@7208781

PC37.113/D8.07.
AUG 2015
Draft Guide for Protective Relay Applications to Transmission Lines
1 PC37.113™/D7.8.0
2 Draft Guide for Protective Relay
3 Applications to Transmission Lines
4 Sponsor
5
6 Power System Relaying Committee
7 of the
8 IEEE Power and Energy Society
9
10
11 Approved <Date Approved>
12
13 IEEE-SA Standards Board
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15 Copyright © 2014 2015 by The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Abstract: Information on the concepts of protection of ac transmission lines is presented in this

2 guide. Applications of the concepts to accepted transmission line protection schemes are
3 presented as well. Many important issues, such as coordination of settings, operating times,
4 characteristics of relays, mutual coupling of lines, automatic reclosing, use of communication
5 channels, are examined. Special protection systems, protection of multi-terminal lines and single-
6 phase tripping and reclosing are also included. The impact of different electrical parameters and
7 system performance considerations on the selection of relays and protection schemes is
8 discussed as well.
9
10 The purpose of this guide is to provide a reference for the selection of relay schemes and to
11 assist less experienced protective relaying engineers in applying protection schemes to
12 transmission lines.
13
14 Keywords: protective relaying, relay application, relaying, transmission line protection, distance
15 protection, pilot protection
16
x
17
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Participants
2 At the time this draft guide was completed, the D19 Working Group had the following Balloting and
3 Corresponding membership:
4 Richard TaylorDon Lukach, Chair

5 Don LukachJeffrey Barsch, Vice- Chair
6
7 Austin, Tom 18 Holbach, Guergan 29 Price, Elmo
8 Barsch, Jeffrey 19 Kobet, Gary 30 Sambasivan, Sam
9 Best, Martin 20 McCannon, Walter 31 Sachdev, Mohindar
10 Brunello, Gustavo 21 McDonald, Mike 32 Tatro, Phil
11 Circa, David 22 Mezco, Alexis 33 Taylor, Richard
12 Conrad, Steve 23 Miller, Dean 34 Thompson, Mike
13 Cunico, Randy 24 Miller, John 35 Tualla, Ian
14 Deaton, James 25 Mooney, Joe 36 Tziouvaras, Demetrios
15 Deronja, Alla 26 O’Brien, Jim 37 Verzosa, Jun
16 Fischer, Normann 27 Ouellette, Dean 38 Whittaker, Roger
17 Fontana, Dom 28 Patti, Claire 39 Zhang, Zhiying
40
41 During work on the draft guide both Richard Taylor and Mohindar Sachdev worked in the capacity of
42 Working Group Chairman. Their contributions were greatly appreciated.
43 The following members of the <individual/entity> balloting committee voted on this guide. Balloters may
44 have voted for approval, disapproval, or abstention.
45 [To be supplied by IEEE]
46 Balloter1 49 Balloter4 52 Balloter7

55
56 When the IEEE-SA Standards Board approved this guide on <Date Approved>, it had the following
57 membership:
58 [To be supplied by IEEE]
59 <Name>, Chair
60 <Name>, Vice Chair
61 <Name>, Past Chair
62 <Name>, Secretary
63 SBMember1 66 SBMember4 69 SBMember7

72 *Member Emeritus
73
74 Also included are the following nonvoting IEEE-SA Standards Board liaisons:
75 <Name>, DOE Representative

76 <Name>, NIST Representative
77
78 <Name>
vi
Copyright © 2014 2015 IEEE. All rights reserved.
This is an unapproved IEEE Standards Draft, subject to change.
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 IEEE Standards Program Manager, Document Development

2
3 <Name>
4 IEEE Standards Program Manager, Technical Program Development
vii
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Introduction
2 This document is a revision of IEEE Std C37.113™-20041999, IEEE Guide for Protective Relay
3 Applications to Transmission Lines. This guide is intended to assist protection engineers and technologists
4 in effectively applying relays and protection systems to protect transmission lines.
5 Several areas have been improved in this revision. Most notably:
6 Several clauses have been revised for uniformity of style and ease of understanding the issues
7 discussed in them.
8 Enhanced fundamental discussions.
9 Better defined the technical discussion about length considerations.
10 Updated relay schemes with current tecnology.
11 Added Annex A that describes system studies.
12
13
14
viii
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Contents
2 1. Overview ............................................................................................................................................................ 1
3 1.1 Scope ........................................................................................................................................................... 1
4 1.2 Purpose ........................................................................................................................................................ 2
5 2. Normative references ......................................................................................................................................... 2
6 3. 3. Definitions, device numbers and abbreviations ........................................................................................... 2

7 3.1 Definitions ................................................................................................................................................... 2
8 3.2 Device numbers .......................................................................................................................................... 5
9 3.3 Abbreviations .............................................................................................................................................. 6
10 4. Fundamentals ..................................................................................................................................................... 6
11 4.1 Transmission line ........................................................................................................................................ 6
12 4.2 Single line representation of lines and equipment .................................................................................... 7
13 4.3 Zone of protection ....................................................................................................................................... 9
14 4.4 Line relaying selection ........................................................................................................................ 1110
15 4.5 Redundancy and backup considerations ............................................................................................. 1716
16 4.6 Autoreclosing methods ........................................................................................................................ 1918
17 4.7 Effects of load on line relay applications and settings ...................................................................... 2019
18 5. Impact of system configuration on selection of protection schemes ....................................................... 2322

19 5.1 Length considerations .......................................................................................................................... 2322
20 5.2 Line design considerations .................................................................................................................. 2826
21 5.3 Number of line terminals ..................................................................................................................... 2827
22 5.4 Lines terminated into transformers ..................................................................................................... 2827
23 5.5 Weak electrical systems ...................................................................................................................... 3834
24 5.6 Ground path configurations ................................................................................................................. 4036
25 5.7 Transmission lines with distribution substation taps ..................................................................... 464139
26 5.8 Lines with devices for var and flow control ................................................................................... 524542
27 5.9 Parallel lines ..................................................................................................................................... 544745
28 5.10 Lines with high-impedance ground returns.................................................................................. 554745 Formatted: Font: (Default) Times New
29 5.11 Terminal configuration considerations ......................................................................................... 585048 Roman, 10 pt, (Asian) Japanese
30 5.12 Mutual coupling considerations Formatted: IEEEStds Paragraph, Indent: First
31 5850 line: 0.17", Tab stops: Not at 5.99"
Formatted: Font: (Default) Times New
32 6. Relay schemes ......................................................................................................................................... 665549 Roman, 10 pt, (Asian) Japanese, Check spelling
33 6.1 Non-pilot schemes ........................................................................................................................... 665549 and grammar
34 6.2 Pilot schemes .................................................................................................................................... 816762
35 6.3 Other protection schemes .............................................................................................................. 1038378
36 6.4 Directional ground overcurrent relay polarization....................................................................... 1078882
37 6.5 Problems associated with multi-terminal lines ............................................................................ 1179490
38 6.6 Application considerations of distance relays .............................................................................. 1249895
39 6.7 Relay considerations for series compensated lines .................................................................. 148111108
40 6.8 Single-phase tripping and reclosing.......................................................................................... 154114112
41 6.9 Application of distance relays to short lines ............................................................................ 160120118
42 6.10 Relay considerations for system transients ............................................................................ 165123121
43 7. Concluding remarks .......................................................................................................................... 173128126
44 Annex A (informative) System Studies Needed for Setting Relays .................................................. 175129127
45 Annex B (informative) Bibliography ................................................................................................... 178131129

