Herman Bavinck's Yes' and Karl Barth's No'

Modern Theology 35:2 April 2019 DOI: 10.1111/moth.
12469
ISSN 0266-7177 (Print)
ISSN 1468-0025 (Online)
HERMAN BAVINCK’S ‘YES’ AND KARL

BARTH’S ‘NO’: CONSTRUCTING A
DIALECTIC-IN-ORGANIC APPROACH
TO THE THEOLOGY OF GENERAL
REVELATION
XIMIAN XU
Abstract
By grounding theology in God’s revelation, Herman Bavinck (1854-1921) and Karl Barth (1886-1968) take
differing attitudes to general revelation, which is widely accepted in the circle of Reformed theology. Bavinck
firmly says ‘Yes’ to the existence of the knowledge of God in creation. In contrast with him, Barth holds fast
to the Christocentric view of God’s revelation, and thus says ‘No’ to general revelation in the universe. This
divergence is primarily due to their different theological thinking and concerns. Bavinck deploys organic
thinking in revelation and focuses on God’s creation, which seems to blur the distinction between general and
special revelation. By contrast, Barth makes use of dialectical thinking and preoccupies himself with divine-
human reconciliation, which subordinates creation to God’s redemption. To this extent, both bring about
disparities within God’s revelation. This essay proposes a dialectic-in-organic approach to general revelation,
which affirms the disclosure of the knowledge of the Triune God in creation, recognises the independent
value of creation, and maintains the diversity-with-parity within the revelation of the Triune God.
Introduction
General revelation refers to the doctrine that knowledge of God disclosed in creation is
publically accessible for all human beings at all times and in all places. This teaching
has been widely accepted in the Reformed tradition since the Reformation. Nonetheless,
Reformed theologians are not unanimous in this regard. There have been longstanding
debates over the worth of this doctrine, particularly in the modern world, due to serious
challenges to natural theology. This essay will compare the views of general revelation
of two prominent modern Reformed theologians – Herman Bavinck (1854-1921), the
leading neo-Calvinist theologian, and Karl Barth (1886-1968), who many regard as be-
longing in stature to the likes of Augustine, Luther and Calvin.1
Ximian Xu
School of Divinity, University of Edinburgh, New College, Mound Place, Edinburgh, EH1 2LX, UK
Email: simeonximian@hotmail.com.
I would like to thank Dr Joshua Ralston for his advice and comments on this paper.
1
For example, Thomas F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology 1910-1931 (London:
T&T Clark, 2004), 15.
© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

324 Ximian Xu
There are several reasons why this comparative study is significant. First, both
Bavinck and Barth understand theology as grounded in God’s self-revelation.2 By
means of their common interest in God’s self-revelation, this study aims to parse out
similarities and differences in their respective theological systems. Second, this study
draws attention to the importance of the historical and cultural location of these two
major theologians. Bavinck’s works were largely completed before World War I in the
Netherlands, whereas Barth wrote his theological writings mainly after World War I in
Switzerland and Germany. To be sure, both worked painstakingly to counter the dom-
inant nineteenth-century liberal theologies. This study elaborates how both Reformed
thinkers responded to the challenges to the orthodox Christian faith in their respective
contexts. Third, scholars concur that Bavinck had an impact on Barth. In particular,
Barth is indebted to Bavinck’s theology of the Word of God, though to what extent is
debated.3 However, current Bavinckian and Barthian scholarship has not comprehen-
sively explored the extent to which Barth’s theology is influenced by Bavinck’s. This
study aims to fill that gap.
Bavinck and Barth advance two diametrically opposite views of general revelation.
The former insists on the disclosure of the knowledge of God in creation, whereas the
latter emphatically says ‘No’. In order to expound their differing views, this article shall
investigate several questions by focusing on Barth’s Church Dogmatics (CD) (I/1-II/1)
and Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics (RD) as well as The Philosophy of Revelation (PR): (1)
What are Bavinck’s and Barth’s views of general revelation? (2) Why does Bavinck say
‘Yes’ to general revelation but Barth say ‘No’? (3) Given the significance of organic and
dialectical thinking in their respective theologies, how is this thinking deployed so as
to, on the one hand, affirm and, on the other, reject general revelation? (4) Are there cer-
tain historical events or theories to which Bavinck and Barth respond with their views
of general revelation?
By dealing with these questions, I shall demonstrate that both Bavinck’s reception
and Barth’s rejection of general revelation are grounded in the otherness of the Triune
God and God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ. Hence, their difference is less stark than
first impressions might suggest. Bavinck’s theology of general revelation is charac-
terised as organic and focuses on God’s creation. He runs a risk of subsuming God’s
redemptive revelation in Jesus Christ to general revelation. By contrast, Barth’s rejec-
tion of general revelation is due to his soteriologically-centred concern, preconditioned
by theological dialectic, especially the Realdialektik of the divine-human antithesis.
Barth holds so fast to a Christocentric understanding of God’s revelation that cre-
ation is dependent upon God’s salvation. In short, a number of disparities afflict both
Bavinck’s and Barth’s accounts of God’s general revelation. In response, I propose a
dialectic-in-organic theology of general revelation that is able to affirm the disclosure
of the knowledge of God in creation, recognise the independent value of creation, and
maintain the diversity-with-parity within God’s revelation.
In section I, I will demonstrate Bavinck’s organic thinking and reception of general
revelation, exploring how Bavinck deploys organic thinking in his ‘Yes’. Then, in sec-
tion II, I investigate Barth’s dialectical thinking and rejection of general revelation,
2
See Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, trans. John Vriend, ed. John Bolt, 4 vol. (Grand Rapids, MI:
Baker Academic, 2003-2008), 1:213, 2:296 (hereafter RD); Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, eds. Geoffrey W.
Bromiley and Thomas F. Torrance, 5 vol. (London: T&T Clark, 2004), I/1, 295-6 (hereafter CD).
3
On further, see John A. Vissers, ‘Karl Barth’s Appreciative Use of Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics’,
Calvin Theological Journal 45, no. 1 (2010): 79-86.

Herman Bavinck’s ‘Yes’ and Karl Barth’s ‘No’ 325
which will be followed by examining how Barth deploys dialectical thinking in his
‘No’. In the third section I lay out my own dialectic-in-organic approach to the theol-
ogy of general revelation, which is based on the common grounds of Bavinck’s ‘Yes’
and Barth’s ‘No’.
Bavinck’s Organic Thinking and ‘Yes’ to General Revelation

In what follows, I argue that Bavinck’s reception of general revelation is swayed by his
organic thinking, which is primarily predicated upon his Trinitarian theology. First, I de-
lineate the contexts of Bavinck’s theology of revelation. Then, I present James Eglinton’s
new reading of Bavinck’s organic motif, following which I expound Bavinck’s theology
of general revelation. Finally, I examine how Bavinck deploys his organic thinking.
The Contexts of Bavinck’s Theology of Revelation

Given that Bavinck’s theology of revelation is mainly presented in RD and PR, the rel-
evant contexts span the period from 1890 to 1910. Two contextual aspects should be
considered.
First, the conflict of theology and religious studies in the Netherlands at the time was
crucial for the formulation of Bavinck’s theology of revelation. As early as 1848, Cornelis
W. Opzoomer (1821-92) proposed that theological faculties should be removed from
universities.4 Although this proposal was never effected, the Higher Education Act
(1876) introduced religious studies into universities but retained the title ‘the Faculty of
Theology’. Bavinck protested this development, arguing that ‘in this way theology is
maimed and robbed of its heart and life.’5 For Bavinck, the reality of God’s self-revelation
could resolve this conflict and safeguard the place of theology in scientific universities.6
Specifically, God’s general revelation in creation could strengthen Bavinck’s defence of
theology in the academy in confrontation with religious studies.
Second, in the Netherlands of the 1890s and the first decade of the twentieth century,
the supernatural worldview—which included such notions as ‘God’, ‘revelation’, and
‘miracle’—was re-introduced into religion and theology. This new cultural tendency,
called ‘new modernism’, opposed nineteenth-century modernism that immanentised
God and was antithetical to the transcendent.7 Hence, what was at issue then was ‘how
to implement the supernatural worldview in modern culture.’8 Bavinck knew that those
formerly dismissed orthodox doctrines ‘have again come into conversation.’9 On the
other hand, Bavinck also firmly objected to naturalistic, mechanical and monistic
worldviews of early Dutch modernists, which insisted on human subjectivity and
4
Herman Bavinck, ‘Theology and Religious Studies: Appendix B’, in Essays on Religion, Science and
Society, ed. John Bolt, trans. Harry Boonstra (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,
2008), 281. Cornelis Willem Opzoomer is championed as the second father of modernism in the Netherlands.
5
Ibid., 283.
6
James Eglinton, Trinity and Organism: Towards a New Reading of Herman Bavinck’s Organic Motif (London:
T&T Clark, 2012), 135.
7
James D. Bratt, ‘The Context of Herman Bavinck’s Stone Lectures: Culture and Politics in 1908’, The
Bavinck Review 1 (2010): 13-4, 17.
8
George Harinck, ‘Why Was Bavinck in Need of a Philosophy of Revelation?’, in The Kuyper Center
Review, Volume 2: Revelation and Common Grace, ed. John Bowlin (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 2011), 38-40.
9
Herman Bavinck, ‘Modernism and Orthodoxy’, trans. Bruce R. Pass, Bavinck Review 7 (2016): 87, 92; also
see Eldred Cornelius Vanderlaan, Protestant Modernism in Holland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924),
110-1.

326 Ximian Xu
threatened the doctrine of special revelation.10 Thus, Bavinck’s task was to elaborate
God’s revelation and its relation to ‘the rest of our knowledge and life.’11 Central to this
task was how God’s revelation in nature and history is related to all human beings.
James Eglinton’s New Reading of Bavinck’s Organic Motif

The traditionally normative reading of Bavinck’s theology is dominated by the theory
of ‘two Bavincks’, which views Bavinck as vacillating between orthodoxy and moder-
nity. These ‘two poles’ shape a tension throughout Bavinck’s life.12
A new reading of Bavinck’s organicism, which is mainly advocated by James Eglinton,
robustly defends the unity of Bavinck’s theology.13 Rather than drawing on German
idealism, Eglinton argues that Bavinck’s organic motif is rooted in the Patristic and
Reformation traditions.14 The rationale of Bavinck’s organicism is: ‘[the] Trinity ad intra
leads to organism ad extra.’15
In light of Christelijke Wereldbeschouwing, Eglinton sums up four principles of Bavinck’s
organicism. First, unity and diversity simultaneously exist in creation. Second, ‘unity
precedes diversity.’ Third, ‘the organism’s shared life is orchestrated by a common idea’,
which obliterates the chaos within organism. Fourth, the glory of the Triune God is the
ultimate telos of the organism.16 At bottom, Bavinck views God’s archetypal Triunity as
the foundation of the ectypal unity and diversity in the creation.17 These four principles
reflect Bavinck’s insistence that ‘the confession of God’s Trinity functions at the center
of [human] thought and life.’18 Logically, Bavinck’s whole theology is Trinitarian and
pervaded by organic thinking. Thus, Bavinck’s theology of general revelation is also
organic in character. In other words, his reception of general revelation is grounded in
the doctrine of the Trinity and manifests organic thinking.
Bavinck’s Theology of General Revelation

Bavinck’s discourse on the theology of revelation immediately follows his elaboration
on the religious foundation of dogmatics. In this regard, Bavinck maintains that reli-
gion consists of the subjective (fear of and faith in God) and the objective (God’s revela-
tion).19 ‘[The] objective religion is the nursery of subjective religion.’20 Therefore, Bavinck
maintains that the idea of revelation is not unique to Christianity; rather, it is common
and essential to all religions.21 This inclusive view of Christianity and other religions
reflects organic thinking (the unity of God’s work ad extra) and Bavinck’s positive view
of other religions.
10
For example, Cornelis Willem Opzoomer, De leer van God bij Schelling, Hegel, en Krause (Leiden: J. H.
Gebhard, 1846), 99.
11
Herman Bavinck, The Philosophy of Revelation (New York: Longmans, 1909), 24 (hereafter PR).
12
Jan Veenhof, Revelatie en Inspiratie (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1968), 108; also see R. H.
Bremmer, Herman Bavinck als Dogmaticus (Kampen: Kok, 1961), 386.
13
For Eglinton’s engagement with Mattson, see Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 60-2; Brian G. Mattson,
Restored to Our Destiny: Eschatology & the Image of God in Herman Bavinck’s Reformed Dogmatics (Leiden: Brill,
2012), 47-54.
14
Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 54.
15
Ibid., 80.
16
Ibid., 67-9.
17
Ibid., 79.
18
RD, 2:330.
19
RD, 1:237-8.
20
RD, 1:250.
21
RD, 1:284-5; PR, 159-60.

