]

occupying the 2nd to the last seat of the bus, together with his live-in partner,
Cristina Abad, and her sister-in-law, Grace Abad. When the bus stopped at
[20]

the Victory Liner Terminal in Tarlac, he stood up to alight from the vehicle but
Feria who was from the front side of the bus approached him and attempted to
stab him. He evaded the thrust and grappled with Feria for the possession of
[21]

the knife.After wrestling the knife from Feria, he stabbed him. However, he
could no longer remember how many times he stabbed the victim. He did not [22]

suffer any bruises or injuries. Thereafter, he alighted from the bus and
[23]

surrendered himself to Sarmiento. He also surrendered the knife he used in

stabbing the victim. Sarmiento turned him over, together with the knife, to
[24]

SPO2 Jarabejo who arrived at the scene of the incident. The latter brought him
to the Police Station but he did not give any written statement about what
happened. Accused-appellant further claimed that he did not know the person
[25]

whom he stabbed. He averred, however, that while boarding the bus at its
terminal in Baguio City in the morning of October 3, 1996, he and the victim
accidentally bumped each other. The latter stared at him with a dagger look. [26]

On January 20, 1998, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Edwin Alcodia y Simon GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer a jail
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the
heirs of Ryan Feria y Verona the amount of P50,000.00 as moral indemnity, to pay his
heirs the amount of P119,700.00 as actual damages, to pay P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
 In appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the RTC
ratiocinated:

The Court is convinced that Alcodia fatally stabbed Feria. But was the killing of the
victim a case of murder as charged? As shown by the evidence spread on the
record, Alcodia fatally attacked Feria with a knife suddenly, unexpectedly and
without any warning as the latter was boarding Bus No. 729 bound for Olongapo
City. Feria then was unarmed and unaware of the evil design of accused Alcodia
when the latter attacked Feria. Accused gave the victim no chance to defend
himself or repel the assault against him, considering the sudden and unexpected attack
on his person, thereby ensuring its accomplishment.

Accused-appellant anchors his appeal on this assignment of error:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING SOLELY ON THE

PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE AND DISREGARDING COMPLETELY HIS
TESTIMONY THAT HE WAS PREVIOUSLY ATTACKED BY THE VICTIM
AND HE MERELY ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE. [27]

Accused-appellant invokes several Decisions of this Court sustaining self-

defense. However, without expounding how these Decisions apply to his case,
he concludes that his plea of self-defense is proper, thus, he should be
acquitted.
In its Appellees Brief, the Solicitor General contends that as between the
version of the prosecution and that of the defense, the former deserves more
weight because first, the RTC found the prosecution witnesses credible, they
having testified with sincerity and candor; and second, no ill motive was shown
why the prosecution witnesses would falsely testify against accused-appellant.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Accused-appellants lone assignment of error borders on the matter of
credibility of witnesses.
Time and again, this Court has pronounced that matters affecting credibility
are best left to the trial court because of its unique opportunity of having
observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witness deportment
on the stand while testifying. The brazen face of the liar, the glibness of the
[28]

schooled witness in reciting a lesson, or the itching over-eagerness of the swift

witness, as well as the honest face of the truthful one, are alone seen by the
trial judge. Thus, the appellate court will not disturb the findings of the lower
[29]

court, unless there appears in the record some facts or circumstances of

[30]
weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which
have been misinterpreted. [31]

Upon a careful evaluation of the evidence, we find that the RTC is justified
in giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. With marked relevance is the fact that there appears to be no motive
on the part of Salvador and Sarmiento to falsely testify against accused-
appellant other than their sincere desire to disclose the truth about Ferias
death.As a matter of fact, accused-appellant did not even attempt to show why
these two disinterested witnesses would concoct an inculpatory story against
him. It must therefore be presumed that they were not moved by wicked
intentions. We quote their clear and straightforward accounts of the
[32]

incident. Salvador testified as follows:

ATTY. FARINAS:
Q What particular portion of the bus were you when Ryan Feria boarded the same?
A I was at the middle of the bus.
Q And how about the accused, where was he at that time?
A He was seated at the fourth seat.

xxxxxx
Q What was he doing when you saw the accused?
A He was looking down.
Q After that, what did he do if he did anything?
A When Ryan Feria boarded the bus, he suddenly stood up, embraced him on the
neck and stabbed him.
Q You said that accused stabbed Ryan Feria, using yourself and myself as point of
impact, please demonstrate how the accused stabbed victim Ryan Feria?
INTERPRETER:
Witness demonstrating by holding Atty. Farinas with his left hand by the neck and
then stabbed him.
ATTY. FARINAS:
Q How many times?
A Three times, sir.
Q How far were you from them when Alcodia stabbed Ryan Feria?
A I was on the eighth seat of the bus.
Q After he stabbed Ryan Feria three times, what happened next, if any?
A Ryan Feria was able to run.
Q Where did he go?
A He went to the parking space and then he fell down.
Q How far from the place where Ryan Feria fell down from the place where he was
stabbed by Edwin Alcodia?
A More or less 4 meters.
Q And what did Edwin Alcodia do when Ryan Feria ran away?
A He chased him.
Q Was he able to chase him?
A No more, sir.
Q Why?
A Because the security guard arrived.
Q And do you know the name of the security guard you are referring to?
A I know him by the family name Sarmiento, sir.
Q What happened when the security guard arrived?
A He ordered him to raise his hand because he was holding a knife. [33]

Sarmiento corroborated the foregoing testimony of Salvador, thus:

ATTY. FARINAS:
Q On October 3, 1996, at 10:15 a.m., do you remember of any unusual incident that
happened?
A There was a stabbing incident, sir.
Q And who were involved in that stabbing incident, if you know?
A Edwin Alcodia, sir.
Q You said that there was a stabbing incident that happened, how did it happen?
A When I was making a round, I approached the passengers of Bus No. 729 to
board their bus because the bus will be leaving. When Ryan Feria was about
to board the bus, he was met by a person who came from inside the bus,
embraced him and then stabbed him.
Q You mentioned Bus No. 729, how far were you from the said bus when the
incident happened?
A About three meters away from the bus.

xxxxxx
Q What weapon did Edwin Alcodia use in stabbing Ryan Feria, if you know?
A A knife (balisong), sir.
Q How long is that balisong you are referring to?
 A About eight inches.
Q After you saw Edwin Alcodia stabbed Ryan Feria, what did you do, if any?
A Being a security guard, I pulled my gun and pointed at him. I let him raised his hand
and that was the time I got the knife from him.
Q Why did you aim your gun to accused Edwin Alcodia?
A Because Edwin Alcodia wanted to go after Ryan Feria.
Q Why, what did Ryan Feria do after he was stabbed?
A He fell on the pavement, then he was able to run and he fell again.[34]

Notwithstanding the searching cross-examination by the defense counsel,

both witnesses were able to survive the ordeal without deviating from their direct
testimonies. And like a chain that derives strength from being interconnected,
their testimonies meet the test of credibility because of their being corroborated
on material points. For one, Salvadors testimony that Feria was stabbed three
times at the shoulder was corroborated not only by Sarmiento but also by Dr.
Fabie who testified that Feria suffered three stab wounds at the chest, with the
second wound penetrating the sternum and the right thoracic cavity. For [35]

another, Salvador and Sarmiento are one in saying that (a) accused-appellant
stabbed Feria without any provocation on the latters part; (b) the weapon used
was a balisong; and (c) accused-appellant chased Feria after he had stabbed
him.
In an attempt to discredit the testimony of Salvador, the defense tried to
show that as a chicharon vendor, he has no business observing the
passengers. This is a very flimsy deduction.Extraordinary events jolt the mind
to attention. The stabbing of a person does not happen everyday such that it
can just be brushed aside as a normal incident unworthy of observation. The
taking of a persons life is so shocking that for anyone who witnesses it, time
stands still and a moment of undivided awareness ensues. Besides, Salvador
was able to establish during cross-examination that he had reason to observe
the passengers. He testified that he was an informer of the Philippine National
Police and a member of the Philippine Watchman tasked to identify the Salisi
Gang.
But more than anything else, what convinces us to affirm the trial courts
finding is the presence of certain badges of guilt that renders accused-
appellants claim of self-defense improbable and unworthy of belief. First, the
physical evidence shows that Feria suffered three stab wounds on the
chest. Dr. Fabie testified that even if Feria was given proper and timely
medication, he would not have survived. The cause of his death was cardiac
[36]

tamponade resulting from stab wounds of the thorax, lungs and heart. The
nature, location, and number of the wounds inflicted on Feria thus belie and
negate the claim of self-defense. It certainly defies reason why accused-
[37]

appellant had to inflict such injuries on Feria if he were only defending

himself. The number of wounds, by itself, negates self-defense and
demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victim.
Second, despite accused-appellants assertions that Feria was the
aggressor and he (accused-appellant) engaged in a struggle for possession of
the balisong, he did not sustain any injury. Surely, a plea of self-defense cannot
be justifiably appreciated when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Not only
this, accused-appellants testimony was uncorroborated by any separate and
competent evidence. The defense failed to present anyone who could confirm
his story, specifically that the victim was the aggressor. This, all the more,
renders his story dubious.
And third, accused-appellant failed to inform the police that he acted in self-
defense. There is nothing in the records that his immediate outcry to SPO2
Jarabejo was self-defense. While he tried to convince the trial court that he did
[38]

not escape nor evade arrest after committing the crime, however, Salvador and
Sarmiento testified that accused-appellant did not voluntarily surrender
himself. He was constrained to do so at a gunpoint. In a number of cases, this
[39]

Court ruled that failure to inform the police of the unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim and to surrender the knife used in stabbing him militates
against the claim of self-defense. [40]

All told, accused-appellants plea of self-defense must fail. His conviction

necessarily follows on the basis of his admission to the killing. It is a hornbook
doctrine that where self-defense is invoked, it is incumbent upon the accused-
appellant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he is not the
unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part;
and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent and repel an
aggression. At the heart of these is the presence of unlawful
[41]

aggression. Without it, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this
justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated. Also, the accused-
[42]

appellant must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the latter were weak, it would
not be disbelieved after his open admission of the killing. [43]

The trial court also held that accused-appellant committed the crime of
murder, as qualified by treachery. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. [44]
 Treachery is evidently present in the instant case. Like a beast waiting for
his prey, accused-appellant stealthily rushed towards Feria, swiftly held him at
the neck, and successively stabbed him in the chest. By holding Feria at the
neck, accused-appellant chose a mode of attack intended to facilitate and
insure the killing without danger to himself. Apparently, Feria who was then
boarding the bus was not aware of any impending danger to his life. He had no
reason to suspect that an assailant lurked inside the bus considering that there
was no prior verbal altercation or heated argument that could have infuriated
accused-appellant. Undoubtedly, the manner of killing shows the existence of
treachery. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning done in a swift and unexpected manner of execution affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. [45]

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the
[46]

consummated crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. The lesser of the

two indivisible penalties shall be imposed, there being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances attending the crime. [47]

In keeping with prevailing jurisprudence, the heirs of the deceased are

entitled to the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity ex delicto. As
[48]

regards the actual damages, it appears that the amount of P119,700.00 was
based solely on the personal list prepared by Ferias mother. To be entitled to
[49]

such damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a

reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence obtainable to the injured party. In the case at bar, the prosecution
[50]

failed to present any receipt to prove the claim for expenses

incurred. Nevertheless, in light of the recent case of People vs.
[51]

Abrazaldo, we grant the award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu

[52]

of actual damages. The moral damages awarded in the amount of P50,000.00

is affirmed, there being proofs that because of Ferias death, his heirs suffered
wounded feelings, mental anguish, anxiety and similar injury. Finally, we
[53]

likewise affirm the trial courts award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. [54]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 20, 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 65, Tarlac, Tarlac, finding accused-appellant Edwin Alcodia y
Simon guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is
ordered to pay the heirs of the late Ryan Feria y Verona the amounts
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00
as exemplary damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 134121. March 6, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWIN ALCODIA

y SIMON, accused-appellant.

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Death, like a thief in the night, strikes at the most unexpected time. Ryan
Feria, a 17-year old engineering student of the University of Baguio, was bound
for home at San Felipe, Zambales when he boarded Victory Liner Bus No. 729
on October 3, 1996. It was to be his last journey.
Assailed in this appeal is the Decision dated January 20, 1998 of the
[1]

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Tarlac, Tarlac in Criminal Case No.
9396 finding accused-appellant Edwin Alcodia guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of deceased Feria the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P119,700.00 as actual
damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages and costs.
In the Information dated November 5, 1996, accused-appellant was
[2]

charged with the crime of murder committed as follows:

That on or about October 3, 1996 at around 10:15 in the morning, in the Municipality
of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused did then and there, with malice aforethought and with
deliberate intent to take the life of Ryan V. Feria, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, suddenly unexpectedly and treacherously attack the latter with a knife
(balisong 29) wounding him several times on his chest and was brought to the Tarlac
Provincial Hospital, Tarlac, Tarlac, for treatment but later on pronounced dead by the
hospital authorities.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial

[3]

on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented as its witnesses Arnold

Salvador, Dominador Sarmiento, Dr. Benjamin Fabie, Esminda Feria and SPO2
Reynaldo Jarabejo. Accused-appellant, alone, took the witness stand for the
defense.
Salvador testified that on October 3, 1996, at around 10:15 oclock in the
morning, he was selling chicharon inside Victory Liner Bus No. 729, then
parked at the Siesta Bus Stop, San Roque, Tarlac, Tarlac. Within his view was
[4]

accused-appellant who was seated at the 4th row of the bus. He tarried while
[5]

waiting for the other passengers to board the vehicle.Thereupon, he noticed

Feria boarding the bus. While Feria was still at the first rung of the bus
doorsteps, he suddenly stood up, held Ferias neck and stabbed him three (3)
times with a balisong. Feria managed to get off the bus and ran towards the
[6]

parking space where he fell down. Accused-appellant chased Feria but

[7]

Sarmiento, a security guard, stopped him, ordered him to raise his hand and
took the balisong. [8]

Sarmiento corroborated Salvadors testimony. He recounted that on the said

date and time, he was making rounds at the Siesta Victory Liner Terminal. He [9]

posted himself three (3) meters away from Bus No. 729 to inform the
passengers that it would be leaving soon. He then saw accused-
[10]

appellant. The latter approached Feria and stabbed him. Feria fell from the
[11]

bus when accused-appellant released him. Somehow Feria was able to run a
few meters away from accused-appellant but he collapsed on the concrete
pavement. When he (Sarmiento) saw accused-appellant chasing the victim, he
blocked his path. While aiming his gun at accused-appellant, Sarmiento
[12]

ordered him to raise his hand and thereafter took the balisong from him. He
gave the balisong to SPO2 Jarabejo who brought accused-appellant to the
police station for investigation. [13]

SPO2 Jarabejo testified that on October 3, 1996, at around 10:15 oclock in

the morning, he was directing traffic at San Roque Junction, Tarlac, Tarlac. A [14]

tricycle driver informed him that there was a commotion at the Victory Liner
Terminal, prompting him to rush to the place. When he reached the terminal,
[15]

Sarmiento turned over to him accused-appellant as well as the balisong he

used. Jarabejo brought accused-appellant to the Police Station.
[16] [17]

Feria was rushed to the Tarlac Provincial Hospital. Dr. Fabie, a resident
pathologist of the Tarlac Provincial Hospital, testified that he performed an
autopsy on Ferias cadaver. His Autopsy Report shows that the victim sustained
three (3) stab wounds on the chest and left shoulder, thus:

1. 3 x 2 cms. (stab wound) at the supra aspect of glenoid left shoulder (non-
penetrating wound);

2. 3 x 2 cms, 3 cms. (stab wound) below stab wound No. 1;

3. 3 x 2 cms. (stab wound) left side of the sternum second intercostal space.

Dr. Fabie affirmed the Medico-Legal Certificate dated October 4, 1986

stating that the cause of Ferias death was Hypovolemic shock due to acute
blood loss and cardiac tamponade resulting from stab wounds of the thorax,
lungs and heart.
Esminda Feria testified that her son was 17 years of age and a second year
Electronics and Communication Engineering student at the University of
Baguio. She said she spent P119,700.00 for his hospitalization, wake and
burial, including miscellaneous expenses. [18]

Accused-appellant presented a different story. He testified that he was one

of the passengers of Victory Liner Bus No. 729 on October 3, 1996. He was [19]

occupying the 2nd to the last seat of the bus, together with his live-in partner,
Cristina Abad, and her sister-in-law, Grace Abad. When the bus stopped at
[20]

the Victory Liner Terminal in Tarlac, he stood up to alight from the vehicle but
Feria who was from the front side of the bus approached him and attempted to
stab him. He evaded the thrust and grappled with Feria for the possession of
[21]

the knife.After wrestling the knife from Feria, he stabbed him. However, he
could no longer remember how many times he stabbed the victim. He did not [22]

suffer any bruises or injuries. Thereafter, he alighted from the bus and
[23]

surrendered himself to Sarmiento. He also surrendered the knife he used in

stabbing the victim. Sarmiento turned him over, together with the knife, to
[24]

SPO2 Jarabejo who arrived at the scene of the incident. The latter brought him
to the Police Station but he did not give any written statement about what
happened. Accused-appellant further claimed that he did not know the person
[25]

whom he stabbed. He averred, however, that while boarding the bus at its
terminal in Baguio City in the morning of October 3, 1996, he and the victim
accidentally bumped each other. The latter stared at him with a dagger look. [26]

On January 20, 1998, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Edwin Alcodia y Simon GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and penalized in Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer a jail
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the
heirs of Ryan Feria y Verona the amount of P50,000.00 as moral indemnity, to pay his
heirs the amount of P119,700.00 as actual damages, to pay P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
 In appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the RTC
ratiocinated:

The Court is convinced that Alcodia fatally stabbed Feria. But was the killing of the
victim a case of murder as charged? As shown by the evidence spread on the
record, Alcodia fatally attacked Feria with a knife suddenly, unexpectedly and
without any warning as the latter was boarding Bus No. 729 bound for Olongapo
City. Feria then was unarmed and unaware of the evil design of accused Alcodia
when the latter attacked Feria. Accused gave the victim no chance to defend
himself or repel the assault against him, considering the sudden and unexpected attack
on his person, thereby ensuring its accomplishment.

Accused-appellant anchors his appeal on this assignment of error:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING SOLELY ON THE

PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE AND DISREGARDING COMPLETELY HIS
TESTIMONY THAT HE WAS PREVIOUSLY ATTACKED BY THE VICTIM
AND HE MERELY ACTED IN SELF-DEFENSE. [27]

Accused-appellant invokes several Decisions of this Court sustaining self-

defense. However, without expounding how these Decisions apply to his case,
he concludes that his plea of self-defense is proper, thus, he should be
acquitted.
In its Appellees Brief, the Solicitor General contends that as between the
version of the prosecution and that of the defense, the former deserves more
weight because first, the RTC found the prosecution witnesses credible, they
having testified with sincerity and candor; and second, no ill motive was shown
why the prosecution witnesses would falsely testify against accused-appellant.
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Accused-appellants lone assignment of error borders on the matter of
credibility of witnesses.
Time and again, this Court has pronounced that matters affecting credibility
are best left to the trial court because of its unique opportunity of having
observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witness deportment
on the stand while testifying. The brazen face of the liar, the glibness of the
[28]

schooled witness in reciting a lesson, or the itching over-eagerness of the swift

witness, as well as the honest face of the truthful one, are alone seen by the
trial judge. Thus, the appellate court will not disturb the findings of the lower
[29]

court, unless there appears in the record some facts or circumstances of

[30]
weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which
have been misinterpreted. [31]

Upon a careful evaluation of the evidence, we find that the RTC is justified
in giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. With marked relevance is the fact that there appears to be no motive
on the part of Salvador and Sarmiento to falsely testify against accused-
appellant other than their sincere desire to disclose the truth about Ferias
death.As a matter of fact, accused-appellant did not even attempt to show why
these two disinterested witnesses would concoct an inculpatory story against
him. It must therefore be presumed that they were not moved by wicked
intentions. We quote their clear and straightforward accounts of the
[32]

incident. Salvador testified as follows:

ATTY. FARINAS:
Q What particular portion of the bus were you when Ryan Feria boarded the same?
A I was at the middle of the bus.
Q And how about the accused, where was he at that time?
A He was seated at the fourth seat.

xxxxxx
Q What was he doing when you saw the accused?
A He was looking down.
Q After that, what did he do if he did anything?
A When Ryan Feria boarded the bus, he suddenly stood up, embraced him on the
neck and stabbed him.
Q You said that accused stabbed Ryan Feria, using yourself and myself as point of
impact, please demonstrate how the accused stabbed victim Ryan Feria?
INTERPRETER:
Witness demonstrating by holding Atty. Farinas with his left hand by the neck and
then stabbed him.
ATTY. FARINAS:
Q How many times?
A Three times, sir.
Q How far were you from them when Alcodia stabbed Ryan Feria?
A I was on the eighth seat of the bus.
Q After he stabbed Ryan Feria three times, what happened next, if any?
A Ryan Feria was able to run.
Q Where did he go?
A He went to the parking space and then he fell down.
Q How far from the place where Ryan Feria fell down from the place where he was
stabbed by Edwin Alcodia?
A More or less 4 meters.
Q And what did Edwin Alcodia do when Ryan Feria ran away?
A He chased him.
Q Was he able to chase him?
A No more, sir.
Q Why?
A Because the security guard arrived.
Q And do you know the name of the security guard you are referring to?
A I know him by the family name Sarmiento, sir.
Q What happened when the security guard arrived?
A He ordered him to raise his hand because he was holding a knife. [33]

Sarmiento corroborated the foregoing testimony of Salvador, thus:

ATTY. FARINAS:
Q On October 3, 1996, at 10:15 a.m., do you remember of any unusual incident that
happened?
A There was a stabbing incident, sir.
Q And who were involved in that stabbing incident, if you know?
A Edwin Alcodia, sir.
Q You said that there was a stabbing incident that happened, how did it happen?
A When I was making a round, I approached the passengers of Bus No. 729 to
board their bus because the bus will be leaving. When Ryan Feria was about
to board the bus, he was met by a person who came from inside the bus,
embraced him and then stabbed him.
Q You mentioned Bus No. 729, how far were you from the said bus when the
incident happened?
A About three meters away from the bus.

xxxxxx
Q What weapon did Edwin Alcodia use in stabbing Ryan Feria, if you know?
A A knife (balisong), sir.
Q How long is that balisong you are referring to?
 A About eight inches.
Q After you saw Edwin Alcodia stabbed Ryan Feria, what did you do, if any?
A Being a security guard, I pulled my gun and pointed at him. I let him raised his hand
and that was the time I got the knife from him.
Q Why did you aim your gun to accused Edwin Alcodia?
A Because Edwin Alcodia wanted to go after Ryan Feria.
Q Why, what did Ryan Feria do after he was stabbed?
A He fell on the pavement, then he was able to run and he fell again.[34]

Notwithstanding the searching cross-examination by the defense counsel,

both witnesses were able to survive the ordeal without deviating from their direct
testimonies. And like a chain that derives strength from being interconnected,
their testimonies meet the test of credibility because of their being corroborated
on material points. For one, Salvadors testimony that Feria was stabbed three
times at the shoulder was corroborated not only by Sarmiento but also by Dr.
Fabie who testified that Feria suffered three stab wounds at the chest, with the
second wound penetrating the sternum and the right thoracic cavity. For [35]

another, Salvador and Sarmiento are one in saying that (a) accused-appellant
stabbed Feria without any provocation on the latters part; (b) the weapon used
was a balisong; and (c) accused-appellant chased Feria after he had stabbed
him.
In an attempt to discredit the testimony of Salvador, the defense tried to
show that as a chicharon vendor, he has no business observing the
passengers. This is a very flimsy deduction.Extraordinary events jolt the mind
to attention. The stabbing of a person does not happen everyday such that it
can just be brushed aside as a normal incident unworthy of observation. The
taking of a persons life is so shocking that for anyone who witnesses it, time
stands still and a moment of undivided awareness ensues. Besides, Salvador
was able to establish during cross-examination that he had reason to observe
the passengers. He testified that he was an informer of the Philippine National
Police and a member of the Philippine Watchman tasked to identify the Salisi
Gang.
But more than anything else, what convinces us to affirm the trial courts
finding is the presence of certain badges of guilt that renders accused-
appellants claim of self-defense improbable and unworthy of belief. First, the
physical evidence shows that Feria suffered three stab wounds on the
chest. Dr. Fabie testified that even if Feria was given proper and timely
medication, he would not have survived. The cause of his death was cardiac
[36]

tamponade resulting from stab wounds of the thorax, lungs and heart. The
nature, location, and number of the wounds inflicted on Feria thus belie and
negate the claim of self-defense. It certainly defies reason why accused-
[37]

appellant had to inflict such injuries on Feria if he were only defending

himself. The number of wounds, by itself, negates self-defense and
demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of the victim.
Second, despite accused-appellants assertions that Feria was the
aggressor and he (accused-appellant) engaged in a struggle for possession of
the balisong, he did not sustain any injury. Surely, a plea of self-defense cannot
be justifiably appreciated when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Not only
this, accused-appellants testimony was uncorroborated by any separate and
competent evidence. The defense failed to present anyone who could confirm
his story, specifically that the victim was the aggressor. This, all the more,
renders his story dubious.
And third, accused-appellant failed to inform the police that he acted in self-
defense. There is nothing in the records that his immediate outcry to SPO2
Jarabejo was self-defense. While he tried to convince the trial court that he did
[38]

not escape nor evade arrest after committing the crime, however, Salvador and
Sarmiento testified that accused-appellant did not voluntarily surrender
himself. He was constrained to do so at a gunpoint. In a number of cases, this
[39]

Court ruled that failure to inform the police of the unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim and to surrender the knife used in stabbing him militates
against the claim of self-defense. [40]

All told, accused-appellants plea of self-defense must fail. His conviction

necessarily follows on the basis of his admission to the killing. It is a hornbook
doctrine that where self-defense is invoked, it is incumbent upon the accused-
appellant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he is not the
unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part;
and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent and repel an
aggression. At the heart of these is the presence of unlawful
[41]

aggression. Without it, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this
justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated. Also, the accused-
[42]

appellant must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if the latter were weak, it would
not be disbelieved after his open admission of the killing. [43]

The trial court also held that accused-appellant committed the crime of
murder, as qualified by treachery. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. [44]
 Treachery is evidently present in the instant case. Like a beast waiting for
his prey, accused-appellant stealthily rushed towards Feria, swiftly held him at
the neck, and successively stabbed him in the chest. By holding Feria at the
neck, accused-appellant chose a mode of attack intended to facilitate and
insure the killing without danger to himself. Apparently, Feria who was then
boarding the bus was not aware of any impending danger to his life. He had no
reason to suspect that an assailant lurked inside the bus considering that there
was no prior verbal altercation or heated argument that could have infuriated
accused-appellant. Undoubtedly, the manner of killing shows the existence of
treachery. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning done in a swift and unexpected manner of execution affording the
hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. [45]

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the
[46]

consummated crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. The lesser of the

two indivisible penalties shall be imposed, there being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances attending the crime. [47]

In keeping with prevailing jurisprudence, the heirs of the deceased are

entitled to the amount of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity ex delicto. As
[48]

regards the actual damages, it appears that the amount of P119,700.00 was
based solely on the personal list prepared by Ferias mother. To be entitled to
[49]

such damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a

reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best
evidence obtainable to the injured party. In the case at bar, the prosecution
[50]

failed to present any receipt to prove the claim for expenses

incurred. Nevertheless, in light of the recent case of People vs.
[51]

Abrazaldo, we grant the award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu

[52]

of actual damages. The moral damages awarded in the amount of P50,000.00

is affirmed, there being proofs that because of Ferias death, his heirs suffered
wounded feelings, mental anguish, anxiety and similar injury. Finally, we
[53]

likewise affirm the trial courts award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. [54]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 20, 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 65, Tarlac, Tarlac, finding accused-appellant Edwin Alcodia y
Simon guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is
ordered to pay the heirs of the late Ryan Feria y Verona the amounts
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00
as exemplary damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 209346 January 12, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ARNALDO BOSITO y CHAVENIA, Appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated 19 April 2013 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05289. The CA affirmed with modification the Decision2 dated 29
September 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tabaco City, Al bay, Branch 15 in Criminal
Case No. T-4696, convicting appellant Arnaldo Bosito y Chavenia (Bosito) of the crime of murder
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The Facts

Bosito was charged in an Information for murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 3 of the
Revised Penal Code. The Information states:

That [on or] about 1:00 in the afternoon of June 11, 2007 at P-1, Barangay Hacienda, San Miguel
Island, City of Tabaco, Philippines, and within the jurisdictionof this Honorable Court, the [above-
named accused], with intent to kill and with treachery, and while armed with a bolo, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously attack, assault, and hack WILLY BERBA BONAOBRA, thereby
inflicting upon the latter multiple mortal wounds which directly caused his death, to the damage and
prejudice of his legal heirs.

ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Upon arraignment, Bosito pleaded not guilty and invoked selfdefense.

On 14 January 2008, at the pre-trial conference, the following facts offered for stipulation by the
prosecution were admitted by the defense: (1) the identity of Bosito; (2) that Bosito and the victim,
Willy Berba Bonaobra (Bonaobra) knew each other; (3) that Bosito was in Hacienda, San Miguel,
Tabaco City on 11 June 2007; (4) that Bosito saw Bonaobra in Hacienda in the afternoon of 11
June2007; (5) that Bonaobra is already dead; (6) that Bosito hacked Bonaobra several times at the
house of Rosemarie Bongon in Hacienda, San Miguel, in the afternoon of 11 June 2007; and (7) that
Bonaobra did not die immediately at the scene of the incident but expired at the hospital. The
prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Adonis Bosito (Adonis), Bosito’s nephew and the
eyewitness to the crime; (2) Vicente Bonaobra, father of the victim; (3) Dr. Nicanor Manzano III, the
attending physician of Bonaobra at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital where the
victim was brought after the hacking incident; (4) Atty. William Balayo, the lawyer who assisted
Bosito when he gave his extrajudicial confession; and (5) SPO1 Dennis Biron, the Investigator and
Blotter Custodian of Tabaco City Police Force.
The prosecution summed up its version of the facts from the testimony of Adonis, the eyewitness
tothe crime: Bonaobra arrived at the house of his sister Rosemarie Bongon (Rosemarie) at around
noon of 11 June 2007. After 30 minutes, Bosito arrived at Rosemarie’s house. Bosito stood beside
Bonaobra and watched a card game being played by other guests. Bonaobra offered Bosito some
peanuts which Bosito accepted.

At around 1:00 in the afternoon, without warning, Bosito hacked Bonaobra with a boloas the victim
was trying to sit. The blow to his head caused Bonaobra to slump to the ground. He tried to crawl
away but Bosito hacked him again and hit him in the leg. Despite his injuries, Bonaobra was still
conscious and continued crawling. Bosito then positioned himself behind Bonaobra and hacked him
in the head two more times. Although already mortally wounded, Bonaobra still managed to stand up
and run away.

After Bonaobra’s escape, Adonis picked up a wooden post from the ground and told Bosito to
stop.However, Bosito waved his boloand told Adonis not to come near him. Bositothen walked
toward the direction of his house and threatened Adonis and his companions that they would be next
should they follow him.

Later, Adonis saw Bonaobra being boarded on a boat and found out that Bonaobra was taken to a
hospital. On 14 June 2007, Bonaobra died of aspiration pneumonia due to sustained multiple hack
wounds.

Adonis testified that Bonaobra did not provoke Bosito. Adonis suspected that Bosito thought that
Bonaobra came to Tabaco City to avenge Edgar Binas, who was also hackedby Bosito three years
earlier.

Dr. Nicanor Manzano III, the attending physician of Bonaobra when he was brought to the hospital
issued two medico-legal certificates showing that Bonaobra sustained: (1) a skull fracture which
caused brain evisceration; (2) severe neck trauma; (3) thoracic area posterior trauma; and (4) left
gluteal area trauma. Dr. Manzano testified that all of Bonaobra’s wounds were to the back of his
head and the back side of his torso. Among all his wounds, the most fatal was the first head trauma
which caused Bonaobra’s brain tissues to come out from his skull.

Atty. William Balayo testified that upon the request of PO2 Joel Zubeldia, he assisted Bosito in
executing his extrajudicial confession. Atty. Balayo ensured that Bosito understood his constitutional
rights and Bosito, having understood the implication of his act, voluntarily gave his confession. Atty.
Balayo stated that Bosito admitted striking the victim only once. However, upon learning that
Bonaobra died in the hospital several days after due to multiple hack wounds, Atty. Balayo decided
not to assist anymore because of Bosito’s misrepresentation.

SPO1 Dennis Biron brought to court and read into the records Police Blotter Entries 062156, 062158
and 062189 and attested to the correctness of the certification submitted in court as documentary
exhibits.

The defense, on the other hand, presented (1) appellant Bosito; (2) Analisa Balderama (Analisa),
appellant’s sister; and (3) Walter Dumaguin, appellant’s friend.

Bosito testified that while on their way to the rice field, he and his sister Analisa passed by the house
of Rosemarie Bongon where Adonis was having a drinking spree with his brothers, Juan and Arnold,
and Bonaobra. The group called on Bosito to join them and when he approached them, Adonis
struck him with a piece of wood, hitting his wrist as he parried the blow. While still holding the piece
of wood, Bonaobra, together with Juan and Arnold, who were all drunk and holding bladed weapons
surrounded Bosito. Just as Bonaobra was about tostab him, Bosito immediately pulled out his bolo
and hacked the victim. Bonaobra ran away and fell to the ground about a kilometer away from the
crime scene. The others scampered away. Bosito went home, left his bolothere and surrendered
himself to the barangay captain.

Analisa testified that she and her brother Bosito were on their way to the rice field when they passed
by Bonaobra, Adonis, Juan and Arnold on a drinking spree at Rosemarie’s house. Adonis invited
Bosito for a drink which the latter refused. Bonaobra then pushed Bositoand struck Bosito with a
bolo four times but Bosito evaded these thrusts. They grappled for possession of the bolo which
Bosito eventually wrestled out of Bonaobra’s hand and hacked Bonaobra maybe four times. She
tried to pacify them but to no avail. Analisa stated that prior to this incident, Bonaobra had been
threatening Bosito for about seven months already whenever Bonaobra was drunk. Walter
Dumaguin, a fishpond operator in Hacienda, San Miguel, testified that he was a friend of Bositoand
visited him in jail for about 10 minutes the day after the incident. Dumaguin did not give any other
relevant information.

In its Decision dated 29 September 2011, the RTC found Bosito guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder. The RTC accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of Adonis and
disregarded Bosito’s claim of self-defense. The RTC stated that Adonis testified in a straight forward
and candid manner thatBosito mercilessly hacked Bonaobra four times, with his bolo. The RTC
stated further that Bosito’s version of self-defense was incredulous and unbelievable since Bosito
was unharmed and unwounded compared to the number of hacked wounds sustained by the victim.
The RTC declared Bosito guilty of the crime of murder attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery and abuse of superior strength due to the sudden and unexpected attack made by Bosito
which afforded no opportunity for Bonaobra to defend himself. The dispositive portion of the decision
states:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused

Arnaldo Bosito y Chavenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. He is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua.

Accused is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Willy BerbaBonaobra the following:

a) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

b) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

c) ₱15,505.45 as actual damages;

d) ₱1,392,120.00 representing the loss of earning capacity.

SO ORDERED.5

Bosito filed an appeal with the CA and raised a lone error by the RTC:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT’S SELF-DEFENSE [THEORY].6

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision dated 19 April 2013, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC. The
CA found no cogent reason to deviate from the trial court’s factual findings and conclusion. The CA
stated that Bosito’s plea of self-defense has been rebutted by the positive and categorical testimony
of prosecution witness Adonis who had convincingly established that the unlawful aggression
emanated from Bosito and not from the victim. The CA added that the trial court correctly accorded
credence to Adonis whose testimony it found spontaneous, straightforward, candid and evincing
credence and belief. Further, the CA ruled out the presence of illmotive on the part of Adonis to
falsely implicate his uncle.

The CA deleted the award of (1) actual damages of ₱15,505.45 since jurisprudence holds that when
actualdamages proven by receipts during the trial amount to less than ₱25,000, the award of
temperate damages of ₱25,000 is justified in lieu of actual damages in a lesser amount; and (2)
damages for loss of earning capacity since no documentary evidence was presented by the
prosecution to substantiate the claim and the victim does not fall under any of the recognized
exceptions. Nevertheless, the CA granted the amount of ₱25,000 as temperate damages in lieu of
actual damages of ₱15,505.45 supported by receipts and ₱30,000 as exemplary damages pursuant
to Article 22307 of the Civil Code. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS:

1. Ordering Appellant Arnaldo Bosito yChavenia to pay the heirs of the victim temperate
damages of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (Php25,000.00) and exemplary damages in the
amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php30,000.00);

2. Deleting the award of actual damages and damages for loss of earning capacity; and

3. Ordering the payment of interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum computed from the
date of finality of this Decision until fully paid on the total amount of damages adjudged in
favor of the heirs of the victim,

the appealed 29 September 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City, Branch 15, in
Criminal Case No. T-4696 is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.8

Appellant Bosito now comes before the Court, submitting for resolution the same issue argued
before the CA. In a Manifestation9 dated 28 February 2014, Bosito stated that in lieu of supplemental
brief, he is adopting the Appellant’s Brief 10 dated 21 June 2012 submitted before the CA. Likewise,
the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it no longer desires to file a supplemental brief and
instead adopts the Appellee’s Brief11 dated 12 November 2012 which it filed before the CA. 12

Appellant assails the decisions of the RTC and CA for not giving credence to his contention of self-
defense.

The Ruling of the Court

The appeal lacks merit.

We agree with the RTC and the CA in ruling that the prosecution fully established Bosito’s guilt for
the crime of murder beyond reasonable doubt. Adonis positively identified Bosito as the person who
hacked Bonaobra and caused his death. Considering that Adonis and Bosito were blood relatives,
Adonis was candid, straightforward, spontaneous and firm in his narration of the events.

In the present case, Bosito would like us to believe that he acted in self-defense. In his Appellant’s
Brief, Bosito admitted hacking Bosito although in self-defense. By invokingself-defense, appellant
admits killing the victim and the constitutional presumption of innocence is effectively waived. The
burden of evidence then shifts to the appellant that the killing was justified and that he incurred no
criminal liability.13 Thus, it is incumbent upon appellant to prove the elements of self-defense: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-
defense.14

Bosito claims that the unlawful aggression consisted of Bonaobra’s group ganging up on him and
attempting to stab him with a knife. However, aside from Bosito’s self-serving testimony, the defense
did not present any witness to corroborate his testimony that Bonaobra pulled a knife and tried to
stab him. Likewise, Bosito failed to present the knife which he said he grabbed during the tussle and
kept in his possession. In People v. Satonero, 15 we held that the failure to account for the non-
presentation of the weapon allegedly wielded by the victim is fatal to the plea of self-defense.

Next, the means employed by Bosito to prevent or repel the supposed unlawful aggression was
beyond reasonably necessary. As correctly found by the trial and appellate courts, the number,
nature, and gravity of the wounds sustained by Bonaobra reveal a determined effort to kill and
contradict Bosito’s claim of self-defense. The prosecution’s evidence shows that Bonaobra sustained
and died from multiple hack wounds. The records show that after Bonaobra received the first blow to
his head, which proved to be the most fatal, Bosito still continued to thrust his boloto the victim three
more times. Even Analisa, Bosito’s sister, who gave her testimony for the defense, confirmed that
Bosito hacked Bonaobra four times. Clearly, the means utilized was not reasonable under the
circumstances.

In People v. Obordo,16 we held that self-defense, to be successfully invoked, must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person
invoking it. Bosito failed to present adequate evidence to prove otherwise. Thus, his claim of self-
defense cannot stand.

Further, we agree with the lower courts in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The
1âwphi1

essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the
victim of any chance to defend himself. Here, the sudden attack of Bosito with a bolo against
Bonaobra while they were watching a card game caught the victim by surprise. Bonaobra was
unprepared and had no means to put up a defense. Such aggression insured the commission of the
crime without risk on Bosito. Also, we agree with the trial court when it held that abuse of superior
strength is deemed absorbed in treachery. Since treachery qualifies the crime of murder, the generic
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is necessarily included in the former.17

In sum, we find no cogent reason to depart from the decision of the trial and appellate courts. Bosito
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act
No. 9346;18 and with all the accessory penalties provided by law. As for damages, the CA awarded
these amounts: (1) ₱50,000 as civil indemnity; (2) ₱50,000 as moral damages; (3) ₱25,000 as
temperate damages; and (4) ₱30,000 as exemplary damages. To conform with recent
jurisprudence,19 the amount of civil indemnity awarded by the CA is hereby increased to ₱75,000.
Moreover, the amounts of damages awarded are subject to interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the
appeal. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 19 April 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 05289 WITH THE MODIFICATIONS that:

(1) appellant Arnaldo Bosito y Chavenia is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder, and sentenced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;

(2) the amount of civil indemnity is increased to ₱75,000; and

(3) appellant is ordered to pay interest on all damages at the legal rate of 6% per annum
from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 185715

Appellee,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
BERSAMIN,
- versus - VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:
ERLINDA CAPUNO y TISON, January 19, 2011
Appellant.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

BRION, J.:

We review the May 27, 2008 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 30215, affirming with modification the April 3, 2006 decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal. The RTC decision found
Erlinda Capuno y Tison (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale
of shabu, under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

ANTECEDENT FACTS
The prosecution charged the appellant with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165 before the RTC, under an Information that states:

That on or about the 21st day of July 2002, in the Municipality of

Rodriguez, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized
by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell,
deliver and give away to another, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet of white crystalline substance weighing 0.04 gram which was
found positive to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, and which substance produces a physiological action
similar to amphetamine or other compound thereof providing similar
physiological effects.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. [4] The prosecution presented
Police Officer 1 (PO1) Jose Gordon Antonio and PO1 Fortunato Jiro III at the trial.
The appellant and Maria Cecilia Salvador took the witness stand for the defense.

PO1 Antonio narrated that at around 11:10 a.m. of July 21, 2002, he was at
the Rodriguez Police Station when a civilian informant arrived and told him that a
woman was openly selling dangerous drugs on Manggahan
Street, Barangay Burgos, Montalban, Rizal. Upon receiving this information, he,
PO1 Joseph G. Fernandez, and PO1 Jiro planned an entrapment operation: he (PO1
Antonio) was designated as the poseur-buyer, while his two companions would act
as back-up. Before leaving the police station, they asked the desk officer to record
their operation.[5] They went to Manggahan Street, and when they were near this
place, the informant pointed to them the appellant. PO1 Antonio alighted from the
vehicle, approached the appellant, and told her, Paiskor ng halagang piso; he then
handed the pre-marked one hundred peso bill to her. The appellant pulled out a
plastic sachet from her left pocket and gave it to PO1 Antonio. PO1 Antonio
immediately held the appellants arm, introduced himself to her, and stated her
constitutional rights. It was at this time that PO1 Fernandez and PO1 Jiro approached
them; PO1 Jiro recovered the marked money from the appellant. They brought the
appellant to the police station for investigation. [6] According to PO1 Antonio, the
police forwarded the seized item to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for
examination.[7]

PO1 Jiro testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of July 21, 2002, he was at the
Rodriguez Police Station when a confidential asset called and informed the police
that he saw one alias Erlinda selling illegal drugs. The police planned a buy-bust
operation wherein they prepared a one hundred peso bill (P100.00) marked money,
and designated PO1 Antonio as the poseur buyer. Afterwards, PO1 Jiro, PO1
Antonio, PO1 Fernandez, and the confidential asset left the police station and
proceeded to Manahan Street. On their arrival there, the confidential asset pointed
to them the appellant.[8] PO1 Antonio alighted from the vehicle, approached the
appellant, and talked to her. Thereafter, PO1 Antonio handed the marked money to
the appellant; the appellant took something from her pocket and handed it to PO1
Antonio.[9] Immediately after, PO1 Antonio arrested the appellant. He (PO1 Jiro)
and PO1 Fernandez approached the appellant; he recovered the marked money from
the appellants left pocket. They brought the appellant to the police station and asked
the duty officer to blotter the incident. Afterwards, they brought the appellant to the
police investigator; they also made a request for a laboratory examination.[10]

On cross-examination, PO1 Jiro stated that he was 10 meters away from PO1
Antonio when the latter was transacting with the appellant. He maintained that the
buy-bust operation took place outside the appellants house.[11] He recalled that the
appellant had two other companions when they arrived. When they arrested the
appellant, some residents of the area started a commotion and tried to grab her. [12]

The testimony of Police Inspector Abraham Tecson, the Forensic Chemist,

was dispensed with after both parties stipulated on the result of the examination
conducted on the specimen submitted to the crime laboratory.

On the hearing of April 14, 2004, the prosecution offered the following as
exhibits:

Exhibit A the Sinumpaang Salaysay of PO1 Antonio, PO1 Jiro and PO1
Fernandez

Exhibit B the request for laboratory examination

 Exhibit C Chemistry Report No. D-1373-02E

Exhibit D the buy-bust money

Exhibit E Chemistry Report No. RD-78-03

Exhibit F the specimen confiscated from the appellant

Exhibit G Police Blotter[13]

The defense presented a different version of the events.

The appellant testified that at around 11:00 a.m. of July 21, 2002, she was
inside her house and lying on the bed, together with her 15-year old daughter, when
two persons, who introduced themselves as police officers, entered her house. They
wore maong pants and sando. They asked her if she was Erlinda Capuno and when
she answered in the affirmative, they searched her house.[14] They invited the
appellant and her daughter to the Municipal Hall of Montalban, Rizal when they did
not find anything in the house. Upon arriving there, the police told her to reveal the
identity of the person who gave her shabu. When she answered that she had no idea
what they were talking about, the police put her in jail.[15] The appellant further stated
that she saw the seized specimen only in court. [16]

On cross-examination, the appellant denied that she had been selling illegal
drugs. She explained that she consented to the search because she believed that the
two persons who entered her house were policemen. [17]

Maria, the appellants daughter, corroborated her mothers testimony on

material points, but stated that the two policemen did not search their house but
merely looked around.[18]

The RTC, in its decision[19] of April 3, 2006, convicted the appellant of the
crime charged, and sentenced her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment for twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, ten (10)
months and twenty (20) days. The RTC likewise ordered the appellant to pay
a P100,000.00 fine.
 The appellant appealed to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 30215. The
CA, in its decision[20] dated May 27, 2008, affirmed the RTC decision with the
modification that the appellant be sentenced to life imprisonment, and that the
amount of fine be increased to P500,000.00.

The CA found unmeritorious the appellants claim that the prosecution

witnesses were not credible due to their conflicting statements regarding the place
of the buy-bust operation. As the records bore, PO1 Antonio stated that they
conducted the entrapment operation on Manggahan Street; PO1 Jiro testified that it
was held on Manahan Street. The CA, nevertheless, ruled that PO1 Jiro made a slip
of the tongue as there was no Manahan Street in Barangay Burgos, Montalban,
Rizal.[21]

The CA added that despite the minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of PO1
Antonio and PO1 Jiro, the records do not show that they were ever motivated by any
ulterior motive other than their desire to help wipe out the drug menace. It added
that the appellants denial cannot prevail over the positive identification made by the
prosecution witnesses, who, as police officers, performed their duties in a regular
manner.[22]

Finally, the CA held that all the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
had been established.[23]

In her brief,[24] the appellant claims that the lower courts erred in convicting
her of the crime charged despite the prosecutions failure to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. She harps on the fact that PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro gave
conflicting statements on how they came to know of her alleged illegal activities. On
one hand, PO1 Antonio claimed that an informant went to the police station and told
them that the appellant was openly selling illegal drugs; PO1 Jiro, on the other hand,
stated that a civilian informant called the police and informed them of the appellants
illegal activities. The appellant also alleges that the testimonies of these two
witnesses differ as regards the actual place of the entrapment operation. She further
argues that the police did not coordinate with the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) in conducting the buy-bust operation.
 The appellant likewise contends that the prosecution failed to show an
unbroken chain of custody in the handling of the seized specimen. She claims that
the apprehending team did not mark the seized items upon confiscation. Moreover,
there was no showing that the police inventoried or photographed the seized items
in her presence or her counsel, a representative of the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official.[25]

For the State, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with the
argument that the testimonies of the police officers prevail over the appellants bare
denial, more so since there was nothing in the records to show that they were
motivated by any evil motive other than their desire to curb the vicious drug trade. [26]

The OSG added that when the buy-bust operation took place on July 21, 2002,
there was no institution yet known as the PDEA, as the Implementing Rules of R.A.
No. 9165 (IRR) took effect only on November 27, 2002.[27] It further claimed that
the failure to comply with the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulations was not fatal to
the prosecution of drug cases.[28]

THE COURTS RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to acquit the appellant for the prosecutions
failure to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the laws own starting
perspective on the status of the accused in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed
innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable
doubt.[29] The burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such presumption of
innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. In so doing, the
prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the
defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet the required amount of evidence, the
defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf. In which case,
the presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be acquitted. [30]
The requirements of paragraph 1, Section 21
of Article II of R.A. No. 9165

In a prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug under Section 5 of

R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity
of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale
transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti,
i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been
committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction. To remove
any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence
must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug
actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession or
for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.[31]

The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in

Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]

This procedure, however, was not shown to have been complied with by the
members of the buy-bust team, and nothing on record suggests that they had
extended reasonable efforts to comply with the said statutory requirement in
handling the evidence. The deficiency is patent from the following exchanges at the
trial:

FISCAL ROMNIEL MACAPAGAL:

Q: Upon arrival at Manggahan Street, what did x x x your group

do?
PO1 JOSE GORDON ANTONIO:

A: We proceeded to the place and before we reach[ed] that place[,]

our civilian asset pointed to us the suspect.

Q: After your civilian informer pointed to the suspect, what did

your group do?

A: I alighted from our private vehicle at the time and I was the one
who talked to Erlinda Capuno.

Q: You said [that] you talked to Erlinda Capuno, what did you tell
her when you approached her?

A: I told her Paiskor ng halagang piso.

Q: When you told this to Erlinda that you buy one Hundred Peso of
shabu, what did he do? [sic]

A: When I gave her on [sic] piece of the marked money[,] he [sic]

pulled out something from her pocket.

Q: What is the denomination of the marked money?

A: One Hundred Peso bill.

Q: Upon receiving the plastic sachet, what did you do next?

A: After she gave me the suspected shabu, I held her by the arm
and my two companions who [were] then seeing me
approached me. [sic]

Q: What is the purpose of holding the hands of Erlinda when you

received this plastic sachet?

A: When I took the plastic sachet that was the time I held her and
after that I introduced myself and explained to her
Constitutional rights. [sic]

Q: After arresting Erlinda, where did you proceed?

 A: We brought her to the Police Station for investigation where she
gave her full name and also turned over the suspected
items[.]

Q: Who recovered the buy-bust money?

A: Police Officer Hero [sic], Sir.

Q: You stated you were the one who handed the buy bust money to
Erlinda. Do you have that buy bust money with you?

A: After I gave the marked money to her[,] she picked from her left
pocket the suspected shabu and Police Officer Hero
recovered the money. [sic]

xxxx

Q: The alleged specimen you got from Erlinda, where is it now?

A: We brought it to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory

for examination.

Q: Were you able to know the result of this examination?

A: Yes, Sir. When we returned we already have the result.[32]

From the foregoing exchanges, it is clear that the apprehending team, upon
confiscation of the drug, immediately brought the appellant and the seized specimen
to the police station. No physical inventory and photograph of the seized items
were taken in the presence of the appellant or her counsel, a representative
from the media and the DOJ, and an elective official. We stress that PO1
Antonios testimony was corroborated by another member of the apprehending team,
PO1 Jiro, who narrated that after arresting the appellant, they brought her and the
seized item to the police station. At no time during PO1 Jiros testimony did he even
intimate that they inventoried or photographed the confiscated item.

A review of jurisprudence, even prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9165, shows
that this Court did not hesitate to strike down convictions for failure to follow the
proper procedure for the custody of confiscated dangerous drugs. Prior to R.A. No.
9165, the Court applied the procedure required by Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, amending Board Regulation No. 7, Series of
1974.[33] Section 1 of this Regulation requires the apprehending team, having
initial custody and control of the seized drugs, to immediately inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused and/or his representatives,
who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.

The Court remained vigilant in ensuring that the prescribed procedures

in the handling of the seized drugs were observed after the passage of R.A. No.
9165. In People v. Lorenzo,[34] we acquitted the accused for failure of the buy-bust
team to photograph and inventory the seized items. People v. Garcia[35] likewise
resulted in an acquittal because no physical inventory was
ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was
taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165. In Bondad, Jr. v.
People,[36] we also acquitted the accused for the failure of the police to conduct an
inventory and to photograph the seized item, without justifiable grounds.

We had the same rulings in People v. Gutierrez,[37] People v.

Denoman,[38] People v. Partoza,[39] People v. Robles,[40] and People v. dela
Cruz,[41] where we emphasized the importance of complying with the required
procedures under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

To be sure, Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in

complying with the express requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165, i.e.,"non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]" This saving clause, however,
applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and, thereafter,
explained the cited justifiable grounds, and when the prosecution established that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved. [42]
 These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution did not
even attempt to offer any justification for its failure to follow the prescribed
procedures in the handling of the seized items.

The Chain of Custody Requirement

Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be

observed in establishing the corpus delicti - the body of the crime whose core is the
confiscated illicit drug. Thus, every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be
established. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust
operations as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.[43]

Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, defines chain of custody as "the duly
recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals
or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the
time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to
presentation in court for destruction." As a method of authenticating evidence, the
chain of custody rule requires that the admission of the exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would, thus, include a testimony about the every link in
the chain, from the moment the item was seized to the time it was offered in court
as evidence, such that every person who handled the same would admit as to how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in
which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The same witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. It is from the testimony of every witness who handled the
evidence from which a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented
in court is one and the same as that seized from the accused. [44]

In the present case, the prosecutions evidence failed to establish the chain that
would have shown that the shabu presented in court was the very same specimen
seized from the appellant.
 The first crucial link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure of the
plastic sachet from the appellant. From the testimonies and joint affidavit of PO1
Antonio and PO1 Jiro, it is clear that the police did not mark the confiscated sachet
upon confiscation. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link,
thus it is vital that the seized contraband is immediately marked because succeeding
handlers of the specimen will use the markings as reference. The marking of the
evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar
or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are
disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or
contamination of evidence.[45]

The second link in the chain of custody is its turnover from PO1 Antonio to
the police station. Both PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro testified that they brought the
appellant and the seized item to the police station. They, however, failed to identify
the person to whose custody the seized item was given. Although the records show
that the request for laboratory examination of the seized item was prepared by the
Chief of Police, Police Senior Inspector Anastacio Benzon, the evidence does not
show that he was the official who received the marked plastic sachet from PO1
Antonio.

As for the subsequent links in the chain of custody, the records show that the
seized item was forwarded to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory by a
certain PO1 Sanchez. We stress, however, that PO1 Sanchez forwarded the said
specimen only on the next day, or on July 22, 2002. To harp back to what we earlier
discussed, there was a missing link in the custody of the seized drug after it left the
hands of PO1 Antonio. We cannot, therefore, presume that PO1 Sanchez had
custody of the specimen in the interim. We also stress that the identity of the person
who received the seized item at the crime laboratory was not clearly identified.

Due to the procedural lapses pointed out above, serious uncertainty hangs over
the identification of the seized shabu that the prosecution introduced into evidence.
In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged,
creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.

Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses

 We likewise cannot acquiesce to the credibility accorded to the prosecution
witnesses by the courts a quo. Contrary to the lower courts ruling, the
inconsistencies in the statements of the prosecution witnesses are substantial, not
trivial. To recall, PO1 Antonio, PO1 Jiro and PO1 Fernandez stated in
their Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay[46]that a civilian asset arrived at the
police station on July 21, 2002, and informed them that one alias Erlinda was
selling illegal drugs on Manahan Street, Barangay Burgos, Rodriguez, Rizal. PO1
Antonio reiterated this fact when he testified in court that a civilian
informant arrived at the police station on July 21, 2002 and told them that a
woman was openly selling dangerous drugs on Manggahan
Street, Barangay Burgos, Montalban, Rizal. PO1 Jiro, however, changed his story
in court and testified that the confidential informant called the police and informed
then that one alias Erlinda was selling illegal drugs.

We are at a loss how PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro could have given different
accounts regarding how the confidential asset informed them of the appellants illegal
activities when both of them were present at the police station on July 21, 2002.
What baffles us even more is why PO1 Jiros gave conflicting statements in his joint
affidavit and in his court testimony. To us, the conflicting statements and
declarations of PO1 Antonio and PO1 Jiro destroyed their credibility; it made their
testimonies unreliable. Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself, such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances.[47]

Presumption of Regularity in the

Performance of Official Duties

In sustaining the appellants conviction, the CA also relied on the evidentiary

presumption that official duties have been regularly performed. This presumption, it
must be stressed, is not conclusive. It cannot, by itself, overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Any taint of irregularity affects the whole performance
and should make the presumption unavailable. [48] The presumption, in other words,
obtains only when nothing in the records suggests that the law enforcers involved
deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. But
where the official act in question is irregular on its face, as in this case, an adverse
presumption arises as a matter of course.[49] As we explained in People v. Sanchez:

While the Court is mindful that the law enforcers enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this
presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to
be presumed innocent and it cannot, by itself constitute proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-
appellant's conviction because "First, the presumption is precisely just
that - a mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case,
xxx [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate
over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof
beyond reasonable doubt." The presumption also cannot prevail over
positive averments concerning violations of the constitutional rights of the
accused. In short, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor
constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.[50]

All told, we find merit in the appellant's claim that the prosecution failed to
discharge its burden of proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, due to the
unreliability of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and substantial gaps in
the chain of custody, raising reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus
delicti.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby REVERSE and SET

ASIDE the May 27, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
30215. Appellant Erlinda Capuno y Tison is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She is ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention unless she is confined for another lawful
cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent, Correctional

Institution for Women, Mandaluyong City, for immediate implementation. The
Superintendent of the Correctional Institution for Women is directed to report the
action she has taken to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120282. April 20, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERT

CASTILLO y MONES, accused-appellant.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The trial court judge is not an idle arbiter during a trial. He can propound clarificatory
questions to witnesses in order to ferret out the truth. The impartiality of a judge cannot
be assailed on the mere ground that he asked such questions during the trial.

The Case

This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated December 23, 1994 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 88, in Criminal Case No. Q-93-45235 convicting Robert
Castillo yMones of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.[2]
On July 23, 1993, an amended Information[3] was filed by Assistant City Prosecutor
Ralph S. Lee, charging appellant with murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of May, 1993, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused, with intent to kill[,] qualified by
evident premeditation, use of superior strength and treachery did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and
employ personal violence upon the person of one ANTONIO
DOMETITA, by then and there stabbing him with a bladed weapon[,]
hitting him on his chest thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds, which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said ANTONIO
DOMETITA.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, Appellant Castillo, assisted by Counsel Salacnib Baterina,
entered a plea of not guilty.[4] After trial in due course, appellant was convicted. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused ROBERTO CASTILLO
y MONES is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder and [is] hereby sentenced to suffer [the] penalty of reclusion
perpetua. He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased
Antonio Dometita actual damages in the sum of P60,000.00, the sum
of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity for the death of the victim and
moral damages in the sum of P100,000.00. He is likewise ordered to
pay costs.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Hence, this appeal.[6]

The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution

The Appellees Brief[7] presents the facts as follows:

On May 25, 1993, around one oclock in the morning, Eulogio Velasco,
floor manager of the Cola Pubhouse along EDSA, Project 7, Veterans
Village, Quezon City, was sitting outside the Pubhouse talking with his
co-worker, Dorie. Soon, Antonio Tony Dometita, one of their
customers, came out of the pubhouse. As he passed by, he informed
Eulogio that he was going home. When Tony Dometita was about an
armslength [sic] from Eulogio, however, appellant Robert Castillo
suddenly appeared and, without warning, stabbed Tony with a fan
knife on his left chest. As Tony pleaded for help, appellant stabbed
him once more, hitting him on the left hand.
Responding to Tonys cry for help, Eulogio placed a chair between
Tony and appellant to stop appellant from further attacking Tony. He
also shouted at Tony to run away. Tony ran towards the other side of
EDSA, but appellant pursued him.
Eulogio came to know later that Tony had died. His body was found
outside the fence of the Iglesia ni Cristo Compound, EDSA, Quezon
City.
Dr. Bienvenido Munoz, the medico-legal officer who autopsied Tonys
cadaver, testified that the proximate cause of Tonys death was the
stab wound on his left chest. Tony also suffered several incised
wounds and abrasions, indicating that he tried to resist the attack.[8]
 Version of the Defense

On the other hand, the defense viewed the facts in this way: [9]

On May 25, 1993, the late Antonio Dometita was found dead by the police
officers at the alley on the right side of the Iglesia ni Cristo Church at EDSA in
Bago Bantay.

It is the theory of the prosecution that the deceased Antonio Dometita was
stabbed by the accused Robert Castillo y Mones as testified to by Leo
Velasco. The corroboration of Leo Velascos testimony is that of Melinda
Mercado who (tsn Oct. 11, 1993) stated that Leo Velasco informed her that
Dometita was stabbed. Robert Castillo was walking away from the pubhouse
with the bladed weapon. Leo Velasco himself detailed the way Castillo
stabbed the deceased Antonio Dometita.

On the other hand the defense claims that the deceased died in the alley at
the right side of the church. That decedent
Dometita was attacked by two malefactors as testified to by Edilberto
Marcelino, a tricycle driver who saw two people ganging up on a third. The
same witness saw the victim falling to the ground. (TSN January 5, 1994,
page 8). A report of Edilberto Marcelino to the Barangay Tanods Office was
made in the blotter of the Barangay and the extract (xerox of the page) was
marked as Exhibit 2.

The Trial Courts Ruling

The court a quo gave full credence to the testimonies of the two prosecution
witnesses, who positively identified the appellant as the killer. It explained:
From the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution and the
defense, it can be gleaned that the accused, to exculpate himself from
the liability, clung to the defense of alibi[,] saying that he was not at the
place where the incident took place at the time of the killing. This was
supported by the testimony of his mother and his neighbor and guide
Malikdem.This, however, is contradicted by the testimonies of the two
eyewitnesses of the prosecution who positively identified accused as
the person who stabbed the victim. While the testimony of Mercado is
to the effect that she did not actually see the accused hit the victim,
she however, saw him walking away and carrying a bladed weapon at
the scene of the crime. Velasco on the other hand, actually saw him
 lunged [sic] his fan knife at the victim. These were further strengthened
by the findings of the medico-legal officer that the weapon used in
killing the victim [was] similar to a balisong.[10]
The trial court also found that the killing was qualified by abuse of superior strength,
because the accused used a deadly weapon in surprising the victim who [was]
unarmed. Although treachery was present, the trial court held that this was absorbed by
abuse of superior strength.

The Issues

The appellant raises the following assignment of errors: [11]

I

That the trial court failed to appreciate the evidence presented by the
accused that there was a stabbing/mauling incident at the side street
near the Iglesia ni Cristo Church at Edsa-Bago Bantay, Quezon City
(at about the time of the alleged stabbing of victime [sic] Antonio
Dometita according to the prosecution version), the same evidence for
the accused being butressed and supported by the barangay blotter,
marked Exhibit 2.
II

That the trial court failed to appreciate the implications of: the medical
finding that the heart and the lungs of the victim were impaled; that
according to the testimony of the prosecution witness, PO3 Manolito
Estacio, the victim was found at the side street near the Iglesia ni
Cristo Church; and that that side street distant from the place the
witnesses for the prosecution stated the victim was stabbed. These
matters create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and
cast distrust on the testimony of the witness Eulogio Velasco who
allegedly witnessed the stabbing of the victim.
III

That the trial court in many instances showed its prejudice against the
accused and in several instances asked questions that [were] well
within the duty of the prosecution to explore and ask; it never
appreciated other matters favorable to the accused, like the frontal
infliction of the mortal wound and the presence [of] defense wounds
which negate treachery and superiority.
IV
 That the trial judge was bias[ed] against the accused hence the
judgement of conviction.
In the main, appellant questions the trial judges (1) assessment of the credibility of
the witnesses and their testimonies and (2) alleged partiality in favor of the prosecution
as shown by his participation in the examination of witnesses.

This Courts Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

First Issue: Credibility of Witnesses

Time and again, this Court has adhered to the rule that the factual findings[12] of the
trial court, as well as its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, [13] are entitled to great
weight and are even conclusive and binding, barring arbitrariness and oversight of some
fact or circumstance of weight and substance. The evaluation of the credibility of
witnesses is a matter that peculiarly falls within the power of the trial court, as it has the
opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses on the
stand.[14] In this case, appellant failed to provide any substantial argument to warrant a
departure from this rule.
The testimony of Prosecution Witness Eulogio Velasco that he saw the appellant stab
the victim is clear and unequivocal. He was sitting outside the pub house when the victim
came out. Dometita, who was then only an arms length away from him, turned around to
say goodbye when, suddenly, the accused came out of nowhere and stabbed the
victim. Velasco narrated further that the victim asked him for help; so he responded by
placing a chair between the victim and the appellant to block the assault of the
accused.[15] Thereafter, he told Dometita to run away. The accused then chased the victim
towards the other side of EDSA.[16] The relevant portions of Velascos testimony are
reproduced hereunder:
Q Immediately thereafter, was there any unusual incident that happened?
A When Dorie went inside the pub house, that was the time Tony went out, sir.
COURT:
Q Who is this Tony?
A Antonio Dimatita alias Tony, Your Honor.
PROS. LEE:
Q When Antonio Dimatita [sic] alias Tony went out, what happened?
A Tony asked permission from me that he will go home, sir.
Q And what happened thereafter?
 A When he ha[d] not gone far yet from me, Robert Castillo suddenly attacked him and
stabbed him, sir.
Q What happened to Antonio Dimatita [sic] alias Tony when he was stabbed by accused
Robert Castillo?
A He was taken aback. He was not able to cover up himself and he was hit by the stab made
by Robert Castillo, sir.
Q On what part of the body was he hit?
A On the left side of the chest, sir.
Q And did you see in what summer [sic] accused Robert Castillo stabbed Antonio Dimatita
[sic]?
A Like this, sir. (Witness demonstrating with his right arm above his shoulder with downward
stabbing position.)
Q As you stated, after Tony was hit on the left side of [his] chest, what happened next?
A He was stabbed again and was hit on the arm, sir.
Q What arm? Left or right?
A On the left arm, air. (Witness is pointing to his left arm in between the 1st and second
finger.)
Q After he was hit on the left arm, what happened next?
A He went near me and asked for help, sir. I placed a bench on the middle to block the way
so that Robert Castillo [would] not be able to reach him and I told Tony to run away, sir.
Q Did Tony run away thereafter?
A Yes, sir.
Q How about accused Robert Castillo, what was he doing the[n]?
A He chased, sir.
Q What happened next?
A I heard Tony was already dead, sir.
The testimony of Velasco that the accused stabbed the victim on the left side of the
chest and then on the left arm was confirmed by the medical findings, [17] particularly the
autopsy report of Dr. Munoz, who testified as follows: [18]
COURT
Q Can you tell the Court the relative position of the victim and the assailant when the stab
wound was inflicted?
TRIAL PROS. RALPH S. LEE
Based on the wound, doctor.
WITNESS
 A If the victim and the assailant were in a standing position, the assailant and the victim
would be facing each other and the fatal wound was delivered from upward to
downward, your honor.
Witness Velasco further testified that the accused used a bladed weapon which
looked like a fan knife.[19] This was also supported by Dr. Munoz, viz.:[20]
Q Dr. Munoz, in your learned medical knowledge, what could have caused this stab wound
marked as Exhibit D?
A This was inflicted by a sharp pointed single bladed instrument like kitchen knife or balisong
or any similar instrument.
Melinda Mercado, the other prosecution witness, corroborated the story of
Velasco. She testified that when she was inside the pub, she heard Velasco shout that
Antonio Dometita was stabbed.[21] She went out to verify and saw the accused walking
away. What she saw was not the stabbing incident itself, but the accused wrapping a
bladed weapon in his shirt.[22] This confirms the assertion of Velasco that the accused was
still holding the bladed instrument as he chased the victim. [23]
Clearly, the straightforward, detailed and consistent narrations of the government
witnesses show that the trial court did not err in giving credence to the account of the
prosecution.
Appellant contends that the trial court failed to appreciate the testimony of Defense
Witness Edilberto Marcelino who narrated a stabbing/mauling incident on a side street
that fateful night near the Iglesia ni Cristo Church, where the victims body was found. Said
witness testified that he was driving his tricycle, when he noticed a group ganging up on
a man (pinagtutulungan).[24] He then saw the person fall.[25] He did not notice if the
assailants had weapons, as he was a bit far from them, illumination coming only from the
headlight of his tricycle. He stated that the appellant, with whom he was familiar because
he often saw him selling cigarettes along EDSA,[26] was not one of those he saw ganging
up on the person who fell to the ground. He described one of the malefactors as long-
haired and lanky, and the other one as fair-complexioned with a medium
build,[27] descriptions which did not fit the accused.Upon witnessing the incident, Marcelino
immediately proceeded to the barangay hall to report the matter.
The trial court did not accord weight to said testimony. We sustain this
holding. Marcelino admitted that he was about twenty-five meters away from the place of
incident[28] and that said place was not lighted. Furthermore, his tricycle was then moving
because he was in a hurry.[29] Thus, we agree with this statement of the trial court:
[C]onsidering that it was dark and the distance from where the witness saw the incident
[was] quite far, it could not have been possible for him to recognize the victim and his
attackers.[30]
Appellant also asserts that the trial court failed to appreciate the implications of the
medical finding that the heart and lungs of the victim were impaled. He argues that these
wounds made it impossible for the victim to traverse the distance from the pub house to
the Iglesia ni Cristo Church area, where his body was eventually found. However, the
testimony of the medico-legal expert did not rule out this possibility, as gleaned from the
following:
 Q And if the stab wound was fatal, how long could have he [sic] lived after the infliction of the
wound?
A It would be very very difficult to give the duration of survival because different individual[s]
would have different types of survival. Others would [live] for five minutes and others
would survive for at least... in shorter time.
Q But five minutes doctor would be a long time already. It could be the survival time of a
person who has a strong constitution. Do you agree with me?
A No, sir. In this particular case considering that the involvement here of the heart is
the left ventricle which is a very thick portion of the heart, I dont think he would
die in less than five minutes because the thick portion of the heart serves as a
sealer once the instrument is pulled out, the tendency of the thick muscle is to
close the injury so there is a much longer time for survival. [31] (Underscoring
supplied.)