46
ix
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Guide for Protective Relay Applications

2 to Transmission Lines
3 IMPORTANT NOTICE: IEEE Standards documents are not intended to ensure safety, security, health,
4 or environmental protection, or ensure against interference with or from other devices or networks.
5 Implementers of IEEE Standards documents are responsible for determining and complying with all
6 appropriate safety, security, environmental, health, and interference protection practices and all
7 applicable laws and regulations.
8 This IEEE document is made available for use subject to important notices and legal disclaimers.
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10 be found under the heading “Important Notice” or “Important Notices and Disclaimers
11 Concerning IEEE Documents.” They can also be obtained on request from IEEE or viewed at
12 http://standards.ieee.org/IPR/disclaimers.html.
13 1. Overview
14 Each electrical component on the electrical power system has protection problems unique to itself but the
15 concepts associated with transmission line protection are fundamental to all other electrical devices and
16 provide an excellent starting point to examine and appreciate the implementation of protection of most
17 components of power systems. A study of transmission line protection leads to a better appreciation of
18 protection related issues because transmission lines are links to substation buses and/or other equipment
19 connected to the lines. Electrical engineers and technologists working with electric power utilities,
20 consultants and manufacturers in general and those working in designing, selecting and maintaining
21 protection systems in particular would benefit from the information provided in this guide.
22 General specifications of relays are given in IEEE Std 37.90™, IEEE Standard for Relay and Relay
23 Systems Associated with Electric Power Apparatus. While protection of transmission lines is discussed in
24 this guide, protection of distribution lines is addressed in IEEE Std 37.230™, IEEE Guide for Pr otective
25 Relay Applications to Distribution Lines.
26 All interrupting devices are shown in the figures included in this guide. The isolators (disconnects) used in
27 conjunction with the interrupting devices are not shown in all figures. If they are not shown, they are
28 assumed to be provided for proper control and operation of the system.
29
30 1.1 Scope
31 Concepts of transmission line protection are discussed in this guide. Applications of these concepts to
32 various system configurations and line termination arrangements are presented. Many important issues,
33 such as coordination of settings, operating times, characteristics of relays, impact of mutual coupling of
34 lines on the protection systems, automatic reclosing and use of communication channels are examined.
1
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Special protection systems, multi-terminal lines and single phase tripping and reclosing are also included.
2 The impact that system parameters and system performance have on the selection of relays and relay
3 schemes is discussed as well.
4 1.2 Purpose
5 The purpose of this guide is to provide protection engineers with information that helps them to properly
6 apply relays and other devices to protect three-phase high-voltage transmission lines.
7 2. Normative references
8 The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document (i.e., they must
9 be understood and used, so each referenced document is cited in text and its relationship to this document is
10 explained). For dated references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of
11 the referenced document (including any amendments or corrigenda) applies.
12 IEEE Std C37.2™, IEEE Standard for Electrical Power System Device Function Numbers, Acronyms, and
13 Contact Designations
14 IEEE Std C37.90™, IEEE Standard for Relay and Relay Systems Associated with Electric Power
15 Apparatus
16 3. 3. Definitions, device numbers, and abbreviations

17 For the purposes of this document, the following terms and definitions apply. The IEEE Standards
18 Dictionary Online should be consulted for terms not defined in this clause. 1
19 3.1 Definitions
20 Adaptive relay: A relay that can change its setting and/or relaying logic upon the occurrence of an external
21 signal or event.
22 Adaptive relaying: A protection philosophy that permits, and seeks to make adjustments automatically, in
23 various protection functions to make them more attuned to prevailing power conditions.
24 Apparent impedance: The impedance from a relay location to a fault as seen determined by a distance
25 relay is determined by from the applied current and voltage. It may be different from the actual impedance
26 because of current infeed or current outfeed at some point between the relay and the fault. (see clause
27 6.5.1and 6.5.2).
28 Arc resistance: The impedance of an arc that is predominantly resistive; it is a function of the magnitude
29 of the current and length of the arc.
30 Backup zone: The backup zone of a relaysegment of the power system for which a relay or element within
31 a relay offers protection is the zone that is in addition to its primary protection zone. The relays for backup
32 protection zone relays or elements within the same relay are coordinated with the remote zone relays or
33 elements usually time delayed (e.g. the over-reaching portions of zones 2 and 3 of a distance relayreaches
34 and usually contain a coordination time delay). The backup zone usually may disconnects more power
35 system elements than those isolated by the operation of the relays that protect the primary zone.
36 Blocking signal: A logic signal, used in a pilot scheme, which is received from a remote terminal for to
37 preventing the instantaneous (pilot time) tripping of the local terminal by the pilot scheme
1
IEEE Standards Dictionary Online subscription is available at:
http://www.ieee.org/portal/innovate/products/standard/standards_dictionary.html.
2
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Breaker failure protection: A form of protection that is designed to detect the failure of a circuit breaker
2 to operate or to interrupt a fault. Upon detection of a breaker failure during a fault condition the scheme is
3 designed to take appropriate action to clear the fault. Upon detection of a breaker failure during a non -fault
4 condition, the scheme may take other appropriate action. Detailed description of this protection function is
5 given in IEEE Std C37.119™, IEEE Guide for Breaker Failure Protection of Power Circuit Breakers.
6 Breaker failure: The failure of a circuit breaker to operate or to interrupt a fault.The failure of a circuit
7 breaker to operate or to interrupt current in the event of a fault.
8 Circuit switcher: A circuit interrupting device with a limited interrupting rating as compared with a circuit
9 breaker. It is often integrated with a disconnecting switch. Its design usually precludes the integration of
10 current transformers (CTs).A circuit switcher is a current interrupting device that has a limited interrupting
11 rating compared with the interrupting rating of a circuit breaker. The operation of a circuit switcher is often
12 integrated with the operation of a disconnecting switch. The design usually precludes the integration of
13 current transformers (CTs) within the circuit switcher.r.
14 Coordination of protection: The process of choosing current or voltage settings and time delay
15 characteristics of protective devices, such that operation of the devices will occur in a specified order to
16 minimize customer service interruption and power system isolation due to a power system
17 disturbance.settings, or time delay characteristics of protective relays such that their operation occurs in a
18 specified sequence so that interruption to customers is minimized and least number of power system
19 elements are isolated following a system fault.
20 Cross polarization: The method used by a relay for determining directionality using the voltage(s) from a
21 healthy (unfaulted) phase(s). One example of this is quadrature polarization.Cross polarization is the use of
22 voltage(s) from healthy (un-faulted) phase(s) for ensuring that the direction of a fault is correctly
23 determined. One form of cross polarization is quadrature polarization in which the polarizing voltage is in
24 quadrature with the voltage of the faulted phase(s). The use of phase A voltage for polarizing during a short
25 circuit between phases B and C is an example of quadrature polarization.
26 Current differential scheme: A protection scheme designed to detect faults by measuring the differences
27 between the currents at the terminals of a transmission line. 13
28 Dependability: The degree of certainty that a protection system will respond when the fault or abnormal
29 condition the protection system is intended to detect is present.
30 Distance relay: A protective relay in which the response to the input quantities is primarily a function of
31 the impedance or a component of the impedance of the circuit from between the relay location and the
32 point of fault.
33 Dual polarization: The method used by a relay for determining directionality using both current and
34 voltage sources.: Dual polarization consists of using both current and voltage for polarization.
35 Fault impedance: Impedance, resistive or reactive, between the phase conductors or the phase conductor
36 and ground during a power system fault.
37 Ground distance relay: A distance relay designed to detect phase-to-ground faults.
38 Grounding transformer: Delta-wye or zigzag connected transformer(s) installed to establish a system
39 ground for that providing provides a path for zero-sequence current flow that assistings in detection of ing
40 phase-to-ground faults.
41 Hybrid scheme: A relay scheme (usually a pilot scheme) that combining es the logic of two or more
42 conventional schemes.
43 Impedance relay: A distance relay in which the threshold of operation depends only on the magnitude and
44 angle of the ratio of the voltage vector to the current vector applied to the relay, and is substantially
45 independent of the phase angle between the applied voltage and current.
46 Infeed: A flow of fault current from a source that is physically located between a relay location and a fault
47 location.
3
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Lenticular characteristic: A distance relay characteristic that hashaving the shape of a lens on a
2 resistance-reactancethe impedance (R-X) diagram.
3 Mho unit: A distance relaying unit that has a circular tripping characteristic that passes through or is offset
4 from the origin on an R-X diagram or is offset from the origin.
5 Multi-terminal Line: A transmission line that has more than two terminals to which sources of power are Formatted: Not Highlight
6 connected. A multi-terminal line can also be considered a line with multiple taps that may not have
7 connected sources.A transmission line that has more than two terminals to which sources of power are
8 connected.
9 Outfeed: Flow of current out of a terminal of a line when there is a fault on the line.
10 Overlapping protection: A situation in which the protected zone of one relay overlaps the protected zone
11 of another relay (usually done to ensure protection of equipment at the border of a protected zone). This is
12 often necessary due to the location of current transformers (CTs) on equipment.The protection system in
13 which protection-zone of a relay extends over the protection-zone of another relay
14 Permissive: Pertaining to aA pilot scheme that requires the receipt of a logic signal from the remote
15 terminal(s) before allowing the tripping of the circuit breaker(s) controlling the line.
16 Phase comparison protection: A form of pilot protection that compares the phase angles of currents at the
17 terminals of a transmission line. Data from the relay at the remote terminal is provided to the local relay
18 using a communications channel. This data is utilized by the local relay to develop representations of the
19 phase angles of the currents measured by the remote relay. These representations are then compared with
20 the phase angles of the currents measured by the local relay.
21 Phase distance relay: A distance relay designed to detect phase-to-phase and three-phase faults.
22 Pilot scheme: A protection scheme involving relays at two or more line-terminals that share data or logic
23 status via a communication channel for improving the tripping speed and/or coordination.
24 Power Swing: A transient power flow due to change in relative angles of generators on the system caused
25 by a change in transmission or generation configuration.
26 Primary zone: The part of a relay’s protected zone where the relay operates with no intentional time delay
27 for distance and differential relays and minimum possible time delay for overcurrent
28 relaysareasegmsegmentant of the power system for which the relay or element within the relay is
29 principally responsible for protection.
30 .Quadrature polarization: A form of cross polarization in which the polarizing voltage is in quadrature
31 with the voltage of the faulted phase(s). Phase A voltage would be used for polarization during a short
32 circuit between phases B and C.
33 Formatted: IEEEStds Paragraph
34 Quadrilateral characteristic: A distance relay characteristic on an R-X diagram created by a directional