What is Bavinck’s definition of revelation? For him, three elements are essential to
revelation.
(1) The existence of a personal divine being who originates the announcement;

(2) a truth, fact, or event that up until the time of its announcement was not yet
known;
(3) a human being to whom the announcement was made.22
The first element demonstrates that for Bavinck the Triune God is the cause of revela-
tion. This implies that revelation is essentially organic insofar as the organic ad extra is
grounded in the Trinity. Thus, Bavinck designates revelation as ‘an organism.’23
Moreover, that the Triune God originates the announcement means God’s self-revelation,
which is requisite to overwhelm ‘the qualitative distinction between the infinite and
the finite that is to be made between the Creator and his creatures.’24 The last two ele-
ments show that certain truths, facts or events will be revealed to humankind in his-
tory. This presupposes God’s creation, and indicates the historical character of
revelation. All these features are doubtless embodied in general revelation. Therefore,
Bavinck maintains that general revelation occurs in God’s ‘maintenance and gover-
nance of all things’ in nature and history.25
Although Bavinck does not set forth a clear definition of general revelation, his idea
of general revelation can be found in the following statement.
In creating the world by his word and making it come alive by his Spirit, God al-
ready delineated the basic contours of all subsequent revelation. … All that is and
happens is, in a real sense, a work of God and to the devout a revelation of his at-
tributes and perfections. That is how Scripture looks at nature and history. Creating,
sustaining, and governing together form one single mighty ongoing revelation of
God.26
The three hallmarks of Bavinck’s theology of general revelation come to the fore in this
statement.
First, Bavinck’s theology of general revelation is characterised as Trinitarian. Here,
Bavinck designates general revelation as the work of the Triune God by the phrases ‘his
word’ and ‘his Spirit.’ This reflects Bavinck’s extratrinitarian rationale: ‘all God’s works
ad extra are undivided and common to all three persons’, and ‘[a]ll things originate si-
multaneously from the Father through the Son in the Spirit.’27 Consequently, Bavinck
opposes the distinction between natural and supernatural revelation. He even critiques
the Reformers’ embrace of this distinction, arguing that to adopt such a distinction is de
facto to adopt a ‘dualistic dichotomy’ of God’s revelation.28 On the contrary, ‘[A]ll reve-
lation … is supernatural’ insofar as it originates from the Triune God.29
22
RD, 1:295.
23
Herman Bavinck, The Certainty of Faith, trans. Harry der Nederlanden (Ontario: Paideia Press, 1980), 61.
24
Bavinck, ‘Modernism and Orthodoxy’, 100; RD, 2:30.
25
RD, 1:310; PR, 83-4, 113, 135.
26
RD, 1:307.
27
RD, 2:329-40, 423.
28
RD, 1:304-6.
29
RD, 1:307.

328 Ximian Xu
What is striking in the Trinitarian character of general revelation is the role of the
Holy Spirit. In this regard, Bavinck differs from John Calvin. In Institutes of the Christian
Religion, the relationship between the Holy Spirit and general revelation only consists
in the Spirit denouncing all human cults and idolatry, which are contrived by human
blind minds.30 For Calvin, general revelation is static in the sense that it furnishes cer-
tain knowledge of God in the human mind, in nature and in history.31 By contrast,
Bavinck views general revelation as dynamic because of ‘[the] working of God’s Spirit.’32
Certain knowledge of God not only has been given in creation, but continues to be
given to humans by the work of the Spirit, inasmuch as ‘[God] is also immanent in all
creatures by His Word and Spirit.’33 Hence, Bavinck holds that general revelation is the
basis of the universality of religion.34 All human religions are the result of ‘an operation
of God’s Spirit and of his common grace’; religion is instituted by humanity who is ‘re-
ligiously inclined.’35
At first glance, Bavinck’s argument seems to confirm the human receptivity of God’s
revelation, which is reminiscent of Emil Brunner’s theory of the point of contact
(Anknüpfungspunkt). Brunner contends that the point of contact for the knowledge of
God is ‘the formal imago Dei,’ which indicates the ‘humanitas.’36 Bavinck also employs a
similar language: ‘God can both objectively and subjectively reveal himself to human
beings created in his image.’37 However, the important point for Bavinck is not ‘image’
but rather ‘God’, which fundamentally repudiates human subjectivity. By means of the
Holy Spirit, God continues to work in creation, even in the non-Christian.38 Eugene
Heideman rightly notes that whereas Brunner grounds the theory of the point of con-
tact in the formal imago Dei, Bavinck articulates his version of this theory in God’s ac-
tivity through the working of the Holy Spirit.39 Therefore, Bavinck maintains that ‘in
general revelation [Christians] have a point of contact with all those who bear the name
“human.”’40
Furthermore, the Holy Spirit is for Bavinck not abstract but ‘the personal immanent
cause by which all things live and move and have their being, receive their own form
and configuration, and are led to their destination, in God.’41 In this respect, Karl Barth
neglects ‘the continuous, new and eschatologically directed role of the Spirit’ in God’s
30
John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Volume 1&2, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, ed. John T. McNeill
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2011), I.v.13.
31
Ibid., I.iii.1, I.v.1-10.
32
RD, 1:318; emphasis added.
33
Herman Bavinck, Christelijke Wereldbeschouwing, 2nd ed. (Kampen: J. H. Bos, 1913), 56; Dutch original:
‘Hij is met Zijn Woord en Geest ook immanent in al het geschapene.’
34
PR, 142, 159.
35
RD, 1:319.
36
Emil Brunner, ‘Nature and Grace’, in Natural Theology, trans. Peter Fraenkel (London: The Centenary
Press, 1946), 31.
37
RD, 1:308; also see PR, 1-2.
38
Herman Bavinck, ‘Calvin and Common Grace,’ trans. Geerhardus Vos, The Princeton Theological Review
7, no. 3 (1909): 455.
39
Eugene Heideman, The Relation of Revelation and Reason in E. Brunner and H. Bavinck (Assen: Van
Gorcum, Prakke & Prakke, 1959), 186.
40
RD, 1:321; emphasis added.
41
RD, 2:423.

creation.42 By contrast, Bavinck’s emphasis on the continuous work of the Spirit under-
scores his Trinitarian principle of the theology of general revelation.
The second hallmark of Bavinck’s theology of general revelation is its focus on God’s
creation.
Creation was the first revelation, the principle and foundation of all revelation; but,
on the other hand, every revelation is also a creation, a divine work, in order to
accomplish something new, to make a new commencement, and to unlock the pos-
sibility of a new development.43
For Bavinck, creation by the Triune God lays the foundation of the understanding of
God’s revelation. As Geerhardus Vos argues, ‘[t]he doctrine of creation forms the basis
of the doctrine of revelation’ inasmuch as God as the Creator wills to reveal Himself to
the world created.44
This creationally-focused view renders revelation as bound up with history, because
for Bavinck ‘[c]reation is not just a past event but a continuous process.’45 Hence, what
matters is the chronological sequence of God’s revelation in history that begins with
creation. For Bavinck, each period in history has not only horizontal significance but
‘vertically its own significance for God, who created and guided it.’46 Moreover, Bavinck
writes that ‘[revelation] is history; it consists of words and facts that have obtained a
place in the life and history of mankind.’47 The words ‘revelation is history’ are
reminiscent of Wolfhart Pannenberg’s view of revelation as history, for whom God’s
‘self-revelation ... is … brought about by means of the historical acts of God,’ and will be
‘comprehended completely … at the end of the revealing history’; thus, revelation as
history is characterised by ‘a universal character.’48 Stanley Grenz observes that
Pannenberg’s purpose is to eliminate the distinction between special and general reve-
lation. Revelation is general insofar as it is accessible for everyone as history; revelation
is special insofar as it discloses, as history, God’s salvific activities.49 By contrast, Bavinck
is always insisting on the organic relationship between general and special revelation.
While arguing that revelation is history, Bavinck’s emphasis is that revelation is requisite
for interpreting history. History cannot provide the meaning of itself; rather, the mean-
ing of history is drawn from faith and given by revelation.50 In this way general revela-
tion is constitutive of things that happened in history, including non-Christian events.
42
David Fergusson, ‘Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Creation: Church-bells beyond the Stars’, International
Journal of Systematic Theology 18, no. 4 (2016): 429.
43
PR, 265; also see RD, 1:307, 2:407.
44
Geerhardus Vos, Reformed Dogmatics, Volume 1: Theology Proper, trans. Richard Gaffin, eds. Richard
Gaffin and Kim Batteau (Bellingham, WA: Lexham, 2014), 159.
45
Jan Veenhof, ‘Revelation and Grace in Herman Bavinck’, in Revelation and Common Grace, ed. John
Bowlin, The Kuyper Center Review, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011),
4; also see John Bolt, A Theological Analysis of Herman Bavinck’s Two Essays on the Imitatio Christi: Between
Pietism and Modernism (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2013), 193, 247.
46
PR, 125.
47
Bavinck, The Certainty of Faith, 61.
48
Wolfhart Pannenberg, ‘Dogmatic Theses on the Concept of Revelation’, in Revelation as History (London:
Sheed and Ward, 1969), 125, 131, 135.
49
Stanley J. Grenz, Reason for Hope: The Systematic Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1990), 40.
50
PR, 133, 142.