Second Issue: Partiality of the Trial Judge

Appellant declares that the trial judge was biased against him, for propounding
questions that were well within the prerogative of the prosecution to explore and
ask. More pointedly, appellant alleges that the trial judge took over from the prosecution
and asked questions in a leading manner,[32] interrupted the cross-examination to help the
witness give answers favorable to the prosecution,[33] and asked questions which
pertained to matters of opinion and allusions of bad moral character, which could not be
objected to by defense counsel, because they have been ventiliated by the judge
himself.[34] To substantiate the alleged bias and prejudice of the judge, appellant in his
brief cited several pages from the transcript of stenographic notes. [35]
The allegation of bias and prejudice is not well-taken. It is a judges prerogative and
duty to ask clarificatory questions to ferret out the truth. [36] On the whole, the Court finds
that the questions propounded by the judge were merely clarificatory in nature. Questions
which merely clear up dubious points and bring out additional relevant evidence are within
judicial prerogative. Moreover, jurisprudence teaches that allegations of bias on the part
of the trial court should be received with caution, especially when the queries by the judge
did not prejudice the accused. The propriety of a judges queries is determined not
necessarily by their quantity but by their quality and, in any event, by the test of whether
the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning. In this case, appellant failed to
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the questions propounded by the trial judge. In
fact, even if all such questions and the answers thereto were eliminated, appellant would
still be convicted.
As correctly observed by the solicitor general, there was no showing that the judge
had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case at bar. He is
therefore presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner [that] preserve[s] the ideal
of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due process (Mateo,
Jr. vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18).[37] That the trial judge believed the evidence of the
prosecution more than that of the defense, does not indicate that he was biased. He
simply accorded greater credibility to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses than to
that of the accused.[38]

Alibi

Appellants defense of alibi and denial is unavailing. For the defense of alibi to
prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time the
crime was committed, but that it was likewise physically impossible for him to be at
the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime.[39] This the appellant miserably failed to
do. Appellant contends that he was then asleep in his house at the time of the
incident. This was supported by his mother who stated that he was asleep from 9:00 p.m.
to 6:00 a.m. the next day[40] and by Rosemarie Malikdem who said that she visited the
accused on the night of May 24, 1993 to counsel him, which was her task in
the Samahamg Magkakapitbahay.[41] Appellant failed to demonstrate, however, the
distance between the crime scene and his house. Indeed, he testified that his house was
near the crime scene. In any event, this defense cannot overturn the clear and positive
testimony of the credible eyewitnesses who located appellant at the locus criminis and
identified him as the assailant.[42]

Aggravating Circumstances

The Court agrees with the trial court that appellant is guilty of murder for the death of
Antonio Dometita. We likewise agree that the prosecution was unable to prove the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. For this circumstance to be
appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of the
following elements: 1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, 2) an
act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination, and 3) a sufficient lapse of
time between determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.[43] These requisites were never established by the prosecution.
On the other hand, we disagree with the trial court that the killing was qualified by
abuse of superior strength. To properly appreciate the aggravating circumstance of abuse
of superior strength, the prosecution must prove that the assailant purposely used
excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked.[44] The prosecution did not demonstrate that there was a marked difference in
the stature and build of the victim and the appellant which would have precluded an
appropriate defense from the victim. Not even the use of a bladed instrument would
constitute abuse of superior strength if the victim was adequately prepared to face an
attack, or if he was obviously physically superior to the assailant.
Nonetheless, we hold that the killing was qualified by treachery. Treachery is
committed when two conditions concur, namely, that the means, methods, and forms of
execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate[;] and that such means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person. [45] These requisites
were evidently present in this case when the accused appeared from nowhere and swiftly
and unexpectedly stabbed the victim just as he was bidding goodbye to his friend, Witness
Velasco. Said action rendered it difficult for the victim to defend himself. The presence of
defense wounds does not negate treachery because, as testified to by Velasco, the first
stab, fatal as it was, was inflicted on the chest. The incised wounds in the arms were
inflicted when the victim was already rendered defenseless.

Damages

The trial court awarded indemnity and actual and moral damages to the heirs of the
victim. We sustain the award of indemnity in the amount of P50,000, but we cannot do
the same for the actual and moral damages which must be supported by proof. In this
case, the trial court did not state any evidentiary basis for this award. We have examined
the records, but we failed to find any, either.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision
is AFFIRMED,[46] but the award of actual and moral damages is DELETED for lack of
factual basis. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 147764. January 16, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANILO CUETO y

CUETO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Accused-appellant Danilo Cueto y Cueto was charged with murder in an

information which reads:
[1]

That on or about July 16, 1997, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with
treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault, and use personal violence upon
one EDUARDO ANDAL y MARTINEZ by then and there shooting the latter with a
handgun hitting him on the lower portion of his stomach, thereby inflicting upon the
said EDUARDO ANDAL y MARTINEZ a mortal gunshot wound which was the
direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned. Trial on the merits

then ensued.
Accused-appellant and the victim Eduardo Andal were neighbors on Madre
Peria Street, San Andres Bukid, Manila, their houses being only ten (10) meters
apart. A few days prior to the incident, a certain Boy Zapanta filed a complaint
against accused-appellant for alleged gun-toting. Eduardo Andal was tasked to
serve the summons on accused-appellant, which the latter resented.
At around 10:00 in the evening of July 16, 1997, an ambulance passed by
and accused-appellant was allegedly heard shouting at the ambulance
driver, Maghintay ka diyan, may isasakay ako diyan. At about the same time,
Eduardo went out of his house to see if the flooded street was passable
considering that it rained hard that night. Eduardo and his family planned to
have a late dinner with their house guest, whose car was parked inside their
garage.
Upon reaching the corner of Madre Peria and Marmol Streets, accused-
appellant accosted Eduardo from behind and angrily uttered, Putang ina mo,
wala kang kwentang tao. Before Eduardo could react, accused-appellant shot
him on the upper left thigh. Eduardos son tried to confront accused-appellant
but stopped on his tracks when the latter pointed his gun at him and said, Isa
ka pa. Accused-appellant then casually walked away.
Eduardo died in the hospital. Dr. Jaime Rodrigo L. Leal, PNP Medico-Legal
Officer, conducted the autopsy and found that the cause of death was
hemorrhage as a result of gunshot wound, trunk. [2]

Accused-appellant went into hiding for two years. On September 28, 1999,
Eduardos widow, Teresita, accidentally saw accused-appellant in a sing-along
club somewhere in Manila and immediately caused his arrest.
Accused-appellant interposed self-defense. He averred that while he was
inside his house at 11:00 in the evening of July 16, 1997, an allegedly drunk
Eduardo loudly knocked at the door and shouted invectives at him. He went out
of his house and confronted the victim. A heated argument ensued and they
cursed each other. At this point, Eduardo drew a gun from the right side of his
waist. Accused-appellant grappled for possession of the gun and, in the
ensuing struggle, the gun accidentally fired hitting the lower portion of Eduardos
stomach.
Fearful that Eduardos relatives might exact revenge, accused-appellant
moved his family to his parents residence in Singalong, Manila, while he hid in
different houses of his friends.
The trial court lent credence to the prosecutions version of the incident and
rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
[3]

Wherefore, accused Danilo Cueto y Cueto is hereby convicted of the crime of murder
without any aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances, and sentenced to
suffer reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay
the costs. The accused is further ordered to pay the legal heirs of the victim actual and
moral damages in the respective sums of P10,500.00 and P400,000.00 and
compensation for the loss of the life of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00 with
interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from this date until fully paid.

Aggrieved, accused-appellant interposed the instant appeal, raising the

following errors:
I. The trial court erred in totally discarding the claim of legitimate self-defense interposed
by the accused;
II. The trial court overlooked or misappreciated certain documents, facts and
circumstances which, if considered, would have altered the outcome of the case:
 III. Flight as an admission of guilt if reasonably explained should not be taken against
the accused;
IV. Prosecution eyewitnesses were not at the scene of the incident when the complained
act was committed;
V. The trial court exhibited manifest bias and hostility against the accused by acting as
the judge, prosecutor and executioner at the same time in a despotic and arbitrary
manner;
VI. Arbitrary and capricious order of the court compelling the newly appointed
counsels de oficio to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses on short notice grossly
violated the right of the accused to due process; and
VII. Prosecution witnesses incurred serious contradictions and manifestly false
assertions which pose a grave challenge on their credibility.[4]

Accused-appellant assails the trial court for giving credence to the

prosecutions evidence and disregarding his claim of self-defense.
Where the accused owns up to killing the victim in self-defense, the burden
of evidence shifts to him. He must show by clear and convincing evidence that
he indeed acted in self-defense. To prove self-defense, the accused must show
with clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor;
(2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he employed
reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression. Self-defense, like alibi, is
a defense which can easily be concocted. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction
that once an accused had admitted that he inflicted the fatal injuries on the
deceased, it was incumbent upon him, in order to avoid criminal liability, to
prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him with clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence. [5]

In stressing his plea of self-defense, accused-appellant reiterates the

following points:
1. That the victim was drunk at the time of the commission of the complained act as
evidenced by the medico-legal report (Exhibit 1 or K);
2. That the downward trajectory of the bullet which hit the upper thigh of the victim is
consistent with the theory of the defense that there was a scuffle for the possession
of the gun before it accidentally went off;
3. That the incident happened in front of the house of the accused at an unholy hour of
11:30 in the evening;
4. That the victim was the holder of a license to possess a .357 cal. Rossi revolver
(Exhibit 3);
5. That the victim had a permit to carry the said firearm outside of his residence and said
permit has not yet expired when the shooting incident occurred (Exhibit 4); and
6. That the accused is not the holder of any license to possess firearm (Exhibits 5 and
I).
 We are not convinced that Eduardo is the unlawful aggressor just because
he was drunk at the time of the incident. The mere fact that Eduardo was drunk
cannot constitute proof that he committed unlawful aggression against
accused-appellant.
For one to be considered the unlawful aggressor, he must be shown to have
exhibited external acts clearly showing his intent to cause and commit harm to
the other. In the case at bar, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses belied
any act of aggression on the part of the victim. It was established that at the
time of the incident, the victim was unarmed and clearly had no idea of the
impending attack on his person.
In the same vein, the trajectory of the bullet which hit the upper thigh of the
victim is not proof that the protagonists initially grappled for possession of the
weapon before it went off. At any rate, even if indeed the parties initially
engaged in a scuffle prior to the shooting, standing alone, such fact does not
prove that Eduardo was the unlawful aggressor.
Likewise, accused-appellants contention that he could not have been the
aggressor because the incident happened in front of his house does not prove
that it was Eduardo who was the aggressor. On the contrary, the same is also
consistent with the theory that it was accused-appellant who accosted Eduardo
in front of his house when the latter passed by.
Neither can it be said that since Eduardo was licensed to possess and had
a permit to carry a gun, it follows that he was the unlawful aggressor. It must be
considered that in this case, the ownership of the weapon used in the shooting
was not established as Eduardos or even that of accused-appellant. All that
was established was that a gun was used to kill Eduardo.
The proliferation of unlicensed firearms has become pervasive and it is of
judicial notice that most firearms used in the commission of crimes are usually
unlicensed.
All in all, accused-appellant failed to establish the element of unlawful
aggression. In self-defense, unlawful aggression is an indispensable
element. Without unlawful aggression, there is no need to discuss the rest of
the elements.
Admittedly, there were contradictions between Teresita Andals and
Ephraim Andals testimonies in open court and their statements before the
police officers. Nevertheless, contradictions between a witness affidavit and his
testimony in open court are not unusual because an affidavit, being taken ex
parte, is often incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions
and inquiries. An affidavit is not a complete reproduction of what the declarant
has in mind because it is generally prepared by the administering officer and
the affiant simply signs it after it has been read to him. In any case, open court
[6]

declarations take precedence over written affidavits in the hierarchy of

evidence. Unlike written statements, there is flexibility on the part of the
[7]

questioner to adapt his questions to elicit the desired answer in order to ferret
out the truth. In addition, the credibility of the testimony as well as of the one
testifying is better assessed by the trial court.
As to who between the prosecution and the defense witnesses are to be
believed, the trial courts assessment enjoys a badge of respect for the reason
that the trial court has the advantage of observing the demeanor of the
witnesses as they testify, unless found to be clearly arbitrary or unfounded. The
rationale for this doctrine, as explained in People v. Cayabyab, is that the trial
judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication
that will determine the guilt and innocence of the accused. That line may not be
discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal records by the reviewing
court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth or
expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the
sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer
or the forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if tears were
shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned
innocence. Only the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of
his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned verdict. [8]

Hence, well-settled is the rule that the findings of facts and assessment of
credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court because of its unique
position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied
to the appellate courts. Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush
of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the
scant or full realization of an oath all of which are useful aids for an accurate
determination of a witness honesty and sincerity. The trial courts findings are
accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance
of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or
misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the results of the
case. [9]

Accused-appellant implies that the trial court might have overlooked or

misappreciated some circumstances which might cast doubt on the credibility
of prosecution witnesses. He claims that the prosecution eyewitnesses were
not at the scene of the incident at the time of the shooting. Accused-appellant
further argues that if Eduardos reason for going out of the house was to check
whether the streets were passable to motor vehicles, then they could have
simply peeped out of the window. Finally, accused-appellant submits that if he
were to assassinate someone in a treacherous manner, he would not shoot the
man frontally and in front of his house.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, accused-appellant still has to rely on the
strength of his own evidence, and not on the weakness of the prosecution for
even if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused admitted the
killing. Precisely because he has to rely on the strength of his evidence,
[10]

accused-appellants admission that he shot Eduardo would render immaterial

his submission that the prosecution eyewitnesses were not at the scene of the
incident when it happened.
Nevertheless, even if the points raised by accused-appellant are
considered, they can hardly affect the credibility of the prosecution
eyewitnesses especially since the trial court assessed the testimonies of
Teresita and Ephraim, the main eyewitnesses, as positive, straightforward and
plausible both of whom positively identified the accused as the one who gunned
down the victim. [11]

Accused-appellants contention that the trial judge exhibited manifest bias

and hostility against him is likewise without basis. A reading of the stenographic
notes reveals that the trial judge was only trying to clarify certain matters relative
to the testimony of Gio Carlo Cueto, accused-appellants son. In so doing, the
trial judge was also testing Gio Carlos credibility. In fact, he focused his
questions on what Gio Carlo supposedly witnessed and on his knowledge of
accused-appellants whereabouts when he was supposedly in
hiding. Regardless, the questions asked were not necessarily favorable to the
prosecution, contrary to accused-appellants contention, as Gio Carlo was
consistent in his testimony that he witnessed the incident and that accused-
appellant went into hiding because of perceived danger to his person and his
family.
Likewise, there is nothing arbitrary or capricious when the trial court ordered
counsel de oficio to cross-examine Teresita and Ephraim immediately after
their respective direct examinations. A reading of the transcripts of
stenographic notes shows that the questions propounded by counsel de
oficio during the cross-examination were sufficiently effective, meaning, they
were reasonable under the circumstances. In the case of Teresitas cross-
[12]

examination, the counsel de oficio even manifested his observation that there
was an inconsistency between her testimony and her sworn
statement. Nonetheless, the cross-examination conducted on Ephraim more
[13]

than made up for whatever perceived deficiency there might have been in
Teresitas cross-examination. If accused-appellant, through his counsel of
[14]
record, felt prejudiced by the order of the trial judge for counsel de oficio to
cross-examine Teresita and Ephraim in the absence of the counsel of record,
then he could have asked the trial court to recall Teresita and Ephraim for
further cross-examination.
The trial court held that accused-appellants flight was the most telling
indication of his guilt. Thus, it brushed aside accused-appellants claim of self-
defense when it stated, thus:

The accuseds claim of self-defense is unworthy of serious consideration and

credence. If his assertion were true it would have been natural for him to voluntarily
surrender and turn over the victims gun to the police instead of fleeing and hiding for
almost two years since the shooting incident. The flight of the accused is significative
of his guilt.
[15]

In criminal law, flight means the act of evading the course of justice by
voluntarily withdrawing oneself to avoid arrest or detention or the institution or
continuance of criminal proceedings. Flight, in jurisprudence, has always been
a strong indication of guilt, betraying a desire to evade responsibility. [16]

In the matter of damages, we affirm the award of civil indemnity in the

amount of P50,000.00. As regards the actual damages, it appears that the trial
court only awarded P10,500.00 when the prosecution was able to substantiate
with receipts the amount of P40,000.00 representing funeral services and
P10,500.00 as interment fee. The award for actual damages is therefore
increased to P50,500.00. However, the award of P400,000.00 as moral
damages is deemed excessive and not in accord with prevailing
jurisprudence. The amount of P50,000.00 is deemed reasonable. It must be
stressed that the purpose of the award of moral damages is not to enrich the
heirs of the victim but to compensate them for the injuries to their feelings. [17]

WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 16, 2000 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 18 in Criminal Case No. 98-165422 finding accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the heirs of
Eduardo Andal the sums of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,500.00 as actual
damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 140544. December 7, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELMER DAMITAN

Y MANTAWEL, defendant-appellant.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

In self-defense, the basic rule that the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies on the
prosecution is reversed and the burden of proof is shifted to the accused to prove the elements of
his defense. It then becomes incumbent upon him to rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution, for even if the latter were weak, it could
not be disbelieved after he had admitted the killing. [1]

The Case

This is an appeal from the Decision[2] dated 14 September 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of
Malaybalay, Branch 8, in Criminal Case No. 8965-98 finding Elmer Damitan y Mantawel guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

The Charge

On 15 June 1998, Elmer Damitan y Mantawel was charged in an Information[3] for the crime
of Murder which reads:

That on or about the 27th day of April 1998, in the morning, at Sitio Likoliko,
Barangay Butong, Municipality of Quezon, Province of Bukidnon, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
to kill by means of treachery, armed with a sharp bladed weapon, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and stab LEON CAHAPON, SR.,
inflicting upon the latter mortal injuries which caused the instantaneous death of
LEON CAHAPON, SR., to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of LEON
CAHAPON, SR. in such amount as may be allowed by law.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. 7659.

Arraignment and Plea

Upon arraignment, accused Damitan, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. [4] Thereafter,
trial ensued.

The Trial

The prosecution presented Conrado Sumin-ao, Junine Cahapon and Trinidad Cahapon as
witnesses. The defense presented as its sole witness accused Damitan himself who admitted having
stabbed the victim Cahapon but invoked the justifying circumstance of self-defense.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented as its first witness Conrado Sumin-ao, 61 years old, a farmer and a
datu chieftain of the Manobo tribe and resident of Butong, Quezon, Bukidnon.[5] He testified that
on 27 April 1998, at around five oclock in the morning, he was at the barrio hall in Butong with
the victim Leon Cahapon, a purok leader in the sitio. They had agreed the day before to meet at
the barrio hall to transfer the basketball court. [6] Cahapons grandson Junine, who was riding a
horse, arrived at the barrio hall and asked his grandfather to fix the rope of the horse. While victim
Cahapon was fixing the rope of the horse, accused Damitan arrived and suddenly stabbed Cahapon
twice with a hunting knife about ten (10) inches long.[7]
Witness Sumin-ao was more or less one (1) meter away from the victim when the stabbing
incident took place. He saw the first strike hit the victims right breast and the second hit the lower
portion of the first stab wound. Witness Sumin-ao testified that the strike of Elmer came from
behind towards the front of Cahapon.[8] When victim
Cahapon fell down after the first stabbing, witness Sumin-ao held him.Accused Damitan stabbed
victim Cahapon for the second time while the latter was already lying down. [9] Thereafter, Damitan
surrendered himself to the military detachment at BUSCO. Witness Sumin-ao went to the barangay
captain to report the incident.[10]
Prosecution witness Junine Cahapon, a 13-year old Grade 5 pupil and resident of Sitio
Likoliko, Butong, Quezon, Bukidnon is the grandson of the victim. [11] He testified that he went to
the barrio hall and requested his grandfather to fix the rope of his horse which was detached. He
was about one and a half (1) meters away from his grandfather when he saw accused Damitan stab
his grandfather at the right side of the breast.[12]
Trinidad Cahapon, the 60-year old widow of the victim, testified that she grieved upon
learning of her husbands death. Trinidad spent P27,000.00 for the burial expenses of her
husband. [13]
 The testimony of Dr. Romeo Egang, the attending physician, was dispensed with in view of
the admission by the defense of victim Cahapons Death Certificate as proof of the fact of death.
The cause of death was Cardio-respiratory arrest, blood loss due to stab wounds.[14]

Version of the Defense

Accused Damitan admitted that he stabbed victim Cahapon but claimed that he acted in self-
defense. Thereafter, he went to the military detachment at BUSCO,
Butong, Quezon, Bukidnon to surrender. [15]

Accused Damitan testified that on 25 April 1998, at four oclock in the afternoon, while he was
cooking supper at their yard, he saw the victims wife shooing away his chickens to the house of
the victim. He told her that the chickens belonged to him and in fact one of the chickens had a tie
on its leg. On 26 April 1998, at two oclock in the afternoon, accused Damitan saw victim Cahapon
catch his chicken.This prompted accused Damitan to see Datu Sumin-ao to complain against
victim Cahapon who became angry and threatened the accused.
On 27 April 1998, at five oclock in the morning, victim Cahapon went to Damitans house and,
in a very harsh tone, challenged the accused to go down from his house. While accused Damitan
was going down the third step of the ladder, victim Cahapon boxed him twice, causing him to fall
on his back. Cahapon knelt on Damitans belly and tried to stab the latter with a knife. Damitan
evaded the strike andwas able to wrest the knife from Cahapon. Then, Cahapon with his two hands
choked Damitan who lost consciousness. Damitan did not realize that he had stabbed Cahapon
twice until the latter fell down. Damitan ran away towards the military detachment at BUSCO to
surrender.[16] On cross-examination, Damitan testified that he used the knife of Cahapon to stab the
latter.[17]

Trial Courts Ruling

On 14 September 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused Damitan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Elmer Damitan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and (sic) defined and penalized under the pertinent
provisions of Republic Act No. 7659, and there being no ordinary aggravating nor
mitigating circumstances present, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs of his victim Leon Cahapon the sum
of P50,000.00.

The Issues
 Hence, the present appeal. Accused-appellant Damitan raised the following assignment of
errors:
I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE DEFENSE

INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER.
III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER ON THE PART OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

The Courts Ruling

We find the appeal without merit.

In the first assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court failed to appreciate the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. He avers that the elements of self-defense are present. He
claims that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim Cahapon. It was Cahapon who
called him in a very harsh tone and challenged him to go down from his house. When appellant
was going down the ladder, Cahapon allegedly boxed him. Thereafter, Cahapon tried to stab him
with a knife but he was able to disarm Cahapon and then they struggled. Appellant further argues
that the knife belonged to the victim and he merely prevented or repelled the attack against his
person.
We uphold the trial courts rejection of appellants plea of self-defense.
When the accused admits killing a person but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence
shifts to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence the elements of his defense. [18] However,
appellants version of the incident was uncorroborated. His bare and self-serving assertions cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the two (2) principal witnesses of the
prosecution.[19] There was no evidence to indicate that the prosecution witnesses were moved by
improper motive to testify against the appellant. Hence, the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are entitled to full faith and credit. The rule is settled that factual findings of the trial
court are accorded great respect since the trial court is in a much better position than an appellate
court to properly evaluate the evidence and observe directly the witnesses deportment and manner
of testifying.[20] The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
there is no reason to depart therefrom.
 As found by the trial court and this Court, appellant Damitan went to the barrio hall and
suddenly stabbed victim Cahapon from behind. He was clearly identified by prosecution witnesses
Sumin-ao and Junine who were very near the victim. Appellant was likewise not a stranger to the
two (2) prosecution witnesses. Sumin-ao knew appellant as a member of the same Manobo tribe
of which Sumin-ao is the datu chieftain.[21] Appellant was also a neighbor of prosecution witness
Junine whose house is about thirty-five (35) meters from the house of appellant.[22] Junine saw
appellant coming from the latters house and walking towards the barrio hall. [23] Appellant,
without uttering a word, suddenly stabbed victim Cahapon at the right portion of his breast. The
first strike came from behind while victim Cahapon was facing the horse and fixing the rope. Then,
appellant stabbed victim Cahapon for the second time while the latter was lying down.
Self-defense as a justifying circumstance must satisfy the following requirements: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused or
the person defending himself.[24] The absence of unlawful aggression negates the existence of self-
defense.[25] Here, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. To constitute
aggression, the person attacked must face a real threat to his life and the peril sought to be avoided
is imminent and actual, not imaginary.[26]The victim was facing the horse and fixing its rope when
appellant attacked him. Indeed, there was no real danger to appellants life or personal safety.
It is difficult to believe appellants claim that there was a scuffle between him and the victim
Cahapon after Cahapon had boxed appellant while the latter was going down the ladder. There
were no bruises, contusions or marks on the bodies of either of them.
Moreover, the presence of two (2) fatal stab wounds on the breast of victim Cahapon negates
self-defense. The victim was stabbed by appellant not once but twice. The first hit the right breast
of the victim while he was facing the horse and fixing its rope, unaware of the deadly attack from
behind. The second stab wound was inflicted while the victim was already lying down and
completely defenseless.The nature, location and number of wounds inflicted by the accused on the
victim belie and negate the claim of self-defense. It is a recognized principle that the nature and
number of wounds inflicted on the victim are important indicia to disprove a plea of self-
defense.[27]
On the second assigned error, appellant argues that the mere fact the victim was hit at the back
is not enough to constitute treachery. Appellant insists that it was the victim Cahapon who
provoked him when Cahapon challenged him to go down from his house. Appellant contends that
if ever he is found guilty, he should only be liable for the crime of Homicide and not Murder.
We are not persuaded.
The position and manner of the attack on the victim Cahapon clearly indicate the presence of
treachery. Appellant arrived at the barrio hall and, without a word of warning, suddenly stabbed
Cahapon twice. Cahapon was then fixing the rope of the horse of his grandson and facing the horse
when appellant stabbed him from behind. Thereafter, while the victim was already lying down,
appellant stabbed him for the second time.
True, the stab wounds were frontal, i.e., at the right portion of the breast. However, the
evidence clearly established that appellant stabbed Cahapon from behind. Witness Sumin-ao
testified as follows:
 Q Now at what point in time wherein he was stabbed by Elmer Damitan while fixing the rope of the
horse or before that time?
A He was stabbed while he was fixing the rope of the horse.
Q So when he was fixing the rope therefore, he was facing the horse?
A Yes, maam.
Q And then this Elmer Damitan from where did he come wherein he stabbed Leon Cahapon?
A From his house.
Q To the place where Leon Cahapon was stabbed how far is the house of Elmer Damitan?
A More or less fifteen (15) meters.
Q So that, therefore, Datu Sumin-ao, when Leon Cahapon was stabbed by Elmer Damitan his back
was facing Elmer Damitan?
A Yes, maam.
Q Now how about you how far were you from Leon Cahapon when he was stabbed by Elmer
Damitan?
A More or less one (1) meter.
Q Now were you facing each other?
A We were side by side.
Q Now how many times did Elmer Damitan stab Leon Cahapon?
A Twice.
Q Now the first stab of Elmer Damitan was Leon Cahapon hit?
A Yes, maam
Q Where was he hit?
A Here. (Witness, pointing to his right breast).
Q How about the second hit where was he hit?
A On the lower portion of the first hit.
Q Now when this Leon Cahapon, Datu Sumin-ao, was stabbed by Elmer Damitan you said that his
back was facing Elmer Damitan and then why is it that he was stabbed in front of his breast or
chest?
A Because the strike of Elmer came from behind towards the front of Leon. [28]
Verily, the manner of attack by appellant was sudden and unexpected leaving the victim
Cahapon defenseless. By positioning himself at the back of the victim and suddenly stabbing the
latter from behind, appellant employed means and methods which tended directly and specially to
insure the execution of the crime, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim
might make.[29] And by stabbing the victim a second time when the victim was already lying down,
appellant employed means to insure or afford impunity.
 Treachery qualified the killing of Cahapon to murder and pursuant to Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, the penalty for the crime of Murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. There being no aggravating circumstance, the trial court was correct in
sentencing appellant Damitan to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On the third assigned error, appellant contends that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender should have been appreciated by the trial court. He argues that after the stabbing incident,
he went to the military detachment at BUSCO to voluntarily surrender.
We agree that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is present in this case.
Appellant immediately surrendered himself to the authorities and this fact is not disputed by the
prosecution. However, since the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed upon appellant is an
indivisible penalty,[30] the same shall be applied regardless of any mitigating circumstance pursuant
to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.[31]
Finally, an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review and it
becomes the duty of the Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment, whether it is made
the subject of an assignment of error or not. [32] In finding appellant Damitan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, the trial court properly awarded the heirs of the victim
the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. The rule is settled that civil indemnity ex delicto can
be awarded forthwith to the heirs of the victim by proof alone of such fact of death. [33] The trial
court was likewise correct in not awarding actual damages there being no proof presented to justify
such an award, except the bare testimony of the victim's widow that she spent P27,000.00 as burial
expenses.[34] However, we find the award of P50,000.00 as moral damages proper considering that
the victims heir suffered grief. Thus, in line with prevailing jurisprudence, [35] the award
of P50,000.00 as moral damages is granted to the heirs of the victim Leon Cahapon, Sr.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that appellant Elmer Damitan y Mantawel is further ordered to pay the heirs of
the victim Leon Cahapon, Sr. the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 171348

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
REYES, JJ.

LARRY ERGUIZA, Promulgated:

Accused-Appellant. November 26, 2008
x----------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

The Court is confronted with another case of rape. The victim, a 13-year-old
girl. And although the Court may be moved by compassion and sympathy, the
Court, as a court of law, is duty-bound to apply the law. Basic is the rule that for
conviction of a crime, the evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt --
conviction with moral certainty.

For review before this Court is the November 18, 2005 Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR H. C. No. 00763 which affirmed with
modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos
City, Pangasinan, Branch 57, finding Larry Erguiza (appellant) guilty of one count of
rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Information, dated April 10, 2000, in Criminal Case No. SCC 3282 reads
as follows:

That on or about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of January 5, 2000, at the

back of the Bical Norte Elementary School, municipality of Bayambang,
province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a kitchen knife,
by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with AAA [3], a minor
of 13 years old, against her will and consent and to her damage and
prejudice.[4]

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.[5] Thereafter trial ensued.

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: private complainant (AAA), her
mother BBB and father CCC, and Dr. James Sison. The defense presented five
witnesses, namely: Joy Agbuya, Juanito Macaraeg, Juanita Angeles, Albina Erguiza,
and appellant.
On November 27, 2000, the RTC found appellant guilty of the crime of rape,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

In view whereof, the Court finds the accused LARRY C. ERGUIZA guilty of
RAPE under Article 266-a paragraph 1(a) in relation to Article 266-b of
R.A. 8353 and R.A. 7659 and sentences (sic) to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the offended party, AAA P50,000 as civil
indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages,
to give support to AAA's offspring and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[6]

On appeal, the CA aptly summarized the respective versions of the parties, based
on the evidence presented before the trial court, thus:

PROSECUTION'S VERSION:

On January 5, 2000, at around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, AAA, a

thirteen-year old first year high school student, together with her
friends, siblings Joy and Ricky Agbuya, went to the mango orchard
located at the back of ZZZ Elementary School to gather fallen
mangoes.[7] When they were bound for home at around 5:00 o'clock in
the afternoon, AAAs short pants got hooked on the fence. AAA asked
Joy and Ricky to wait for her but they ran away and left her.[8]
While AAA was trying to unhook her short pants, Larry suddenly grabbed
and pulled her. Poking a knife at her neck, Larry threatened to hurt her if
she would make a noise.[9]

Accused-appellant dragged AAA towards a place where a tamarind tree

and other thorny plants grow. Then Larry removed his maong pants and
forced AAA to lie down on the grassy ground. Thereafter, he removed
her short pants and panty, mounted himself on top of her and inserted
his penis into her private parts and made push and pull movements. He
likewise raised AAAs sando and mashed her breast. AAA felt pain when
accused-appellant entered her and she felt something sticky in her
private part after Larry made the push and pull movements.[10]

Larry told AAA not to tell anybody about the incident otherwise he would
kill her and all the members of her family and then he ran away.[11]

AAA lingered for a while at the place and kept crying. Having spent her
tears, she wore her panty and short pants and proceeded to the adjacent
store of her Aunt Beth who was asleep. After staying for some time at
the store, AAA decided to come (sic) home. Upon reaching home, she
directly went to bed. Fearing Larry's threat, AAA kept mum on the
incident.[12]
On April 7, 2000, BBB brought her daughter AAA to her grandmother
(BBB's mother), a hilot residing in XXX, Tarlac, to consult her on the
unusual palpitation on the mid-portion of AAA's throat and the absence
of her monthly period.[13] After examining AAA, her grandmother told
BBB that her daughter was pregnant.

BBB asked AAA who was the father of her unborn child but AAA refused
to talk. After much prodding, and in the presence of her Uncle, Rudy
Domingo, AAA finally revealed that she was raped by accused-
appellant.[14]
On April 8, 2000, AAA, accompanied by her mother and uncle, went to
the police headquarters in YYY, Pangasinan to report the
incident.[15] Then the police brought her to YYY DistrictHospital[16] where
Dr. James Sison, Medical Officer III of said hospital conducted the
examination on Michelle. Dr. Sison made the following findings:

Q. x x x No extragenital injuries noted. Complete

healed hymenal laceration 11:00 o'clock. x x x. In layman's term,
Dr. Sison found no physical injury from the breast, the body except the
genital area wherein he found a significant laceration complete (sic)
healed over 11:00 o'clock.[17] Dr. Sison also testified that a single sexual
intercourse could make a woman pregnant.

BBB testified that her daughter AAA stopped going to school after she
was raped and that no amount of money could bring back the lost
reputation of her daughter.

CCC (AAA's father), testified that on May 2, 2000, the family of accused-
appellant went to their house and initially offered P50,000 and later
P150,000; that in January 5, 2000, while they were repairing his house
for the wedding reception[18], Larry left at around 4:00 o'clock p.m.

DEFENSE'S VERSION

On January 5, 2000, Larry Erguiza helped in the repair of CCC's[19] house

from 8:00 o'clock in the morning up to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
When he reached home at around 5:00 pm, his
mother Albina Erguiza instructed him to fetch a hilot as his wife Josie was
already experiencing labor pains. He proceeded to fetch the hilot Juanita
Angeles and stayed in their house until his wife delivered a baby at
around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 6, 2000.[20]

Juanita Angeles corroborated Larry's testimony that he indeed fetched

her at around 5:10 pm on January 5, 2000 to attend to his wife who was
experiencing labor pains and who delivered a baby at about 3:00 a.m.
of January 6, 2000; and that Larry never left his wife's side until the
latter gave birth.

Albina, mother of the accused-appellant, testified that AAA is the

daughter of her balae Spouses CCC and BBB; that her son Larry, her
husband and two others left CCC and BBB's residence at about 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon on January 5, 2000; that she went to Spouses
CCC and BBB to talk about the charge of rape against her son; that
Spouses CCC and BBB were asking for P1,000,000.00 which was later
reduced to P250,000.00 and that she made a counter-offer
of P5,000.00.[21]

Joy Agbuya testified that she and AAA were at the mango orchard
of Juanito Macaraeg on January 5, 2000; that she never left AAA when
her short pants got hooked; that they went together to the store of
Auntie Beth where they parted.[22]

Juanito Macaraeg, the mango orchard caretaker, testified that the house
of Larry was a walking distance of about three minutes from the mango
orchard; that if one runs fast, it would only take a minute to reach his
house; and that he could not recall having seen Larry in the
orchard.[23] (Emphasis supplied)
 In its Decision dated November 18, 2005, the CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC, but modified the amount of the award of exemplary damages and costs as
follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing circumstances, the Decision of

the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos (Pangasinan), Branch 57
dated November 27, 2000 in Criminal Case No. SCC-3282
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Larry Erguiza is
held GUILTY of Rape and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the victim AAA P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages and to give support to AAAs offspring.

SO ORDERED.[24]

Hence, herein appeal.

In his appeal Brief,[25] appellant raises the following errors:

1. THE COURT A QUO GRAVLEY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE

INCREDIBLE, THUS UNBELIEVABLE TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT AAA.

2. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED

APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
PROSECTUION EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
 3. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT'S DEFENSE OF ALIBI CORROBORATED BY THE WITNESSES
PRESENTED BY THE DEFENSE.[26]

The appeal is meritorious. The prosecution's evidence does not pass the test
of moral certainty.

This Court has ruled that in the review of rape cases, the Court is guided by the
following precepts: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility, but it is
more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (b) the
complainant's testimony must be scrutinized with extreme caution since, by the
very nature of the crime, only two persons are normally involved; and (c) if the
complainant's testimony is convincingly credible, the accused may be convicted of
the crime.[27]
In the case at bar, the CA upheld the conclusion of the RTC in finding the
complainant credible, to wit:

The testimonies of victims who are young and of tender age, like AAA,
deserve full credence and should not be dismissed as mere fabrication
especially where they have absolutely no motive to testify against the
accused-appellant as in this case. Larry even admitted that AAA had no
ill motive for charging him with rape. The Supreme Court in
several cases, ruled that full credence is accorded the testimony of a rape
victim who has shown no ill motive to testify against the accused. This
being so, the trial court did not err in giving full credence to AAA's
testimony.[28]

This Court does not agree with the CA.

The Court is not unmindful of the general rule that findings of the trial court
regarding credibility of witnesses are accorded great respect and even finality on
appeal.[29]However, this principle does not preclude a reevaluation of the evidence
to determine whether material facts or circumstances have been overlooked or
misinterpreted by the trial court.[30] In the past, this Court has not hesitated to
reverse a judgment of conviction, where there were strong indications pointing to
the possibility that the rape charge was false.[31]
Generally, when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped,
she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. And so
long as her testimony meets the test of credibility and unless the same
is controverted by competent physical and testimonial evidence, the accused may
be convicted on the basis thereof.[32]

After a judicious examination of the records of the case, the Court finds that there
is testimonial evidence that contradicts the findings of the RTC and CA on the basis
of which no conviction beyond reasonable doubt could arise. It is
the unrebutted testimony of a credible defense witness. The testimony of
Joy Agbuya (Joy) casts doubt as to the possibility of rape having taken place as
narrated by complainant. In addition, the testimony of a disinterested defense
witness, Juanita Angeles (Juanita) corroborated the alibi of appellant.

Before dwelling on the testimonies of Juanita and Joy, the Court shall first scrutinize
the testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution and the defense.

Aside from the testimony of complainant, the prosecution presented the following
witnesses: Dr. James Sison, BBB, and CCC. The pertinent portions of their
testimonies may be summarized as follows:

Dr. James Sison testified that he conducted the medical examination of

complainant. His diagnosis was that there was a significant laceration completely
healed at the 11:00 o'clock position.[33] However, Dr. Sison testified that his
findings were not conclusive, but were rather suggestive that complainant was
raped. Furthermore, as to the question of paternity of the child of complainant,
Dr. Sison suggested doing a DNA match.[34]
BBB testified the she brought AAA to her grandmother, a hilot residing in
XXX, Tarlac, to consult her on the unusual palpitation on the mid-portion of
complainant's throat and the absence of her monthly period.[35] After examining
complainant, the hilot told BBB that her daughter was pregnant. AAA later revealed
that she was raped by appellant.[36]BBB further testified that she accompanied AAA
to the police headquarters in YYY, Pangasinan to report the incident.[37] Afterwards,
the police brought complainant to YYYDistrict Hospital[38] where Dr. James Sison,
Medical Officer III of said hospital, conducted the examination on complainant. On
cross-examination, BBB testified that the family of appellant offered her money to
settle the case.[39]

CCC, the father of AAA, was the lone rebuttal witness of the prosecution. In order
to rebut the allegation made by appellant's family that the present case was filed
because appellant's family did a poor job in preparing for the wedding
of CCC's daughter DDD and apellant's brother Carlito, CCC testified that on the
contrary, the wedding went smoothly.[40] CCC further claimed that the family of
appellant knelt before him crying and offered money to settle the
case.[41] Moreover, CCC testified that appellant left his house at 4:00
p.m. on January 5, 2000.

On the other hand, the defense presented four witnesses,

namely: Juanito Macaraeg (Macaraeg), Albina Erguiza (Albina), Juanita and Joy.

Macaraeg, the caretaker of the mango orchard, testified that he did not see
appellant on any occasion in the orchard.[42] More
specifically, Macaraeg emphasized that he did not see appellant on January 5,
2000.[43] However, on cross-examination, he testified that the house of appellant is
only a three-minute walk from the mango orchard and probably a minute if one
walks fast.[44]

Albina, the mother of appellant, testified that on January 5, 2000, she was with
appellant at the house of CCC and BBB preparing for the wedding of CCC's daughter
DDD and appellant's brother Carlito. She said that they left the house of CCC at
around 5:00 p.m.[45] Albina narrated that when they arrived home, at
around 5:02 or 5:03 p.m., she sent appellant to fetch a hilot, as the wife of
appellant was having some labor pains.[46] She said that appellant and
the hilot arrived at around 5:30 p.m.[47] According to Albinaappellant never left
their house.[48]

On the day of the wedding, Albina testified that she had an altercation with BBB
regarding the bills and that they never resolved their quarrel.[49] She spoke to BBB
and CCC because she learned that they were falsely accusing appellant of raping
AAA.[50] After talking to BBB and CCC, she and her husband confronted appellant
and asked if he had raped complainant, which appellant denied. [51] Albina claimed
that CCC and BBB were demanding P1,000,000.00 and that they later reduced it
to P250,000.00.[52] Albina said that she offered P5,000.00 to BBB and CCC only to
preserve their relationship as in-laws and for peace.[53]

In sum, with the exception of the claim of AAA that she was raped by appellant,
other evidence presented by the prosecution did not identify appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime.
Moreover, the testimonies of the witnesses for both the prosecution and the
defense conflict on certain points, more notably the claim by BBB and CCC that the
family of appellant offered to settle the case. This, however, was denied by Albina,
who claimed that it was BBB and CCC who demanded P1,000,000.00.
The offer of compromise allegedly made by Albina is critical to the case at bar in
light of law and jurisprudence that an offer of compromise in a criminal case may
be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. [54] In the case at bar, the
offer of compromise was first testified to by BBB on cross-examination, to wit:

Q. Is it not a fact that there was an offer by you to the mother of the
accused that they pay you 1 million and you have reduced it
to P250,000.00?
 A. No, sir, it was they who were the ones offering for settlement, but we
never offer them any settlement, sir.[55]

On rebuttal, CCC corroborated the testimony of BBB that the family of appellant
offered to settle the case, to wit:

Q. And according to Larry Erguiza as well as his witnesses they told the
Honorable Court that you and your wife are demanding from
Larry Erguiza and his parents the amount of one million pesos so
that you will not file this case against the accused, what can you say
about that?
A. There is no truth about that, sir.

Q. And what is the truth about it?

A. It was they who went to my house, they even knelt before me crying
and they were offering money, sir.[56]

However, Albina, the mother of appellant, denied the foregoing allegations, to wit:

Q. What happened when you went to the house of BBB and CCC talking
with them about their problem of the alleged rape on AAA, their
daughter?
A. They were asking for a settlement price for one million pesos but we
have no money, sir.

Q. What did you do when they were asking one million pesos from you?
A. We told them that we do not have that money until they reduced the
price to P250,000.00 but we have no money because we are poor,
sir.
 Q. Were you around when BBB testified to the witness stand?
A. I was here, sir.

Q. Did you hear what BBB said that you were the one offering money?
A. Yes, sir, I was here and I heard that.

Q. What can you say to that allegation of BBB?

A. That is not true, sir. She was saying that we were the ones offering
money for one million to them but she was telling a lie, it was they
who were asking for one million pesos, sir.

Q. What is your proof that is was they who are demanding the amount
of one million and reduced that to two hundred fifty thousand
(P250,000.00)?
A. We already left because we cannot afford to give that much, sir.
Q. Aside from the fact that you do not have money, was there any reason
or what was your other reason in going there?
A. Our reason in talking to them was that when Larry said that he did not
commit the alleged rape and so we went there to talk to them so
that we could preserve our relationship as in-laws even if it is for the
sake of peace we could try our best to cope up even P5,000.00 just
for the sake of peace because our intention in going to their house
was to extract the truth, sir.[57]

On cross-examination, appellant gave the following statements:

 Q. Before the filing of this case with this Honorable Court, your parents
and you were pleading to the parents of AAA not to continue
anymore the case, is it not?
A. Yes, sir, so that the case will not be filed and our relationship will not
be destroyed, sir.

Q. In fact you asked your parents to do so, is it not?

A. No, sir. They were the ones who went to the house of AAA, sir.

Q. But the family of AAA did not agree to the pleadings of your parents
that the case be not filed anymore, is it not?
A. They will agree if we will pay then 1 million, but we do not have 1
million, sir.

Q. Did you offer them 1 million?

A. No, sir. They were the ones who told that to us.[58] (Emphasis Supplied)

The alleged offer of the parents of appellant to settle the case cannot be used
against appellant as evidence of his guilt. Appellant testified that he did not ask his
parents to settle the case. Moreover, appellant was not present when the offer to
settle was allegedly made.

An offer of compromise from an unauthorized person cannot amount to an

admission of the party himself.[59] Although the Court has held in some cases that
an attempt of the parents of the accused to settle the case is an implied admission
of guilt,[60] we believe that the better rule is that for a compromise to amount to an
implied admission of guilt, the accused should have been present or at least
authorized the proposed compromise.[61] Moreover, it has been held that where
the accused was not present at the time the offer for monetary consideration
was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for the
prosecution.[62]

In addition, the Court, in weighing the evidence presented, may give less weight to
the testimonies of Albina, on the one hand, and BBB and CCC, on the other, as they
are related to the appellant and the victim, respectively[63] Their testimonies
relating to the offer of settlement simply contradict each other. As a matter of fact,
even the lower courts did not consider the alleged offer of settlement in resolving
the case.

Thus, the Court now considers the testimonies of Juanita and Joy.

Testimony of Juanita Angeles

Juanita, a hilot, testified that appellant fetched her at around 5:10 in the afternoon
of January 5, 2000.[64] She asserted that they arrived at the house of appellant
at 5:30 p.m. She said that appellant's wife gave birth at dawn at 3:00
a.m. of January 6, 2000.[65] Juanita said that appellant was with her the entire time
and never left the house.[66]
Testimony of Joy Agbuya

For a better perspective on the testimony of Joy, it is necessary to repeat the

testimony of AAA. AAA testified that on January 5, 2000, she was accompanied by
12-year-old Joy and the latter's brother Ricky Agbuya (Ricky) to the mango orchard
at the back of the elementary school to pick fallen mangoes. Further, complainant
claims that she was left behind by Joy and Ricky when her shorts got hooked to the
fence and that while she was unhooking her pants from the fence, appellant
grabbed her and raped her.[67]

This was however contradicted by Joy, to wit:

Q. How many times did you go to the mango orchard
of Juanito Macaraeg?
A. Three (3) times, sir.

Q. When you usually go to the mango orchard of Juanito Macaraeg,

where did you met [sic] with AAA?
A. In their house, I dropped by her house, sir.

Q. Was there an occasion wherein you brought your brother Ricky

when you went with AAA to the mango orchard
of Juanito Macaraeg?
A. No, sir.

Q. Are we made to understand that Ricky, your brother did not go even
once to the mango orchard of Maning Macaraeg?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. According to AAA in her sworn statement she stated that in [sic]

January 5, 2000 you were with your brother Ricky and AAA in going
to the mango orchard, what can you say about that?
A. What she is saying is not true. I was not with my brother, sir. I did
not tug him along with me.

Q. It is also said by AAA that you left her behind in the mango orchard
when her pants was hooked, what can you say about that?
A. No, sir I waited for her.
 Q. Are we made to understand Madam Witness, that there was no
instance or never that happened that you left her in the mango
orchard alone?
A. No, sir, I waited for her and both of us went home together, sir.

Q. Going back to the occasion wherein you were with AAA, who were
with you in going back home?
A. Just the two (2) of us, sir.

Q. In your way home, where did you part or separate with each other?
A. In front of the store of auntie Beth, sir.[68]

xxxx

Q. Is AAA your bestfriend?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Since you said that AAA is your bestfriend was there an occasion
wherein she told you that she was raped?
A. None, sir.[69] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On cross-examination, Prosecutor Ely Reintar elicited the following statements

from Joy:

Q. In the year 2000, when was the last time that you talked to AAA?
A. April, sir.
 Q. After April, you did not talk to AAA anymore?
A. No more, sir.

Q. Your friendship was severed?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you please tell the Honorable Court why your friendship became
severed?
A. Because she quarreled with me, sir.

Q. And because you quarreled, that is the reason why you are now
testifying against her?
A. Yes, sir.[70]

On re-direct examination, Joy clarified, thus:

Q. Madam Witness, you said that you have a quarrel with the private
complainant, AAA, will you please tell this Honorable Court what
is the reason or cause of your quarrel with AAA?
A. Because they wanted me to say another statement that I left AAA
behind, sir.[71] (Emphasis supplied)

On re-cross examination, Joy gave the following answers to the questions of

Prosecutor Reintar:
 Q. You said that the reason for your quarrel is that they wanted you to
change your statement, that you left behind AAA, who are
those they, that you are referring to?

INTERPRETER
No answer.

Witness
I, sir.

PROS. REINTAR
Q. Who told you to change your statement that you left AAA behind?
A. Because they are saying that I will change my statement that I left
AAA but I did not sir.

Q. Who are these who are telling that?

A. They, sir.

Q. Will you please mention them?

A. BBB, only her, sir.[72]

The testimony of 12-year-old Joy makes it impossible for the appellant to have
raped AAA the way complainant narrated it, to wit:

Q. You try to understand clearly the question, Madam Witness, and may
I repeat that, at the time of the rape when according to you, you
were the one raped, where were Joy and Ricky Agbuya?
 A. They left ahead of me because my short pants was hooked at the
fence so I was left behind, sir.

Q. Were you able to remove the pants of yours at the fence?

A. I was removing it sir, when he suddenly grabbed me.

Q. And who is this person you are referring to as the one who grabbed
you?
A. Larry Erguiza, sir.[73]

Put simply, complainant could not have been raped because Joy waited for
complainant when the latters shorts got hooked to the fence and thereafter both
went home together.The Court finds no cogent reason for Joy to lie and say that
she had waited for complainant and that they both went home together. She had
nothing to gain for lying under oath.Moreover, the records are bereft of any
showing or claim that Joy was related to or was a close friend of appellant or his
family. On the contrary, Joy considers herself the best-friend and playmate of
complainant.[74]

When Prosecutor Reintar questioned her as to her understanding of the oath she
took, Joy answered, That I will swear to God, sir. x x x The truth,
sir.[75] Furthermore, Joy did not succumb to pressure even as she was being
conscientiously examined by Prosecutor Reintar. Joy boldly testified that BBB, the
mother of complainant, was forcing her to change her statement.

The testimony of Joy clearly lays down the following facts which are damaging to
the case of the prosecution: first, that Joy did not leave behind AAA when the
latters shorts got hooked to the fence; and secondly, that Joy and AAA left the
orchard, went home together and separated at their Aunt Beth's house, indicating
that no untoward incident, much less rape, was committed by appellant at the time
and place that complainant had testified on.

Necessarily, either Joy or AAA lied under oath. It was thus critical for the
prosecution to show that Joy gave false statements.
Unfortunately for AAA, the prosecution miserably failed to rebut Joys
testimony. Neither complainant nor Ricky, BBB or any other witness was called to
the witness stand to refute Joys testimony. True, it is up to the prosecution to
determine who to present as witnesses.[76] However, considering that the
testimony of Joy critically damaged the case of the prosecution, it behooved the
prosecution to present evidence to rebut the defense evidence. Witnesses such as
Ricky, AAA and BBB should have been presented by the prosecution to demolish
Joy's testimony. The testimony of Ricky is particularly significant, especially since
AAA claimed that he was with her and his sister Joy at the mango orchard on the
day of the alleged rape incident. The failure on the part of the prosecution to
present Ricky or AAA bolsters the defense evidence, that no rape happened on the
date and time claimed by AAA.

The prosecution presented CCC, the father of complainant, as it's lone rebuttal
witness.[77] However, the testimony of CCC covered facts and issues not related to
the testimony of Joy. The testimony of CCC merely rebutted the allegation made
by appellant's family that the present case was filed because appellant's family did
a poor job of preparing for the wedding of CCC's daughter DDD
and apellant's brother Carlito. To this, CCC testified that on the contrary, the
wedding went smoothly.[78] Furthermore, CCC claimed that the family of appellant
knelt before him crying and offered money to settle the case. [79] In addition, CCC
testified that appellant left his house at 4:00 p.m. on January 5, 2000. Thus, the
testimony of CCC did not in any way rebut the testimony of Joy.

Further, Joy testified that during the three times she went with AAA to the mango
orchard, the time was 1:00 p.m.[80] However, AAA testified that she went to the
mango orchard with Joy at 4:00 p.m.[81] The variance in the testimonies of Joy and
AAA as to the time they went to the mango orchard on the day of the alleged rape
incident may be disregarded as they are de minimis in nature and do not relate to
the commission of the crime. There is a common point uniting the testimonies of
both Joy and AAA; that is, that both referred to the day when AAAs short got
hooked to the fence.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that the variance between the testimonies of AAA
and Joy as to the time they were together at the mango orchard is an indicia that
AAA may have been raped by appellant on a different day, not on January 5, 2000,
to still impute to appellant the crime of rape is not plausible.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the exact date of the commission of the
crime of rape is extraneous to and is not an element of the offense, such that any
inconsistency or discrepancy as to the same is irrelevant and is not to be taken as a
ground for acquittal.[82] Such, however, finds no application to the case at bar. AAA
and Joy may differ in their testimonies as to the time they were at the mango
orchard, but there could be no mistake as to the actual day when AAA was
supposed to have been raped; it was the day when AAA's shorts got hooked to the
fence at the mango orchard.
The RTC and CA unwittingly brushed aside the testimonies of Juanita and Joy and
gave full credence to the testimony of AAA. As a matter of fact, their probative
weight were not considered or evaluated in the text of the lower courts' decision.

As mentioned earlier, the prosecution could have rebutted the testimony of Joy,
but for some reason or oversight, it chose not to do so.

Consequently, in view of the unrebutted testimony of Joy, appellants defense of

alibi and denial assumes considerable weight. It is at this point that the issue as to
the time that the rape was committed plays a significant factor in determining the
guilt or innocence of appellant. This Court must therefore address this issue for a
thorough evaluation of the case.
The Court takes note that Macaraeg, the caretaker of the orchard, testified that
appellant's house was only a minute away from the orchard if one would run.

As earlier mentioned, CCC testified that appellant left CCC's house at 4:00 p.m. on
January 5, 2000, contrary to the testimony of Albina that she and appellant left at
5:00 p.m. AAA declared that the alleged rape took place after 5:00 p.m.

Q. So at 4:00 o'clock you were at the house and you left and proceeded
at the back of the school to pick mangoes?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. That was already around 5:00 o'clock?

A. Yes, sir. I asked my companion Joy.

Q. What did you ask of her?

A. She was wearing a wristwatch and I asked Joy what time is it and
when I looked at her wristwatch, it was already 5:00 o'clock,
sir.[83] (Emphasis Supplied)

Moreover, on cross-examination, AAA gave the following statements, to wit:

Q. So it is almost 5:00 p.m. When you went to the mango orchard with
Joy Agbuya and Ricky Agbuya?
A. What I only know was that, it was already about 5:00 o'clock then, sir.

Q. How many minutes did you consume in getting mangoes?

 A. When we went there, we were not able to get some mango and
when I asked sir what was the time then and when I looked at the
wristwatch, it was already 5:00 o'clock, sir.[84](Emphasis Supplied)

The testimony of Joy makes it impossible for AAA to have been raped at 4:00
p.m. or 5:00 p.m. or any time thereafter since it was not rebutted that Joy never
left complainant at the mango orchard even when AAA's shorts got hooked to the
fence, and both went home together without any other untoward incident.

This Court is not unmindful of the doctrine that for alibi to succeed as a defense,
appellant must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at
another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical
impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.[85]

In the case at bar, although the orchard is just a minute away from the house
of appellant, in view of the testimony of the hilot Juanita that appellant was with
her from 5:10 p.m. and never left his house from that time until his wife gave birth
at 3:00 a.m.; and the testimony of Joy that she never left AAA in the orchard and
that they both went home together, the defense of alibi assumes significance or
strength when it is amply corroborated by a credible witness. [86] Thus, the Court
finds that appellant's alibi is substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.

What needs to be stressed is that a conviction in a criminal case must be supported

by proof beyond reasonable doubt -- moral certainty that the accused is
guilty.[87] The conflicting testimonies of Joy and complainant, and the testimony of
Juanita that corroborated appellants alibi preclude the Court from convicting
appellant of rape with moral certainty.

Faced with two conflicting versions, the Court is guided by

the equipoise rule.[88] Thus, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence
of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.[89] The
equipoise rule provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly
balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of
the accused.[90]

It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and
persuasion, so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable
conclusion.[91] What is required of it is to justify the conviction of the accused with
moral certainty.[92] Upon the prosecution's failure to meet this test, acquittal
becomes the constitutional duty of the Court, lest its mind be tortured with the
thought that it has imprisoned an innocent man for the rest of his life.[93]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November 18, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR H. C. No. 00763 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Larry Erguiza is ACQUITTED and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody,
unless he is being held for some other lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision

forthwith and to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of the
date appellant was actually released from confinement.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 157221 March 30, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
CESAR GALVEZ, Appellant.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

For review before this Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 18255
dated March 30, 2001, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Isabela,
Basilan finding the accused-appellant Cesar Galvez (Galvez), guilty of Murder, but modifying the
penalty of the RTC from a sentence of "seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day as
minimum to twenty (20) years as maximum" to reclusion perpetua.

The facts are as follows:

At around 11 o’clock in the evening of July 27, 1991, Danilo Perez, Rosalio Enojarda, Noel Cugal,
Ricardo Francisco and Wilfredo Rellios, took a break from making copra to eat leftover dinner inside
the copra kiln in the farm of Perez in Matarling, Lantawan, Basilan. When Enojarda stood up from
the circle where they were eating to drink water, shots rang out and Enojarda fell to the ground
shouting "Dan ya tupa comigo" (Dan, I am hit). The rest of the group took cover, crawling to different
directions. After the attack, Rellios reported the incident to the barangay captain and they brought
Enojarda’s dead body to his family.3

On May 28, 1992, an Information was filed against Cesar Galvez (Galvez), a member of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) for Murder, which reads:

That on or about the 27th day of July, 1991, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz. at
Matarling, Municipality of Lantawan, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above named accused,
armed with an M16 armalite rifle, with treachery and evident premeditation, and with intent to kill, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one Rosalio Enojarda
with the said M16 armalite rifle, thereby inflicting gunshot wound on the body of the latter which
caused his death.4

The prosecution presented evidence showing that: after Enojarda fell, the rest of the group took
cover and Rellios while in a crawling position, saw Galvez about 5 meters away holding an armalite
rifle and firing at their direction; Rellios also saw that Galvez had companions but did not recognize
them as well as the firearms they carried because they were approximately nine meters
away;5 Perez, also crawled and hid in the bushes about 5 meters away; when the firing stopped, one
of the attackers passed by about two meters from where Perez was hiding and because the moon
was bright, he recognized Galvez, his cousin, who was wearing a fatigue uniform and armed with an
armalite rifle; he also saw that Galvez had three armed companions but did not recognize them nor
the firearms they were carrying because they were about nine meters from Galvez. 6
Galvez put up denial and alibi as his defenses. He testified that he was staying at his father-in-law’s
house on July 27, 1991 and drank tuba at around 10:30 p.m. at a nearby store. He went home and
slept with his wife soon after.7To corroborate his testimony, he presented SPO2 Danilo Ramillano, a
visitor at his father-in-law’s house and Wilhelmina Espinosa, a sari-sari store owner. 8 He also
presented Athena Elisa Anderson, Document Examiner and Forensic Analyst of the PNP Crime
Laboratory of Region 9, Zamboanga City, who testified that the paraffin test conducted on both his
hands showed that there was no nitrate present;9 and Police Inspector Lemuel Caser, Ballistic
Examiner, who testified that the shells found at the scene of the crime were not fired from the firearm
issued to Galvez.10

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated February 27, 1995 with the following findings:

From the foregoing facts as well as from the records of this case, this Court finds the following facts
to be undisputable, to wit:

1) That at the late night of July 27, 1991, Rosalio Enojarda, while making copra in the
coconut land of Danilo Perez at Matarling, Lantawan, Basilan, was shot to death by one of
the four (4) men. How many gunshot wounds he suffered and what part of his body was hit
by the gunfire, the evidence is found wanting.

2) That a day before the incident and on the date of the incident which was July 27, 1991,
the accused Cesar Galvez has not fired any firearms.

xxx

3) That the five (5) empty shells of armalite rifle…allegedly found by Barangay Captain
Inocente Manicap from the scene of the crime and later turned over to PFC Samuel Omoso,
the Police Investigator of this case, did not come from the M16 armalite rifle with Serial No.
117460, the gun issued to the accused Cesar Galvez. (citations omitted). 11

Further, the trial court found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Rellios and Perez,
were credible and trustworthy as there was no motive to perjure themselves; that the testimony of
defense witness SPO2 Ramillano was full of loopholes; and that the testimony of the store owner
was insufficient to disprove the presence of the accused at the scene of the crime. 12

The RTC concluded:

xxx since this accused, Cesar Galvez, has not fired his M16 armalite rifle on that night of July 27,
1991, and those five (5) empty shells were not fired from his armalite, then xxx the bullet that hit
and instantly killed Rosalio Enojarda on that night of July 27, 1991 at the copra kiln of Danilo
Perez came from the gun fired by any of the three (3) unidentified persons who were the
companions of the accused, Cesar Galvez at the night of the incident xxx.13 (emphasis
supplied)

Despite the fact that the Information failed to allege conspiracy and the aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity and armed band, the RTC still convicted Galvez of murder based on conspiracy since
Galvez was seen by two witnesses at the scene of the crime carrying a firearm together with his
unidentified armed companions.14 The trial court also held that the offer of Galvez to have the case
settled out of court is an indication of his guilt. 15

The RTC then disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, all factual and circumstantial matters surrounding the commission of the crime, being
carefully and meticulously examined and studied, this Court finds the accused SPO2 Cesar Galvez,
a member of the Philippine National Police GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal in
committing the crime of Murder as alleged in the Information and which crime is defined and
penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, but considering his good military records after
the commission of the crime, hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of SEVENTEEN (17)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS as
maximum, which is the minimum period of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period to death. And
to indemnify the heirs of the late Rosalio Enojarda, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages
and to pay the Court the amount of P500.00 as judicial costs and other accessory penalties attached
to the penalty of Reclusion Temporal.

And further this accused is hereby stripped of all the military ranks he now hold [sic] in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.

And upon the promulgation of this decision, the accused shall immediately be committed to the
Provincial Jail where the Provincial Warden is directed to immediately transfer him to the National
Penitentiary at San Ramon Penal Colony at Zamboanga City for commitment thereat.

And the property bail bond he has posted for his provisional liberty is hereby ordered cancelled and
its pertinent papers returned, upon receipt to the bondsman. 16

Galvez appealed the case to the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 18255, which rendered its
Decision on March 30, 2001 affirming his guilt but modifying the penalty to be imposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATION that appellant CESAR GALVEZ is hereby sentenced
to reclusion perpetua, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.17

The CA held that the RTC erred in holding Galvez criminally liable based on conspiracy when such
fact was not alleged in the Information. However, it still found Galvez guilty of Murder. 18 The CA
reasoned that: the negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests do not negate the possibility that
Galvez used another gun in shooting the victim; the eyewitnesses of the prosecution identified
Galvez as the perpetrator if not one of the perpetrators of the crime; alibi, which was offered by
Galvez, is the weakest of all defenses and cannot prevail over positive identification; the offer of
Galvez to the wife of the victim to have the case settled is also a strong indication of Galvez’s
culpability; and treachery was adequately established as the attack was sudden, unexpected and did
not accord the victim an opportunity to defend himself. 19 The CA further held that since there was no
mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty should be reclusion perpetua.20

Galvez filed a Motion for Reconsideration21 which the CA denied in its Resolution dated August 21,
2001, stating that it was a mere rehash of the arguments already addressed in the decision.22

The entire records of the case were forwarded to this Court pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. On April 8, 2003, the Court issued a Resolution23 accepting the case;
committing the accused to the Davao Prison and Penal Farm; and informing the accused and the
Solicitor General that they may file additional briefs with this Court. 24

In his Appellant’s Brief, Galvez argued that the trial court erred:

I
… IN HOLDING THAT (HE) THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS LIABLE FOR MURDER FOR THE
DEATH OF ROSALIO ENOJARDA ON JULY 27, 1991 DESPITE ITS EXPRESS FINDINGS THAT
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT FIRE HIS RIFLE ON THAT FATAL NIGHT AND THAT THE
BULLET THAT HIT AND KILLED ROSALIO ENOJARDA COULD HAVE BEEN FIRED FROM ANY
OF THE GUNS OR RIFLES BELONGING TO ANY OF THE THREE UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS
WHO WERE NOT CHARGED NOR INDICTED TOGETHER WITH THE ACCUSED IN THE SAME
CRIMINAL INFORMATION IN QUESTION.

II

… IN HOLDING THAT DANILO PEREZ AND WILFREDO RELLIOS, WHILE IN CRAWLING

POSITION WHOSE CHESTS WERE ALMOST TOUCHING THE GROUND AND UNDER
CONDITIONS DESCRIBED BY THEM, HAD SEEN THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ARMED WITH
M16 ARMALITE RIFLE IN THE NIGHTIME, OF 27 JULY 1991 DESPITE DANILO PEREZ’ [sic]
POSITIVE ASSERTION THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE OF HIS (SIC) TO IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED
WHEN ASKED TO DEMONSTRATE IN OPEN COURT IN THE MANNER AND CIRCUMSTANCE
NARRATED BY HIM.25

In his Supplemental Appellant’s Brief, Galvez further claims that it was seriously erroneous:

I.

…TO CONCLUDE THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY BETWEEN ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND

THE OTHER MALEFACTORS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PRESENT CASE.

II.

…TO BE SELECTIVE IN APPRECIATING MATTERS NOT INCLUDED IN THE INFORMATION,

MORE SO THE THEORY OF CONSPIRACY AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT, THERE BEING
NO OTHER PERSONS CHARGED IN THE PRESENT CASE.

III.

…TO FIND THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF MURDER UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES FAR

DIFFERENT FROM THE INFORMATION, IN EFFECT DENYING ACCUSED-APPELLANT [THE]
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM.

IV.

…TO GIVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE TWO ALLEGED EYE WITNESSES
WHOSE DECLARATIONS WERE CLEARLY BELIED DURING THEIR CROSS EXAMINATION.

V.

…NOT TO CONSIDER THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

VI.

…TO MAKE UNSUBSTANTIATED, BASELESS PRESUMPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS IN A

CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED IS PRESUMED. 26
Galvez also filed an Addendum to Supplemental Appellant’s Brief adding that:

VII

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE

RESULTS OF THE PARAFFIN AND BALLISTIC TESTS AND IN ASSUMING THAT THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOT THE DECEASED USING AN M16 RIFLE OTHER THAN THE ONE
ISSUED TO HIM.27

Galvez contends that: the degree of proof required in criminal cases is proof beyond reasonable
doubt because an accused is always presumed to be innocent unless proven otherwise; 28 when
circumstances yield two or more inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of
innocence and the other compatible with the finding of guilt, the court must side with that which will
acquit the accused; in this case, the RTC found undisputed the fact that he did not shoot the victim
on the night of July 27, 1991 and the firearm that was used in killing the victim was owned and
possessed by another man, as shown by the negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests; the
statement of Danilo Perez that he saw the accused on the night of July 27, 1991 is not credible since
Perez was in a crawling position with his chest almost touching the ground at the time he allegedly
saw the accused; Judge Memoracion, who penned the decision could not have assessed the
demeanor of the prosecution witnesses while testifying as it was another judge who heard and
received their testimonies;29 the two defense witnesses, who corroborated his (Galvez’s) alibi are
unbiased and unrelated to him; while alibi is the weakest defense, it is the only defense if it is the
truth and it assumes importance where the prosecution evidence is weak; the statement of the trial
court that the offer of the accused to have the case extra-judicially settled is a tacit admission of guilt
is also unsubstantiated as there is nothing in the records that shows that the accused made an offer
to settle the case out of court.30

For the plaintiff-appellee, the Solicitor General argued that: the paraffin test and the ballistic
examination are not conclusive proof that Galvez did not fire a gun during the incident; in this case,
the paraffin test was conducted on Galvez two days from the date of the incident; Galvez was also
positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of four armed men who attacked them
during the incident; Perez clarified that while he was in a crawling position, he was looking upward,
thus, he was able to identify Galvez; between Galvez’s alibi and the positive declarations of
witnesses whose testimonies have not been assailed nor discredited by improper motive, the latter
deserves greater credence; the trial court correctly convicted Galvez of murder as there was
treachery since the victim was not in a position to defend himself from the attack of the accused; the
proper penalty should be reclusion perpetua under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code as there was
no mitigating circumstance;31 Galvez is also liable for temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 since
pecuniary loss has been suffered although its exact amount could not be determined, and exemplary
damages of ₱25,000.00 due to the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery; the amount
of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity should also be awarded to the heirs of the victim together with the
₱50,000.00 awarded by the trial court for moral damages.32

After reviewing the entire records of the case, the Court resolves to acquit Galvez.

Conspiracy must be alleged in the information in order that an accused may be held liable for the
acts of his co-accused. In the absence of any averment of conspiracy in the information, an accused
can only be made liable for the acts committed by him alone and such criminal responsibility is
individual and not collective.33

As explained in People v. Tampis,34

The rule is that conspiracy must be alleged, not merely inferred, in the information. Absence of a
particular statement in the accusatory portion of the charge sheet concerning any definitive act
constituting conspiracy renders the indictment insufficient to hold one accused liable for the
individual acts of his co-accused. Thus, each of them would be held accountable only for their
respective participation in the commission of the offense. 35

The rationale for this rule has long been settled. In People v. Quitlong, the Court explained:

Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court, evidence of conspiracy is not
enough for an accused to bear and respond to all its grave legal consequences; it is equally
essential that such accused has been apprised when the charge is made conformably with
prevailing substantive and procedural requirements. Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution,
in particular, mandates that no person shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due
process of law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. The right to be informed of any such indictment is likewise
explicit in procedural rules. x x x

xxx

x x x Quite unlike the omission of an ordinary recital of fact which, if not excepted from or objected to
during trial, may be corrected or supplied by competent proof, an allegation, however, of conspiracy,
or one that would impute criminal liability to an accused for the act of another or others, is
indispensable in order to hold such person, regardless of the nature and extent of his own
participation, equally guilty with the other or others in the commission of the crime. Where
conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to perpetrate the felony
becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the others. Verily, an
accused must know from the information whether he faces a criminal responsibility not only for his
acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.36

Since conspiracy was not alleged in the Information in this case, it is imperative that the prosecution
prove Galvez’s direct participation in the killing of the victim. This, the prosecution failed to do.

The CA, in holding Galvez guilty of Murder, gave weight to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses Rellios and Perez that they saw Galvez fire an armalite rifle in their direction on the night
in question. The positive identification of these witnesses, the CA ruled, has more weight than the
negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests. 37

We disagree.

The prosecution witnesses never actually saw Galvez shoot the victim. While this Court does not
ordinarily interfere with the findings of the lower courts on the trustworthiness of witnesses, when
there appears on the records, however, facts and circumstances of real weight which might have
been overlooked or misapprehended, this Court cannot shirk from its duty to render the law and
apply justice.38

During his direct examination, Perez testified as follows:

Q: While you were eating your merienda at about 11:00 o’clock in the evening on July 27, 1991 what
happened?
A: Suddenly we heard shots and we could not determine where it came from and one of our
companion was hit.

Q: Do you know who was that companion of yours who was hit?

A: Yes, Rosalio Enojarda.

xxx

Q: After you heard the gun fire which hit your companion Rosalio Enojarda, what did you do?

A: I dropped and crawled, sir.

xxx

Q: And then did the gunfire stop after you hid yourself among the grasses?

A: Yes sir.

Q: What happened after the firings stopped, when you were already hiding among the grasses?

A: I recognized the culprit sir because he passed by where I was hiding about two meters from me.

Q: You said you recognized the culprit when he passed by where you were hiding, who was that
culprit?

A: Cesar Galvez, sir.

xxx

COURT:

After you heard the shots how long after you saw him passed by?

xxx

Q: Was it 30 minutes after?

xxx

A: In my own estimate about 20 to 25 minutes.

Q: In other words more or less you saw him (accused) passed by together with his companions
around 20 to 25 minutes after you heard the shots, is that what you want to impress this Court?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

xxx

Q: Did you see him really shoot?

A: No, Your Honor. 39 (Emphasis supplied)

During his cross-examination, Perez further testified:

Q: So, when you said the explosions came from different directions, was not true?

A: We heard shots but we do not know where it came from, what we did was to drop and crawl.

COURT: (To the witness)

You did not see the one firing?

Yes, your Honor, because I crawled.

Q: And how many minutes after you heard firings you saw this accused and companions pass by?

A: I am not sure Your Honor about the exact time but I think it has about 20 to 25 minutes. 40

xxx

Q: Mr. Perez, you did not see the accused shot at Mr. Enojarda?

A: No sir.41 (Emphasis supplied).

Rellios also admitted during his cross-examination the following:

Q: You did not actually see Mr. Galvez shoot at Mr. Enojarda?