35 measurement, a reactance measurement, and two resistive measurements.
36 Redundancy: A design of relaying, equipment instrument transformers, and tripping circuits developed
37 with the goal of avoiding the possibility that a single component failure will prevent the relaying from
38 reliably sensing and isolating a fault in the protected zone.
39 Reliability: The ability of a protection system to operate correctly taking into consideration both Formatted: Font: Not Bold
40 dependability and security.
Formatted: Default Paragraph Font
41 Security: The degree of certainty that a protection system will not respond when the fault or abnormal
42 condition the protection system is intended to detect is not present.
43 Segregated phase comparison protection: Similar to phase comparison protection, except that the phase
44 angle data of all phase currents (or all phase and ground currents) measured by the remote relay are sent
45 separately to the local relay for individual comparison with the phase angle of the currents measured by the
46 local relay.
4
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Self-checking (by a relay): Self-testing by microprocessor-based relays that checks operation of selected
2 modules of processor software as well as selected hardware components.
3 Sequential tripping: A situation where a local relay cannot detect and trip for a line fault, typically
4 because of current infeed, until one or more of the remote terminals has opened and to removed the infeed.
5 Single-phase tripping and reclosing: Opening the interrupters of a circuit breaker in one phase only to
6 isolate the faulted phase in the event of a single-phase-to-ground fault and reclosing them after some time
7 delay.
8 Source impedance: The impedance of the equivalent source behind a terminal of a transmission line used
9 in calculating the source impedance ratio for determining the electrical length of the line. This impedance
10 is determined by calculating the voltage drop to the terminal for a fault at the end of the line divided by the
11 current in the line. In network applications, this impedance can vary depending on the position of other
12 circuit breakers and switches close to the transmission line terminal.
13 The Thévenin equivalent impedance of an electrical system seen from a terminal of a transmission line; this
14 impedance is determined with the transmission line disconnected from the system. In network applications,
15 this impedance can vary depending on the status (i.e., opened or closed) of other circuit breakers and
16 switches in close proximity with the transmission line terminal.
17 Source of fault current: A terminal that contributes current to a fault on the protected line.
18 Source-to-line impedance ratio (SIR): The ratio of the source impedance behind the a relay terminal
19 where a relay is installed to the line impedance.
20 Step distance: A non-pilot distance relay scheme using multiple reach settings (zones) with time delays
21 associated with some zones to provide coordination of protection.
22 Switch onto fault protection (also called line pickup protection): A protection scheme that trips the line
23 circuit breaker if it is closed into a fault. This protection scheme is to clear a line before the breaker at the
24 remote terminal closes or in cases where there is in insufficient voltage for polarizing the directional
25 elements. Also referred to as line pickup protection.
26 A protection scheme that trips the line circuit breaker if it is closed into a fault that results in insufficient
27 voltage for determining whether the fault is on the line-side or bus-side of the relay; an example of such a
28 fault is when a ground switch for the line is closed or temporary grounds are left on the line following
29 maintenance work.
30 Transfer trip: A pilot scheme that receives a logic signal from a remote terminal to trip the local terminal
31 with or without local supervision.
32 Unblocking: Pilot scheme logic that allows a permissive pilot scheme local relay to trip within a time
33 window if a communication signal, such as an audio tone (AT), power-line carrier (PLC) or frequency shift
34 keying (FSK), is lost from the remote relay. The logic is based on the possibility that the communications
35 signal was interrupted by the occurrence of a line fault.
36 Untransposed: Refers to the physical positions of the phase conductors of a transmission line, which are
37 not interchanged periodically to balance the mutual impedances between phases.
38 3.2 Device numbers
39 The device numbers used in this guide are in accordance with IEEE Std C37.2™, IEEE Standard for
40 Electrical Power System Device Function Numbers, Acronyms, and Contact Designations.
41
5
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 3.3 Acronyms and abbreviations
2 AT audio tones (pilot-wire)