330 Ximian Xu
Given the intimate relationship of general revelation and history, general revelation
involves, for Bavinck, the whole creation. He believes that ‘[r]evelation … in its periph-
ery extends to the uttermost ends of creation. … With the whole of nature, with the
whole of history, with the whole of humanity, with the family and society, with science
and art it is intimately connected.’51 By adopting such a position, Bavinck is able, on the
one hand, to repudiate any naturalistic denial of divine revelation, and defend the pos-
itive relation of general revelation to every domain of human life. Moreover, and on the
other hand, Bavinck is able to respond to the new modernism by expounding on how
God’s revelation relates to the modern world.
The third hallmark is Christocentrism. Bavinck argues that ‘[a]ll the revelations and
words of God, in nature and history, in creation and re-creation, both in the Old and the
New Testament, have their ground, unity, and center in [Christ].’52 This Christocentric
character of general revelation is due to Christ as the Mediator of creation.53 Hence,
Bavinck even contends that there is an illumination of the Logos among pagans. This
illumination is operating through the work of the Spirit so that humans ‘can under-
stand God’s general revelation in nature and history.’54
Bavinck’s Christocentric (pre-incarnational-Logos centred) understanding of general
revelation is not unique. Geerhardus Vos argues that the Prologue of the Gospel of John
‘links together creation and redemption as both mediated by the same Logos.’55 Both
Bavinck and Vos agree that the Christocentric understanding of God’s special revela-
tion in Christ’s salvation safeguards the Christocentric view of general revelation in the
Logos’ creation. It should be noted that Bavinck’s notion of ‘Logos’ here differs from
Barth’s. According to Barth, the Logos in John 1:1 ‘is unmistakably substituted for
Jesus.’56 For Bavinck, the Logos of creation is in the abstract, the Logos asarkos, whereas
the Logos of redemption is Jesus Christ, the Logos ensarkos. Therefore, Bavinck’s
Christocentric understanding of general revelation is grounded on the second person
of the Triune God—predicated, in other words, on intradivine relationality. As Bavinck
writes, ‘[g]eneration and procession in the divine being are the immanent acts of God,
which make possible the outward works of creation and revelation.’57
Moreover, Bavinck’s Christocentric view of general revelation regards Christ as the
centre of revelation as organism. ‘In Christ, in the middle of history, God created an
organic center; from this center, in an ever widening sphere, God drew the circles
within which the light of revelation shines.’58 Hence, the whole general revelation is
concentrated in Christ, the Logos. General revelation can therefore be truly compre-
hended in Christ alone. The corollary is that Bavinck holds a Christocentric view of
history. Specifically, due to the inseparable relationship of history to general revelation
that is an organism, history is also an organism, and Christ is its organic centre. The
51
PR, 27; also see RD, 1:310.
52
RD, 1:402.
53
RD, 2:423.
54
RD, 1:350; also see 1:318-9.
55
Geerhardus Vos, ‘The Range of the Logos Title in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel’, in Redemptive
History and Biblical Interpretation: The Shorter Writings of Geerhardus Vos, ed. Richard Gaffin (Phillipsburg, NJ:
P&R Publishing, 2001), 90.
56
CD, II/2, 96.
57
RD, 2:333.
58
RD, 1:383.

telos of this organic history ‘is the fullness of the Kingdom of God, the all-sided,
all-containing dominion of God.’59 This Christocentric understanding of the relation-
ship between general and special revelation enables Bavinck to articulate their funda-
mentally organic relationship.
In short, Bavinck’s theology of general revelation is essentially Trinitarian. In partic-
ular, his stress on the continuous work of the Holy Spirit renders God’s general revela-
tion as both dynamic and active. Moreover, Bavinck regards creation—that is, the first
extratrinitarian work—as the first divine revelation. This creationally-focused view
of general revelation accords history with a supernatural value. Intrinsic to these two
hallmarks is the Christocentric character of general revelation insofar as Christ is the
second person of the Trinity and the Mediator of creation. This Christocentric view
denotes Christ as the centre of revelation as organism.
Bavinck’s Organic Thinking in His Reception of General Revelation

Having set forth Eglinton’s new reading of Bavinck’s organic motif and Bavinck’s theol-
ogy of general revelation, a question arises: how does Bavinck deploy his organic think-
ing in the theology of general revelation?
In fact, from the three hallmarks described above, it could be inferred that general
revelation is essentially organic. According to Eglinton’s new reading that the Trinity ad
intra leads to organism ad extra, the Trinitarian hallmark de facto proves the organic
character of general revelation. The continuous work of the Holy Spirit implies that
general revelation is not random; rather, it has a definite telos—the glory and dominion
of God. As the work of the Triune God ad extra, creation is organic. By laying creation as
the foundation of general revelation, Bavinck states the principle of organic general
revelation: unity precedes diversity.60 Hence, general revelation penetrates creation and
history as a whole. Bavinck’s Christocentrism reinforces the organic thinking in his
theology of general revelation. As the organic centre of the organism ad extra, Christ is
doubtless the centre of both God’s general and special revelation. Thus, ‘[r]evelation
taken as a whole … will have reached its end and goal only in the parousia of Christ.’61
By virtue of this Christocentric view, Bavinck expressly points out the eschatological
telos of organic general revelation.
These three hallmarks thus converge on the organic character of general revelation,
which reflects how Bavinck’s theology of general revelation is formed by the doctrine of
the Trinity, the doctrine of creation, and Christology. In other words, for Bavinck, these
three doctrines do lead to the organic character of general revelation. Hence, to speak of
Bavinck’s organic general revelation is to discourse on a theology of general revelation
that is characterised as Trinitarian, creationally focused and Christocentric.
I pause here to consider James Eglinton’s observation that in RD the organic thought
disappears in Bavinck’s construction of the theory of general revelation, but reappears
again in reading general revelation through the lens of Scripture. Eglinton maintains
that this disappearance and reappearance underscores the fact that only by the aid of
Scripture can general revelation be rightly comprehended as the revelation of the Triune
God.62 To take Eglinton’s argument further, this disappearance and reappearance
59
PR, 141.
60
On Bavinck’s view of ‘unity precedes diversity’ in creation, see RD, 2:422.
61
RD, 1:382.
62
Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 149-51.

332 Ximian Xu
reflects the organic relationship of general and special revelation, which enhances the
deployment of organic thinking in Bavinck’s theology of general revelation.
Given that Christ is the organic centre of both creation and recreation, of both general
and special revelation, general and special revelation are essentially related. Bavinck
writes:
General revelation leads to special, special revelation points back to general. The
one calls for the other, and without it remains imperfect and unintelligible. Together
they proclaim the manifold wisdom which God has displayed in creation and
redemption.63
What is striking here is that general and special revelation are required for one another.
In the chronological sense, moreover, general revelation is more important than special
revelation. As Bavinck writes, ‘[n]ot only is special revelation founded on general reve-
lation, but it has taken over numerous elements from it … so every word of God in
special revelation is both spoken from above and yet brought to us along the pathway
of history.’64 For Bavinck, the organic relationship of general and special revelation is
being unfolded in the course of history, because history is an organism and Christ is the
organic centre.
Given this organic relationship, Bavinck asserts that ‘[r]evelation in nature and reve-
lation in Scripture form, in alliance with each other, a harmonious unity which satisfies
the requirements of the intellect and the needs of the heart alike.’65 Two observations of
this organic relationship warrant comment. First, this organic relationship indicates
that Bavinck by no means regards general revelation as sufficient for knowing God.
Rather, Bavinck maintains that inasmuch as sin entered into creation, general revela-
tion is insufficient for a human to know God.66 He objects to using proofs for God’s
existence as the epistemological approach to the true knowledge of God, which is im-
parted via special revelation only.67 In this respect, Bavinck and Barth concur, though
Barth is more Christocentric, arguing that God’s revelation in Jesus Christ is the unique
way to know God truly. For Bavinck, despite the entrance of sin, the organic relation-
ship of general and special revelation safeguards general revelation from devolving
into a form of idolatry.68 Moreover, special revelation ‘takes up, confirms, and completes
all that had been from the beginning put into human nature by revelation and had been
preserved and increased subsequently in the human race.’69 By so doing, Bavinck uses
this organic relationship as a way to manifest the great extent to which the Christian
supernatural worldview is related to the modern world.
Second, this organic relationship is characterised by an ‘in alliance with’ rather than
an interchange. That is to say, general revelation and special revelation remain with one
another. Neither one is transformed nor assimilated into the other. Bearing in mind the
principle of organic thinking ‘simultaneous existence of unity and diversity’, there is no
wonder that Bavinck is always insisting on the distinction of general and special
63
PR, 28.
64
PR, 22-3.
65
PR, 310.
66
RD, 1:313-4.
67
RD, 2:77-91.
68
PR, 107.
69
PR, 188-9.

revelation. Thus, Robert Covolo rightly remarks that the unity in diversity restrains
Bavinck from conceding ‘the interchangeability of the two revelations.’70 This alliance
confirms the diversity within God’s revelation, and implies the influence of the human
fall on divine revelation. In Bavinck’s view, sin does not necessitate God’s revelation
insofar as it has already occurred before the human fall. What sin necessitates, rather, is
the specific content of revelation, especially the revelation of the person of Christ and
his saving work.71
A question emerges here: to what extent do general and special revelation differ?
According to Bavinck, creation is the foundation of all God’s revelation; hence, every
revelation subsequent to creation is also a creation. As such, God’s redemption is a form
of creation.72 According to some critics, Bavinck appears to ‘obliterate the distinction
between creative and redemptive acts of God.’73 Furthermore, his incarnational ap-
proach to general revelation seems also to blur the distinction between general and
special revelation. Bavinck writes, for example, that ‘[a]lready in creation God made
himself like human beings when he created them in his image. But in re-creation he
became human and entered totally into our nature and situation.’74 For some this incar-
national approach suggests that ‘special revelation tends to be degraded towards a spe-
cial instantiation of general revelation.’75 Evidence for this can be found in Bavinck’s
argument in Common Grace: ‘[a]fter the fall, God’s revelation takes another form on ac-
count of man’s sinful state; it flows forth entirely from God’s grace.’76 In this sense,
special revelation is a soteriological modification of general revelation.77 In short, Bavinck
seems to subsume the special revelation in Jesus Christ to general revelation.
Although Bavinck insists on the organic relationship of general and special revela-
tion, he does not set forth a clear boundary between them. This is probably because
Bavinck’s intention is to articulate how God’s special revelation aids the right com-
prehension of general revelation in nature and history. In any case, the deployment of
organic thinking in Bavinck’s theology of general revelation is clearly embodied in this
organic relationship, which strengthens the organic character of general revelation.
To what extent does organic thinking inform Bavinck’s ‘Yes’ to general revelation?
One might argue that Bavinck’s ‘Yes’ to general revelation is historically conditioned.
Inasmuch as RD and PR were completed prior to World War I, Bavinck held an optimis-
tic attitude to Western culture. It is not surprising, therefore, that he positively received
the doctrine of general revelation in nature and history. In my view, this judgment ex-
aggerates the importance of the historical context and ignores Bavinck’s pessimistic
attitude towards the modern world. In fact, in PR, which is the Stone Lectures delivered
70
Robert S. Covolo, ‘Beyond the Schleiermacher-Barth Dilemma: General Revelation, Bavinckian
Consensus, and the Future of Reformed Theology’, The Bavinck Review 3 (2012): 41.
71
RD, 1:359.
72
RD, 1:474.
73
Vos, ‘Review of Gereformeerde Dogmatiek – Vol. One by H. Bavinck’, in Redemptive History and Biblical
Interpretation: The Shorter Writings of Geerhardus Vos, ed. Richard Gaffin (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing,
2001), 479.
74
RD, 1:344.
75
Ernst Conradie, ‘On Jesus Christ as Mediator of Creation’, Nederduitse Gereformeerde Teologiese Tydskrif
54, no. 3-4 (2013): 6.
76
Herman Bavinck, ‘Common Grace’, trans. Raymond VanLeeuwen, Calvin Theological Journal 24, no. 1
(1989): 58.
77
The term ‘soteriological modification’ is taken from Heideman, The Relation of Revelation and Reason in
E. Brunner and H. Bavinck, 198.