A: No sir.

COURT: (To the witness)

In other words you were only presuming that it was him.

A: No, Your Honor, I saw him.

ATTY. MARTIN: (Continuing)

Did you understand the question when you were asked by the Court. Since you did not
actually see Mr. Galvez shoot at the victim, and reportedly you saw him only five minutes
thereafter, you only presume Mr. Galvez to have shoot Mr. Enojarda?

A: Yes sir.42 (Emphasis supplied)

Based on the above testimonies, the following circumstances appear to have been established: (1)
at around 11 p.m., Enojarda, Rellios, Perez, and their two companions were eating merienda near
the copra kiln when they were sprayed with gunfire; (2) Enojarda was fatally hit and fell on the
ground; (3) Rellios, Perez and their two companions ducked and crawled to seek cover; (4) about
five minutes after the first burst of gunfire, Galvez, armed with an M16 armalite rifle, was seen firing
at Rellios, Perez and their two companions as well as in the direction of the copra kiln; and (5) about
20 to 25 minutes after the first burst of gunfire, Galvez was again seen clad in fatigue uniform and
carrying an M16 armalite rifle along with three armed companions, after which, their group left the
scene of the crime.

However, these circumstances are not sufficient to establish the guilt of Galvez beyond reasonable
doubt.

It is well to emphasize the four basic guidelines that must be observed in assaying the probative
value of circumstantial evidence:

x x x (a) It should be acted upon with caution; (b) All the essential facts must be consistent with the
hypothesis of guilt; (c) The facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt of the accused;
and, (d) The facts must establish with certainty the guilt of the accused as to convince beyond
reasonable doubt that he was the perpetrator of the offense. The peculiarity of circumstantial
evidence is that the series of events pointing to the commission of a felony is appreciated not singly
but collectively. The guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one (1) particular
piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle which when put together reveals a convincing picture
pointing to the conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime. 43

as well as the doctrines enunciated by the Court that the prosecution must establish beyond
reasonable doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of the accused; 44 and that every
circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused must be duly taken into account. 45

The "incriminating circumstances" enumerated above are mainly based on the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses Perez and Rellios. A perusal of said testimonies reveals, however, other
circumstances that should be appreciated in favor of Galvez, to wit:

(a) Both Perez and Rellios testified that they saw Galvez with three other armed companions
minutes after Enojarda was shot but they did not testify that they saw him in the
vicinity before the shooting of Enojarda.46

(b) Perez testified that only one shot hit Enojarda. 47

(c) Perez testified that he did not see Galvez shoot at Enojarda and that he merely assumed
that Galvez was the one who shot the victim when the latter passed by him. 48 Rellios testified
that he only presumed that Galvez shot at Enojarda. 49

(d) Perez testified that he had no misunderstanding with Galvez50 and that he does not know
any motive why Enojarda was killed.51

In considering both favorable and "incriminating" circumstances for or against Galvez, the following
must always be borne in mind: that the Information charged Galvez as the sole perpetrator of the
crime of Murder; that the three other armed men were not included as John Does; and that there
was no allegation of conspiracy in the Information.

Consequently, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that Galvez was the sole author of
the shot that killed Enojarda. The "incriminating circumstances" do not point to Galvez as the sole
perpetrator of the crime. The presence of the three armed men raises the probability that any one of
those men inflicted the fatal shot. It must be stressed that the prosecution witnesses merely
presumed that it was Galvez who shot Enojarda.
Moreover, the fact that Galvez was seen minutes after Enojarda was shot does not sufficiently
establish that Galvez was the one who shot Enojarda. There is no evidence that Galvez was seen or
was together with the three other armed men when Enojarda was hit. There is a missing link that
precludes the Court from concluding that it was Galvez who shot Enojarda.52 It cannot be said
therefore that there was positive identification of Galvez through circumstantial evidence.

In People v. Comendador,53 the Court held:

While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial evidence which will
suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty
person.54 (Emphasis supplied)

And in Dela Cruz v. People,55 the Court stressed, thus:

To emphasize, the foundation of the ruling of acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that
the prosecution’s evidence was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of the accused-petitioner beyond
the point of moral certainty – certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and the conscience of
those who are to act upon it. It is such proof to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the
presumption of innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to
support it. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accused’s
innocence may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the evidence of
the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. And, if the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not
fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction, and, thus, that
which is favorable to the accused should be considered.56 (Emphasis supplied).

And when the evidence on the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive,
motive is vital. As held in Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,57

Motive is generally held to be immaterial because it is not an element of the crime. However, motive
becomes important when the evidence on the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or
inconclusive. Motive is thus vital in this case. 58

In this case, prosecution witness Perez testified that he did not know of any motive on the part of
Galvez to kill Enojarda.59 This is a circumstance that should be taken in favor of Galvez.

In line with the ruling of the Court in Torralba v. People,60 to wit:

Time and again, this Court has faithfully observed and given effect to the constitutional presumption
of innocence which can only be overcome by contrary proof beyond reasonable doubt – one which
requires moral certainty, a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those
who are to act upon it. As we have so stated in the past –

Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt, the prosecution must
overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To meet this
standard, there is need for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the State, both oral and
documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge
below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been
committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence
be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring innocence be duly
taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.61 (Emphasis supplied)

There could not be any doubt that the facts, as established by the circumstantial evidence, failed to
exclude the possibility that another person shot Enojarda. There were three other armed men, any
one of whom could be the culprit.

When a crime is committed, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the identity of the perpetrator of
the crime beyond reasonable doubt for there can be no conviction even if the commission of the
crime is established.62Indeed, the State, aside from showing the existence of a crime, has the burden
of correctly identifying the author of such crime.63 Both facts must be proved by the State beyond
reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the
defense.64

Galvez correctly pointed out in his supplemental brief before this Court that it was erroneous for the
CA to have affirmed the RTC ruling that Galvez’s offer to the victim’s wife to settle the case is a tacit
admission of guilt.65

While the Court agrees that in criminal cases, an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt, 66 such principle is not applicable in this case.

The only basis of the RTC in concluding that Galvez made on offer of compromise, 67 is the March 3,
1993 Order of the RTC which reads as follows:

Considering that the accused as well as his Counsel, Atty. Bienvenido G. Martin appeared in Court
together with Rosaflor Enojarda, the wife of the victim, and manifested that there is a possibility of
understanding and settlement between the parties, the above-entitled case is hereby reset for new
assignment.68

Galvez’s supposed offer of compromise was not formally offered and admitted as evidence during
the trial. The victim’s widow or any prosecution witness did not testify on any offer of compromise
made by Galvez. We have held that when the evidence on the alleged offer of compromise is
amorphous, the same shall not benefit the prosecution in its case against the accused.69

The Court also recognizes that there may be instances when an offer of compromise will not amount
to an admission of guilt. Thus, in People v. Godoy,70 the Court pronounced that:

…In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party
making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize,
that in the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, no compromise whatever
may be entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such
cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness
of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason
which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an
admission of guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would ordinarily
ensue therefrom.71(Emphasis supplied).

As the alleged offer of compromise was not presented in court, it was not shown that Galvez indeed
made such an offer under the consciousness of guilt. Galvez was not given the opportunity to
explain that it was given for some other reason that would justify a claim that it was not an admission
of guilt or an attempt to avoid its legal consequences.

In this case, the presumption of innocence of Galvez prevails over the alleged implied admission of
guilt. In Godoy, the Court, in acquitting the accused, explained that:

It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are involved. Sometimes
the presumptions conflict, one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the accused and the other his
innocence. In such case, it is necessary to examine the basis for each presumption and determine
what logical or social basis exists for each presumption, and then determine which should be
regarded as the more important and entitled to prevail over the other. It must, however, be
remembered that the existence of a presumption indicating his guilt does not in itself destroy the
presumption against innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all the evidence, or
the lack of any evidence or explanation, is sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence by
proving the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the defendant’s guilt is shown in this
manner, the presumption of innocence continues. 72

xxx

The presumption of innocence, x x x is founded upon the first principles of justice, and is not a mere
form but a substantial part of the law. It is not overcome by mere suspicion or conjecture; a
probability that the defendant committed the crime; nor by the fact that he had the opportunity to do
so. Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven contest between the
lone individual pitted against the People and all the resources at their command. Its inexorable
mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted
and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond the whisper of a doubt. This is in consonance with
the rule that conflicts in evidence must be resolved upon the theory of innocence rather than upon a
theory of guilt when it is possible to do so.73

Thus, taking into account all the circumstances in favor of Galvez, there could not be a moral
certainty as to the guilt of Galvez. The prosecution has not proven the guilt of Galvez beyond
reasonable doubt.

It may be pointed out that the following circumstances support the conviction of Galvez as charged:

(a) the negative findings of the paraffin and ballistic tests do not prove that Galvez did not fire
a gun;

(b) Galvez was a police officer who could have justified his presence at the scene of the
crime with a lawful purpose, yet he put up alibi which is inherently weak;

(c) Galvez did not present his wife and father-in-law as witnesses to corroborate his story
that he was at their house on the night in question; and

(d) Galvez refused three times to give a statement to the investigating police officer.

These circumstances do not help the prosecution in the discharge of its duty to prove the guilt of
Galvez beyond reasonable doubt.

It is true that a negative finding in a paraffin test is not a conclusive proof that one has not fired a
gun, as held by this Court in People v. Pagal74 and People v. Teehankee75 which were cited by the
CA in its Decision, since it is possible for a person to fire a gun and yet bear no traces of nitrate or
gunpowder as when the hands are bathed in perspiration or washed afterwards. 76 Such principle,
however, has no bearing in the present case. In the Pagal and Teehankee cases, the Court
concluded that a negative finding does not prove that the accused therein had not fired a gun
because the accused were positively identified by witnesses as having shot their victims, unlike in
the case at hand where Galvez is not positively identified by direct or circumstantial evidence that he
shot Enojarda. If the principle should be given any weight at all, it should be in favor of Galvez, that
is, considering that he is not positively identified, then, the negative results of the paraffin test bolster
his claim that he did not shoot Enojarda, and not the other way around.

The argument that the negative result of the ballistic examination does not prove that Galvez did not
fire a gun during the incident as it was possible that he used another gun, should also be struck
down. It is the prosecution which has the burden of showing that Galvez used a firearm other than
the one issued to him and that such firearm, which Galvez used, was the one that killed the victim. It
is not for Galvez to prove the opposite of the possibility adverted to by the prosecution as it is the
prosecution which must prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and not for him to prove his
innocence.

Thus, while it is true that the negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests do not conclusively
prove that Galvez did not shoot the victim, the same negative results cannot be used as
circumstantial evidence against Galvez to prove that he shot Enojarda. To do otherwise would
violate the basic precepts of criminal law which presumes the innocence of the accused. Every
circumstance favoring an accused’s innocence must be duly taken into account, the proof against
him must survive the test of reason, and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment.77

That Galvez was a police officer who could have justified his presence at the scene of the crime with
a lawful purpose, yet he put up an alibi which is inherently weak; and that Galvez did not present his
wife and father-in-law as witnesses to corroborate his story that he was at their house on the night in
question, pertain to the weakness of Galvez’s alibi which may cast doubt on his innocence.
However, these circumstances do not prove beyond reasonable doubt Galvez’s guilt. Although an
accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi, the burden in criminal cases still rests on the prosecution
to prove the accused’s guilt. The prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and
cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Unless the prosecution overturns the
constitutional presumption of innocence of an accused by competent and credible evidence proving
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption remains. 78 Courts must judge the guilt or
innocence of the accused based on facts and not on mere conjectures, presumptions, or
suspicions.79

That Galvez refused three times to give a statement to the investigating police officer is a
prerogative given to the accused and should not be given evidentiary value to establish his guilt.
In People v. Saavedra,80 the Court held that an accused has the right to remain silent and his silence
should not be construed as an admission of guilt.

Even if the defense of the appellant may be weak, the same is inconsequential if, in the first place,
the prosecution failed to discharge the onus of his identity and culpability. 81 Conviction must be
based on the strength of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense, i.e., the obligation
is upon the shoulders of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and not the accused to
prove his innocence.82 The prosecution’s job is to prove that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.83 Thus, when the evidence for the prosecution is insufficient to sustain a conviction, it must be
rejected and the accused absolved and released at once. 84
Time and again, the Court has pronounced that the great goal of our criminal law and procedure is
not to send people to jail but to render justice. 85 Under our criminal justice system, the overriding
consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains
reasonable doubt as to his guilt.86

It is indeed lamentable that because of the lapses of the Prosecution, justice could not be rendered
in this case for the untimely death of Enojarda. Justice, however, would also not be served with the
conviction of the herein accused. It is well to quote Justice Josue N. Bellosillo:

In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the crime charged; but justice must be
dispensed with an even hand. Regardless of how much we want to punish the perpetrators of
this ghastly crime and give justice to the victim and her family, the protection provided by
the Bill of Rights is bestowed upon all individuals, without exception, regardless of race,
color, creed, gender or political persuasion – whether privileged or less privileged – to be
invoked without fear or favor. Hence, the accused deserves no less than an acquittal; ergo,
he is not called upon to disprove what the prosecution has not proved.87 (Emphasis supplied)

As the prosecution in this case failed to discharge its burden of proving Galvez’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the Court has no choice but to acquit him.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Basilan, Branch 1 in Criminal Case
No. 1816 dated February 2, 1995 and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
18255 dated March 30, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant Cesar
Galvez is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause the immediate release of Cesar
Galvez unless he is being lawfully held for another crime and to inform this Court accordingly within
ten (10) days from notice.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 113788. October 17, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NORLITO GERON

y VILLANUEVA, accused-appellant.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

Here is yet another instance where the Court, aware as it is of the persistent
calls of the public for the conviction of societys misfits, finds itself constrained
to apply the maxim Better to free a guilty man than to punish the innocent. In a
recent decision, the Court aptly stated: It is better to liberate a guilty man than
to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proved by the required
quantum of evidence. Hence, despite the Courts support to ardent crusaders
[1]

waging all out war against felons on the loose, when the Peoples evidence fail
to indubitably prove the accuseds authorship of the crime of which he stands
accused, then it is the Courts duty, and the accuseds right, to proclaim his
innocence. Acquittal, therefore, is in order.
This is an appeal stemming from the prosecution and subsequent conviction
of herein accused-appellant Norlito Geron y Villanueva under an information for
robbery with homicide the accusatory portion of which reads:
[2]

That on or about the 29th day of April, 1990, at about 9:00 oclock in the evening, at
Brgy. Pantay na Bata, Municipality of Tanauan, Province of Batangas, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused armed
with an axe and nylon cord with intent of (sic) gain and by means of violence and
intimidation against persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, rob and carry away one (1) radio cassette, one (1) Walkman and cash money
[3] [4]

amounting [to] Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), Philippine Currency, belonging

to Teodora Valencia, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the
aforementioned amount and that on the occasion of and by reason of said robbery, the
said accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hit with the said axe
and tied with the said nylon cord Teodora Valencia y Valencia and Martin Valencia y
Vicencio, which directly caused their instantan[e]ous death. [5]
 A plea of not guilty to the said charge having been entered by the accused
at arraignment, trial ensued. The prosecution presented seven (7) witnesses.
Evidence for the Prosecution
First to testify for the State was Juan Valencia, Teodora Valencias husband
and father of Martin Valencia, who, in his sworn statement and answers on
[6]

direct and cross-examination in court, declared that the accused worked for
[7]

his wife and son at Barangay Pantay na Bata three months prior to the
incident. Although he was not with his family at the time, he was convinced that
the accused committed the crime because only the latter had access to their
house. This belief was reenforced when he saw items allegedly belonging to
the victims in accuseds possession upon his arrest and detention in jail. He
identified these items as one radio cassette (hereinafter the radio) and
a Walkman (hereinafter the cassette player) whose photographs were marked
for exhibit by the prosecution. Likewise missing, according to him, were money
[8]

and pieces of jewelry but the records failed to show if these were ever recovered
from the accused.
PO3 Eduardo Lirio of the Philippine National Police (PNP) station in
Tanauan, Batangas, whose testimony was corroborated by Capt. Tomas Lirio
[9]

told the court that he and Capt. Lirio rushed to Barangay Pantay na Bata after
receiving a report regarding the incident at 6:30 oclock in the morning of April
30, 1990. At the crime scene, they found the lifeless body of Teodora who
appeared to have been strangled and fatally wounded at the nape, as well as
that of Martin, who likewise sustained wounds on his head. They also
discovered after further investigation an axe and a nylon cord believed to have
[10]

been used in killing the victims. This witness acknowledged his awareness that
some items inside the victims house were missing as he was informed by Juan
Valencia himself about it and that the accused surrendered a radio and a
cassette player upon his arrest. Other possible motives in the commission of
the crime were explored but they concluded that it was a case of robbery in
view of the missing items retrieved from the accused.
Teodoras niece Melecia A. Vicencio recalled having encountered the
accused at about 4:30 oclock in the morning of April 30, 1990, when she
boarded a jeepney driven by Anselmo Trinidad at Barangay Pantay na
Matanda, Tanauan, Batangas. The accused whom she only knew by face was
already sitting at the rear end of the vehicle carrying a chicken, a black bag and
a black-colored radio which she identified as the same radio belonging to one
of the victims and offered in evidence by the prosecution. She also remembered
very well that during their trip, accused seemed perturbed and showed signs of
fear (lagi siyang nakalingon sa hulihan ng jeep na aming sinasakyan na sa
aking tingin ay parang may kinatatakutan). After a while, accused hastily got off
at a bus stop without bothering to claim his change. [11]

Jeepney driver Anselmo Trinidad supported Vicencios testimony in his

sworn statement before the police authorities where he declared having
[12]

learned about the incident after his return trip to Alabang and that he also knew
the accused as Teodoras helper. He positively identified the accused in court
and the radio the latter was carrying while on board his jeepney. [13]

Patrolman Avelino Manalo, a nephew of Teodora and accuseds former

employer, related to the court that he was informed of the victims death when
Teodoras brother, Cresencio Vicencio, came to him at about 6:00 oclock in the
morning of April 30, 1990. Since the victims house was only a few meters away,
both of them dashed to the place and immediately proceeded thereafter to the
Tanauan police station where he allegedly got orders from the station
commander to arrest the accused. With one Sgt. Celedonio Alcantara, he then
went to the Batangas pier and, having found the accused lying in the upper
deck of a boat listening to a cassette player, apprehended him. Seized from the
accused were a cassette player and a radio found beside him, both of which
were later identified as the same articles photographed and shown in Exhibits
C and C-1. [14]

Finally, the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Priscilla Guzman, testified on the
[15]

death certificates she issued for Teodora Valencia and Martin Valencia, as
[16] [17]

well as post-mortem reports on their corpses. Her findings indicated that

Teodora sustained injuries consisting of hematoma, occiput; skull fracture,
post-auricular right; hacking wound, ear left; and hematoma around the
neck. Martin, on the other hand, had a stab wound, occipital; hacking wound
from right nasal bridge extending up to the right eye; and hacking wound at the
right side of the mouth. This witness calculated that the victims could have died
at around 8:30 oclock in the evening of April 29, 1990.
Evidence for the Defense
The accused had an entirely different version of the incident. He pointed
[18]

to Patrolman Avelino Manalo who allegedly harbored a grudge against the

victims regarding a piece of land. According to him, he knew about this because
he had twice been prevented by Manalo from tilling a portion of the victims farm
on the ground that the same was his.
Against this background, accused narrated that on the night of April 29,
1990, he and the two victims were about to sleep when the door suddenly
swung open and Manalo, without a word, hacked Teodora at the nape with an
axe. Horrified, he scampered for safety in the kitchen and hid between two jars
(tapayan), both of which were two and a half feet high. Manalos two other
companions gave chase but fortunately, they failed to find him because the
kitchen was dark. Frustrated, the assailants turned to Martin who remained
standing beside his bed.While in that position, Manalo mercilessly delivered the
fatal blow on the defenseless victim, thus, causing his instantaneous death.
After the assault, Manalo ordered his two companions to search the house,
particularly Teodoras room. The two immediately obeyed but reported that their
efforts were fruitless. The trio then left the place leaving behind the murder
weapon. After assuring himself that the assailants were gone, the accused
hurriedly took his bag and left the house without ascertaining whether the
victims were still alive. Neither did he report the incident to the police because
he knew Manalo was also assigned to the Tanauan police station.
Upon leaving the house, accused proceeded to the poblacion. Fearing that
he might encounter the killers of Teodora and Martin, he decided to wait till
daybreak, when he took a jeepney to Tanauan and then a bus to Batangas pier
where he planned to board a boat bound for Mindoro as a stowaway. However,
Manalo and Alcantara nabbed him even before the boat could leave the
pier. From there, Manalo and two other companions brought him to a place
called Sambat where he was allegedly maltreated by his captors for four days
until he was taken by Maj. Cesar Valencia, another son of the deceased
Teodora to the Municipal Building. Despite his transfer, Manalo and Alcantara
continued maltreating him whenever Major Valencia was not around. He was
even electrocuted in order to implicate a certain Randy as the perpetrator of the
crime.
When asked why he had in his possession at the time of his arrest, a
cassette player and a radio belonging to Martin, accused explained that these
were already in his bag even prior to the incident because Martin told him that
if someone should steal their cow, he might fail to notice it above the din of the
radio. He has since had the items in his possession.
When presented by the defense, Major Valencia testified that he knew that
the accused worked for the victims because he was informed of this fact eight
months before the incident. He likewise admitted having requested the
accuseds transfer of detention and that he filed a motion to implead Manalo as
an additional accused to clear doubts on the latters possible participation in the
crime. The records reveal, however, that subsequent investigation against
Manalo was closed and terminated for lack of evidence. [19]

After trial, the court a quo rendered the appealed decision dated [20]

November 25, 1993, finding the accused guilty of the crime charged and,
accordingly, sentenced him as follows:
WHEREFORE, Norlito Geron is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with double homicide and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of Teodora Valencia in the amount
of P50,000.00 and the heirs of Martin Valencia in the amount of P50,000.00; and to
pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

To support the conviction, the trial court relied on what it believed were
inculpatory circumstantial evidence which, when taken together, led to the
inescapable conclusion that the accused was indeed the author of the crime,
thus:

On the basis of the evidence that accused Norlito Geron was at the house of the
victims Teodora Valencia and Martin Valencia, at the time they were axed to death, as
he himself admitted; that he took with him articles, consisting of a radio casette and a
radio walkman, which were taken from the house of the victims; that he fled [from]
the scene of the crime and boarded a boat on his way to Mindoro; that when arrested
he was lying on the upper deck of the boat nonchalantly listening to the radio attached
to his ears; that, while he testified that he had no money and was on board the boat
only as a stowaway, the driver and a passenger in the jeep he rode on his way away
from the scene of the crime, declared that he paid his fare and did not bother to get his
change; that his being in the upper deck of the boat shows that he was a paying
passenger and not a stowaway; and that he did not even bother to report to anyone the
dastardly and brutal slaying of the victims, all point to his criminal involvement and
participationboth in the slaying of his employers, Teodora Valencia and Martin
Valencia, and that the motive was robbery as shown by his taking away of two radios,
which he admitted belonged to Martin, and the ransacking of the cabinet in the room
of Teodora Valencia.

The evidence is sufficient for a finding of guilt by circumstantial evidence. x x x.

(Emphasis supplied).

We cannot concur with the findings of the trial court.

Doubtless, it is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be
convicted of the crime for which he is charged. There is in fact consensus that
[21]

resort to circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on direct testimony

would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper protection
to the community. However, certain guidelines have been evolved for
[22]

circumstantial evidence to be acceptable. Like a tapestry made up of strands

which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment of conviction based on
[23]
circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person. All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent
[24]

with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent
with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rationale except
that of guilt.[25]

Upon a close scrutiny of the records and bearing in mind the standards set
forth above, the Court is of the view that the circumstantial evidence proffered
by the prosecution, contrary to the trial courts position, do not show beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused indeed perpetrated the crime of which he
stands charged. The supposed string of circumstances relied upon by the
court a quo to secure a conviction consists of the following:

(1) Accused was present at the crime scene;

(2) Accused had in his possession articles belonging to the victims at the time
he was apprehended;

(3) Accused fled from the crime scene and boarded a boat bound for Mindoro;

(4) Accused was at the upper deck of the boat when arrested;

(5) Accused paid his jeepney fare and did not bother to claim his change; and

(6) Accused never reported the incident to anyone.

The above circumstances, as will be shown below, point to no inference

exclusively consistent with the guilt of the accused.
First, the mere presence of the accused at the locus criminis and his
possession of certain items belonging to the victims, while it may have pointed
the finger of suspicion at him, cannot be solely interpreted to mean that he
committed the robbery and the attendant killings. His presence at the victims
house was not unusual as he was serving there as their household
helper. Along the same line, accuseds unrefuted explanation that Martin himself
placed the radio and cassette player in his bag prior to the incident was equally
plausible. It was neither extraordinary nor unlikely that Martin could have
allowed the accused to use and keep them as these items could have been
easily lent. At any rate, the mere possession by the accused of items allegedly
stolen, without more, cannot conduce to a single conclusion that robbery indeed
took place or at least was the primary motive for the killings. In the absence of
positive and indubitable evidence showing unlawful taking by the accused by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, the prosecution cannot
rely with certitude on the fact of possession alone. The Courts application of the
presumption that a person found in possession of the personal effects
belonging to a person robbed and killed is considered the author of the
aggression, the death of the person, as well as the robbery committed, has
been invariably limited to cases where such possession is either unexplained
or that the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of independent
evidence inconsistent thereto.
For instance, in People v. Fulinara, we applied the presumption to that
[26]

case because the accused therein had two irreconcilable versions as to how
the car belonging to a victim of kidnapping was subsequently found with
him. More than that, there was independent testimonial evidence presented by
the prosecution positively identifying the accused and describing in detail how
the seizure of the victim took place with his participation.
Similarly, we enunciated the same rationale in People v. Corpuz, also a [27]

case of robbery with homicide, in view of the fact that accused was unable to
explain the incriminating evidence consisting of the victims bag and shirt found
in his possession after the incident and that there were also other
circumstances independent of the fact of said possession upon which his guilt
was predicated.
Since the above factual considerations do not obtain in the case at bar, we
can find no compelling reason to arrive at a similar conclusion here.
Moreover, we have underscored time and again that in cases of robbery
with homicide, the taking of personal property with intent to gain must itself be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Conclusive evidence proving the
physical act of asportation by the accused must be presented by the
prosecution. It must be shown that the original criminal design of the culprit
[28]

was robbery and the homicide was perpetrated with a view to the
consummation of the robbery by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. [29]

Thus, in People v. Parel, a case involving a similar challenge to the

[30]

sufficiency of circumstantial evidence against the accused, we declared

emphatically that:

To sustain a conviction for the complex crime of robbery with homicide , which is
primarily an offense against property, it is essential that the robbery itself be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof of the homicide alone is not sufficient to support a
conviction for the crime of [robbery with homicide]. The taking with intent to gain of
personal property belonging to another by means of violence against or intimidation
of person or using force upon things are the essential elements of robbery. There is
robbery with homicide when by reason or on the occasion of a robbery with the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed.

In the instant case, two things must be borne in mind: first, there was no eyewitness
either to the robbery or to the homicide; and second, none of the things already stolen
was ever recovered. If there was any proof to support the charge, the same was
entirely circumstantial in character. xxx.

As there was no eyewitness to the alleged robbery, and although the evidence already
showed that at the time of the killing the money in the bag of the deceased was
missing, it cannot be presumed that there was robbery. It is essential to prove intent to
rob. This necessarily includes evidence to the effect that the accused carried away the
effects or personalty of the deceased. In the instant case, there is absence of positive
proof appellant intended to rob the deceased or that he was the one who carried away
the money belonging to the victim. His mere presence at the locus criminis is not
sufficient to implicate him. [Emphasis supplied].

Second, accuseds alleged flight from the crime scene, his failure to
immediately report the gruesome incident and the fact that he was seen
apparently perturbed while on board a jeepney in the early morning of April 30,
1990, are equally susceptible of interpretation which would be consistent with
his innocence. While we adhere to the rule that flight is competent evidence to
indicate guilt, its application, however, is qualified by either the presence or
absence of sufficient explanation therefor. We have ruled that flight, when
adequately explained, cannot be attributed to ones consciousness of guilt. In [31]

the case at bar, accused himself presented an unrebutted explanation that he

fled, not because of guilt for having perpetrated a crime, but rather for fear that
the suspects who knew he witnessed the dastardly act would run after
him. Considering that the accused in so testifying was subjected to the usual
[32]

rigors of cross examination by the prosecution, we have no reason to doubt its

veracity.
Third, the trial courts intimation that the accused indeed robbed the victims
in view of his ability to pay his boat fare to the extent of foregoing his change
when he took a jeepney likewise deserves little consideration. These
circumstances, even if taken together with the rest, do not conclusively
demonstrate that the money he used were proceeds of an unlawful taking. In
fact, the existence of the Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) and pieces of
jewelry alleged to have been lost and stolen by the accused was not adequately
established by the prosecution. Furthermore, it is preposterous to think that the
only way the accused could have paid for his fare was through stolen
money. The records do not reveal that the accused has been penniless. From
what we have gathered, it appears that accused was employed as a household
helper of the victims, hence, we cannot reasonably discount the possibility that
he had money of his own.
All told, whatever apparent weakness is discernible in the accuseds defense
is no reason for us to sustain his conviction. The established doctrine adhered
to consistently by the Court is that the conviction of the accused must rest on
the strength of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. As a [33]

general rule, the doctrine of reasonable doubt applies only to criminative, not
exculpatory facts; accused is not required to establish matters in mitigation or
defense beyond a reasonable doubt, nor in most jurisdiction, is he required to
establish the truth of such matters by a preponderance of evidence, or even to
a reasonable probability. It is sufficient if he satisfies the court of their truth by
credible and preponderating evidence. The truth is that it is not even necessary
[34]

for him to explain, on some theory consistent with innocence, any fact or
circumstance relied on by the prosecution. [35]

Furthermore, the circumstances proffered by the prosecution and relied

upon by the trial court, albeit taken to be established and credible, only go so
far as to create a suspicion that the accused probably perpetrated the crime
charged. But suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence
being proof beyond reasonable doubt. Hence the saying: The sea of suspicion
has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass. [36]

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED and the decision of

Judge Flordelis Ozaeta Navarro in Criminal Case No. 1890 dated November
25, 1993, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Norlito Geron y
Villanueva is hereby ACQUITTED of all charges against him on ground of
reasonable doubt. Consequently, let the accused be immediately released from
his place of confinement unless there is reason to detain him further for any
other legal or valid cause. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO
GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO
GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.

SARMIENTO, J.:

In a decision 1 dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in
Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto
Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found
all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has remain at large and not
yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the
sum of P14,000.00 and to pay the costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44, landowner, and a
resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.

Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of appeal
from the trial court's decision. During the pendency of their appeal and before judgment thereon
could be rendered by the Court of Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants, except Custodio
Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose instead to pursue their respective applications for
parole before the then Ministry, now Department, of Justice, Parole Division. 3

On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 on the appeal of Custodio
Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed decision in that the lone appellant was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00. In all other
respect, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. Further, on the basis of our ruling in People
vs. Ramos, 5 the appellate court certified this case to us for review.6

The antecedent facts are as follows:

At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of
Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and
thus would like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in
the killing and Fausta with her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his
to take the spouses to the police authorities at the Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed,
Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his motorcycle, to the municipal
building. 7 Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple informed the police on duty of the
incident. That same night, Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales
spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to Paja's
residence where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto proceeded
to the latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly occurred. 8 There they
saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an underwear, sprawled face down inside
the bedroom. 9 The group stayed for about an hour during which time Patrolman Centeno inspected
the scene and started to make a rough sketch thereof and the immediate surroundings. 10 The next
day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Patrolman Centeno, accompanied by
a photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to conduct further investigations. Fausta
Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought back that same day by Barangay Captain Paja to the
police substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his companion arrived at Sitio Nabitasan,
two members of the 321st P.C. Company stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been informed
of the incident, were already there conducting their own investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued
with his sketch; photographs of the scene were likewise taken. The body of the victim was then
brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.

The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20 a.m. on February 22,
1981; after completed, a report was made with the following findings:

PHYSICAL FINDINGS

1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body moderately built and on
cadaveric rigidity.

EXTERNAL FINDINGS

1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located at the lower 3rd anterior
aspect of the arm, right, directed upward to the right axillary pit.

2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd, forearm right, posterior
aspect with an entrance of 5 cm. in width and 9 cm. in length with an exit at the
middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound exit.

3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the
forearm right, 1 cm. in width.

4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right lateral border of the sternum,
6th and 7th ribs, right located 1.5 inches below the right nipple.

5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed inward to the thoracic
cavity right, located at the left midclavicular line at the level of the 5th rib left.

6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed toward the right thoracic
cavity, located at the mid left scapular line at the level of the 8th intercostal space.

7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of the left armpit directed
toward the left thoracic cavity.

8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, directed toward the left deltoid
muscle, located at the upper 3rd axilla left.
9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the anterior aspect,
proximal 3rd arm left, directed downward.

10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm. in length, medial aspect,
palm right.

11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed inward with portion of large
intestine and mysentery coming out.

12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion of the shoulder, right,
directed downward to the aspex of the light thoracic cavity.

13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located at the medial portion of
the medial border of the right scapula.

14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, located at the posterior aspect of
the right elbow.

15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located at the posterior portion,
middle 3rd, forearm, right.

16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural fracture of the skull.

INTERNAL FINDINGS:

1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of the heart.

2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right lower lobe of the
lungs.

3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe of the lungs.

4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending colon of the large
intestine, thru and thru.

5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex of the right lungs
(sic).

CAUSE OF DEATH:

MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE

LACERATED, STABBED (sic), INCISED AND
PUNCTURED WOUNDS.

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The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which are fatal
because they penetrated the internal organs, heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased." 12

On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared before the police sub-
station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for
detention and protective custody for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. He
requested that he be taken to the P.C. headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta, was
already detained having been indorsed thereat by the Ajuy police force. 13
Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy police force and the 321st
P.C. Company, an information for murder dated August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal
of Iloilo against the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The information read as follows:

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and AUGUSTO

GONZALES of the crime of MURDER committed as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province
of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named
accused with four other companions whose identities are still unknown and are still at
large, armed with sharp-pointed and deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and
helping each other, with treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate intent
and decided purpose to kill, and taking advantage of their superior strength and
number, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab,
hack, hit and wound Lloyd D. Peñacerrada, with the weapons with which said
accused were provided at the time, thereby inflicting upon said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada
multiple wounds on different parts of his body as shown by autopsy report attached
to the record of this case which multifarious wounds caused the immediate death of
said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 14

When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty.
Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria 15 who claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, presented himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and
volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by
the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended Information, 16 dated March 3, 1982,
naming as additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant), Custodio Gonzales, Jr.,
Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused except as earlier explained,
Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.

At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health physician of Ajuy who
conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim; Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay
Tipacla; Patrolman Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt. (ret)
Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C. Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose
Huntoria; and Nanie Peñacerrada, the widow.

Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the deceased Lloyd
Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981 after it was taken to the municipal hall of
Ajuy. 17 His findings revealed that the victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4)
punctured wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound. In
his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the possibility that only one weapon might have caused all
the wounds (except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim, nevertheless opined that due to the
number and different characteristics of the wounds, the probability that at least two instruments were
used is high. 18 The police authorities and the P.C. operatives for their part testified on the aspect of
the investigation they respectively conducted in relation to the incident. Nanie Peñacerrada testified
mainly on the expenses she incurred by reason of the death of her husband while Barangay Captain
Bartolome Paja related the events surrounding the surrender of the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales to him, the location of the houses of the accused, as well as on other matters.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness account of the
incident. According to Huntoria, who gave his age as 30 when he testified on July 27, 1982, 19 at 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo
where he was employed as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio, and walked home; 20 he took a short-
cut route. 21 While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock in
the evening, he heard cries for help. 22 Curiosity prompted him to approach the place where the
shouts were emanating. When he was some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of
banana
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns in
stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said
he clearly recognized all the accused as the place was then awash in moonlight. 24 Huntoria further
recounted that after the accused were through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his
body and carried it into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was situated some 20 to 25
meters away from the "linasan". 25 Huntoria then proceeded on his way home. Upon reaching his
house, he related what he saw to his mother and to his wife 26 before he went to sleep. 27Huntoria
explained that he did not immediately report to the police authorities what he witnessed for fear of
his life. 28 In October 1981 however, eight months after the extraordinary incident he allegedly
witnessed, bothered by his conscience plus the fact that his father was formerly a tenant of the
victim which, to his mind, made him likewise a tenant of the latter, he thought of helping the victim's
widow, Nanie Peñacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he travelled from his place at Sitio Nabitasan,
in Barangay Tipacla Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs. Peñacerrada lived, and related to
her what he saw on February 21, 1981. 29

Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her honor as the deceased
attempted to rape her, all the accused denied participation in the crime. The herein accused-
appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep 30 in his house which was located
some one kilometer away from the scene of the crime 31 when the incident happened. He asserted
that he only came to know of it after his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his
house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform him. 32

The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony of Huntoria.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone appellant, contended that the
trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged
eyewitness, and in not appreciating his defense of alibi.

The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding Huntoria's testimony, the
appellate court held that:

. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the herein accused-
appellant, as the assailants of Peñacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27, 1982) The claim
that Huntoria would have difficulty recognizing the assailant at a distance of 15 to 20
meters is without merit, considering that Huntoria knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-
39) If Huntoria could not say who was hacking and who was stabbing the deceased,
it was only because the assailant were moving around the victim.

As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities, we think that Huntoria's
explanation is satisfactory. He said he feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As stated
in People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The natural reticence of most
people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. As held in People
v. Delfin, '. . . the initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to volunteer
information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in or dragged
 into criminal investigations is common, and has been judicially declared not to affect
credibility.'"

It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted that he had known Huntoria
for about 10 years and that he and Huntoria were in good terms and had no
misunderstanding whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984) He said that he could not
think of any reason why Huntoria should implicate him. (Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's
credibility. is beyond question. 33

The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of alibi. 34 The appellate court,
however, found the sentence imposed by the trial court on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said
the appellate court:

Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the accused-appellant to 12
years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal. The penalty for
murder under Article 248 is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. As
there was no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the imposible penalty should
be reclusion perpetua. Consequently, the appeal should have been brought to the
Supreme Court. With regard to the indemnity for death, the award of P40,000.00
should be reduced to P30,000.00, in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme
Court. (E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128
SCRA 31 (1984); People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43 (1984); People v. Bautista, G.R. No.
68731, Feb. 27, 1987).35

The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the Court of Appeals, the
penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.

After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the same insufficient to
convict the appellant of the crime charged.

To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be desired.
Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his sworn statements 36 even gave the date of the
commission of the crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the scene is of
little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their locations relative to
the scene of the crime, there was however no indication as to their quantity. This is rather
unfortunate for the prosecution because, considering that there are two versions proferred on where
the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have provided a more definite clue
as to which version is more credible. If, as the version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired
inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would have been more blood stains inside the
couple's bedroom or even on the ground directly under it. And this circumstance would provide an
additional mooring to the claim of attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On the other hand, if the
prosecution's version that the killing was committed in the field near the linasan is the truth, then
blood stains in that place would have been more than in any other place.

The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the other authorities. Police
Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that accused Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on February
23, 1981 failed to state clearly the reason for the "surrender." It would even appear that Augusto
"surrendered" just so he could be safe from possible revenge by the victim's kins. Corporal Sazon
likewise admitted that Augusto never mentioned to him the participation of other persons in the
killing of the victim. Finally, without any evidence on that point, P.C. investigators of the 321st P.C.
Company who likewise conducted an investigation of the killing mentioned in their criminal
complaint 38 four other unnamed persons, aside from the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to
have conspired in killing Lloyd Peñacerrada.

Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the sixteen wounds described
in the autopsy report were caused by two or more bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the
possibility that one bladed instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr. Rojas' testimony
and the autopsy report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone was responsible
for the killing appears not at all too impossible. And then there is the positive testimony of Dr. Rojas
that there were only five wounds that could be fatal out of the sixteen described in the autopsy
report. We shall discuss more the significance of these wounds later.

It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by the lower courts is to be
sustained, it can only be on the basis of the testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness.
Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is compelling.

To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the appellant, take turns
in hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21,
1981, in the field near a "linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood concealed behind a clump of banana
trees some 15 to 20 meters away from where the crime was being committed. According to him, he
recognized the six accused as the malefactors because the scene was then illuminated by the
moon. He further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on cross-
examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who among the six accused did the
stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was used by each of them.

ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):

Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And you would like us to understand that you saw the hacking and
the stabbing, at that distance by the herein accused as identified by
you?

A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.

Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you please tell this
Honorable Court who was hacking the victim?

A Because they were surrounding Peñacerrada and were in constant

movement, I could not determine who did the hacking.

ATTY. GATON:

The interpretation is not clear.

COURT:

They were doing it rapidly.

 A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or "bunu" is rapid. I
only saw the rapid movement of their arms, Your Honor, and I cannot
determine who was hacking and who was stabbing. But I saw the
hacking and the stabbing blow.

ATTY. GATON:

Q You cannot positively identify before this Court who really hacked
Lloyd Peñacerrada?

A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the hacking.

Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this Honorable Court who
did the stabbing?

A Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.

Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could not even identify
the weapons used because according to you it was just flashing?

A Yes, sir.39

(Emphasis supplied)

From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act committed, or
contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.

It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the Court of
Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as a principal by direct
participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in
the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same
Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part
in the killing did the appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by the Court of
Appeals on him?

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.

Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or

property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the commission of a felony.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, provides how felonies are committed.
 Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).

Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault
(culpa).

There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault
when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack
of skill.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2) the act or
omission must be punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the
omission incurred by means of deceit or fault.

Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found, that the appellant has
committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what
act was performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the
external world." 40 In this instance, there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the
appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that produced his death.

Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he did not see who "stabbed"
or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this principal witness did not say, because he could not whether
the appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what specific act was
performed by the appellant. This lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid
down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code previously discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the
victim sustained only five fatal wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to above, while
there are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of the six accused could
not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one could as well be the appellant, granted ex
gratia argumenti that he took part in the hacking and stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not
him? Is he not after all the oldest (already sexagenarian at that time) and practically the father of the
five accused? And pursuing this argument to the limits of its logic, it is possible, nay even probable,
that only four, or three, or two of the accused could have inflicted all the five fatal wounds to the
exclusion of two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is possible, nay probable,
that all the fatal wounds, including even all the non-fatal wounds, could have been dealt by Fausta in
rage against the assault on her womanhood and honor. But more importantly, there being not an iota
of evidence that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with the
prosecution's failure to prove the presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's
conviction can not be sustained.

Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact that he only came out
to testify in October 1981, or eight long months since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21,
1981. While ordinarily the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his credibility,41 here, the
unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out engenders doubt on his veracity. 42 If the silence of
coming out an alleged eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility doubtful, 43 the more it
should be for one who was mute for eight months. Further, Huntoria's long delay in reveiling what he
allegedly witnessed, has not been satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that he feared his life
would be endangered is too pat to be believed. There is no showing that he was threatened by the
accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he feared a possible retaliation from the
accused, 44 why did he finally volunteer to testify considering that except for the spouses Augusto
and Fausta Gonzales who were already under police custody, the rest of the accused were then still
free and around; they were not yet named in the original information, 45 thus the supposed danger on
Huntoria's life would still be clear and present when he testified.

Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by the prosecution. He

admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased. In fact, he stated that one of the principal reasons
why he testified was because the victim was also his landlord.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long from the time you
saw the stabbing and hacking of Lloyd Peñacerrada when you told
Mrs. Peñacerrada about what happened to her husband?

A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but because I was
haunted by my conscience and secondly the victim was also my
landlord I revealed what I saw to the wife of the victim. 46

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis ours.)

At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the
very source of his livelihood, if not existence itself, from his landlord who provides him with the land
to till. In this milieu, tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden to their landlords and seek ways and
means to ingratiate themselves with the latter. In this instance, volunteering his services as a
purported eyewitness and providing that material testimony which would lead to the conviction of the
entire family of Augusto Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has confessed to the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, would, in a perverted sense, be a way by which Huntoria sought to ingratiate himself
with the surviving family of his deceased landlord. This is especially so because the need to get into
the good graces of his landlord's family assumed a greater urgency considering that he ceased to be
employed as early as May 1981. 47 Volunteering his services would alleviate the financial distress he
was in. And Huntoria proved quite sagacious in his choice of action for shortly after he volunteered
and presented himself to the victim's widow, he was taken under the protective wings of the victim's
uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him employment and provided lodging for his family. 48 Given all the
foregoing circumstances, we can not help but dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable witness, to say the
least.

At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation of the appellant in the
killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada doubtful — it is contrary to our customs and traditions. Under the
Filipino family tradition and culture, aging parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult children
from any possible physical and emotional harm. It is therefore improbable for the other accused who
are much younger and at the prime of their manhood, to summon the aid or allow the participation of
their 65-year old 49 father, the appellant, in the killing of their lone adversary, granting that the victim
was indeed an adversary. And considering that the appellant's residence was about one kilometer
from the scene of the crime, 50 we seriously doubt that the appellant went there just for the purpose of
aiding his three robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and Augusta), not to mention the brother and
sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived
enemy.

Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under appropriate circumstances, like in the instant
case in which the participation of the appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as
exculpatory. Courts should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in the
light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit the accused. 52

In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 143071. August 6, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SPO2 JOSE MAGNABE

JR., appellant.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

By invoking self-defense, the accused admits killing the victim. Hence, the
constitutional presumption of innocence is effectively waived, and the burden of proof
shifts to the appellant.Where aggression on the part of the victim is not proved, the prayer
for acquittal collapses and conviction becomes inevitable. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
we clarify that the implied admission of a killing does not include that of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. When the prosecution fails to prove treachery, the accused
may be held liable only for homicide, not murder.

The Case

SPO2 Jose T. Magnabe Jr. appeals the March 30, 2000 Decision[1] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 219, in Criminal Case No. Q95-63296. The
RTC found him guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua, as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged in the Information, the Court hereby sentences the accused:

a] to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua;

b] to pay the heirs of Sgt. Cajucom the amount of P50,000.00 as actual damages;
P50,000.00 as moral damages; P75,000.00 as indemnity for his death; P50,000.00
as exemplary damages; and P863,452.80 for the loss of his earning capacity plus
interest from the date of his death at the rate of six (6%) percent per annum; and
c] to pay the costs.[2]
In an Information dated October 2, 1995, Assistant City Prosecutor Restituto A.
Sevilla charged appellant in these words:

That on or about the 17th day of September 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with other persons whose
true names, identities and whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill and by means of treachery, evident
premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the
person of SPO2 PERFECTO CAJUCOM Y CUYA, by then and there, shooting him
with a gun several times, hitting him on different parts of his body, thereby inflicting
upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the late SPO2 PERFECTO
CAJUCOM Y CUYA. [3]

Upon his arraignment on March 20, 1996,[4] appellant, assisted by his

counsel,[5] pleaded not guilty. After trial in due course, the court a quo rendered the
assailed Decision.

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief,[6] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions
version of the facts as follows:

About 10:30 p.m. of September 17, 1995, Emilio Andan, a Barangay Kagawad,
together with a certain Delmo, Popoy Ortega and Jose Manabo, another Kagawad,
went to Tylers Videoke Bar located at the corner of E. Rodriguez Blvd. and Lopez
Jaena St., Quezon City. They each ordered a bottle of beer.

About five (5) minutes later, a certain Noel, a friend of Kagawad Manabo, joined the
group. About twenty (20) minutes later, a group of five (5) youngsters, including
Jomel Magnabe, son of appellant, arrived.

Almost an hour later, the group of the youngsters started making trouble inside
Tylers. They kicked, punched and hit with bottles of beer the group of Kagawad
Andan.

Kagawad Andan, not knowing that his side was hit with a dart by a member of Jomel
Magnabes group rushed out of the bar. Outside, he chanced upon SPO2 Perfecto
Cajucom and asked for help.

SPO2 Cajucom was then with Ma. Cristina Crisanta Manabo, his teammate in
bowling. The two had just finished taking a snack at the Goodies Carinderia along
Sto. Tomas Street. They were on their way to visit Ms. Manabos friend.
As soon as Kagawad Andan informed SPO2 Cajucom of the commotion, the former
pointed to two (2) malefactors standing some fifteen (15) meters away. The two (2)
immediately ran and SPO2 Cajucom shouted Tigil, pulis ako!. The latter then pulled
out his gun, fired a warning shot and ran after the two (2).

Kagawad Andan, on the other hand, looked for a tricycle and proceeded to the Jose
Reyes Memorial Hospital for treatment.

Ms. Manabo followed SPO2 Cajucom when he ran after the two. Said police officer
was able to catch up with one of them at the door of a house selling La Paz Batchoy,
along Cordillera Street.

Ms. Manabo was then beside a lam[p]post just opposite said house selling La Paz
Batchoy. The area was well lighted, there being many lights and a night club adjacent
to said house.

SPO2 Cajucom told the one he caught, Halika, sumama ka!. However, the latter
refused to go with the former. Besides, the people inside the house were trying to pull
him away from SPO2 Cajucom who refused to let go of his hold.

While the tagging and dragging was going on, a taxicab arrived bearing herein
appellant SPO2 Jose Magnabe. He alighted, watched what was happening, pulled a
gun and, while at the back of SPO2 Cajucom, pointed the same at the latters neck.

Barely five (5) meters away, Ms. Manabo was able to recognize SPO2 Magnabe who
is familiar with the latter, being assigned in Galas, Quezon City where she lives.

When SPO2 Cajucom turned his head and shoulder to his right, appellant immediately
shot him on the clavicle. Said victim was then no longer holding his gun, being
preoccupied with pulling with both his hand[s] Jomel Magnabe the person he caught.

After the shot, appellant pushed SPO2 Cajucom inside the house. The man the latter
caught then pulled him inside, and appellant closed the door. Thereafter, Ms. Manabo
heard gunshots, and shouts of women.

When appellant later came out, Ms. Manabo immediately ran to him, told him what
she saw, and asked where SPO2 Cajucom was. SPO2 Magnabe answered Anong
sinasabi mo, wala akong alam sa sinasabi mo. And when told that she witnessed him
shoot SPO2 Cajucom, SPO2 Magnabe just stared at Ms. Manabo.
Ms. Manabo got scared and immediately ran away. Along E. Rodriguez Avenue, she
met a mobile patrol car and briefly related what she witnessed. She then pointed to
appellant who was still staring at her.

When confronted by the responding police officers, appellant uttered Walang

papasok. Wala munang makikialam. Hintayin natin ang imbestigador.

Despite the arrival of another mobile car, appellant continued to refuse to allow entry
inside the house.

On the other hand, still afraid, Ms. Manabo ran and went home.

The body of said victim was later autopsied by Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra, a medico-
legal officer who issued Medico-Legal Report No. M-1443-95 wherein it was stated
that SPO2 Cajucom died of multiple gunshot wounds.

During the autopsy, Dr. Freyra found that SPO2 Cajucom [sustained] five (5) wounds,
four (4) of which were gunshot wounds and one (1) lacerated wound. Wound No. 1
was located on the left supraclavicular region and had tattooing near it. Wound No. 2
was a lacerated wound on the left parietal region. Wound No. 3 was a gunshot wound
in the epigastric region which went through and through.Wound No. 4 was a gunshot
wound on the left anterior lumbar region. Wound No. 5 was a gunshot wound on the
left coastal region.

Dr. Freyra declared that all the gunshot wounds were fatal because they penetrated the
vital organs. The first gunshot wound penetrated the upper lobe of the liver and the
lungs. The second wound reached the left dome of the diaphragm and the left lobe of
the liver and the pancreas. The third wound found its way up to the loops and
mesentery of the large intestine. The fourth wound slipped up to the left dome of the
diaphragm, loops of the large intestine, and both kidneys. (Citations omitted)
[7]

Version of the Defense

Invoking self-defense, appellant narrates his version of the facts in the following
manner:[8]

On September 17, 1995, an advance birthday party was given to the grandson of
accused. After Rodnel had helped in the preparation of the food at about 5:00 in the
afternoon, Rodnel sought x x x permission from accuseds wife, Teresita, to leave the
house. When he failed to see the person he would meet he proceeded to a carinderia
named Foodchow located just near the accuseds house at the other side of E.
Rodriguez Street. He just sat there until [his] brother, Roger Padilla, with three (3)
friends, namely: Edgar, Lloyd and Roland, arrived at about 11:30 in the evening.

Meantime, at x x x Magnabes birthday, the visitors started to go home and among

them were Josephine Moreno and her son. Since it was already late in the evening,
accused and his sons, upon the request of Josephine accompanied the latter to
Novaliches on board a taxicab.

On the other hand, brothers Rodnel and Roger Padilla, in the company of Edgar,
Lloyd and Roland went to Tylers Videoke-Bar (Tylers for short)[.] They sat at the
table located at the right side of the door and ordered only five (5) bottles of
beer. Thereafter, one of his companions, Roland, caused a loud sound with the use of
a Humpty-Dumpty, chichiria wrapper. It immediately caught the attention of the
group of eight (8) persons, one of them later identified as the deceased Sgt. Cajucom,
who [was] seated at the other table. One of them remarked: Pare, HAPPY NEW
YEAR, para sa ating lahat iyan - After two of Rodnels companions left the place, five
(5) persons stood up from the other table and approached Rodnels group and
asked Pare, ano bang problema ninyo? Rodnel answered: Wala, pare . . . walang
problema sa amin!

Trouble then ensued. Lloyd and Roland were hit with bottles and a chair while Rodnel
was punched by one of the five (5) men on his right cheek. Rodnel ran out and he was
pursued by the other three (3) persons, namely, the deceased [Sgt.] Cajucom who was
in civilian clothes, wearing a white T-shirt; and Kagawads Andan and Manabo. While
he was at the vicinity of [F]oodchow, he saw that the two kagawads still pursued him
while [Sgt.] Cajucom had stayed in the middle of the road.

Then a fistfight ensued between Rodnel and the two kagawads and Rodnel having
been able to subdue his two attackers tried to run towards the accuseds house
whereupon he was accosted by Sgt. Cajucom who said: Huwag kang tatakbo, pulis
ako! which the former answered back, saying: Pulis ka pala, kanina pa kami
nagsusuntukan, hindi mo kami inawat[,] and continued running towards his
house[.] Sgt. Cajucom followed him and when he turned his head back he saw [Sgt.]
Cajucom pulling a gun from his belt bag strapped in his waist[.] Then Rodnel felt
pains at his right leg as he was hit at his right ankle.

Despite his injury, Rodnel was able to reach the accuseds house but Sgt. Cajucom
followed him. Inside the house, Sgt. Cajucom held Rodnel by his waist and pointed
his gun, a .38 caliber revolver, at his head. Surprised by what was happening inside
the house, the wife of the accused pleaded Sandali . . . sandali baka pwede nating
pag-usapan ito . . . ano bang nangyari? . . . Pulis din naman ang asawa ko . . . baka
pwede nating hintayin ang asawa ko at pag-usapan natin? But the gun-wielding man
reasoned out: Ayoko . . . hindi pwede . . . pulis pa rin ako! and continued pulling
Rodnel outside. While the pleadings of the accuseds wife were being made, Sgt.
Cajucom was pointing his gun to those inside the sala at that time so no one could
approach him.

At that moment, the accused was coming home and while still on board the taxicab,
he noticed many people milling in front of their house and one was shouting to him,
saying Mang Jun . . . Mang Jun . . . may tao sa loob ng bahay ninyo, may baril! By
police instinct, the accused walked cautiously towards the door and saw at their sala,
Sgt. Cajucom pointing his gun at the head of his nephew Rodnel.

The accused asked Sgt. Cajucom: Pare, ibaba mo iyang baril mo baka may matamaan
dito sa pamilya ko or words of similar [import]. But Sgt. Cajucom who appeared to be
not in his senses parang wala sa sarili . . . lasing ignored him. The accused continued
to approach Sgt. Cajucom and [pleaded] with him to put his gun down, afraid that his
family might be hurt. Accuseds wife introduced him to Sgt. Cajucom and told him
that he was also a policeman. Accused also introduced himself pleading Brod, baka
puwedeng ibaba mo yang baril mo at pag-usapan natin ito dahil pulis din naman
ako[,] and, further, saying Pareho tayong pulis. [B]ut the latter answered back, in
hostile language saying, Eh ano kung pulis ka! and/or Hindi kita kilala! and/or Wala
akong pakialam kung pulis ka! The accused continued pleading, saying: Hindi . . .
pag-usapan na lang natin ito . . . pulis Galas ako . . . hindi mo ako kilala. which was
answered by Sgt. Cajucom in this wise Ah . . . basta hindi kita kilala.

After saying those words, Sgt. Cajucom let go of Rodnel and thereafter, faced the
accused, and [pointed] his gun at him. The accused instinctively grabbed and raised
the left hand of Sgt. Cajucom which held the gun and parried it assuring himself that
if it would go off it would not hit any member of his family. As it happened, the gun
held by Sgt. Cajucom went off hitting the ceiling of their house. Accused at once
brought down the left hand of Sgt. Cajucom which still held the gun and signaled his
family to move out of the way.

The accused tried to shove his wife, and turned to his right towards his wife but the
gun went off for the second time hitting his left buttock. Fearing for his life and those
of his family, and still feeling the hot sensation running over his behind and at the
verge of losing consciousness, the accused drew his .45 caliber service pistol from his
right waist line and fired it once [directed] at Sgt. Cajucoms left shoulder. To insure
their safety, he fired again his gun as he was still sumusugod sa akin. Thereafter, he
lost consciousness and when he had regained it, a mobile patrol car had arrived.

Operatives of the Police Station 11 in Galas, Quezon City, in the persons of PO3
Rodolfo Mercado and one PO3 Asigan likewise responded to the call for police
assistance and proceeded to the scene of the incident. Cristina Donaire, a civilian
police photographer, took pictures of Sgt. Cajucom, including those items encircled
with chalk markings identified as the recovered slugs as well as the area where blood
had spilt.

While they were in the process of taking photographs, another investigator arrived in
the person of PO3 Rene Goyena who ordered Cristina Donaire to take pictures of
everything inside the house and among the pictures she had taken [was] that of the
birthday cake and a poster indicating the greeting, HAPPY BIRTHDAY!

xxxxxxxxx

Meantime, while the policemen were investigating the incident and taking
photographs, the accused was rushed to St. Lukes Hospital in Quezon City in a
stretcher and treated for gunshot wound. His X-ray examination showed a foreign
body lodged at the left lumber area. (Citations omitted)

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court found that the respective versions of the parties are diametrically
opposed. The prosecutions version is that the killing transpired outside the house of the
accused while that of the defense is that it took place inside the house. [9]
However, the RTC ruled that the prosecution, through the credible and convincing
testimony of its witness Cristina Manabo, was able to establish the guilt of appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. Manabo was with the victim, SPO2 Perfecto Cajucom, when
trouble began outside Tylers. She followed him up to a point near the doorstep of
appellants house. There he was shot by appellant on the clavicle and thereafter pushed
inside and shot three more times.
The trial court rejected the testimonies of the defense witnesses, saying they were
not credible when they took the witness stand. They appeared tentative and evasive in
giving their answers and, therefore, not convincing. Instead of a clear picture of the
shooting incident, what had been depicted was a blurred presentment of what they
claimed to have transpired. The Court could not make anything out of their contradictory
and irreconcilable testimonies.[10]
Likewise, the RTC overruled the contention of self-defense proffered by appellant, as
his witnesses failed to present a consistent and coherent story. [11] It further held that
treachery had qualified the shooting to murder.
Hence, this appeal.[12]

Issues
 In his Brief, appellant raises the following alleged errors for our consideration:
I

The lower court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Prosecution Witness
Cristina Manabo that the victim was shot outside the house.
II

The lower court erred in ruling that the testimonies of appellants witnesses are
contradictory and irreconcilable.
III

The lower court erred in not ruling that appellant acted in self-defense.
IV

The lower court erred in not acquitting appellant, his guilt not having been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
V

The lower court erred in ruling that the offense charged was qualified by the attending
circumstance of treachery. [13]

In the main, these issues can be lumped into three: (1) the credibility of Prosecution
Witness Cristina Manabo, (2) the viability of appellants self-defense argument, and (3)
the presence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant should be convicted of homicide, not

murder.

First Issue:
Credibility of the Prosecution Witness

Appellant assails the credibility of Cristina Manabo, claiming that she had not seen
him shoot Sergeant Cajucom on the clavicle before the latter was pushed inside the
house. In addition, she allegedly did not hear the subsequent gunshots inside or accost
appellant to ask about the victims whereabouts.
 Time and time again, this Court has said that the assessment of the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court, because it has the
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor and conduct
on the witness stand. Its findings on such matters, absent any arbitrariness or oversight
of facts or circumstances of weight and substance, are final and conclusive upon this
Court and will not to be disturbed on appeal.[14]
In this case, the RTC found the prosecution witnesses to be credible and
convincing. It observed that Manabo had appeared very candid and truthful on the
witness stand. She remained steadfast, notwithstanding the grueling cross-examination
conducted by the defense lawyer. In her narration she said that she was outside the
house of appellant, about six meters away from the door, when he shot
Sergeant Cajucom.[15] She positively stated that, earlier, while the victim was pulling with
both hands the person he had caught, appellant alighted from a taxi and approached
Sergeant Cajucom from the back. Appellant poked his .45 caliber pistol at the nape of the
victim. When the latter turned around, the former immediately opened fire, hitting the
victim on the clavicle. Manabo testified thus:
PROS. CHUA CHENG:
Q: When Sgt. Magnabe arrived while the back of Sgt. Cajucom was towards Sgt. Magnabe,
what did Sgt. Magnabe do, if any?
A: I saw him [point] his gun at the nape of Sgt. Cajucom, mam.
Q: What side of the nape?
A: At this side, mam. I am not sure if it is in the middle.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to the base of her neck.
ATTY. ABIVAS:
The word nape is enough.
WITNESS:
A: I am not sure if it is in the center of the nape or what, mam.
PROSECUTOR CHUA CHENG:
Q: When Sgt. Magnabe poked his gun at the back of Sgt. Cajucom, at the nape area, what did
Sgt. Cajucom do, if any?
A: When he turned his head around binaril ho agad siya.
Q: Will you please demonstrate to us how Sgt. Cajucom turned his head?
A: Like this, mam.
INTERPRETER:
Witness turning her head towards the left shoulder with movement.
PROS CHUA CHENG:
 Q: You are Sgt. Magnabe and the interpreter is Sgt. Cajucom.
A: When the gun of Sgt. Magnabe was pointed to the nape of Sgt. Cajucom, Sgt. Cajucom
turned his head with shoulder movement, turned towards the right then Sgt. Magnabe shot
him on his clavicle, mam.
ATTY. ABIVAS:
Your Honor please, we just make it of record the exact position of the body of this Sgt. Cajucom
when the accused allegedly fired his gun because it would appear that the right side of
the victim was facing Sgt. Magnabe.
COURT:
Q: Was there a shoulder movement?
A: Yes, your Honor.
ATTY. ABIVAS:
We again let the witness demonstrate, your Honor. May it be reflected in the record that the
right side of the victim was facing the front of the alleged assailant, Sgt. Magnabe, when
the shot was made, your Honor.
May we know the distance, your Honor.
WITNESS:
A: Less than a foot, your Honor.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to the area of the clavicle, a portion below the shoulder but above the chest. [16]
After firing once, appellant pushed the victim inside the house, stepped in, and closed
the door behind them. Manabo, who was left standing outside the closed door, heard two
to four more gunshots. She further testified in this wise:
PROS CHUA CHENG:
xxxxxxxxx
Q: After he was shot at by Sgt. Magnabe, what happened next, if any?
A: He was pulled by the man he was holding at the time he was shot and then Sgt. Magnabe
pushed him inside the house, mam.
Q: How about Sgt. Magnabe?
A: He closed the door, mam.
COURT:
Q: Who closed the door?
A: Sgt. Magnabe, your Honor.
PROS CHUA CHENG:
Q: Sgt. Magnabe also went inside the house?
A: Yes, mam.
 Q: What happened next?
A: I heard gunshots, mam.
xxxxxxxxx
COURT:
Q: How many gunshots did you hear inside the house?
A: From 2 to 4 shots, your Honor.[17]
Manabo executed her affidavit before a police investigator on September 19, 1995,
or less than 36 hours after the shooting incident on September 17, 1995. On the other
hand, the witnesses for the defense executed theirs long after the incident and in the
presence of appellants counsel. Obviously, Manabo hardly had an opportunity to concoct
her clear and convincing story. Interwoven, her affidavit and testimony complement each
another.
Verily, there is no cogent reason to overturn the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of the witnesses.

Second Issue:
Self-Defense

Similarly without merit is the contention of appellant that he was able to establish the
elements of self-defense. The defense witnesses conflicting, inconsistent and unreliable
testimonies betray his claim.
By invoking self-defense, appellant admits to killing Sergeant Cajucom and thereby
incurs the burden of proving the following: (a) that the victim was guilty of unlawful
aggression, (b) there was reasonable necessity of the means employed by appellant to
prevent or repel the aggression, and (c) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on
appellants part.[18]
It is crucial to ask whether the victim Cajucom was an unlawful aggressor. We answer
this question in the negative. Aggression, to be unlawful, must be actual and imminent,
such that there is a real threat of bodily harm to the person resorting to self-defense or to
others whom that person is seeking to defend. According to Manabos testimony,
appellant was behind while, with both hands, Sergeant Cajucom was pulling the person
he had caught towards the door. This was the scenario that appellant chanced upon when
he arrived at the scene. The victims demeanor at that moment did not constitute unlawful
aggression. There was no actual or imminent threat of bodily harm to appellant or to
Jomel or to any other person.
Without unlawful aggression, appellant cannot successfully invoke self-
defense. Even assuming that he tried to defend a stranger, his defense will not prosper. In
the defense of a stranger, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is also
indispensable.[19]
 Appellant alleges that the physical evidence supports his self-defense argument. He
asserts that no blood was spilt or bullet shell recovered outside the door of his house,
thus giving credence to his claim that no actual shooting had occurred there. Furthermore,
he points to a crack in the wall inside the house, allegedly hit by a bullet fired from the
victims .38 caliber revolver.
We are not convinced. It is a hornbook doctrine that one who invokes self-defense
must rely on the strength of ones own evidence, not on the weakness of that of the
prosecution.[20]Having admitted to killing the victim, appellant had the duty to present clear
and convincing evidence in order to absolve himself.
The physical evidence relied upon by appellant does not convince the Court that he
must be acquitted. Indeed, of no moment is the claim that no bullet shell or blood was
found outside the house. The defense failed to establish that the investigating policemen
had actually examined the area outside the house. There is not even any assertion in this
direction. The blood from the victim did not spill anywhere outside the house because,
before he fell, he was immediately pushed inside by appellant. That no bullet shell was
recovered outside the house is consistent with the evidence indicating that the
investigating policemen readily examined the inside of the house, but not the
outside. Whatever its source, the wall crack inside does not negate the fact that the
victims body was found there riddled with bullets.

Third Issue:
Treachery

Contrary to the trial courts finding, we believe that the prosecution failed to prove that
treachery had attended the killing of the victim. For treachery to be present, the means,
methods or forms of execution should give the person attacked no opportunity for self-
defense or retaliation. And it must be proven that these were deliberately and consciously
adopted without danger to appellant.[21]
Appellant could not have deliberately and consciously adopted his mode of attack for,
upon alighting from a taxi outside his residence, he merely chanced upon the victim. That
treachery was absent when the former first shot the latter outside the house was thus
correctly ruled by the RTC.
However, the Court disagrees that treachery attended the subsequent shots fired by
appellant inside the house, for the proven facts do not support this finding. We quote from
the assailed Decision as follows:

The Court would not speculate on how the accused sustained the gunshot wound on
his left buttock but it could not have been the scenario the defense presented
considering all the inconsistencies and contradictions. The accused said that it was
when he shoved his wife that the second shot rang out and hit his left buttock. The
slug may have come from the .38 firearm of Sgt. Cajucom, but the Court believes that
he could not have fired it because he was no longer in control. When Sgt. Cajucom
was shot by the accused, he was pushed inside the house while the others from the
inside pulled him in. When he was already inside, the door was closed to the
exclusion of everyone except family members. There he was repeatedly shot. [22]

After a thorough review of the records of the instant case, we hold that the court a
quo could not have ascertained what had actually transpired behind the closed door. Its
own findings cited above belie its ruling that treachery was present. Other than plain
speculation, there is no clear and convincing showing that the victim had no opportunity
to defend himself; or that appellant deliberately and consciously employed means,
methods or forms of execution without any danger to the latter. Aside from hearing the
gunshots and the screams of the women inside the house, Manabo could not and did not
testify on what had actually transpired behind the closed door.
Even after sustaining a fatal injury from the first gunshot wound, it is possible that the
victim put up a last-ditch effort to defend himself against appellant. They might have
grappled for the latters .45 caliber service pistol. It is also possible that the victim himself,
with his last ounce of strength, pulled the trigger of his .38 caliber revolver while aiming
at appellant. The available evidence shows that the latter was indeed hit by a bullet fired
from the formers revolver.[23] We cannot ascertain the immediate sequence of events
leading to the exchange of gunfire inside the house. Thus, doubt still lingers as to whether
treachery attended the shooting there, simply because the door was closed and the
prosecution eyewitness could not see what was going on inside.
To appreciate treachery, the facts constituting this circumstance cannot be left to
mere speculation, but must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant, in asserting
self-defense, admits to killing the victim, but his admission does not include the fact that
treachery attended the killing. Treachery cannot be presumed. It cannot be carved out
from mere suppositions.[24]Since treachery has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt
in the present case, appellant should be convicted only of homicide, not murder.
The penalty for homicide under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
temporal. Because no aggravating or mitigating circumstances were proven, the
appropriate penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period.[25] Appellant is also entitled
to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Civil Liability

The award of P50,000 as actual damages must be reduced. The trial court based this
award mainly on the assertion of the wife of the victim. She claimed that she had spent
that much for his burial; however, only P15,955 was supported by receipts.[26] Only this
latter amount may thus be awarded, in line with the rule that only damages supported by
evidence on record shall be allowed.[27] Moral damages awarded by the RTC in the amount
of P50,000 is reasonable, considering the grief and sorrow suffered by the wife of the
victim at the sudden loss of her husband.[28] However, there being no aggravating
circumstance, the award of P50,000 as exemplary damages is hereby
deleted. Furthermore, the P75,000 civil indemnity for the victims death is reduced
to P50,000. The trial court erred in relying on People v. Victor,[29] because the P75,000
award there is applicable only when a crime is qualified by any of the circumstances under
which the death penalty is authorized.
After recomputation, the award for loss of earning capacity is increased
from P863,452.80 to P925,128.[30] Sgt. Cajucoms monthly income at the time of his death
was P8,566.[31] His annual income, computed at the rate of P8,566 per month multiplied
by 12 months, is P102,792. To this amount would be deducted his necessary and
incidental expenses estimated at fifty percent (50%) thereof, leaving a net annual income
of P51,396. Being fifty-three (53) years old at the time of his death,[32] his life expectancy
of 18 more years is derived using this formula: 2/3 x [80 (age of victim at the time of
death)]. Multiplying his net annual income of P51,396 to his remaining life expectancy of
18 years, we arrive at P925,128 as his loss of earning capacity.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant
is CONVICTED of homicide and SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of eight years
of prision mayor medium, as minimum; to fourteen years and eight months of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum. The award for civil damages is
hereby MODIFIED to P15,955 for actual damages, P50,000 for moral damages, P50,000
for indemnity ex delicto, and P925,128 for loss of earning capacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

THE PEOPLE OF THE G.R. Nos. 152864-65

PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,

Present:
- versus -
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUITIERREZ,
CORONA,
SPO1 MARIO MARCIAL, SPO1 AZCUNA, and
MONICO BOLOTANO, SPO1 GARCIA, JJ.
ANASTACIO MAGLINTE, SPO1
ALFREDO NUEZ, SPO1 RUDY
BUNALOS, and PO3 TOMAS
DUHAYLUNSOD,
Respondents.