3 BCG phase B to phase C to ground fault
4 BLK blocking function
5 CT current transformer
6 CVT capacitance voltage transformer
7 DCB directional comparison blocking
8 DCUB Directional comparison unblocking
9 DTT direct transfer trip
10 DUTT direct under-reaching transfer trip
11 EHV extra high voltage
12 EMI electromagnetic induction
13 FO fiber optic
14 FSK frequency shift keying
15 GIC geomagnetically induced currents
16 GOOSE Generic object oriented substation event
17 HIROP high resistance open phase condition
18 HV high voltage
19 IED Intelligent electronic device
20 IOC instantaneous overcurrent
21 LOP loss of potential
22 MOV metal oxide varistor
23 MUX multiplexer
24 MVA megavoltampere
25 Mvar megavoltampere reactive
26 mw microwave
27 MW megawatts
28 OS out-of-step
29 PLC power line carrier
30 POTT permissive over-reaching transfer trip
31 PUTT permissive under-reaching transfer trip
32 PW pilot-wire
33 R point-to-point radio
34 RO over-reaching relay element
35 RU under-reaching relay element
36 R-X resistance-reactance
37 SIR source-to-line impedance ratio
38 SVC static var compensator
39 TOC time overcurrent
40 UHV ultra high voltage
41 var voltampere reactive
42 VT voltage transformer
43
44 4. Fundamentals
45 It is necessary to review two terms used in this guide before the fundamentals are discussed; the terms are
46 transmission line and zones of protection.
47 4.1 Transmission line
48 Terms such as transmission, sub-transmission, and distribution lines have different connotations among
49 different utilities. Many issues, such as what constitutes a line terminal, may also vary among companies.
6
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Clauses of this guide address many line configurations and the effect those configurations may have on the
2 application of systems to protect lines.
3 For purposes of protection, a “line” is defined by the locations of circuit breakers (or other sectionalizing
4 devices) that are used to isolate the line from other parts of the power system. The line may include the
5 sections of bus, overhead conductor, underground cable, and other electrical apparatus (including line traps,
6 series capacitors, shunt reactors, and transformers) that fall between these circuit breakers. For example,
7 segments from circuit breaker CB 1 to circuit breaker CB 2 and from circuit breaker CB 3 to circuit breaker
8 CB 4 in Figure 1 are defined as lines. It would normally be assumed that a line exists when two or more
9 stations are involved or the circuit breakers are too far apart to allow interconnection of control cables and
10 station ground mats.
11
Field Code Changed
Bus A Bus B
CB 1 CB 2
VS VR
CB 3 CB 4
12
13 Figure 1 —Definition of line
14 4.2 Single line representation of lines and equipment
15 There are many ways to represent electrical systems and protection schemes applied to them. These include
16 three-line ac diagrams,
17 single-line diagrams,
18 single-line diagrams with CTs and voltage transformers (VTs),
19 single-line diagrams with protection, and other related equipment
20 dc and ac schematics,
21 relay functional diagrams
22 relay logic diagrams, and
23 dc elementary diagrams.
24 Connections of protective relays are shown in their broadest level (minimum detail) in a single-line
25 diagram shown in Figure 2. Connections shown as single lines are actually three-phase circuits. The relays
26 are represented as circles labeled “R” (for relay), connected to CTs and VTs. This type of single-line
27 diagram is useful for understanding the various zones of protection. One of the relays shown in Figure 2 is
28 labeled “21,” which indicates that this device is a distance relay that is provided to protect the line.
7
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Function numbers are given in IEEE Std C37.2™, IEEE Standard for Electrical Power System Device
2 Function Numbers, Acronyms, and Contact Designations as already stated in clause 3.2.
3
4 Figure 2 —One-line diagram of a sample transmission system
5 More detailed methods of showing relay connections, such as single-line and three-line diagrams, single-
6 line and three-line diagrams with CTs and VTs are often used. Other types of diagrams include switching,
7 control and tripping circuit schematics, logic diagrams etc.
8 Protection characteristics can be shown on time-current diagrams, R-X diagrams, and relay-reach vsversus.
9 operating time diagrams, or distance to fault vs.versus the zone operating time of each zone of a protection
10 system. Figure 3 shows one method of representing protective relay characteristics. This particular
11 characteristic is the current versus time characteristic of a time overcurrent relay. The characteristic shows
12 two regions: one in which the relay operates, and the other in which the relay does not operate. The line
13 separating the regions is the characteristic curve of the relay. Figure 4 shows the method of representing the
14 operating characteristics of a distance relay on an R-X diagram. This characteristic, like that on the current
15 versus time, also separates the operate and the non-operate regions. The region of where load plots is
16 illustrated as well on the R-X diagram.
8
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
2 Figure 3 —Extremely inverse time overcurrent characteristics
3
4 Figure 4 —Relay characteristics on the R-X plane
5 4.3 Zone of protection
6 There are many types of protection zones; the following basic protection zones are shown in Figure 5.
7 Generator protection zone (a)

8 Transformer protection zone (b)
9 Bus protection zone (c)
9
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Line protection zone (d)

2 Motor protection zone (e)
3 Generator-transformer protection zone (f)
4 The boundaries of a measuring zone of protection, as applied to protective relays, are determined by the
5 locations of the current transformers (CTs) that provide currents to the relay; these currents represent the
6 line currents. Overlapping of zones of protection is an established protection concept whose application is
7 shown in Figure 6. The placement of CTs for part of Station B of Figure 5 is shown in Figure 6. The CT
8 connections for the generator zone and bus zone relays are also shown in this figure. Detailed discussion of
9 bus protection is provided in IEEE Std C37.234™, IEEE Guide for Protective Relay Applications to Power
10 System Buses[B48]. Detailed discussion of generator protection is provided in IEEE Std C37.102™, IEEE
11 Guide for Generator Protection [B41].
12
13 Figure 5 —A sample power system and its zones of protection
10
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
Line
zone Bus
relays zone
relays
Generator
Transformer zone
zone relays relays
Line
zone
relays
1
2
3 Figure 6 —The principle of overlapping protection
4 The boundaries of the zone of protection of a line protection scheme that uses pilot communication are
5 clearly defined. Many line protection practices, however, have unrestricted zones; the start of the zone is
6 defined by the CT location, but the extent of the zone is determined by measurement of system quantities
7 that may vary with generation and system configuration changes.
8 4.4 Line relaying selection
9 The selection of a system for protecting a line requires that several factors, some of which are mutually
10 exclusive, should be considered. For example, knowledge of the most probable modes of failure,
11 recommendations of equipment suppliers, and good practical judgment can assist a protection engineer in
12 determining the emphasis that each factor should be given.
13 Certain transmission lines have a vital role in the operation of a power system. If a fault occurs on such a
14 line, the impact on the power system and the equipment connected to the system is significant. Such faults
15 should be detected and isolated faster than the faults that have an impact on smaller parts of the system. If
16 it is necessary to clear all faults on a transmission line at high speed, then independent protection systems,
17 such as multi-zone distance protection systems, at the line terminals will not meet this requirement. Relays
18 with communication channels should be used in such cases for achieving high-speed clearance of faults
19 along the entire length of the line.
20 One of the most important considerations for selecting a protection system is reliability. The reliability of
21 protection systems is separated into two aspects: dependability and security. Dependability is defined as
22 "the degree of certainty that a protection system will operate correctly." Security is defined as "the degree
23 of certainty that a protection system will not operate incorrectly." In other words, dependability is a
24 measure of the ability of the protection system to operate when it is supposed to operate. Security is a
25 measure of the ability of the protection system to avoid operation for all conditions for which tripping is not
26 desired.
27 Dependability is relatively easy to obtain in relay design or in the application of a number of relays. Testing
28 using operating conditions and redundancy are methods to ensure dependability. Security is difficult to
29 attain; an almost infinite variety of tests would be needed to simulate all possible conditions to which a
30 relay may be exposed.
31 Various engineering practices can enhance dependability. These include:
11
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 application of redundant relay systems with independence of design