334 Ximian Xu
in 1908-1909, Bavinck had already forecast five years before World War I that there
might be ‘a war which would surpass all previous wars’ in Western civilisation.78
What is clear thus far is that Bavinck’s explicit ‘Yes’ to general revelation is ultimately
theologically conditioned. For Bavinck, the ultimate foundation of the theology of gen-
eral revelation and organic thinking is the Triune God, who created all things. The re-
lation between the Creator and creation is debated in the modern world. Modern
thinkers such as Kant, Hegel, and Schleiermacher tend to stress the divine immanence
at the expense of the divine transcendence. By arguing for the organic character of gen-
eral revelation, Bavinck contends that the Triune God is immanent in every part of
creation yet remains transcendent.79 Steven Duby rightly notes that for Bavinck ‘God
continues to reveal himself in creation and supernaturally as well … [T]he telos of rev-
elation remains the same: the perfection and flourishing of human beings for the glory
of God.’80 Moreover, the way he deploys organic thinking in his theology of general
revelation allows him to maintain ‘the unity of nature and grace, of the world and the
kingdom of God.’81 In his view, it is not nature but rather sin that is antithetical to grace.
Grace and nature are ‘organically related’ via general revelation.82 For Bavinck, adopt-
ing a Christian worldview is neither an expression of world-flight nor of world-
conformity. Rather, the organic relationship of general and special revelation underlies
the belief that God will restore and renew both humanity and the whole cosmos.83 This
reflects Bavinck’s understanding of Calvinism: ‘[t]he term Calvinism … denotes a spe-
cific type in the political, social and civil spheres. It stands for that characteristic view
of life and the world as a whole.’84 Given this unity of grace and nature, Bavinck’s the-
ology of the organic general revelation could be understood as his effort to seek a lead-
ing position for Christianity in modern culture. In so doing, Bavinck defends the
legitimate place of theology in the academy of the Netherlands.
Summary
Bavinck’s organic theology of general revelation was a vigorous response to the conflict
of theology and religious studies in the universities of the Netherlands at the time.
Standing in the Reformed tradition, Bavinck draws on organic thinking and deploys it
in his theology of general revelation, which is characterised as Trinitarian, creationally
focused and Christocentric. Moreover, the organic relationship of general and special
revelation more clearly manifests the deployment of his organic thinking. Although
Bavinck does not delineate a clear boundary between these two revelations, it is un-
questionably the case for him that the organic character of general revelation serves as
78
PR, 303.
79
PR, 22.
80
Steven J. Duby, ‘Working with the Grain of Nature: Epistemic Underpinnings for Christian Witness in
the Theology of Herman Bavinck’, The Bavinck Review 3 (2012): 76.
81
RD, 1:322.
82
Eglinton, Trinity and Organism, 153. Due to space constraints, it is not possible here to explicate fully
Bavinck’s view of common grace and general revelation. On this point, see John Bowlin ed. Revelation and
Common Grace, The Kuyper Center Review, vol.2 (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,
2011), particularly 3-13, 81-104.
83
See RD, 1:346.
84
Herman Bavinck, ‘The Future of Calvinism’, trans. Geerhardus Vos, The Presbyterian and Reformed
Review 5, no. 17 (1894): 3.

the indispensable aid to special revelation, and thus the true approach to comprehend-
ing the knowledge of God in nature and history.
In contrast to Bavinck, Barth expresses a diametrically antithetical attitude toward
the doctrine of general revelation, insofar as he lays emphasis on God’s revelation
through the event of Jesus Christ alone.
Barth’s Dialectic Thinking and ‘No’ to General Revelation

In theological terms, ‘dialectical’ indicates the co-existence of two contradictory ele-
ments. This section argues that since theological dialectic is a permanent feature of
his theology, Barth’s rejection of general revelation should reflect a form of dialectical
thinking, central to which is his soteriological concern. In what follows, I will examine
the contexts of Barth’s theology of revelation. I will then demonstrate how Barth’s theo-
logical dialectic is an enduring feature of his theology. Finally, I will explicate Barth’s
theology of revelation and critically examine the dialectical character of his rejection of
general revelation.
The Contexts of Barth’s Theology of Revelation

The formation and formulation of Barth’s theology of revelation are historically related
to the two Great Wars in the twentieth century. After the outbreak of World War I, Barth
was disillusioned with the reaction of his liberal teachers, who viewed the war as in
some sense the revelation of God.85 But this reaction resulted in nothing short of a shak-
ing to the foundations of received ‘theological exegesis, ethics, dogmatics, and preach-
ing.’86 World War I, in other words, precipitated Barth’s break with liberalism and
stimulated him to re-consider ‘God’ and ‘revelation.’
In the wake of Protestant liberal theology’s response to World War I, Barth argues
that ‘what we needed for preaching, instruction, and pastoral care was a “wholly other”
theological foundation.’87 For him, the notion of ‘wholly other’ is anchored in the ideas
of ‘God’, ‘Jesus Christ’ and ‘revelation’. For Barth, God’s ‘unmediated, real revelation’
consists in and is mediated through none other than ‘Christ the Crucified.’88
Barth continued to re-consider and investigate the theology of revelation throughout
the rest of his life. This lifetime study shaped Barth’s formulation of this doctrine in
part through his confrontation with the German Christian movement, the latter of
which identified God’s law with the law of the German people. One guiding principle
of the German Christian movement was to espouse a blatant racialism purportedly
based on the divine law instituted in the creation of God.89 Needless to say, it gave rise
to certain formulations of, and support for, anti-Semitic policies. Suffice it to say that
central to this movement was a high view of natural or general revelation in creation,
which was taken as affirming National Socialism. It could be argued that the German
85
Karl Barth, Predigten 1914 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 1999), 523.
86
Karl Barth, ‘Concluding Unscientific Postscript on Schleiermacher’, in The Theology of Schleiermacher:
Lectures at Göttingen, Winter Semester of 1923/24, ed. Dietrich Ritschl, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids,
MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1982), 264.
87
Ibid.
88
Karl Barth, ‘Biblical Questions, Insights, and Vistas, 1920’, in The Word of God and Theology, trans. Amy
Marga (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 88; emphasis added.
89
German Christian National Church Union, ‘The Handbook of the German Christians (1933)’, in A
Church Undone: Documents from the German Christian Faith Movement, 1932-1940, trans. and ed. Mary M.
Solberg (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2015), 170-2.

336 Ximian Xu
Christian movement originated in a misunderstanding of God’s revelation. For Barth,

the German Christian movement, which was the worst variant of Neo-Protestantism,
betrayed the gospel.90
Dialectic as the Permanent Feature of Barth’s Theology

Interpretations of Barth’s theological ouvre are variously debated. One early reading is
to view Barth’s theology as divisible into three stages. The publication of the first edi-
tion of the Romans commentary (1919) signified Barth’s break with liberal theology.
Thereafter, Barth’s theology was dialectical during the 1920s, and then assumed an ana-
logical character in the early 1930s, particularly after Anselm: Fides quaerens intellectum
(1931). On this reading, there are two ‘conversions’ in the development of Barth’s
theology.91
In contrast with the ‘two conversions’ account, under the influence of Bruce
McCormack’s groundbreaking work, most scholars are now of the view that Barth re-
mained a dialectical theologian since the publication of the second edition of the
Romans commentary.92
For Barth, there are two basic implications and forms of theological dialectic. First, it
refers to a theological method, that is, the Denkform of dialectic in ‘human thinking and
speaking in theology.’93 He writes: ‘As theologians, we ought to speak of God. But we
are humans and as such cannot speak of God. We ought to do both, to know the “ought”
and the “not able to,” and precisely in this way give God the glory.’94 Moreover, this
dialectical thinking for Barth manifests human obedience to God and hope for divine
grace.95 Suffice it to say that Barth’s theological dialectic aims to uphold God’s sovereign
grace precisely because it displays the divine glory. This dialectical method continues
in CD. Therein, for example, Barth critiques the Christological mistakes of Ebionism
and Docetism, both of which issue from their respective misunderstandings of the dia-
lectical relationship between the humanity and deity of Jesus Christ.96
The second implication of Barth’s theological dialectic is the Realdialektik of the in-
finite divine-human qualitative distinction. Barth argues that ‘if I have a system, it is
limited to a recognition of what Kierkegaard called the “infinite qualitative distinction”
between time and eternity’, between God and humankind.97 This dialectic of the di-
vine-human distinction is reinforced by Barth’s Realdialektik of divine veiling and un-
veiling, which is Christologically determined – the hidden God reveals Himself in and
as Jesus Christ.98 This Realdialektik is echoed in Göttingen Dogmatics. Herein, Barth
90
‘Abschied, 1933’, Karl Barth, ‘Der Götze wackelt’: Zeitkritische Aufsätze, Reden und Briefe von 1930 bis 1960
(Berlin: Käthe Vogt Verlag, 1961), 66.
91
Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth: Exposition and Interpretation, trans. Edward T. Oakes
(San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1992), 64-113, particularly 93.
92
Bruce L. McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development,
1909-1936 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1-28.
93
Ibid., 11, 270.
94
Karl Barth, ‘The Word of God as the Task of Theology’, in The Word of God and Theology, trans. Amy
Marga (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 177.
95
Karl Barth, ‘Church and Theology (1925)’, in Theology and Church: Shorter Writings 1920-1928, trans.
Louise Pettibone Smith (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2015), 302.
96
CD, I/1, 404.
97
Barth, Romans II, 10.
98
Barth, Romans II, 369.

stresses that there is an unsurmountable divine-human contradiction, which can only

be overcome by God Himself through the event of Jesus Christ.99 Again, this implica-
tion of dialectic is clearly evident in CD, involving God’s otherness, hiddenness and
revealedness.100 In short, this second form of Barth’s theological dialectics lays out
God’s otherness and the divine-human antithesis, and is characterised as Christological.
What is the inner relationship between these two forms of theological dialectic?
Barth argues that ‘[t]he adjective “dialectical” describes a way of thinking arising from
man’s conversation with the sovereign God who encounters him.’101 Bruce McCormack
thus rightly notes that the Denkform of dialectic stems from the Realdialektik, particu-
larly and fundamentally from ‘the dialectic of veiling and unveiling in revelation.’102 As
a permanent feature of Barth’s theology, theological dialectic should feature in his the-
ology of revelation as well as in his rejection of general revelation.
Barth’s Theology of Revelation

Unlike the conventional structure of dogmatics, which expounds the doctrine of God
after the elaboration of the doctrines of Holy Scripture and of the one God, Barth dem-
onstrates the doctrine of the Trinity firstly in dealing with the doctrine of revelation. He
argues that the true understanding of God’s revelation is anchored in the awareness of
the fact that ‘God, the Revealer, is identical with His act in revelation and also identical
with its effect.’103 Evidently, the question ‘who is the Revealer?’ is for Barth more impor-
tant than ‘what is Revelation?’; the ontological question is the foundation of the ques-
tion of God’s revelation. Therefore, the human possibility of knowing God is located in
the immanent Trinity insofar as God is the Revealer, Revelation and Revealedness.
Barth de facto rejects human subjectivity and affirms divine objectivity as the locus of
revelation.104 This highlights God’s otherness and the Realdialektik of the divine-human
antithesis. As Peter Kline rightly notes, ‘[t]he doctrine of the Trinity is the engine of this
dialectic since it supports the affirmation that the event of revelation is itself the event
of God’s utterly free and lordly essence.’105
Barth’s concern to underscore the ontological priority of the Revealer is clearly evi-
dent. What, then, is revelation? From the sustained and comprehensive elaboration of
the theology of revelation in CD, three statements—which may serve as theses—might
be singled out as constitutive of Barth’s theology of revelation.
Thesis 1: ‘[I]t is God Himself, it is the same God in unimpaired unity, who accord-
ing to the biblical understanding of revelation is the revealing God and the event
of revelation and its effect on man.’106
99
Karl Barth, The Göttingen Dogmatics: Instruction in the Christian Religion, Volume One, trans. Geoffrey W.
Bromiley, ed. Hannelotte Reiffen (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1991), 78.
100
For example, CD, I/1, 315, 320.
101
‘To Kroner Verlag, 7 March 1954’ cited by Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and
Autobiographical Texts, trans. John Bowden (Eugene, OR: Wipf&Stock, 2005), 144.
102
McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology, 274.
103
CD, I/1, 296.
104
Bruce McCormack argues that since the first edition of the Romans commentary, Barth shows no in-
terest in ‘the locus of revelation in human subjectivity.’ McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical
Theology, 135.
105
Peter Kline, ‘“You Wonder Where the Spirit Went”: Barth and Jenson on the Hiddenness of God’, in
Karl Barth in Conversation, ed. W. Travis McMaken and David W. Congdon (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2014), 92.
106
CD, I/1, 299.