Promulgated:

September 27, 2006

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court purportedly
raising a question of law and assailing the orders dated February 6, 2002 [1] and
March 7, 2002[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of Oroquieta City (the
RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 798-14-235 and 800-14-237.

The facts appear as follows:

 Two informations, one for homicide and one for frustrated homicide, were
filed with the RTC against respondents SPO1 Mario Marcial,
SPO1 Monico Bolotano, SPO1 Anastacio Maglinte, SPO1 Alfredo Nuez, SPO1
Rudy Bunalos and PO3 Tomas Duhaylunsod, all members of the Philippine
National Police, in connection with a shooting incident that occurred on December
18, 1999. As a result of the incident, one Junnyver Dagle died while one Wendell
Sales was seriously injured.

The information for homicide against the respondents reads as follows:

That on 18 December 1999, in Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental, and within

the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
together and mutually helping one another, committing the offense in relation to
their office and in grave abuse thereof with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot JUNNYVER DAGLE with their firearms, thereby
inflicting upon the latter a fatal injury to his head, which caused his instantaneous
death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Oroquieta City, Philippines, May 23, 2001.[3]

On the other hand, the information for frustrated homicide reads as follows:

That on or about the 18th December 1999, in the municipality of Lopez Jaena,
province of Misamis Occidental, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
once another, committing the offense in relation to their office and in grave abuse
thereof, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
shoot WENDELL SALES with their firearms, thereby inflicting upon the latter an
injury which ordinarily would cause the death of said WENDELL SALES, thus
performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of
homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the said accused, that is, by the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to the said WENDELL SALES which prevented his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Oroquieta City, Philippines, May 23, 2001.[4]

 On arraignment, respondents pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against
them. Pre-trial was thereafter held and terminated, resulting in the issuance by the
RTC of a pre-trial order[5] which, among others, approved the partial stipulation of
facts, issues and witnesses[6] dated December 20, 2001 entered into by the parties.

The parties stipulated as to the following facts:[7]

(1) The identity of all respondents and their affiliation with the PNP-
Lopez Jaena Police Station;
(2) In the evening of December 18, 1999, all respondents were
members of the PNP Team that responded to an alleged or reported call for police
assistance at, and received by, the Lopez Jaena Police Station, coming from an
alleged caller;
(3) The PNP team composed of all respondents proceeded to the
direction of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental;
(4) After the Solsolon Bridge located in Barangay Sibula,
Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental, all respondents saw two (2) persons riding
astride a motorcycle going towards the direction of Plaridel, Misamis Occidental,
who, after the incident, were identified to be the late Junnyver Dagle and Wendell
Sales;
(5) While Junnyver Dagle and Wendell Sales were riding on a
motorcycle with the latter driving, there were shots fired, coming from the direction
of respondents;
(6) As a result of the shooting, Junnyver Dagle and Wendell Sales were
hit and injured, the nature of their injuries being described in their respective
Medico-legal Certificates dated December 27, 1999 issued by
Dr. Olyzar H. Recamadas, the attending physician, and attested to by Provincial
Health Officer II Jose M. Salomon, Sr. of the Misamis Occidental Provincial
Hospital, Oroquieta City as follows:
a. Junnyver Dagle:
DOA
Gunshoot wound left temporal area
Avulsion left leg

b. Wendell Sales:
Avulsion left leg distal 3rd secondary to alleged gunshot wound

(7) The Lopez Jaena Police Station, through Police Inspector Mario R.
Rubio, issued a Certification dated December 23, 1999 relative to the entries found
on its Police Blotter on December 23, 1999. This certification was admitted as to its
existence only by the prosecution;

(8) The fact of death of Junnyver Dagle is admitted as well as the fact
that Wendell Sales sustained bodily injury;

(9) For the death of Junnyver Dagle, his heirs are entitled to a civil
indemnity in the sum of P50,000;

(10) In relation to the December 18, 1999 incident subject of the present
criminal cases, there was a criminal case for robbery filed against Wendell Sales by
the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Misamis Occidental before RTC, Branch 14,
of Oroquieta City entitled People v. Wendell Sales docketed as Criminal Case No.
729-14-167. A judgment was subsequently rendered in the latter case convicting
Wendell Sales of the crime charged but this judgment was appealed to the Court of
Appeals where it remains pending to date.

The parties likewise agreed on the following issues:[8]

(1) Whether there was a hot pursuit conducted by respondents on the motorcycle-
riding tandem of Junnyver Dagle and Wendell Sales, with respondents
riding on board their police service vehicle in the vicinity of
Barangay Sibula, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental;

(2) Whether there were warning shots made by respondents, directed in the air,
to cause the motorcycle riders to stop;

(3) Whether Junnyver Dagle or Wendell Sales tried to pull out a short firearm
and (whether Dagle or Sales) fired it at respondents, causing some of them
to fire back;

(4) Assuming a firearm was pulled out, whether it was Junnyver Dagle who pulled
out such gun and aimed and fired it at the direction of respondents;

(5) Whether there was found near the person of the fallen Junnyver Dagle a .45
caliber pistol without a serial number;

(6) Whether the parents of the late Junnyver Dagle incurred burial and
transportation expenses by reason of the latters untimely demise;

(7) Whether Wendell Sales incurred medical expenses by reason of his

hospitalization for the injuries he sustained; and,
 (8) Whether the parents of the late Junnyver Dagle and private complainant Wendell
Sales are entitled to moral damages.

During the hearing held on February 6, 2002, petitioner made an oral motion
to reverse the order of the trial upon the ground that respondents admitted
committing the acts for which they were charged in the two informations but
interposed lawful justifying circumstances. The motion was denied by the RTC for
lack of merit in the assailed order dated February 6, 2002. Its motion for
reconsideration having been similarly denied, petitioner filed the present petition.
The issues are:

(a) Whether an order denying a partys motion to modify or reverse the order of
trial in a criminal case is appealable; and,

(b) Assuming that the order is appealable, whether it is mandatory for a trial
court to modify or reverse the order of trial when an accused admits the
offense but interposes a lawful defense.

Petitioner argues as follows:

Firstly, since respondents expressly admitted having committed the acts

charged but are interposing an affirmative defense, a modification or reversal of the
order of trial is warranted under Section 3 (e),[9] Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
which provides as follows:
(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be
modified.

Secondly, an order reversing or modifying the order of trial would also be

consistent with the second paragraph of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493 (Speedy
Trial Act) and its implementing Circular No. 38-98, specifically the second
paragraph of Section 3 of the Circular, thus:
 Republic Act No. 8493, Section 7:

xxx

If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state
whether he/she interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative
defense shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial
and require the accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing
evidence.

Circular No. 38-98, Section 3:

xxx

If the accused has pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, he may state
whether he interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense
shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyong reasonable doubt, while an affirmative defense may
modify the order of trial and require the accused to prove such defense by
clear and convincing evidence.

Thirdly, the reversal or modification of the order of trial in the present case
would promote the intent and objectives of the Speedy Trial Act, preserve the rights
of the parties, and prevent a confusing and disorderly trial.
The assailed orders of the RTC denied the request of the prosecution for a
reverse order of trial basically on the grounds that:

1. There is no clear admission of guilt on the part of the

accused, herein respondents, under the stipulation of facts entered into;

2. A reverse order of trial in these cases would only serve to

delay rather than speed up the proceedings; and,

3. The course of the trial is better governed by the usual order

under Section 11, Rule 119, of the Revised Rules of Court and the sequence
set forth in the pre-trial order, agreed upon by the parties, which did not
include an agreement to a reverse the order of trial.
 After considering the arguments of both parties herein, the Court finds that the
RTC did not commit any reversible error in denying the request for a reverse order
of trial, a matter which under the rules is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. In fact, the rule relied upon by petitioner clearly reflects this discretionary
nature of the procedure, thus:
Rules of Court, Rule 119, Section 3(e):

xxx

(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be
modified.[10] (Emphasis supplied.)

Republic Act No. 8493, Section 7, likewise states:

xxx
If the accused pleads not guilty to the crime charged, he/she shall state
whether he/she interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense
shall require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require the
accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence. (Emphasis
supplied.)

So also Circular No. 38-98, Section 3, reads as follows:

xxx

If the accused has pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, he may state
whether he interposes a negative or affirmative defense. A negative defense shall
require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyong reasonable doubt,
while an affirmative defense may modify the order of trial and require the
accused to prove such defense by clear and convincing evidence. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Accordingly, the RTC correctly exercised its discretion in denying petitioners

request for a reverse order of trial.

In any event, a denial of a motion to reverse the Order of Trial is interlocutory in

nature and, hence, not appealable. As it turned out, petitioners appeal has in fact
caused more, a lot more, delay than would have been caused by proceeding with the
trial forthwith as directed by the trial court. No further delay should be countenanced
in these cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 198110 July 31, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
WILSON ROMAN, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated February 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03972, which affirmed with modification the Judgment 2 dated June 10, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 35, in Criminal Case No. IR-4231.

The Antecedent Facts

On November 11, 1996, Wilson Roman (accused-appellant) was charged with Murder before the
RTC of Iriga City, Branch 35. Upon arraignment on February 6, 2004, accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty to the charge.3 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented the following as witnesses: Elena Romero (Romero), Asterio Ebuenga
(Ebuenga), Martin Borlagdatan (Borlagdatan), Elisea Indaya (Indaya), Ramil Baylon (Baylon), SPO1
Medardo Delos Santos and Dr. Teodora Pornillos (Dr. Pornillos). The defense, on the other hand,
presented the testimony of the accused-appellant and Delia Tampoco (Tampoco).

Prosecution witness Romero testified that in the morning of June 22, 1995, she was at a wedding
party in the house of a certain Andang Toniza in Barangay Coguit, Balatan, Camarines Sur, when
she witnessed the accused-appellant hacks Vicente Indaya (victim) unrelentingly with a bolo. The
victim was hit on his head, nape, right shoulder, base of the nape and right elbow before he fell on
the ground and instantly died.4

Borlagdatan, who was also at the wedding party, testified that he was at the kitchen, getting rice to
be served for the guests, when he heard someone shouting that somebody was hacked. When he
went out to check what the commotion is about, he saw the victim lying on his stomach, drenched in
his own blood, while the accused-appellant was standing in front of him, holding a bolo. Borlagdatan
tried to seize possession of the bolo from the accused-appellant but the latter made a downward
thrust, hitting his right thumb. He left the place and proceeded to the nearby health center to have
his wound treated.5

The testimonies of Ebuenga and Ramil Baylon, who were also in attendance at the wedding party,
corroborated the testimony of Borlagdatan.

Ebuenga testified that he was only two (2) feet away from the accused-appellant and the victim
when the former hacked the latter at the back of his head, nape and left shoulder.6 Baylon, on the
other hand, demonstrated in open court how the incident transpired, with him acting as the accused-
appellant and a court employee as the victim. With the court employee had his back to Baylon, the
latter mimicked how the accused- appellant hacked the victim five (5) times. The accused-appellant
continued to hack the victim even when he was already on his knees. 7

Indaya, wife of the victim, testified that she learned of the incident from her sister-in-law, Consorcia
Villaflor. They immediately proceeded to the crime scene and saw her husband lying on his
stomach, with five (5) hack wounds at the back of his head. She further testified on the damages
sustained by their family from the untimely demise of the victim, who is a father to eleven (11)
children and the breadwinner of the household.8

Dr. Pornillos interpreted in open court the Necropsy Report 9 executed by Dr. Mario Bañal (Dr.
Bañal), who conducted the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of the victim. She testified that
the victim sustained seven (7) hack wounds. The first and second wounds were inflicted at the back
of the head and at the posterior lobe, respectively, while the third and fourth wounds were found at
the skull. The fifth and sixth wounds were inflicted at the left shoulder of the victim while the seventh
wound was at the back portion, above the waist and along the spine. She further testified that the
weapon used could be a bolo and that the assailant was positioned at the back of the victim. She
also confirmed that the wounds could have been inflicted while the victim is already down on the
ground.10

The accused-appellant proffered a different version of the incident. He testified that on June 22,
1995, he went to the house of his parents-in-law in Barangay Coguit, Balatan, Camarines Sur to
bring the bamboos he towed from San Isidro, Balatan, Camarines Sur. On his way back, he met his
close friend, Abundio Belbis (Belbis), who cajoled him to come with him to a wedding party at
Barangay Coguit, Balatan, Camarines Sur. At the wedding venue, he saw the victim having a heated
exchange of words with his brother-in-law, Geronimo Villaflor (Villaflor), who happened to be his
friend. He pacified the two and told Villaflor to leave. Thereafter, he joined Belbis and had some
drinks. After twenty (20) minutes, the victim suddenly appeared, loudly tapped their table and, while
pointing at him, exclaimed, "Son of a bitch, I’ll kill you! Why are you pacifying me? You are just like
your friends." He stood up and turned to leave. While leaving, however, he heard a woman shouting,
"Wilson, you will be hacked!" When he turned his head, he saw the victim running towards him with a
bolo. Seeing the impending attack, he moved back, making him lean on the fence, but still he was hit
on his left hand at the back of his palm. While wrapping his palm with a towel, the victim hit him once
again but he was able to dodge. He got mad and lost control of himself so he pulled his bolo from
the scabbard and hacked the victim.11

Tampoco, on the other hand, testified that when she saw the victim aiming to hack the accused-
appellant, she shouted, "Wilson, you will be hacked!" With her warning, the accused-appellant was
able to move back and avoid the attack. However, the victim moved and lunged at the accused-
appellant again. The accused-appellant was hit once but was, thereafter, able to seize possession of
the bolo from the victim and hacked the latter. 12

The Ruling of the RTC

On June 10, 2009, the RTC rendered a decision, 13 finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused WILSON ROMAN beyond
reasonable doubt for the felony of murder, he is hereby CONVICTED and sentenced to suffer
imprisonment from twenty years and one day to forty years of reclusion perpetua. He is further
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Vicente Indaya represented by Elisea B. Indaya the following
amount: 1)For the death of Vicente Indaya – Pesos:One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00); 2)actual
Damages in the amount of Pesos: Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00); 3)Moral Damages in the amount of
Pesos: Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00); and the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.14

The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements constitutive of the crime
charged. Specifically, it was able to prove the identity of the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of
the crime through the categorical testimonies of Romero, Ebuenga, Borlagdatan and Baylon who
personally witnessed the hacking of the victim. Further, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was
also sufficiently established by the consistent accounts of the witnesses that the accused-appellant
attacked and hacked the victim from behind, while he was unarmed and defenseless, until he was
down on the ground.15

The RTC also dismissed the plea of self-defense proffered by the accused-appellant. It ruled that the
accused-appellant’s bare claim that the unlawful aggression initially came from the victim cannot
stand against the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution showing that it was him who
attacked and repeatedly hacked the victim to his death. It noted the variance between the
testimonies of the accused-appellant and his witness, Tampoco, as to where the bolo that was used
in the crime came from.16 The accused-appellant testified, thus:

"Q What did you do, if any?

A I was able to pull my bolo out of the scabbard and hacked him." 17

On the other hand, Tampoco testified:

"Q While Wilson Roman, the accused was in that position, what did Vicente Indaya do if any?

A What Vicente Indaya did was to move to where I was standing and then Vicente Indaya lunged at
Wilson Roman.

Q Then after that what happened?

A Wilson Roman was able to seize the bolo.

Q Before Wilson Roman was able to seize the bolo held by Vicente Indaya, was Wilson Roman hit
by that bolo?

A Yes, sir.

Q You said that accused Wilson Roman was able to seize the bolo from the victim, Vicente Indaya
and Wilson Roman hacked Indaya, that’s why he died?

A Yes, sir."18

As regards the civil liability, the RTC ordered the accused-appellant to indemnify the heirs of the
victim with actual and moral damages. 19

The Ruling of the CA

On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC in a Decision20 dated February
28, 2011, disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated
June 10, 2009 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the damages. Accordingly, accused-
appellant Wilson Roman is directed to pay the heirs of Vicente Indaya the amount of ₱50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages and ₱30,000.00
as exemplary damages. The award of actual damages of ₱50,000.00 is deleted.

SO ORDERED.21

The CA ruled that the RTC correctly dismissed the accused-appellant’s plea of self-defense to
extricate himself from criminal liability. It pointed out that the eyewitnesses’ accounts confirmed that
the accused-appellant was the unlawful aggressor and not the victim. It was established during the
trial that the victim was only walking in the yard when the accused-appellant attacked him from
behind.

Further, the CA noted that the disparity of the wounds sustained by the accused-appellant and the
victim militates against the claim of self-defense. While the accused-appellant sustained a superficial
cut at the back of his palm, measuring an inch, the victim was inflicted with seven (7) hack wounds
on his head, neck and shoulder, all of which were mortal. 22

The CA, however, modified the award of damages, ratiocinating thus:

In consonance with the Supreme Court’s pronouncements, WE reduce the award of civil indemnity
given by the trial court from ₱100,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 while the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages is maintained.

As to actual damages, the heirs of the victim of murder are not entitled thereto because said
damages were not duly proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. To be entitled to actual
damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable to the injured party.

In the present case, no proof was presented that the heirs of Vicente Indaya actually spent the
amount of ₱50,000.00 awarded by the court a quo. However, under Article 2224 of the Civil Code,
temperate damages may be recovered, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered
pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved. Thus, in lieu of actual damages, the
award of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages is proper.

Likewise, exemplary damages is warranted when the commission of the offense is attended by an
aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. In this case, since the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was established, WE award the amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.23 (Citations omitted)

On March 10, 2011, the accused-appellant, through the Public Attorney’s Office, filed a Notice of
Appeal24 with the CA, pursuant to Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC.

The Issues

The issues for consideration of this Court in the present appeal are the following:
(1) Whether the accused-appellant may properly invoke self-defense;

(2) Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery exists.

The accused-appellant contends that the prosecution was not able to establish his guilt beyond
moral certainty. He argues that he should not be held criminally liable for the death of the victim as
he only acted in self-defense from the unlawful aggression exerted by the latter. He was just

walking when he was suddenly attacked by the victim with a bolo and that he swung his own bolo
only to save himself from the impending danger to his person.25

The accused-appellant further asseverates that there was a reasonable necessity for him to use his
bolo to repel the unlawful aggression of the victim as it is the only weapon available to him at the
time of the attack. He adds that the unlawful aggression was exerted by the victim without any
provocation on his part.26

Even granting that the theory of self-defense is unavailing to him, the accused-appellant contends
that he should only be convicted of the lesser crime of homicide for failure of the prosecution to
establish the presence of treachery. He claims that the evidence on record failed to show that there
was a conscious effort on his part to adopt a particular means, method or form of attack to ensure
the commission of the crime, without affording the victim any opportunity to defend himself. And,
considering that treachery cannot be presumed, he opines that any doubt as to its existence must be
resolved in his favor.27

For their part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the accused-appellant’s guilt
for the crime of murder was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses were positive, clear and consistent in that the victim was unarmed when he was attacked
from behind by the accused-appellant.28

The OSG likewise refutes the accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense. It argues that the evidence
presented by the accused-appellant do not clearly and convincingly establish the presence of
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. The mere fact that the victim was engaged in a heated
argument with another person so much so that the accused-appellant pacified them does not
constitute unlawful aggression within the contemplation of the law. 29

Finally, the OSG maintains that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was clearly established by
the eyewitnesses’ consistent accounts that the accused-appellant, without provocation, suddenly
attacked the victim with his bolo from behind, the latter being defenseless and totally unaware of the
impending danger to his person.30

The Court’s Ruling

The accused-appellant’s guilt was

proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Absent any showing that the lower court overlooked circumstances which would overturn the final
outcome of the case, due respect must be made to its assessment and factual findings. Such
findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are generally binding and conclusive upon this
Court.31
In the instant case, the records are replete with evidence establishing the accused-appellant’s guilt
for the crime charged. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Romero, Borlagdatan and
Baylon, were positive, clear and consistent in all material points. They uniformly declared that they
were at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed and identified the accused-appellant as
the assailant who hacked the victim to his death. Specifically, Baylon relayed in his testimony how
the accused-appellant hacked the unsuspecting victim from behind with a bolo. He recounted that
the accused-appellant continued hacking the victim even as the latter was already kneeling on the
ground.32 Baylon’s testimony was corroborated by several eyewitnesses: Romero, Ebuenga and
Borlagdatan, all of whom confirmed the veracity of his account.

Further corroborating the eyewitnesses’ testimonies is the Necropsy Report issued by Dr. Bañal. In
the said report, it was confirmed that all of the wounds suffered by the victim were located at his
back, mostly in the head, inflicted by a sharp-edged object which is presumably a bolo. 33

Remarkably, the accused-appellant did not impute any ill-motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses which could have impelled them to falsely implicate him in a serious crime like murder.
Where there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill-motive, it is
presumed that they were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.34

With the overwhelming evidence presented against the accused-appellant, this Court entertains no
doubt on his guilt.

The accused-appellant failed to

establish the elements of self-defense.

In his vain attempt to extricate himself from criminal liability, the accused-appellant interposed a plea
of self-defense. In his version of the incident, he claims that the victim was the unlawful aggressor
and that he simply acted in self-defense in order to avert an impending harm. He avers that he
earned the ire of the victim when he intervened in his altercation with Villaflor while at a wedding
reception. A few minutes after that, he claims that the victim came back and loudly tapped the table
where he and his friends were having some drinks. The victim hurled invectives against him and
threatened to kill him but he simply stood up and turned to leave the place. As he was leaving,
however, he heard someone shouting that he is about to be hacked. Turning his head, he saw the
victim running towards him, aiming to hit him with a bolo. He was able to avoid the attack but he was
still hit in the palm as the victim continued to thrust his bolo. It was then that he removed the bolo
from his scabbard and hit the victim.35

It bears emphasizing that self-defense, like alibi, is an inherently weak defense for it is easy to
fabricate. Thus, it must be proven by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes
any vestige of criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it. 36 In order for self-defense to
be appreciated, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence the following elements:
(a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 37

It is a statutory and doctrinal requirement that, for the justifying circumstance of self-defense,
unlawful aggression as a condition sine qua non must be present. There can be no self-defense,
complete or incomplete, unless the victim commits an unlawful aggression against the person
defending himself.38 There is unlawful aggression when the peril to one’s life, limb or right is either
actual or imminent. There must be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon. 39

In People v. Nugas,40 this Court expounded on the nature of unlawful aggression as the key element
of self-defense:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying circumstance
of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in defense of oneself.
The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression
from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril
must not be an imagined or imaginary threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the
concurrence of three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or
material attack or assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the
attack or assault must be unlawful.

Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent
unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or
with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the
injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening;
it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be
offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a
knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere
threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was
holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot. 41 (Citations omitted)

In Del Castillo, the Court discussed the implication of a plea of self-defense, viz:

The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused’s defense is self-
defense he thereby admits being the author of the death of the victim, that it becomes incumbent
upon him to prove the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. The rationale for the
shifting of the burden of evidence is that the accused, by his admission, is to be held criminally liable
unless he satisfactorily establishes the fact of self-defense. But the burden to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is not thereby lifted from the shoulders of the State, which carries it until the end of
the proceedings. In other words, only the onus probandi shifts to the accused, for self-defense is an
affirmative allegation that must be established with certainty by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He
must now discharge the burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness
of that of the Prosecution, considering that the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, cannot be
disbelieved in view of his admission of the killing. 42 (Citations omitted)

Unfortunately for the accused-appellant, his claim of self-defense shrinks into incredulity when
scrutinized alongside the positive and consistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to what
transpired during the incident. It is worth noting that the incident transpired in broad daylight, in the
midst of a wedding reception at that, within the clear view of a number of guests. Thus, it is of no
wonder that the testimonies of all the prosecution witnesses are consistent in all material points,
particularly how the attack was made upon the defenseless victim. They all confirmed that before the
crime was consummated, the victim was only walking in the yard, unarmed. There was not the least
provocation done by the victim that could have triggered the accused-appellant to entertain the
thought that there was a need to defend himself. The victim did not exhibit any act or gesture that
could show that he was out to inflict harm or injury. On the contrary, the witnesses all point to the
accused-appellant as the unlawful aggressor who mercilessly hacked the unwary victim until he
collapsed lifeless on the ground.

Further, as correctly observed by the CA, the severity, location and the number of wounds suffered
by the victim are indicative of a serious intent to inflict harm on the part of the accused-appellant and
not merely that he wanted to defend himself from an imminent peril to life. The CA noted:

As clearly shown by the evidence at hand, his cut was superficial which only measures one (1) inch.
In stark contrast, Vicente Indaya suffered seven (7) hack wounds on his head, neck and shoulder, all
located at the back and Dr. Teodora Pornillos described all of them as fatal. It is, therefore, difficult to
believe that accused-appellant hacked Vicente Indaya merely to defend himself or to disarm the
latter. The severity, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim are eloquent evidence
that accused-appellant was resolute on his intent to kill Vicente Indaya. 43

Moreover, in the incident report executed by the police officers, only one (1) bolo, specifically that
which was used in the hacking, was reported to have been recovered from the crime scene. 44

This belies the accused-appellant’s claim that the victim was also armed at the time of the incident.

Crime was qualified by treachery.

The accused-appellant contends that even supposing he should be found guilty of killing the victim,
he should be convicted only of homicide, not murder, for failure of the prosecution to establish
treachery.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against a person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 45 It
takes place when the following elements concur: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not
in a position to defend himself; and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means of
attack employed.46

The CA correctly appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, viz:

WE also concur with the lower court’s appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressors on unsuspecting
victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its
commission without risk to the aggressors, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the
victims. Verily, what is decisive is that the attack was executed in a manner that the victim was
rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate.

The record shows that Vicente Indaya, while walking in the yard, was suddenly and repeatedly
attacked with a bolo from behind. The manner and mode of attack adopted by accused-appellant, to
OUR minds, bespeak of treachery. To be sure, the victim, who was then unarmed and unsuspecting,
was deprived of any real chance to mount a defense, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime
without risk to accused-appellant. This is also buttressed by the fact that the wounds sustained by
the victim were all located at the back. On this score, WE agree with the trial court’s finding of
treachery.47 (Citations omitted)

At the time that the crime was about to be committed, the victim does not have the slightest idea of
the impending danger to his person. He was not facing the accused-appellant and unarmed, hence,
lacked the opportunity to avoid the attack, or at least put up a defense to mitigate the impact. On the
one hand, the accused-appellant was armed and commenced his attack while behind the victim. The
presence of treachery cannot be any clearer.

Penalty and Award of Damages

The RTC and the CA did not err in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder qualified by treachery. However, modifications have to be made with respect to
the penalty imposed and the amount of civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim.
In its Judgment dated June 10, 2009, the RTC convicted the accused-appellant with the crime of
murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of "imprisonment from twenty years and one day to
forty years of reclusion perpetua."48 On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with
modification only as to the damages.49

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the crime of murder is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2 of the same Code, if the penalty
prescribed by law is composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be imposed if
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the crime. 50 In the
present case, no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime. Thus, the lesser
penalty of reclusion perpetua is the proper penalty which should be imposed upon the accused-
appellant.

The RTC, however, sentenced the accused-appellant to an imprisonment of twenty (20) years and
one (1) day to forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua, giving the impression that the penalty of
reclusion perpetua can be divided into periods when in fact it is a single and indivisible penalty. In
People v. Diquit,51 perpetua is an indivisible penalty, it has no minimum, medium, and maximum
periods. It is imposed in its entirety regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
may have attended the commission of the crime.52 Consequently, in this case, the CA should have
rectified the error committed by the RTC as to the penalty imposed on the accused-appellant. The
CA should have been more circumspect in scrutinizing the appealed decision, specifically the
propriety of the penalty imposed, since the very purpose of appeal is to amend or correct errors
overlooked by the lower court. In this case, therefore, the accused-appellant should simply and
appropriately be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without any specification of
duration.53

Further, modification has to be made with respect to the amount of civil indemnity awarded to the
heirs of the victim.
1âwphi1

In People v. Asis,54 this Court held:

When death occurs due to a crime, the following may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for
the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary
damages; and (5) temperate damages.

Conformably with existing jurisprudence, the heirs of Donald Pais are entitled to civil indemnity in the
amount of ₱75,000.00, which is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of
proof other than the commission of the crime. Likewise, moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00
shall be awarded in favor of the heirs of the victim. Moral damages are awarded despite the absence
of proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs. As borne out by human nature and
experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on
the part of the victim’s family.55 (Citations omitted)

The award of civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof
other than the commission of the crime. It requires only the establishment of the fact of death as a
result of the crime and that the accused-appellant is responsible thereto.56 However, in order to
conform with the prevailing jurisprudence, the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of victim must be
raised to ₱75,000.00.57

The awards of moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00, temperate damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00, of the CA are all in accordance
with existing jurisprudence58 and are thus sustained.
Moral damages in the sum of ₱50,000.00 can be awarded despite the absence of proof of mental
and emotional suffering of the victim’s heirs. As borne out by human nature and experience, a
violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the
victim’s family.59 The award of temperate damages, on the other hand, is warranted when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss was suffered but its amount cannot be proved with
certainty.60 Considering that the death of the victim definitely caused his heirs some expenses for his
wake and burial, though they were not able to present proof, temperate damages in the amount of
₱25,000.00 was properly awarded to them.

Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may also be imposed when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances.61 The presence of treachery was sufficiently established by
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, recounting how the victim was surprised by the
accused-appellant’s attack from behind. It has been repeatedly reiterated in the records that the
victim was unarmed and defenseless at the time of the attack. The results of the post-mortem
examination of the cadaver of the victim further confirmed the veracity of the accounts of the
witnesses particularly that the attack was done when the victim had his back against the accused-
appellant. Given the clear presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery, the
award of exemplary damages of ₱30,000.0062 is in place.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated February 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03972, finding Wilson Roman GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of murder is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that Wilson Roman is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible
penalty of reclusion perpetua and that the award of civil indemnity is hereby raised to ₱75,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 175593
Appellee,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
SALVADOR SANTOS, JR. y VELASCO, JR., JJ.
SALVADOR,
Appellant.
Promulgated:
October 17, 2007

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Salvador Santos, Jr. y Salvador (appellant) was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77 with illegal sale and possession of shabu in
violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 [1] (R.A. 9165),
to wit:

CRIMINAL CASE No. 6365

That on or about the 28th day of August 2002 in the Municipality of San Mateo,
Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there
 willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to another person
one (1) heat-sealed plastic sachet of white crystalline substance weighing 0.08 gram
which was found positive result (sic) to the screening and confirmatory test for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]

CRIMINAL CASE No. 6366

That on or about the 28th day of August 2002 in the Municipality of San Mateo,
Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and control white crystalline
substance placed in twelve (12) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets with a total
weight of 1.36 grams which were found positive to the test for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Appellant entered a negative plea to both charges.[4] The two cases were jointly
heard. At the trial, the prosecution presented its lone witness,
PO3 Juanito L. Tougan.

Tougan, who was assigned at the Intelligence Section of the San Mateo, Rizal Police
Station, testified that at around 9:50 p.m. on 28 August 2002, he, together with SPO1
Arellano and PO2 Pontilla received information from their civilian informant that a
certain Badong Santos was selling illegal drugs. The police officers right away
planned the arrest of herein appellant and they agreed that Tougan would act as a
poseur-buyer. Together with the civilian informant, they headed to appellants
residence. There, Arellano and Pontilla positioned themselves more or less ten (10)
meters away from the house where they could observe the impending transaction
without being noticed. It was dark outside but the house was well-lit. Appellant
opened the gate and upon seeing the civilian informant uttered, Pare. The civilian
informant replied, Pare, kukuha kami ng panggamit.Tougan handed appellant the
marked money worth P200.00 which bore Tougans initials, JLT. After taking the
money, appellant went back inside the house and returned with a plastic sachet
of shabu. Tougan got hold of the plastic sachet of shabu, held appellants hand and
introduced himself as a policeman. Tougan then directed appellant to empty his
pockets of their contents. Tougan recovered the two (2) one hundred peso bills used
as marked money and twelve (12) plastic sachets of shabu contained inside a white
box. The police officers thereafter brought appellant to the police station.
There, Tougan wrote his initials on all the thirteen (13) sachets of shabu. A
document was prepared for these to be examined at the PNP Crime
Laboratory. Tougan also stated that he had executed a sworn statement regarding the
buy-bust incident.[5]
On cross-examination, Tougan stated that appellant had been included in a drug-
watch list submitted by the barangay captain containing the names of drug pushers
in the area. At the time of appellants apprehension, however, the barangay captain
had already discontinued submission of the said list to the police. Tougan was
directed by the judge to bring to court the watch list he had talked about. [6]

At the next hearing, Tougan presented the watch list for the years 2000 and 2001.
He explained that appellant was not included in the said list as the latter was then
detained in the provincial jail for another criminal charge. He disclosed, however,
that the latest watch list in possession of the police department was dated July
2003.[7]
As lone witness for the defense, appellant testified that at around 11:00 p.m. on 28
August 2002, he was at home fixing a fluorescent lamp. His wife and three children
were there with him. Suddenly, they heard a sound coming from the gate. Appellant
peeped through the window and saw policemen Tougan, Arellano and Pontilla. He
was able to recognize them because he had served as their informer for almost
three months. He went out of the house to greet them and in response, the policemen
told him that they had been looking for him. They then held his hands and pushed
him into the house. Tougan shoved him onto the sofa, and Arellano
and Pontilla searched the house. Tougan frisked him and confiscated his money
of P180.00. Meantime, Pontilla searched the table and got hold of a set of dart pins
owned by appellants son. Appellant asked the police officers why they came to his
house and they replied that they had been harboring a grudge against him because
he no longer wanted to serve as their informer. He saw Pontilla take a box out of his
pocket and heard him say that it contained shabu and drug paraphernalia. He
told Pontilla that if the box was his he would not have placed it on the table but
instead hidden it from his children. Pontilla replied, tumigil ka diyan, tumahimik ka.
At the time of the commotion, appellant stated that the members of his family stayed
in another room and were very afraid. Pontilla told appellants
wife, ilabas mo na iyan to which she
replied, Ano ang ilalabas ko? Pinerwisyo ninyo na nga kami. Afterwards, appellant
was handcuffed and dragged to the police station where he was detained at once
without being informed of his rights.[8]

Appellant also testified that aside from being a police informer, he also worked as a
tricycle driver. He likewise stated that he was applying for a job at the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor and that he had a recommendation from police
officer Amatong. He denied being a drug pusher, as well as receiving the marked
money. And while appellant believed that the evidence against him had been planted,
he did not file a complaint against the police officers because nobody would attend
to his complaint.[9]

On cross-examination, appellant stated that he volunteered to be a police informer

and served as such from May to July 2002. During this period, he reported to the
police officers four times and had acted three times as a poseur-buyer. He, however,
decided to sever his ties with the police officers as the latter reneged on their promise
to give him money each time a drug pusher was arrested. He also claimed that the
police officers had him arrested in order to conceal the illegal acts they had
committed during arrests, such as confiscating all the belongings and monies of the
person arrested. But he admitted having been previously indicted in two (2) cases
for selling and possessing shabu.[10] On re-direct examination, he revealed that he
was released from imprisonment on 13 December 2001. Thereafter, he worked as a
tricycle driver and applied for a job in the municipal government of San
Mateo, Rizal.[11]

After trial, the trial court rendered a Decision[12] dated 17 November 2004 disposing
as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused SALVADOR SANTOS Y

SALVADOR is hereby found GUILTY as charged beyond reasonable doubt and
is hereby sentenced to Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED
THOSAND (sic) (P500,000.00) PESOS for Violation of Section 5, of R.A. 9165
and to suffer an imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE DAY TO
TWENTY YEARS (20) and to pay a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P300,000.00) PESOS for violation of Section 11, of the same law.

SO ORDERED.[13]

Appellant elevated the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. Before the
Court of Appeals, he argued that the trial court erred: (1) in convicting him of the
crimes charged despite the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt; and (2) in giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution witness. [14]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in lieu of an appellees brief, filed a
Manifestation and Motion for Acquittal.[15] It submitted that there existed reasonable
doubt on the culpability of appellant as the identity of the corpus delicti was not
sufficiently established and the testimony of the lone prosecution witness, Tougan,
was of doubtful veracity.[16] It further maintained that should there be reservations
regarding the innocence of appellant, the equipoise rule should apply. [17]
The Court of Appeals in a Decision[18] dated 31 July 2006 in CA G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01227 affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED for

lack of merit. The appealed DECISION dated November 17, 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellant is hereby instead sentenced in
Criminal Case No. 6366 to suffer an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal. Needless to add, the P300,000.00 fine STANDS.

The regulated drug subject of this case is hereby ordered confiscated and forfeited
in favor of the Government to be disposed of in accordance with law.

With costs against the accused-appellent.

SO ORDERED.[19]

The Court of Appeals held that absent any arbitrariness or oversight in the
appreciation of facts or circumstances of weight and substance, it would not disturb
on appeal the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses. The Court of
Appeals, moreover, stated that police officers involved in buy-bust operations are
presumed to have performed their duties regularly. The fact that appellants name
was not actually found in the drug-watch list provided by Tougan did not constitute
inconsistency nor did it render doubtful his entire testimony. The watch list was
brought up by the prosecution only to highlight the fact that appellant was previously
involved in the illegal peddling of drugs and that the buy-bust operation was
prompted by reliable information.[20]

The Court of Appeals dismissed appellants defense of frame-up as self-serving and

uncorroborated. It ruled that the evidence on record supports his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.[21] The appellate court, however, modified the penalty imposed by
the trial court in Criminal Case No. 6366. The appellate court reduced the prison
term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, imposed by the trial
court, to an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal. The fine of P300,000.00 stood.[22]

Appellant is now before the Court reiterating his previous submissions. Through his
Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplementary Brief)[23] dated 13 April 2007, appellant
stated that he had exhaustively argued all the relevant issues in his brief filed before
the Court of Appeals. Thus, he manifested that he was adopting it as his
supplemental brief. The OSG likewise manifested that it was no longer filing a
supplemental brief.[24]

There is merit in the appeal.

The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has the burden to
overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence
required. Corollarily, the prosecution must rest on its own merits and must not rely
on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution fails to meet the required quantum
of evidence, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its own behalf.
In which case, the presumption of innocence shall prevail and hence, the accused
shall be acquitted. However, once the presumption of innocence is overcome, the
defense bears the burden of evidence to show reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused. Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole
proof and an inability after such investigation to let the mind rest each upon the
certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict
a criminal charge, but moral certainty is required as to every proposition of proof
requisite to constitute the offense.[25]
In the case at bar, the testimony for the prosecution and for the defense are
diametrically opposed to each other. The prosecutions version of events solely
consisted of Touganstestimony regarding the buy-bust operation whereas appellant,
who cried frame-up, was presented as the lone witness for the defense. In resolving
such conflict, which involves the credibility of witnesses, the usual rule is for the
Court to respect the findings of the trial court, it having had the opportunity to hear
the witnesses themselves and to observe their deportment and manner of testifying
during trial. Nonetheless, the rule admits of certain exceptions. Thus, the factual
findings of the trial court may be reversed if, by the evidence or the lack of it, it
appears that the trial court erred.[26]

The trial court decreed appellants guilt as follows:

His admission of knowing drug violators in San Mateo, only confirms the fact
that he is one of them and his nefarious activities resulted to his several arrest
and convictions in two (2) Courts of San Mateo, Rizal.
Accused, himself admitted he was arrested and convicted by RTC Branch 77
San Mateo, Rizal and records of this Court confirms this fact. He averred, thus:

xxx

The two (2) drug cases previously filed with this Court, against the accused were
Criminal cases nos. 3483-98 and 3484-98, which resulted to his convictions for
possession and drug pushing and was sentenced to a jail term of two (2) years for
each case. Two (2) more cases were filed against him with another Court, RTC. Br.
75 for violation of Section 16, R.A. 6425, as amended which also resulted to his
convictions and a jail term of one (1) year for each case, docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 3711 and 3819.

Accused allegation (sic) that he was illegally arrested because the police harbored
a grudge against him for refusing to continue to be their informer deserves scant
consideration. The police has at their disposable several informants who can help
them in gathering information in their area of jurisdiction. The loss of one (1)
informant will not adversely affect their police operations on illegal drug activities.

Another allegation of the accused that the evidence against him was planted
because he came to know their illegal activities in apprehending drug violators by
taking their belongings or their money is unsubstantiated by evidence and cannot
be given any credence.
xxx
 If the policemen planted the drugs as alleged by the accused why did he not tell it
to his wife or to any member of his family or to anybody in their community or
better still filed (sic) a complaint against the abusive policemen. But not a whimper
of the protest was heard from him belying his claim of being framed-up.

The court has ruled in a litany of cases that frame-up, like alibi, is viewed with
disfavor for it is self-serving, it can easily be fabricated and is a common standard
defense ploy in most prosecution for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Clear
and convincing evidence is required to prove the defense, which the accused in
this case failed to sustain.

What the police operatives did was in accordance with law and absence of any
proof of any wrong-doing or ill-motive, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their official functions prevail.
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs have been
complied and proven. The identity of the buyer and seller, the object and
consideration and the delivery of the thing sold and payment thereto.
In this case the buyer was the prosecution witness Tougan who acted as poseur
buyer and the seller was the herein accused. The object was the shabu sold in
consideration of two (2) hundred pesos which was received by the accused. The
prohibited drugs confiscated were presented and identified by the prosecution
witness in Court, which was not objected to by the defense. No doubt the
transaction or sale found in the possession of the accused and they were all
presented and identified by the accused with his initials JLT. [27]

xxx

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven:
(1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was
presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified. [28] What is
material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the dangerous drug. The delivery of the contraband to the
poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money consummates the buy-bust
transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused. [29]

An examination of the decision of the trial court reveals that apart from heavily
relying on the sole testimony of Tougan, it used appellants admission of his previous
convictions, his declaration as a police informer and the presumption of regularity
of Tougans performance of his duties as anchor for finding appellant guilty.

The Court, however, finds such reliance on Tougans testimony misplaced. Other
than his bare statements, Tougans testimony is unsubstantiated by other proof that
the alleged buy-bust operation, through which appellant was apprehended, took
place. In light of appellants theory that he was framed up, it is imperative that the
prosecution present more evidence to support Tougans allegations. The prosecution
could have easily presented the other police officers, namely Arrellano and Pontilla,
who Tougan claimed were members of his backup team. As it is, the lack of any
other evidence to buttress Tougans declaration reduces it into a self-serving
assertion. Curiously, the prosecution never offered rebuttal evidence to refute
appellants defense of frame-up. This omission does not hold well for the cause of
the prosecution. It creates doubts on whether there has actually been any buy-bust
operation at all.

The Court also agrees with the OSGs contention that the inconsistencies
in Tougans testimony on the matter of the list should not be ignored.[30] During trial,
when Tougan was asked whether appellants name appeared in the list, he
categorically answered in the affirmative. Then again, it surfaced that this assertion
was untruthful as the list he had brought to court did not contain appellants name.
The Court believes that Tougans lack of candidness on this detail renders the rest of
his testimony doubtful.[31]

Moreover, the Court finds that the trial court erred in allowing Tougan to use the
mantle of regularity of official functions to prop up his allegations. The presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the
presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. As the
Court ruled in People v. Ambrosio:[32]
 The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as
basis for affirming accused-appellants conviction because, [f]irst, the presumption
is precisely just thata mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this
case, x x x [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the
presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.[33]

While buy-bust operations deserve judicial sanction if carried out with due regard
for constitutional and legal safeguards, it is well to recall that

x x x by the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment

procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of
marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting
provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the
possibility of abuse is great. Thus, courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in
trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe
penalties for drug offenses. Needless to state, the lower court should have exercised
the utmost diligence and prudence in deliberating upon accused-appellants guilt. It
should have given more serious consideration to the pros and cons of the evidence
offered by both defense and the State and many loose ends should have been settled
by the trial court in determining the merits of the present case. [34]

Consequently, courts are required to put the prosecution evidence through the
crucible of a severe testing, and the presumption of innocence requires them to take
a more than casual consideration of every circumstance or doubt favoring the
innocence of the accused.[35]

Significantly, the Court agrees with the OSGs observation that the identity of
the corpus delicti has not been sufficiently established. Tougans testimony does not
definitively express that the confiscated plastic sachets of shabu have been
marked/initialed at the scene of the crime, according to proper
procedure. Tougan testified as follows:

PUBLIC PROS. MAJOMOT

 Q After that, what did you do after you recovered or confiscated these plastic
sachets from the accused?
A After he was arrested, sir, we brought him to the police station.
Q After that, what happened next?
A When we reached the police station, sir, he gave his name as Salvador Santos.
Q What happened to the plastic sachets?
A I wrote my initials on all the plastic sachets or the evidence confiscated from him,
sir, and a document was prepared for them to be examined at the PNP Crime
Laboratory.[36]

The case of People v. Lim[37] specifies that any apprehending team having
initial control of illegal drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure
or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the
presence of the accused if there be any, and/or his representative, who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure
of the agents to comply with such a requirement raises doubt whether what was
submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was the same drug
and/or paraphernalia as that actually recovered from the accused. It negates the
presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the police officers.

On the point that appellant has previously been charged with and convicted of similar
offenses, the Court believes that the trial court wrongly considered such
circumstance for the purpose of showing that he was likely to commit the crimes
charged in the indictment. Evidence of collateral offenses must not be received as
substantive evidence of the offenses on trial.[38]

Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. This, however,
cannot be used to advance the cause of the prosecution as the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the defense.[39] Moreover, when the circumstances are
capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, such that one of which is consistent
with the presumption of innocence and the other is compatible with guilt, the
presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. [40]

All told, given the attendant circumstances, the Court entertains serious doubts as to
the culpability of appellant and its mind cannot rest easily upon the certainty of his
guilt.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 17 November 2004 of the Regional Trial Court
of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77 in Criminal Case Nos. 6365 and 6366 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant SALVADOR SANTOS, JR.
y SALVADOR is ACQUITTED of the crimes charged on the ground of reasonable
doubt and ordered immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he is being held
for some other lawful cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this decision

forthwith and to INFORM this Court, within five (5) days from receipt hereof, of the
date appellant was actually released from confinement. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 116071. June 20, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENATO

VALLADOR, alias "Morito" and CARLOS
VALLADOR, accused, RENATO VALLADOR, accused-appellant.

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:*

Accused-appellant Renato Vallador, alias "Morito", and his brother,

accused Carlos Vallador, were charged before the Regional Trial Court, Branch
46, of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro with the crime of murder with frustrated
[1]

murder. The particulars of the accusation for that complex crime are provided
by the information filed therefor on July 28, 1986, which alleges:

That on or about the 27th day of November, 1985, at around 11:30 o'clock in the
evening in Barangay Magbay, Municipality of San Jose, Province of Occidental
Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together and helping one
another by means of treachery and by taking advantage of their superior strength, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Henry
Pelagio and Roy Montoya, thereby inflicting upon Henry Pelayo serious wound which
had been the cause of his untimely death and upon Roy Montoya wounds which
ordinarily would have caused his death, thus performing all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of their will, that is, persons were
able to prevent them from committing further acts.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [2]

Although the arraignment of appellant was held on September 30, 1986,

with the said appellant entering a plea of not guilty, the case was ordered
[3]

archived by the lower court on November 10, 1987 since appellant had escaped
from the Philippine Constabulary (PC) stockade wherein he was temporarily
detained. An alias order of arrest was then issued for the arrest of Renato
[4]

Vallador, and also of Carlos Vallador who was then still at large. On February
[5]

3, 1992, the two brothers were arrested and subsequently detained at the
provincial jail of Occidental Mindoro. Thereafter, accused Carlos Vallador was
arraigned on February 24, 1992 and he pleaded not guilty to the charge lodged
against him and his brother." Trial was, however, suspended again when the
[6]

two accused escaped from detention on August 4, 1992. [7]

After they were re-apprehended and the case set for hearing, appellant filed
with the lower court on May 6, 1993 an omnibus motion praying that he be
allowed to plead guilty to an information for homicide, with a reservation to
present evidence on mitigating circumstances, or that leave be granted allowing
him to file a motion for reinvestigation. Said motion was denied by the trial court
[8]

on July 1, 1993. [9]

At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence by the prosecution, a joint

motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence was filed by both accused on
October 20, 1993. Resolving the motion, the court a quo denied appellant's
[10]

motion, while it granted the motion of his co-accused and directed the latter to
file a demurrer to evidence. The demurrer filed by accused Carlos Vallador
[11]

was granted and a judgment of acquittal was rendered in his favor by the court
below on November 9, 1993, based on its finding that said accused took no part
in the killing of Henry Pelayo and the infliction of injury upon Roy Montoya. [12]

After a continuous trial on the merits, the remaining accused in Criminal

Case No. R-2055, herein appellant Renato Vallador, was found guilty as
charged and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of Henry Pelayo and Roy Montoya. Hence, it is only
[13]

Renato Vallador's criminal liability which remains to be determined in the

present appeal.
Before us, appellant questions the decision of the trial court in not acquitting
him on the ground of self-defense and in concluding that treachery attended the
commission of the crime. [14]

From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it appears that a benefit

dance party was held in the compound of Magbay Elementary School on the
night of November 27,1985 in honor of the candidates for the Miss Magbay
beauty contest. Among the people inside the makeshift dance hall situated in
[15]

front of the school building were two friends, Henry Pelayo, a newcomer in the
town, and Roy Montoya who was on vacation there. Outside the entrance of the
dance hall stood appellant Renato Vallador, a member of the local Civilian
Home Defense Force (CHDF), carrying an M-14 rifle. As Montoya wanted to
buy something, he informed Pelayo that he was going to the store located within
the compound. Unknown to Montoya, Pelayo followed him.
 When Pelayo passed appellant by the doorway, the latter pounded the
former on the chest with the butt of his rifle. Frightened by the sudden and
unexpected assault, Pelayo ran towards Montoya and hid behind the latter. As
his friend ran towards his back, Montoya turned around and faced appellant
who was following the former. With the rifle leveled at them from a distance of
about one arm's length, Montoya asked appellant the reason for his hostile
acts. Without replying appellant fired in the direction of the two friends who both
fell to the ground. [16]

The bullet that hit Montoya passed through his body and likewise hit Pelayo
who was then hiding behind the former's back. That single projectile which
came from appellant's rifle hit Montoya on his lateral umbilical area, perforating
his cecum, and then exited at the right side of his posterior lumbar area. From
[17]

this point of exit, the same bullet continued towards Pelayo and hit him on his
right lower quadrant, subsequently causing his untimely death. According to
[18] [19]

the testimony of the physician who diagnosed the wounds of Montoya, the injury
suffered by him is ordinarily fatal as it involves an injury to an internal organ.[20]

When the two victims were already lying on the ground, appellant fired again
at their prostrate bodies. Fortunately, neither of the victims was hit. After
appellant had thus fired the second shot, he walked away from the scene of the
crime and, upon reaching the gate of the school compound, he fired another
shot in the air.[21]

Although appellant admitted the shooting, he presented a different story

[22]

which sought to lay the basis for a justified act of self-defense on his part.
According to him and the witnesses he presented, he was at the elementary
school on that fateful night to maintain peace and order in the festivities, at the
request of his uncle, Rogelio Vallador, who was in charge of organizing the
dance party. Arriving in the school compound, appellant smoked and
[23]

consumed two sticks of cigarettes beside the school building and later went to
the dance hall. Standing about three arms' length away from the dance floor,
he slung his M- 14 service rifle on his shoulder with its muzzle pointing to the
ground.
After awhile, Henry Pelayo suddenly appeared at appellant's left side and
immediately grabbed the latter's gun with both hands. Appellant reacted to this
threat by stepping backwards away from his attacker and by successively firing
two shots in the air to warn the charging Pelayo. However, Pelayo was firm in
his intention and he jumped towards appellant to grab his rifle again. This left
appellant with no choice but to shoot in the direction of Pelayo's stomach while
the latter was still grappling for the rifle.
 Pelayo fell down, together with the person embracing him from behind who
was later identified as Roy Montoya. At that time, Montoya apparently was
[24]

trying to pull his friend away from appellant. Since the fallen Pelayo tried to
[25]

get up, appellant fired another warning shot in the air. Thereafter, his uncle
Rogelio Vallador, arrived and told him to go home, which order he submissively
obeyed. [26]

Appellant contends in his brief that he was able to prove all the elements of
self-defense through his presentation of evidence in court. They are: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of Henry Pelayo; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed by appellant to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on his part. In support of his second assignment of error,
he claims that treachery cannot be appreciated in this case because when he
shot the two friends, he was only defending himself from possible harm that
might be inflicted on him by Pelayo.
Evidently, what we have here are two different versions of the events
leading to the death of Pelayo and the wounding of Montoya. To believe
appellant's account of the incident will lead to his acquittal, while to accept the
People's story will result in his conviction. The resolution of the issue revolves
around the credibility of the witnesses upon which appellant's two assignments
of error rest, vis-a-vis those presented by the prosecution.
The evaluation of testimony is a primary task of trial courts before whom
conflicting versions of the same events come up day after day. Accordingly,
[27]

we now state again, as this Court has held in a long line of cases, that the trial
court's determination on the issue of the credibility of witnesses and its
consequent findings of fact must be given great weight and respect on appeal,
unless certain facts of substance and value have been overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. This is so because of the
[28]

judicial experience that trial courts are in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. It can thus more easily
detect whether a witness is telling the truth or not. [29]

After extensively reviewing the entire records of the case and meticulously
assessing the evidence, we find no cogent reason to deviate from this rule on
credibility, or any error in the evaluation or findings of the lower court which
would warrant a reversal or modification of its findings and conclusions.
From our careful scrutiny of the records, and as an unavoidable
consequence thereof, we agree with the lower court's holding that:
 The said accused's pretension of self-defense is not persuasive. It cannot
prevail over the positive identification by and the clear and convincing
testimonies of the prosecution's material witnesses, more particularly the
complainant Roy Montoya himself, that the accused committed the crime so
charged. [30]

There appears to be no reason to discredit the testimonies of the witnesses

for the prosecution. They clearly and affirmatively gave a full account of what
actually transpired on the night of November 27, 1985. They were consistent in
their respective narrations on the witness stand, except for Freddie dela Cruz
who testified that he heard four gunshots that night as against the testimony of
the other prosecution witnesses that they only heard three gunshots. But, the
[31]

divergence of his perception can be explained by the shock that one may
experience immediately after hearing the ostensible first two shots. Besides, we
have held that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to
minor and insignificant details cannot destroy their credibility. Such minor
inconsistencies even guarantee truthfulness and candor. [32]

Be that as it may, the prosecution witnesses have positively and directly

shown that it was appellant who initiated the unlawful aggression, and not
Pelayo as he claims. Their testimonies on this point were categorical and
forthright, and appellant has not presented any evidence showing any evil or
sinister motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses that could have led them
to testify falsely against and to impute to him such a serious crime. He even
declared in court that no animosity existed between him and Pelayo prior to the
shooting. Neither has appellant offered any substantial reason why this Court
[33]

should overturn the trial court's appreciation of the evidence presented against
him. Instead, he merely reiterates in this appeal his discredited and rejected
claim of self-defense.
It should be remembered that in cases where the accused admits
committing the crime but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the
basic rule that the burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies on the
prosecution is reversed and the burden of proof is shifted to the accused to
prove the elements of his defense. It then becomes incumbent upon him to
[34]

rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
prosecution, for even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after he
had admitted the killing.[35]

Self-defense, being an affirmative allegation, appellant must now sufficiently

prove its elements to the satisfaction of the court, otherwise his conviction is
imperative. It is required in this jurisdiction that the accused establish his claim
[36]

of self-defense by clear and convincing evidence in order to successfully justify

his criminal act. If he fails to discharge this burden of proof, his conviction shall
[37]

of necessity follow, on the basis of his admission to the killing. [38]

Here appellant's invocation of self-defense cannot save him from the

consequence of his felonious act because it is unworthy of belief as found by
the trial court. Indeed, there are strong reasons to doubt the version of the
defense. Neither appellant nor his witnesses made an exact account of how
Montoya got involved in the scuffle for the gun. All of them claimed that after
the third fatal shot was fired, Montoya was already on the ground lying beside
Pelayo. None of them, however, testified at what point in time Montoya started
pulling Pelayo away from appellant. It was as if Montoya was conveniently
thrown into the scene of the crime from nowhere to provide basis for the claim
of self-defense by appellant.
The submission of another medical certificate by the defense increases
[39]

disbelief in appellant's story. This medical certificate dated October 26, 1993, is
almost identical to the other medical certificate presented by the prosecution,
[40]

dated April 22, 1993. Both documents were issued by Dr. Senen M. Zapanta,
Jr. certifying to the location of the gunshot wound suffered by Henry
Pelayo. The difference lies in the addition of points of entry and exit with
measurements of the wound, in the medical certificate presented by the
defense. In this later document, the point of entry of the slug measures
approximately 7mm and the point exit about 9mm. There was no such data
provided in the certificate earlier issued to the prosecution by Dr. Zapanta
regarding the wound of Pelayo.
The later medical certificate appears to have been presented by appellant
to show that Pelayo was closer to the rifle than Montoya when they were
shot. There was no explanation given why such an important information was
[41]

not included in the first certificate. It should be noted that Montoya's gunshot
wound had an entry point measuring about 9mm with an exit point of 2.5 cm. It [42]

is hard to believe that Pelayo, granting that he was in front of Montoya, would
suffer a gunshot wound with an opening of 7mm because the rifle used in the
crime only loads .308 caliber bullets. Converting this size of the bullet to the
metric system, a .308 inch slug will be 7.62 mm in diameter. Thus, we will have
an unusual situation where a point of entry is smaller than the bullet that caused
it. Instead of supporting the cause of appellant, therefore, the amended medical
certificate submitted later opened his defense to grave suspicion.
Lastly, the conduct of appellant in escaping not only once but twice from
detention during the hearing of the case negates his plea of self-defense. It is
settled that the flight of an accused is an indication of his guilt or of a guilty
mind. There is flight when an accused evades the course of justice by
[43]
voluntarily withdrawing one's self in order to avoid arrest or detention or the
institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. By reason of his escaping
[44]

successively, the proceedings before the lower court were suspended twice.
Based on the foregoing, we hold that appellant failed to discharge the onus
probandi which was shifted to him by his plea of self-defense. Ergo, his
conviction necessarily follows from his admission that he shot the victim.
Further, upon the facts established by the prosecution, we agree with the
trial court that the complex crime committed by appellant was accompanied
by alevosia. Treachery can be appreciated when the following requisites are
present: (1) the employment of means, method or manner of execution which
would ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory acts on
the part of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself
or to retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. The essence of treachery
[45]

is a swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest

provocation on his part.[46]

There is treachery in the instant case since the attack on the two unarmed
victims was sudden and unexpected, rendering them defenseless in the hands
of their assailant and ensuring the accomplishment of the latter's evil
purpose. When appellant fired his gun, Pelayo was already hiding behind
Montoya. It was thus ordinarily inconceivable that appellant would still fire at
Pelayo considering that another person was already standing between them,
yet that did not faze or deter appellant at all.
As in the killing of Pelayo, treachery qualified the mortal wounding of
Montoya to frustrated murder because of the suddenness of the
attack. Montoya was shot by appellant when he was still waiting for the latter's
answer to his question as to why appellant was incensed at his friend Pelayo.
Obviously, the two victims were not given the chance to protect themselves
or run away from the aggression of appellant who deliberately acted in such a
way that his quarries were unaware of and helpless against his evil
intention. Without waiting for the victims next move or reaction to his threatening
posture, appellant quickly fired his gun at the two friends. The attack was so
sudden and unexpected to the point of preventing the victims from repelling or
escaping from it.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 178778

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J.,

Chairperson,
- versus - BRION,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

T/SGT. PORFERIO R. ANGUS, JR., Promulgated:

Accused-Appellant.
August 3, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

On appeal is the Decision[1] dated December 5, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00114, which affirmed with modification the Decision[2] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch
18, convicting appellant T/Sgt. Porferio R. Angus, Jr. of the crime of parricide
in Criminal Case No. 2002-587.

Appellant T/Sgt. Porferio R. Angus, Jr. was charged in an Information [3] dated June
7, 2002, as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of January, 2002, at about 10:00 oclock in
the morning, more or less, at Lanis[i] Patrol Base, Lanis[i], Municipality
of Claveria, Province of Misamis Oriental, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault,
choked and strangled the neck of his legitimate wife Betty Angus, thereby
causing her instantaneous death.
 CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Upon arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not

[4]
guilty to the offense charged.

The prosecution and the defense stipulated on the following facts at the pre-
trial, to wit:
1. That the accused and the victim were legally married.
2. That the incident happened on January 10, 2002, at the Lanisi Patrol Base,
Lanisi, Claveria, Misamis Oriental.
3. That T/SGT Porferio R. Angus, Jr. is a member of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, particularly the Philippine Army, assigned at the Lanisi
Patrol Base, Lanisi, Claveria, Misamis Oriental.[5]

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Police Senior Inspector Reynaldo A.

Padulla, Staff Sergeant Romeo Rhea, Dr. Alex R. Uy, Dr. Luchie S. Serognas-At-at,
and Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) members Romeo I. Malaran,
Leoncio P. Jintapa and Alejo O. Carpio. Their testimonies may be synthesized into
the following narration of events:

The victim, Betty D. Angus, arrived at the Lanisi Patrol Base at around 7:00
p.m. on January 9, 2002. Appellant fetched her at the gate and they proceeded to his
bunker. Later, CAFGU members Malaran and Carpio heard the two (2) arguing
about appellants relationship with another woman. Appellant was also seen go out
of his bunker around midnight to get some rice, beef and vegetables for dinner.[6]

The following day, January 10, 2002, at around 7:00 a.m., appellant had
breakfast at the mess hall with Jintapa, Malaran and Carpio. As appellant was not
with his wife, Jintapa reminded appellant to call her. When appellant returned, he
told them that he would just leave some food for his wife because she was still
sleeping.
 After eating, Malaran and Jintapa asked for permission to fetch water near the
barangay elementary school about a kilometer away. While they were gone, Carpio
went to the outpost and started cleaning his firearm. Appellant went to the comfort
room then decided to join Carpio at the outpost. On his way to the outpost, appellant
passed by his bunker and peeped through the door which was open by about 1
inches.[7] Carpio was able to see the door because it was facing the outpost. [8] A few
minutes later, Malaran and Jintapa returned and joined appellant and Carpio at the
outpost. The four (4) shared funny stories and joked for a while, after which Carpio
went to the mess hall while Jintapa went to his bunker. Malaran and appellant
decided to continue their conversation at the mess hall. [9]

On their way to the mess hall, appellant passed by his bunker but was not able
to open the door at once because something was blocking it from the inside. When
appellant pushed the door, Malaran saw the back of the victim in a slanting position
and leaning at the door. Appellant went inside and almost immediately shouted for
help. Malaran and Carpio saw appellant embracing his wife. They helped appellant
carry Bettys body to the bed. Malaran observed that her skin below the jaw was
reddish and her knees were covered with mud.[10] There was food on the table and a
multi-colored tubao[11] was hanging on the purlins of the roof about a meter away
from the victim. The lower tip of the tubao was in a circular form and was hanging
about four (4) feet from the ground. They heard appellant repeatedly say, Why did
you do this? How can I explain this to our children?[12]

Carpio called Jintapa and told him that something had happened to Betty. This
was around 10:00 a.m. When Jintapa entered appellants bunker, he noticed that
the tubaowas still hanging from the roof. He also saw appellant embracing his wife
and crying hard. Appellant exerted effort to revive his wife by pumping her
chest. Malaran tried to help by massaging Bettys hands, feet, and legs. When Carpio
and Malaran left to look for a vehicle, Jintapa took Malarans place and also massaged
Bettys hands and feet which were already cold. Appellant, who continued to cry very
hard, covered Bettys neck with his tubao and draped a blanket over her body.
The tubao that was hanging on the roof was not removed until Corporal Teodoro
Guibone ordered a meat collector to remove it.[13]

At the Claveria Municipal Hospital, Dr. Luchie S. Serognas-At-at concluded

that Betty was already dead upon arrival for she no longer had a pulse. She asked
appellant as to the cause of her death, and after two (2) minutes, he replied that maybe
she suffered a heart attack as she had a history of heart ailment. Dr. At-at wanted to
thoroughly examine Bettys body but she was not able to do so because appellant was
crying very hard. A commotion also took place at the hospital when a soldier, later
identified as Sgt. Romeo Rhea, tried to box appellant, saying that appellants crying
was only an act.[14] Rhea and appellant were companions at Bravo Company, while
Betty was Rheas neighbor in Basilan.Appellant is also the godfather of Rheas
child. According to Rhea, he knew about appellants illicit relationship with a certain
Jennifer Abao, with whom appellant had been sweethearts for about three (3) years
prior to the incident on January 10, 2002.[15]

Dr. Alex R. Uy, Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police

(PNP) Crime Laboratory of Patag, Cagayan de Oro City, conducted the autopsy. His
examination revealed the following findings:
HEAD AND NECK

1. Abrasion: Right Mandibular Region: measuring 4 x 2 cm., 4 cm.

from the anterior midline.

2. Ligature mark: extending bilaterally around the neck at the level

below the hyoid bone, measuring 42 x 1 cm., bisected by the
anterior midline, directed horizontally and posteriorward.Larynx
and Trachea are markedly congested and hemorrhagic.[16]

Dr. Uy stated that Betty may have died two (2) hours after taking her last meal
due to the presence of partially digested food inside the stomach.[17] He believed that
the cause of her death was asphyxia by strangulation and not by hanging, as the
victim did not sustain a fractured bone on her neck or hyoid bone and there was no
hemorrhage above the trachea and larynx. He explained that the sudden gravitational
force would usually cause a fractured bone. Dr. Uy clarified that the absence of a
fractured bone would only happen if the person hangs herself very slowly without a
sudden force or if she was in a kneeling position.[18]

For its part, the defense presented as witnesses Angeles S. Ociones, Senior
Police Officer 1 Victorino Busalla, Cheryl Ann A. Siarez, Master Sergeant
Benedicto Palma, Emeliano Bolonias, Bobby Padilla Lopez and appellant. Taken
together, their testimonies present the following narrative:

Cheryl Ann A. Siarez is the only daughter of Betty and appellant. In the
afternoon of January 9, 2002, at around 1:30 p.m., Betty went inside Cheryl Anns
bedroom and told her to be serious in her studies. Betty also intimated to Cheryl Ann
that she wanted to go to a far place where there would be no more rumors, no
backbiting, and nobody would recognize her. At 4:00 p.m., they boarded a bus
bound for Cagayan de Oro City. Betty disembarked at Villanueva, Misamis Oriental
to transfer to a passenger jeepney going to Claveria. [19]

From Villanueva to Claveria, Betty sat beside Angeles Ociones, an old friend,
in the front seat of the jeepney. She confided to Ociones about her jealousy towards
her husband. She also mentioned that she was angry that she was not able to catch him
and his mistress. Ociones advised Betty to confront her husband regarding the rumors
she had heard, as it was common to hear such rumors every time a soldier is assigned
to a place away from home. Betty revealed that she planned to commit suicide because
of the many stories she had heard about her husband. This was the third time she
shared thoughts of suicide. Betty further said she wanted to go to a far place where
nobody would recognize her.At around 7:00 p.m., Betty arrived at Lanisi Patrol
Base.[20]

Appellant met his wife at the gate and went with her to his bunker. Appellant
testified that they talked about only three (3) things: his whereabouts on January 7,
2002, the conference in Mat-i, Claveria, and whether he was able to borrow money
for the renovation of their house. He later admitted, however, that Betty also
confronted him about his relationship with another woman. At around 11:00 p.m. they
went to bed. He asked Betty if she has eaten dinner but she said she did not want to
eat. Nonetheless, he brought her some food then went back to sleep. He woke up the
following day at around 6:00 a.m. and heard Emiliano Bolonias knocking at his
door. Bolonias confirmed that when the door was opened, he saw Betty sleeping on
the bed. Since Betty was still asleep, appellant suggested that they proceed to the mess
hall to talk about their financial dealings. He did not lock the door to his bunker when
they left. At around 8:00 a.m. appellant went back to his bunker to invite his wife to
have breakfast with them.[21]
 After having breakfast, appellant, Malaran, Carpio and Jintapa went to the
outpost while Bolonias left the patrol base. Malaran and Jintapa asked permission to
fetch water but later arrived and stayed at the outpost. Appellant went to his bunker
and found the same locked from inside. He knocked and called his wife, but there was
no response. He forcibly opened the door and saw his wife hanging with the use of
a tubao which was tied at the purlins of the roof. Her body was hanging and almost in
a kneeling position. He shouted for help as he untied the knot around Bettys neck but
was not able to carry her since she was heavy. The other CAFGU members helped
appellant put Betty on the bed. Malaran massaged Bettys feet while appellant
massaged her chest and even did a mouth-to-mouth resuscitation. When the vehicle
appellant had requested arrived, Betty was brought to the hospital. The tubao that was
used by the victim was left hanging at the purlins.[22]

That same day, Cheryl Ann was informed that her mother was in serious
condition. She was fetched and brought to Claveria, Misamis Oriental, where she saw
her father crying.Appellant told Cheryl Ann that her mother had committed
suicide. The burial was originally scheduled on January 16, 2002 so her grandmother
could attend. Bettys relatives who attended the wake did not attend the burial because
they got angry when appellant did not allow them to bring Bettys body to Basilan. Her
grandfather, SPO4 Cesar Ocay, told Cheryl Ann to bury her mothers body in Basilan
so that they will not file a case against appellant. Cheryl Ann believes her mother
committed suicide.[23]

M/Sgt. Benedicto Palma testified that on January 15, 2002, at around 2:00
p.m., he was at the funeral parlor of Poblacion, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental,
assisting Dr. Alex Uy, who was conducting the autopsy on Bettys body. When he
asked Dr. Uy regarding his findings, the doctor replied that appellant had nothing to
do with the death of his wife, and that she indeed committed suicide. [24] Aside from
appellant, his brothers-in-law, Edgardo De Vera and Mariano De Vera, Sgt. Rhea,
and appellants sister-in-law, Jerry, were also present at the funeral parlor when Dr.
Uy announced his findings that Betty committed suicide. [25]

On May 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
 WHEREFORE, finding accused T/SGT. PORFERIO R. ANGUS,
JR., GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt [of] the crime of Parricide,
punishable under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, and taking into
account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, including its
accessory penalties. He is also directed to pay FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00), as indemnity, to the heirs of the victim.

SO ORDERED. Cagayan de Oro City, May 20, 2003.[26]

Appellant interposed an appeal to this Court. Pursuant to People v.

Mateo,[27] which modified Rules 122, 124 and 125 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to
this Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was referred to the CA for intermediate
review.

On December 5, 2006, the CA rendered judgment affirming with modification the

decision of the RTC. The fallo of the CA decision reads:
FOR THE REASONS STATED, the
appealed Decision convicting T/SGT. PORFERIO R. ANGUS, JR. of
Parricide is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is
additionally ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim P25,000 as
exemplary damages and P50,000 as moral damages on top of the decreed
indemnity. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.[28]

Hence, this appeal. In his brief,[29] appellant raises a lone assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED
DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Appellant argues that nobody really saw who killed the victim or when and
how she was killed. He asserts that the prosecution witnesses merely testified to have
last seen Betty alive on the night of January 9, 2002. Thereafter, they heard the
couple arguing about a woman. The following morning Betty was found
dead. Although there was more than one (1) circumstance, appellant contends that
the prosecution failed to prove that the combination thereof leads to the inevitable
conclusion that he killed his wife.

We find merit in appellants contentions.

The Constitution mandates that an accused shall be presumed innocent until

the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The burden lies on the prosecution
to overcome such presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence
required. In so doing, the prosecution must rest on the strength of its own evidence
and must not rely on the weakness of the defense. [30] And if the prosecution fails to
meet its burden of proof, the defense may logically not even present evidence on its
own behalf. In such cases the presumption prevails and the accused should
necessarily be acquitted.[31]

We may well emphasize that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the
only basis on which a court draws its finding of guilt. Established facts that form a
chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a conscious process of
reasoning towards a conviction.[32] Verily, resort to circumstantial evidence is
sanctioned by Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

While no general rule can be laid down as to the quantity of circumstantial

evidence which will suffice in a given case, all the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty,
and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with
every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The circumstances proved should
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one (1) fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean the degree of proof excluding the possibility
of error and producing absolute certainty. Only moral certainty or that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind is required. [33]

The following are the requisites for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to

support conviction: (a) there is more than one (1) circumstance, (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived have been proven, and (c) the combination of all
the circumstances results in a moral certainty that the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, is the one (1) who has committed the crime. Thus, to justify a conviction
based on circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be
interwoven in such a way as to leave no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused.[34]

After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find sufficient basis to warrant
the reversal of the assailed judgment of conviction. The crime of parricide is defined
and punished under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, to wit:
Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or
descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be
punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.