2 application of redundant relay systems with different operating principles
3 redundancy within the relay systems
4 local backup methods
5 remote backup methods
6 Security can be enhanced by various practices, such as:
7 application of relays and relay systems that do not cause undesirable trips upon failure.
8 using protection systems that fail into a "disarmed" modedegrade into a fail safe mode
9 series connected protection systems; for example 2-out-of-2 protection systems systems require
10 both relay systems to operate to initiate a trip. While using 2-out-of-2 increases security, it reduced
11 reduces dependability. Failure of one of the two systems would result in no operation during a
12 fault.
13 using an independent disturbance detector to supervise the protection system
14 improved monitoring and self-checking
15 emphasis on high-quality components
16 two or more protection systems can be used to protect a line and a voting scheme can be used to
17 achieve a balance between dependability and security, for example a voting scheme that uses two
18 out of three trip logic.
19 Another important design consideration is selectivity and coordination of the protection system. Selectivity
20 is the ability of a protection system to cooperate with other protection systems to reduce the outage-area
21 when a faulted component of the system is isolated from the system. Coordination refers to the process of
22 applying relays to operate for faults in their primary zone of protection and within their backup zones,
23 which extend beyond the primary zone. Within backup zones the relay operation may be delayed but
24 delaying their operation for faults beyond their primary zone of protection to coordinate the operation with
25 operation of the relay systems protecting the components in the extended zones. Selectivity and
26 coordination should be achieved to ensure maximum service continuity and security.
27 Fault clearing time is an important consideration in the selection of a system for protecting lines.
28 Requirements for the speed of a relay should be carefully determined. If the operating speed is too slow,
29 system instability, excessive equipment damage, and adverse effects on customers’ equipment may result.
30 However, faster operating speed of the protection system may compromise security, coordination, and
31 selectivity of the protection system. There is a limit to the speed with which a protection system can
32 correctly respond to the occurrence of a fault; the limit is due to the operating principle of the relay, and
33 due to the transients that are present in voltages and currents experienced during faults and applied to the
34 protection system via the CTs and VTs (see clause 6.10).
35 Sensitivity of a protection system that refers to the minimum operating quantities required for the system to
36 detect a fault is an important factor. Most solid-state or numerical relays are more sensitive than their
37 electromagnetic and electromechanical predecessors. But certain problems, such as detecting high-
38 impedance ground faults, inherent system voltage unbalances, and high source-to-line impedance ratios
39 (SIR ratios, clause 5.1) still challenge the sensitivity of relays and should be considered when protection
40 systems are selected.
12
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 The design of a line protection system may fail to recognize one of the more important design factors -
2 simplicity. The multifunction and programmable capabilities of modern relays have created an abundance
3 of special solutions to possible system problems. The implementation of these solutions challenges
4 protection engineers, who are responsible for setting relays, and operations and maintenance personnel. The
5 problems caused by incorrect or incomplete implementation of overly complex protection systems may
6 create more serious consequences than not providing solutions for special situations. Protection engineers
7 should carefully weigh the consequences and probability of each problem to determine if they justify using
8 the complex special solutions that might be available or could be developed.
9 Protection engineers have long pointed out the relatively low cost and high importance of protection
10 systems compared with the equipment they protect. However, it is important to achieve the required
11 protection at the lowesta reasonable cost. In recent years, more importance has been placed on economic
12 analysis that considers considered more than just the lowest initial cost. The additional factors considered
13 include installation and maintenance costs as well as the cost of unreliable protection. In addition, modern
14 protection systems usually offer many features that were not previously available; those features may result
15 in improvements in operations, restoration of the system, and post-fault analysis. The value of these
16 improvements should also be considered in a complete economic evaluation of the available alternatives.
17 Pilot relaying schemes are used to achieve high-speed tripping for faults at all locations on the line. These
18 schemes require that, during a fault, information be transmitted between the protection systems that are
19 located in different substations to determine if the fault is inside or outside of the line-protection zone. This
20 is accomplished by using several different methods ranging from direct hardwire communications to fiber
21 optic communication systems (see cRefer to Clause 6.2). Some other protection systems interpret the lack
22 of signal from the remote terminal as a fault on the protected line (such as directional comparison blocking
23 scheme described in clause 6.2.4.5. Different protection schemes and communication channels have
24 different degrees of dependability and security. Knowledge of the communication options is necessary to
25 determine the reliability of the protection schemes being considered. The network configuration and local
26 system loading requirements may also affect the suitability of pilot protection schemes.
27 4.4.1 Factors influencing line relaying selection
28 A number of factors affect the selection of an adequate protection system for a given application. Some of
29 the factors are described in clauses 4.4.1.1 through 4.4.1.7.
30 4.4.1.1 Impact of Line Faults on the Power System
31 One of the significant factors in determining the system for protecting a transmission line is the impact a
32 fault on the line will have on the power system. How the fault is detected and cleared is important to the
33 remaining system not so much to the faulted line except that high speed clearing of line faults will reduce
34 the damage to the line hardware and increases the likelihood of a successful reclose. The greater the impact
35 a fault on the line will have to the power system may justify redundancy in protection, communication, and
36 perhaps even dc auxiliary supply. The impact of aA fault on a medium voltage, long, radial transmission
37 line will have minimum affect to the remaining system so it may be adequately protected with a step-
38 distance or overcurrent system, whereas a high voltage, short, line that is part of a closely tied network may
39 require a pilot or a current differential system.
40 The determination of the type of line protection is usually based on factors such as operating voltage of the
41 line, length of the line, proximity of the line to generating stations, power flows, stability studies, regional
42 and federal regulations and customer service considerations.
43 Several factors related to the requirements of the power system or to the requirements of the configuration
44 of the line should be weighed in the selection of transmission line protection. These include the factors
45 outlined in Clauses 4.4.1.1.1 through 4.4.1.1.5.
13
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 The fFaster the clearing of line faults will reduce the damage to the insulators and support hardware caused
2 by the arcing of the fault. This reduction in damage could increase the success rate of the autoreclosing.
3 4.4.1.1.1 Fault-clearing time requirements
4 The time in which a protection system should clear a fault is determined by considering issues such as
5 system stability and effects of the durations of voltage sags on customers’ operations. The clearing time
6 consideration not only influences the selection of primary relays, but may also dictate the application of
7 local backup protection and selection of the type of inter-substation communications needed for the
8 application.
9 4.4.1.1.2 Line length
10 Very short lines or very long lines may require protection solutions specifically designed for those lines
11 (see clause 5.1).
12 4.4.1.1.3 Capacity of sources
13 Closely related to the line length consideration is the capacity of the sources connected to a transmission
14 line. The source-capacity determines fault current levels and affects the ability of protection systems to
15 provide adequate selectivity. If the capacities of the sources are subject to significant variations due to
16 changes in operating conditions, some protection systems require flexibility for modifying the protection
17 system, or to automatically adapt to accommodate the impact of changes in the power system.
18 4.4.1.1.4 Line configuration
19 The number of terminals, effects of tapped loads and impacts of series capacitors and shunt reactors have
20 considerable influence on the selection of a protection system. This issue is discussed in detail in Clause 5.
21 4.4.1.1.5 Line loading
22 The voltage to current ratio (impedance), as seen from a line terminal, can be small if the line is heavily
23 loaded. This impedance could lie in the operating characteristic of a distance relay provided to protect the
24 line. Protection systems that include load-blinding features or that are naturally immune to flow of load
25 currents should be used in such cases.
26 4.4.1.2 Communications
27 Many transmission-line protection systems depend on communication between the line terminals. The
28 choice of the communication system is influenced by many factors, including most of the factors that
29 influence the selection of the protective relays.
30 If the choice of communication is dictated by factors independent of the choice of the protection system,
31 then the communication system will influence the protection to be applied. If the protection is chosen based
32 on factors independent of the communication system, then the communication selected should be
33 compatible with the protection requirements.
34 It is important to understand the difference between goals and means of such protection when the need for a
35 communication-based protection system is considered. For example, improved stability is a goal and short
36 fault clearing time is a means of achieving that goal. Utilities target to reduce the fault clearing time on
37 transmission lines for technical reasons such as to improve generator angular stability or to reduce
38 equipment damage that might occur if the flow of fault currents continued for longer periods of time.
39 There are several reasons for the need of high-speed clearing of faults on an entire line. Generator angular
40 stability is just one of the issues that require consideration to justify the need for communication-based
14
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 transmission line protection. Some of the other reasons for the need of using communication systems in
2 transmission line protection include:
3 limiting fault current damage by reducing fault clearing times