338 Ximian Xu
Three observations are worth noting with respect to the statement above. First, reve-
lation is the sovereign and active action of the Triune God, which refers to humans as
passive recipients. A clear differentiation between God’s activeness and human pas-
siveness indicates Barth’s dialectical thinking and highlights the divine-human antith-
esis. Together, they both stress God’s otherness.107 Moreover, Barth’s opposition to the
traditional orthodox teaching of vestigia trinitatis—which is well accepted by Bavinck,
referring to the existence of the vestiges of the Triune God in creation, particularly in
human nature—reinforces Barth’s dialectical approach.108 For Barth, the doctrine of
vestigia trinitatis obliterates the infinitely qualitative difference in the divine-human
distinction, and undermines the revelation as the foundation of the doctrine of the
Trinity.109 By his uncompromising insistence on God’s otherness, Barth argues that ‘the
[only] true vestigium trinitatis is the form assumed by God in revelation.’110 Specifically,
the humanity of Jesus Christ is the sole vestigium trinitatis. This reflects Barth’s decisive
Christocentric understanding of God’s revelation.
Barth’s rejection of the teaching of vestigia trinitatis in CD I/1 paves the way for his
opposition to the theory of analogia entis in CD II/1. Therein, Barth objects to any ‘anal-
ogy on the basis of which the nature and being of God’ can be accessible for human-
kind.111 In his view, ‘[r]evelation is the revelation of lordship and therewith it is the
revelation of God.’112 Hence, the absolute lordship of God is the fundamental ground of
Barth’s rejection of analogies applied to God.113 For Barth, if there were analogia entis,
humans would be capable of knowing God apart from God’s revelation. In order to
guard against this error, human knowledge of God should be restricted to the encroach-
ment of God’s revelation; for Barth, the knowability of God is to be found not in the
analogia entis but in the analogy of grace and faith.114 In other words, Barth’s opposition
to analogia entis is motivated by his ‘struggle against the denial of sovereign grace, …
against every form of synergism’ inasmuch as no human intrinsic capacity given in
creation can make humans capable of knowing God under the influence of sin.115
A second observation worth considering is that Barth’s resolute rejection of any syn-
ergistic view of revelation undergirds his insistence on God’s self-revelation. Kant’s
epistemological revolution should be considered here. Kant’s philosophical epistemology
severs the phenomenal from the noumenal in a way that knowledge is a merely human
constructed experience. As a result, the knowledge of God is restricted to the domain of
human experience. For Barth, however, God’s self-revelation bridges the noumenal and
the phenomenal. ‘[T]his Subject [God] is objectively present to the speakers and hearers,
107
McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology, 17. This is not to suggest that for Barth
humans are merely passive. As John Webster points out, for Barth ‘the defeat of sin [in Jesus Christ] is a
summons to us to recover our agency and assume the liberty in which we stand.’ John Webster, Barth’s Moral
Theology: Human Action in Barth’s Thought (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 76.
108
RD, 2:421-2.
109
CD, I/1, 334.
110
CD, I/1, 339.
111
CD, II/1, 76-8.
112
CD, I/1, 306.
113
CD, II/1, 79.
114
CD, II/1, 85.
115
G. C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth, trans. H. R. Boer (London: Paternoster,
1956), 194; Keith L. Johnson, Karl Barth and the Analogia Entis (London: T&T Clark, 2010), 120.

so that man in the Church really stands before God.’116 In other words, ‘if genuine
knowledge of God … were to be possible, then God must enter into the realm of intuit-
ability. God must make himself to be phenomenal.’117
The third observation concerns Barth’s stress on Holy Scripture. For Barth, Holy
Scripture is the witness to God’s revelation and thus a legitimate source of our knowl-
edge of God.118 By insisting that God’s revelation is objectively witnessed by Scripture,
any hint of a human subjectivism in knowing God is completely eradicated. Thus, the
witness and language of the prophets and apostles in Holy Scripture are not free inven-
tions but rather determined by God’s revelation.119 Human freedom does not depend
on itself; rather, it is God who turns human beings toward God to receive God’s revela-
tion.120 Barth defends God’s otherness and the Realdialektik of the divine-human quali-
tative distinction by establishing Holy Scripture as the authoritative witness against
human authority. In this light it is clear to see why Barth emphatically opposes natural
theology insofar as it claims its independent authority apart from Holy Scripture.
Thesis 2: ‘Revelation in the Bible means the self-unveiling, imparted to men, of the
God who by nature cannot be unveiled to men.’121
According to this statement, the dialectic of God’s self-unveiling and veiling is essen-
tial to Barth’s theology of revelation. God’s self-unveiling does not indicate the human
capacity of grasping God’s revelation. Conversely, God in God’s self-unveiling is inscru-
table to humanity, which means that God’s sovereign freedom to choose the way and
the form by which God encounters human beings manifests the character of divine
revelation.122 In short, God veils Himself in His self-unveiling.123
Why does God veil Himself? Barth explains that,
[God] does not belong to the sphere of what man as a creature can know directly.
Nor can He be unveilable for man indirectly in the created world, for He is the Holy
One to see whom, even indirectly, other eyes are needed than these eyes of ours
which are corrupted by sin.124
Terry Cross puts it well: ‘God remains hidden partly because of our finitude and
partly because of our sin.’125 In light of human finitude, what is requisite is God’s sov-
ereignty and freedom in God’s objective revelation. Furthermore, given the influence of
116
CD, II/1, 3. As a theologian (not a philosopher), Barth’s intent is to re-appeal to supernatural revelation
of God as authoritative in the post-Kantian intellectual context. See Cornelis van der Kooi, As in a Mirror:
John Calvin and Karl Barth on Knowing God, trans. Donald Mader (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 225-6.
117
Bruce McCormack, ‘Beyond Nonfoundational and Postmodern Readings of Barth: Critically Realistic
Dialectical Theology’, in Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Academic, 2008), 125.
118
CD, I/1, 107-8; I/2, 207-8.
119
CD, I/2, 7.
120
CD, I/2, 210.
121
CD, I/1, 315.
122
CD, I/1, 321.
123
CD, I/1, 169.
124
CD, I/1, 320.
125
Terry L. Cross, Dialectic in Karl Barth’s Doctrine of God (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 151.

340 Ximian Xu
sin on human cognition, God has prescribed a method of revelation that directs hu-
mans in revelation to know Himself. Human sinfulness lays bare the human need of
redemptive grace. Because of this universal need for grace, Barth rejects human reli-
gion as unbelief insofar as religion refers to human efforts to justify and sanctify them-
selves.126 Consequently, no religion is true unless it is both judged and exalted by God’s
revelation in His redemptive grace.127
The Realdialektik of God’s veiling and unveiling in CD I/1 anticipates the dialectic of
God’s hiddenness and revealedness in CD II/1. Therein, Barth references Bavinck’s em-
phasis on the hiddenness of God.128 Barth argues that the divine hiddenness is the
starting point (terminus a quo) of the human knowledge of God.129 This serves to under-
score God as the primary subject of the knowledge of God.
The hiddenness of God is the inconceivability … of the one true God, our Creator,
Reconciler and Redeemer, who as such is known only to Himself, and is therefore
viewable and conceivable only to Himself, and alone capable of speaking of Himself
aright, i.e., in truth.130
This means that humankind is the secondary subject of the knowledge of God, which
is ‘taken up into’ God’s self-knowledge.131 Therefore, we recognise in faith that ‘our
knowledge of God begins in all seriousness with the knowledge of the hiddenness of
God.’132 Barth here sets forth the idea of analogia fidei—that is, that ‘the knowledge of
God as knowledge of faith’ refers to an analogical correspondence between God’s
self-knowledge and the human knowledge of God in grace.133
Barth’s insistence on the divine hiddenness does not lapse into theological agnosti-
cism, however. For him, the analogia fidei ultimately points to Jesus Christ.134 ‘In [God’s]
revelation, in Jesus Christ, the hidden God has indeed made Himself apprehensible.
Not directly, but indirectly.’135 This means that the hiddenness and the revealedness are
at once reconciled in Jesus Christ. For Barth, both God’s hiddenness and God’s re-
vealedness consist in the humanity of Jesus Christ.136 This Realdialektik of God’s veiling
and unveiling is essentially grounded in and determined by Christocentric definition
of God’s revelation.
Thesis 3: ‘Revelation in fact does not differ from the person of Jesus Christ nor from
the reconciliation accomplished in Him. To say revelation is to say “The Word be-
came flesh.”’137
126
CD, I/2, 323-4.
127
CD, I/2, 326.
128
CD, II/1, 186.
129
CD, II/1, 192.
130
CD, II/1, 197.
131
CD, II/1, 181.
132
CD, II/1, 183.
133
CD, II/1, 26.
134
CD, II/1, 320.
135
CD, II/1, 199.
136
CD, I/1, 323; this Christological understanding already appears in Romans II, 98.
137
CD, I/1, 119.

Underlying the foregoing two theses is Barth’s Christocentric understanding of God’s

revelation. The otherness and self-revelation of the Triune God manifest the divine sover-
eignty and grace in God’s revelation, and lay the foundation of the divine veiling and
unveiling as witnessed by Holy Scripture. All of these are used to manifest God’s revela-
tion in Jesus Christ: revelation is identified with the Word who became flesh. Thus, Barth’s
insistence on the hiddenness of God is due to his view of the mediation of the true knowl-
edge of God in Jesus Christ. According to George Hunsinger, ‘this mediation means that
the truth of God’s identity remains hidden in the midst of revelation and revealed in the
midst of hiddenness.’138 Moreover, Barth adopts the anhypostatic-enhypostatic model of
Christology of early Christianity to articulate his theology of revelation.139 The divine
hiddenness is the hiddenness of the second person of the Trinity in the veil of creaturely
flesh.140 Thus, the Realdialektik of the veiling and unveiling indicates that God veils Himself
in the humanity of Jesus Christ, which is the revelation of God’s veiling. In short, Barth’s
Christocentric view of revelation can be summed up as follows: ‘in [incarnation] the mys-
tery of revelation must be brought to its definite expression.’141
For Barth, God’s revelation in Jesus Christ overcomes the Realdialektik of the di-
vine-human distinction, overwhelms the noetic influence of sin on human beings, and
brings human beings in Jesus Christ to participate into God’s self-knowledge. One
might critique Barth for his Christological centrality (if not Christomonism) insofar as
it makes God’s revelation in Jesus Christ appear exclusive. This is not the case, however.
Barth’s insistence on God’s sovereignty and freedom implies that he does not absolutely
deny the possibility of the existence of other media of God’s revelation. As he writes,
‘God may speak to us through Russian Communism, a flute concerto, a blossoming
shrub, or a dead dog. We do well to listen to Him if He really does.’142 By saying such,
Barth de facto calls on us to be obedient to God’s sovereign revelation if it occurs in other
forms. How, then, shall we understand Barth’s rejection of natural theology and his
‘No’ to general revelation? Is Barth inconsistent? In order to respond to these questions,
attention to dialectical thinking and general revelation is in order.
Barth’s Dialectical Thinking in His Rejection of General Revelation

Before tackling the relationship between Barth’s dialectic and rejection of general reve-
lation, the dialectical character of his theology of revelation should be re-affirmed. What
is more, this dialectical character should be investigated further. As has already been
mentioned, Barth’s dialectical thinking (the Denkform of dialectic) is grounded in the
Realdialektik of the infinite and the finite, God and humankind, the divine veiling and
unveiling. Central to both the dialectical thinking and the Realdialektik is Barth’s acute
concern regarding human sin. This theological concern fundamentally differentiates
Barth’s dialectic from Hegel’s dialectic. The latter’s dialectic leads to a synthesis, whereas
the reality of sin compels Barth to repudiate the way of synthesis.143
138
George Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth: The Shape of His Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1991), 79.
139
CD, I/2, 163-5; also see Barth, Göttingen Dogmatics I, 156-8. On Barth’s adoption of and going beyond
the doctrine anhypostasis-enhypostasis of early Christianity, see James P. Haley, The Humanity of Christ: The
Significance of the Anhypostasis and Enhypostasis in Karl Barth’s Christology (Eugene, Oregon: Pickwick
Publications, 2017), particularly chapter five.
140
McCormack, ‘“The Limits of the Knowledge of God”: Theses on the Theological Epistemology of Karl
Barth’, in Orthodox and Modern: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), 171.
141
CD, I/2, 124.
142
CD, I/1, 55.
143
See CD, I/1, 175.