The elements of the crime of parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is
killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, of the accused or any of his ascendants or descendants, or
his spouse.[35]

The evidence in this case shows that Betty arrived at the camp at around 7:00
oclock in the evening of January 9, 2002. Witnesses heard Betty and the appellant
arguing over the latters illicit relationship with another woman. The following day,
appellant went out of his bunker at around 6:00 oclock in the morning. He had
breakfast at the mess area with his companions, but went back to his bunker at
around 8:00 oclock to ask his wife to join them for breakfast. When he returned, he
told his men that his wife could not join them for breakfast because she was still
asleep. At around 10:00 a.m., appellant returned to his bunker followed by Malaran
who saw the dead body of the victim.

The Court is not satisfied that the circumstantial evidence in this case constitutes
an unbroken chain which leads to the conclusion that appellant, to the exclusion of all
others, is guilty of killing his wife. The trial court relied on the testimonies of Malaran
and Carpio who heard the appellant and his wife arguing about the latters illicit
relationship with another woman, which supposedly proves motive for him to commit
the crime. However, granting that appellant and Betty had an argument on the night
before her death, it would be too much to presume that such an argument would drive
appellant to kill his wife. Clearly, the motive is not convincing. If at all, the testimonies
of Malaran and Carpio merely show a suspicion of appellants responsibility for the
crime. Needless to state, however, suspicion no matter how strong can not sway
judgment.[36] In the absence of any other evidence reasonably linking appellant to the
crime, evidence of motive is not sufficient to convict him.[37]

Likewise, Dr. Uy explained that if a person hangs herself, most of the time
there will be a fracture on the bone of the neck because of the pressure caused by
gravity that pulls the rope. However, he also testified that if the person hangs herself
slowly, there will be no fracture on her neck or hyoid bone. Thus, the fact that Betty
did not sustain a fractured bone on her neck or hyoid bone, as the doctor observed,
does not automatically lead to the conclusion that appellant strangled the victim.
Given the evidence that the victim had intimated her wish to commit suicide a day
before the incident, it is not farfetched to conclude that she indeed chose to take her
life.

An acquittal based on reasonable doubt will prosper even though the accuseds
innocence may be doubted, for a criminal conviction rests on the strength of the
evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. And, if the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two (2) or more explanations, one
(1) of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent
with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction. That which is favorable to the accused should be
considered.[38] After all, mas vale que queden sin castigar diez reos presuntos, que se
castigue uno inocente.[39] Courts should be guided by the principle that it would be
better to set free ten (10) men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than
to convict one (1) innocent man for a crime he did not commit.[40]

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated

December 5, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00114 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant T/Sgt. Porferio R. Angus, Jr. is
ACQUITTED of the crime of parricide on the ground of reasonable doubt. Unless
detained for some other lawful reasons, appellant is hereby ordered released
immediately.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 146481. April 30, 2003]

ARTURO G. RIMORIN SR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Corpus delicti in its legal sense refers to the fact of the commission of the
crime, not to the physical body of the deceased or to the ashes of a burned
building or -- as in the present case -- to the smuggled cigarettes. The corpus
delicti may be proven by the credible testimony of a sole witness, not
necessarily by physical evidence such as those aforementioned.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
[1]

Court, seeking to reverse the December 22, 2002 Decision of the Court of
[2]

Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CR No. 17388. The assailed Decision modified the
February 18, 1994 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
[3] [4]

(Branch 46) in Criminal Case Nos. CCC-VI-137 (79) and CCC-VI-138 (79),
finding Arturo Rimorin Sr. guilty of smuggling under the Tariff and Customs
Code. The dispositive portion of assailed CA Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

(a) The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the trial court finding Felicisimo Rieta,
Arturo Rimorin, Pacifico Teruel and Carmelo Manaois GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime charged.

(b) Appellants Ernesto Miaco, Guillermo Ferrer, Fidel Balita, Robartolo Alincastre
and Ernesto de Castro are ACQUITTED as recommended by the Solicitor General. [5]

In an Information docketed as CCC-VI-137 (79), petitioner and his co-

accused Felicisimo Rieta, Fidel Balita, Gonzalo Vargas, Robartolo Alincastre,
Guillermo Ferrer and Ernesto Miaco were charged in these words:
That on or about October 15, 1979, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another with the
evident intent to defraud the government of the Republic of the Philippines of the
legitimate duties accruing to it from merchandise imported into this country, did then
and there [willfully,] unlawfully [and] fraudulently import or bring into the
Philippines or assist in so doing contrary to law, three hundred five (305) cases of
assorted brands of blue seal cigarettes which are foreign articles valued
at P513,663.47 including duties and taxes, and/or buy, sell transport or assist and
facilitate the buying, selling and transporting of the above-named foreign articles after
importation knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law which was
found in the possession of said accused and under their control which articles said
accused fully well knew have not been properly declared and that the duties and
specific taxes thereon have not been paid to the proper authorities in violation of said
Sec. 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 34, in relation to Sec. 3602 of said Code and Sec. 184 of the
National Internal Revenue Code. [6]

With the assistance of his counsel de parte, petitioner pleaded not guilty
[7]

when arraigned on May 5, 1980. After trial in due course, the latter was found
[8]

guilty of smuggling under the Tariff and Customs Code.

The Facts

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the prosecutions

[9]

version of the facts thus:

On October 12, 1979, Col. Panfilo Lacson, then Chief of the Police Intelligence
Branch of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group (MISG for brevity),
received information that certain syndicated groups were engaged in smuggling
activities somewhere in Port Area, Manila. It was further revealed that the activities
[were being] done at nighttime and the smuggled goods in a delivery panel and
delivery truck [were] being escorted by some police and military personnel. He
fielded three surveillance stake-out teams the following night along Roxas Boulevard
and Bonifacio Drive near Del Pan Bridge, whereby they were to watch out for a cargo
truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 bound for Malabon. Nothing came out of it. On the
basis of his investigation, [it was discovered that] the truck was registered in the name
of Teresita Estacio of Pasay City.

At around 9:00 oclock in the evening of October 14, 1979, Col. Lacson and his men
returned to the same area, with Col. Lacson posting himself at the immediate vicinity
of the 2nd COSAC Detachment in Port Area, Manila, because as per information
given to him, the said cargo truck will come out from the premises of the 2nd COSAC
Detachment in said place. COSAC stands for Constabulary Off-Shore Anti-Crime
Battalion. The night watch lasted till the wee hours of the following morning. About
3:00 a.m. an Isuzu panel came out from the place of the 2nd COSAC Detachment. It
returned before 4:00 a.m. of same day.

At around 5 minutes before 4:00 oclock that morning, a green cargo truck with Plate
No. T-SY-167 came out from the 2nd COSAC Detachment followed and escorted
closely by a light brown Toyota Corona car with Plate No. GR-433 and with 4 men on
board. At that time, Lt. Col. Panfilo Lacson had no information whatsoever about the
car, so he gave an order by radio to his men to intercept only the cargo truck. The
cargo truck was intercepted. Col. Lacson noticed that the Toyota car following the
cargo truck suddenly made a sharp U-turn towards the North, unlike the cargo truck
which was going south.Almost by impulse, Col. Lacsons car also made a U-turn and
gave chase to the speeding Toyota car, which was running between 100 KPH to 120
KPH. Col. Lacson sounded his siren. The chase lasted for less than 5 minutes, until
said car made a stop along Bonifacio Drive, at the foot of Del Pan Bridge. Col.
Lacson and his men searched the car and they found several firearms, particularly:
three (3) .45 cal. Pistol and one (1) armalite M-16 rifle. He also discovered that T/Sgt.
Ernesto Miaco was the driver of the Toyota car, and his companions inside the car
were Sgt. Guillermo Ferrer, Sgt. Fidel Balita and Sgt. Robartolo Alincastre, the four
of them all belonging to the 2nd COSAC Detachment. They were found not to be
equipped with mission orders.

When the cargo truck with Plate No. T-SY-167 was searched, 305 cases of blue seal
or untaxed cigarettes were found inside said truck. The cargo truck driver known only
as Boy was able to escape while the other passengers or riders of said truck were
apprehended, namely: Police Sgt. Arturo Rimorin of Pasay City Police Force, Pat.
Felicisimo Rieta of Kawit Police Force, and Gonzalo Vargas, a civilian. [10]

On the other hand, petitioners version of the facts is summarized by the

CA as follows:
[11]

Accused Pasay City Policeman Arturo Rimorin, was assigned at Manila International
Airport (MIA for brevity) Detachment, Pasay City. He tried to show that in the
[latter] part of 1978 during the wake of a fellow police officer, he met a man named
Leonardo [a.k.a.] Boy. After that occasion, Boy would see him at Pasay City Police
Station asking for some assistance. Once Boy told him he will get rice at Sta. Maria,
Bulacan and he asked him to just follow him. He consented. A truckload of rice was
brought from Sta. Maria to Quezon City. Boy gave him a sack of rice for providing
company.
In the afternoon of October 14, 1979 while he was at his Station at MIA, Boy came
and requested that he [accompany] him to Divisoria to haul household fixtures. By
arrangement, they met at the gasoline station near Cartimar in Pasay City not later
than 2:30 a.m. of October 15. At the gasoline station, Boy introduced him to Gonzalo
Vargas, a mechanic and who is his co-accused herein. After boarding the truck, they
went to the other gasoline station where he was introduced to Felicisimo Rieta [a.k.a.]
Sonny, who also boarded the truck. When he came to know that Rieta is a policeman
from Kawit, he started entertaining the thought that Leonardo had plenty of policemen
friends.

They passed Roxas Boulevard on their way to Divisoria. But he [noted] something
unusual. Boy, who was on the wheels, turned right before reaching Del Pan Bridge
and proceeded to pass under the bridge, a route that will take them to Port Area and
not Divisoria. So he commented that it [was] not the route to Divisoria. Boy replied
that there [would] be some cargo to be loaded. At a small carinderia fronting the
Delgado Bros., Boy pulled over after Rieta commented that he was hungry. So Rieta
alighted and Rimorin joined him. Rimorin asked Rieta what [would] be loaded in the
truck but Rieta professed ignorance.After about an hour, the truck arrived. Rimorin
and Rieta boarded the truck and they drove towards Roxas Boulevard-Bonifacio
Drive. Rimorin noted one more unusual thing. He expected Boy to have driven
towards Rotonda so they can go back to Divisoria but Boy drove straight ahead at the
corner of Aduana to Roxas Boulevard. So he asked why they x x x [werent] going to
Divisoria, but Boy replied that theres no more space in the truck and theyll just go the
next day. But then, they were ordered to pull over by men in a vehicle who upon
alighting[,] poked guns at them. They introduced themselves as Metrocom
[agents]. He noticed some back-up vehicles. They were made to alight, lie on their
belly x x x on the road and they were frisked. They were ordered to board a Land
Cruiser, one of the vehicles used by the Metrocom [agents] and they drove towards
Bonifacio Drive. The Metrocom [agents] intercepted another vehicle.

Rimorin claims that he did not see the Metrocom men open their truck. They were
hauled later to Camp Crame. There he asked: Whats this? But a certain Barrameda,
while pointing to a truck different from what they used, told them thats the reason
why youll be jailed. So he thought they were being framed up. It was only two to
three days later that he saw the alleged smuggled cigarettes at the office of the MISG
when it was presented by the investigator. They were not present when these alleged
smuggled cigarettes were taken from the truck they rode in. On inquiry from the
Metrocom men where their driver Boy [was], the Metrocom men said he escaped. He
thought there [was] something fishy in that claim. He also thought there was
something fishy in their apprehension. He wondered that they were the only persons
during the apprehension, so how could have Boy escaped? There was no possibility
for escape when they were intercepted. Yet, out of the four, only three of them were
apprehended. [12]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In affirming the RTC, the CA ruled that the defense of denial interposed by
petitioner paled in comparison with the overwhelming testimonial and
documentary evidence against him. In particular, it noted that while he and his
co-accused raised questions of fact in their appeal, they failed to show that the
trial court had significantly erred in assessing the credibility of the testimonies
of witnesses for respondent.
Moreover, the CA held that the non-presentation in court of the seized blue
seal cigarettes was not fatal to respondents cause, because the crime was
established by other competent evidence.
The appellate court, however, found no sufficient evidence against the other
co-accused who, unlike petitioner, were not found to be in possession of any
blue seal cigarettes.
Hence, this Petition. [13]

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

I

That the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance not yet determined by
the Supreme Court.

II

That the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it misapprehended and sanctioned the
following glaring and fatal errors committed by the lower court[:]

(a) In not dismissing the charge for the prosecutions failure to produce
the corpus delicti of the crime;

(b) In concluding, even without evidence, that the petitioner knew that
what was loaded in the intercepted truck were contraband
cigarettes;
 (c) In including in its appreciation with inculpatory effects the notice of
sale and the results of the auction sale which were made without
the benefit of court order, much less, notice to the accused;

(d) In merely relying on the photographs of the contraband as a substitute

for the seized goods;

(e) In not acquitting the petitioner on ground of reasonable doubt. [14]

In sum, the issues boil down to the following: (1) whether it was necessary
to present the seized goods to prove the corpus delicti; (2) whether petitioner
knew that the cargo being transported was illegal; and (3) whether, in the sale
of the seized cargo, a notice to petitioner was required.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First Issue:
Corpus Delicti Established by Other Evidence

Petitioner argues that he cannot be convicted of smuggling under the Tariff

and Customs Code, because respondent failed to present the seized
contraband cigarettes in court.Equating the actual physical evidence -- the 305
cases of blue seal cigarettes -- with the corpus delicti, he urges this Court to
rule that the failure to present it was fatal to respondents cause.
We disagree. The Court, on several occasions, has explained that corpus
delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the body
[15]

or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the ransom
[16]

money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person
[17]

murdered. Hence, to prove the corpus delicti, it is sufficient for the prosecution
[18]

to be able show that (1) a certain fact has been proven -- say, a person has
died or a building has been burned; and (2) a particular person is criminally
responsible for the act.[19]

Since the corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court
has ruled that even a single witness uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may
suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even
[20]

be established by circumstantial evidence. [21]

 Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the corpus delicti had been competently
established by respondents evidence, which consisted of the testimonies of
credible witnesses and the Custody Receipt issued by the Bureau of Customs
[22]

for the confiscated goods.

Col. Panfilo Lacsons testimony on the apprehension of petitioner and on the
seizure of the blue seal cigarettes was clear and straightforward. He
categorically testified as follows:
Q Let us go back to the truck after you apprehended the COSAC soldiers on board the
[C]orona car, what did you do thereafter?
A We told them to the place where the cargo truck was intercepted, Sir.
Q What did you notice thereat?
A Inside the truck were hundreds of cases of blue seal cigarettes, and I also found out
that my men were able to apprehend the occupants of the cargo truck although they
reported to me that the driver managed to make good escape, Sir.
Q Now you stated that a search was made on the truck and you found how many cases
of blue seal cigarettes?
A Three hundred five (305) cases, Sir.
Q Blue seal cigarettes?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What do you mean by blue seal cigarettes?
A Blue seal cigarettes are untaxed cigarettes, Sir.
Q Did you find out how many were there on board the truck which was intercepted by
your men per your order?
A Yes, Sir, [there] were three.
Q Who?
A They were P/Sgt. Arturo Rimorin, Sir.
Q P/Sgt. of what department?
A Of Pasay City Police Force, Sir, and Pat. Felicisimo Rieta.
Q Of what police department?
A Of Kawit, Cavite Police Force, and Gonzalo Vargas, Sir.
Q Who is this Gonzalo Vargas?
A Civilian, Sir.[23]

xxxxxxxxx
Fiscal Macaraeg:
 I am showing to you a Custody Receipt dated October 15, 1979, which states;
Received from Lt. Col. Rolando N. Abadilla, AC of S, M2/CC, MISG. PC
METROCOM (Thru S/Sgt. Rodolfo Bucao, PC) THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY
ONE (371) cases of assorted brands of Blue Seal Cigarettes, which were
intercepted and confiscated by elements of the MISG, PC METROCOM on or about
0400 15 October 79 along Bonifacio Drive, Manila, which for [purposes] of
identification we respectfully request that it be marked [on] evidence as Exhibit A.
COURT:
Mark it Exhibit A.
Fiscal Macaraeg:
Q Will you please do examine Exhibit A and tell us whether this is the same receipt?
A This is the same receipt, Sir.
Q By the way, were photographs taken of the car as well as the vehicle involved in this
case, together with the blue seal cigarettes that were confiscated?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Do you have copies of these photographs?
A The copies are with our evidence custodian, Sir.
Q Can you bring those pictures if required next time?
A Yes, Sir.[24]

So, too, did Gregorio Abrigo -- customs warehouse storekeeper of the

Bureau -- categorically testify that the MISG had turned over to him the seized
[25]

blue seal cigarettes, for which he issued a Custody Receipt dated October 15,
1979.
We find no reason to depart from the oft repeated doctrine of giving
credence to the narration of prosecution witnesses, especially when they are
public officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular
manner. [26]

Moreover, it is well-settled that findings of fact of lower courts are binding

on this Court, absent any showing that they overlooked or misinterpreted facts
or circumstances of weight and substance. This doctrine applies particularly
[27]

to this case in which the RTCs findings, as far as petitioner is concerned, were
affirmed by the appellate court.

Second Issue:
Knowledge of the Illegal Nature of the Goods
 According to petitioner, the CA erred in concluding that he knew of the
nature of the contraband cargo. However, he conveniently overlooks the fact
that the burden of proving knowledge that the seized goods were smuggled was
no longer incumbent upon respondent, as it had sufficiently established the fact
of possession. This point is clear from Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs
Code, as amended, which reads:

SEC. 3601 - Unlawful Importation. - Any person who shall fraudulently import or
bring into the Philippines, or assist in so doing, any article, contrary to law, or shall
receive, conceal, buy, sell, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, concealment,
or sale of such article after importation, knowing the same to have been imported
contrary to law, shall be guilty of smuggling and shall be punished x x x[.]

xxxxxxxxx

When, upon trial for a violation of this section, the defendant is shown to have or
to have had possession of the article in question, possession shall be deemed
sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant shall explain the
possession to the satisfaction of the court; Provided, however that payment of the
tax due after apprehension shall not constitute a valid defense in any prosecution
under this section. (Emphasis provided)

In his discussion of a similarly worded provision of Republic Act No. 455, a [28]

criminal law authority explained thus:

In order that a person may be deemed guilty of smuggling or illegal importation under
the foregoing statute three requisites must concur: (1) that the merchandise must have
been fraudulently or knowingly imported contrary to law; (2) that the defendant, if he
is not the importer himself, must have received, concealed, bought, sold or in any
manner facilitated the transportation, concealment or sale of the merchandise; and (3)
that the defendant must be shown to have knowledge that the merchandise had been
illegally imported. If the defendant, however, is shown to have had possession of
the illegally imported merchandise, without satisfactory explanation, such
possession shall be deemed sufficient to authorize conviction. (Emphasis
[29]

supplied)

The prosecution competently established that (1) the 305 cases of untaxed
blue seal cigarettes discovered inside the cargo truck were fraudulently
imported; and (2) petitioner was in control of the truck when it transported the
cargo on October 15, 1979. Petitioner was unable to satisfactorily explain his
possession of the untaxed cigarettes, which the MISG agents seized from him
and his co-accused. Rather, he feigns ignorance of the true nature of the cargo,
a claim which the RTC and the CA found incredible:

Now on the explanations of Police Sgt. Rimorin of Pasay City Police Force and Pat.
Rieta of Kawit Police Force, riders in the loaded cargo truck driven by Boy. Their
claim that they did not have any knowledge about the cargo of blue seal cigarettes is
not given credence by the court. They tried to show lack of knowledge by claiming
that along the way, Boy and Gonzalo Vargas left them behind at a certain point for
snacks and picked them up later after the cargo had been loaded. The Court cannot see
its way through how two policemen, joining Boy in the dead of the night, explicitly to
give him and his goods some protection, which service would be paid, yet would not
know what they are out to protect. And neither could the Court see reason in Boys
leaving them behind when he was going to pick up and load the blue seal cigarettes.
Boy knew the risks. He wanted them for protection, so why will he discard them?
How so unnatural and so contrary to reason. [30]

Third Issue:
No Need for Notice to Petitioner

Petitioner questions the sale of the seized cigarettes without notice to

him. However, the sale of the seized items, which were then already in the
custody of the Bureau of Customs, was authorized under the Tariff and
[31]

Customs Code, Sections 2601 and 2602 of which provide as follows:

SECTION 2601. Property Subject to Sale. - Property in customs custody shall be

subject to sale under the conditions hereinafter provided:

a. Abandoned articles;

b. Bonded articles entered under warehousing entry not withdrawn nor the
duties and taxes paid thereon within the period prescribed by law;

c. Articles for which import entry has been filed but have not been
claimed within fifteen days thereafter; Provided, that in justifiable
cases, or when public interest so requires, the Collector may, in
his discretion, grant an extension of not more than fifteen days;

d. Seized property, other than contraband, after liability to sale shall have
been established by proper administrative or judicial proceedings
in conformity with the provisions of this Code.
 e. Any article subject to a valid lien for customs duties, taxes or other
charges collectible by the Bureau of Customs, after the expiration
of the period allowed for the satisfaction of the same.

SECTION 2602. Place of Sale or Other Disposition of Property. - Property within the
purview of this Part of this Code shall be sold, or otherwise disposed of, upon the
order of the Collector of the port where the property in question is found, unless the
Commissioner shall direct its conveyance for such purpose to some other port.

Moreover, Section 2603 of the Code states that the seized goods shall be
sold at public auction after the required ten-day notice. In the instant case, these
were sold on November 15-16, 1979. Thus, absent any evidence to the
contrary, the sale is presumed to have been conducted by public officers in the
regular performance of their duties.
Petitioner did not raise any objection to the presentation of the Notice of
Sale and the results of the auction as evidence for respondent. Clearly, his
[32]

belated protestation now comes as an afterthought.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

ROBERT SIERRA y CANEDA, G.R. No. 182941

Petitioner,
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO-MORALES
**
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
***
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent. Promulgated:

July 3, 2009

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition of Robert Sierra y Caneda (petitioner) for the review
on certiorari[1] of the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals[4] (CA)
that affirmed with modification his conviction for the crime of qualified rape
rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 159, Pasig City, in its decision
of April 5, 2006.

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

In August 2000, thirteen-year-old AAA[5] was playing with her friend BBB in the
second floor of her familys house in Palatiw, Pasig. The petitioner arrived holding a
knife and told AAA and BBB that he wanted to play with them. The petitioner then
undressed BBB and had sexual intercourse with her. Afterwards, he turned to AAA,
undressed her, and also had sexual intercourse with her by inserting his male organ
into hers. The petitioner warned AAA not to tell anybody of what they did.

AAA subsequently disclosed the incident to Elena Gallano (her teacher) and to
Dolores Mangantula (the parent of a classmate), who both accompanied AAA to
the barangayoffice. AAA was later subjected to physical examination that revealed
a laceration on her hymen consistent with her claim of sexual abuse. On the basis of
the complaint and the physical findings, the petitioner was charged with rape under
the following Information:

On or about August 5, 2000, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, a minor, 15 years old, with lewd designs and by
means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his (accused) sister, AAA, thirteen
years of age, against the latters will and consent.

Contrary to law.[6]

The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge and raised the defenses of
denial and alibi. He claimed that he was selling cigarettes at the time of the alleged
rape. He also claimed that AAA only invented her story because she bore him a
grudge for the beatings he gave her. The parties mother (CCC) supported the
petitioners story; she also stated that AAA was a troublemaker. Both CCC and son
testified that the petitioner was fifteen (15) years old when the alleged incident
happened.[7]

The defense also presented BBB who denied that the petitioner raped her; she
confirmed the petitioners claim that AAA bore her brother a grudge.

On April 5, 2006, the RTC convicted the petitioner of qualified rape as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ROBERT
SIERRA y CANEDA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
(Violation of R.A. 8353 in relation to SC A.M. 99-1-13) and hereby sentences the
said juvenile in conflict with law to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua; and to indemnify the victim the amount of P75,000 as civil
indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, and P25,000 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.[8]

The petitioner elevated this RTC decision to the CA by attacking AAAs credibility.
He also invoked paragraph 1, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Act of 2006)[9] to exempt him from criminal liability considering that he was
only 15 years old at the time the crime was committed.

The CA nevertheless affirmed the petitioners conviction with modification as to

penalty as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that the trial court did not err in convicting Robert
Sierra, the assailed Decision is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that Robert Sierra has to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of RECLUSION
TEMPORAL MAXIMUM. The award of damages are likewise affirmed.

SO ORDERED.[10]
 In ruling that the petitioner was not exempt from criminal liability, the CA
held:

As to the penalty, We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that Robert is
not exempt from liability. First, it was not clearly established and proved by the
defense that Robert was 15 years old or below at the time of the commission of the
crime. It was incumbent for the defense to present Roberts birth certificate if it was
to invoke Section 64 of Republic Act No. 9344. Neither is the suspension of
sentence available to Robert as the Supreme Court, in one case, clarified that:

We note that, in the meantime, Rep. Act No. 9344 took effect
on May 20, 2006. Section 38 of the law reads:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child

who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment
of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with
the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence
shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen
(18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement
of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the

various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the
appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme
Court on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

The law merely amended Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as

amended by A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, in that the suspension of
sentence shall be enjoyed by the juvenile even if he is already 18
years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her
guilt. The other disqualifications in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as
amended, and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC have not been
deleted from Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344. Evidently, the
intention of Congress was to maintain the other disqualifications as
provided in Article 192 of P.D. No. 603, as amended, and Section
32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC. Hence, juveniles who have been
convicted of a crime the imposable penalty for which is reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death or death,
are disqualified from having their sentences suspended. [11]
 The CA denied the petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration; hence,
the present petition.
THE ISSUES

The petitioner no longer assails the prosecutions evidence on his guilt of the
crime charged; what he now assails is the failure of the CA to apply paragraph 1,
Section 6[12]of R.A. No. 9344 under the following issues:

(1) Whether or not the CA erred in not applying the provisions of R.A. No.
9344 on the petitioners exemption from criminal liability;

(2) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that it was incumbent for the defense
to present the petitioners birth certificate to invoke Section 64 of R.A. No.
9344 when the burden of proving his age lies with the prosecution by
express provisions of R.A. No. 9344; and

(3) Whether or not the CA erred in applying the ruling in Declarador v. Hon.
Gubaton[13] thereby denying the petitioner the benefit of exemption from
criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344.

The threshold issue in this case is the determination of who bears the burden
of proof for purposes of determining exemption from criminal liability based on the
age of the petitioner at the time the crime was committed.

The petitioner posits that the burden of proof should be on the prosecution as
the party who stands to lose the case if no evidence is presented to show that the
petitioner was not a 15-year old minor entitled to the exempting benefit provided
under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344.[14] He additionally claims that Sections
3,[15] 7,[16] and 68[17] of the law also provide a presumption of minority in favor of a
child in conflict with the law, so that any doubt regarding his age should be resolved
in his favor.

The petitioner further submits that the undisputed facts and evidence on record
specifically: the allegation of the Information, the testimonies of the petitioner and
CCC that the prosecution never objected to, and the findings of the RTC established
that he was not more than 15 years old at the time of the commission of the crime.

The Peoples Comment, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
counters that the burden belongs to the petitioner who should have presented his
birth certificate or other documentary evidence proving that his age was 15 years or
below. The OSG also stressed that while petitioner is presumed to be a minor, he is
disqualified to have his sentence suspended following the ruling in Declarador v.
Hon. Gubaton.[18]

THE COURTS RULING

We grant the petition.

We examine at the outset the prosecutions evidence and the findings of the
lower courts on the petitioners guilt, since the petition opens the whole case for
review and the issues before us are predicated on the petitioners guilt of the crime
charged. A determination of guilt is likewise relevant under the terms of R.A. No.
9344 since its exempting effect is only on the criminal, not on the civil, liability.

We see no compelling reason, after examination of the CA decision and the

records of the case, to deviate from the lower courts findings of guilt. The records
show that the prosecution established all the elements of the crime charged through
the credible testimony of AAA and the other corroborating evidence; sexual
intercourse did indeed take place as the information charged. [19] As against AAAs
testimony, the petitioner could only raise the defenses of denial and alibi defenses
that, in a long line of cases, we have held to be inherently weak unless supported by
clear and convincing evidence; the petitioner failed to present this required
evidentiary support.[20] We have held, too, that as negative defenses, denial and alibi
cannot prevail over the credible and positive testimony of the complainant. [21] We
sustain the lower courts on the issue of credibility, as we see no compelling reason
to doubt the validity of their conclusions in this regard.

While the defense, on appeal, raises a new ground i.e., exemption from
criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344 that implies an admission of guilt, this
consideration in no way swayed the conclusion we made above, as the defense is
entitled to present all alternative defenses available to it, even inconsistent ones. We
note, too, that the defenses claim of exemption from liability was made for the first
time in its appeal to the CA. While this may initially imply an essential change of
theory that is usually disallowed on appeal for reasons of fairness, [22] no essential
change is really involved as the claim for exemption from liability is not
incompatible with the evidence submitted below and with the lower courts
conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of the crime charged. An exempting
circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the
accused is freed from criminal liability; in other words, the accused committed a
crime, but he cannot be held criminally liable therefor because of an exemption
granted by law.In admitting this type of defense on appeal, we are not unmindful,
too, that the appeal of a criminal case (even one made under Rule 45) opens the
whole case for review, even on questions that the parties did not raise.[23] By mandate
of the Constitution, no less, we are bound to look into every circumstance and
resolve every doubt in favor of the accused.[24] It is with these considerations in mind
and in obedience to the direct and more specific commands of R.A. No. 9344 on
how the cases of children in conflict with the law should be handled that we rule in
this Rule 45 petition.
 We find a review of the facts of the present case and of the applicable law on
exemption from liability compelling because of the patent errors the CA committed
in these regards. Specifically, the CAs findings of fact on the issues of age and
minority, premised on the supposed absence of evidence, are contradicted by the
evidence on record; it also manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. [ 2 5 ]

In tackling the issues of age and minority, we stress at the outset that the ages
of both the petitioner and the complaining victim are material and are at issue. The
age of the petitioner is critical for purposes of his entitlement to exemption from
criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344, while the age of the latter is material in
characterizing the crime committed and in considering the resulting civil liability
that R.A. No. 9344 does not remove.
Minority as an Exempting Circumstance

R.A. No. 9344 was enacted into law on April 28, 2006 and took effect on May
20, 2006. Its intent is to promote and protect the rights of a child in conflict with the
law or a child at risk by providing a system that would ensure that children are dealt
with in a manner appropriate to their well-being through a variety of disposition
measures such as care, guidance and supervision orders, counseling, probation,
foster care, education and vocational training programs and other alternatives to
institutional care.[26] More importantly in the context of this case, this law modifies
as well the minimum age limit of criminal irresponsibility for minor offenders; it
changed what paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, previously provided i.e., from under nine years of age and above nine
years of age and under fifteen (who acted without discernment) to fifteen years old
or under and above fifteen but below 18 (who acted without discernment) in
determining exemption from criminal liability. In providing exemption, the new law
as the old paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 12 of the RPC did presumes that the minor
offenders completely lack the intelligence to distinguish right from wrong, so that
their acts are deemed involuntary ones for which they cannot be held
accountable.[27] The current law also drew its changes from the principle of
restorative justice that it espouses; it considers the ages 9 to 15 years as formative
years and gives minors of these ages a chance to right their wrong through diversion
and intervention measures.[28]
In the present case, the petitioner claims total exemption from criminal liability
because he was not more than 15 years old at the time the rape took place. The CA
disbelieved this claim for the petitioners failure to present his birth certificate as
required by Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344.[29] The CA also found him disqualified to
avail of a suspension of sentence because the imposable penalty for the crime of rape
is reclusion perpetua to death.

Burden of Proof

Burden of proof, under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules on Evidence, refers
to the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue in order to establish
his or her claim or defense. In a criminal case, the burden of proof to establish
the guilt of the accused falls upon the prosecution which has the duty to prove all the
essential ingredients of the crime. The prosecution completes its case as soon as it
has presented the evidence it believes is sufficient to prove the required elements. At
this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the defense to disprove what the
prosecution has shown by evidence, or to prove by evidence the circumstances
showing that the accused did not commit the crime charged or cannot otherwise be
held liable therefor. In the present case, the prosecution completed its evidence and
had done everything that the law requires it to do. The burden of evidence has now
shifted to the defense which now claims, by an affirmative defense, that the accused,
even if guilty, should be exempt from criminal liability because of his age when he
committed the crime. The defense, therefore, not the prosecution, has the burden of
showing by evidence that the petitioner was 15 years old or less when he committed
the rape charged.[30]
 This conclusion can also be reached by considering that minority and age are
not elements of the crime of rape; the prosecution therefore has no duty to prove
these circumstances. To impose the burden of proof on the prosecution would make
minority and age integral elements of the crime when clearly they are not. [31] If the
prosecution has a burden related to age, this burden relates to proof of the age of the
victim as a circumstance that qualifies the crime of rape. [32]

Testimonial Evidence is Competent Evidence

to Prove the Accuseds Minority and Age

The CA seriously erred when it rejected testimonial evidence showing that the
petitioner was only 15 years old at the time he committed the crime. Section 7 of
R.A. No. 9344 expressly states how the age of a child in conflict with the law may
be determined:
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be
determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or
any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age
may be based on information from the child himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and
other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it
shall be resolved in his/her favor. [Emphasis supplied]

Rule 30-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 9344 provides the
implementing details of this provision by enumerating the measures that may be
undertaken by a law enforcement officer to ascertain the childs age:

(1) Obtain documents that show proof of the childs age, such as

(a) Childs birth certificate;

(b) Childs baptismal certificate ;or
(c) Any other pertinent documents such as but not limited to the childs school
records, dental records, or travel papers.
 (2) x x x

(3) When the above documents cannot be obtained or pending receipt of such
documents, the law enforcement officer shall exhaust other measures to
determine age by:

(a) Interviewing the child and obtaining information that indicate age (e.g. date
of birthday, grade level in school);
(b) Interviewing persons who may have knowledge that indicate[s] age of the
child (e.g. relatives, neighbors, teachers, classmates);
(c) Evaluating the physical appearance (e.g. height, built) of the child; and
(d) Obtaining other relevant evidence of age.
xxx

Section 7, R.A. No. 9344, while a relatively new law (having been passed only
in 2006), does not depart from the jurisprudence existing at that time on the evidence
that may be admitted as satisfactory proof of the accuseds minority and age.

In the 1903 case of U.S. v. Bergantino,[33] we accepted testimonial evidence

to prove the minority and age of the accused in the absence of any document or other
satisfactory evidence showing the date of birth. This was followed by U.S. v.
Roxas[34] where the defendants statement about his age was considered sufficient,
even without corroborative evidence, to establish that he was a minor of 16 years at
the time he committed the offense charged. Subsequently, in People v. Tismo,[35] the
Court appreciated the minority and age of the accused on the basis of his claim that
he was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense in the absence of
any contradictory evidence or objection on the part of the prosecution. Then,
in People v. Villagracia,[36] we found the testimony of the accused that he was less
than 15 years old sufficient to establish his minority. We reiterated these dicta in the
cases of People v. Morial[37] and David v. Court of Appeals,[38] and ruled that the
allegations of minority and age by the accused will be accepted as facts upon the
prosecutions failure to disprove the claim by contrary evidence.

In these cases, we gave evidentiary weight to testimonial evidence on the

accuseds minority and age upon the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the
absence of any other satisfactory evidence such as the birth certificate, baptismal
certificate, or similar documents that would prove the date of birth of the accused; (2)
the presence of testimony from accused and/or a relative on the age and minority of
the accused at the time of the complained incident without any objection on the part
of the prosecution; and (3) lack of any contrary evidence showing that the accuseds
and/or his relatives testimonies are untrue.

All these conditions are present in this case. First, the petitioner and CCC both
testified regarding his minority and age when the rape was committed. [39] Second,
the records before us show that these pieces of testimonial evidence were never
objected to by the prosecution. And lastly, the prosecution did not present any
contrary evidence to prove that the petitioner was above 15 years old when the crime
was committed.

We also stress that the last paragraph of Section 7 of R.A. No. 9344 provides
that any doubt on the age of the child must be resolved in his favor. [40] Hence, any
doubt in this case regarding the petitioners age at the time he committed the rape
should be resolved in his favor. In other words, the testimony that the petitioner as
15 years old when the crime took place should be read to mean that he was not more
than 15 years old as this is the more favorable reading that R.A. No. 9344 directs.

Given the express mandate of R.A. No. 9344, its implementing rules, and
established jurisprudence in accord with the latest statutory developments, the CA
therefore cannot but be in error in not appreciating and giving evidentiary value to
the petitioners and CCCs testimonies relating to the formers age.

Retroactive Application of R.A. No. 9344

That the petitioner committed the rape before R.A. No. 9344 took effect and
that he is no longer a minor (he was already 20 years old when he took the stand)
will not bar him from enjoying the benefit of total exemption that Section 6 of R.A.
No. 9344 grants.[41] As we explained in discussing
Sections 64 and 68 of R.A. No. 9344[42] in the recent case of Ortega v. People:[43]

Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15 years

old and below, at the time of the commission of the crime, shall immediately be
dismissed and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officers (LSWDO). What is controlling, therefore, with respect to
the exemption from criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICLs age at the
time of the promulgation of judgment but the CICLs age at the time of the
commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal
irresponsibility has been raised from 9 to 15 years old. [Emphasis supplied]

The retroactive application of R.A. No. 9344 is also justified under Article 22 of the
RPC, as amended, which provides that penal laws are to be given retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the accused who is not found to be a habitual criminal. Nothing
in the records of this case indicates that the petitioner is a habitual criminal.

Civil Liability

The last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that the accused
shall continue to be civilly liable despite his exemption from criminal liability;
hence, the petitioner is civilly liable to AAA despite his exemption from criminal
liability. The extent of his civil liability depends on the crime he would have been
liable for had he not been found to be exempt from criminal liability.

The RTC and CA found, based on item (1) of Article 266-B of the RPC, as
amended, that the petitioner is guilty of qualified rape because of his relationship
with AAA within the second civil degree of consanguinity and the latters
minority.[44] Both courts accordingly imposed the civil liability corresponding to
qualified rape.
 The relationship between the petitioner and AAA, as siblings, does not appear
to be a disputed matter. Their mother, CCC, declared in her testimony that AAA and
the petitioner are her children. The prosecution and the defense likewise stipulated
in the proceedings below that the relationship exists. We find, however, that AAAs
minority, though alleged in the Information, had not been sufficiently
proven.[45] People v. Pruna[46] laid down these guidelines in appreciating the age of
the complainant:

In order to remove any confusion that may be engendered by the

foregoing cases, we hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating
age, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an

original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such
party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic

documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which
show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have

been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear
and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by
affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the
offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and

what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7
years old;
 b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12
years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and
what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18
years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the

testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims
age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is
expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the
offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the
testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against
him. [Emphasis supplied]

The records fail to show any evidence proving the age of AAA. They do not
likewise show that the petitioner ever expressly and clearly admitted AAAs age at
the time of the rape. Pursuant to Pruna, neither can his failure to object to AAAs
testimony be taken against him.

Thus, the required concurrence of circumstances that would upgrade the

crime to qualified rape i.e., relationship within the third degree of consanguinity
and minority of the victim does not exist. The crime for which the petitioner should
have been found criminally liable should therefore only be simple rape pursuant to
par. 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, not qualified rape. The civil liability that can be
imposed on the petitioner follows the characterization of the crime and the
attendant circumstances.
 Accordingly, we uphold the grant of moral damages of P50,000.00 but
increase the awarded exemplary damages P30,000.00, both pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence.[47]Moral damages are automatically awarded to rape victims
without the necessity of proof; the law assumes that the victim suffered moral
injuries entitling her to this award.[48]Article 2230 of the Civil Code justifies
the award of exemplary damages because of the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of relationship between AAA and petitioner and dwelling. [49] As
discussed above, the relationship (between the parties) is not disputed. We
appreciate dwelling as an aggravating circumstance based on AAAs testimony that
the rape was committed in their house.[50] While dwelling as an aggravating
circumstance was not alleged in the Information, established jurisprudence holds
that it may nevertheless be appreciated as basis for the award of exemplary
damages.[51]

We modify the awarded civil indemnity of P75,000.00 to P50,000.00, the

latter being the civil indemnity appropriate for simple rape [52] on the finding that
rape had been committed.[53]

In light of the above discussion and our conclusions, we see no need to discuss
the petitions third assignment of error.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED.

The Decision dated February 29, 2008 and Resolution dated May 22, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.-CR.-H.C. No. 02218 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

Pursuant to Section 64 of R.A. No. 9344, Criminal Case No. 120292-H for
rape filed against petitioner Robert Sierra y Caneda is hereby DISMISSED.
Petitioner is REFERRED to the appropriate local social welfare and development
officer who shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9344.
Petitioner is ORDERED topay the victim, AAA, P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
 Unless there are other valid causes for petitioners continued detention, we
hereby ORDER his IMMEDIATE RELEASE under the above terms.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of

Corrections in Muntinlupa City for its immediate implementation. The Director of
the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court within five days from
receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.

Let a copy of this Decision be likewise furnished the Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Council.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION

DANTE T. TAN, G.R. No. 173637

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,

- versus - VELASCO, JR., ** and

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,***JJ.

Promulgated:

April 21, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the
Decision[1] dated 22 February 2006 and Resolution[2] dated 17 July 2006 issued by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83068 entitled, People of the Philippines v.
Hon. Briccio C. Ygana, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 153, Regional
Trial Court, Pasig City and Dante Tan.
The assailed Decision reinstated Criminal Case No. 119830, earlier dismissed by the
trial court due to an alleged violation of petitioner Dante T. Tans right to speedy
trial. The assailed Resolution denied his Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to
Inhibit.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:

On 19 December 2000, a Panel of Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ),

on behalf of the People of the Philippines (People), filed three Informations against
Dante T. Tan (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The
cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832,
all entitled, People of the Philippines v. Dante Tan.

Criminal Case No. 119830[3] pertains to allegations that petitioner employed

manipulative devises in the purchase of Best World Resources Corporation (BW)
shares. On the other hand, Criminal Cases No. 119831[4] and No. 119832[5] involve
the alleged failure of petitioner to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of BW shares.

In two other related cases, two Informations were filed against a certain Jimmy
Juan and Eduardo G. Lim for violation of the Revised Securities Act involving BW
shares of stock. These were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No.
119829.
On the same day, the DOJ, through Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C.
Mariano, filed a Motion for Consolidation praying that Criminal Cases No. 119830,
No. 119831 and No. 119832 be consolidated together with Criminal Cases No.
119828 and No. 119829, which the trial court granted.
On 21 December 2000, Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832
were raffled off to the Pasig RTC, Branch 153, presided by Judge Briccio C.
Ygana. Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No. 119829 also went to the same court.
Petitioner was arraigned on 16 January 2001, and pleaded not guilty to the
charges.[6]

On 6 February 2001, the pre-trial was concluded, and a pre-trial order set, among
other things, the first date of trial on 27 February 2001.[7]
Atty. Celia Sandejas of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), under the
direct control and supervision of Public Prosecutor Nestor Lazaro, entered her
appearance for the People; Atty. Agnes Maranan for petitioner Dante Tan; Atty.
Sigfrid Fortun for Eduardo Lim, Jr.; and Atty. Rudolf Brittanico for Jimmy Juan. State
Prosecutors Susan Dacanay and Edna Villanueva later on took over as lawyers for
the People.

The People insists that during the pendency of the initial hearing on 27 February
2001, the parties agreed that Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 would be
tried ahead of Criminal Case No. 119830, and that petitioner would not interpose
any objection to its manifestation, nor would the trial court disapprove it.

Thereafter, the People presented evidence for Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No.
119832. On 18 September 2001, the prosecution completed the presentation of its
evidence and was ordered by the RTC to file its formal offer of evidence within
thirty days.
After being granted extensions to its filing of a formal offer of evidence, the
prosecution was able to file said formal offer for Criminal Cases No. 119831 and
No. 119832 on 25 November 2003.[8]

On 2 December 2003, petitioner moved to dismiss Criminal Case No. 119830 due
to the Peoples alleged failure to prosecute. Claiming violation of his right to speedy
trial, petitioner faults the People for failing to prosecute the case for an
unreasonable length of time and without giving any excuse or justification for the
delay. According to petitioner, he was persistent in asserting his right to speedy
trial, which he had allegedly done on several instances. Finally, he claimed to have
been substantially prejudiced by this delay.
The prosecution opposed the Motion, insisting on its claim that the parties had an
earlier agreement to defer the trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 until after that of
Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832, as the presentation of evidence and
prosecution in each of the five cases involved were to be done separately. The
presentation of evidence in Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832, however, were
done simultaneously, because they involved similar offenses of non-disclosure of
beneficial ownership of stocks proscribed under Rule 36(a)-1[9] in relation to
Sections 32(a)-1[10] and 56[11] of Batas Pambansa Bilang 178, otherwise known as
the Revised Securities Act. Criminal Case No. 119830 pertains to alleged violation
of Section 27 (b),[12] in relation to Section 56 of said act.

On 22 December 2003, Judge Briccio C. Ygana of the Pasig RTC, Branch 153, ruled
that the delays which attended the proceedings of petitioners case (Criminal Case
No. 119830) were vexatious, capricious and oppressive, resulting in violation of
petitioners right to speedy trial. The RTC ordered[13] the dismissal of Criminal Case
No. 119830, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises duly considered and finding the motion

to dismiss to be meritorious, the Court hereby orders Criminal Case No.
119830 DISMISSED.
On motion for reconsideration, the prosecution insisted that the parties agreed to
hold separate trials of the BW cases, with petitioner acquiescing to the prosecution
of Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 ahead of Criminal Case No.
119830. In an Order dated 20 January 2004, the RTC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.

The RTCs order of dismissal was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition
for certiorari, with the People contending that:

RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT

THE PEOPLE VIOLATED DANTE TANS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL, ALBEIT,
THE LATTER AND RESPONDENT JUDGE HIMSELF HAVE CONFORMED TO
THE DEFERMENT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 119830 PENDING HEARING OF
THE TWO OTHER RELATED CASES.

Setting aside the trial courts order of dismissal, the Court of Appeals granted the
petition for certiorari in its Decision dated 22 February 2006. In resolving the
petition, the appellate court reinstated Criminal Case No. 119830 in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the assailed Orders

dated December 22, 2003 and January 20, 2004 are set aside. Criminal
Case No. 119830 is reinstated and the trial court is ordered to conduct
further proceedings in said case immediately.[14]

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Decision and filed a motion for
inhibition of the Justices who decided the case.
On 17 July 2006, the Court of Appeals denied both motions.

Petitioner Dante Tan, henceforth, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari,
raising the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MAY VALIDLY

EXECUTE THE CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING ATTACHED TO
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY THE PEOPLE WITH THE COURT
OF APPEALS EVEN THOUGH THE CRIMINAL ACTION WAS INSTITUTED BY
A COMPLAINT SUBSCRIBED BY THE AUTHORIZED OFFICERS OF THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI VIOLATED TANS

RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT CRIMINAL CASE NO. 119830 WAS CORRECTLY

DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT ON THE GROUND OF VIOLATION OF
TANS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.

IV.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.

We first resolve the preliminary issues.

In an attempt at having the instant petition dismissed, petitioner contends that the
certificate of non-forum shopping attached to the Peoples appeal before the Court
of Appeals should have been signed by the Chairman of the SEC as complainant in
the cases instead of Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N. Gutierrez.

Petitioners argument is futile. The Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining

the authority of Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas Gutierrez to sign the certificate
of non-forum shopping of the petition for certiorari before said court. It must be
stressed that the certification against forum shopping is required to be executed
by the plaintiff.[15]Although the complaint-affidavit was signed by the Prosecution
and Enforcement Department of the SEC, the petition before the Court of Appeals
originated from Criminal Case No. 119830, where the plaintiff or the party
instituting the case was the People of the Philippines. Section 2, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court leaves no room for doubt and establishes that criminal cases are
prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines, the offended party in
criminal cases. Moreover, pursuant to Section 3, paragraph (2) of the Revised
Administrative Code, the DOJ is the executive arm of the government mandated to
investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the
probation and correction system. It is the DOJ, through its prosecutors, which is
authorized to prosecute criminal cases on behalf of the People of
the Philippines.[16] Prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of criminal
offenses, including the conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review by
the Secretary of Justice. Since it is the DOJ which is the government agency tasked
to prosecute criminal cases before the trial court, the DOJ is best suited to attest
whether a similar or related case has been filed or is pending in another court of
tribunal. Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N. Gutierrez, being the head of the DOJ,
therefore, had the authority to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping for
Criminal Case No. 119830, which was filed on behalf of the People of
the Philippines.

The preliminary issues having been resolved, the Court shall proceed to discuss the
main issues.

At the crux of the controversy is the issue of whether there was a violation of
petitioner Dante Tans right to speedy trial.
Petitioner Dante Tan assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 83068. The appellate court determined that he impliedly agreed
that Case No. 119830 would not be tried until after termination of Criminal Cases
No. 119831-119832, which finding was grounded entirely on speculations, surmises
and conjectures.

Both parties concede that this issue is factual. It is a basic rule that factual issues
are beyond the province of this Court in a petition for review, for it is not our
function to review evidence all over again.[17] Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides
that only questions of law may be raised in this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari.[18] The reason is that the Court is not a trier of facts.[19] However, the
rule is subject to several exceptions.[20] Under these exceptions, the Court may
delve into and resolve factual issues, such as in cases where the findings of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals are absurd, contrary to the evidence on record,
impossible, capricious or arbitrary, or based on a misappreciation of facts.

In this case, the Court is convinced that the findings of the Court of Appeals
on the substantial matters at hand, while conflicting with those of the RTC, are
adequately supported by the evidence on record. We, therefore, find no reason to
deviate from the jurisprudential holdings and treat the instant case differently.
An accuseds right to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial is guaranteed in
criminal cases by Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution. This right to a
speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free
from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt
determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose. [21] Intimating
historical perspective on the evolution of the right to speedy trial, we reiterate the
old legal maxim, justice delayed is justice denied. This oft-repeated adage requires
the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an
accused is constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial.[22]
Following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No.
8493, otherwise known as The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, was enacted, with Section
6 of said act limiting the trial period to 180 days from the first day of trial.[23] Aware
of problems resulting in the clogging of court dockets, the Court implemented the
law by issuing Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, which has been incorporated in
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 119.[24]
In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan,[25] the Court had occasion to state
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of
the case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the
citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an
indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by
mandating the courts to proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of
criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a
case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious and oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an
accused has been denied such right is not susceptible by precise
qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and
must necessarily be a flexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is

orderly, expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said
how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift,
but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon
 circumstances. It secures rights to the accused, but it does not preclude
the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights
given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are
shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.

The Court emphasized in the same case that:

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the

accused necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on
an ad hoc basis.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right

to a speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must
be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the
defendants assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. x x
x.

Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification

of the State for such delay. Different weights should be assigned to
different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. x x x. [26]

Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accuseds right to speedy

trial is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays. In determining whether petitioner was deprived
of this right, the factors to consider and balance are the following: (a) duration of
the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and
(d) prejudice caused by such delay.[27]
From the initial hearing on 27 February 2001 until the time the prosecution filed its
formal offer of evidence for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832 on 25 November
2003, both prosecution and defense admit that no evidence was presented for
Criminal Case No. 119830. Hence, for a period of almost two years and eight
months, the prosecution did not present a single evidence for Criminal Case No.
119830.

The question we have to answer now is whether there was vexatious,

capricious, and oppressive delay. To this, we apply the four-factor test previously
mentioned.

We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial,

courts are required to do more than a mathematical computation of the number
of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case. A mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient,[28] and particular regard must
be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. [29]

In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,[30] the Court ruled that there was no violation of the
right to speedy trial and speedy disposition. The Court took into account the
reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent amendments of procedural laws by
presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial
agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of
personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting
agencies. The Court also considered the failure of the accused to assert such right,
and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.

In Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan,[31] the complexity of the issues and

the failure of the accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the
appropriate time spelled defeat for her claim to the constitutional guarantee.
 In Cadalin v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administrations
Administrator,[32] the Court, considering also the complexity of the cases and the
conduct of the parties lawyers, held that the right to speedy disposition was not
violated therein.

Petitioners objection to the prosecutions stand that he gave an implied

consent to the separate trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 is belied by the records
of the case. No objection was interposed by his defense counsel when this matter
was discussed during the initial hearing.[33] Petitioners conformity thereto can be
deduced from his non-objection at the preliminary hearing when the prosecution
manifested that the evidence to be presented would be only for Criminal Cases No.
119831-119832. His failure to object to the prosecutions manifestation that the
cases be tried separately is fatal to his case. The acts, mistakes and negligence of
counsel bind his client, except only when such mistakes would result in serious
injustice.[34] In fact, petitioners acquiescence is evident from the transcript of
stenographic notes during the initial presentation of the Peoples evidence in the
five BW cases on 27 February 2001, herein quoted below:

COURT: Atty. Sandejas, call your witness.

ATTY. SANDEJAS [SEC Prosecuting Lawyer]: May we make some

manifestation first, your Honor, before we continue presenting
our witness. First of all, this witness will only be testifying as to
two (2) of the charges: non-disclosure of beneficial ownership of
Dante Tan x x x.

xxxx

COURT: (to Atty. Sandejas) Call your witness.

 ATTY. SANDEJAS: Our witness is Mr. Wilfredo Baltazar of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, your Honor. We are presenting this
witness for the purpose of non-disclosure of beneficial ownership
case

COURT: I would advise the counsel from the SEC to make it very clear
your purpose in presenting your first witness.

ATTY. SANDEJAS: Yes, your Honor. Can I borrow the file?

COURT: Show it to counsel.

ATTY. SANDEJAS: Crim. Case Nos. 119831 and 119832, for Violation of RA
Rule 36(a)1, in relation to Sec. 32 (a)-1 of the Revised Securities
Act when he failed to disclose his beneficial ownership amounting
to more than 10% which requires disclosure of such fact.[35]

During the same hearing, the People manifested in open court that the parties had
agreed to the separate trials of the BW Cases:

PROSECUTOR LAZARO:

May we be allowed to speak, your Honor?

Your Honor please, as we x x x understand, this is not a joint trial but a

separate trial x x x so as manifested by the SEC lawyer, the witness is
 being presented insofar as 119831 and 119832 as against Dante Tan only
x x x.[36]

The transcript of stenographic notes taken from the 3 April 2001 hearing further
clarifies that only the two cases against Dante Tan were being prosecuted:
ATTY. DE LA CRUZ [new counsel for accused Eduardo Lim, Jr.]:
Your Honor, please, may I request clarification from the prosecutors
regarding the purpose of the testimony of the witness in the stand. While
the Private Prosecutor stated the purpose of the testimony of the
witness. . .

xxxx

PROSECUTOR LAZARO:

I was present during the last hearing. I was then going over the transcript
of this case, well, I believe the testimony x x x mainly [is] on accused
Dante Tan, your Honor. As a matter of fact, there was a clarification made
by the parties and counsels after the witness had testified that the
hearing in these cases is not a joint trial because it involves separate
charges, involving different documents, your Honor. That is why the
witness already testified only concerning Dante Tan. Per the query made
by Atty. Fortun, because at that time, Atty. Fortun was still representing
Mr. Lim, I believe, your Honor, then I understand that the testimony of
this witness cannot just be adopted insofar as the other accused, your
Honor.

ATTY. MARANAN:
 We confirm that, your Honor, since x x x particularly since this is already
cross, it is clear that the direct examination dealt exclusively with Mr.
Dante Tan.

PROS. LAZARO:

Mr. Dante Tan, involving the 2 (two) cases.[37]

Moreover, although periods for trial have been stipulated, these periods are not
absolute. Where periods have been set, certain exclusions are allowed by
law.[38] After all, this Court and the law recognize that it is but a fact that judicial
proceedings do not exist in a vacuum and must contend with the realities of
everyday life. In spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to
adopt the view that the fundamentally recognized principle is that the concept of
speedy trial is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.[39]
As to the assertion that delay in the presentation of evidence for Criminal Case No.
119830 has prejudiced petitioner because the witnesses for the defense may no
longer be available at this time, suffice it to say that the burden of proving his guilt
rests upon the prosecution.[40] Should the prosecution fail for any reason to present
evidence sufficient to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner will be
acquitted. It is safely entrenched in our jurisprudence that unless the prosecution
discharges its burden to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt,
the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf.[41]

In the cases involving petitioner, the length of delay, complexity of the issues
and his failure to invoke said right to speedy trial at the appropriate time tolled the
death knell on his claim to the constitutional guarantee.[42] More importantly, in
failing to interpose a timely objection to the prosecutions manifestation during the
preliminary hearings that the cases be tried separately, one after the other,
petitioner was deemed to have acquiesced and waived his objection thereto.
For the reasons above-stated, there is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that
the prosecution is guilty of violating petitioners right to speedy trial. Grave abuse
of discretion defies exact definition, but generally refers to capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Any capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment in dismissing a criminal case is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. This is true in the instant case.

There is also no merit to petitioners claim that a reversal of the RTCs Order
dismissing Criminal Case No. 119830 is a violation of his constitutional right against
double jeopardy which dismissal was founded on an alleged violation of his right to
speedy trial.

The constitutional protection against double jeopardy shields one from a second or
later prosecution for the same offense. Article III, Section 21 of the 1987
Constitution declares that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense, providing further that if an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
Following the above constitutional provision, Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Court found it apt to stipulate:

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused

has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
 necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in
the former complaint or information.

For double jeopardy to attach then, the following elements in the first criminal case
must be present:

(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in

form and substance to sustain a conviction;

(b) The court had jurisdiction;

(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and

(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed or

otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.[43]

Among the above-cited elements, we are concerned with the fourth element,
conviction or acquittal, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused. This element is crucial since, as a general rule,
the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal, made with the express
consent of the accused or upon his own motion, will not place the accused in
double jeopardy.[44] This rule, however, admits of two exceptions, namely:
insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial. [45] While indeed
petitioner was in fact the one who filed the Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No.
119830, the dismissal thereof was due to an alleged violation of his right to speedy
trial, which would otherwise put him in double jeopardy should the same charges
be revived. Petitioners situation is different. Double jeopardy has not attached,
considering that the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 119830 on the ground of
violation of his right to speedy trial was without basis and issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Where the right of the
accused to speedy trial has not been violated, there is no reason to support the
initial order of dismissal.
Following this Courts ruling in Almario v. Court of Appeals,[46] as petitioners right to
speedy trial was not transgressed, this exception to the fourth element of double
jeopardy that the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused was not
met. Where the dismissal of the case was allegedly capricious, certiorari lies from
such order of dismissal and does not involve double jeopardy, as the petition
challenges not the correctness but the validity of the order of dismissal; such grave
abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, which prevents double jeopardy
from attaching.[47]

As this Court ruled in People v. Tampal,[48] reiterated in People v. Leviste,[49] where

we overturned an order of dismissal by the trial court predicated on the right to
speedy trial

It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that dismissal of

cases on the ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal
that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same
offense. It must be stressed, however, that these dismissals were
predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases
are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of
the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the
State. x x x.

From the foregoing, it follows that petitioner cannot claim that double jeopardy
attached when said RTC order was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Double
jeopardy does not apply to this case, considering that there is no violation of
petitioners right to speedy trial.

The old adage that justice delayed is justice denied has never been more valid than
in our jurisdiction, where it is not a rarity for a case to drag in our courts for years
and years and even decades. It was this difficulty that inspired the constitutional
requirement that the rules of court to be promulgated by the Supreme Court shall
provide for a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy trial and
disposition of cases.[50] Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance, for
justice is not to be dispensed for the accused alone.[51]

Evidently, the task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve
our democratic society under the rule of law, ensuring that all those who appear
before or are brought to the bar of justice are afforded a fair opportunity to present
their side. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, Criminal Case No. 119830
is just one of the many controversial cases involving the BW shares scam where
public interest is undoubtedly at stake. The State, like any other litigant, is entitled
to its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. A hasty
dismissal, instead of unclogging dockets, has actually increased the workload of the
justice system and unwittingly prolonged the litigation.[52]

Finally, we reiterate that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and
the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons. Courts are tasked to give meaning to
that intent. There being no capricious, vexatious, oppressive delay in the
proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably sought, we concur in the
conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed 22 February 2006 Decision

and 17 July 2006 Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83068
are hereby AFFIRMED.
The instant case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch
153, Pasig City for further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 119830 with
reasonable dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 219603, January 26, 2016

MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO, Petitioner, v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

AND PHILIP ARREZA PICHAY, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This special civil action for certiorari1 assails the Decision dated 18 March 20152 and Resolution dated 3
August 20153 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), in HRET Case No. 13-022,
declaring respondent Philip A. Pichay (Pichay) eligible to hold and serve the office of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur.

The Facts

On 16 September 2008, the Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. Nos. 161032 and 161176, entitled "Tulfo
v. People of the Philippines," convicting Pichay by final judgment of four counts of libel.4 In lieu of
imprisonment, he was sentenced to pay a fine in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) for each
count of libel and One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages. This Decision became final and
executory on 1 June 2009. On 17 February 2011, Pichay paid One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral
damages and Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) as fine for each count of libel.

On 9 October 2012, Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Member of the Flouse of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur for the 13 May 2013 elections.

On 18 February 2013, petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado (Ty-Delgado) filed a petition for disqualification
under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code against Pichay before the Commission on Elections
(Comelec), on the ground that Pichay was convicted of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. Ty-Delgado
argued that when Pichay paid the fine on 17 February 2011, the five-year period barring him to be a
candidate had yet to lapse.

In his Answer dated 4 March 2013, Pichay, through his counsel, alleged that the petition for disqualification
was actually a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy under Section 78, in relation
to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code, and it was filed out of time. He admitted his conviction by final
judgment for four counts of libel, but claimed that libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. He
argued that he did not personally perform the acts prohibited and his conviction for libel was only because of
his presumed responsibility as president of the publishing company.

On 14 May 2013, Ty-Delgado filed a motion to suspend the proclamation of Pichay before the Comelec.

On 16 May 2013, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Surigao del Sur proclaimed Pichay as the duly
elected Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur,
obtaining a total of seventy-six thousand eight hundred seventy (76,870) votes.

On 31 May 2013, Ty-Delgado filed an ad cautelam petition for quo warranto before the HRET reiterating that
Pichay is ineligible to serve as Member of the House of Representatives because: (1) he was convicted by
final judgment of four counts of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude; and (2) only two years have passed
since he served his sentence or paid on 17 February 2011 the penalty imposed on him. In his Answer,
Pichay claimed that his conviction for the crime of libel did not make him ineligible because ineligibility only
pertained to lack of the qualifications under the Constitution.

In its Resolution dated 4 June 2013, the Comelec First Division dismissed the petition for disqualification
filed against Pichay because of lack of jurisdiction.

On 16 July 2013, Ty-Delgado manifested her amenability to convert the ad cautelam petition into a regular
petition for quo warranto.

On 22 October 2013, the preliminary conference took place and the parties waived the presentation of their
evidence upon agreement that their case only involved legal issues.

The HRET Decision

In a Decision dated 18 March 2015, the HRET held that it had jurisdiction over the present quo
warrantopetition since it involved the eligibility of a Member of the House of Representatives due to a
disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. However, the HRET held that there is
nothing in Tulfo v. People of the Philippines which found that Pichay directly participated in any way in
writing the libelous articles, aside from being the president of the publishing company.

Thus, the HRET concluded that the circumstances surrounding Pichay's conviction for libel showed that the
crime did not involve moral turpitude.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: chanRoblesvirtualLa wlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition (for Quo Warranto) is DISMISSED, and respondent
Philip A. Pichay is DECLARED ELIGIBLE to hold and serve the office of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.5
cralawlawli brary
ChanRoblesVi rtualawl ibrary

In Resolution No. 15-031 dated 3 August 2015, the HRET denied Ty-Delgado's motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit considering that no new matter was raised which justified the reversal or modification of the
Decision.

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

Ty-Delgado raises the following issues for resolution: chanRoblesvirtualLawli brary

[I]

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTANTIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING RESPONDENT PICHAY'S CONVICTION OF LIBEL DID NOT SHOW
THAT MORAL TURPITUDE IS INVOLVED, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL
FINDINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN GR. NO. 161032 ENTITLED "ERWIN TULFO V. PEOPLE AND
ATTY. CARLOS T. SO" AND IN G.R. NO. 161176 ENTITLED "SUSAN CAMBRI, ET. AL. V. COURT OF
APPEALS, ET. AL"

[II]

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTANTIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO DECLARE RESPONDENT
PICHAY INELIGIBLE OR DISQUALIFIED FROM HOLDING THE POSITION OF MEMBER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTANTIVES BY REASON OF HIS CONVICTION OF LIBEL, A CRIME INVOLVING
MORAL TURPITUDE.

[III]

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTANTIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT
RESPONDENT PICHAY FALSELY REPRESENTED IN HIS CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY THAT HE IS
ELIGIBLE TO RUN FOR CONGRESSMAN BECAUSE HIS CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING
MORAL TURPITUDE RENDERED HIM INELIGIBLE OR DISQUALIFIED.
 [IV]

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTANTIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT
RESPONDENT PICHAY SHOULD BE DEEMED TO HAVE NEVER BECOME A CANDIDATE SINCE HIS
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY IS VOID AB INITIO.

[V]

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTANTIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT SINCE
THE PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO QUESTIONED THE VALIDITY OF RESPONDENT PICHAY'S
CANDIDACY, THE JURISPRUDENCE ON A "SECOND PLACER" BEING PROCLAIMED AS WINNER
SHOULD THE CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY OF A "FIRST PLACER" IS CANCELLED, SHOULD APPLY.

[VI]

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTANTIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BY FAILING TO DECLARE THAT
PETITIONER DELGADO WAS THE SOLE LEGITIMATE CANDIDATE FOR MEMBER, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTANTIVES OF THE FIRST LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT OF SURIGAO DEL SUR, THUS SHE
MUST BE DECLARED THE RIGHTFUL WINNER IN THE 2013 ELECTIONS AND MUST BE MADE TO
ASSUME THE SAID POSITION.6
cralawlawli brary
ChanRoblesVirtua lawl ibrary

The Ruling of the Court

We find merit in the petition.

A sentence by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disqualification under
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code: chanRoblesvirtualLawl ibrary

Sec. 12. Disqualifications.— Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been
given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period
of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
(Emphasis supplied) cralawlawlibra ry

Moral turpitude is defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act
of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general.7 Although not every criminal act involves moral turpitude, the Court is guided by one of
the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes mala prohibita do not.8

In Villaber v. Commission on Elections,9 we held that violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is a crime
involving moral turpitude because a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on the
private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of
right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals. In Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections,10 we held that
the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude because actual knowledge by the "fence" that property
received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one's rightful property as that which
animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. In Magno v.
Commission on Elections,11 we ruled that direct bribery involves moral turpitude, because the fact that the
offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from
performing an official duty in exchange for some favors denotes a malicious intent on the part of the
offender to renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general.

In Zari v. Flores,12 we likewise listed libel as one of the crimes involving moral turpitude. The Revised Penal
Code defines libel as a "public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary,
or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt
of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead."13 The law recognizes that the
enjoyment of a private reputation is as much a constitutional right as the possession of life, liberty or
property.14

To be liable for libel, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act
or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d)
existence of malice.15 Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure
the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.16 Malice
is bad faith or bad motive and it is the essence of the crime of libel. 17 To determine actual malice, a libelous
statement must be shown to have been written or published with the knowledge that it is false or in reckless
disregard of whether it is false or not.18 Reckless disregard of what is false or not means that the defendant
entertains serious doubt as to the truth of the publication or possesses a high degree of awareness of its
probable falsity.19

In the present case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of libel. In Tulfo v. People of the
Philippines,20 the Court found Pichay liable for publishing the four defamatory articles, which are libelous per
se, with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. The fact that another libelous article was
published after the filing of the complaint can be considered as further evidence of malice. 21 Thus, Pichay
clearly acted with actual malice, and intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. He committed an "act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which he owes his fellow men, or society in general,"
and an act which is "contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals."

The dissenting opinion before the HRET even considered it "significant that [Pichay] has raised no issue
against libel being a crime involving moral turpitude, and has taken issue only against ascribing moral
turpitude to him despite his being only the President of the publishing company." 22 Thus, Pichay insists that,
since he was only the publisher of the libelous articles and the penalty for his conviction was reduced to
payment of fine, the circumstances of his conviction for libel did not amount to moral turpitude.

The Revised Penal Code provides that: "Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same. The author or
editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the
author thereof."23

The provision did not distinguish or graduate the penalty according to the nature or degree of the
participation of the persons involved in the crime of libel. It is basic in statutory construction that where the
law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Accordingly, we cannot distinguish Pichay's criminal
liability from the others' criminal liability only because he was the president of the company that published
the libelous articles instead of being their author. Pichay's criminal liability was the same as that of the
others, such that he was even meted the same penalty as that imposed on the author of the libelous
articles.

The crime of libel would not even be consummated without his participation as publisher of the libelous
articles. One who furnishes the means for carrying on the publication of a newspaper and entrusts its
management to servants or employees whom he selects and controls may be said to cause to be published
what actually appears, and should be held responsible therefor, whether he was individually concerned in
the publication or not.24

Although the participation of each felon in the crime of libel differs in point in time and in degree, both
author and publisher reneged on the private duties they owe their fellow men or society in a manner
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty, or good morals.

Contrary to Pichay's argument, the imposition of a fine does not determine whether the crime involves moral
turpitude or not. In Villaber v. Commission on Elections,25 we held that a crime still involves moral turpitude
even if the penalty of imprisonment imposed is reduced to a fine. In Tulfo v. People of the Philippines,26 we
explained that a fine was imposed on the accused since they were first time offenders.

Having been convicted of the crime of libel, Pichay is disqualified under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code for his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude.

Under Section 12, the disqualification shall be removed after the expiration of a period of five years from his
service of sentence. In Teves v. Comelec,27 we held that the five-year period of disqualification would end
only on 25 May 2010 or five years from 24 May 2005, the day petitioner paid the fine he was sentenced to
pay in Teves v. Sandiganbayan. In this case, since Pichay served his sentence when he paid the fine on 17
February 2011, the five-year period shall end only on 16 February 2016. Thus, Pichay is disqualified to
become a Member of the House of Representatives until then.

Considering his ineligibility due to his disqualification under Section 12, which became final on 1 June 2009,
Pichay made a false material representation as to his eligibility when he filed his certificate of candidacy on 9
October 2012 for the 2013 elections. Pichay's disqualification under Section 12 is a material fact involving
the eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. The pertinent
provisions read: chanRoblesvirtualLawl ibrary

Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person
filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if
for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or
district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of
birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that
he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is
assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

xxxx

Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to
deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is
false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five, days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before
the election. (Emphases supplied) cralawlawlibrary

In Fermin v. Comelec,28 we likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under
Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a
candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a Section 78 petition is filed before proclamation, while
a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. This is also similar to a quo
warranto petition contesting the election of a Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of
ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines filed before the HRET.29

Under Section 78, a proceeding to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy is premised
on a person's misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the elective office. 30 This is
to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public
office.31 In Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections,32 we held that if a candidate is not actually eligible because
he is barred by final judgment in a criminal case from running for public office, and he still states under oath
in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a
false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.

In the present case, Pichay misrepresented his eligibility in his certificate of candidacy because he knew that
he had been convicted by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Thus, his representation that
he was eligible for elective public office constitutes false material representation as to his qualification or
eligibility for the office.