4 allowing high-speed autoreclosing
5 technically simplifying single-phase tripping and reclosing applications
6 providing protection for remote transformers that do not have interrupting devices
7 adequately protecting multi-terminal and high SIR (short) lines
8 protecting weak infeed terminals and instantaneously clearing low-current faults along the entire
9 transmission line
10 providing breaker failure protection and transfer trip for multiple breaker terminals
11 limiting voltage sag to prevent voltage stability issues and voltage sag to nearby customer loads,
12 thereby improving power quality
13 avoiding fault induced voltage collapse
14 Each of these aspects should be studied when determining the need for a communication-based protection
15 system. These considerations may be added to other uses for communication paths (e.g., need for substation
16 SCADA) that may provide sufficient justification to permit pilot protection to be implemented.
17 Once the need for a communication-based protection scheme has been established, some additional general
18 requirements that should be determined include:
19 the number of communication systems required,

20 type of communication system, such as analog or digital
21 medium for communication, such as copper wire, fibre optic, power-line carrier
22 need for alternative communication paths if the normal communication path/paths fail
23 how to operate the line if the communication becomes unavailable,
24 and how breaker/relay maintenance affects the protection at each terminal.
25 This type of thorough analysis of the technical justification and operational requirements for pilot
26 protection should be integrated with the economic implications of those requirements in a comprehensive
27 review of the transmission line protection. This practice should be followed for selecting protection systems
28 for new transmission lines and also when protection is replaced on existing lines (PSRC Report[B63]).
29 A thorough discussion of the commonly applied pilot protection schemes and the interrelationships of
30 protection and communications is included in clause 6.2.
31 4.4.1.3 Failure modes
32 Protective relaying design should consider and reduce the negative effects of “single-point failures.” A
33 single-point failure is any one failure of a relay, breaker, dc auxiliary supply, communication system, or
34 any other component of the overall protection system. Redundant protection, local backup-protection,
35 remote backup-protection, and duplication of other system components are used to reduce the effects of
36 single-point failures.
15
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 “Common mode failure” is another design consideration. Common mode failures are failures of multiple
2 functions due to the failure of one component or due to the same root cause. Examples would be failures
3 due to mechanical jolts, such as bumping the panel or earthquake vibrations. Other common mode failures
4 could be application errors, setting errors, incorrect maintenance or calibration procedures or inadequate
5 shielding from EMI. Independence in the operating principles of the primary and backup protection
6 systems is a technique that may be applied to reduce the chances of common mode failures. Physical
7 isolation or separation, use of different manufacturer’s equipment, varying maintenance personnel from
8 time to time, and independent checks of settings and designs are other techniques for reducing the
9 possibility of common mode failures.
10 4.4.1.4 Protective scheme design compromises
11 The design of a protection system may require considerable compromise. Reliability is, by definition, a
12 combination of dependability and security. Increasing dependability usually reduces security; a tradeoff is,
13 therefore, necessary. Other compromises are reliability versus cost, speed versus security, simplicity versus
14 complex features, independence of design and manufacture versus standardization, and old technology
15 versus new technology. All of these, and many more choices, should be considered at the design stage. A
16 prudent relay design engineer would document these choices, particularly the compromises and the reasons
17 behind them. This documentation process provides the operations department with the information
18 necessary to evaluate the protection in less technically-complex terminology. It would provide continuity
19 and consistency over time so that subsequent generations of protection personnel can better understand the
20 reasons for certain practices.
21 The very act of documenting the reasons for choices and compromises often reveals other alternatives or
22 options and generally results in a better final design.
23 4.4.1.5 Past practices
24 The selection of protection usually takes into consideration past practices and the familiarity of the
25 personnel responsible for those practices. The selection of different protective systems may result in
26 requirements for development of new documentation and for additional training for the staff. Protection
27 solutions can only be effective if designed properly, installed and commissioned correctly, and supported
28 sufficiently by operations and maintenance personnel.
29 4.4.1.6 Old versus new technologies
30 Similar to the discussion on past practices is the issue of whether to sustain application of the old “tried and
31 proven” technologies, or take advantage of the many advanced protection features provided by new
32 technologies. Often, the benefits of the new technologies in areas such as reduced maintenance
33 requirements and additional operational information provide the incentives to make the change. N ewer
34 relay technologies also provide lower CT and VT burdens, better sensitivities, wider setting ranges, easier
35 setting changes, greater flexibility, and the ability to solve special protection problems. Multifunctional
36 relays also reduce panel wiring and panel space.
37 4.4.1.7 The future
38 While it is not possible to anticipate all changes to the line or to the surrounding system within the
39 foreseeable future, it is often prudent to select protection that is capable of handling changes in line loading,
40 source conditions, or effective line length. Other changes to CT ratios, communications, substation
41 configuration, etc., can be handled if the protection is selected and designed to be flexible, easy to modify,
42 or replace.
16
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 4.5 Redundancy and backup considerations
2 Redundancy is the design of relaying developed with the goal of avoiding the possibility that a single
3 component failure will prevent the relaying from reliably sensing and isolating a fault in the protected zone.
4 Backup protection is a form of protection that operates independently of specified components in the
5 primary protective system. It may duplicate the primary protection or may be intended to operate only if
6 the primary protection fails or is temporarily out of service. Many transmission lines are protected by two
7 protection systems, for example, the line from Bus B to Bus D shown in Figure 7 is protected by a
8 differential protection system as well as by a permissive over-reaching transfer-trip protection system. Both
9 protection systems operate independently and ensure that the line is disconnected from the rest of the power
10 system in the event a fault occurs in the line protection zone. The two protection systems are functionally
11 equivalent and do not share any components, and therefore are deemed to be redundant protection systems.
12
Bus B Field Code Changed
Bus D
Transmission Line
Communication Link
87 87
21 21
Communication Link
13
14 Figure 7 —Main 1 and Main 2 systems for protecting a transmission line
15 These redundant protection systems are often referred to as main-1, main-2, system 1 and system 2, system
16 A and system B or similar descriptions for these redundant protection systems. The advantage of using
17 redundant protection systems is that the failure of one component of a protection system does not result in
18 losing the ability of isolating the protected circuit if a fault occurs on that circuit. This improves the
19 reliability of the power system.
20 Redundant CTs, VTs, breaker trip coils, power circuit breakers, dc sources, communication channels,
21 and/or other system components can be used to improve the reliability of the power system.
22 Backup protection is achieved by using different protection systems or functions. These systems function