342 Ximian Xu
Barth’s concern with sin proves that the notion of God’s redemptive grace is indis-
pensable to his dialectical thinking. The Realdialektik of the divine-human antithesis ‘is
fundamentally a soteriological one.’144 It is essential, then, while speaking of the dialecti-
cal character of revelation, to maintain a soteriologically focused theology of revelation.
Barth underlines this in his Gifford Lectures: ‘Revelation is an act of God’s compassion.
So it reveals the plight of man as one who needs compassion. Revelation is an act of
God’s condescension. So it reveals the depth to which man has sunk.’145 The fact of
God’s self-revelation is thus for Barth tantamount to God’s grace.
Barth’s theology of revelation as soteriologically dialectical in character reinforces
why he adamantly rejects any account of general revelation that is not soteriologically
informed. Barth’s view of religion and his ‘No’ to natural theology are but two instances
or expressions of the way he deploys his soteriologically dialectical thinking.
In expounding Thesis 2 earlier, Barth’s negation of human religion as self-justifica-
tion and self-sanctification was briefly mentioned in order to demonstrate Barth’s
Realdialektik of God’s veiling and unveiling. Barth’s negation is normally viewed as his
thorough rejection of religion. To a large extent, this misunderstanding is caused by the
English translation of the German term Aufhebung. In the English edition of CD I/2, the
title Gottes Offenbarung als Aufhebung der Religion of the seventeenth section is translated
as ‘The Revelation of God as the Abolition of Religion.’ To render Aufhebung as ‘abolish’
is questioned and repudiated by many scholars. John Webster, for one, argues that
Aufhebung indicates ‘both abrogation and preservation.’146 Likewise, Sven Ensminger
contends that Aufhebung has both negative and positive implications.147 He sets out
three meanings of Gottes Offenbarung als Aufhebung der Religion in CD. First, God’s reve-
lation ‘single[s] out’ religion. Second, God’s revelation ‘restrain[s] or suspend[s]’ reli-
gion. Third, God’s revelation ‘uphold[s] and preserve[s]’ religion. These three senses
together lay bare the fact that religion should not be rejected or repudiated, but essen-
tially and fundamentally transformed by God’s revelation.148
In light of Ensminger’s reading of Barth’s view of revelation and religion, it is hard to
say that Barth only negates religion in toto. More than that, Barth’s view of religion is
characterised as soteriologically dialectical. For him, no religion, including Christianity,
can attain the true knowledge of God. The Christian religion is the true religion not
because of itself. Rather, the revelation in and as Jesus Christ grants Christianity God’s
grace so as to make it true.149 God’s ‘No’ to religion has been shouldered by Jesus Christ
in His humanity; meanwhile, God sanctifies the Christian religion by the name of Jesus
Christ.150 Then, religion is both judged and exalted in the divine revelation.151 God’s
redemptive grace in Jesus Christ overwhelms the Realdialektik of the infinite God and
144
Bruce McCormack, ‘Karl Barth’s Version of an “Analogy of Being”: A Dialectical No and Yes to Roman
Catholicism’, in The Analogy of Being: Invention of the Antichrist or the Wisdom of God?, ed. Thomas Joseph
White (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011), 97; emphasis original.
145
Karl Barth, The Knowledge of God and the Service of God according to the Teaching of the Reformation, trans.
J. L. M. Haire and Ian Henderson (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2005), 48.
146
John Webster, Barth (London: Continuum, 2000), 64; also see Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, 98.
147
Sven Ensminger, Karl Barth’s Theology as a Resource for a Christian Theology of Religions (London:
Bloomsbury, 2014), 51.
148
Ibid., 52.
149
CD, I/2, 343-4.
150
CD, I/2, 352-8.
151
CD, I/2, 326.

finite human beings. Therefore, Barth’s view of religion, which is determined by soter-
iologically dialectical thinking, can serve to confirm his rejection of general revelation
as soteriologically focused.
Barth’s ‘No’ to natural theology is also bound up with his soteriologically dialectical
theology of revelation. This ‘No’ is intended to oppose Emil Brunner’s ‘Yes’. For Brunner,
natural revelation means, on the one hand, that God has shown His traces and knowl-
edge in nature, and, on the other, that by the implanted imago Dei humans have a point
of contact (Anknüpfungspunkt) by which to receive God’s revelation.152 Nonetheless,
Brunner does not sever natural theology from God’s revelation. He maintains that ‘the
man who stands within the revelation in Christ, has the true natural knowledge of
God.’ He also argues for ‘the preserving grace of God’, which exists independently of
‘the saving grace of God.’153
Barth’s response to Brunner is radically and categorically negative. He objects to
almost all notions put forward by Brunner, such as general revelation, the point of
contact and preservation.154 In addition, Barth’s relentlessly inhospitable attitude to-
ward natural theology can also be attested by the substitution of ‘capacity for revela-
tion’ (Offenbarungsmächtigkeit) for ‘capacity for words’ (Wortmächtigkeit) and ‘possibility
of being addressed’ (Ansprechbarkeit).155 John Hart argues that this substitution is
Barth’s deliberate action since Barth ‘sees Brunner’s attempt to grant humanity any
natural capacity towards God as a denial of humanity’s radical dependence on
grace.’156 This insight seems to be confirmed in Barth’s deliberate and conscious sub-
stitution ‘capacity for words’ with ‘capacity for revelation’ in order better to conform
to his own definition of natural theology. In Barth’s view, natural theology refers to
‘every (positive or negative) formulation of a system which claims to be theological’
apart from God’s revelation as witnessed by Holy Scripture, and which ‘usually deals
with its soi-disant data derived from reason, nature and history.’157 According to
Barth’s definition, natural theology apparently contradicts his soteriologically dialec-
tical theology of revelation, which lays emphasis on human sin and incapacity to at-
tain the knowledge of God. Barth maintains that ‘the [human] capacity to know God
is taken away from us by revelation and can be ascribed to us again only by revela-
tion.’158 The ‘taken away’ and ‘ascribed to’ reflect how God’s redemptive grace trans-
forms human minds to receive God’s knowledge. Thus, the real concern in Barth’s
critique of natural theology is his insistence on the enduring noetic effects of sin in
human minds, which renders God’s revelation and knowledge qualified as ‘to be
given’ rather than ‘given.’159
152
Brunner, ‘Nature and Grace’, 27, 31.
153
Ibid., 27-8.
154
Karl Barth, ‘No! Answer to Emil Brunner’, in Natural Theology, trans. Peter Fraenkel (London: The
Centenary Press, 1946), 74.
155
Ibid., 78.
156
John W. Hart, Karl Barth vs. Emil Brunner: The Formation and Dissolution of a Theological Alliance, 1916-
1936 (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 158.
157
Barth, ‘No!’, 74-5, 77.
158
CD, II/1, 184.
159
William J. Brennan, ‘Idolatry in the Theology of Karl Barth’ (PhD dissertation, University of St
Andrews, 2016), 81; emphasis original.

344 Ximian Xu
Situated within its historical context, Barth’s ‘No’ to natural theology is clearly asso-
ciated with his opposition to the German Christian movement and National Socialism
in Germany, both of which he views as a form of natural theology. However, the histor-
ical context should not be overemphasised.160 My argument heretofore has shown that
Barth’s soteriologically dialectical thinking is indispensable to the understanding of his
‘No’ to natural theology.
At this juncture an important question should be raised: what is Barth’s view of the
relationship between creation and salvation or reconciliation? According to G. C.
Berkouwer, Barth constructs ‘the unbreakable unity of creation and reconciliation.’161
Moreover, Barth’s soteriologically focused view of general revelation makes creation
dependent upon God’s salvation in Christ.162 By so doing, the divine work of creation
loses its independent value and becomes inferior to God’s redemption in Jesus Christ.
What is Barth’s understanding of the role of the Holy Spirit in creation? Barth’s soterio-
logically dialectical character of revelation largely restricts the work of the Holy Spirit
to the confines of God’s salvific work and makes the Spirit relatively absent from God’s
continuous work in creation. Barth, in other words, does not weave satisfactorily the
doctrine of the Trinity into other possible forms of God’s revelation.
These objections notwithstanding, my analysis of Barth’s view of religion and natu-
ral theology nonetheless shows that a convincing conclusion can be drawn that Barth’s
rejection of general revelation is soteriologically focused, a reflection of his overall theo-
logical dialectic. Barth’s intention is not to reject natural theology thoroughly. His pur-
pose, rather, is to insist that the noetic influence of sin makes humans incapable of
subjectively appropriating God’s revelation in nature. In this regard, Barth is consistent
with his dialectical theology of revelation. Meanwhile, his recognition of other forms of
God’s revelation does not contradict his rejection of general revelation. Indeed, Barth
mentions a kind of general revelation in his writings—for instance, where he asserts
that God reveals Godself in the world inasmuch as God is sovereign over all things.163
Elsewhere, he argues that ‘[God’s] glory overflows in His creating, sustaining and gov-
erning the world and in the world man, and in His giving to this His creation the glory
of being the reflection (imago) of His own glory.’164 Although he does not explicitly use the
word ‘revelation’ here, it is plausible to take Barth’s expression of creation as the reflec-
tion of God’s glory as reference to God’s general revelation.
Summary
That Barth continues to be identified as a dialectical theologian indicates that reve-
lation is for Barth intrinsically dialectical. Indeed, the three theses discussed above
further manifest how Barth deploys dialectical thinking in his theology of revelation.
They lay bare the truth that only by God’s revelation in and as Jesus Christ can the
Realdialektik of God and human beings be surpassed. This soteriologically dialectical
thinking definitely characterises Barth’s rejection of general revelation. Although this
160
For example, Alister McGrath contends that the Barth-Brunner debate was mainly concerned with
ideology rather than theology at the time. See Alister E. McGrath, Emil Brunner: A Reappraisal (Oxford:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), 90-127.
161
Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth, 250.
162
Conradie, ‘On Jesus Christ as Mediator of Creation’, 7-8.
163
Karl Barth, Texte Zur Barmer Theologischen Erklarung (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag, 2004), 19.
164
Barth, The Knowledge of God and the Service of God, 38; emphasis added.

soteriologically focused view undermines the independent value of God’s creation and
disconnects the Holy Spirit from God’s continuous work in creation, it strongly sup-
ports Barth’s consistent view of the dialectical character of God’s revelation as well as of
the various forms of God’s creation in nature.
We come now to the crux of the matter: setting Barth’s ‘No’ alongside of Bavinck’s
‘Yes’ poses in the sharpest terms the question of how to deal with a theology of general
revelation. Must one choose between these two approaches? Or is there a third way
other than Barth’s ‘Yes’ and Bavinck’s ‘No’?
The Dialectic-in-Organic Approach to the Theology of General Revelation

In the foregoing two sections, Bavinck’s ‘Yes’ and Barth’s ‘No’ have been set forth as two
differing, and perhaps mutually exclusive, approaches to the doctrine of general rev-
elation. By deploying organic thinking in his reception of general revelation, Bavinck
shows how the Triune God has revealed and continues to reveal himself in creation.
Despite his tendency to subsume special revelation to general revelation, Bavinck al-
ways stresses the necessity of the former for the right comprehension of the latter. On
the other hand, by deploying dialectical thinking in his rejection of general revela-
tion, Barth articulates a Christocentric and soteriologically focused account of God’s
revelation—although to be clear, Barth’s ‘No’ does not absolutely preclude other pos-
sibilities of divine revelation.
In light of these two differing postures vis-à-vis general revelation, I propose a di-
alectic-in-organic view of general revelation—an account which has organic think-
ing as the framework while at the same time incorporating a theological dialectic
in order to articulate the diversity-with-parity in God’s revelation as organism. To
be clear, the dialectic-in-organic thinking I am advocating should not be viewed
as seeking out an eclectic way in order to avoid the tension between Bavinck and
Barth. Instead, it should be regarded positively insofar as both dialectical and or-
ganic thinking are seminal in the Reformed tradition. Organic thinking and dialec-
tical thinking can together be viewed as interrelated at the source of the Reformed
outlook in its generic sense.
In what follows, I will outline the common grounds of Bavinck’s ‘Yes’ and Barth’s ‘No’
followed by an elucidation of the reasons for their dissimilarities. I will then conclude
by offering a constructive account of how this proposed dialectic-in-organic thinking
offers a more compelling approach to the theology of general revelation.
The Common Grounds of Bavinck’s ‘Yes’ and Barth’s ‘No’

What is striking about Bavinck’s and Barth’s accounts is their common grounds. First,
both anchor their respective ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ in the otherness of the Triune God. It is
interesting that both use the expression ‘the qualitative distinction’ to describe the on-
tological chasm between God and humans. This divine otherness necessitates God’s
self-revelation in order to overcome the gap between the infinite and the finite. Thus,
Bavinck says ‘Yes’ to general revelation inasmuch as God takes the initiative to reveal
Godself to all humans, while Barth says ‘No’ to general revelation inasmuch as this
guards God’s initiative in revelation as Jesus Christ against the incursion of any pos-
sibility of human effort in attaining the knowledge of God in creation.