A person whose certificate of candidacy had been denied due course and/or cancelled under Section 78 is
deemed to have not been a candidate at all, because his certificate of candidacy is considered void ab
initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily to valid votes.33 In both Jalosjos, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections34 and Aratea v. Commission on Elections,35 we proclaimed the second placer, the
only qualified candidate who actually garnered the highest number of votes, for the position of Mayor. We
found that since the certificate of candidacy of the candidate with the highest number of votes was void ab
initio, he was never a candidate at all, and all his votes were considered stray votes.

Accordingly, we find that the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction when it failed to disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude.
Since Pichay's ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy and he was never a valid
candidate for the position of Member of the House of Representatives, the votes cast for him were
considered stray votes. Thus, the qualified candidate for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections who
received the highest number of valid votes shall be declared the winner. Based on the Provincial Canvass
Report, the qualified candidate for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First
Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections who received the highest number of valid
votes is petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado.36

Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates
the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. While it is well-recognized that the HRET has been
empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives, the Court maintains jurisdiction over it to
check "whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction"
on the part of the latter. In other words, when the HRET utterly disregards the law and settled precedents
on the matter before it, it commits grave abuse of discretion.37

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE and SET ASIDE the Decision dated 18 March 2015
and Resolution dated 3 August 2015 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No.
13-022. Respondent Philip A. Pichay is ineligible to hold and serve the office of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur. Petitioner Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado
is DECLARED the winner for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative
District of Surigao del Sur in the 13 May 2013 elections. Considering that the term of the present House of
Representatives will end on 30 June 2016, this Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvirtuallawl ibrary

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-5161 and L-5162 October 9, 1912

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MIKE BEECHAM, defendant-appellant.

Frederick Garfield Waite, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Harvey, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

Mike Beecham, the defendant and appellant in this case, was convicted in the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga of the crime of asesinato (murder in the first degree) and sentenced to life
imprisonment together with the accessory penalties prescribed by law.

From the judgment of that court convicting and sentencing him, he appealed to this court. Upon a full
review of the whole case and upon the evidence disclosed by the record made up in the court below,
this court was of opinion that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of which he was
convicted in the court below, but marked with an aggravating circumstance, premeditacion
conocida (deliberate premeditation), which was not taken into consideration by the trial judge; and
that the trial judge erred in not taking this aggravating circumstance into consideration and in failing
to impose the capital penalty upon the convict, that being the penalty prescribed by law for the
commission of the crime with which he was charged and of which the evidence of record
conclusively established his guilt. Thereupon and in accordance with the practice in this jurisdiction,
and under authority of the law provided in such cases, this court entered final judgment reversing the
sentence of life imprisonment, declaring the defendant and appellant guilty of the crime
of asesinato (murder in the first degree), marked with the aggravating circumstance of premeditacion
conocida (deliberate premeditation), and sentencing him to the death penalty.

From the judgment of this court an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States.
This appeal was dismissed in that court for lack of jurisdiction. In due course certified copies of the
mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States dismissing the appeal and of the judgment
entered by this court, were remitted to the trial court, wherein the following auto (order) was entered
on the 19th day of August, 1912:

Received certified copies of the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States and of
the judgment and sentence rendered by the Supreme Court of these Islands.

Observe, fulfill, and execute the provisions thereof and file the case.

September 9, 1912, at 7 a.m., is fixed for the execution of Mike Beecham.

 So ordered.

(Sgd.) JULIO LLORENTE

Judge of First Instance of the Fourth District.

Thereafter, on the 19th day of August, 1912, the following order was issued to the Director of
Prisons:

Whereas, the Supreme Court of these Islands has reversed the judgment rendered in this
case and sentenced the defendant to the penalty of death, with the accessories of article 53
of the Penal code;

Whereas, the Supreme Court of the United States has dismissed the writ of error filed in this
case for lack of jurisdiction;

Whereas, this court issued an order, directing that the mandate of the judgment of said
Supreme Court of these Islands be observed, fulfilled, and executed and September 9, 1912,
at 7 a. m., be fixed for the execution of the defendant Mike Beecham;

Therefore, it is ordered that you proceed to carry out said sentence, copy whereof is hereto
attached, in accordance with Act No. 1577, on September 9, 1912, at 7 a. m. Please notify
this court of compliance herewith.

Given by the Honorable Julio Llorente, judge of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga,
fourth judicial district, this 19th day of August, 1912.

ESTANISLAO TAMAYO
Clerk of Court of Pampanga
By (Sgd.) JOSE PANLILIO,
Deputy Clerk

On the 27th of August, 1912, counsel for the convict submitted the following motion for the
revocation of the action thus taken by the trial judge:

The defendant hereby appears in the above-named case and asks for reversal of the
sentence promulgated by this court on August 19, 1912, for the following reasons:

First. That it does not appear from said sentence that the defendant and his counsel had any
notice of the rendition thereof and neither one nor the other was present in this court at the
time of the promulgation of said sentence.

Second. That it is a fact that neither said defendant nor his counsel was notified to be
present at the time of the promulgation of said sentence and neither one nor the other was
present in the court at the time of the promulgation thereof, as provided by General Orders,
No. 58, section 15, paragraph 1.

Dated at Manila, this 27th day of August, 1912.

(Sgd.) FREDERICK GARFIELD WAITE,

Attorney for defendant.
On the 30th day of August, 1912, the trial judge entered the following auto (order) in the record of
the case:

In the present case the defendant, Mike Beecham, through his counsel, asks for reversal of
the "sentence promulgated by this court on August 19, 1912," on the ground that they were
not "notified" nor "present" at the time of the promulgation thereof.

The "sentence" to which the defendant's petition refers is an auto (order) of this court that the
mandate of the Honorable Supreme Court of these Islands in this case be observed, fulfilled,
and executed and fixing the day and hour for the execution of the penalty imposed. It is not a
sentence for the promulgation whereof the notification or the presence of the defendant or
his counsel is necessary. It is simply an order of execution, absolutely necessary for
executing the mandates of higher courts in this case. Therefore, no legal reason exists for
entertaining the defendant's motion.

Wherefore, the motion is denied.

So ordered.

(Sgd.) JULIO LLORENTE,

Judge of First Instance of the Fourth District

It is from this auto (order) that this appeal was taken. Counsel for the convict contends that
all the proceedings had in trial court since the receipt therein of the certified copies of the
mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the judgment of this court were
null and void because neither the accused nor his counsel were given an opportunity to be
present, and as he alleges and as it appears from the record, were not in fact present when
these proceedings were had.

There is no question as to the authority of the trial court to issue the auto (order) fixing the
time and place for the execution of a valid judgment which had been duly rendered and
which imposes the sentence of death upon one convicted of a capital offense. Under the
provisions of Spanish law still in force in this jurisdiction, whereby all capital sentences
imposed by the trial courts are brought to this court for review (en consulta), and whereby
this court is authorized in a proper case to reverse a sentence imposing a less penalty and
itself impose the death penalty, it has always been and still is the duty of the trial
court, after a judgment imposing the death penalty has become final and the record has
been returned to that court for the execution of the sentence, to enter in the record
an auto (order) fixing the time and place therefor, and directing the proper officer to carry out
the sentence of the court. Some modifications have been made by a statute under American
sovereignty in regard to the mode in which death penalties are to be executed, and, with
certain exceptions, Bilibid Prison has been designated by law as the place of execution of all
such penalties. But there are no provisions in these statutes which change or modify the
uniform practice whereby the trial court is required to designate the time and place for the
execution in a proper auto (order) entered of record after a judgment imposing the death
penalty has become final.

But it is contended that no valid judgment imposing the death penalty has ever been
rendered in the case at bar because the defendant was not present when the judgment of
this court imposing that penalty was promulgated, and it is further contended that even if it
admitted that the judgment of this court was lawfully rendered in the absence of the
defendant, nevertheless the order of the trial court designating the place and date for its
 execution was erroneously entered in the absence of the convict and his counsel. It is urged
that no such order can be legally entered of record in the absence of the convict, and that he
is as much entitled to be present when such an order is entered as he is at any other stage
of the proceedings. It is said that the alleged rights which were denied the convict are
guaranteed him not only by the provisions of the Philippine Bill of Rights (sec. 5 of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902), but also by the express terms of sections 15 and 41 of General
Orders, No. 58.

The pertinent provisions relied upon are as follows:

Sec. 5 of Act of Congress, July 1, 1902,

That in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.

Section 15 of General Orders, No. 58, under the caption of "Rights of Accused at the Trial," provides
that:

In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be entitled —

1. To appear and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings.

Section 41 of General Orders, No. 58, provides that —

The defendant must be personally present at the time of pronouncing judgment, if the
conviction is for a felony; if for misdemeanor, the judgment may be pronounced in his
absence.

We are cited to our own construction of these statutes set forth in our decision in the case of U.S. vs.
Karelsen (3 Phil. Rep., 223) wherein we said:

In all criminal prosecutions the accused has an absolute right to be personally present during
the entire proceedings from arraignment to sentence if he so desires. In cases of felony must
insist upon the presence of the accused in court during every step in the trial. The record
must also show that the accused was present at every stage of the prosecution. (Hopt vs.
Utah, 110 U.S., 574.) it is not within the power of the court, the accused, or his counsel to
dispense with the provisions of General Orders, No. 58 (sec. 41), as to the personal
presence of the accused at the trial. We mean by the phrase `at the trial' to include
everything that is done in the course of the trial, from arraignment until after sentence is
announced by the judge in open court.

We are of the opinion, however, that both on principle and authority these various provisions
securing to an accused person the right to be present "in all criminal prosecutions" must be
understood as securing to him merely the right to be present during every step in the trial in the
Court of First Instance; and that as was said in the case cited by counsel for appellant, the phrase
"at the trial" is to be taken "to include everything that is done in the course of the trial, from the
arraignment until the sentence is announced," which clearly refers to the proceedings had in the nisi
prius court. A careful examination of the language and the context of each of the statutory provisions
above cited satisfies us that it was not the intention of the legislature to extend the right to be present
beyond limits just indicated, and we are confirmed in our conclusions in this regard by a review of
the decisions of the various courts of last resort in the United States construing similarly worded
constitutional and statutory provisions touching the right of accused persons to be present in the
course of criminal proceedings instituted against them.

In the case of Fielden et al. vs. The People (128 Ill., 595), the supreme court of Illinois, discussing
contentions substantially similar to those relied upon by counsel for appellant, said:

We are not unmindful that it is guaranteed by section 9 of article 2 of the constitution of this
State, that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend, in person and by counsel." But is clear, from the connection of the clause, that this
has reference to trials at nisi prius, only. The entire paragraph reads thus: "In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel to demand the nature and cause of the accusation and to have a copy thereof, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have process to compel the attendance of witnesses
in his behalf, and a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county," all of which rights
these plaintiffs in error have fully enjoyed on the trial in the criminal court resulting in their
conviction. But they are not now defending against prosecution. They are, themselves,
prosecuting a suit to reverse the judgment by which they were convicted, and it is therefore
impossible that these provisions can have any application to it. (Tooke vs. State, 23 Tex. Ct.
App., 10.)

The mere naming of the day on which the sentence was to be executed was but the exercise
of a ministerial power, which, at common law, was sometimes exercised by the sheriff (1
Chitty's Crim. Law, 5th Am. ed., 782, 783), and is in this state exercised by the governor in
case of a temporary reprieve.

In the review of this case on appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States (143 U.S., 452) it was
held:

That due process of law did not require the presence of the accused in the appellate court
when the original judgment of the trial court was affirmed, and a new day fixed for his
execution.

In the case of Schwab vs. Berggren (143 U.S., 442), the Supreme Court of the United States said
that:

The demurrer to the petition for the writ admits that the judgment of the supreme court of
Illinois of September 14, 1987, was rendered in the absence of both the appellant and his
counsel, and without notice to either that the case would be disposed of at that time. It is,
therefore, contended by the appellant that the judgment was void, as not being that due
process of law required by the Constitution of the United States, where life or liberty is
involved.

At common law, it was deemed essential in capital cases, that inquiry be made of the defendant,
before the judgment was passed, whether he had anything to say why the sentence of death should
not be pronounced upon him; thus giving him an opportunity to allege any ground of arrest, or to
plead a pardon, if he had obtained one, or to urge any other legal objection to further proceedings
against him. This privilege was deemed of such substantial value to the accused, that the judgment
would be reversed if the record did not show that it was accorded to him. (Ball vs. United States, 140
U.S., 118, 129; 1 Chitty's Crim. Law, 699, 700; Rex vs. Geary, 2 Salk., 630; King vs. Speke, 3 Salk.,
358; Anonymous, 3 Mod., 266; 1 Archbold's Crim. Prac. and Plead. (Pomeroy's ed.) 577, 578.) And
it has been so ruled in the courts of some of the States. (Hamilton vs. Commonwealth, 16 Penn. St.,
129, 133; Messner vs. People, 45 N.Y., 1, 5 ; James vs. State, 45 Miss., 572, 579; Crim. vs. State,
43 Ala., 53, 56; Perry vs. State, 43 Ala., 53; State vs. Jennings, 24 Kans., 642, 659; Keech vs. State,
15 Fla., 591, 609; Grady vs. State, 11 Ga., 253, 257; Safford vs. The People, 1 Parker's Crim. Rep.,
474, 476.)

But this rule of the common law, as the authorities clearly show, applied to the court of
original jurisdiction which pronounced the sentence, and not to an appellate court, which,
upon review of the proceedings in the trial court, merely affirms the final judgment — no error
having been committed to the prejudice of the accused — without rendering a new judgment.
The entire argument, on behalf of the appellant, assumes that the supreme court of Illinois
pronounced a sentence of death upon him. But such is not the fact. The sentence of death,
by hanging, was pronounced by the criminal court of Cook County, October 9, 1986, "neither
the said defendant nor his counsel for him saying anything further why the judgment of the
court should not be pronounced against him on the verdict of guilty heretofore rendered to
the indictment in this cause." The execution of that sentence having been stayed by the
prosecution of a writ of error, with supersedes, the supreme court of the State, upon
examination of the matters assigned for error, affirmed the judgment in all things, and (the
day originally fixed for the execution having been passed) fixed November 11, 1887, as the
day for carrying into execution "the sentence by the criminal court of Cook County." What
that court did was in strict confirmity with the Criminal Code of Illinois relating to prosecutions
by indictment for capital offenses, which provides that "if the judgment is affirmed, the
supreme court shall, by order, fix the time when the original sentence of death shall be
executed, a copy of which order shall be sufficient authority to the sheriff for the execution of
the prisoner at the time therein specified; and that "if the judgment is affirmed, the supreme
court shall direct the court in which the original sentence was rendered to carry the same into
effect, and shall give judgment against the plaintiff in error for costs, and execution may
issue therefor from the supreme court." (Rev. Stats. Ill. c. 38, Crim. Code, par. 459, 465, Div.
XV.)

Numerous authorities have been cited for the appellant in support of the general common
law rule that the accused must be present when the judgment against him is pronounce; but
they fall far short of establishing the contention that due process of law required his personal
presence in the supreme court of Illinois at the time the order was sentenced to death. No
case is cited and we are aware of no well-considered case, which supports that contention.
The personal presence of the accused, from the beginning to the end of a trial for felony,
involving life of liberty, as well as at the time final judgment is rendered against him, may be,
and must be assumed to be vital to the proper conduct of his defense, and cannot be
dispensed with. This court in Hopt vs. utah (110 U. S., 574, 579), after observing that the
public has an interest in the life and liberty of the accused, and that neither can be lawfully
taken except in the mode prescribed by law, said: "That which law makes essential in
proceedings involving deprivation of life or liberty cannot be dispensed with or affected by the
consent of the accused, much less by his mere failure, when on trial and custody, to object to
unauthorized methods. The great end of punishment is not the expiation or atonement of the
offense committed, but the prevention of future offenses of the same kind.(4 Bl. Com., 11.)
Such being the relation which the citizen holds to the public, and the object of punishment for
public wrongs, the legislature has deemed it essential to the protection of one whose life or
liberty is involved in a prosecution for felony, that he shall be personally present at the trial,
that is, at every stage of the trial when his substantial rights may be affected by the
proceedings against him. If he be deprived of his life or liberty without being so present, such
deprivation would be without that due process of law required by the Constitution." See
Harris vs. People (130 Ill., 457, 459). But neither reason nor public policy require that he
shall be personally present pending proceedings in an appellate court whose only function is
 to determine whether, in the transcript submitted to them, there appears any error of law to
the prejudice of the accused; especially, where, as in this case, he had counsel to represent
him in the court of review. We do not men to say that the appellate court may not, under
some circumstances, require his personal presence; but only that his presence is not
essential to its jurisdiction to proceed with the case.

In Donnely vs. State (2 Dutcher (26 N. J. Law), 463, 471), it was said:

"If the presence of the prisoner is necessary in cases of murder to conduct a writ of error, or
to receive the judgment of the court, it is, upon the principles of the English law, equally so in
all other cases of felony or crimes above misdemeanors. But upon examining the
precedents, we do not find a single case, where, upon writ of error, the defendant was either
brought into this court or prosecuted the writ in person." After referring to several previous
cases, the court proceeded: "We think it must be considered as settled by the practice in this
State, that in proceedings upon a writ of error the personal presence of the prisoner in court
is not a technical necessity; that he appears by counsel, errors are assigned by counsel, and
judgment may be pronounced in the defendant's absence."

In State vs. Overton (77 N.C., 485), it appears that the prisoner objected to any judgment being
rendered against him, because he had been denied his constitutional right of being present in the
supreme court of North Carolina when his case was there argued and determined. In that case the
court said:

This objection is founded upon a erroneous idea of a criminal trial, and of the power and duty
of this court in such a case brought it by appeal. The constitution provides that a defendant in
a criminal action shall be informed of the accusation against him, and shall have the right to
confront the accusers and witnesses with other testimony, and shall not be convicted except
by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful men in open court as heretofore
used. That is his trial. This of course implies that he shall have a right to be present. If he
complains of any error in his trial, the record of the trial is transmitted to this court. Here, are
no "accusers," no "witnesses," and no "jury;" but upon inspection of the record this court
decides whether there was error in the trial, and without rendering any judgment, orders its
decision to be certified to the court below. It has never been understood, nor has it been the
practice that the defendant shall be present in this court; nor is he ever "convicted" here. To
the same effect are State vs. Leah (90 N.C., 655); State vs. Jacobs (107 N.C., 772). (See
also People vs. Clark, 1 Parker's Criminal Rep., 360, 367.)

In commenting of opinion on these various decisions of the state courts, the Supreme Court of the
United States said in the case of Schwad vs. Berggren (supra):

We are of opinion that the practice prevailing in Illinois, New Jersey and North Carolina, as
shown in the above cases, is that which is pursed, and has always been pursued, in the
different States, as well as the common law. It is not only consistent with "due process of
law" — giving these words the most liberal interpretation — but is founded on a wise public
policy.

Nor is the question affected by the fact that the supreme court of Illinois, under express
authority conferred by statute, fixed the time when the punishment prescribed by the
judgment which it affirmed should be inflicted. Neither the statute nor due process of law
required that the accused should, upon the affirmance of the judgment, be sentenced anew
by the trial court to suffer the punishment of death, or that he should be present when the
day was fixed by the appellate court for carrying the original sentence into execution. The
 judgment prescribing the punishment was not vacated by the writ of error; only its execution
was stayed pending proceedings in the appellate court. Besides, it is well settled that the
time and place of execution are not, strictly, part of the judgment or sentence, unless made
so by statute. (Holden vs. Minnesota, 137 U.S., 483, and authorities there cited; 1 Chitty's
Crim. Law, 780, 787; Costley vs. Commonwealth, 118 Mass., 32.)

In the case of Holden vs. Minnesota (137 U.S., p. 483), the Supreme Court of the United States,
discussing a statute of the State of Minnesota conferring upon the governor of the State power to
designate the day upon which sentences of death imposed by the courts shall be executed, said:

The court sentence the convict to the punishment prescribed for the crime of murder in the
first degree, leaving the precise day for inflicting the punishment to be determine by the
governor. The order designating the day of execution is, strictly speaking, no part of the
judgment, unless made so by statute. And the power conferred upon the governor to fix the
time of infliction is no more arbitrary in its nature than the same power would be, if conferred
upon the court. Whether conferred upon the governor or the court, it is arbitrary in no other
sense than every power is arbitrary that depends upon the discretion of the tribunal or the
person authorized to exercised it. It may be also observed that at common law the sentence
of death was generally silent as to the precise day of execution. (Atkinson vs. The King, 3
Bro. P.C. (2d ed.), 517, 529; Rex vs. Rogers, 3 Burrow, 1809, 1812; Rex vs. Doyle, 1 Leach
(4th ed.), 67; Cuthcart vs. Commonwealth, 37 Penn. St., 108, 115; Costley vs.
Commonwealth, Commonwealth vs. Costley, 118 Mass., 1, 35.)" In the case of State vs.
Haddox (40 S. E. Rep. (W. Va.), 387) it was held, in the language of the syllabus —

1. If a prisoner pending a sentence of death obtain a writ of error to this court, and thereby
delay the execution of such sentence until the time fixed therefor has passed, and the
judgment is afterwards affirmed, it is the legal ministerial duty of the trial court, without
requiring the prisoner to be again brought before it, to enter an order fixing a further time for
the execution of such sentence.

2. After a sentence of death has been passed upon a prisoner, his trial is at end, and he has
no right to be present, and there is no necessity for his presence, at the further ministerial
steps necessary to be taken to carry into execution such sentence. The final denouncement
alone requires his presence.

In the body of the opinion in this case it is said that —

In Ex Parte Howard (17 N. H., 548), it is said that if, from any cause, "the time prescribed for
execution has passed, the court must make a new order, if no other disposition has been
made of the case." Nor is the presence of the prisoner necessary or required when such
order is made. He has had his trial, been convicted, and sentenced to death. All that remain
to be done is to fix the time and carry the execution of the sentence into effect. Whether that
time shall be short or long, on Monday or Friday, on the first or thirteenth of the month, it is
for the law and the trial court to fix; and, having forfeited his life by his criminal conduct, he is
permitted no voice in the matter. It has nothing to do with the trial. He is as though dead, in
so far as his legal rights are concerned, for his own conduct has destroyed them all. It is
probably better for his peace of mind if he know not the day of his death, that it come upon
him suddenly, after the law of nature, which blinds the eyes of the doomed, so that on the
very verge of the grave their hearts are buoyant with the anticipation of long life and
unnumbered days. Sometimes death had better come as a thief in the night, than as a
torturing savage in the noonday sun. After sentence is affirmed, the law gives him no more
right to be present when the day for execution is fixed, than to be present when the warden
 selects the rope for the noose, the lumber for the scaffold, or the coffin for his remains.
These arrangements are purely ministerial. His presence is not needed. He is civilly dead.
(Fielden vs. People, 128 Ill., 595, 21 N.E., 584, affirmed in 143 U.S., 452, 12 Sup. Ct. 528,
36 L. Ed., 224.) The conclusion of the whole matter is that the trial court, when the day fixed
by it for execution has passed, as soon as convenient after the judgment and sentence has
been affirmed by this court by its order entered of record, without requiring the prisoner to be
brought before it, should fix a further day for the execution of its sentence, and certify the
same to the warden of the penitentiary.

We think that upon the authority and the reasoning of the foregoing citations there can be no
question that the language of the Philippine Bill of Rights in which it secures to the accused the right
to be heard by himself and counsel in all criminal prosecutions, and the language of General Orders,
No. 58, which secures to the accused the right "at the trial" to be present in person and by counsel at
every stage of the proceedings, and specifically "at the time of pronouncing judgment," must be
understood to be limited to the proceedings in the trial court, that is to say the Court of First Instance,
and to extend only to the actual trial therein, and not to appellate proceedings or to proceedings
subsequent to the entry of final judgment looking merely to the execution of the sentence.

But it is contended that the proceedings in the Supreme Court of the Philippines are differentiated
from the proceedings in the courts of last resort wherein these opinion were rendered, because while
in those courts no new sentence is imposed upon appeal, in the Supreme Court of the Philippines, in
a case such as that at bar, the judgment in the court below is reversed, a new trial is had upon the
record, and an original judgment is rendered convicting the defendant and sentencing him to a
higher penalty than that imposed in the court below. This is true, but it does not justify the conclusion
that the language used in the Philippine Bill of Rights and in General Orders, No. 58, is to be given a
different meaning from the settled and well known meaning, sanctioned by judicial decision which
was given to substantially similar language in general use at the time when those laws were
enacted. (Kepner vs. United States, 195 U.S., 100.) 1 Moreover, as we have said already, an
examination of the language used clearly indicates that it was intended to apply only to the
proceedings in the Court of First Instance in the course of the trial.

In the case of Trono vs. United States (199 U.S., 521), 2 wherein it was held that in reversing on
appeal and imposing a higher penalty than that imposed in the lower court, the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands acted within its powers and in ordinary procedure in the courts of that country
under the Act of July 1, 1902, the Supreme Court of the United States said:

It is urged, however, that he has no power to waive such a right, and the case of Hopt vs.
Utah (110 U.S., 574) is cited as authority for that view. We do not so regard it. This court
held in that case that in the Territory of Utah the accused was bound, by provisions of the
Utah statute to be present at all times during the trial, and that it was not within the power of
the accused or his counsel to dispense with such statutory requirement. But on an appeal
from a judgment of this nature there must be a waiver to some extent on the part of the
accused when he appeals from such judgment.

It is very clear therefore, upon the authority of this decision, that even if it were granted that the
language of the statutes would seem to secure to the accused the right to be present when he is
retried in The Supreme Court upon the record, nevertheless he waives any such right when he
comes before this court by way of appeal from a judgment entered in the Court of First Instance.

But the truth is, as we have already indicated, that an examination of the language and the context
of the provisions of law securing to an accused person in this jurisdiction the right to be present "in
all criminal prosecutions" and specifically at the time when the judgment is entered, quite clearly
discloses that they were not intended to have any application, and that they have no application to
the proceedings in this court on appeal nor to the entry and promulgation of our judgments.
Furthermore, the reasons which have been assigned for the original grant of the right of the accused
to be present in all criminal prosecutions are not applicable to the proceedings in this court. In
Fielden vs. The People (supra), the court in discussing these reasons says:

The common law required, when any corporal punishment was to be inflicted on the defendant, that
he should be personally present before the court at the time of pronouncing the sentence. (1 Chitty's
Crim. Law (5th Am. ed.), 693,696.) Reasons given for this are, that the defendant may be identified
by the court as the real party adjudged to be punished (Holt, 399); that the defendant may have a
chance to plead a pardon (3 More, 265); that he may have a chance to plead or move in arrest of
judgment (King vs. Speke, 3 Salk., 358); that he may have an opportunity to say what he can say
why judgment should not be given against him (2 Hale's Pleas of the Crown, 401, 402); and that the
example of the defendants, who have been guilty of misdemeanors of a gross and public kind, being
brought up for the animadversion of the court and the open denunciation of punishment, may tend to
deteroters from the commission of similar offenses (Chitty's Crim. Law (5th ed.), 693, 696). It is
manifest that none of these can apply to this court, because, first, it acts and decides only upon the
record made in the court below. It can therefore have nothing to do with the question of the identity
of the party whom the sheriff shall have in his custody for punishment. Nor can it entertain a motion
in arrest, or a plea of pardon. And since its opinion is prepared and written out and filed with the
clerk without being read from the bench, there is, when judgment of affirmance is given, no
animadversion and open denunciation of punishment which could benefit bystanders. If the present
plaintiffs in error and their counsel had been actually present in court when the judgment of
affirmance, here, was entered, the law allowed them to then say or do nothing which, by any
possibility, could have benefitted plaintiffs in error. They were, after judgment was entered, entitled
only to move for a rehearing — and this could only be done on printed petition; but thirty days were
allowed in which to prepare it (93 Ill., 11 rule 43). Undoubtedly, if plaintiffs in error or their counsel
had been actually present in court when the decision was; but that fact was equally well made
known to them by notice from the clerk — in ample time to avail of their right to file a petition for
rehearing. And if, indeed, without any fault of theirs, more time would have been needed within
which to prepare the petition for rehearing, it was the recognized practice of this court to have
extended the time for that purpose beyond the thirty days. But no claim is here made that plaintiffs in
error were not informed of the decision in the case in time to file a petition, for rehearing. They did
not seek to avail of that right, but voluntarily waived it, and prosecuted a writ of error upon the record
from the Supreme Court of the United States, and it was not until after that was decided adversely to
them, that they discovered the claimed error in the record of which amendment is now sought.

In the people vs. Clark (1 Park Crim. R., 360), the supreme court of New York, at general
term, held, that on a writ of error brought to reverse a judgment in a capital case, the
personal attendance of the defendant on the argument or at the decision in the appellate
court is not necessary to give such court jurisdiction. And there was like ruling in Donnelly vs.
The State (2 Dutch., 463). See, also, in principle, to like effect, Bales vs. The State (18 Mo.,
318), and Commonwealth vs. Costello (121 Mas., 371).

The comment of the supreme court of Illinois just set forth is substantially applicable in the case at
bar, and the reasoning in this regard is no wise affected by the fact that in cases such as that at bar,
the Supreme Court of the Philippines, after reversing the judgment of the trial court proceeds to retry
the accused on the record and to convict and sentence him if the evidence of record conclusively
establishes his guilt of the crime with which he is charged in the complaint or information.

The Philippine Supreme Court, even when it retries the case, acts and decides only upon the record
made up in the court below. The judgments in criminal cases are never entered by the clerk until a
sufficient time has elapsed after the order directing the entry of judgment has been filed and after
notice thereof has been forwarded to the counsel for the accused and the Government to give to
counsel full opportunity to move for a rehearing, or to submit any reason which he may have for
objecting to the final entry of the judgment by the clerk. We are unable to perceive any useful end
which would be attained by bringing the accused himself before this court in person, during the
proceedings on appeal, or at the time of the entry and promulgation of the judgment. We do not
believe that it was the intention of the lawmaker to burden the proceedings in criminal cases with the
accused himself can do in his own behalf if he be present during the proceedings in this court on
appeal, which cannot be done as effectively by his counsel. 1awphil.net

If the appellant is entitled to be present in this court throughout the proceedings on appeal in capital
cases he is equally entitled, on principle, to be present in all cases wherein he is charged with a
felony. We are satisfied however not only that the various statutes organizing this court and
providing for the trial of appealed cases do not contemplate that the appellant in criminal cases will
be personally present during the proceedings on appeal, but that they contemplate that he will not be
present; and it has been the uniform practice of this court from its organization to the present time to
hear and decide appeals in criminal cases wherein the accused is represented by counsel in the
absence of the accused. Thus in the early case of U.S., Lewis (2 Phil. Rep., 193), we held that —

Proceedings on appeal in the Supreme Court will not be stayed in a criminal case on account
of the absence of the accused, as his presence is not necessary at the hearing.

Although it should not be necessary to do so, nevertheless, in conclusion, and to avoid

misunderstanding, we repeat that the "rendering," "pronouncing," or "legal promulgation" of our
judgments (whichever of those terms may be employed to designate the act), takes place when the
clerk of this court enters judgment is thus entered it is "legally promulgated," and all the parties to the
appeal are bound to take notice of the action of the court, although as a matter of convenience the
clerk invariably serves notice on the various counsel or record inviting their attention to the fact that
the judgment has been entered. The trial courts have nothing to do with the "rendering."
"pronouncing," or "legal promulgation" of our judgments, the duty of those courts in respect to our
judgments being merely to see that they are duly executed when in their nature the intervention of
the Court of First Instance is necessary to that end.

We find no error in the proceedings had in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga looking to the
execution of the sentence imposed upon the appellant, and without stopping to inquire whether
counsel for the accused was entitled to bring these orders and proceedings before us for review at
this time, a point which was not raised or discussed by counsel, we affirm the orders entered in the
lower court from which this appeal was taken. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Trent, JJ., concu

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-9230 November 10, 1914

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE CORRALES, defendant-appellant.

M. Abejuela for appellant.

Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

Jose Corrales, the appellant in this case, was convicted in the court below of the crime of
misappropriation of public funds, and sentenced to nine months imprisonment and to pay the costs
of the trial.

The evidence of record conclusively establish that on June 6, 1913, the accused, who at that time
was clerk of the Court of First Instance of Misamis, received the sum of P321.88 from a chinaman
named Melliza, that being the amount of a fine and costs which had been imposed upon Melliza; that
instead of giving Melliza the prescribed official receipt, the accused handed him a copy of the
judgment of conviction with a note at the foot showing "Multa y costas pagadas" fine and costs paid);
that on June 13, 1913, the district auditor examined the property and accounts of the accused, the
property, books, and accounts of his office having been duly submitted by the accused for the
purpose that the sum of P321.88, collected from Meliza, was not turned over to the auditor nor was it
found with the funds or property of the accused, nor was any reference to its payment developed as
a result of the inspection; that before 12 o'clock on the following (June 14) an information was filed
charging the accused with the misappropriation of this money; that a few hours later the accused
went to the house of the auditor, and told him that the amount in question was in the office safe, in
the drawer in which he kept his personal funds.

The accused substantially admitted the facts above set but, but claimed that when he received the
money from Melliza he was busy, and not having time to enter the receipt of the money in his books,
he put it in the drawer of the safe in which he kept his personal funds, intending to make the proper
entry at his convenience; that thereafter he forgot all about the incident until after the auditor had
closed his examination; that the money continued in the safe in the drawer with his personal funds,
and was never withdrawn by him; and that when he recalled the transaction after the inspection, he
prepared an official receipt for the money and sent it to Melliza, and then went to the house of the
auditor and told him what had occurred.

If this story could be believed it would be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to the existence of
any criminal intent to misappropriate these funds in the mind of the accused. But we agree with the
trial judge that the evidence of record conclusively establishes the falsity of the account of what
occurred as given by the accused.
The auditor testified that when the accused came to him on June 14 to tell him that the money was
in safe, he asked the accused when he had put it there, and that he accused then and there
admitted that he had put the money in the safe at about half past 5 of the afternoon of the day before
(June 13) after the inspection had been completed. Counsel for appellant does not question the fact
that this admission was made to the auditor, though he does contend that the evidence as to this
admission should be disregarded, on the ground that it was incompetent and inadmissible.

We are of opinion that the evidence fully sustains the trial judge in refusing to accept as true the
story told by the accused on the witness stand, and especially his claim that, through an oversight,
the money in question had not been placed with the other government funds in his safe, but the
remained untouched in the safe in his office, together with his personal funds, from the time it was
received until the day after the inspection, when he informed the auditor that it was in the safe.

The failure of the accused to make any note of the receipt of the money in the books and accounts
of his office; his substitution of a non-official receipt in lieu of the prescribed official receipt which it
was his duty to give the person from whom he received the money; the fact that this money was not
turned over by him at the time of the inspection of his office by the auditor, and that he made no
reference to it until a criminal prosecution had been instituted against him the day after the
inspection; and finally his admission to the auditor that he had returned the money to the safe a few
hours after the inspection, all conclusively establish the fact that he misappropriated these funds,
and leave no room for doubt the receipt of this substantial sum of money until after the inspection,
and that it had been lying in the drawer with his personal funds from the time when it was received
until the day after the inspection when he reported the matter to the auditor.

Counsel for the accused does not attempt to question the truth of the testimony of the auditor as to
the admission of the accused that he had put the money in the safe on the afternoon of the day of
the inspection of his property and accounts. Counsel contends, however, that this evidence was
incompetent and should not be taken in to consideration, because as counsel contends: First, it was
not first made to appear that it was freely and voluntarily made, without compulsion or inducement;
and second, it was not made under oath. lawph!1.net

These contentions of counsel cannot be maintained Counsel relies chiefly on the statutory provisions
which forbid the introduction of testimony as to extrajudicial confessions unless it is first made to
appear that the alleged confession was made freely and voluntarily and without inducement or
compulsion. But a distinction must be made between confessions and admissions. A confession, as
distinguished from an admission, is a declaration made at any time by a person, voluntarily and
without compulsion or inducement, stating or acknowledging that he had committed or participated in
the commission of a crime. The term admission, on the other had, is usually applied in criminal
cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of the
guilt of the accused or of criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. The
statutory provision excluding evidence as to confessions until and unless the prescribed foundation
is laid not applicable to admissions, which do not amount to confessions although they may be
sufficient, when taken together with other evidence of surrounding circumstances to sustain an
inference of the guilt of the accused. The reason for the rule excluding evidence as to confessions
unless it is first made to appear that they are made voluntarily does not apply in cases of
admissions, although, of course, evidence of the fact that a particular statement was made under
duress would tend very strongly to destroy its evidentiary value. It is very clear from all the evidence,
and from the circumstances under which the statement was made by the accused to the auditor, that
it was not made under duress, and we are of opinion that the trial judge properly took it under
consideration as evidence against the accused.
There is no provision of law which prescribes that either confessions or admissions are not
competent evidence unless made under oath. It is the fact that they are made by the accused and
against his own interest which gives to them their evidentiary value, and provided the fact is
established it does not matter whether they are made under oath or not.

The judgment entered in the court below should be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against
the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Moreland, J., dissents.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 1272 January 11, 1904

THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,

vs.
BALDOMERO NAVARRO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Felix Ferrer for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.

MCDONOUGH, J.:

The defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de Leon, and Fidel Feliciano (alias Bulag) are
charged with the crime of illegal detention, committed, according to the information, as follows:

The said defendants, together with other persons unknown armed with revolvers and daggers, went
one night about the middle of November, 1902, to the house of one Felix Punsalan, situated in
Matang-tubig, barrio of Malinta, town of Polo, Province of Bulacan, and by force and violence
kidnapped the said Felix Punsalan, without, up to the date of this information, having given any
information as to his whereabouts or having proven that they set him at liberty.

The defendants on being arraigned pleaded not guilty.

In the course of the trial Teodoro Pangan, Gregorio Mendoza, and Flaviano Punsalan testified as
witnesses for the prosecution. The witness Pangan said that one night about the middle of
November, 1902, while he was asleep in the house of Felix Punsalan, situated in the barrio of
Malinta, in front of Maysilo, he, being at that time a servant of the said Punsalan, was aroused by the
barking of the dogs; that his master, Felix Punsalan, arose and opened the window, and, upon
seeing some people there, asked them who they were; they answered him by asking who was with
him in the house, to which he replied that his servant was there; they asked him if he had a gun, and
he replied that he had no gun, and they asked him to come down and talk with them, and the said
Felix Punsalan, having gone down accordingly, did not return, and the witness added that he had not
seen again since that time. This witness says that he did not see the men who called to his master
from below but only heard them.

Gregorio Mendoza, the second witness, testifies that he was taken from his house one night in the
month of November, 1902, by seven men, among who were these defendants; that in addition to
himself, the same party on that night kidnapped Felix Punsalan and that the latter, with the witness,
were taken by their captors to Pudag-babuy where the defendant Marcelo de Leon hung them to a
tree, demanding of them that they hand over their guns; that on that same night they set the witness
at liberty, but kept Felix Punsalan; that the witness did not see Punsalan again since that time, and
that before the kidnapping he frequently saw him because he lived next door.

Flaviano Punsalan, brother of Felix Punsalan, testified that the latter was kidnapped on the night of
November 17, 1902, and that he had not seen since that time; that subsequently, in January, 1903,
on occasion of the witness having been called to the barracks of the Constabulary by the officers of
that corps, he heard a statement made there by the defendant Baldomero Navarro in the presence
of the superintendent of secret information, Captain Crame, Inspector Brown, and Interpreter Austin,
in the course of which statement Baldomero Navarro stated that he was the leader of the band that
kidnapped Felix Punsalan and Gregorio Mendoza, and that his companions were Marcelo de Leon,
Fidel Feliciano, Remigio Delupio, and one Luis; that the said Felix Punsalan died within a week from
the time he was kidnapped, in consequence of the ill treatment received. The witness testified that
Navarro made the statement freely and spontaneously, without threats or compulsion. The witness
also testified that in the court of the justice of the peace in Malabon he heard one Florencia
Francisco testify that when his brother, Felix Punsalan, died he was covered with bruises and was
passing blood, and that his body was buried at a place called Ogong, in the village known as Cay-
grande.

The defendant Marcelo de Leon, who testified as a witness in the case, stated that Felix Punsalan
and Gregorio Mendoza were kidnapped by Baldomero Navarro and Mariano Jacinto, one night in
November, 1902, and that the witness knew this because he also was on of the men kidnapped by
these defendants.

The court below rendered judgment condemning each one of the defendants, Baldomero Navarro,
Marcelo de Leon, and Feliciano Felix (alias Bulag), to life imprisonment and payment of the costs of
prosecution. Against this judgment the defendants appealed.

Article 481 of the Penal Code provides that a private person who shall lock up or detain another, or
in any way deprive him of his liberty shall be punished with the penalty of prision mayor.

The second paragraph of article 483 provides that one who illegally detains another and fails to give
information concerning his whereabouts, or does not prove that he set him at liberty, shall be
punished with cadena temporal in its maximum degree to life imprisonment.

The punishment for the crime mentioned in article 483 of the Penal Code is the penalty of cadena
temporal in its maximum degree to cadena perpetua, or in other words one convicted of simply
depriving a person of his liberty may be imprisoned for a term of from six to twelve years and one
convicted of depriving a person of his liberty and who shall not state his whereabouts or prove that
he had set said person at liberty may be punished by imprisonment for a term of seventeen years
four months and one day, to life, as in this case. In other words, for failure on the part of the
defendant to testify regarding the whereabouts of the person deprived of his liberty, or to prove that
he was set at liberty, the punishment may be increased from imprisonment for a term of six years to
life imprisonment.

This provisions of the law has the effect of forcing a defendant to become a witness in his own
behalf or to take a much severer punishment. The burden is put upon him of giving evidence if he
desires to lessen the penalty, or, in other words, of criminating himself, for the very statement of the
whereabouts of the victim or the proof that the defendant set him at liberty amounts to a confession
that the defendant unlawfully detained the person.

So the evidence necessary to clear the defendant, under article 483 of the Penal Code, would have
the effect of convincing him under article 481.

The counsel for the defendants claims that such practice is illegal, since the passage by Congress of
the act of July 1, 1902, relating too the Philippines, section 5 of which provides that ". . . no person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Section 57 of General
Orders, No. 58, provides that a defendant in a criminal case shall be presumed to be innocent until
the contrary is proved; and section 59 provides that the burden of proof of guilt shall be upon the
prosecution.

In fact he contends that as these provisions are in conflict with those of article 483 they have the
effect of repealing that section.

Under the system of criminal procedure existing here under the Spanish Government it was
doubtless lawfull to require a suspected or accused person to give evidence touching the crime of
which he was charged or suspected.

And so in order to arrive at a true interpretation of article 483 it is necessary to examine that system
of procedure.

In Escriche's Dictionary of Legislation and Jurisprudence, volume 3, page 577, we find the following
description of the distinctive features of the inquisitorial system of criminal procedure, which
constitutes the machinery by which the legislator proposed to enforce the penalty prescribed in the
article under consideration. He say:

A criminal prosecution is divided into two principal parts or sections which are, first, the
summary, and second, the penalty stages. The principal purpose of the summary trial is to
inquire whether a criminal act has been committed and to determine by whom the act has
been committed — that is to say, the object is to get together all the date possible for the
purpose of proving that an act falling within the sanction of the penal law has been
committed by such and such persons. In the plenary stage the purpose is a contradictory
discussion of the question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and the rendition of a
judgment of conviction or acquittal. It may well be that although it appear in the summary
stage of the proceeding that the act has been performed by the accused, still in the plenary
stage it may be shown that the act was not really criminal or that there was a lawful excuse
for its commission.

The record of the summary proceeding should contain evidence of the commission of a
punishable act, all possible data tending to point out the delinquent, a record of all
proceedings connected with his arrest and imprisonment, the answers of the accused to the
interrogatories put to him as to any other witness to obtain from him a statement of all he
knows concerning the crime and those guilty of it.

The record of the proceedings described above was then sent to the prosecuting attorney, or to the
private accuser and in view of the facts which appeared from the record the prosecution made out
the formal charge, the facts elicited by the proceeding enabling the prosecuting attorney to
determine within what article of the Penal Code the criminal act fell. After the filing of such a charge
further proceedings were had in which more evidence might be taken by either party and in which
the accused had his opportunity to make a defense.

The summary proceeding was secret, but the plenary stage was conducted publicly.

Article 544 of the royal decree of May 6, 1880, which provided the procedural law applicable in
criminal cases in the Islands, reads as follows: "The defendant can not decline to answer by
questions addressed him by the judge, or by the prosecuting attorney, with the consent of the judge,
or by the private prosecutor, even though he may believe the judge to be without jurisdiction, in
which case he may record a protest against the authority of the court."
The author above cited, Escriche, commenting upon this obligation on the part of the defendant to
testify, says that in case he stands mute the court can not put him to the torture as formerly, but can
only inform the prisoner that his silence is unfavorable to him, that it is an indication of his guilt, that
in consequence thereof he will be regarded as guilt for all the purposes of the summary, and that his
silence will be taken into account with all the other evidence against him when the time comes for
the rendition of judgment upon him.

Now let us apply the rules of law above indicated to the case in question, supposing that the crime
had been committed prior to the passage of the Philippine bill or General Orders, No. 58. The judicial
authorities having reason to believe that some one has been illegally detained or kidnapped proceed
to make a secret investigation of the case, arrest the suspected culprit, and demand of him that he
give any information he may have concerning the act under investigation and to state whatever may
have been his own participation therein. The evidence shows that some one has been taken away
from home and has not been heard of again, and the facts point to the prisoner as the presumptive
criminal. He is told to state what he knows of the matter. If he does so, and proves that the person
detained was liberated by him, or that such person is living in such and such a place, then the
prosecuting attorney will know that he must draw a charge under the first or following sections of
article 481, according to whether the facts elicited by the preliminary or summary investigation show
only a detention in general, or for the specific periods of time indicated in the latter part of the
section. But if the prisoner fails to prove the whereabouts of the person whom he is accused of
making away with, or that he liberated him, then the prosecuting attorney has a case falling within
the last paragraph of article 483.

It follows, therefore, from an examination of the old law that no prosecution under this article would
have ever been possible without a concomitant provision of the procedural law which made it the
duty of the accused to testify and permitted the prosecution to draw an unfavorable deduction from
his refusal to do so. The crime defined by article 483 was composed of three elements:

(a) The illegal detention of a person by the accused.

(b) Lack of evidence up to the time of the summary investigation that this person had
recovered his liberty.

(c) A failure on the part of the accused in the course of the summary proceeding to prove
that he had liberated the person detained, or to give information at that time of his
whereabouts, or a refusal to give any evidence at all which left him in the same position as
would an unsuccessful attempt to prove the facts above mentioned, and which were
necessary to overcome the prima facie case made out by the proof of the first two elements.

Now every one of these ingredients of the offense must exists before an information can be filed for
a prosecution under this article. The real trial was the plenary and was very similar to out regular trial
after arraignment. But the summary, with its secret and inquisitorial methods, was vastly different
from our preliminary investigation. If the right had been taken away to question the accused and
compel him to testify, then element (c) above indicated, would have always been lacking. And that
right has been taken from the prosecution by both General Orders, No. 58, and by the guaranty
embodied in the Philippine bill. That being the case the crime defined in article 483 can not now be
committed, because the possibility of adding to the element (a) arising from the act of the accused
the other two elements equally essential to the offense has been forever swept away by the
extension to these Islands of the constitutional barrier against an inquisitorial investigation of crime.

Under the present system the information must charge the accused with acts committed by him prior
to the filing of the information and which of themselves constitute an offense against the law. The
Government can not charge a man with one of the necessary elements of an offense and trust to his
making out the rest by availing himself of his right to leave the entire burden of prosecuting on the
prosecution from beginning to end.

In this case the prosecuting attorney charges the accused with kidnapping some person and with not
having given any information of the whereabouts of that person, of having proved that he — the
accused — has set him at liberty. To make out a case the Government must show that the prisoner
has been guilty of every act or omission necessary to constitute the crime of which he is charged,
and it will not be disputed that the exercise of an absolute right can not form part of a crime. In this
case the Government has proved that the defendant was guilty of a breach of his duty to respect the
rights of others by showing that he, with others, carried a certain individual away from his house
against his will, the accused not being vested with authority to restrain his fellow-citizens of liberty. It
is impossible for the Government to prove the other elements of the crime, because the acts
necessary to constitute them must be anterior in point of time to the trial, and must constitute some
breach of duty under an existing law. It has been demonstrated that the omission which, under the
former law constituted the two remaining elements, is no longer penalized but is nothing more than
the exercise of one of the most essential rights pertaining to an accused person.

The provision that no one is bound to criminate himself is older than the Government of the United
States. At an early day it became a part of the common law of England.

It was established on the grounds of public policy and humanity — of policy, because if the party
were required to testify, it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit the
crime of perjury, and of humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of confessions by duress.

It had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused person,
which had long obtained in the continental system. (Jones's Law of Evidence, sec. 887; Black's
Constitutional Law, 575.)

In other words, the very object of adopting this provision of law was to wipe out such practices as
formerly prevailed in these Islands of requiring accused persons to submit to judicial examinations,
and to get testimony regarding the offense with which they were charged.

In Emery's case (107 Mass., 172) it was said that the principle applies equally to any compulsory
disclosure of the guilt of the offender himself, whether sought directly as the object of the inquiry, or
indirectly and incidentally for the purpose of establishing facts involved in an issue between the
parties.

If the disclosure thus made would be capable of being used against him as a confession of crime, or
an admission of facts tending to prove the commission of an offense, such disclosure would be an
accusation against himself.

In the present case, if the defendant, as said before disclosed the whereabouts of the person taken,
or shows that he was given his liberty, this disclosure may be used to obtain a conviction under
article 481 of the Penal Code.

The decision of the case of Boyd vs. The United States (116 U. S., 616) is authority for the
contention in the present case. There the question raised was one of a violation of the revenue laws,
it being claimed that false entry of merchandise had been made, the punishment for which was fixed
by law at a fine not exceeding $5,000 nor less than $50, or by imprisonment.
It became important on the part of the prosecution to show the quality of the goods imported. Section
5 of the Revenue Law, passed in June, 1874, authorized the district attorney to obtain an order of
court requiring the defendants to produce their invoices, books, papers, etc., to be examined by the
district attorney in order to obtain such evidence as he desired. Such an order was served on the
defendant. The invoices were produced under protest, the objection being that their introduction in
evidence could not be compelled and that the statute was unconstitutional as it compelled the
defendant to testify against himself.

The law provided that for a failure or refusal to produce the invoices the allegations stated by the
district attorney as to what he expected to prove by them should be taken as confessed, unless the
failure of refusal of the defendant to produce the same shall be explained to the satisfaction of the
court.

The court stated that a compulsory production of a man's private papers to establish a criminal
charge against himself, or to forfeit his property is unconstitutional.

The law, it is true, only required the defendant to produce the invoices, but it declared that if he did
not do so then the allegations which it is affirmed the district attorney will prove shall be taken as
confessed. "This," said the court, "is tantamount to compelling their production for the prosecution
will always be sure to state the evidence expected to be derived from them as strongly as the case
will admit of."

Precisely the same of law applies to the case at bar. If the defendant does not do certain things, if he
does not make certain statements or proofs, he is severely punished.

It may be said that the defendant is only required to speak on one point in the case, that the
prosecution must prove the illegal detention, and that the burden of showing the whereabouts only is
put upon the defendant.

Chief Justice Marshall, in the trial of Aaron Burr, expressed his views on this question as follows:

Many links frequently compose the chain of testimony which is necessary to convict an
individual of a crime. It appears to the court to be the true sense of the rule that not witness
is compelled to furnish any one of them against himself. It is certainly not only a possible but
a probable case that a witness by declaring a single fact may complete the testimony against
himself as entirely as he would by stating every circumstance which would be required for his
conviction. The fact of itself would be unavailing, but all the other facts without it would be
insufficient. While that remains concealed in his own bosom he is safe, but draw it from
thence and he is exposed to a prosecution. 1

If it be urged that the defendant is not compelled to testify, that he remain mute, the answer is that,
the illegal detention only being proved by the prosecution, if he does not make certain proof, if he
remains mute, then not only the presumption but the fact of guilt follows as a consequence of his
silence, and such a conclusion is not permitted under American law.

In the case of the People vs. Courtney (94 N. Y., 490), decided by the court of appeals of the State
of New York, the question to be determined was whether or not a law permitting a person charged
with crime to testify in his own behalf was constitutional or not. The law in question provided also
that his omission or refusal to testify "should create no presumption against him." Judge Andrews, in
rendering the decision of the court, stated: "A law which, while permitting a person accused of a
crime to be a witness in his own behalf, should at the same time authorize a presumption of guilt
from his omission to testify, would be a law adjudging guilt without evidence, and while it might not
be obnoxious to the constitutional provision against compelling a party in a criminal case to give
evidence against himself, would be a law reversing the presumption of innocence, and would violate
the fundamental principles binding alike upon the legislature and the courts."

It is the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict one of a crime, to produce evidence showing guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt; and the accused can not be called upon either by express words or acts
to assist in the production of such evidence; nor should his silence be taken as proof against him. He
has a right to rely on the presumption of innocence until the prosecution proves him guilty of every
element of the crime with which he is charged.

In the language of Mr. Justice Bradley, in the Boyd case, "any compulsory discovery by extorting the
party's oath . . . to convict him of a crime . . . is contrary to the principles of free government; it is
abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may suit
the purposes to despotic power but it can not abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and
personal freedom."

The judgment of the Court of First Instance is reversed and the defendants are found guilty of the
crime defined and punished by article 482 of the Penal Code; applying the aggravating circumstance
of nocturnity each and every one of them is condemned to eighteen years of reclusion temporal, with
the legal accessory penalties, and to the payment of the costs of both instances.

Arellano, C. J., Cooper and Johnson, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MAPA, J., with whom concur WILLARD and TORRES, JJ., dissenting:

When a person is illegally detained he may recover his liberty or he may not be seen or heard of
again. In the first case the crime would fall within the provisions of articles 481, 482, and 483,
paragraph 1 of the Penal Code, according to the circumstances of the case. The maximum penalty
which could be imposed upon this hypothesis would be that of reclusion temporal, fixed by article
482.

If the person detained is not seen or heard again, the crime is unquestionably a more serious one,
and the code, in order to be consistent with the system adopted by it of making the penalty attached
to crimes correspond to the extent and degree of the harm occasioned thereby, necessarily had to
fix a heavier penalty upon the illegal detention of a person followed by his complete disappearance,
than in any of the cases in which the person detained recovers his liberty. "The disappearance of a
person who has been illegally detained by another," says Groizard, in his Commentaries on the
Penal Code, volume 5, page 633, "is certainly sufficient to cause alarm to society. It constitutes a
natural increase of the mediate harm caused by the crime of illegal detention, and gives rise to a
well-founded presumption of an increased extent or immediate harm."

The greater the harm caused by the crime, the greater and more severe the penalty attached to it.
This is the system invariably followed by our code.

It appearing, then, that the code fixes the penalty of reclusion temporal when the person detained
recovers his liberty if his detention has lasted more than twenty days, or any other of the aggravating
circumstances expressed in article 482 concur, it was logical and unavoidably necessary, in order
not to destroy the unity of the system referred to, that the code should fix a heavier penalty
than reclusion temporal for a case in which the person detained has disappeared, owing to the
greater gravity with which the circumstance invests the crime. This would be so if only on account of
the fact while the illegal detention continues, while the person detained remains in the power of his
captors, he continues to be expressed to the danger of being a helpless and defenseless victim of
violence and ill treatment of every kind, including the loss of his life. Hence the code has fixed the
penalty of cadena temporal in its maximum degree to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua) when the
person detained disappears.

"One who illegally detains another," says paragraph 2 of article 483, "and fails to give information
concerning his whereabouts, or does not prove that he has set him at liberty, shall be punished
with cadena temporal in its maximum degree to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua)."

The fact that Felix Punsalan was kidnapped by the accused in November, 1901, having been fully
proven, and the fact that he has disappeared and that nothing has been heard of him up to the
present time having been also proven, we think that the case should be determined in accordance
with the provisions of article 483 above transcribed, and that the defendants should be sentenced to
the penalty of life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), taking into consideration the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity, inasmuch as they have not given information as to the whereabouts of
Punsalan, and have not proven that they set him at liberty.

In the opinion of the majority of the court this article "has the effect of forcing the defendant to
become a witness in his own behalf or to take a much severer punishment. The burden is put upon
him of giving evidence if he desires to lessen the penalty, or in other words of incriminating himself,
for the very statement of the whereabouts of the victim or the proof that the defendant set him at
liberty, amounts to a confession that the defendant unlawfully detained the person." As a
consequence of this interpretation, the majority are of the opinion that this article has been repealed
by section 5 of the Philippine bill, enacted July 1, 1902, which provides that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, and by the provisions of section 57
and 59 of General Orders, No. 58, which provide that the defendant in a criminal case shall be
presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and that the burden of the proof of guilt shall be
upon the prosecution. "It follows, therefore, from an examination of the old law," say the majority,
"that no prosecution under this section would ever have been possible (par. 2, art. 483) without a
concomitant provision of the procedural law, which made it the duty of the accused to testify and
permitted the prosecution to draw an unfavorable inference from his refusal to do so." If the right had
been taken away to question the accused and compel him to testify, the majority of the court are of
the opinion that one of the essential elements of the crime defined and punished by article 483
would always have been lacking, and that right they say has been taken from the prosecution by
both General Orders, No. 58, and the guaranty embodied in the Philippine bill.

Article 554 of the compilation of rules concerning criminal procedure, approved by the royal decree
of May 6, defendant can not decline to answer the questions addressed him by the judge or by the
prosecuting attorney with the consent of the judge, or by the private prosecutor, even though he may
believe the judge to be without jurisdiction, in which case he may record a protest against the
authority of the court," does in fact appear to support the opinion of the majority with respect to the
obligation which it is assumed rested upon the accused under the old system of procedure to appear
as a witness. This provision of law, however, carefully considered, lacks a great deal of having the
meaning and scope attributed to it in the majority opinion, for neither the article in question nor any
other article in the royal decree cited, or any other provision of law of which we are aware, provides
for any penalty in case the accused should refuse to testify. Far from it, paragraph 2 of article 545 of
the royal decree in question provides that "in no case shall the defendant be questioned or cross-
examined," and article 541 in its last paragraph provides: "Nor shall the defendant be in any way
threatened or coerced." Article 543 provides that a judge who disregards this precept shall be
subject to a disciplinary correction unless the offense is such as to require still heavier punishment.

The use of threats or coercion against the accused being prohibited in absolute and precise terms,
how could it be lawful to threaten him, as Escriche states in his Dictionary of Legislation and
Jurisprudence, cited by the majority in support of their opinion (a work which, by the way, was written
long before the enactment of the procedural law in force in the Philippines at the time General
Orders, No. 58, was published) — how could it be lawful, we say, to coerce the accused by
informing him that "his silence is prejudicial to him, that it is an indication of his guilt, that he will be
thereby considered guilty, and that his refusal to testify will be taken into consideration, together with
all other evidence against him when the time arrives for rendering judgment?" Would this not be an
actual coercion, and a coercion of the worst kind, inasmuch as it implies a threat, also prohibited by
the law, of a certain and sure conviction, for the purpose of constraining and compelling the accused
to testify? Would not the judge making such a threat become subject to the punishment prescribed
by article 543 above cited?

Escriche himself, in his article on criminal procedure in the work above mentioned, in speaking of the
testimony of defendants says that "all coercion is prohibited by law." "This," he adds, "has done
away with all physical or moral compulsion to obtain testimony." And in paragraph 70 of the same
article he also says as follows: "If the defendant remains silent when called upon to plead, and
refuses to answer the charges made against him by the judge, he can not be compelled to answer . .
.; nor does it appear that this can be regarded as a plea of guilt, or that the accused can be
considered as the author of the crime on that account.

Providing for the case of the accused refusing to testify, article 392 of the Law of Criminal Procedure
of 1882 provides that "when the accused refuses to answer or pretends to be insane, or dumb, the
judge shall warn him that notwithstanding his silence the prosecution will continue." This is the only
thing which can be done in such a case — the only thing the law permits — and anything which may
be done beyond that for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear, no matter how light, upon the
accused to constrain him to testify would be unjust and illegal.

If, therefore, the law prescribes no penalty for the refusal of the accused to testify, and if an accused
person who does so refuse can not be compelled to do so in any way, if the only procedure which
the law authorizes, if the only action which the judge can take in that case is to continue the
prosecution notwithstanding this denial, how can it be successfully contended that the accused was
obliged to testify? If the law had assumed to impose upon him such an obligation it would have
prescribed some adequate means of enforcing it, for there can not be an obligation in the true legal
sense of the word without the coexistence of some penalty by which to enforce its performance.

Thus, for example, the law in imposing upon witnesses the obligation to testify, at the same time
prescribes a penalty for one who refuses to perform this duty. Article 560 of the compilation says that
"all persons residing in Spanish territory, whether natives or foreigners, who are not under disability,
shall be obliged to respond to a judicial citation to testify as to all matters within their knowledge
concerning which they may be questioned." And article 567 providing that "he who, not being under
disability, shall fail to respond to the first judicial citation . . ., or shall refuse to testify as to the facts
concerning which he may be interrogated . . . shall be subject to a fine of not less than 25 nor more
than 250 pesetas; and if he should persist in his resistance he shall in the first case be taken before
the court by the officers of the law and prosecuted for the crime defined and punished in paragraph 2
of article 383 of the Penal Code (art. 252 of the Code of these Islands), and in the second case shall
also be prosecuted for the crime defined and punished in article 265 of the same Code." (Art. 368 of
the Philippine Code.)
This provision of law certainly constitutes a significant contrast to the absence of any other similar
coercive provision which might produce the effect of compelling accused persons to testify against
their will, and this demonstrates that the law did not propose to impose upon them such an
obligation.

To such a degree has the law carried its respect for the conscience of accused persons and for their
natural desire to refrain from incriminating statements that is absolutely prohibits the administration
of an oath even in cases in which such persons voluntarily offer to testify. (Art. 593 of the
Compilation, par. 17 of the royal order (auto acordado) of 1860, and art. 9 of the royal cedula of
1855), thus leaving them entirely at liberty to testify as they may see fit, whether false or true, without
the fear, which necessarily produces a certain moral pressure, of thereby incurring the guilt of
perjury. On this account, and of the fact of the absolute prohibition of using any threats or coercion
against them, the practical result was that not only might accused persons testify with impunity as to
whatever they might see fit, even if false, when voluntarily offering themselves as witnesses, but that
they could never be compelled against their will to testify at all. This is equivalent to saying that
accused persons were not under any obligation to testify.

We have stated that the law did not authorize the drawing of any inference as to the guilt of the
accused from his silence, and we insist that such is the case. We believe that no provision of law
can be cited in support of the contrary proposition. To what has been said above upon this point we
may add that among the means of proof of the guilt of the accused expressly mentioned in article 52
of the provisional law for the application of the Penal Code in the Philippines, the silence of the
accused or his refusal to testify is not included.

In corroboration of the assertions heretofore made we refer to a work published in 1883 by the
editorial staff of the Review of Legislation and Jurisprudence, under the title of "Law of criminal
procedure," in which, in the chapter in which the subject of the testimony of the accused is dealt with
(vol. 1, p. 257), the following statement is made:

Is the accused under any obligation to testify? This is the first doubt which arises in
examining the subject with which this chapter deals. The law does not solve the question
expressly, and consequently we must endeavor to discover whether this obligation is
imposed indirectly. We are of the opinion that it is not, inasmuch as obligations, and more
especially with respect to the penal law, are not to be presumed. Nor do we attribute the lack
of the provision to which we refer to carelessness or oversight on the part of the legislator,
both because it is such a serious matter and because it is expressly provided that the
accused is under no obligation to testify, and because our former laws and the law of
Aragon, before the laws of other European countries, relieved accused persons from the
obligation of taking an oath in order not to place them in the predicament of either telling a
falsehood and thereby committing perjury, or of declaring themselves to be guilt of a crime of
which they are charged. That is to say, our ancient laws of Aragon and the other laws of
Europe which copied the provisions of the laws of Aragon when providing that accused
persons should not be required to take an oath, or permitted to do so, were based upon the
principle which is at the present time recognized by all criminologists of Europe, that the
accused should not be required under penalty to aid in the prosecution of the crime of which
he is charged. Upon these principles, which at the present time are beyond question, it can
not be inferred that the accused is under obligation to testify.

For the purpose of supporting this contention we have still many other reasons. Upon the
supposition that the law imposes upon the defendant the obligation to testify what penalty
exists for the failure to perform this obligation? None, absolutely none; so that assuming the
obligation to exist, if the accused should refuse to testify, he might do so with absolute
 immunity, for in such case there is no coercion measure which can be used since the
abolition of torture. Consequently if our law had imposed the obligation of testifying upon
accused persons, they would have provided some adequate penalty. And not only is this
conclusion to be reached from an examination of all modern systems of law, without any
exception, but it is based upon the express provisions of the law we are commenting upon in
article 392 and the last paragraph of article 689 [should be 389], which provides that no
coercion or threats can be used against the accused, and to endeavor to compel him to
testify would certainly be a coercion. If the accused refuses to testify, notwithstanding his
silence, the prosecution will continue without any prejudice whatever to the defendant. It is
true that article 693 provides that the presiding judge shall demand a categorical answer
from the accused, but in case the accused refuses to give such answer there is no penalty
other than that of article 798, to wit, that the prosecution shall continue, even although the
accused shall refuse to answer the questions addressed to him by the presiding judge.
Consequently this appears to decide the question in favor of our contention. If the accused
refuses to testify, that is his privilege, but the trial will continue down to final judgment.

With respect to the legal presumption of the innocence of the accused in the absence of proof to the
contrary, this is not a new principle in the law of criminal procedure of the Philippine, nor was it
introduced here by General Orders, No. 58, as might be inferred from the majority opinion. Centuries
ago the Code of the Partidas, which for a long time constituted an integral part of the laws of this
Archipelago, solemnly recognized this principle by establishing in a number of its provisions that no
person should be considered as guilty of a crime except upon proof of his guilt, and that proof to
such degree as to exclude all doubt, proof "as clear as light." "A criminal charge," says Law 12, title
14, third partida, "brought against anyone . . . must be proved openly by witnesses or by writing, or
by the confession of the accused, and not upon suspicion alone. For it is but just that a charge
brought against the person of an man, or against his reputation, should be proved and established
by evidence as clear as light, evidence not leaving room for any doubt. Wherefore the ancient sages
held and decided that it was more righteous to acquit a guilty man, as to whom the judge could not
find clear and manifest evidence, than to convict an innocent man even though suspicion point his
way."

Again, the provincial law for the application of the Penal Code which was in force here at the time of
the publication of General Orders, No. 58, also required, in order to authorize the conviction of the
defendant, that his guilt be established by some of the means of proof enumerated in article 52 of
that law. In default of this proof the presumption prevailed that the accused was innocent and the law
required his acquittal.

In Escriche's Dictionary of Legislation of Jurisprudence, above cited, in the article on Criminal

Evidence, paragraph 5, the author says: "Until it appears to a certainty that the accused is guilty, it
would be a crime to condemn him to suffer any penalty whatever; because he may be innocent,
and every man has a right to be so considered until the contrary is established by proof."

It follows then that if the accused could under no circumstance be compelled to testify against his will
under the procedural law prior to General Orders, No. 58, and of that procedure the principle of the
presumption of the innocence of the accused until the contrary is proven formed part, and that
notwithstanding this the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 483 existed, it is logical to conclude,
against the opinion of the majority, that in establishing that precept the legislator in no wise took into
consideration the supposed obligation of the accused to testify as to the charge against him, and did
not consider it incompatible with that presumption of innocence, for then as now the accused was
under no obligation to testify, and then as now the presumption referred to constituted a fundamental
right of the accused under the law of procedure.
Passing from this aspect of the question, we will now consider the provisions of paragraph 2 of
article 483 of the Penal Code in connection with section 5 of the Philippine bill enacted July 1, 1902.

Pacheco, in commenting upon article 413 of the penal code of Spain, which is the equivalent of
article 483 of the Code of the Philippines, in his work entitled "The Penal Code" (fifth edition, vol. 3,
p. 258), says that this article is based upon "the hypothesis that the person detained has completely
disappeared." Then the author adds: "The law considers the person guilty of this detention to be guilt
by presumption of killing the person detained, unless he proves that he set that person at liberty."
Such is the essence of the crime punished under the provisions of article 483. It does not consist
solely in the detention, but in the detention followed by the disappearance of the person detained. It
is indispensable to prove these two facts, for neither of them alone are sufficient to authorize the
application of the article. But, these facts having been proven, upon that proof alone, and without the
necessity of any further evidence, then as stated by the author cited, we have the crime punished by
the article in question, and as a consequence a case calling for the application of the penalty
prescribed by that article. This being so, if for the purpose of convicting the accused the prosecution
has only to prove the two facts above mentioned, this is doubtless because these facts and these
facts alone are sufficient to constitute the crime under consideration.

Hence it is not true, as stated in the majority opinion, that one of the constituent and essential
elements of the crime is the fact that the accused has failed to give information as to the
whereabouts of the person detained, or failed to prove that he has set him at liberty. This fact, that is
to say, the fact of having given or failed to give information as to the whereabouts or liberty of the
person detained, is entirely foreign to the essence of the crime. Not only is it not a necessary
element for the existence of the crime, but is, on the contrary, a defense, or, as Groizard says in his
Commentaries to the Penal Code (vol. 5, p. 632), an exception which the law grants the defendant
as a means by which, if he avails himself of it and establishes it by proof, he may avoid the penalty
prescribed in that article. "In order that this exception be available," says that author, "it must be
shown by competent evidence that the act alleged in defense was actually performed." It is
unnecessary to add that a defense available to the accused is not and can not be an integral
element of the crime, its direct and immediate effect being, as it is, to overcome the criminal action
arising from the crime.

It having been demonstrated that the wording of article 483 of the Code, the effect that if the person
guilty of illegal detention "does not give information as to the whereabouts of the person detained, or
proof that he set him at liberty," had for their purpose the establishment of a defense of which the
accused may take the benefit, and that they do not constitute an essential element of the crime in
question, it is not possible in our opinion to interpret these words in the sense of imposing upon the
defendant an obligation of testifying as to those facts — an obligation which did not exist under the
old system of procedures, as we have demonstrated — because the use of a defense allowed by the
law would lose its character as such if its use were obligatory.

But it said that if the accused does not give information of the whereabouts of the person detained,
or does not prove that he set him at liberty, he becomes subject to the penalty of paragraph 2 of
article 483, which is much heavier than that prescribed by articles 481 and 482, to which he would
be subject in the contrary case. True. But what is intended to be inferred from this? Is it contended
that upon this supposition the accused is convicted by reason of the fact that he does not give
information as to the whereabouts of the person detained, or proof that he set him at liberty? Is it
meant that the prosecution has only to prove this fact in order to obtain a conviction? Is it meant that
the law punishes as a crime the silence of the accused, as the majority opinion would lead us to
infer? Far from it. Nothing could be further from the true meaning of article 483 under consideration.
What is therein punished is the disappearance of the person detained. This it is which constitutes the
crime defined in that article, and this it is which must be proven by the prosecution. If the prosecution
does not prove the detention of the supposed victim, and does not moreover prove
his disappearance, no matter how complete the silence of the accused or how obstinate his refusal
to give information as to the whereabouts or liberty of the person detained, there can be no
possibility of his conviction under the article in question. This conclusively shows that the ground of
the conviction would not be the silence of the accused, but the proof offered by the prosecution upon
the two facts above mentioned, which are, as we have stated, essential elements of the crime we
are now considering.

For this reason it was that in the case of the United States vs. Eulogio de Sosa, for illegal detention,
decided February 6, 1903, the court acquitted the defendant, declaring that there was no ground
upon which he could be convicted under the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 483, giving among
others the reason that "there was not sufficient evidence that the whereabouts of Nicasio Rafael are
unknown," Rafael being the person detained. Mr. Justice Willard, who wrote the opinion of the court,
in that opinion said: "The mere fact that the accused has not given information as to the
whereabouts of the person sequestered is not sufficient to authorize a conviction." He also expressly
laid down the rule that in order to justify a conviction it is necessary that it "appear to the satisfaction
of the court that the person has disappeared." It is not necessary to add, for it is self-evident, that
this decision implies the proposition that paragraph 2 of article 483 of the Penal Code has not been
repealed by the Philippine bill of July 1, 1902. The sense of the decision is that if the disappearance
of Nicasio Rafael had been proven, it would have been proper to convict the accused in accordance
with the provisions of the article of the code under consideration.