23 simultaneously with the primary protection systems but their operation is delayed long enough to allow the
24 primary protection systems to isolate the fault first. Backup systems perform the tripping function only if
25 the primary protection systems fail to isolate the faulted line.
17
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Redundant and backup protection of ac transmission lines can be provided by different methods, each with
2 varying levels of complexity. The practices in various utilities range from using identical systems through
3 using different models or principles from the same manufacturer, or using the same principles from
4 different manufacturers to using different manufactures and different principles. There are various
5 tradeoffs in complexity, cost, dependability and security in all of those alternatives. The history in each
6 utility is sometimes the deciding factor. One of the objectives sometimes is to lessen the possibility of
7 similar hardware and software design problems affecting both protection systems.
8 Backup protection can be divided in two types: local backup and remote backup. Local backup protection
9 refers to the protection system located at the substations where line terminals are located. The term “remote
10 backup” refers to detecting faults using protection systems that are located at substations other than the
11 substations where the line terminals are located.
12 The basic form of local backup protection is the inclusion of redundancy in the protection scheme.
13 Typically, the higher the voltage level, the greater is the redundancy provided in the protection systems.
14 The use of local backup reduces delays and loss of selectivity that occurs with the operation of remote
15 backup protection. The tradeoff occurs in extra cost for the additional equipment required for local backup
16 protection.
17 A part of a transmission system protected by multiple-zone distance relays is shown in Figure 8. All lines in
18 this transmission system are protected with step-distance protection systems that use separate relay
19 elements for each zone using the setting philosophy detailed in clause 6.1.3.1. Also, no breaker failure or
20 other protective relays are provided. A fault on line from Bus B to Bus D would be detected by the distance
21 relays provided on the line at those buses and would isolate the line by opening circuit breakers B3 and D3.
22 Zone-2 elements of those relays provide backup protection for the failure of the zone-1 elements and
23 provide time-delayed protection of the line section from the end of zone-1 to the end of the line. The zone-3
24 elements of those relays provide local backup protection for the failure of zone-2 elements to clear faults
25 beyond the reach of the zone-1 elements as well as provide backup protection for the zone-1 elements. This
26 is because separate protection elements are used in the distance relays in this example. Zone-2 and/or zone-
27 3 elements of distance relays provided at circuit breaker A1, C2, E1, E2 and F4 would also detect the fault
28 in the forward direction if they are within the reach of the relay. They would open circuit breakers A1, C2,
29 E1, E2 and F4 after the set time-delay in case the primary or local backup protection of the faulted line
30 failed to isolate the line from the system before the expiration of the coordination time delays. This
31 illustrates a drawback of remote backup protection in that it results in a complete loss of supply to the
32 affected substations, because all lines into the station have to be tripped to remotely clear the fault.
33 The operation of the remote backup protection is delayed more than the operating time of the local backup
34 protection to ensure that parts of the power system other than the faulted line are not unnecessarily de-
35 energized. Where remote protection is required to provide secondary or backup protection, it should be
36 verified that the sensitivity of the remote backup protection would detect all types of faults and for all
37 credible system configurations. The effects of infeed from other lines at the remote terminals should be
38 taken into account to ensure complete coverage of the protected line. In some cases, it may be acceptable
39 for remote backup relays to operate sequentially if the remote backup relays cannot provide complete
40 coverage of the line. Also remote backup protection should not operate during high system loads and
41 during low levels of system voltage.
42 If the remote backup cannot provide the required sensitivity, redundant protection system or systems should
43 be used.
44 If the remote backup cannot provide this sensitivity, redundant protection system or systems should be
45 used. Also, remote backup protection should not operate during high system loads and during low levels of
46 system voltage. Also remote backup protection should not operate during high system loads and during
47 low levels of system voltage.
48 It is important to appreciate that one relay can provide local and/or remote backup protection
49 simultaneously to different components of a system including transmission lines. Also, a transmission line
18
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 can have a number of different backup protection relays. Some elements within a protection system may
2 back each other up as well as back up the protection in other transmission lines. However since different
3 elements within a single system may share some common components (such as power supply) completely
4 independent backup cannot be achieved within a single system.
5
6 Figure 8 —Remote backup protection of a transmission line
7 Some protection functions operate only for faults on a transmission line. These functions, such as pilot
8 wire, current differential and phase comparison protection do not offer remote backup protection and can
9 be used only as primary functions. Other protection functions, such as overcurrent protection and step-
10 distance with over-reaching zones, can detect faults on the transmission line they are provided for and parts
11 of adjacent protection zones. These functions offer remote backup and can be used as primary or local
12 backup functions as well.
13 The operation of some protection functions requires transfer of information between protection systems
14 provided at all the terminals of a line. It is always desirable to provide backup protection functions that do
15 not need communications between the terminals for detecting the fault and isolating the faulted line.
16 4.6 Autoreclosing methods
17 Automatic reclosing is discussed in detail in the IEEE Std C37.104™, IEEE Guide for Automatic
18 Reclosing of Line Circuit Breakers for AC Distribution and Transmission Lines[B42]. Some comments are
19 provided in this clause for ready reference of the readers.
19
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Protective relays are applied to isolate faulted elements and maintain the integrity of electrical transmission
2 systems. The loss of a single line in the transmission system can have a great impact on the economics and
3 reliability of the system. Many system faults, such as those caused by lightning, wind, or tree branches, are
4 temporary in nature and may disappear once the faulted circuit is de-energized. Autoreclosing of line
5 circuit breakers is widely used to reduce the impact of these temporary faults by re-energizing and restoring
6 the faulted section of the transmission system.
7 Two methods of autoreclosing are typically applied on transmission lines; these are high-speed
8 autoreclosing and time-delayed autoreclosing. High-speed autoreclosing is initiated with high-speed relays
9 and consists of automatic closing of a circuit breaker with no intentional delay beyond an allowance for arc
10 deionization. Some benefits of high-speed autoreclosing include fast restoration of power to customers,
11 improved system stability and immediate restoration of system capacity and reliability. It should be noted
12 that high-speed tripping of all line terminals needs to be present in order to apply this method of
13 autoreclosing. A time delayed reclosing is sometimes attempted if high speed reclosing does not succeed.
14 Time-delayed autoreclosing is implemented with a definite circuit breaker open interval. A time-delayed
15 autoreclose can be used following an unsuccessful initial high-speed autoreclose or where multiple shot
16 autoreclosing is desired. The initial autoreclose dead time for a time-delayed autoreclose cycle can be as