346 Ximian Xu
A second common ground shared by Bavinck and Barth is the way that each holds
fast to a Christocentric approach to their respective ‘Yes’ and ‘No.’ For Bavinck, Christ
is not only the organic centre of the whole creation as an organism, but the centre of
God’s revelation as an organism. Hence, the organic centre of God’s revelation deter-
mines the existence of general revelation in creation. For Barth, given the Realdialektik of
God and humanity as well as the divine veiling and unveiling, God’s knowledge can be
mediated to humans nowhere other than in Jesus Christ. In other words, the knowledge
of God is by no means mediated to humans in creation, though there may be other
forms of revelation. Indeed, this common ground can be illustrated in their individual
interpretations of Calvin’s view of general revelation. Bavinck argues that Calvin in-
sists on the existence of general revelation and its insufficiency for salvation; hence,
salvation in Christ is requisite.165 Barth, on the other hand, argues that for Calvin the
notion of semen religionis has nothing to do with his exposition of the core of Christianity
insofar as ‘this semen cannot ripen’ unless ‘religio … is taken up into revelation and fash-
ioned by it.’166 It is apparent that both Bavinck and Barth staunchly adhere to a
Christocentric approach in their respective reception and rejection of general revela-
tion, although their meanings of ‘Christocentric’ differ.
These two foregoing common grounds are undergirded by a third: both Bavinck and
Barth insist that Holy Scriptures play a significant role in their theologies of revelation.
For Bavinck, accounts of God’s revelation in creation are readily found in Scripture.
Indeed, the organic relationship between general revelation and special revelation
is explicitly laid down in Scripture. According to Barth, Holy Scripture bears faith-
ful witness to God’s revelation in and as Christ. Hence, given the Realdialektik of the
divine-human antithesis, one can only attain knowledge of God through Scripture
rather than subjectively via creation. It suffices to say that both Bavinck’s and Barth’s de-
ployment of organic and dialectical thinking in their ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ essentially amounts
to a wholehearted commitment to the Word of God.
These three grounds are formally common. Bavinck and Barth make use of the no-
tions of God’s otherness, Christocentrism and the authority of Holy Scripture, but in
differing ways. My contention is that these formal common grounds serve as junctures
on the basis of which the dialectic-in-organic view of general revelation can be artic-
ulated. At the same time, drawing attention to the shared formal common grounds
effectively weakens the antithesis between Bavinck’s ‘Yes’ and Barth’s ‘No.’
The Causes of the Divergence

To be sure, these three common grounds do not prevent Bavinck and Barth from diverg-
ing in their views of general revelation. However, it is important to keep in mind that
this divergence issues from their different ideas of Christocentrism, different central
concerns of theological organicism and dialectic, and different views of what counts as
revelation and the knowledge of God.
Despite the fact that both Bavinck and Barth hold fast to the Christocentric approach,
they nonetheless advocate differing notions of Christocentrism. Underlying Bavinck’s
Christocentrism is an unmistakable doctrine of the Trinity. Granted that Christ is the
Mediator of creation and salvation, argues Bavinck, Christ’s mediatorship is not
165
RD, 1:311 (particularly note 35), 3:279-80.
166
CD, I/2, 284-5.

established in the works ad extra. Rather, it is eternal, because grounded in the divine
life of the Trinity.167 For Bavinck, Christ’s eternal mediatorship manifests God’s grace as
essential to both creation and re-creation.168 Given that Christ is the organic centre of
the organism ad extra, the grace of the Triune God mediated via Christ will restore the
whole creation. By general revelation, the unity of grace and nature is organically
formed. At bottom, then, Bavinck’s organic thinking is Christologically theocentric.169
Barth’s Christocentrism, by contrast, is characterised by his emphasis on Jesus Christ as
the epistemic source. Given humans’ incapacity for God’s revelation, the attaining of
God’s knowledge is exclusively conditioned by God’s redemptive revelation in Jesus
Christ as witnessed by Holy Scripture, all of which underlies Barth’s dialectical think-
ing. Barth’s principal Christocentrism views Christ as the essential foundation (princip-
ium essendi) and the cognitive foundation of theology (principium cognoscendi theologiae).170
Barth’s ‘No’ is therefore intended precisely to safeguard Jesus Christ as the essentially
cognitive foundation of the knowledge of God. In brief, to know God is for Barth to
know Jesus Christ.
A second reason that accounts for Bavinck’s ‘Yes’ and Barth’s ‘No’ is that the focal
points of organic and dialectical thinking are different. Bavinck’s organic thinking
clearly places the emphasis on God’s creation. This creationally focused view of revela-
tion of course embraces general revelation, by which God is immanent in creation but
remains transcendent. The importance of creation is not undermined after the human
fall. On the contrary, revelation is imparted vertically from God insofar as God continu-
ously speaks in creation and in history. By contrast, the idea of God’s salvation is central
to Barth’s dialectical thinking. His soteriologically focused position implies that the
transformation of human minds by God’s salvation is the precondition for any human
knowledge of God. Without doubt, Barth by no means concedes an epistemological
path to the knowledge of God independent of God’s salvific revelation in Christ, which
would effectively undermine the Realdialektik of the divine-human distinction.
A third reason why Bavinck and Barth diverge in their views rests on what each
thinks is constitutive of God’s revelation. For Bavinck, the components of God’s revela-
tion are truths, facts and events, which are plural and more propositional. General rev-
elation thus concerns those divine truths that were revealed, and continue to be
revealed, in creation. For Bavinck, the whole creation understood as an organism is
God’s theatre where God’s glorious truths are revealed. By contrast, Barth regards rev-
elation as primarily the event of Jesus Christ, which is singular and essentially per-
sonal. Given his soteriologically dialectical view of revelation, Barth lays more emphasis
167
RD, 3:215.
168
Cf. RD, 3:216.
169
The phrase ‘Christologically theocentric’ is taken from Fred H. Klooster, Calvin’s Doctrine of
Predestination, second edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1977), 14, note 10. Klooster argues that Calvin’s the-
ology is characterised by theocentrism that is qualified as Christological. In my view, Bavinck’s rejection of
the Christological scheme of dogmatics (defining dogmatics rather as Trinitarian) shows his allegiance to
Calvin’s theological framework; RD, 1:110, 112.
170
Richard A. Muller, ‘A Note on “Christocentrism” and the Imprudent Use of Such Terminology,’
Westminster Theological Journal 68, no. 2 (2006): 256. Muller surveys the history of Christianity and then sums
up three forms of Christocentrism: the soteriological, the prototypical (the Adam-Christ typology) and the
principal, 254-6. The hallmark of the third form is to be found in the way it differs from traditional Reformed
theology in not regarding Scripture as the essential foundation of theology. In this regard, Bavinck is evi-
dently closer to the Reformed tradition than Barth; RD, 1:455-65.

348 Ximian Xu
on the divine-human encounter and fellowship through the revelatory event of Jesus
Christ.171
Seeking a Third Way: The Dialectic-in-Organic Theology of General Revelation

These three common grounds and three accounts of Bavinck’s ‘Yes’ and Barth’s ‘No’ pave
the way to explore the dialectic-in-organic thinking as an approach to the theology of
general revelation. In other words, those common grounds lay the foundation of dialectic-
in-organic thinking, and those causes lay bare the necessity of this way of thinking.
What constitutes a dialectic-in-organic theology of general revelation? There are three
important aspects to this account. First, emphasizing a theology of general revelation as
dialectic-in-organic suggests that theological organicism is the framework in which gen-
eral revelation is recognised. Situating Bavinck’s organic thinking within such a frame-
work serves to articulate why his theology of general revelation is more biblically
informed than Barth’s ‘No.’172 In other words, a dialectical-in-organic thinking such as
Bavinck’s recognises that Holy Scripture incorporates numerous accounts of God’s rev-
elation in creation, such as Psalms 19:1-4, Acts 17:24-28 and Romans 1:18-20. For Barth, on
the other hand, these passages—for example Romans 1:18-20—do not target all human
beings but rather only those who have been transformed by the gospel.173 Barth there-
fore argues that these verses indicate God’s salvific grace hidden in the divine wrath
and judgment.174 But Pauls’ use of γνωστόν in Rom. 8:19 contradicts Barth’s interpreta-
tion. This Greek term is here used to describe things that can be known, recognised and
perceived without the precondition of God’s salvation. Likewise, Barth argues that Acts
17:24-28 delineates a general aspect of the life of nature, which is grounded in the life of
grace, that is, the life of Jesus Christ.175 But once again Paul’s universal emphasis in this
pericope, which reflects the logic and mode of Paul’s evangelisation, is not necessarily
grounded in the life of Jesus Christ, though his intent is to preach the Gospel of Jesus
Christ.176 In a similar vein, Barth maintains that Psalm 19:1-4 indicates the necessity of
‘faith in God’s Word and revelation’ as a prerequisite for the comprehension of the orig-
inal knowledge of God.177 But the Hebrew verbs ‫( מְ ֽ ַס ְפ ִ ּ֥רים‬telling) and ‫( ַמ ּ֥גִיד‬proclaim) in
verse 1 of Psalm 19 concern speech and announcement. That is to say, the psalmist views
creation per se as the witness to God and His glory.
Barth’s biblical exposition thus seems more determined by his soteriological and dia-
lectical way of thinking than by a careful exposition of the biblical texts. In short, Barth
tends to read his soteriological concerns into these passages rather than draw out these
concerns from the passages themselves. This leads one to wonder whether there is some
truth in James Barr’s judgement that ‘Barth’s rejection of natural theology was never re-
ally based on biblical exegesis.’178 The dialectic-in-organic method advanced here renders
the theology of general revelation biblically in a way that affirms both Bavinck’s and
Barth’s insistence on the authority of Holy Scripture. Moreover, given the theological
171
For more on this topic, see Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, 152-84.
172
Cf. RD, 1:310.
173
CD, II/1, 119; also see 107-8.
174
CD, II/2, 225-6.
175
CD, IV/3.1, 43.
176
James Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 24.
177
CD, III/3, 50.
178
Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology, 103.