It is clear that the accused can overcome the evidence of the prosecution in whole or in part, either
by proving that he had not committed the alleged detention, in which case his innocence would be
completely established, or else by limiting his proof to showing that it is not true that the person
detained has disappeared, as, for instance, proving the whereabouts of the latter, in which case the
gravity of the crime would naturally be reduced. Whatever the evidence may be, total or partial,
demonstrative of the complete innocence of the accused, or only of a lesser degree of guilt, the law
admits this defense either as a total defense or attenuate the penalty, as the case may be. In the
latter case, which is the one to which article 483 expressly refers, the accused may prove the
whereabouts of the person detained, or show that the placed him at liberty. And because the law
makes provisions for this case, which is certainly favorable to the accused, who under such a
hypothesis would be responsible solely for the fact of the detention and not for the disappearance of
the person detained, because the law expressly grants and authorizes this exception or defense on
behalf of the accused, we do not believe that the law can be accused of injustice, or that it can not
be considered as incompatible in the slightest degree with section 5 of the Philippine bill cited in the
decision.

It would be, on the contrary, highly unreasonable and unjust if such a means of defense were denied
to the accused — if solely upon proof by the prosecution of the disappearance of the person
detained, the accused should be held under all circumstances responsible for this crime, even
though he might show by competent evidence the whereabouts of the person or proof that he had
set him at liberty.

It is said that this exculpatory evidence required by article 483 would be accusatory for the purpose
of article 481, because the mere statement as to the whereabouts of the victim or proof that the
accused had set him at liberty implies the confession that the accused did kidnap that person.

This argument would be weighty if the introduction of this testimony were not wholly voluntary or
optional on the part of the accused. The law gives him this means of defense. It is for him to
determine whether it is for his benefit to avail himself of it or not. In the course of the trial the
accused has an opportunity to inform himself of the evidence for the prosecution, and in view of that
evidence to adopt such a plan of defense as may best suit him. If the evidence of his guilt is
insufficient, if the prosecution does not prove the detention, and furthermore the disappearance of
the supposed victim, the accused even if guilty, may remain silent, and certainty will do so as to the
whereabouts or liberation of the person detained, and may do so with the complete assurance that
his silence will not in the slightest degree be prejudicial to him, and that he can not by virtue of that
silence be sentenced to any penalty whatever.

If on the contrary he sees that the evidence of the prosecution is conclusive, if he sees that it clearly
establishes his guilt, if he feels that it is absolutely convincing, if in fine he feels that he is helpless to
overcome that evidence completely, would he not instinctively realize, no matter how obtuse he may
be, that inasmuch as it is no longer possible for him to avoid conviction, it would be better for him to
elect to suffer the lesser penalty by giving information as to the whereabouts of his victim? If he does
so he does so freely and for his own convenience, and not because he is presumed by the law
without evidence to be guilty, for it has been demonstrated that then as now the presumption of the
innocence of the accused was a principle deeply rooted in the former system of procedure. Upon
this supposition, even if the accused does by implication admit the fact of the illegal detention he
would be benefited thereby, because he would thus avoid the heavier penalty imposed for the
disappearance of the person detained, and which we assume has been established by the
prosecution by sufficient evidence.

And what, we ask, but this very thing, occurs with respect to the allegation and proof of mitigating
circumstances? A defendant who alleges mitigating circumstances by implication admits the
commission of the crime with which he is charged, and seeks solely by means of that allegation to
obtain a reduction of the penalty. Can it be said on that account that the law which establishes
mitigating circumstances is unconstitutional and unjust? Can it be said with reason that such a
law compels the accused to incriminate himself because it puts before him the alternative of
suffering the entire penalty prescribed for the crime, or alleging some mitigating circumstance,
confessing the commission of the offense in order to obtain a reduction of the penalty? We can not
in truth see any difference whatever between the confession of guilt implied by allegation of a
mitigating circumstance and that involved in the fact of giving information of the whereabouts of the
person detained, in crimes if illegal detention.

Apart from this, it is not true that such a statement always implies the confession of illegal detention.
On the contrary, it would be in many cases a complete denial of it. In the present case, for example,
the accused, without testifying at all, might have proved that Felix Punsalan is living at such and
such a place in the Province of Bulacan, without this statement necessarily carrying with it the
conclusion that they admit even by implication that they had sequestered him, for they might very
well have knowledge of his present whereabouts without having been guilty of sequestering or
detaining him. And if the proof should be sufficient to show that Punsalan was in that place during all
the month of November, 1901, the date on which the crime in question is alleged to have been
committed, and that he remained there, entirely at liberty from that time down to the present, this fact
would show furthermore the falsity if the alleged illegal detention of that individual.

The natural tendency of an accused person is to evade, if possible, the penalty. If the evidence for
the prosecution is such as to make it impossible to evade the penalty, then his tendency is to elect to
suffer the lightest penalty which the law authorizes. In case of paragraph 2 of article 483 of the Penal
Code, the law does not condemn the accused because of his remaining silent during the trial or
because he fails to give information of the whereabouts of the person detained. If the law convicts
him it is upon the supposition that the prosecution has fully established the fact of the illegal
detention and the fact of the disappearance of the person detained. It does not convict the accused
without evidence or by reason of his silence. It convicts him when those two facts which constitute
the crime defined in that article have been proven.
But the law, while demanding that proof from the prosecution, at the same time takes into
consideration that it may be overcome by the accused, if not with respect to the fact of the detention
itself, which may be absolutely proven, at least with respect to the disappearance of the victim, and
therefore the law commands that the accused be heard and that the evidence which he may offer on
the point be considered, when he — admitting his guilt of illegal detention in view of the evidence for
the prosecution — voluntarily determines to give information as to the whereabouts or liberation of
the person detained. The law grants him this exception or defense, but does not impose it upon him.
It constitutes a right but not an obligation. For the reasons stated we find no incompatibility between
the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 483 of the Penal Code and section 5 of the Philippine bill of
July 1, 1902. And taking into consideration the legal doctrine that "posteriores leges ad priores
pertinent, nisi contrario sint," we are of the opinion that it has not repealed by implication — and it
certainly has not done so expressly — the provision in question of the Penal Code.

If this article had so been repealed and its principles could not therefore be applied to these
accused, neither could they be punished, strictly speaking, under article 482 of the code, cited in the
decision of the majority, because that article is based upon the fundamental supposition that the
person detained has recovered his liberty, which is not the fact in the case at bar.
 EN BANC

ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y G. R. No. 160188

NATIVIDAD,
Petitioner, Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
SANTIAGO,
- versus - GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES NACHURA, JJ.
and HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents.
Promulgated:

June 21, 2007

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This case aims for prime space in the firmament of our criminal law jurisprudence.
Petitioner effectively concedes having performed the felonious acts imputed against
him, but instead insists that as a result, he should be adjudged guilty of frustrated
theft only, not the felony in its consummated stage of which he was convicted. The
proposition rests on a common theory expounded in two well-known
decisions[1] rendered decades ago by the Court of Appeals, upholding the existence
of frustrated theft of which the accused in both cases were found guilty. However,
the rationale behind the rulings has never been affirmed by this Court.

As far as can be told,[2] the last time this Court extensively considered whether
an accused was guilty of frustrated or consummated theft was in 1918, in People v.
Adiao.[3] A more cursory

treatment of the question was followed in 1929, in People v. Sobrevilla,[4] and in

1984, in Empelis v. IAC.[5] This petition now gives occasion for us to finally and
fully measure if or how frustrated theft is susceptible to commission under the
Revised Penal Code.

I.

The basic facts are no longer disputed before us. The case stems from an
Information[6] charging petitioner Aristotel Valenzuela (petitioner) and Jovy
Calderon (Calderon) with the crime of theft. On 19 May 1994, at around 4:30 p.m.,
petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket
within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a
security guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the
supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card with the
mark Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU), hauling a push cart with cases of detergent
of the well-known Tide brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking
space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then returned inside the supermarket,
and after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramaticand again
unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space. [7]

Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the
cab and directed it towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon
loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. All
these acts were eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the
open parking area. When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise,
petitioner and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to
alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were
apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered.[8] The filched items
seized from the duo were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25
grams, and three (3) additional cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate value
of P12,090.00.[9]

Petitioner and Calderon were first brought to the SM security office before they were
transferred on the same day to the Baler Station II of the Philippine National
Police, Quezon City, for investigation. It appears from the police investigation
records that apart from petitioner and Calderon, four (4) other persons were
apprehended by the security guards at the scene and delivered to police custody at
the Baler PNP Station in connection with the incident. However, after the matter was
referred to the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor, only petitioner and Calderon
were charged with theft by the Assistant City Prosecutor, in Informations prepared
on 20 May 1994, the day after the incident. [10]

After pleading not guilty on arraignment, at the trial, petitioner and Calderon both
claimed having been innocent bystanders within the vicinity of the Super Sale Club
on the afternoon of 19 May 1994 when they were haled by Lago and his fellow
security guards after a commotion and brought to the Baler PNP Station. Calderon
alleged that on the afternoon of the incident, he was at the Super Sale Club to
withdraw from his ATM account, accompanied by his neighbor, Leoncio
Rosulada.[11] As the queue for the ATM was long, Calderon and Rosulada decided
to buy snacks inside the supermarket. It was
while they were eating that they heard the gunshot fired by
Lago, leading them to head out of the building to check what was

transpiring. As they were outside, they were suddenly grabbed by a security guard,
thus commencing their detention.[12] Meanwhile, petitioner testified during trial that
he and his cousin, a Gregorio Valenzuela,[13] had been at the parking lot, walking
beside the nearby BLISS complex and headed to ride a tricycle going to Pag-asa,
when they saw the security guard Lago fire a shot. The gunshot caused him and the
other people at the scene to start running, at which point he was apprehended by
Lago and brought to the security office. Petitioner claimed he was detained at the
security office until around 9:00 p.m., at which time he and the others were brought
to the Baler Police Station. At the station, petitioner denied having stolen the cartons
of detergent, but he was detained overnight, and eventually brought to the
prosecutors office where he was charged with theft.[14]During petitioners cross-
examination, he admitted that he had been employed as a bundler of GMS
Marketing, assigned at the supermarket though not at SM.[15]

In a Decision[16] promulgated on 1 February 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

of Quezon City, Branch 90, convicted both petitioner and Calderon of the crime of
consummated theft. They were sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of two (2)
years of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years of prision mayor as
maximum.[17] The RTC found credible the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
and established the convictions on the positive identification of the accused as
perpetrators of the crime.

Both accused filed their respective Notices of Appeal, [18] but only petitioner
filed a brief[19] with the Court of Appeals, causing the appellate court to deem
Calderons appeal as abandoned and consequently dismissed. Before the Court of
Appeals, petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since
at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose
of the articles stolen.[20] However, in its Decision dated 19 June 2003,[21] the Court
of Appeals rejected this contention and affirmed petitioners conviction.[22] Hence the
present Petition for Review,[23] which expressly seeks that petitioners conviction be
modified to only of Frustrated Theft.[24]

Even in his appeal before the Court of Appeals, petitioner effectively conceded both
his felonious intent and his actual participation in the theft of several cases of
detergent with a total value of P12,090.00 of which he was charged.[25] As such,
there is no cause for the Court to consider a factual scenario other than that presented
by the prosecution, as affirmed by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The only
question to consider is whether under the given facts, the theft should be deemed as
consummated or merely frustrated.

II.

In arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft, petitioner cites[26] two
decisions rendered many years ago by the Court of Appeals: People v.
Dio[27] and People v. Flores.[28] Both decisions elicit the interest of this Court, as
they modified trial court convictions from consummated to frustrated theft and
involve a factual milieu that bears similarity to the present case. Petitioner invoked
the same rulings in his appeal to the Court of Appeals, yet the appellate court did not
expressly consider the import of the rulings when it affirmed the conviction.

It is not necessary to fault the Court of Appeals for giving short shrift to
the Dio and Flores rulings since they have not yet been expressly adopted as
precedents by this Court. For whatever reasons,

the occasion to define or debunk the crime of frustrated theft has not come to pass
before us. Yet despite the silence on our part, Dio and Flores have attained a level
of renown reached by very few other appellate court rulings. They are
comprehensively discussed in the most popular of our criminal law
annotations,[29] and studied in criminal law classes as textbook examples of
frustrated crimes or even as definitive of frustrated theft.

More critically, the factual milieu in those cases is hardly akin to the fanciful
scenarios that populate criminal law exams more than they actually occur in real life.
Indeed, if we finally say that Dio and Flores are doctrinal, such conclusion could
profoundly influence a multitude of routine theft prosecutions, including
commonplace shoplifting. Any scenario that involves the thief having to exit with
the stolen property through a supervised egress, such as a supermarket checkout
counter or a parking area pay booth, may easily call for the application
of Dio and Flores. The fact that lower courts have not hesitated to lay down
convictions for frustrated theft further validates that Dio and Flores and the theories
offered therein on frustrated theft have borne some weight in our jurisprudential
system. The time is thus ripe for us to examine whether those theories are correct
and should continue to influence prosecutors and judges in the future.

III.

To delve into any extended analysis of Dio and Flores, as well as the specific
issues relative to frustrated theft, it is necessary to first refer to the basic rules on the
three stages of crimes under our Revised Penal Code. [30]

Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and
attempted felonies. A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present. It is frustrated when the offender
performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence
but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the
will of the perpetrator. Finally, it is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other
than his own spontaneous desistance.

Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a subjective phase, or that portion of
the acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins the
commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior
acts, should result in the consummated crime.[31] After that point has been breached,
the subjective phase ends and the objective phase begins.[32] It has been held that if
the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense, the crime is merely
attempted.[33] On the other hand, the subjective phase is completely passed in case
of frustrated crimes, for in such instances, [s]ubjectively the crime is complete. [34]

Truly, an easy distinction lies between consummated and frustrated felonies

on one hand, and attempted felonies on the other. So long as the offender fails to
complete all the acts of execution despite commencing the commission of a felony,
the crime is undoubtedly in the attempted stage. Since the specific acts of execution
that define each crime under the Revised Penal Code are generally enumerated in
the code itself, the task of ascertaining whether a crime is attempted only would need
to compare the acts actually performed by the accused as against the acts that
constitute the felony under the Revised Penal Code.

In contrast, the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated

necessitates an initial concession that all of the acts of execution have been
performed by the offender. The critical distinction instead is whether the felony itself
was actually produced by the acts of execution. The determination of whether the
felony was produced after all the acts of execution had been performed hinges on
the particular statutory definition of the felony. It is the statutory definition that
generally furnishes the elements of each crime under the Revised Penal Code, while
the elements in turn unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and
accompanying criminal intent.

The long-standing Latin maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea supplies an
important characteristic of a crime, that ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an
unlawful act for there to be a crime, and accordingly, there can be no crime when
the criminal mind is wanting.[35] Accepted in this jurisdiction as material in
crimes mala in se,[36] mens reahas been defined before as a guilty mind, a guilty or
wrongful purpose or criminal intent,[37] and essential for criminal liability.[38] It
follows that the statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to supply
what the mens rea of the crime is, and indeed the U.S. Supreme Court has
comfortably held that a criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement infringes
on constitutionally protected rights.[39] The criminal statute must also provide for the
overt acts that constitute the crime. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is not
enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be an actus reus.[40]

It is from the actus reus and the mens rea, as they find expression in the
criminal statute, that the felony is produced. As a postulate in the craftsmanship of
constitutionally sound laws, it is extremely preferable that the language of the law
expressly provide when the felony is produced. Without such provision, disputes
would inevitably ensue on the elemental question whether or not a crime was
committed, thereby presaging the undesirable and legally dubious set-up under
which the judiciary is assigned the legislative role of defining crimes. Fortunately,
our Revised Penal Code does not suffer from such infirmity. From the statutory
definition of any felony, a decisive passage or term is embeddedwhich attests when
the felony is produced by the acts of execution. For example, the statutory definition
of murder or homicide expressly uses the phrase shall kill another, thus making it
clear that the felony is produced by the death of the victim, and conversely, it is not
produced if the victim survives.

We next turn to the statutory definition of theft. Under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, its elements are spelled out as follows:

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person
who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latters consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to
deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the
property of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits
or object of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where
trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and
without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the
same or shall gather cereals, or other forest or farm products.

Article 308 provides for a general definition of theft, and three alternative and highly
idiosyncratic means by which theft may be committed. [41] In the present discussion,
we need to concern ourselves only with the general definition since it was under it
that the prosecution of the accused was undertaken and sustained. On the face of the
definition, there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft
─ the taking of personal property of another. It is also clear from the provision that
in order that such taking may be qualified as theft, there must further be present the
descriptive circumstances that the taking was with intent to gain; without force upon
things or violence against or intimidation of persons; and it was without the consent
of the owner of the property.
 Indeed, we have long recognized the following elements of theft as provided
for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of
personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be
done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner;
and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things.[42]

In his commentaries, Judge Guevarra traces the history of the definition of

theft, which under early Roman law as defined by Gaius, was so broad enough as to
encompass any kind of physical handling of property belonging to another against
the will of the owner,[43] a definition similar to that by Paulus that a thief handles
(touches, moves) the property of another.[44] However, with the Institutes of
Justinian, the idea had taken hold that more than mere physical handling, there must
further be an intent of acquiring gain from the object, thus: [f]urtum est contrectatio
rei fraudulosa, lucri faciendi causa vel ipsius rei, vel etiam usus ejus
possessinisve.[45] This requirement of animo lucrandi, or intent to gain, was
maintained in both the Spanish and Filipino penal laws, even as it has since been
abandoned in Great Britain.[46]

In Spanish law, animo lucrandi was compounded with apoderamiento, or

unlawful taking, to characterize theft. Justice Regalado notes that the concept
of apoderamientoonce had a controversial interpretation and application. Spanish
law had already discounted the belief that mere physical taking was constitutive
of apoderamiento, finding that it had to be coupled with the intent to appropriate the
object in order to constitute apoderamiento; and to appropriate means to deprive the
lawful owner of the thing.[47] However, a conflicting line of cases decided by the
Court of Appeals ruled, alternatively, that there must be permanency in the
taking[48] or an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the stolen property;[49] or
that there was no need for permanency in the taking or in its intent, as the mere
temporary possession by the offender or disturbance of the proprietary rights of the
owner already constituted apoderamiento.[50] Ultimately, as Justice Regalado notes,
the Court adopted the latter thought that there was no need of an intent to
permanently deprive the owner of his property to constitute an unlawful taking. [51]
So long as the descriptive circumstances that qualify the taking are present,
including animo lucrandi and apoderamiento, the completion of the operative act
that is the taking of personal property of another establishes, at least, that the
transgression went beyond the attempted stage. As applied to the present case, the
moment petitioner obtained physical possession of the cases of detergent and loaded
them in the pushcart, such seizure motivated by intent to gain, completed without
need to inflict violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things, and
accomplished without the consent of the SM Super Sales Club, petitioner forfeited
the extenuating benefit a conviction for only attempted theft would have afforded
him.

On the critical question of whether it was consummated or frustrated theft, we are

obliged to apply Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code to ascertain the answer.
Following that provision, the theft would have been frustrated only, once the acts
committed by petitioner, if ordinarily sufficient to produce theft as a consequence,
do not produce [such theft] by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator. There are clearly two determinative factors to consider: that the felony
is not produced, and that such failure is due to causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator. The second factor ultimately depends on the evidence at hand in each
particular case. The first, however, relies primarily on a doctrinal definition attaching
to the individual felonies in the Revised Penal Code[52] as to when a particular felony
is not produced, despite the commission of all the acts of execution.

So, in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is

necessary to inquire as to how exactly is the felony of theft produced. Parsing
through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent
answer provided in the language of the law that theft is already produced upon the
tak[ing of] personal property of another without the latters consent.

U.S. v. Adiao[53] apparently supports that notion. Therein, a customs inspector was
charged with theft after he abstracted a leather belt from the baggage of a foreign
national and secreted the item in his desk at the Custom House. At no time was the
accused able to get the merchandise out of the Custom House, and it appears that he
was under observation during the entire transaction.[54] Based apparently on those
two circumstances, the trial court had found him guilty, instead, of frustrated theft.
The Court reversed, saying that neither circumstance was decisive, and holding
instead that the accused was guilty of consummated theft, finding that all the
elements of the completed crime of theft are present. [55] In support of its conclusion
that the theft was consummated, the Court cited three (3) decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain, the discussion of which we replicate below:

The defendant was charged with the theft of some fruit from the land of
another. As he was in the act of taking the fruit[,] he was seen by a
policeman, yet it did not appear that he was at that moment caught by the
policeman but sometime later. The court said: "[x x x] The trial court did
not err [x x x ] in considering the crime as that of consummated theft
instead of frustrated theft inasmuch as nothing appears in the record
showing that the policemen who saw the accused take the fruit from the
adjoining land arrested him in the act and thus prevented him from taking
full possession of the thing stolen and even its utilization by him for an
interval of time." (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, October 14,
1898.)

Defendant picked the pocket of the offended party while the latter
was hearing mass in a church. The latter on account of the solemnity of
the act, although noticing the theft, did not do anything to prevent it.
Subsequently, however, while the defendant was still inside the church,
the offended party got back the money from the defendant. The court said
that the defendant had performed all the acts of execution and considered
the theft as consummated. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain,
December 1, 1897.)

The defendant penetrated into a room of a certain house and by

means of a key opened up a case, and from the case took a small box,
which was also opened with a key, from which in turn he took a purse
containing 461 reales and 20 centimos, and then he placed the money over
the cover of the case; just at this moment he was caught by two guards
who were stationed in another room near-by. The court considered this as
consummated robbery, and said: "[x x x] The accused [x x x] having
materially taken possession of the money from the moment he took it from
the place where it had been, and having taken it with his hands with intent
to appropriate the same, he executed all the acts necessary to constitute
 the crime which was thereby produced; only the act of making use of the
thing having been frustrated, which, however, does not go to make the
elements of the consummated crime." (Decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain, June 13, 1882.)[56]

It is clear from the facts of Adiao itself, and the three (3) Spanish decisions cited
therein, that the criminal actors in all these cases had been able to obtain full
possession of the personal property prior to their apprehension. The interval between
the commission of the acts of theft and the apprehension of the thieves did vary,
from sometime later in the 1898 decision; to the very moment the thief had just
extracted the money in a purse which had been stored as it was in the 1882 decision;
and before the thief had been able to spirit the item stolen from the building where
the theft took place, as had happened in Adiao and the 1897 decision. Still, such
intervals proved of no consequence in those cases, as it was ruled that the thefts in
each of those cases was consummated by the actual possession of the property
belonging to another.

In 1929, the Court was again confronted by a claim that an accused was guilty only
of frustrated rather than consummated theft. The case is People v.
Sobrevilla,[57] where the accused, while in the midst of a crowd in a public market,
was already able to abstract a pocketbook from the trousers of the victim when the
latter, perceiving the theft, caught hold of the [accused]s shirt-front, at the same time
shouting for a policeman; after a struggle, he recovered his pocket-book and let go
of the defendant, who was afterwards caught by a policeman. [58] In rejecting the
contention that only frustrated theft was established, the Court simply said, without
further comment or elaboration:

We believe that such a contention is groundless. The [accused]

succeeded in taking the pocket-book, and that determines the crime of
theft. If the pocket-book was afterwards recovered, such recovery does
not affect the [accuseds] criminal liability, which arose from the
[accused] having succeeded in taking the pocket-book.[59]
If anything, Sobrevilla is consistent with Adiao and the Spanish Supreme Court
cases cited in the latter, in that the fact that the offender was able to succeed in
obtaining physical possession of the stolen item, no matter how momentary, was
able to consummate the theft.
 Adiao, Sobrevilla and the Spanish Supreme Court decisions cited therein
contradict the position of petitioner in this case. Yet to simply affirm without further
comment would be disingenuous, as there is another school of thought on when theft
is consummated, as reflected in the Dio and Flores decisions.

Dio was decided by the Court of Appeals in 1949, some 31 years

after Adiao and 15 years before Flores. The accused therein, a driver employed by
the United States Army, had driven his truck into the port area of the South Harbor,
to unload a truckload of materials to waiting U.S. Army personnel. After he had
finished unloading, accused drove away his truck from the Port, but as he was
approaching a checkpoint of the Military Police, he was stopped by an M.P. who
inspected the truck and found therein three boxes of army rifles. The accused later
contended that he had been stopped by four men who had loaded the boxes with the
agreement that they were to meet him and retrieve the rifles after he had passed the
checkpoint. The trial court convicted accused of consummated theft, but the Court
of Appeals modified the conviction, holding instead that only frustrated theft had
been committed.

In doing so, the appellate court pointed out that the evident intent of the
accused was to let the boxes of rifles pass through the checkpoint, perhaps in the
belief that as the truck had already unloaded its cargo inside the depot, it would be
allowed to pass through the check point without further investigation or
checking.[60] This point was deemed material and indicative that the theft had not
been fully produced, for the Court of Appeals pronounced that the fact determinative
of consummation is the ability of the thief to dispose freely of the articles stolen,
even if it were more or less momentary.[61] Support for this proposition was drawn
from a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated 24 January 1888 (1888
decision), which was quoted as follows:

Considerando que para que el apoderamiento de la cosa sustraida sea

determinate de la consumacion del delito de hurto es preciso que so haga en
circunstancias tales que permitan al sustractor la libre disposicion de
aquella, siquiera sea mas o menos momentaneamente, pues de otra suerte,
dado el concepto del delito de hurto, no puede decirse en realidad que se
haya producido en toda su extension, sin materializar demasiado el acto de
tomar la cosa ajena.[62]
 Integrating these considerations, the Court of Appeals then concluded:

This court is of the opinion that in the case at bar, in order to make
the booty subject to the control and disposal of the culprits, the articles
stolen must first be passed through the M.P. check point, but since the
offense was opportunely discovered and the articles seized after all the
acts of execution had been performed, but before the loot came under the
final control and disposal of the looters, the offense can not be said to have
been fully consummated, as it was frustrated by the timely intervention of
the guard. The offense committed, therefore, is that of frustrated theft.[63]

Dio thus laid down the theory that the ability of the actor to freely dispose of
the items stolen at the time of apprehension is determinative as to whether the theft
is consummated or frustrated. This theory was applied again by the Court of Appeals
some 15 years later, in Flores, a case which according to the division of the court
that decided it, bore no substantial variance between the circumstances [herein] and
in [Dio].[64] Such conclusion is borne out by the facts in Flores. The accused therein,
a checker employed by the Luzon Stevedoring Company, issued a delivery receipt
for one empty sea van to the truck driver who had loaded the purportedly empty sea
van onto his truck at the terminal of the stevedoring company. The truck driver
proceeded to show the delivery receipt to the guard on duty at the gate of the
terminal. However, the guards insisted on inspecting the van, and discovered that
the empty sea van had actually contained other merchandise as well.[65] The accused
was prosecuted for theft qualified by abuse of confidence, and found himself
convicted of the consummated crime. Before the Court of Appeals, accused argued
in the alternative that he was guilty only of attempted theft, but the appellate court
pointed out that there was no intervening act of spontaneous desistance on the part
of the accused that literally frustrated the theft. However, the Court of Appeals,
explicitly relying on Dio, did find that the accused was guilty only of frustrated, and
not consummated, theft.

As noted earlier, the appellate court admitted it found no substantial variance

between Dio and Flores then before it. The prosecution in Flores had sought to
distinguish that case from Dio, citing a traditional ruling which unfortunately was
not identified in the decision itself. However, the Court of Appeals pointed out that
the said traditional ruling was qualified by the words is placed in a situation where
[the actor] could dispose of its contents at once.[66] Pouncing on this qualification,
the appellate court noted that [o]bviously, while the truck and the van were still
within the compound, the petitioner could not have disposed of the goods at once.
At the same time, the Court of Appeals conceded that [t]his is entirely different from
the case where a much less bulk and more common thing as money was the object
of the crime, where freedom to dispose of or make use of it is palpably less
restricted,[67] though no further qualification was offered what the effect would have
been had that alternative circumstance been present instead.

Synthesis of the Dio and Flores rulings is in order. The determinative

characteristic as to whether the crime of theft was produced is the ability of the actor
to freely dispose of the articles stolen, even if it were only momentary. Such
conclusion was drawn from an 1888 decision of the Supreme Court of Spain which
had pronounced that in determining whether theft had been consummated, es preciso
que so haga en circunstancias tales que permitan al sustractor de aquella, siquiera
sea mas o menos momentaneamente. The qualifier siquiera sea mas o menos
momentaneamente proves another important consideration, as it implies that if the
actor was in a capacity to freely dispose of the stolen items before apprehension,
then the theft could be deemed consummated. Such circumstance was not present in
either Dio or Flores, as the stolen items in both cases were retrieved from the actor
before they could be physically extracted from the guarded compounds from which
the items were filched. However, as implied in Flores, the character of the item
stolen could lead to a different conclusion as to whether there could have been free
disposition, as in the case where the chattel involved was
of much less bulk and more common x x x, [such] as money x x x.[68]

In his commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino makes the following pointed

observation on the import of the Dio ruling:
 There is a ruling of the Court of Appeals that theft is consummated
when the thief is able to freely dispose of the stolen articles even if it were
more or less momentary. Or as stated in another case[ [69]], theft is
consummated upon the voluntary and malicious taking of property
belonging to another which is realized by the material occupation of the
thing whereby the thief places it under his control and in such a situation
that he could dispose of it at once. This ruling seems to have been based
on Viadas opinion that in order the theft may be consummated, es preciso
que se haga en circumstancias x x x [[70]][71]

In the same commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino, concluding from Adiao and
other cases, also states that [i]n theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the
accused had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same,
although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated. [72]

There are at least two other Court of Appeals rulings that are at seeming
variance with the Dio and Flores rulings. People v. Batoon[73] involved an accused
who filled a container with gasoline from a petrol pump within view of a police
detective, who followed the accused onto a passenger truck where the arrest was
made. While the trial court found the accused guilty of frustrated qualified theft, the
Court of Appeals held that the accused was guilty of consummated qualified theft,
finding that [t]he facts of the cases of U.S. [v.] Adiao x x x and U.S. v. Sobrevilla x
x x indicate that actual taking with intent to gain is enough to consummate the crime
of theft.[74]

In People v. Espiritu,[75] the accused had removed nine pieces of hospital linen
from a supply depot and loaded them onto a truck. However, as the truck passed
through the checkpoint, the stolen items were discovered by the Military Police
running the checkpoint. Even though those facts clearly admit to similarity with
those in Dio, the Court of Appeals held that the accused were guilty of consummated
theft, as the accused were able to take or get hold of the hospital linen and that the
only thing that was frustrated, which does not constitute any element of theft, is the
use or benefit that the thieves expected from the commission of the offense. [76]
 In pointing out the distinction between Dio and Espiritu, Reyes wryly
observes that [w]hen the meaning of an element of a felony is controversial, there is
bound to arise different rulings as to the stage of execution of that felony. [77] Indeed,
we can discern from this survey of jurisprudence that the state of the law insofar as
frustrated theft is concerned is muddled. It fact, given the disputed foundational basis
of the concept of frustrated theft itself, the question can even be asked whether there
is really such a crime in the first place.

IV.

The Court in 1984 did finally rule directly that an accused was guilty of
frustrated, and not consummated, theft. As we undertake this inquiry, we have to
reckon with the import of this Courts 1984 decision in Empelis v. IAC.[78]

As narrated in Empelis, the owner of a coconut plantation had espied four (4)
persons in the premises of his plantation, in the act of gathering and tying some
coconuts. The accused were surprised by the owner within the plantation as they
were carrying with them the coconuts they had gathered. The accused fled the scene,
dropping the coconuts they had seized, and were subsequently arrested after the
owner reported the incident to the police. After trial, the accused were convicted of
qualified theft, and the issue they raised on appeal was that they were guilty only of
simple theft. The Court affirmed that the theft was qualified, following Article 310
of the Revised Penal Code,[79] but further held that the accused were guilty only of
frustrated qualified theft.
It does not appear from the Empelis decision that the issue of whether the theft
was consummated or frustrated was raised by any of the parties. What does appear,
though, is that the disposition of that issue was contained in only two sentences,
which we reproduce in full:

However, the crime committed is only frustrated qualified theft

because petitioners were not able to perform all the acts of execution
which should have produced the felony as a consequence. They were not
able to carry the coconuts away from the plantation due to the timely
arrival of the owner.[80]
No legal reference or citation was offered for this averment, whether Dio, Flores or
the Spanish authorities who may have bolstered the conclusion. There are indeed
evident problems with this formulation in Empelis.

Empelis held that the crime was only frustrated because the actors were not able to
perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the felon as a
consequence.[81] However, per Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime is
frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution, though not
producing the felony as a result. If the offender was not able to perform all the acts
of execution, the crime is attempted, provided that the non-
performance was by reason of some cause or accident other than spontaneous
desistance. Empelis concludes that the crime was

frustrated because not all of the acts of execution were performed due to the timely
arrival of the owner. However, following Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, these
facts should elicit the conclusion that the crime was only attempted, especially given
that the acts were not performed because of the timely arrival of the owner, and not
because of spontaneous desistance by the offenders.

For these reasons, we cannot attribute weight to Empelis as we consider the present
petition. Even if the two sentences we had cited actually aligned with the definitions
provided in Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, such passage bears no reflection
that it is the product of the considered evaluation of the relevant legal or
jurisprudential thought. Instead, the passage is offered as if it were sourced from an
indubitable legal premise so settled it required no further explication.

Notably, Empelis has not since been reaffirmed by the Court, or even cited as
authority on theft. Indeed, we cannot see how Empelis can contribute to our present
debate, except for the bare fact that it proves that the Court had once deliberately
found an accused guilty of frustrated theft. Even if Empelis were considered as a
precedent for frustrated theft, its doctrinal value is extremely compromised by the
erroneous legal premises that inform it, and also by the fact that it has not been
entrenched by subsequent reliance.
Thus, Empelis does not compel us that it is an insurmountable given that frustrated
theft is viable in this jurisdiction. Considering the flawed reasoning behind its
conclusion of frustrated theft, it cannot present any efficacious argument to persuade
us in this case. Insofar as Empelis may imply that convictions for frustrated theft are
beyond cavil in this jurisdiction, that decision is subject to reassessment.

V.

At the time our Revised Penal Code was enacted in 1930, the 1870 Codigo Penal de
Espaa was then in place. The definition of the crime of theft, as provided then, read
as follows:

Son reos de hurto:

1. Los que con nimo de lucrarse, y sin volencia o intimidacin en las

personas ni fuerza en las cosas, toman las cosas muebles ajenas sin la
voluntad de su dueo.

2. Los que encontrndose una cosa perdida y sabiendo quin es su dueo se

la apropriaren co intencin de lucro.

3. Los daadores que sustrajeren o utilizaren los frutos u objeto del dao
causado, salvo los casos previstos en los artίculos 606, nm. 1.0; 607,
nms, 1.0, 2.0 y 3.0; 608, nm. 1.0; 611; 613; Segundo prrafo del 617 y
618.

It was under the ambit of the 1870 Codigo Penal that the aforecited Spanish
Supreme Court decisions were handed down. However, the said code would be
revised again in 1932, and several times thereafter. In fact, under the Codigo Penal
Espaol de 1995, the crime of theft is now simply defined as [e]l que, con nimo de
lucro,
tomare las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad de su dueo ser castigado[82]

Notice that in the 1870 and 1995 definition of theft in the penal code
of Spain, la libre disposicion of the property is not an element or a statutory
characteristic of the crime. It does appear that the principle originated and perhaps
was fostered in the realm of Spanish jurisprudence.

The oft-cited Salvador Viada adopted a question-answer form in his 1926

commentaries on the 1870 Codigo Penal de Espaa. Therein, he raised at least three
questions for the reader whether the crime of frustrated or consummated theft had
occurred. The passage cited in Dio was actually utilized by Viada to answer the
question whether frustrated or consummated theft was committed [e]l que en el
momento mismo de apoderarse de la cosa ajena, vindose sorprendido, la arroja al
suelo.[83] Even as the answer was as stated in Dio, and was indeed derived from the
1888 decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, that decisions factual predicate
occasioning the statement was apparently very different from Dio, for it appears that
the 1888 decision involved an accused who was surprised by the employees of a
haberdashery as he was abstracting a layer of clothing off a mannequin, and who
then proceeded to throw away the garment as he fled. [84]

Nonetheless, Viada does not contest the notion of frustrated theft, and
willingly recites decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain that have held to that
effect.[85] A few decades later, the esteemed Eugenio Cuello Caln pointed out the
inconsistent application by the Spanish Supreme Court with respect to frustrated
theft.

Hay frustracin cuando los reos fueron sorprendidos por las

guardias cuando llevaban los sacos de harino del carro que los conducia
a otro que tenan preparado, 22 febrero 1913; cuando el resultado no tuvo
efecto por la intervencin de la policia situada en el local donde se realiz
la sustraccin que impidi pudieran los reos disponer de lo sustrado, 30 de
octubre 1950. Hay "por lo menos" frustracin, si existe apoderamiento,
pero el culpale no llega a disponer de la cosa, 12 abril 1930; hay
frustracin "muy prxima" cuando el culpable es detenido por el
perjudicado acto seguido de cometer la sustraccin, 28 febrero 1931.
Algunos fallos han considerado la existencia de frustracin cuando,
perseguido el culpable o sorprendido en el momento de llevar los efectos
 hurtados, los abandona, 29 mayo 1889, 22 febrero 1913, 11 marzo 1921;
esta doctrina no es admissible, stos, conforme a lo antes expuesto, son
hurtos consumados.[86]

Ultimately, Cuello Caln attacked the very idea that frustrated theft is actually
possible:

La doctrina hoy generalmente sustentada considera que el hurto se

consuma cuando la cosa queda de hecho a la disposicin del agente. Con
este criterio coincide la doctrina sentada ltimamente porla jurisprudencia
espaola que generalmente considera consumado el hurto cuando el
culpable coge o aprehende la cosa y sta quede por tiempo ms o menos
duradero bajo su poder. El hecho de que ste pueda aprovecharse o no de
lo hurtado es indiferente. El delito no pierde su carcter de consumado
aunque la cosa hurtada sea devuelta por el culpable o fuere
recuperada. No se concibe la frustracin, pues es muy dificil que el que
hace cuanto es necesario para la consumacin del hurto no lo consume
efectivamente, los raros casos que nuestra jurisprudencia, muy
vacilante, declara hurtos frustrados son verdaderos delitos
consumados.[87] (Emphasis supplied)

Cuello Calns submissions cannot be lightly ignored. Unlike Viada, who was
content with replicating the Spanish Supreme Court decisions on the matter, Cuello
Caln actually set forth his own thought that questioned whether theft could truly be
frustrated, since pues es muy dificil que el que hace cuanto es necesario para la
consumacin delhurto no lo consume efectivamente. Otherwise put, it would be
difficult to foresee how the execution of all the acts necessary for the completion of
the crime would not produce the effect of theft.

This divergence of opinion convinces us, at least, that there is no weighted

force in scholarly thought that obliges us to accept frustrated theft, as proposed
in Dio and Flores. A final ruling by the Court that there is no crime of frustrated
theft in this jurisdiction will not lead to scholastic pariah, for such a submission is
hardly heretical in light of Cuello Calns position.

Accordingly, it would not be intellectually disingenuous for the Court to look

at the question from a fresh perspective, as we are not bound by the opinions of the
respected Spanish commentators, conflicting as they are, to accept that theft is
capable of commission in its frustrated stage. Further, if we ask the question whether
there is a mandate of statute or precedent that must compel us to adopt
the Dio and Flores doctrines, the answer has to be in the negative. If we did so, it
would arise not out of obeisance to an inexorably higher command, but from the
exercise of the function of statutory interpretation that comes as part and parcel of
judicial review, and a function that allows breathing room for a variety of theorems
in competition until one is ultimately adopted by this Court.
V.

The foremost predicate that guides us as we explore the matter is that it lies in
the province of the legislature, through statute, to define what constitutes a particular
crime in this jurisdiction. It is the legislature, as representatives of the sovereign
people, which determines which acts or combination of acts are criminal in nature.
Judicial interpretation of penal laws should be aligned with what was the evident
legislative intent, as expressed primarily in the language of the law as it defines the
crime. It is Congress, not the courts, which is to define a crime, and ordain its
punishment.[88] The courts cannot arrogate the power to introduce a new element of
a crime which was unintended by the legislature, or redefine a crime in a manner
that does not hew to the statutory language. Due respect for the prerogative of
Congress in defining crimes/felonies constrains the Court to refrain from a broad
interpretation of penal laws where a narrow interpretation is appropriate. The Court
must take heed of language, legislative history and purpose, in order to strictly
determine the wrath and breath of the conduct the law forbids. [89]

With that in mind, a problem clearly emerges with the Dio/Flores dictum. The
ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive
element of the crime of theft. It finds no support or extension in Article 308, whether
as a descriptive or operative element of theft or as the mens rea or actus reus of the
felony. To restate what this Court has repeatedly held: the elements of the crime of
theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be
taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the
taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of
the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. [90]
 Such factor runs immaterial to the statutory definition of theft, which is the
taking, with intent to gain, of personal property of another without the latters
consent. While the Dio/Flores dictum is considerate to the mindset of the offender,
the statutory definition of theft considers only the perspective of intent to gain on the
part of the offender, compounded by the deprivation of property on the part of the
victim.

For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in

the frustrated stage, the question is again, when is the crime of theft produced? There
would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there
is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain.
Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the
offender, once having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable
to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone
has already ensued from such acts of execution. This conclusion is reflected in Chief
Justice Aquinos commentaries, as earlier cited, that [i]n theft or robbery the crime is
consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to
appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated. [91]

It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the
property stolen delves into the concept of taking itself, in that there could be no true
taking until the actor obtains such degree of control over the stolen item. But even if
this were correct, the effect would be to downgrade the crime to its attempted, and
not frustrated stage, for it would mean that not all the acts of execution have not been
completed, the taking not having been accomplished. Perhaps this point could serve
as fertile ground for future discussion, but our concern now is whether there is indeed
a crime of frustrated theft, and such consideration proves ultimately immaterial to
that question. Moreover, such issue will not apply to the facts of this particular case.
We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was
completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the
stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop
these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a taxicab.

Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is

deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even
if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. [92] And long ago, we asserted
in People v. Avila:[93]

x x x [T]he most fundamental notion in the crime of theft is the taking of

the thing to be appropriated into the physical power of the thief, which
idea is qualified by other conditions, such as that the taking must be
effected animo lucrandi and without the consent of the owner; and it will
be here noted that the definition does not require that the taking should be
effected against the will of the owner but merely that it should be without
his consent, a distinction of no slight importance.[94]

Insofar as we consider the present question, unlawful taking is most material

in this respect. Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal property,
is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same
time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be
attempted theft, if at all.

With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted
or consummated.

Neither Dio nor Flores can convince us otherwise. Both fail to consider that
once the offenders therein obtained possession over the stolen items, the effect of
the felony has been produced as there has been deprivation of property. The
presumed inability of the offenders to freely dispose of the stolen property does not
negate the fact that the owners have already been deprived of their right to possession
upon the completion of the taking.

Moreover, as is evident in this case, the adoption of the rule that the inability
of the offender to freely dispose of the stolen property frustrates the theft would
introduce a convenient defense for the accused which does not reflect any legislated
intent,[95] since the Court would have carved a viable means for offenders to seek a
mitigated penalty under applied circumstances that do not admit of easy
classification. It is difficult to formulate definite standards as to when a stolen item
is susceptible to free disposal by the thief. Would this depend on the psychological
belief of the offender at the time of the commission of the crime, as implied in Dio?
 Or, more likely, the appreciation of several classes of factual circumstances
such as the size and weight of the property, the location of the property, the number
and identity of people present at the scene of the crime, the number and identity of
people whom the offender is expected to encounter upon fleeing with the stolen
property, the manner in which the stolen item had been housed or stored; and quite
frankly, a whole lot more. Even the fungibility or edibility of the stolen item would
come into account, relevant as that would be on whether such property is capable of
free disposal at any stage, even after the taking has been consummated.

All these complications will make us lose sight of the fact that beneath all the
colorful detail, the owner was indeed deprived of property by one who intended to
produce such deprivation for reasons of gain. For such will remain the presumed fact
if frustrated theft were recognized, for therein, all of the acts of execution, including
the taking, have been completed. If the facts establish the non-completion of the
taking due to these peculiar circumstances, the effect could be to downgrade the
crime to the attempted stage, as not all of the acts of execution have been performed.
But once all these acts have been executed, the taking has been completed, causing
the unlawful deprivation of property, and ultimately the consummation of the theft.

Maybe the Dio/Flores rulings are, in some degree, grounded in common

sense. Yet they do not align with the legislated framework of the crime of theft. The
Revised Penal Code provisions on theft have not been designed in such fashion as
to accommodate said rulings. Again, there is no language in Article 308 that
expressly or impliedly allows that the free disposition of the items stolen is in any
way determinative of whether the crime of theft has been produced. Dio itself did
not rely on Philippine laws or jurisprudence to bolster its conclusion, and the
later Flores was ultimately content in relying on Dio alone for legal support. These
cases do not enjoy the weight of stare decisis, and even if they did, their erroneous
appreciation of our law on theft leave them susceptible to reversal. The same holds
true of Empilis, a regrettably stray decision which has not since found favor from
this Court.
 We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of
frustrated theft. As petitioner has latched the success of his appeal on our acceptance
of the Dio and Flores rulings, his petition must be denied, for we decline to adopt
said rulings in our jurisdiction. That it has taken all these years for us to recognize
that there can be no frustrated theft under the Revised Penal Code does not detract
from the correctness of this conclusion. It will take considerable amendments to our
Revised Penal Code in order that frustrated theft may be recognized. Our deference
to Viada yields to the higher reverence for legislative intent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 151258
Respondent.
x-------------------------x

GERARDA H. VILLA,
Petitioner,

- versus -
G.R. No. 154954

MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA

II, MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN
RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ
SARUCA, JR., and ANSELMO
ADRIANO,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 155101

 G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
February 1, 2012

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

SERENO, J.:
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo Lenny Villa the victim in this case
on 10 February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing. [1] Due in
large part to the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were
organized, condemning his senseless and tragic death. This widespread
condemnation prompted Congress to enact a special law, which became effective in
1995, that would criminalize hazing.[2] The intent of the law was to discourage
members from making hazing a requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity,
organization, or association.[3] Moreover, the law was meant to counteract the
exculpatory implications of consent and initial innocent act in the conduct of
initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala prohibita.[4]

Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the
country.[5] Within a year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths
emerged those of Frederick Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul
Camaligan of San Beda College; Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in
Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito
Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; and Joselito Hernandez of the
University of the Philippines in Baguio City. [6]

Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case
the general condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe
a fundamental principle in our criminal justice system [N]o act constitutes a crime
unless it is made so by law.[7] Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act
is viewed by a large section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot be
considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the
law, judges are called upon to set aside emotion, to resist being swayed by strong
public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on the elements of the offense and the
facts allowed in evidence.

Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258
(Villareal v. People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No.
155101 (Dizon v. People), and G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).

FACTS
The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)[8] and the
trial court,[9] are as follows:

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila

University School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris
Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They were Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel Sam
Belleza, Bienvenido Bien Marquez III, Roberto Francis Bert Navera, Geronimo
Randy Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo Lenny Villa (neophytes).

On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members
of the Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all
proceeded to Rufos Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house
of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect
during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical
beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled
to last for three days. After their briefing, they were brought to the Almeda
Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.

Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats
and insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and
walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans
delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional
forms of Aquilan initiation rites. These rites included the Indian Run, which required
the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering
blows to the neophytes; the Bicol Express, which obliged the neophytes to sit on the
floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans
walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the Rounds, in which the neophytes were
held at the back of their pants by the auxiliaries (the Aquilans charged with the duty
of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter were being
hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two Aquilans;
and the Auxies Privilege Round, in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity
to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were also
indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.

On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were made
to present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to
memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Whenever they would give a
wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the
Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically
and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing
that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for
the day officially ended.

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members[10] Fidelito

Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be
reopened. The head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused.
Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites.
The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes
to paddling and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle
blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The
neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After
their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be
carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was
officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the
carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys

shivering and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these
rumblings, as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that
Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They
removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When
his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35
Aquilans:

In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)

1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)

26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)

In Criminal Case No. C-38340

1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
 8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)

Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were

jointly tried.[11] On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in
Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to
be resolved first.[12]

On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No.
C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code.[13] A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29
November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine
accused commenced anew.[14]

On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)[15] set aside the finding of
conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the
criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation.
Accused De Leon had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied only
to the remaining 25 accused, viz:

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban, Lledo,

Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim,
Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas,
and Brigola (Victorino et al.) were acquitted, as their individual guilt
was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama,

Antonio Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were
found guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20
days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of
the victim the sum of ₱30,000 as indemnity.

3. Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizon and Artemio

Villareal were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Having found
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an
 indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years
of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of ₱50,000 and to pay the
additional amount of ₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.

On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the
charge against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy
trial.[16]Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial
court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca,
and Adriano.[17]On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 &
90153[18] reversed the trial courts Orders and dismissed the criminal case against
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to
speedy trial.[19]

From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were
individually brought before this Court.

G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

The instant case refers to accused Villareals Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly
committed by the CA in its Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520
first, denial of due process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable
doubt.[20]

While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner
Villareal filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the
Notice, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the
subject matter of the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the death
of the accused.

G.R. No. 155101 Dizon v. People

Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning
the CAs Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in
CA-G.R. No. 15520.[21] Petitioner sets forth two main issues first, that he was denied
due process when the CA sustained the trial courts forfeiture of his right to present
evidence; and, second, that he was deprived of due process when the CA did not
apply to him the same ratio decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other
accused.[22]

As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizons
right to present evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present
evidence on an earlier date since a co-accused, Antonio General, no longer presented
separate evidence during trial. According to Dizon, his right should not have been
considered as waived because he was justified in asking for a postponement. He
argues that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact
insisted that he was ready to present
evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.

Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise
been acquitted, like the other accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional
initiation rites and were not tainted by evil motives. [23] He claims that the additional
paddling session was part of the official activity of the fraternity. He also points out
that one of the neophytes admitted that the chairperson of the initiation rites decided
that [Lenny] was fit enough to undergo the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to
do the paddling.[24]Further, petitioner echoes the argument of the Solicitor General
that the individual blows inflicted by Dizon and Villareal could not have resulted in
Lennys death.[25] The Solicitor General purportedly averred that, on the contrary, Dr.
Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could not be considered fatal if
taken individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the violent death of the
victim.[26]

Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill
will. He claims that Lennys father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizons
father, since the latter did not have a car, and their fathers did not work in the same
place or office. Revenge for the loss of the parking space was the alleged ill motive
of Dizon. According to petitioner, his utterances regarding a stolen parking space
were only part of the psychological initiation. He then cites the testimony of Lennys
co-neophyte witness Marquez who admitted knowing it was not true and that he was
just making it up.[27]

Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated
by his show of concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the
testimony of one of the neophytes, who mentioned that the former had kicked the
leg of the neophyte and told him to switch places with Lenny to prevent the latters
chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon, together with Victorino, helped Lenny
through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair. According to petitioner, his
alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of compassion and
concern for the victims well-being.

G.R. No. 154954 People v. Court of Appeals

This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CAs Decision
dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520,
insofar as it acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the
accused Aquilans of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries. [28] According to the
Solicitor General, the CA erred in holding that there could have been no conspiracy
to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity initiation had not yet been criminalized at
the time Lenny died.

In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have
been upheld, inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical
injuries on Lenny. Since the injuries led to the victims death, petitioner posits that
the accused Aquilans are criminally liable for the resulting crime of homicide,
pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code. [29] The said article provides:
Criminal liability shall be incurred [b]y any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.

Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable.

According to the Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial courts finding of
conspiracy and in ruling that the criminal liability of
all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the commission of
the crime.

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona

Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for
the reversal of the CAs Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17
May 2007 in CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 and 90153.[30] The Petition involves the
dismissal of the criminal charge filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.

Due to several pending incidents, the trial court ordered a separate trial for
accused Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S.
Fernandez, and Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence after
proceedings against the 26 other accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall
have terminated. On 8 November 1993, the trial court found the 26 accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340
involving the nine other co-accused recommenced on 29 November 1993. For
various reasons, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005,
or almost 12 years after the arraignment of the nine accused.

Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9
accused, namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the
accused failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time.
She also points out that the prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original
records and the required evidence were not at its disposal, but were still in the
appellate court.

We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five.

ISSUES
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizons right to present evidence constitutes
denial of due process;

2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos,
Saruca, and Adrianofor violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial;

3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court
and adjudicated the liability of each accused according to individual
participation;
4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced
Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.

DISCUSSION

Resolution on Preliminary Matters

G.R. No. 151258 Villareal v. People

In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending
resolution, this Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death of Party.
 According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for
personal penalties is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast,
criminal liability for pecuniary penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to
final judgment. The term personal penalties refers to the service of personal or
imprisonment penalties,[31] while the term pecuniary penalties (las pecuniarias)
refers to fines and costs,[32] including civil liability predicated on the criminal offense
complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).[33] However, civil liability based on a
source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the accused and is
recoverable through a separate civil action.[34]

Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal
liability for both personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability
directly arising from the delict complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby
dismissed, and the criminal case against him deemed closed and terminated.

G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)

In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception
of evidence for accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and
the 5thand 12 of October 1993.[35] The Order likewise stated that it will not entertain
any postponement and that all the accused who have not yet presented their
respective evidence should be ready at all times down the line, with their evidence
on all said dates. Failure on their part to present evidence when required shall
therefore be construed as waiver to present evidence.[36]

However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open

court that his client Antonio General would no longer present separate evidence.
Instead, the counsel would adopt the testimonial evidence of the other accused who
had already testified.[37] Because of this development and pursuant to the trial courts
Order that the parties should be ready at all times down the line, the trial court
expected Dizon to present evidence on the next trial date 25 August 1993 instead of
his originally assigned dates. The original dates were supposed to start two weeks
later, or on 8 September 1993.[38] Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to present
evidence on the accelerated date. To address the situation, counsel filed
a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to appear in a previously
scheduled case, and that he would be ready to present evidence on the dates
originally assigned to his clients.[39] The trial court denied the Manifestation on the
same date and treated the Constancia as a motion for postponement, in violation of
the three-day-notice rule under the Rules of Court.[40] Consequently, the trial court
ruled that the failure of Dizon to present evidence amounted to a waiver of that
right.[41]
 Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of
law when the trial court forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him,
the postponement of the 25 August 1993 hearing should have been considered
justified, since his original pre-assigned trial dates were not supposed to start until 8
September 1993, when he was scheduled to present evidence. He posits that he was
ready to present evidence on the dates assigned to him. He also points out that he
did not ask for a resetting of any of the said hearing dates; that he in fact insisted on
being allowed to present evidence on the dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he
contends that the trial court erred in accelerating the schedule of presentation of
evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt.

The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the
Constitution itself.[42] Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel This constitutional right includes the right to present evidence in ones
defense,[43] as well as the right to be present and defend oneself in person at every
stage of the proceedings.[44]

In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,[45] the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the

defenses presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995
hearing was cancelled due to lack of quorum in the regular membership of the
Sandiganbayans Second Division and upon the agreement of the parties. The hearing
was reset for the next day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel failed to
attend. The Sandiganbayan, on the very same day, issued an Order directing the
issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Crisostomo and the confiscation of his surety
bond. The Order further declared that he had waived his right to present evidence
because of his nonappearance at yesterdays and todays scheduled hearings. In ruling
against the Order, we held thus:
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of
Court, Crisostomos non-appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely
a waiver of his right to be present for trial on such date only and not for the
succeeding trial dates

xxxxxxxxx

Moreover, Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not

have been deemed as a waiver of his right to present evidence. While
constitutional rights may be waived, such waiver must be clear and must be
coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not
voluntarily waive in person or even through his counsel the right to present
evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the
prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel.
 In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the
present case, the court is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally
made aware of the consequences of a waiver of the right to present evidence.
In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the consequences
of another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. The court must first explain
to the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a
waiver. Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply went
ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to present evidence without even allowing
Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing.

Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case

involving a grave penalty is not assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the
accused and his counsel is indispensable so that the court could personally conduct
a searching inquiry into the waiver x x x.[46] (Emphasis supplied)

The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present
evidence on 25 August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the
contrary, it should have considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since
counsel for another accused General had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial
evidence that freed up the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled
to testify until two weeks later. At any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing
dates for the reception of evidence. If it really wanted to impose its Order strictly,
the most it could have done was to forfeit one out of the five days set for Dizons
testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-assigned trial dates
constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process.

Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver

of the right to present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding
of guilt in the criminal case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial
court.[47] In People v. Bodoso, we ruled that where facts have adequately been
represented in a criminal case, and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has
prejudiced either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the
rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be upheld if the judgment is supported
beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record. [48]

We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to

resolve the case at bar. Neither can we see any procedural unfairness or irregularity
that would substantially prejudice either the prosecution or the defense as a result of
the invalid waiver. In fact, the arguments set forth by accused Dizon in his Petition
corroborate the material facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what he is really
contesting in his Petition is the application of the law to the facts by the trial court
and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits direct participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa
by alleging in his Petition that all actions of the petitioner were part of the traditional
rites, and that the alleged extension of the initiation rites was not outside the official
activity of the fraternity.[49] He even argues that Dizon did not request for the
extension and he participated only after the activity was sanctioned. [50]

For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one
judge or justice to another at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme
Court. Remanding the case for the reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon
would only inflict further injustice on the parties. This case has been going on for
almost two decades. Its resolution is long overdue. Since the key facts necessary to
decide the case have already been determined, we shall proceed to decide it.

G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)

Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Adriano should not have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to
speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She points out that the accused failed
to raise a protest during the dormancy of the criminal case against them, and that
they asserted their right only after the trial court had dismissed the case against their
co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also emphasizes that the trial court denied the
respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano,
because it found that the prosecution could not be faulted for the delay in the
movement of this case when the original records and the evidence it may require
were not at its disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals. [51]

The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2)
and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.[52] This right requires that there be a trial
free from vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays.[53] The right is deemed violated
when the proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a
long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause
or justifiable motive.[54] In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts
should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements
of the scheduled hearings of the case.[55] The conduct of both the prosecution and the
defense must be weighed.[56] Also to be considered are factors such as the length of
delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the right, and the prejudice wrought upon the
defendant.[57]
 We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case
pursuant to the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal. [58] As
a consequence, an appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a
violation of the principle of double jeopardy.[59] As we have previously discussed,
however, where the dismissal of the case is capricious, certiorari lies.[60] The rule on
double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition challenges the validity of the order
of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.[61] Rather, grave abuse of discretion
amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents double jeopardy
from attaching.[62]

We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CAs dismissal of the case
against accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation
of their right to speedy trial. The court held thus:
An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the
following factors contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case
below:

xxxxxxxxx

5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals
and the prosecutions failure to comply with the order of the court a quo
requiring them to secure certified true copies of the same.

xxxxxxxxx

While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that
contributed to the delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless
hold that their right to speedy trial has been utterly violated in this case x x x.

xxxxxxxxx

[T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the
records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions
failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring it to secure
certified true copies of the same. What is glaring from the records is the fact that
as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo already issued an Order requiring
the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to secure the complete records
of the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not comply with the
said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in an Order
dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of the
prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied with. It appears,
however, that even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the
 disposal of the trial court because the lack of it was made the basis of the said
court in granting the motion to dismiss filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.

xxxxxxxxx

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002,
or for a period of almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of
the court a quo. Except for the pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the
petitioners, the latest of which was on January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner
Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August 17, 1998 which the court did not act
upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable length of time. This
prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the constitution
frowns upon x x x.[63] (Emphasis supplied)

This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was
filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon,
Concepcion, and De Vera.[64] On 29 November 1993, they were all
arraigned.[65] Unfortunately, the initial trial of the case did not commence until 28
March 2005 or almost 12 years after arraignment.[66]

As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or

inactivity of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the
accused amounts to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases a clear violation
of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of cases. [67] Thus, we held:
The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in
the disposition of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found
the delay of six years by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints
to be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition
of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the Ombudsman, where the Court held
that the delay of almost six years disregarded the Ombudsman's duty to act
promptly on complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs. Sandiganbayan, where
the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not
quashing the information which was filed six years after the initiatory
complaint was filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case. So it must be in the instant case, where the
reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on for a decade
already.[68] (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP

No. 89060 that accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there
is nothing in the records that would show that the subject of this Petition includes
accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall
be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.

G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals)

The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It
dictates that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated
either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused the accused cannot again be charged with the same or an identical
offense.[69] This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and
conscience.[70] It is embodied in the civil law maxim non bis in idem found in the
common law of England and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence.[71] It
found expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the United States, and
in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen, [72] viz:
Article III Bill of Rights

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular
constitutional right, provides as follows:[73]
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. When an accused has
been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon
a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge,
the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar
to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the
judgment in order to reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either
through a regular appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal
by certiorari on pure questions of law under Rule 45 of the same Rules. [74] The
requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the following: (a) there is a valid
complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent court; (c) the defendant
pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case
against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the defendants
express consent.[75]

As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, [a] verdict

of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal,
even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense.
The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents
the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear
out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the
additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively
retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents
the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of
securing a greater penalty.[76] We further stressed that an acquitted defendant is
entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his
acquittal.[77]

This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower
courts acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in
the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due
process;[78] (2) where there is a finding of mistrial;[79] or (3) where there has been a
grave abuse of discretion.[80]

The third instance refers to this Courts judicial power under Rule 65 to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.[81] Here, the party asking for the review must show the presence of a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a
patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law;
an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility;[82] or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe as to
deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice. [83] In such an event, the
accused cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.[84]

The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the
reversal of (1) the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et
al. for the lesser crime of slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a
misappreciation of facts and evidence. According to the Petition, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law because private complainant and
petitioner were denied due process of law when the public respondent completely
ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial Reconsideration x x x
and c) the petitioners Comment x x x. [85] Allegedly, the CA ignored evidence when
it adopted the theory of individual responsibility; set aside the finding of conspiracy
by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.[86] The
Solicitor General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only
by Dizon and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villas consent to
hazing.[87]

In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and
reweigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.[88] In People v.
Maquiling, we held that grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court
simply because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the evidence.[89] Mere errors
of judgment are correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, and not by an application for a writ of certiorari.[90] Therefore,
pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we are constrained to deny the
Petition contra Victorino et al. the 19 acquitted fraternity members.

We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda,
and Bantug the four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.

Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy
similarly applies when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the
accused.[91]We have also recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to correct
an abusive judgment upon a clear demonstration that the lower court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice.[92] The present case is one of those instances of grave abuse of discretion.

In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda,

and Bantug, the CA reasoned thus:
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of
the fatal wounds inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries
sustained by the victim as a result of the physical punishment heaped on him
were serious in nature. However, by reason of the death of the victim, there can
be no precise means to determine the duration of the incapacity or the medical
attendance required. To do so, at this stage would be merely speculative. In a
 prosecution for this crime where the category of the offense and the severity of the
penalty depend on the period of illness or incapacity for labor, the length of this
period must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in much the same manner
as the same act charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950].
And when proof of the said period is absent, the crime committed should be
deemed only as slight physical injuries [People v. De los Santos, CA, 59 O.G.
4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 Phil. 398]. As such, this Court is constrained to
rule that the injuries inflicted by the appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug,
Jr., are only slight and not serious, in nature.[93] (Emphasis supplied and citations
included)

The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa[94] in finding that
the four accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to
the CA, because of the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to
determine the duration of the incapacity or medical attendance required. [95] The
reliance on Penesa was utterly misplaced. A review of that case would reveal that
the accused therein was guilty merely of slight physical injuries, because the victims
injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor required medical
attendance.[96] Furthermore, he did not die.[97] His injuries were not even
serious.[98] Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered
physical injuries and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable.

On the contrary, the CAs ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and
Bantug were liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own
findings of fact. According to the court, the four accused were found to
have inflicted more than the usual punishment undertaken during such initiation
rites on the person of Villa.[99] It then adopted the NBI medico-legal officers findings
that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villas death was the multiple traumatic injuries
he suffered from the initiation rites.[100]Considering that the CA found that
the physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in nature,[101] it
was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical
injuries, which is a light felony.

Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be
liable for the consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended.
Thus, once a person is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the
unlawful infliction of physical injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts
are required to automatically apply the legal framework governing the destruction
of life. This rule is mandatory, and not subject to discretion.
 The CAs application of the legal framework governing physical injuries
punished under Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for
culpable felonies is therefore tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive
exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. According to the Revised
Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable penalty in case the victim dies
should be based on the framework governing the destruction of the life of a person,
punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for
culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that
these two types of felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each other,
in that the accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual
death occurs.[102]

Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon as if only their acts,
in and of themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa is contrary to the CAs own
findings. From proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the
multiple injuries he suffered,[103] the only logical conclusion is that criminal
responsibility should redound to all those who have been proven to have directly
participated in the infliction of physical injuries on Lenny. The accumulation of
bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest. Accordingly, we find that
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight
physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we
therefore give due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.

Resolution on Ultimate Findings

According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a
crime, the intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a
felonious act under Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling
against the accused, the court a quo found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, the accused fraternity members were guilty of homicide, as it
was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the physical injuries they had
intentionally inflicted.[104]

The CA modified the trial courts finding of criminal liability. It ruled that
there could have been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had
knowingly consented to the conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The
accused fraternity members, therefore, were liable only for the consequences of their
individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the accused Victorino et al. were acquitted; 4 of
them Tecson et al. were found guilty of slight physical injuries; and the remaining 2
Dizon and Villareal were found guilty of homicide.

The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the
perpetrator clearly commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage
over, to harm maliciously, or to get even with, the victim. Rather, the case involves
an ex ante situation in which a man driven by his own desire to join a society of men
pledged to go through physically and psychologically strenuous admission rituals,
just so he could enter the fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how our criminal
laws apply to such situation absent the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to
make a brief exposition on the underlying concepts shaping intentional felonies, as
well as on the nature of physical and psychological initiations widely known as
hazing.

Intentional Felony and Conspiracy

Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought.[105] The
classical theory posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an
absolute free will to choose between good and evil.[106] It asserts that one should only
be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears
unimpaired.[107]The basic postulate of the classical penal system is that humans are
rational and calculating beings who guide their actions with reference to the
principles of pleasure and pain.[108] They refrain from criminal acts if threatened with
punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible gain or advantage in committing
the crime.[109] Here, criminal liability is thus based on the free will and moral blame
of the actor.[110] The identity of mens rea defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or
wrongful purpose or criminal intent is the predominant consideration. [111] Thus, it is
not enough to do what the law prohibits.[112] In order for an intentional felony to
exist, it is necessary that the act be committed by means of dolo or malice.[113]

The term dolo or malice is a complex idea involving the elements

of freedom, intelligence, and intent.[114] The first element, freedom, refers to an act
done with deliberation and with power to choose between two things.[115] The second
element, intelligence, concerns the ability to determine the morality of human acts,
as well as the capacity to distinguish between a licit and an illicit act.[116] The last
element, intent, involves an aim or a determination to do a certain act. [117]

The element of intent on which this Court shall focus is described as the state
of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.[118] It refers to the purpose
of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.[119] It does not refer to
mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result of the
act.[120] While motive is the moving power that impels one to action for a definite
result, intent is the purpose of using a particular means to produce the result. [121] On
the other hand, the term felonious means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or
proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.[122] With these elements taken together,
the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which
is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated
otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus that the act or
omission be done willfully, maliciously, with deliberate evil intent, and with malice
aforethought.[123] The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is
innocent.[124] As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of
malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. [125]

In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy

to attach. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that conspiracy exists
when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it is to be interpreted to refer only to felonies committed
by means of doloor malice. The phrase coming to an agreement connotes the
existence of a prefaced intent to cause injury to another, an element present only in
intentional felonies. In culpable felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted
on another is unintentional, the wrong done being simply the result of an act
performed without malice or criminal design.[126] Here, a person performs an initial
lawful deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack of foresight, or lack of
skill, the deed results in a wrongful act.[127] Verily, a deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a
felony committed by means of culpa.[128]

The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital

ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of
homicide.[129] Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of
malice or dolo[130] immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of
injuries.[131] Intent to kill or animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred,
unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.[132] Furthermore, the
victims death must not have been the product of accident, natural cause, or
suicide.[133] If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent
but with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence the act must be qualified as
reckless or simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.[134]
Hazing and other forms of initiation rites

The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.[135] It is said

that, throughout history, hazing in some form or another has been associated with
organizations ranging from military groups to indigenous tribes.[136] Some say that
elements of hazing can be traced back to the Middle Ages, during which new
students who enrolled in European universities worked as servants for
upperclassmen.[137] It is believed that the concept of hazing is rooted in ancient
Greece,[138] where young men recruited into the military were tested with pain or
challenged to demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the recruits for
battle.[139] Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these
values of ancient Greek civilization.[140] According to a scholar, this concept lends
historical legitimacy to a tradition or ritual whereby prospective members are asked
to prove their worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which they seek to attain
membership through hazing.[141]

Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student
wishing to join an organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for
a particular chapter.[142] The neophyte period is usually one to two semesters
long.[143] During the program, neophytes are required to interview and to get to know
the active members of the chapter; to learn chapter history; to understand the
principles of the organization; to maintain a specified grade point average; to
participate in the organizations activities; and to show dignity and respect for their
fellow neophytes, the organization, and its active and alumni members. [144] Some
chapters require the initiation activities for a recruit to involve hazing acts during the
entire neophyte stage.[145]

Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that

serves as prerequisite for admission to an organization. [146] In hazing, the recruit,
pledge, neophyte, initiate, applicant or any other term by which the organization may
refer to such a person is generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating situations,
like being forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or activities.[147] It
encompasses different forms of conduct that humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically
endanger those who desire membership in the organization.[148] These acts usually
involve physical or psychological suffering or injury.[149]
 The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than
a century ago, our national hero Andres Bonifacio organized a secret society
named Kataastaasan Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The
Highest and Most Venerable Association of the Sons and Daughters of the
Nation).[150] The Katipunan, or KKK, started as a small confraternity believed to be
inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by confraternities or sodalities
approved by the Catholic Church.[151] The Katipunans ideology was brought home
to each member through the societys initiation ritual.[152] It is said that initiates were
brought to a dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and were asked a series
of
questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve. [153] They were
made to go through vigorous trials such as pagsuot sa isang lungga or [pagtalon] sa
balon.[154] It would seem that they were also made to withstand the blow
of pangherong bakal sa pisngi and to endure a matalas na punyal.[155] As a final step
in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign membership papers with the
his own blood.[156]

It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the

Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be seen in the following
instances, the manner of hazing in the United States was jarringly similar to that
inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity on Lenny Villa.

Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth

classmen to do exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent
physical damage; to eat or drink unpalatable foods; and in various ways to humiliate
themselves.[157] In 1901, General Douglas MacArthur got involved in a
congressional investigation of hazing at the academy during his second year at West
Point.[158]

In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-

victim was injured during the shriners hazing event, which was part of the initiation
ceremonies for Hejaz membership.[159] The ritual involved what was known as the
mattress-rotating barrel trick.[160] It required each candidate to slide down an eight
to nine-foot-high metal board onto connected mattresses leading to a barrel, over
which the candidate was required to climb.[161] Members of Hejaz would stand on
each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-paddle candidates en route to the
barrel.[162]
 In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune,
North Carolina, were seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper
jump wings directly onto the neophyte paratroopers chests.[163] The victims were
shown writhing and crying out in pain as others pounded the spiked medals through
the shirts and into the chests of the victims.[164]

In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University

chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a pledgeship
program.[165] The fraternity members subjected the pledges to repeated physical
abuse including repeated, open-hand strikes at the nape, the chest, and the back;
caning of the bare soles of the feet and buttocks; blows to the back with the use of a
heavy book and a cookie sheet while the pledges were on their hands and knees;
various kicks and punches to the body; and body slamming, an activity in which
active members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air and dropped them to the
ground.[166] The fraternity members then put the pledges through a seven-station
circle of physical abuse.[167]

In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing

by fraternity members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in
Alabama.[168]The hazing included the following: (1) having to dig a ditch and jump
into it after it had been filled with water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit;
(2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) being pushed and kicked, often onto
walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like peppers, hot sauce, butter, and
yerks (a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans, and other items); (5) doing
chores for the fraternity and its members, such as cleaning the fraternity house and
yard, being designated as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing regularly at 2
a.m. meetings, during which the pledges would be hazed for a couple of hours; and
(7) running the gauntlet, during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit as
they ran down a hallway and descended down a flight of stairs. [169]

In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim Sylvester
Lloyd was accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi
Alpha Fraternity.[170] He participated in initiation activities, which included various
forms of physical beatings and torture, psychological coercion and
embarrassment.[171]

In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim

suffered injuries from hazing activities during the fraternitys initiation
rites.[172] Kenner and the other initiates went through psychological and physical
hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks for more than 200 times.[173]
 In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones a university student in Florida sought
initiation into the campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-
06 academic year.[174] The pledges efforts to join the fraternity culminated in a series
of initiation rituals conducted in four nights. Jones, together with other candidates,
was blindfolded, verbally harassed, and caned on his face and buttocks. [175] In these
rituals described as preliminaries, which lasted for two evenings, he received
approximately 60 canings on his buttocks.[176] During the last two days of the hazing,
the rituals intensified.[177] The pledges sustained roughly 210 cane strikes during the
four-night initiation.[178] Jones and several other candidates passed out.[179]

The purported raison dtre behind hazing practices is the proverbial birth by
fire, through which the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his
or her worth.[180] Some organizations even believe that hazing is the path to
enlightenment. It is said that this process enables the organization to establish unity
among the pledges and, hence, reinforces and ensures the future of
the organization.[181] Alleged benefits of joining include leadership opportunities;
improved academic performance; higher self-esteem; professional networking
opportunities; and the esprit dcorp associated with close, almost filial, friendship
and common cause.[182]

Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.

The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in
the military.[183] The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so
prevalent that Congress prohibited all forms of military hazing, harmful or not.[184] It
was not until 1901 that Illinois passed the first state anti-hazing law, criminalizing
conduct whereby any one sustains an injury to his [or her] person therefrom. [185]

However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts
of the Committee to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar
organizations, that states increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting and/or
criminalizing hazing.[186] As of 2008, all but six states had enacted criminal or civil
statutes proscribing hazing.[187]Most anti-hazing laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a
misdemeanor and carry relatively light consequences for even the most severe
situations.[188] Only a few states with anti-hazing laws consider hazing as a felony in
case death or great bodily harm occurs.[189]
 Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing
that results in death or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony. [190] In a Class 4
felony, a sentence of imprisonment shall be for a term of not less than one year and
not more than three years.[191] Indiana criminal law provides that a person who
recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits criminal
recklessness, a Class D felony.[192]

The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly

weapon.[193] As an element of a Class C felony criminal recklessness resulting in
serious bodily injury, death falls under the category of serious bodily injury. [194] A
person who commits a Class C felony is imprisoned for a fixed term of between two
(2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4) years.[195] Pursuant
to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, unless the act creates a substantial
risk to the life of the student or prospective member, in which case it becomes a
Class C felony.[196] A Class C felony provides for an imprisonment term not to
exceed seven years.[197]

In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony. [198] An
individual adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state
jail for any term of not more than two years or not less than 180 days.[199] Under
Utah law, if hazing results in serious bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a third-
degree felony.[200] A person who has been convicted of a third-degree felony may be
sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to exceed five years.[201] West Virginia law
provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise be deemed a felony, the hazer may
be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties provided therefor. [202] In Wisconsin,
a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing results in the death of another. [203] A
Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed
10 years, or both.[204]

In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies,
as there was no hazing statute.[205] This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma
Nu General Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballous family resorted to a civil action for
wrongful death, since there was no anti-hazing statute in South Carolina until
1994.[206]

The existence of animus interficendi or intent to

kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt
 The presence of an ex ante situation in this case, fraternity initiation rites does
not automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is
proven beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were equipped with a guilty
mind whether or not there is a contextual background or factual premise they are
still criminally liable for intentional felony.

The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that with
the exception of Villareal and Dizon accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did
not have the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes.
We shall no longer disturb this finding.

As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court
and found that the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny
Villa, not merely to inflict physical injuries on him. It justified its finding of
homicide against Dizon by holding that he had apparently been motivated by ill will
while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating that his fathers parking space had been
stolen by the victims father.[207] As to Villareal, the court said that the accused
suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the neophytes, to have had a
hand in the death of Villareals brother.[208] The CA then ruled as follows:
The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very
clear that they acted with evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is
unrebutted and so for the death of Villa, appellants Dizon and Villareal must and
should face the consequence of their acts, that is, to be held liable for the crime
of homicide.[209] (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.

The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to

determine the existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context
in which the supposed utterances were made, the Court deems it necessary to
reproduce the relevant portions of witness Marquezs testimony:
Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngis] room and we were briefed as
to what to expect during the next three days and we were told
the members of the fraternity and their batch and we were also
told about the fraternity song, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngis] house and we were made to
ride a van and we were brought to another place in Kalookan
City which I later found to be the place of Mariano Almeda, sir.
 xxxxxxxxx

Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to link our
arms and then the driver of the van and other members of the
Aquilans who were inside left us inside the van, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, Villa akin ka,
Asuncion Patay ka and the people outside pound the van,
rock the van, sir.

Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a voice
these remarks uttered upon your arrival?

Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of excitement in their
voices, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through and
through, what were the voices or utterances that you heard?

Witness Villa akin ka, Asuncion patay ka, Recinto patay ka sa amin, etc., sir.

Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue during
the rocking of the van which lasted for 5 minutes?

xxxxxxxxx

Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing voices, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were being
inflicted, was there any utterances by anybody?

Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and some were
encouraging others who were pounding and beating us, it
was just like a fiesta atmosphere, actually some of them
enjoyed looking us being pounded, sir.

Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard?
Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us whether matigas
pa yan, kayang-kaya pa niyan.

Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words that you
quote?

Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances

simultaneously, I could not really pin point who uttered those
words, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of this
Bicol Express?

Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances.

Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the
utterances that you remember?

Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my thigh,
he would say that and I quote ito, yung pamilya nito ay
pinapatay yung kapatid ko, so that would in turn sort of
justifying him in inflicting more serious pain on me. So instead
of just walking, he would jump on my thighs and then after on
was Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect that this guy, his
father stole the parking space of my father, sir. So, thats why
he inflicted more pain on Villa and that went on, sir.

Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused?

Witness Boyet Dizon, sir.

Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of having
your family have his brother killed, what was your response?

Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was just making
it up sir. So he said that I knew nothing of that incident.
However, he just in fact after the Bicol Express, he kept on
uttering those words/statements so that it would in turn justify
him and to give me harder blows, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that Lenny
Villas father stole the parking space allotted for his father,
 do you recall who were within hearing distance when that
utterance was made?

Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were different
people who heard from time to time, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation against
Lenny Villas father was made?

Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us and
when Lenny Villas turn, I heard him uttered those
statements, sir.

Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villas father?

Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.

Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?

Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villas thighs and sometime he
stand up and he kicked his thighs and sometimes jumped at it,
sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You mentioned
also that accusations made by Dizon you or your family had
his brother killed, can you inform this Honorable Court
what exactly were the accusations that were charged against
you while inflicting blows upon you in particular?

Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I knew
that his family who had his brother killed, and he said that his
brother was an NPA, sir so I knew that it was just a story that
he made up and I said that I knew nothing about it and he
continued inflicting blows on me, sir. And another incident
was when a talk was being given, Dizon was on another part of
the pelota court and I was sort of looking and we saw that he was
drinking beer, and he said and I quote: Marquez, Marquez, ano
 ang tinitingin-tingin mo diyan, ikaw yung pamilya mo ang
nagpapatay sa aking kapatid, yari ka sa akin, sir.

Atty. Tadiar What else?

Witness Thats all, sir.

Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a
physician came around as promised to you earlier?

Witness No, sir.[210] (Emphasis supplied)

On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus:

Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez, have you
stated that there was a briefing that was conducted immediately
before your initiation as regards to what to expect during the
initiation, did I hear you right?

Witness Yes, sir.

Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?

Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino.

Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you to
expect during the initiation?

Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place, we

would be mocked at, sir.

Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc.,
and the likes?

Witness Yes, sir.

Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be physical
contact?

Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.

xxxxxxxxx

Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go back to
school. All the bruises would be limited to our arms and legs,
sir. So, if we wear the regular school uniforms like long sleeves,
 it would be covered actually so we have no thinking that our face
would be slapped, sir.

Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have bruises
on your body but that will be covered?

Witness Yes, sir.

JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you expect that
would create bruises to your body?

Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a paddling or
paddle, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the initiation
procedures is psychological in nature?

Witness Combination, sir.[211] (Emphasis supplied)

xxxxxxxxx

Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of physical
initiation, meaning body contact, is that correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological initiation,
correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things calculated to
terrify you, scare you, correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation
intended to, I repeat, terrify you, frighten you, scare you into
perhaps quitting the initiation, is this correct?

Witness Sometimes sir, yes.

Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he said
or he was supposed to have said according to you that your
 family were responsible for the killing of his brother who was
an NPA, do you remember saying that?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to you by Dizon
that you did not believe him because that is not true, correct?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps, the
purpose as I have mentioned before, terrifying you, scaring
you or frightening you into quitting the initiation, this is
correct?

Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why he was
saying those things was because he wanted to inflict injury.

Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception, correct?

Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to Villareal, he was
hitting me.

Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the same
forms of initiation by all the initiating masters? You said that
earlier, right?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or kicked
you said something similar as was told to you by Mr. Dizon?

Witness No, sir.

Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the
masters would run on your thighs, right?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the initiating
masters not only on you but also on the other neophytes?

Witness Yes, sir.

Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of initiation
was administered by one master, was also administered by
 one master on a neophyte, was also administered by another
master on the other neophyte, this is correct?

Witness Yes, sir.[212] (Emphasis supplied)

According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the
CA to Dizon and Villareal were baseless,[213] since the statements of the accused
were just part of the psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of
the neophytes; that [t]here is no element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido
Marquez; and that the harsh words uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are part of
tradition concurred and accepted by all the fraternity members during their initiation
rites.[214]

We agree with the Solicitor General.

The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of

substantial proportion on the part of the CA it mistook the utterances of Dizon for
those of Villareal. Such inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially because it was the
CAs primary basis for finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny Villa,
thereby making Villareal guilty of the intentional felony of homicide. To repeat,
according to Bienvenido Marquezs testimony, as reproduced above, it was Dizon
who uttered both accusations against Villa and Marquez; Villareal had no
participation whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by the CA. It was Boyet
Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquezs] thigh; and who told witness Marquez, [I]to,
yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko. It was also Dizon who jumped on
Villas thighs while saying, [T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father.
With the testimony clarified, we find that the CA had no basis for concluding the
existence of intent to kill based solely thereon.
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the
entire factual milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and
understand the testimony of witness Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were
briefed that they would be subjected to psychological pressure in order to scare them.
They knew that they would be mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. They heard
fraternity members shout, Patay ka, Recinto, Yari ka, Recinto, Villa, akin ka,
Asuncion, gulpi ka, Putang ina mo, Asuncion, Putang ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin,
or some other words to that effect.[215] While beating the neophytes, Dizon accused
Marquez of the death of the formers purported NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny
Villas father for stealing the parking space of Dizons father. According to the
Solicitor General, these statements, including those of the accused Dizon, were all
part of the psychological initiation employed by the Aquila Fraternity. [216]
 Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizons way of inflicting psychological
pressure was through hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted
the fictitious stories, so that he could justify giving the neophytes harder blows, all
in the context of fraternity initiation and role playing. Even one of the neophytes
admitted that the accusations were untrue and made-up.

The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of

hazing. In fact, during the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing
Law, former Senator Lina spoke as follows:
Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period of
interpellations on why we included the phrase or psychological pain and suffering.

xxxxxxxxx

So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit but
the recruit or neophyte is made to undergo certain acts which I already
described yesterday, like playing the Russian roulette extensively to test the
readiness and the willingness of the neophyte or recruit to continue his desire
to be a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar organizationor playing and
putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making the recruit or
neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the building facing outside, asking
him to jump outside after making him turn around several times but the reality is
that he will be made to jump towards the inside portion of the building these are
the mental or psychological tests that are resorted to by these organizations,
sororities or fraternities. The doctors who appeared during the public hearing
testified that such acts can result in some mental aberration, that they can even lead
to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what we want to prevent. [217] (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizons behavior must not be
automatically viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa.
Rather, it must be taken within the context of the fraternitys psychological initiation.
This Court points out that it was not even established whether the fathers of Dizon
and Villa really had any familiarity with each other as would lend credence to the
veracity of Dizons threats. The testimony of Lennys co-neophyte, Marquez, only
confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he knew it was not true and that [Dizon]
was just making it up.[218] Even the trial court did not give weight to the utterances
of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: [T]he cumulative acts of all the accused were
not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as part of the
fraternity initiation rites x x x.[219] The Solicitor General shares the same view.
 Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of
homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence
of intent to kill. Animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there
is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.[220] Instead, we adopt and reinstate
the finding of the trial court in part, insofar as it ruled that none of the
fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny Villa.[221]

The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious

intent to injure not proven beyond reasonable
doubt

The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict
physical injuries on Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor
General then posits that since all of the accused fraternity members conspired to
inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa and death ensued, all of them should be liable
for the crime of homicide pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to
266 of the Revised Penal Code,[222] the employment of physical injuries must be
coupled with dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious
intent is fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the
wrongdoer iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the
accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical
injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or
malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a
person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions.
Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt
act of inflicting physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and
intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself,
make a man guilty unless his intentions are.[223]

Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances[224] that the mere infliction of

physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically
liable for an intentional felony. In Bagajo v. People,[225] the accused teacher, using a
bamboo stick, whipped one of her students behind her legs and thighs as a form of
discipline. The student suffered lesions and bruises from the corporal punishment.
In reversing the trial courts finding of criminal liability for slight physical injuries,
this Court stated thus: Independently of any civil or administrative responsibility
[w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she had done with criminal intent the
means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will,
hatred or any malevolent intent. Considering the applicable laws, we then ruled that
as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of
whipping her pupil. In People v. Carmen,[226] the accused members of the religious
group known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima under the guise of a ritual
or treatment plunged the head of the victim into a barrel of water, banged his head
against a bench, pounded his chest with fists, and stabbed him on the side with a
kitchen knife, in order to cure him of nervous breakdown by expelling through those
means the bad spirits possessing him. The collective acts of the group caused the
death of the victim. Since malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the trial
courts finding of liability for murder under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and
instead ruled that the accused should be held criminally liable for reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 thereof.

Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accuseds initial acts of inflicting
physical pain on the neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a
felonious act punishable under the Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to
Article 4(1) thereof. In People v. Regato, we ruled that malicious intent must be
judged by the action, conduct, and external acts of the accused.[227] What persons do
is the best index of their intention.[228] We have also ruled that the method employed,
the kind of weapon used, and the parts of the body on which the injury was inflicted
may be determinative of the intent of the perpetrator.[229] The Court shall thus
examine the whole contextual background surrounding the death of Lenny Villa.

Lenny died during Aquilas fraternity initiation rites. The night before the
commencement of the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that
there would be physical beatings, that the whole event would last for three days, and
that they could quit anytime. On their first night, they were subjected to traditional
initiation rites, including the Indian Run, Bicol Express, Rounds, and the Auxies
Privilege Round. The beatings were predominantly directed at the neophytes arms
and legs.

In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present
comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and
recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once again
subjected to traditional initiation rituals. When the rituals were officially reopened
on the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to another
traditional ritual paddling by the fraternity.

During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes.
The auxiliaries protected the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and
shielding them from those who were designated to inflict physical and psychological
pain on the initiates.[230] It was their regular duty to stop foul or excessive physical
blows; to help the neophytes to pump their legs in order that their blood would
circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical activity or round; to serve
food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give them whatever they
needed.

These rituals were performed with Lennys consent.[231] A few days before the
rites, he asked both his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity. [232] His
father knew that Lenny would go through an initiation process and would be gone
for three days.[233] The CA found as follows:
It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to
undergo physical initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of
facts, they voluntarily agreed to join the initiation rites to become members of the
Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to the initiation, they were given briefings on what
to expect. It is of common knowledge that before admission in a fraternity, the
neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they were made aware that
traditional methods such as mocking, psychological tests and physical
punishment would take place. They knew that the initiation would involve
beatings and other forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and
opportunity to quit at any time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness
Navera testified that accused Tecson told him that after a week, you can already
play basketball. Prosecution witness Marquez for his part, admitted that he
knew that the initiates would be hit in the arms and legs, that a wooden paddle
would be used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms and legs.
Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation without consenting
neophytes.[234] (Emphasis supplied)

Even after going through Aquilas grueling traditional rituals during the first
day, Lenny continued his participation and finished the second day of initiation.

Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing
clear malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus
iniuriandi was not present in this case. Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking,
paddling, and other modes of inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily, freely,
and with intelligence, thereby satisfying the elements of freedom and intelligence in
the felony of physical injuries, the fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the contrary, all that was proven was that the
acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the additional rounds on the second
night were held upon the insistence of Villareal and Dizon, the initiations were
officially reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation rites; and the
accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the paddling,
which were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other weapon
was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly
the legs and the arms. The designation of roles, including the role of auxiliaries,
which were assigned for the specific purpose of lending assistance to and taking care
of the neophytes during the initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious
intent. All those who wished to join the fraternity went through the same process of
traditional initiation; there is no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or
given a different treatment. We stress that Congress itself recognized that hazing is
uniquely different from common crimes.[235] The totality of the circumstances must
therefore be taken into consideration.

The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries
was rooted may also be determined by Lennys continued participation in the
initiation and consent to the method used even after the first day. The following
discussion of the framers of the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening:
SENATOR GUINGONA. Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished
under the Revised Penal Code.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. If hazing is done at present and it results in death,

the charge would be murder or homicide.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated

homicide or serious physical injuries.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does
so it can be penalized under rape or acts of lasciviousness.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new

offense under this definition of the crime of hazing?

SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either

composing a sorority, fraternity or any association from making this requirement
of initiation that has already resulted in these specific acts or results, Mr. President.
 That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land
that no group or association can require the act of physical initiation before a person
can become a member without being held criminally liable.

xxxxxxxxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that
imposition? Because the distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a
mere organization, he is not seeking the punishment of an initiation into a club or
organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain acts that resulted in death, et
cetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.

The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage

hazing, abusive hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more
charges or offenses, because these very same acts are already punishable under the
Revised Penal Code.

That is my difficulty, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. x x x

Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling

difference: When a person or group of persons resort to hazing as a
requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to commit a
wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific
crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if
one files a case, then the intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if
the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from the act of
hazing.

To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter
the sororities or fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called
hazing. Because, initially, these fraternities or sororities do not even consider
having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness are even
committed initially, Mr. President.

So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That
is why there is need to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang
fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiyong
makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o
pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong
neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder
kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga
kabataan na: Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung
mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo.
 xxxxxxxxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the

distinguished Sponsor. But I am again disturbed by his statement that the
prosecution does not have to prove the intent that resulted in the death, that
resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of
lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of
the accused in proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a
novel situation where we create the special crime without having to go into the
intent, which is one of the basic elements of any crime.

If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to

initiate, then there is no offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits
that the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to have a new society or
a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts
that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be proven by intent,
but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic
concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being

criminalized because in the context of what is happening in the sororities and
fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will admit that their intention
is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical
pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred,
discouraged.

If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters
intended to kill or the masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of
the act of hazing. Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the physical pain
can easily escape responsibility and say, We did not have the intention to kill.
This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have any intention
to kill or maim.

This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged
therefore with the ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the
prosecution will have a difficulty proving the elements if they are separate
offenses.

xxxxxxxxx

SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that

initiated and a person died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if
it becomes a law, would the prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x

x
 SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the
prosecution have to prove conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to prove
intent to kill or not?

SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if

that occurs, there is no need to prove intent to kill.

SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.

SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should
be hazing, Mr. President. [236] (Emphasis supplied)

During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of
whether to include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator
Lina further clarified thus:
SENATOR BIAZON. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection
to the inclusion of sodomy as one of the conditions resulting from hazing as
necessary to be punished. However, the act of sodomy can be committed by two
persons with or without consent.

To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of

sodomy forced into another individual by another individual. I move, Mr. President,
that sodomy be modified by the phrase without consent for purposes of this section.

SENATOR LINA. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy

with the concept that it is only going to aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done
without consent will change a lot of concepts here. Because the results from
hazing aggravate the offense with or without consent. In fact, when a person
joins a fraternity, sorority, or any association for that matter, it can be with or
without the consent of the intended victim. The fact that a person joins a
sorority or fraternity with his consent does not negate the crime of hazing.

This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the malpractices
that attend initiation which may have been announced with or without physical
infliction of pain or injury, Mr. President. Regardless of whether there is
announcement that there will be physical hazing or whether there is none, and
therefore, the neophyte is duped into joining a fraternity is of no moment.
What is important is that there is an infliction of physical pain.

The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from
himself if he joins a fraternity, so that at a certain point in time, the State, the
individual, or the parents of the victim can run after the perpetrators of the
crime, regardless of whether or not there was consent on the part of the victim.

xxxxxxxxx

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the

distinguished Gentleman from Cavite and Metro Manila. It is correct that society
sometimes adopts new mores, traditions, and practices.

In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of some
individuals when they do their acts in private as we do not take a peek into the
private rooms of couples. They can do their thing if they want to make love in ways
that are not considered acceptable by the mainstream of society. That is not
something that the State should prohibit.

But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that
the act may even be entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction
of pain may be done with the consent of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that
does not make the act of hazing not punishable because the neophyte accepted
the infliction of pain upon himself.

If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator
said, Well, he allowed it upon himself. He consented to it. So, if we allow that
reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent of the victim, then we would
not have passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we pass this bill,
because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the infliction of pain
or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.

But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to
prohibit. That the defense of consent will not apply because the very act of
inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable
act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely aggravates
the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify
the criminal nature of the act.

So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the
offense if it is committed without consent of the victim, then the whole
foundation of this proposed law will collapse.

SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.

THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment?

(Silence.) The Chair hears none; the same is approved.[237]
(Emphasis supplied)
 Realizing the implication of removing the states burden to prove intent,
Senator Lina, the principal author of the Senate Bill, said:
I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea
of intent or whether there it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical
amendment if that is the point that he wants to go to.

If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special
law on hazing. We will not include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code.
That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that suggestion, Mr.
President.[238](Emphasis supplied)

Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the
core principle of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did
not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing,
founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is
further proof of how the nature of hazing unique as against typical crimes cast a
cloud of doubt on whether society considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct
or mala in se at the time. It is safe to presume that Lennys parents would not have
consented[239] to his participation in Aquila Fraternitys initiation rites if the practice
of hazing were considered by them as mala in se.

Furthermore, in Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice

(now retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent history, the
people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing,
[an] act[] previously considered harmless by custom, as criminal.[240] Although it
may be regarded as a simple obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows
recognition that hazing or the conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or
psychological suffering has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995
Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was not
clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the
interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio
pro reo.

For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to
rule against the trial courts finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on
Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of
malicious intent to inflict physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala
in se cases, considering the contextual background of his death, the unique nature of
hazing, and absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide

The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that
the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The
Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault
(culpa). According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.

Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without

malice, from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results
by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person
committing it.[241] In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by
the actor.[242] In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done
without grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a
mere lack of foresight or skill.[243] Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and
the danger is not openly visible. [244]

The test[245] for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an

act is as follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom
negligence is attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable
consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer
the duty to take precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do
so constitutes negligence.[246]

As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with

recklessness, the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree
of the danger involved.[247] If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of
causing harm to another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that
particular course of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid
damage or injury.[248] In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is
required.[249] It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of precaution or
diligence that may be required of an individual, from a transitory glance of care to
the most vigilant effort.[250] The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of
care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. [251]

There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.

According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure

secondary to multiple traumatic injuries.[252] The officer explained that cardiac
failure refers to the failure of the heart to work as a pump and as part of the
circulatory system due to the lack of blood.[253] In the present case, the victims heart
could no longer work as a pumping organ, because it was deprived of its requisite
blood and oxygen.[254] The deprivation was due to the channeling of the blood supply
from the entire circulatory system including the heart, arteries, veins, venules, and
capillaries to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus causing the formation of
multiple hematomas or blood clots.[255] The multiple hematomas were wide, thick,
and deep,[256] indicating that these could have resulted mainly from injuries sustained
by the victim from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like. [257] Repeated blows
to those areas caused the blood to gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the
circulating blood became so markedly diminished as to produce death. [258] The
officer also found that the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other
organs seen in the abdominals, as well as the thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale
due to the lack of blood, which was redirected to the thighs and forearms.[259] It was
concluded that there was nothing in the heart that would indicate that the victim
suffered from a previous cardiac arrest or disease.[260]

The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villas arms and thighs,
resulting from repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital
organs and led to his eventual death. These hematomas must be taken in the light of
the hazing activities performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity. According to the
testimonies of the co-neophytes of Lenny, they were punched, kicked, elbowed,
kneed, stamped on; and hit with different objects on their arms, legs, and
thighs.[261] They were also paddled at the back of their thighs or legs;[262] and slapped
on their faces.[263] They were made to play rough basketball.[264] Witness Marquez
testified on Lenny, saying: [T]inamaan daw sya sa spine.[265] The NBI medico-legal
officer explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the
multiple injuries suffered by the latter.[266] The relevant portion of the testimony is
as follows:
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various cross
examinations of defense counsels that the injuries that you have
enumerated on the body of the deceased Lenny Villa previously
marked as Exhibit G-1 to G-14 individually by themselves
would not cause the death of the victim. The question I am going
to propound to you is what is the cumulative effect of all of these
injuries marked from Exhibit G-1 to G-14?

Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the victim. So, it
is not fair for us to isolate such injuries here because we are
talking of the whole body. At the same manner that as a car
would not run minus one (1) wheel. No, the more humane in
 human approach is to interpret all those injuries in whole and not
in part.[267]

There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members
were drinking during the initiation rites.[268]

Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount

to recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must
be remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause
them injury in the process.[269] With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are
guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal
officer found that the victims death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered,
criminal responsibility redounds to all those who directly participated in and
contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.

It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been
prevented, or at least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity accused Dizon
and Villareal restrained themselves from insisting on reopening the initiation rites.
Although this point did not matter in the end,
as records would show that the other fraternity members participated in the reopened
initiation rites having in mind the concept of seniority in fraternities the implication
of the presence of alumni should be seen as a point of review in future legislation.
We further note that some of the fraternity members were intoxicated during Lennys
initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to Congress, for legislative
consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of
intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during
hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.

It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly or unwittingly impose the

misery of hazing and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There
must be a better way to establish kinship. A neophyte admitted that he joined the
fraternity to have more friends and to avail himself of the benefits it offered, such as
tips during bar examinations.[270] Another initiate did not give up, because he feared
being looked down upon as a quitter, and because he felt he did not have a
choice.[271] Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other neophytes, joining the Aquila
Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under the circumstances,
they left their fates in the hands of the fraternity members. Unfortunately, the hands
to which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.
 Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and
Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity
members would have all been convicted of the crime of hazing punishable
by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).[272] Since there was no law prohibiting
the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained to rule according to existing
laws at the time of his death. The CA found that the prosecution failed to prove,
beyond reasonable doubt,
Victorino et al.s individual participation in the infliction of physical injuries upon
Lenny Villa.[273] As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability was totally
extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the

applicability of the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the
modification of criminal liability from slight physical injuries to reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only with respect to accused
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.

The accused liable to pay damages

The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts
of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and ₱1,000,000 as moral damages, to be
jointly and severally paid by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the
amount of ₱30,000 as indemnity to be jointly and severally paid by
accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.

Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death
of the victim.[274] In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,[275] we sustain the
CAs award of indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000.

The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages,

including expenses incurred in connection with the death of the victim, so long as
the claim is supported by tangible documents. [276] Though we are prepared to award
actual damages, the Court is prevented from granting them, since the records are
bereft of any evidence to show that actual expenses were incurred or proven during
trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the Solicitor General does not interpose any claim
for actual damages.[277]
 The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered
on account of the victims death.[278] This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of
the Civil Code, which provides that the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate
descendants and the ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. [279] Thus, we hereby we
affirm the CAs award of moral damages in the amount of ₱1,000,000.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding

petitioner Fidelito Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET
ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 finding Antonio
Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson
guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries is also MODIFIED and SET
ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and
penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly
and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount
of ₱50,000, and moral damages in the amount of ₱1,000,000, plus legal interest on
all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this Decision
until satisfaction.[280]Costs de oficio.

The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is

hereby AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080,
dismissing the criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano,
are likewise AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case
against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the
amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the
presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating
circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

ROBERT P. WA-ACON, G.R. No. 164575

Petitioner, Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
December 6, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeks the reversal of the April 22, 2004 Decision[1] of the Sandiganbayan convicting
petitioner Robert P. Wa-acon of Malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code for misappropriating PhP 92,199.20, which forms part of his accountabilities
as Special Collecting Officer of the National Food Authority (NFA); and the July
23, 2004 Resolution[2] of said graft court denying Wa-acons plea for reconsideration
in Criminal Case No. 14375.

The Facts

The information against the accused Wa-acon reads as follows:

 That on about the period from July 19, 1979 to September 28, 1981,
in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Robert P. Wa-acon, a public officer, being a
Special Collecting Officer, National Food Authority (NFA) and stationed
at Canonigo, Paco, Manila and as such was accountable and responsible
of rice stocks and empty sacks for which he received and entrusted to him,
by reason of his official position, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence, misappropriate,
misapply, embezzle and convert to his own personal use and benefit the
aforesaid stocks of rice and empty sacks with a total aggregate money
value of P114,303.00, to the damage and prejudice of the government in
the aforementioned amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

The facts of the case as found by the Sandiganbayan are:

On the period from July 19, 1979 to September 28, 1981, accused
Robert P. Wa-acon was a Special Collecting Officer of the National Food
Authority (NFA) and was assigned at the Kadiwa Center at Moriones,
Tondo, Manila. One of his duties was to receive grains, consisting of rice
and mongo, which shall then be sold to the public on retail. The proceeds
of the sale of the grains shall then be collected by the same accused.

On September 28, 1981, by virtue of a Travel Order, a team of

Auditors from the Commission of Audit, composed of Dionisio A. Nillo,
as team leader, Mercedes Punzalan, Audit Examiner II, Herminia
Gonzales, Audit Examiner II and Raquel Cruz, Clerk II, as members,
conducted an examination of the accountabilities of various Special
Collecting Officers of the NFA, one of whom was accused Robert P. Wa-
acon. The said examination was conducted at the Office of the Regional
Auditor, NFA Metro Manila Office at Paco, Manila. In that office, the
audit team asked the presence of accused Robert P. Wa-acon by virtue of
a demand letter dated September 1981, demanding the latter to produce
cash, cash items, stocks and empty sacks and other pertinent papers. As
testified by Prosecution witness Dionisio A. Nillo, accused Robert P. Wa-
acon told the audit team that he has no cash on hand at the time pertaining
to his accountability as Special Collecting Officer. Hence, it was indicated
in the Cash Count Sheet that there was no cash counted during the cash
examination.
 Based on the examination conducted on the various Warehouse Stock
Issues, Empty Sacks Receipts, Official Receipts submitted and the
Certificate of Inventory of Stocks and Empty Sacks dated September 18,
1981, containing the signature of accused Robert P. Wa-acon and
witnessed by Virgilio Cacanendin, Special Investigator, Manolito Diaz,
Bookkeeper, Louie Pastofide, Proceso A. Saavedra, Audit Examiner II
and Gloria T. Reyes, Audit Examiner I, the audit team rendered a Report
of Examination, Form 74-A of the Cash and Accounts of accused Robert
P. Wa-acon. All of the aforementioned documents were submitted by
Proceso Saavedra, a resident Audit Examiner of the NFA Metro Manila
Office, Paco, Manila, to the Audit team headed by Dionisio A. Nillo. In
connection with the Audit conducted, the Audit Team prepared the
following Schedules: Schedule 1: Statement of Rice received by Robert
A. Wa-acon, Schedule 1-A: Statement of Rice/mongo Received by Robert
P. Wa-acon, Schedules 2: Statement of Remittances of Proceeds from
Sales of Robert P. Wa-acon, Schedule 3: Statement of Refunds made by
Robert P. Wa-acon, Schedule I: Statement of Empty Sacks Returned by
Robert P. Wa-acon, and Summary of Empty Sacks Accountability of
Robert P. Wa-acon and the Revised Summary of Cash Examination of
Robert P. Wa-acon.

The Report of the Examination of the Cash and Accountabilities of

accused Robert P. Wa-acon shows that the latter incurred a cash shortage
of One Hundred Fourteen Thousand Three Hundred Three Pesos
(P114,303.00). In the Revised Summary of the Cash Examination of
accused Robert P. Wa-acon, the cash shortage was changed to One
Hundred Two Thousand and One Hundred Ninety Nine Pesos and Twenty
Centavos (P102,199.20) after deducting the cost of sixty (60) bags of
regular milled rice value of Six Thousand Nine Hundred (P6,900.00) and
the monetary value of the empty sacks returned by accused Robert P. Wa-
acon, which is Five Thousand Two Hundred Three Pesos and Eighty
Centavos (P5,203.80). However, accused Robert P. Wa-acon made a
refund of the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). Therefore, the
total shortage amount[ed] to Ninety Two Thousand One Hundred Ninety
Nine Pesos and Twenty Centavos(P92,199.20).[4]

During the trial before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner denied that he

misapplied and converted for his personal use the stocks of rice and empty sacks as
he had been faithfully remitting all the proceeds of the rice he sold to consumers.[5]
 Petitioner also contended that the shortage discovered by the Audit Team may
be attributed to the discrepancy in the actual weight of the rice actually delivered to
him and that of the weight reflected in the receipts. In other words, he claimed that
the rice delivered to him weighed less than that for which he signed. He alleged that
he discovered the shortage of five (5) to ten (10) kilos per sack only upon delivery
of the rice to the station/outlet. Petitioner explained that he could not check the
weight of the sacks delivered to him as the weighing scale in their office had a
maximum capacity of only twelve (12) kilograms. Petitioner claimed that he
informed his superiors of such shortage verbally, but was unheeded. [6]
Petitioner further claimed that the only reason he signed for the sacks of rice,
despite the shortage, was because he was told that he would not be paid his salary
if he would not sign, added to the fact that he was then hungryall of which prompted
Wa-acon to sign the audit report of the Audit Team.[7] As to the missing empty sacks,
petitioner argued that those were in the custody of the delivery man who had a
logbook where Special Collecting Officers sign as proof that the delivery man had
taken the sacks.[8]

The Sandiganbayan Ruling

Citing the presumption under the last paragraph of Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code that the failure of the public officer to have duly forthcoming any public
funds which he is chargeable upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall
be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal
use and the inability of accused Wa-acon to rebut the presumption that he had put
the rice stocks and the empty sacks to personal use, the Sandiganbayan found him
guilty of malversation of public funds under the Revised Penal Code. In the graft
courts April 22, 2004 Decision, the dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused

Robert P. Wa-acon, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Malversation of Public Funds as defined in and penalized by Article 217
of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstance, is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from TWELVE
(12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal minimum, as the
minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE
(1) DAY of reclusion temporal maximum, as the maximum and to suffer
 perpetual special disqualification. The accused Robert P. Wa-acon is
likewise ordered to pay a FINE equal to the amount of the funds
malversed, which is Ninety Two Thousand One Hundred Ninety Nine
Pesos and Twenty Centavos (P 92,199.20) and to indemnify the National
Food Authority (NFA) the amount of Ninety Two Thousand One Hundred
Ninety Nine Pesos and Twenty Centavos (P92,199.20) with interest
thereon.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Correspondingly, petitioner filed his May 20, 2004 Motion for

Reconsideration[10] of the Decision, reiterating his defenses raised during the trial.

On July 23, 2004, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that accused Wa-acon raised
no new substantial issues and cogent reasons to justify the reversal of the April 22,
2004 Decision.

Thus, Wa-acon filed the instant petition.

The Courts Ruling

Petitioner Wa-acon presented a lone issue to be resolved: his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt; thus, the assailed Decision and Resolution
convicting him of malversation must be reversed.

In seeking the recall of his conviction, accused petitioner asserts that the unremitted
amounts for the rice stocks and the money allegedly gained from the empty sacks
were not used for his personal use and therefore, the fourth element of
malversationthat the accused appropriated, took, or misappropriated public funds or
property for which he was accountablewas not proven. According to petitioner,
while he might have violated certain auditing rules and regulations, this violation is
not tantamount to malversation. He leans on the rulings in Madarang v.
Sandiganbayan,[11] and Agullo v. Sandiganbayan[12] that it is essential to prove that
there had been a conversion of public fund to personal use and that conversion must
be affirmatively proved; otherwise, the presumption is deemed never to have existed
at all.
 Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code whereas provides:

Malversation of public funds or property. Presumption of

malversation. Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office,
is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or
shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or
property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property x x x

xxxx

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any

public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand
by any duly authorized officer shall be prima facie evidence that he
has put such missing funds or property to personal uses (emphasis
supplied).

The elements to constitute malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
are as follows:

The elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217

are: (a) that the offender be a public officer; (b) that he had custody or
control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (c) these
funds were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and
(d) that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. [13]

Accused petitioner has conceded that the first three (3) elements of the crime
of malversation exist but asseverates that the fourth elementthat he appropriated,
took, or misappropriated the public funds for which he was made accountable by the
Commission on Audit (COA) to his own personal usewas not proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

Unfortunately, petitioners postulation has no legal mooring. Article 217, as

amended by Republic Act 1060, no longer requires proof by the State that the
accused actually appropriated, took, or misappropriated public funds or
property. Instead, a presumption, though disputable and rebuttable, was installed
that upon demand by any duly authorized officer, the failure of a public officer to
have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which said officer is
accountableshould be prima facie evidence that he had put such missing funds or
properties to personal use. When these circumstances are present, a presumption of
law arises that there was malversation of public funds or properties as decreed by
Article 217. A presumption of law is sanctioned by a statute prescribing that a certain
inference must be made whenever facts appear which furnish the basis of the
interference. This is to be set apart from a presumption of fact which is a [conclusion]
drawn from particular circumstances, the connection between them and the sought
for fact having received such a sanction in experience as to have become recognized
as justifying the assumption.[14] When there is a presumption of law, the onus
probandi (burden of proof), generally imposed upon the State, is now shifted to the
party against whom the interference is made to adduce satisfactory evidence to rebut
the presumption and hence, to demolish the prima facie case.

After the government auditors discovered the shortage and demanded an

explanation, petitioner Wa-acon was not able to make money readily
available,[15] immediately refund the shortage,[16] or explain satisfactorily the cash
deficit.[17] These facts or circumstances constitute prima facie evidence that he
converted such funds to his personal use.

Prima facie evidence is defined as:

Evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the
judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or
chain of facts constituting the partys claim or defense, and which if not
rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient. Evidence which, if
unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a judgment in
favor of the issue it supports, but which may be contradicted by other
evidence (emphasis supplied).[18]

Neither can accused petitioner claim that such presumption under Article 217
violates the constitutional guarantee of presumption of innocence for the
establishment of a prima facie case does not take away the presumption of innocence
which may x x x be such as to rebut and control it. [19] Such prima facie evidence, if
unexplained or uncontradicted, can counterbalance the presumption of innocence to
warrant a conviction.[20]

Since the facts adduced by the State brought about a prima facie evidence
which is considered sufficient to sustain petitioners conviction under Article 217, it
is incumbent upon petitioner Wa-acon to destroy the presumption of law.

In his quest to exculpate himself from the legal assumption of criminal

liability for the missing funds, he insisted that: 1) the sacks of rice were less than
that declared in the receipts when they were delivered to him; 2) he sold the rice at
the older and lower prices, as he was not informed of changes in the prices of the
rice; and 3) the empty sacks of rice were in the possession of the delivery
men. However, petitioner merely settled for his bare uncorroborated testimony
during the trial before the Sandiganbayan. He never bothered to adduce other pieces
of evidence to fortify his defenses. Petitioner did not produce the delivery men
whom he claims had in their possession the empty sacks or any acknowledgement
receipt for said bags. Moreover, petitioner did not bring forward his co-workers to
attest to and confirm the practice of, and substantiate petitioners story of receiving
sacks of rice without weighing them and that the bags received weighed less than
that reflected in the receipt. The established rule is that [d]enials, if unsubstantiated
by clear and convincing evidence, are deemed negative and self-serving evidence
unworthy of credence.[21] The court a quo is correct in holding that as compared to
credible witnesses like the COA auditors who testified on affirmative matters, the
self-serving negative testimony of accused petitioner Wa-acon has no substantial
weight or credit.[22]

Negative testimony is made clear as

testimony that a fact did not exist, that a thing was not done, that no one
did not hearis admissible and, in the absence of opposing testimony, is
usually regarded as of sufficient probative force to sustain a verdict. It is
however, a long recognized general rule of evidence that all other things
being equal, positive evidence is stronger than negative evidence. [23]

Since Wa-acon lamentably fell short of adducing the desired quantum of evidence,
his weak and unconvincing testimony standing alone did not overthrow the
presumption that he misappropriated public funds.
 As a last ditch effort to exonerate himself, petitioner anchored his defense
on Madarang[24] and Agullo,[25] where public employees charged of malversation
were cleared of criminal liability.

In these two (2) cases cited by petitioner, we elucidated the legal presumption of
assumed criminal liability for accountable funds under the last paragraph of Article
217 of the Revised Penal Code. In Madarang, we explained:

Concededly, the first three elements are present in the case at bar.
Lacking any evidence, however, of shortage, or taking, appropriation, or
conversion by petitioner or loss of public funds, there is no malversation
(Narciso vs. Sandiganbayan, 229 SCRA 229 [1994]). True, the law
creates a presumption that the mere failure of an accountable officer to
produce public funds which have come into his hand on demand by an
officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is prima facie evidence of
conversion. The presumption is, of course, rebuttable. Accordingly, if
petitioner is able to present adequate evidence that can nullify any
likelihood that he had put the funds or property to personal use, then that
presumption would be at an end and the prima facie case is effectively
negated.[26]

In Agullo, we amplified that:

Thus, in a string of categorical pronouncements, this Court has

consistently and emphatically ruled that the presumption of
conversion incarnated in Article 217, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal
Code is by its very nature rebuttable. To put it differently, the presumption
under the law is not conclusive but disputable by satisfactory evidence to
the effect that the accused did not utilize the public funds or property for
his personal use, gain or benefit.

Accordingly, if the accused is able to present adequate

evidence that can nullify any likelihood that he had put the funds or
property to personal use, then that presumption would be at an end and
the prima facie case is effectively negated. This Court has repeatedly said
that when the absence of funds is not due to the personal use thereof by
the accused, the presumption is completely destroyed; in fact, the
presumption is never deemed to have existed at all.[27]
Unfortunately, petitioners vaunted reliance on Madarang and Agullo does not
provide legal relief as the facts in these cases are not on all fours with his case. The
accused parties in said cases were able to produce satisfactory evidence ample
enough to prove that the missing funds were not converted to their personal uses and
thus, the legal presumption was effectively negated.

In Madarang, the accused, based on the COA audit report, was charged with
malversation of PhP 20,700.00 representing advance rental payments for the lease
of real property owned by the City of Cebu for which he was responsible as a
barangay captain. When the accused was asked to account for such missing funds,
he introduced convincing evidence that the funds were utilized by the barangay for
its projects and for the benefit of his constituents, namely: for materials for the water
system of the barangay hall, barangay police uniforms, and payment for medicine.
Therefore, the legal presumption was successfully overturned.

Likewise, in Agullo, the accused, who was the disbursing officer of then
Ministry of Public Works and Highways, Regional Office No. VIII, Candahug,
Palo, Leyte, was charged based on audit, with malversation of PhP 26,404.26
representing the salaries of the personnel in her office. The accused admitted that the
funds were lost; however, she was able to prove that she suffered a stroke while
going to her office. This was corroborated by the barangay captain of the place where
she suffered a stroke, as well as medical certificates to prove the illness. She was
acquitted because the loss of funds was not due to malversation.

In contrast, petitioner anchored his defenses solely on his own bare testimony
unsubstantiated by other parol, documentary, or object evidence to prop up such self-
serving allegations. Without doubt, the rulings in Madarang and Agullo cannot be
considered precedents to the case at bar because the facts in said cases are not the
same or substantially similar to petitioner Wa-acons situation.
Without any strong and convincing proof to bring down the disputable
presumption of law, the Court is left with no other option but to sustain petitioners
conviction.
 WHEREFORE, We DENY the petition and the assailed April 22,
2004 Decision and the July 23, 2004 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 14375 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 150917 September 27, 2006

ARTEMIO YADAO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For Review1 is the 18 April 2001 Decision2 and 13 November 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19818, affirming in toto the 28 March 1996 Decision4 of the Regional
Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, in Criminal Case No. 1042-BG.

Petitioner Artemio Yadao (Yadao) prays for the reversal of the decision finding him "guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide as charged in the information x x x," 5 defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code for the death of Deogracias Gundran
(Gundran), and sentencing him to suffer the "indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional in its maximum period, as Minimum to EIGHT (8)
YEARS of prision mayor in its minimum period, as Maximum, x x x."6

On 21 April 1989, petitioner Yadao was charged with the crime of homicide before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33, for allegedly mauling one Deogracias Gundran, in an
Information,7 the accusatory portion of which states:

That on or about the 1st day of October, (sic) 1989, in the Municipality of Bauang, Province
of La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and maul one DEOGRACIAS GUNDRAN, thereby inflicting upon said victim several
injuries on the different parts of his body which directly caused his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the victims.

CONTRARY TO ART. 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1042-BG.

Upon arraignment, petitioner Yadao with assistance of a counsel de parte, pleaded "Not Guilty" to
the crime charged. Thus, trial ensued, with the prosecution presenting four witnesses, namely 1)
Carmelita Limon,8 2) Teofilo Gundran,9 3) Napoleon Estigoy10 and 4) Dr. Arturo Llavore,11 to establish
petitioner Yadao's culpability beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

To counter the evidence abovementioned, the defense offered the testimonies of the following
defense witnesses: 1) petitioner Artemio Yadao, 2) Reynaldo Feratero, 12 3) Dr. Magdalena
Alambra,13 4) Calixto Chan14 and 5) Evelyn Uy, as well as documentary evidence, i.e., the Autopsy
Report of Dr. Alambra.

From a review of the record of the case, we cull the following established facts:
It was petitioner Yadao's birthday on 1 October 1988. As such, he had a few guests over at his
house to help him celebrate it. The guests included defense witnesses Reynaldo Feratero, Calixto
Chan and Evelyn Uy. At around 9:00 a.m., petitioner Yadao noticed the victim, Gundran, 15 albeit not
invited, to be milling around with the guests and was already drinking gin. At around 3:45 p.m. of the
said day, while petitioner Yadao was sitting on one end of a bench, the victim, who happened to be
lying down on the other end of the same bench, suddenly stood up. Because no one else was sitting
on the middle, said bench tilted due to the weight of petitioner Yadao, thus, causing him to fall to the
ground. Upon seeing him fall to the ground, the victim went over to petitioner Yadao and began
boxing him on the stomach. Petitioner Yadao's wife tried to pacify her nephew but this merely
enraged the latter who then got a can opener and tried to stab petitioner Yadao with it. The latter
deflected said attempt and delivered a slap on the face of the victim in order to "knock some sense"
into him. But because he was already intoxicated, as he had been drinking since early that morning,
the victim lost his balance, hit his head on the edge of a table and fell to the ground landing on his
behind. The other guest helped the victim to stand up and proceeded to show him to the door.

The victim, Gundran, left the house of petitioner Yadao, between 4:00 to 5:00 p.m., and proceeded
to the house of Carmelita Limon who was the sister of one of his friends. At that time, Limon was
inside her house doing the laundry. Upon seeing him, Limon noticed a one-inch in diameter lump on
the victim's forehead. The victim told her that he came from the birthday party of petitioner Yadao
and that the latter "mauled" him. While she treated the "wound" with "kutsay," an herb, the victim
complained of pain on his breast/stomach area, the area where he claimed to have been hit by
petitioner Yadao.

Two days later, or on 3 October 1988, Teofilo Gundran, the father of the victim was informed by his
granddaughter that his son, the victim, was having difficulty breathing. Teofilo Gundran then
proceeded to where the victim was, which happened to be in his (the victim's) sister's house, a short
distance away from Limon's house. When he got to the house, Teofilo Gundran saw the victim sitting
on an "arinola" gasping for breath. He then held the victim's two hands until the latter expired.

On the same day that he died, the body of the victim was autopsied by Dr. Magdalena Alambra,
Medical Specialist II of the Rural Health Unit of Bauang, La Union. In her Autopsy Report, she made
the following findings:

PERTINENT PHYSICAL FINDINGS:

1. Hematoma suboponeurotic layer of the scalp rt. Fronto parietal area 10 cm. in length and
9 cm. in width.

2. Fibrocaseous necrosis of the right lung with loss of lung parenchymal tissue and pleural
adhesion of the rt. Lateral wall of the chest.

CAUSE OF DEATH: Cardio respiratory arrest due to pulmonary tuberculosis. Far advanced
with massive pleural adhesion rt. side. 16

During the trial of the case, Dr. Alambra testified for the defense. She stated under oath that
immediately after the death of the victim, she conducted the autopsy of the body of said victim; that
during the procedure, she made an internal, as well as external, examination of the body of the
victim; that fibrocaseous meant that half of the victim's lungs, the right one in particular, was already
gone; that she was only told that the victim had been mauled and that the latter became weak
thereafter; that although a hematoma17 was present on the victim's forehead, she did not consider it
as the cause of death as hematoma alone will not cause the death of a person especially seven to
eight days later; and, that when she opened the skull of the victim to study the latter's brain, she did
not see anything unusual. Dr. Alambra then confirmed that the cause of death of the victim was
cardio-respiratory arrest due to pulmonary tuberculosis that was already so far advanced with
massive pleural adhesions. On cross, however, she stated that a person with only one lung left, with
proper medication, would still be able to live normally.

Disbelieving that cardiac arrest secondary to Tuberculosis was the cause of death of his son; Teofilo
Gundran had the victim's body re-autopsied, this time by the National Bureau of Investigation. The
re-autopsy was conducted by Dr. Arturo G. Llavore, a Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Regional Office, San Fernando, La Union, on 11 October 1991, or eight days
after the first autopsy.18 Dr. Llavore's autopsy report stated:

AUTOPSY REPORT NO. 88-26-LU

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

Cadaver, embalmed.

I. Abrasions: Frontal region, left side. 0.9 x 0.2 cm.; Arm, left, upper third, anterior aspect, 2.0
x 0.6 cm.; Forearm, right, upper third, anteromedial aspect, 0.2 x 0.2 cm.; Elbow, left,
posterior aspect, 0.6 x 0.4 cm., and right, posters-medial aspect, 2.0 x 0.5 cm. in size.

II. Hematoma, Scalp, Interstitial; Fronto-tempero-parietal region, right side, 13.0 x 10.0 cms.,
massive, extensive; Frontal region, slightly to the right of the anterior medial line, 2.0 x 1.6
cms., mild; Occipital region, mid-aspect, 8.0 x 2.3 cms, moderate.

III. Brain, markedly congested, with flattening and widening of gyri and narrowing of the sulci.
Cerebral blood vessels markedly engorged.

IV. Lungs, Left lung intact; right lung previously dissected. Cut sections showed areas of
fibrosis at the right lung (focal) surrounded by atelectatic and emphysematous changes,
(Pleural Adhesions, right. - B-2)19

V. Other internal visceral organs, markedly congested.

VI. Stomach, with approximately 60 cc of dark brownish fluid.

*** end ***

CAUSE OF DEATH: CEREBRAL EDEMA, SEVERE, SECONDARY TO TRAUMATIC

INJURIES; HEAD/

REMARKS: Pls. see pathology Report No. P-88-339. Old healed scars noted at Chest,
anterior and lateral aspects, right. Scalp incision, postmortem, extending from above left ear,
over the superior midline and down to the front of right ear, 36.0 cms. long. Postmortem
incision, Y-shaped, extending from anterior superior portion of Chest to abdominal area,
lower quadrant, 53.0 cms. long.

During the trial, prosecution witness Dr. Llavore testified that the cause of death of the victim was the
collective effect of all the injuries sustained by the latter on the head. He explained that the forces
that could have caused the injuries to the victim's head were also the same forces that could have
caused the edema or swelling of the victim's brain. He illustrated further that a human fist applied
with "sufficient" force on the fronto-temporo-parietal region of the head could cause an injury the
same as that sustained by the victim on his forehead. Similarly, the injury found at the back of the
head of the victim could have been caused by an edge of a palm applied with sufficient force or it
could have been caused by hitting his head on the edge of a table as the shape of said injury is
somewhat elongated. On cross examination, Dr. Llavore admitted that he did the re-autopsy seven
(7)20 days after the victim died but that his Autopsy Report failed to indicate that the cadaver had
previously been autopsied by another physician; that the blow inflicted on the head of the victim was
strong enough to have injured the "moorings" of the brain causing the destruction of the brain cells
and the shifting of the fluid in the skull to one side; that the most serious wound between the two
injuries sustained by the victim on the head is the one found on his right forehead; and that the
process of swelling became irreversible when the compression of the brain had caused its center to
become "imbalanced," so that the victim's brain ceased to function.

After trial, in a Decision21 promulgated on 28 March 1996, the RTC rendered judgment finding
petitioner Yadao guilty of the crime of homicide, and sentencing him as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court, finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide as charged in the information, and after
considering two (2) mitigating circumstances, hereby sentences him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional in its maximum period, as Minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor in its
minimum period, as Maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of
P50,000.00 for the death of Deogracias Gundran and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

The RTC held that:

After a careful consideration and examination of the testimonies of both medico-legal

officers, this Court is inclined to give more weight on the testimony of Dr. Arturo Llavore that
the cause of death of Deogracias Gundran was "cerebral edema, severe, secondary to
traumatic injuries, head" and not "Cardio respiratory Arrest due to pulmonary tuberculosis. It
is to be noted that Dra. Magdalena Alambra testified and even admitted that a person even if
he has no (sic) lungs can still live. Hence, the injuries which the victim Deogracias Gundran
sustained on his head caused his death as he did not immediately undergo medical
treatment. And as testified to by Dr. Arturo Llavore x x x the blow inflicted was fatal or very
serious that "if no medical intervention is made, it will be untreated (sic)" (T.S.N., September
25, 1991, p. 38).

x x x [g]ranting for the sake of argument that accused Artemio Yadao did not maul the victim
but only slapped him slightly which caused him to fall down as he was very drunk, still
accused is liable for the consequences of his act.

xxxx

The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that
"Criminal liability shall be incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. x x x "Pursuant to this
provision, "an accused is criminally responsible for the acts committed by him in violation of
law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting there from". (sic) x x x.

xxxx
 Under paragraph 1, Article 4, revised Penal Code, a person committing a felony is still
criminally liable even if – "x x x

(c) the injurious result is greater than that intended-prater-intentionem. x x x

Indeed the act of the accused in slapping the victim Deogracias Gundran causing the latter
to fall down hitting his head which caused his eventual death is something which the
accused cannot escape. This Court does not favor making conjectures but looking at the
body built (sic) of the accused who is tall and sturdy as compared to the body built (sic) of
the victim who was described to be tall and lanky, it is not hard to believe that accused did
not know that natural and inevitable result of the act of slapping the victim, considering the
fact that accused even admitted that the victim was then very drunk.

Aggrieved, petitioner Yadao appealed the aforequoted decision to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court, in its Decision22 of 18 April 2001, affirmed in toto the judgment of conviction rendered
by the RTC. The fallo of Court of Appeals decision states that:

WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, there being no reversible error

but instead being in accordance with law and evidence, the appealed Decision dated March
28, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Bauang, La Union (sic) is AFFIRMED in
toto. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner Yadao's ensuing motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in
its Resolution of 13 November 2001, seeing as no "new matters or issues raised in (the) Motion for
Reconsideration x x x."23

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Petitioner Yadao seeks the reversal of the decision of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. Essentially, it is his contention
that the evidence presented by the prosecution was not sufficient to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt as the perpetrator of the crime of homicide. He maintains that the existence of two
autopsy reports entirely differing as to the cause of death of the victim is tantamount to reasonable
doubt respecting his legal culpability thereto. Particularly, he argues that:

x x x [t]he trial court's finding "that the blow inflicted was fatal and very serious" is not in
accord with the physical manifestations of Gundran in going to and while in the house of
Carmelita. It is a matter of human experience that when a person is struck with a fatal or
serious blow in the head to such an extent that his brain becomes swollen with its moorings
injured as found by Dr. Llavore in this case, such person will suffer serious, disabling or
painful consequences. Either he will be rendered comatose or unconscious or suffer severe
pain in the head.

xxxx

And although Limon noticed a lump in (sic) his forehead, Gundran did not complain of any
pain in the head and when asked what he felt he told Limon that he felt pain in his chest and
stomach because that was where he was mauled.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, asserts that:

It is clear from the record that Dr. Alambra failed to notice the brain injury sustained by the
victim because she merely relied on "gross findings" of said organ during her autopsy. After
opening the skull, she merely took a look at the brain, felt it, and found nothing unusual about
the organ. She testified that she could not conduct further laboratory examinations on the
victim's brain for lack of facilities (citation omitted).

This circumstance indicates that the findings of the two (2) medico-legal experts, although
inconsistent, are not necessarily irreconcilable.

The threshold issue in this case, therefore, is whether or not the prosecution was able to prove the
guilt of petitioner Yadao beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, especially Dr. Llavore's, and documentary evidence presented, i.e., the Dr. Llavore's
Autopsy Report.

The petition has merit.

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) defines and punishes the crime of homicide, viz:

ART. 249. Homicide. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246,24 shall
kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next
preceding article, shall be guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusión temporal.

From the abovequoted provision of law, the elements of homicide are as follows: 1) a person was
killed; and 2) the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance; 3) the accused had the
intention to kill, which is presumed; and 4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide. 25

The Constitution demands that every accused be presumed innocent until the charge is proved.
Before an accused can be convicted of any criminal act, his guilt must first be proved beyond
reasonable doubt.26 In this jurisdiction, proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral
certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it does not
demand absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of error;27 it is that engendered by an
investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy
upon the certainty of guilt.28

Basic is the principle in criminal law that the evidence presented must be sufficient to prove
the corpus delicti – the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact
that a crime has been actually committed.29 The corpus delicti is a compound fact composed of two
things: 1) the existence of a certain act or a result forming the basis of the criminal charge, and 2)
the existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or result. 30 In all criminal prosecutions, the
burden is on the prosecution to prove the body or substance of the crime. In the case at bar, was the
prosecution able to prove the two components of the corpus delicti?

We think not.

Though it was established that petitioner Yadao slapped the victim, and as a result of which the
latter fell down and struck his head on the edge of a table, the prosecution nonetheless failed to
show the nexus between the injury sustained by the victim and his death. It failed to discharge the
burden to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the death of the victim resulted from the use of
violent and criminal means by petitioner Yadao.

The fact that the victim herein was wounded is not conclusive that death resulted therefrom. To
make an offender liable for the death of the victim, it must be proven that the death is the natural
consequence of the physical injuries inflicted. If the physical injury is not the proximate cause 31 of
death of the victim, then the offender cannot be held liable for such death.

It has been established in this case that on the afternoon of 1 October 1988, at around 3:45 p.m.,
petitioner Yadao slapped the victim once. This is based from the unrebutted testimonies of defense
witnesses – the only eyewitnesses to the assault. It is also undisputed that the victim died on 3
October 1988, or two days later. What is in dispute, however, is the cause of the latter's death.

In convicting Petitioner Yadao, the RTC and the Court of Appeals principally relied upon the
testimony of Dr. Llavore in addition to the latter's autopsy report, both essentially stating that the
injury sustained by the victim in the head caused massive hematoma and/or cerebral edema.
However, we find said testimonial and documentary evidence utterly insufficient on which to anchor
a judgment of conviction for homicide. To our mind, his testimony, as well as the Autopsy Report
containing his findings, vis-à-vis the first autopsy conducted by Dr. Alambra and the factual
circumstances surrounding the conduct of two autopsies done on said cadaver, do not engender a
moral certainty, much less a belief, that the injury sustained was the cause of his death. This Court's
doubt is brought about by Dr. Llavore's failure to account the effects of the following facts: 1) that the
cadaver had previously been autopsied; 2) that during the first autopsy, Dr. Alambra opened up the
skull of the victim to physically examine his brain and did not see anything out of the ordinary,
neither blood clot and/or pooling nor any swelling; 3) that the cadaver of the victim had already been
embalmed; 4) that it had not been established for how long the embalming fluid was supposed to
stave off or delay the decomposition of the cadaver of the victim; 5) that the re-autopsy was
conducted eight (8) days after the death of the victim; 6) that when the cadaver of the victim was re-
autopsied, decomposition may have already set in despite the body having been embalmed; and 7)
that the only hematoma noted inside of the cadaver's head was that on the "suboponeurotic layer of
the scalp rt. fronto parietal region,"32 or "scalp, interstitial; Fronto-temporo-parietal region, right
side."33 In layman's terms, the hematoma, noted by both physicians, was merely on the scalp, just
below the skin, of the frontal right side of the head – nowhere near the brain as the area was still
outside of the skull. Even Dr. Llavore recognized such fact as clearly stated in his Autopsy Report
and testified to in open court, viz:

COURT:

Now, could you tell us – could you tell this Court what is the cause of that trauma?

xxxx

Witness:

A x x x the cause of the trauma on the head is physical contact as shown in paragraph 3,
there were injuries to these areas on the right side and actually there were two (2) and one
(1) at the back of the head and the force or violence that was applied to these areas caused
the brain to move suddenly also and the displacement of the substances, the brain
substances, because the brain is very fragile, it is very soft, once they are displaced from
their place, because they move, there is breaking of very minute blood vessels – the very
minute blood vessels if the force is stronger, it could create breakage or rupture of larger
blood vessels which you can say grossly as hemorrhage, but in this case, there is no
 hemorrhage – there is no gross hemorrhage, there is only minute blood vessels and since
there is destruction of the very minute blood vessels, they swell individually, they swell and
collectively, the swelling becomes so great because it already involves the whole brain and
the brain becomes swollen, it expands, it tries to expand, but it cannot. Therefore, it
compresses in itself.

Consequently, the post mortem report and testimony of Dr. Alambra should not be easily discounted.
The same is significant in that the testimony and the report on the autopsy, which was done
immediately after the death, establishes the nature and extent of the "injury," sustained as a result of
the assault, as well as the state of the brain and the surrounding area at the time of death. The
significance of said evidence will lead to the precise nature of the injury sustained by the victim.
From a legal perspective, therefore, the examination of a wound should lead to the determination as
to the degree of danger of the wound and the danger it poses to the life or bodily function of the
victim when the wound was inflicted.

Wharton and Stille's discussion on the importance of a thorough and painstaking post-mortem
examination or assessment of the degree of injury sustained by the victim is highly instructive, it
reads:

x x x [a] careful post-mortem examination will usually show the violent cause of death, and it
is the duty of the physician whose opinion is desired, to make that examination most
carefully, and to base his opinion entirely upon the findings of this examination; not
upon previous notions of the probable nature and effects of the wound. Moreover, it is
necessary not merely to make an examination of the regions apparently involved in the
injury, but also a thorough examination of the entire body; for, notwithstanding the immediate
cause of death may be evident, it is still advisable to be sure that there was no cause of
death in any other part. [Emphasis supplied.]

This Court recognizes the fact that the most critical aspect of head trauma is what happens to the
brain; that the immediate brain damage that results from head trauma is dependent upon the force
applied to the head, the area of its application, and whether the head is fixed or freely movable; that
when viable tissue receives an application of force strong enough to be injurious, it (the body)
responds by alteration in intracellular and extracellular fluid content, by extravasation of blood, by
increasing blood supply to the local area, and by mobilization of cells capable of removing cellular
debris and repairing any disruption.34 Moreover, it is acknowledged that tissues of the nervous
system, the brain being one of its components, and like any other tissue of the body, responds to
injury by the formation of edema or the retention of fluid.35 Hence, it is not quite farfetched that the
victim may have had cerebral edema as a result of the injury he sustained in the head. But just the
same, such a conclusion, as stated in the second post mortem report, does not necessarily preclude
the fact that the swelling or edema noted in the tissues of the brain may have been due to other
factors i.e., such as decomposition or the fact that the cadaver of the victim had already been
embalmed. The foregoing uncertainty is all the more reinforced by the testimony of Dr. Alambra and
her findings stated in the First Autopsy Report stating that there were no signs of damage to the
brain, external or internal. This, by itself, is very much inconsistent with the allegation that the
cerebral edema was the cause of death of the victim, which if it were so, would have already been
manifest at the time of death.

From a medical perspective, the abovediscussed issues are essentially significant and must be
established first before any correlation of the injury to the victim's cause of death is done. It is an
established fact that during decomposition, numerous cellular changes occur in the body. A
microscopic examination of the tissues (of the body) under the influence of "autolytic
enzymes"36 enzymes shows disintegration, swelling or shrinkage, vacuolization and formation of
small granules within the cytoplasm of the cells. 37 Therefore, the swelling of the brain, along with the
other organs of the victim as stated in the Pathology Report38 by the NBI, which reads:

FINDINGS

MICROSCOPIC DESCRIPTIONS:

Brain (cerebral cortex): and cerebellum) : sections show markedly widened spaces in the
virchow in the white matter of the cerebrum and collapsed walls of the capillaries.
Cloudy swelling of neurons and interstitial edema, marked.

Kidneys: sections show focal infiltrations of chronic inflammatory cells in the interstitium
accompanied by tubular atrophy and glomeruler sclerosis. Cloudy swelling of tubules in the
cortex, moderate. Medullary congestion, moderate. The cerebellum shows

Liver: sections show moderate congestion of red blood cells in the sinusoids and
cloudy swelling of liver cells.

Lungs: sections show marked congestion of pulmonary septae exhibiting numerous

macrophages containing hemusiderin pigments. Alternating atelectatic and hyperinflated
lung alveoli with emphysematous and bullae formation can be noted. Fibrosis in diffuse in
other areas with calcifications. The small bronchi are irregularly dilated.

Myocardium: congestion of capillaries and cloudy swelling of muscle fibers, moderate.

x x x x [Emphasis supplied.]

may have also been due to the decomposing state of the cadaver of the victim and not just that
caused by the head injury he sustained from the hands of petitioner Yadao.

Additionally, to delay the onset of decomposition, cadavers are embalmed. Embalming is the
artificial way of preserving the body after death by injecting 6 to 8 quarts of antiseptic solutions of
formalin, perchloride or mercury or arsenic, which is carried into the common carotid and the femoral
arteries.39 However, a dead body must not be embalmed before the autopsy. 40 The embalming fluid
may render the tissue and blood unfit for toxicological analyses. 41 The embalming may alter the
gross appearance of the tissues or may result to a wide variety of artifacts that tend to
destroy or obscure evidence.42 Thus, in the case at bar, even if the cadaver of the victim may not
have started decomposing at the time of the re-autopsy, all the same, the fact that such had already
been embalmed, any examination will likely lead to findings or conclusion not at all accurate as to
the true status of the tissues of the body of the victim.

From the above, absent further clarifications, Dr. Llavore's conclusion that the victim's cause of
death is cerebral edema is nothing but conjecture, being tenuous and flawed. Consequently, the
findings as stated in said autopsy report is not decisive of the of the issue of whether or not injury
sustained by the victim in his head when he was slapped by petitioner Yadao and/or when the victim
hit his head on the edge of the table were the sole cause of the cerebral edema observed in the
latter's brain during the re-autopsy conducted eight (8) days after his death. Again, it could have
been caused by other factors, one of which could have been the decomposition or the breakdown of
the cellular tissues of the body naturally occurring after death, or the fact that the cadaver of the
victim had already been previously embalmed.
Dr. Llavore's testimony that the cause of death of the victim was the collective effect of the blow
sustained by the latter's head; that the blow was strong enough to have caused the displacement of
the brain from its moorings and the resultant swelling. Such conclusion was brought about by the
doctor's external and internal examination of the brain of the victim. The records of the case,
however, is again bereft of any indication that the said inference or conclusion took into account the
fact that the cadaver of the victim had been previously autopsied, more importantly, that his brain
had been already been removed from its "moorings" by Dr. Alambra in order for her to take the same
out of the skull when she examined it.

Indeed, the evidence of the defense might not, by itself, suffice to emphatically negate the causal
relationship between the actions of petitioner Yadao causing injury to the victim and the cause of his
death, but the same must be considered in conjunction with the weakness of the evidence given by
the prosecution's witness discussed above. Defense witness Dr. Alambra's Autopsy Report, on top
of her testimony that upon opening the skull of the victim, she found nothing out of the ordinary in the
brain, tend to reinforce the doubt already engendered by the weakness of the prosecution's evidence
about the fundamental correlation of the injury and the cause of death. It was incumbent upon the
prosecution to demonstrate petitioner Yadao's culpability beyond a reasonable doubt, independently
of whatever the defense has offered to exculpate the latter. Conviction must rest on the strength of
the prosecution's evidence, not merely on conjectures or suppositions, and certainly not on the
weakness of the accused's defense; otherwise, the phrase "constitutional presumption of innocence"
will be reduced to nothing but an innocuous grouping of words; worse, to a conspicuous exercise in
futulity. As a rule, findings of fact of trial courts are accorded great weight, even finality, on appeal,
unless the trial court has failed to appreciate certain facts and circumstances that, if taken into
account, would materially affect the result of the case.43 In this case, prescinding from the above
discussion, it is arrantly manifest that the RTC, as well as the Court of Appeals, overlooked material
and relevant facts that could affect the outcome of the case. The constitutional presumption of
innocence aforementioned requires us to take "a more than casual consideration" of every
circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused as court have the imperative duty to
"put prosecution evidence under severe testing." 44

The principle has been dinned into the ears of the bench and the bar that in this jurisdiction,
accusation is not synonymous with guilt. 45 The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the
strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. 46 If the evidence is susceptible of
two interpretations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, the accused must be acquitted.47 The overriding consideration is not
whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt
as to his guilt.48 If there exist even one iota of doubt, this Court is "under a long standing legal
injunction to resolve the doubt in favor of herein accused-petitioner."49

From the foregoing, the inevitable conclusion is that the guilt of petitioner Yadao has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. The facts of the case, the autopsy reports, as well as the
testimony of Dr. Llavore do not definitely establish that the assault was the proximate cause of the
death of the victim. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the blow inflicted on the head of
the victim resulted in an edematous condition of the brain, petitioner Yadao would still not be held
liable for the death as the prosecution failed to present proof that said act was
the efficient and proximate cause of the victim's demise. An acquittal based on reasonable doubt
will prosper even though the accused's innocence may be doubted. 50 It is better to free a guilty man
than to unjustly keep in prison one whose guilt has not been proved by the required quantum of
evidence. For only when there is proof beyond any shadow of doubt that those responsible should
be made answerable.51

The heirs of the victim, however, have not completely lost their case. Settled in jurisprudence is the
principle that a court may acquit an accused on reasonable doubt and still order payment of civil
damages in the same case. 52 In this case, though petitioner Yadao is acquitted, nonetheless, his
liability for damages is not considered extinguished since the judgment of acquittal is not based on a
pronouncement that the facts from which civil claims might arise did not exist. Accordingly, this Court
awards P50,000.00 as civil damages to the heirs of the victim.

WHEREFORE, the 28 March 1996 Decision of the Regional Tial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch
33, as well as the 18 April 2001 Decision and 13 November 2001 Resolution both of the Court of
Appeals are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Petitioner Artemio Yadao is ACQUITTED of the
charge of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt. His immediate release from custody is
hereby ordered unless he is being held for other lawful causes. However, Petitioner Artemio Yadao
is ordered to pay the heirs of victim Deogracias Gundran in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.