organicism as a framework, the dialectic-in-organic method more fully confirms Barth’s

view of the existence of other forms of God’s revelation. In short, Barth never absolutely
denies the existence of the natural knowledge of God; rather, he views this natural knowl-
edge as set ‘in opposition to the actual knowledge of God mediated through his Word’ so
that it cannot really be called the knowledge of God.179 Thus, the dialectic-in-organic
view of general revelation may well bring about a sort of natural theology, which is fun-
damentally different to the one Barth has in mind. Specifically, the dialectic-in-organic
framework could produce a natural theology that is nothing short of ‘a specifically
Christian understanding of the natural world, reflecting the core assumptions of the
Christian faith, which is to be contrasted with secular or naturalist accounts of nature.’180
In this light, such a framework would be consistent with the language of ‘the many lights
of His creation’ in Barth’s later work. There Barth argues that ‘the self-declaration of God
in the prophecy of Jesus Christ’ is compatible with ‘the self-attestations of the creature’
inasmuch as they are derived from the same God.181 In other words, for Barth Jesus Christ
is the Light of God’s creation, which does not nullify the many lights created by God
insofar as these many lights are enlightened by the Light, Jesus Christ.
Second, the theology of general revelation is also a dialectic-in-organic. This means that
the theology of general theology must be articulated through the lens of the doctrine of
the Trinity. As noted above, Barth disconnects the Holy Spirit from God’s continuous
work in creation. For him, the Spirit is intimately related to God’s salvation and redemp-
tive revelation.182 In Barth’s theology ‘[t]he Redeemer-Spirit is never quite fully acknowl-
edged as the Creator-Spirit of man’s corporeal being and rational dynamism.’183 Given
that the organic thinking emphasises the working of the Spirit in creation, the dialec-
tic-in-organic theology of general revelation stresses the co-working of the divine persons
of the Triune God in creation. This contention accords with the psalmist: ‘When you hide
your face, they are terrified; when you take away their breath, they die and return to the
dust. When you send your Spirit, they are created, and you renew the face of the earth’
(Psalm 104:29-30; NIV). The psalmist here declares God’s providence in creation by the
Holy Spirit, who is the sustainer of all life. This also manifests the God of Israel who con-
tinues to reveal Himself by the work of the Spirit. In this light, the dialectic-in-organic
thinking aims to be faithful to the Trinitarian character of the divine work ad extra.
Furthermore, ‘dialectic-in-organic’ affirms the independent value of God’s creation
inasmuch as organic thinking is creationally focused. By applying dialectical thinking
to the theology of general revelation, Barth makes creation dependent upon God’s sal-
vation. Indeed, Barth’s intent is to defend the particularity of God’s revelation as Jesus
Christ. Nonetheless, as Cornelis van der Kooi and Gijsbert van den Brink point out,
‘recognizing the particularity of God’s revelation does not exclude the possibility that
his revelation also makes itself known in the midst of our everyday life.’184 This ‘everyday
life’ is the very value of God’s creation, which is defended as independent by the
179
T. F. Torrance, ‘The Problem of Natural Theology in the Thought of Karl Barth’, Religious Studies 6, no.
2 (1970): 125.
180
Alister McGrath, Re-Imagining Nature: The Promise of a Christian Natural Theology (Chichester: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2017), 21.
181
CD, IV/3.1, 152.
182
See CD, I/1, 448-89; I/2, 203-79.
183
Philip Rosato, The Spirit as Lord: The Pneumatology of Karl Barth (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1981),154-5.
184
Cornelis van der Kooi and Gijsbert van den Brink, Christian Dogmatics: An Introduction, trans. Reinder
Bruinsma and James D. Bratt (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2017), 188; empha-
sis added.
350 Ximian Xu
organic thinking. Moreover, the dialectic-in-organic reminds us of the diverse goals of

God’s creation insofar as creation as an organism is characterised by diversity.
Nonetheless, the ultimate end of God’s creation is the self-glorification of God.185 Then,
the dialectic-in-organic theology of general revelation manifests that creation does not
serve God’s salvation in Jesus Christ but the glory of the Triune God ultimately.
Third, the theology of general revelation is dialectic-in-organic. Notwithstanding the
way that organic thinking safeguards the independent value of creation, Bavinck none-
theless fails to draw a clear enough boundary between general and special revelation,
appearing instead to subsume the latter to the former. The raison d’etre of
‘dialectic-in-organic’ is that dialectical thinking keeps the diversity within the organism
of God’s revelation, which in fact strengthens Bavinck’s organic thinking. To put it spe-
cifically, central to Barth’s dialectical thinking are the ideas of sin and of God’s redemp-
tive revelation in Jesus Christ. Hence, ‘revelation is [for Barth] not just a doctrine about
salvation but a saving transaction.’186 The ‘dialectic-in-organic’ reminds us that special
revelation is by no means subsumed within general revelation. On the contrary, special
revelation has independent value, underscoring the parity of general and special reve-
lation. In short, the ‘dialectic-in-organic’ qualifies the diversity of God’s revelation with
parity.
Moreover, dialectic-in-organic thinking defines God’s revelation dialectically as plu-
ral and then singular. Before the divine-human encounter through the event of Jesus
Christ (singular), there should already exist certain knowledge of God (plural); other-
wise, God cannot be recognised by humans as they encounter each other. By reveal-
ing the knowledge of God in creation, God’s purpose is to encounter human beings
through Christ (the Logos asarkos) as the Mediator of creation. However, due to the
noetic influence of sin, the knowledge of God drawn from general revelation is not
effective apart from God’s special revelation in Jesus Christ (the Logos ensarkos) as the
Mediator of salvation, as witnessed by Holy Scripture. The simultaneity of singularity
and plurality reinforces the centrality of Jesus Christ in God’s revelation.
‘Dialectic-in-organic’ introduces a further caution by underscoring the continuing ex-
istence of the adverse influence of sin on general revelation. Note that Bavinck never
belittled the continuous sway of sin on human beings. Rather, general revelation for
Bavinck cannot provide sinners sufficient knowledge of God, and thus stands in need
of the aid of special revelation and God’s redemption. However, Bavinck’s view that
every revelation is creation, combined with his blurring of the distinction between gen-
eral and special revelation, seems to identify everything that has happened, is happen-
ing and will happen as positively God’s work. For example, he seems to identify the
development of history with the unfolding of the divine revelation in history:
‘[Christianity’s] revelation begins with paradise, continues itself through centuries, re-
ceives its centre in the person and work of Christ and completes itself to the end of
centuries.’187 Despite Bavinck’s sound efforts to deploy from the Reformed tradition the
pattern of God as primary cause and creatures as secondary causes to explicate God’s
providence, van der Kooi and van den Brink nonetheless argue that Bavinck’s pattern
185
Oliver Crisp, ‘Karl Barth on Creation’, in Retrieving Doctrine: Exploration in Reformed Theology (Milton
Keynes: Paternoster, 2010), 26-44.
186
Avery Dulles, Models of Revelation (New York: Orbis Books, 1992), 92.
187
Bavinck, Christelijke Wereldbeschouwing, 90; Dutch original: ‘Hare openbaring begint bij het paradijs,
zet zich door de eeuwen voort, ontvangt haar centrum in den persoon en het werk van Christus en voltooit
zich aan het einde der eeuwen.’

of the universality of general revelation ‘[runs] the major risk of identifying God with
what exists and of distilling his will from what we see around us.’ The net effect is to
downplay the significance of special revelation.188 To a certain extent, the influence of
sin on the secondary causes (creatures) is weakened by Bavinck, which means that his
theology of general revelation is susceptible to being misread as detaching special from
general revelation despite the fact that Bavinck always accentuates the organic relation-
ship between them. This tendency to detach special from general revelation character-
ised the German Christian movement. ‘Dialectic-in-organic’ thus helpfully reminds us
of sin’s continuous influence since the human fall, the upshot of which means that
God’s revelation in creation cannot be truly comprehended without God’s redemptive
revelation in Jesus Christ. Bearing in mind this acute awareness of sin, the notion of
divine condemnation must be given the same prominence as Bavinck’s view of divine
restoration and renewal in dialectic-in-organic thinking. In accordance with Bavinck
and Barth’s claim of biblical authority, this contention is biblical in a thoroughgoing
way, inasmuch as Holy Scripture indicates that God condemns, restores and renews
what he created (e.g., Isa. 19:22; Jer. 1:10; Eze. 29:1-16; Rom. 8:18-25; Eph. 4:20-24; Rev. 21:1-
2). Therefore, the true knowledge of sin that stems from special revelation becomes one
delimiter of the distinction between general and special revelation.
Conclusion
In the first two sections of this essay, I have argued that Bavinck’s ‘Yes’ and Barth’s
‘No’ are emphases that arise from their differing theological concerns. Bavinck’s theol-
ogy is fundamentally creationally focused whereas Barth’s is soteriologically focused;
these foci are central to organic and dialectical thinking respectively. Despite the fact
that both Bavinck’s ‘Yes’ and Barth’s ‘No’ manifest strenuous theological responses to
their own contexts, the historical contexts could not be overemphasised. That is to say,
Bavinck’s ‘Yes’ and Barth’s ‘No’ are alike essentially conditioned by their theological
investigations.
Although Bavinck compellingly and robustly defends general revelation, his theo-
logical project nonetheless betrays a tendency to subsume special revelation under gen-
eral revelation. Similarly, Barth’s theological project—typified in his ‘No’— is marked
by a tendency to make creation subject to God’s salvation. Given Bavinck’s and Barth’s
shared theological interests in the otherness of the Triune God, the Christocentric ap-
proach and the authority of Holy Scripture, the kind of dialectic-in-organic thinking
that I have outlined above offers a way to account for the seemingly opposing attitudes
that each adopts toward general revelation—their respective ‘Yes’ and ‘No’. The dialec-
tic-in-organic theology of general revelation takes Bavinck’s theological organicism as
the framework within which general revelation can be comprehended as Trinitarian,
while at the same time recognising the integrity of creation as having independent
value. Moreover, dialectic-in-organic thinking stresses diversity-with-parity as a hall-
mark of general revelation, and reminds us of the continuous influence of sin as key
to comprehending God’s general revelation. All in all, this dialectic-in-organic method
affords a promise to the enterprise of Christian natural theology, which at once is pre-
supposed by Christian faith and reflects Christian understanding of the natural world
created by the Triune God.
188
RD, 2:608-15; van der Kooi and van den Brink, Christian Dogmatics, 186.

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Herman Bavinck's Yes' and Karl Barth's No'

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Modern Theology 35:2 April 2019 DOI: 10.1111/moth.

HERMAN BAVINCK’S ‘YES’ AND KARL

© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

Bavinck’s Organic Thinking and ‘Yes’ to General Revelation

The Contexts of Bavinck’s Theology of Revelation

© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

James Eglinton’s New Reading of Bavinck’s Organic Motif

Bavinck’s Theology of General Revelation

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(1) The existence of a personal divine being who originates the announcement;

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© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

Bavinck’s Organic Thinking in His Reception of General Revelation

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© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

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© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

Barth’s Dialectic Thinking and ‘No’ to General Revelation

The Contexts of Barth’s Theology of Revelation

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Christian movement originated in a misunderstanding of God’s revelation. For Barth,

Dialectic as the Permanent Feature of Barth’s Theology

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stresses that there is an unsurmountable divine-human contradiction, which can only

Barth’s Theology of Revelation

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Underlying the foregoing two theses is Barth’s Christocentric understanding of God’s

Barth’s Dialectical Thinking in His Rejection of General Revelation

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© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

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The Dialectic-in-Organic Approach to the Theology of General Revelation

The Common Grounds of Bavinck’s ‘Yes’ and Barth’s ‘No’

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The Causes of the Divergence

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© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

Seeking a Third Way: The Dialectic-in-Organic Theology of General Revelation

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organicism as a framework, the dialectic-in-organic method more fully confirms Barth’s

organic thinking. Moreover, the dialectic-in-organic reminds us of the diverse goals of

© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

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