17 low as 0.5 seconds and as high as 60 seconds.
18 Single-shot autoreclosing is the automatic closure of a circuit breaker one time only. Multiple-shot
19 autoreclosing is the automatic closure of a circuit breaker more than one time in a predetermined
20 autoreclose sequence. Autoreclosing on EHV systems is typically of the single-shot type. Multiple-shot
21 reclosing, however, has gained acceptance on lower voltage transmission systems even though the success
22 rate for additional dead-line autoreclose attempts is poor.
23 Various forms of supervision may be applied to autoreclose schemes. Autoreclose supervision prevents
24 autoreclosing for conditions that might cause undesired affects, such as damage to generators or motors, or
25 re-energizing faulted equipment such as transformers and reactors. Selective and adaptive autoreclosing are
26 other methods utilized to prevent autoreclosing for specific types of faults or system conditions.
27 Autoreclosing has evolved due to the availability of greater amounts of information through SCADA and
28 modern relaying systems, such as neural network based devices. This evolution allows for more selective
29 schemes that improve the reclosing success rates and lessens damage to system components that might
30 have been caused by closing into permanent faults. The type of autoreclosing used typically depends on the
31 voltage level, customer requirements, stability considerations, and the proximity of generation.
32 4.7 Effects of load on line relay applications and settings
33 One of the principal influences on protective relay settings is load; hence, maximum load current level, in
34 turn, influences fault-detection sensitivity.
35 4.7.1 Phase overcurrent relays
36 Phase overcurrent relays are generally set such that they do not operate when system load is being supplied
37 as well as during transient operating conditions, such as transformer inrush, motor starting, emergency
38 loads and recoverable power swings. This usually requires an overcurrent pickup setting above a maximum
39 load level. The sensitivity that can be achieved is, therefore, somewhat coarse, but many applications in
40 which they are used do not require high sensitivity (for details see clauses 6.1.1 and 6.1.2).
41 4.7.2 Ground overcurrent relays
42 Ground overcurrent relays have the advantage of using current that is either zero or very small under
43 normal conditions. The sensitivity that can be achieved is substantially better than that afforded by phase
44 overcurrent relays. Only unbalanced load currents and system unbalances affect the setting of these
20
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 devices. Balanced system load has no impact on the ground overcurrent relay applications on transmission
2 lines.
3 4.7.3 Directional overcurrent relays
4 Directional overcurrent relays have the same restrictions as phase and ground overcurrent relays for load
5 flow in their tripping direction. Properly selected directional elements block tripping for load flow and
6 faults in the non-tripping direction. For further discussion on directional overcurrent relays see clause 6.1.2.
7 4.7.4 Phase distance relays
8 Phase distance relays have a relatively fixed reach along the line impedance depending on the shape of their
9 operating characteristics and settings. These relays are applied to operate when fault currents flow on the
10 protected line and to not operate when only load currents flow on the protected line. Phase distance relays
11 may sometimes require a setting for adequate fault coverage that might limit the line loading capability. A
12 detailed discussion of this issue is given in clause 6.6.1.
13 4.7.5 Ground distance relays
14 Ground distance relays are applied on transmission lines using phase-currents, residual-current and phase-
15 voltages as inputs. In some cases, the residual current is not zero during normal operation of the line
16 because of various reasons, such as unbalance in the loads on the three phases. This makes these relays
17 susceptible to operate under heavy load conditions if not supervised by directional elements. , such as
18 negative or zero sequence directional functions. Sometimes, ground distance relays are supervised by
19 ground fault detectors that are set after considering such things as current transformer mismatch or normal
20 load load unbalance that might occur.
21 Ground distance relays are also susceptible to errors associated with ground fault resistance in the presence
22 of load flow induced source angle differencesground fault resistance and out-of-phase sources. The relaysy
23 may over-reach or under-reach for leading and lagging phases when phase-to-ground faults occur if some
24 provisions are not included in the relay design to compensate for these factors. An A&M Protective Relay
25 Conference paper by Giuliante, A. T., McConnell, J. E., and Turner, S. D [B31] describes these provisions.
26 These problems can be taken care of by using more conservative settings of the relay.
27 4.7.6 Pilot systems--two terminal lines
28 The influence of load on pilot systems depends largely on the nature of the protective relaying scheme. The
29 systems that use over-reaching distance measurement, such as directional comparison blocking (DCB),
30 permissive over-reaching transfer trip (POTT), and directional comparison unblocking (DCUB), have the
31 advantage of limited load angle sensitivity. These systems also have the advantage that they are not
32 required to be set for a specific reach. These systems are least affected by load currents, typically because
33 the overreaching element does not come near loading values. However, the pilot trip elements may
34 approach loading impedances except in very long line applications. In some cases, these systemsthe relays
35 include blinders, load encroachment, or shaped characteristics that prevent operation of the pilot-system
36 during balanced three-phase load conditions. (The DCB, POTT, and DCUB schemes are further described
37 in clauses 6.2.4.36.2.4.56.2.4.5, POTT scheme is further described in clause 6.2.4.3.., and 6.2.4.6,
38 respectively.
39 The distance relays are set short of the remote line terminal for direct under-reaching transfer trip (DUTT)
40 schemes. This setting makes the scheme less susceptible to tripping under heavy load conditions. However,
41 the reach variation of the distance relay as a result of pre-fault load current is much more critical than for
42 the over-reaching schemes for situations in which fault resistance is not zero. It is desirable that load or
43 fault current, or any combination of the two, should never cause operation of the zone 1 elements for any
44 condition other than a fault on the protected line. ( The DUTT scheme is further described in clause
45 6.5.3.2.6.2.4.1.
21
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Phase comparison and current differential schemes are not normally susceptible to operation for load
2 currents flowing on the line because these schemes use the summation of current from each terminal of the
3 line, which is very low during normal load flow. Load does influence the setting of fault detectors in phase
4 comparison blocking schemes and in current differential schemes when operation following channel failure
5 is allowed. The use of channel trip inhibit circuits in these schemes prevents them from false tripping even
6 when their current-based fault detectors have operated. But if the channel trip inhibit circuits are not
7 provided or if they fail, this would result in incorrect operation of the protection system during normal
8 operating conditions or during faults external to the protected circuit. Current differential schemes may be
9 sensitive to tapped loads, and settings should be chosen accordingly. Also, high levels of through load
10 currents may reduce the fault detection sensitivity of both phase comparison and current differential
11 schemes. This can happen because the phase angles of currents may shift beyond the operating region
12 resulting in restraining the protection system during internal faults (weak-infeed and outfeed conditions).
13 Line charging current is substantial in EHV transmission lines (more than 1 Mvar per km for a 500 kV line)
14 and HV cables. Special considerations may be required for setting fault detectors used to protect those
15 systems.
16 4.7.7 Pilot systems--three terminal
17 An outfeed condition may occur even without load during an internal fault on a three terminal line.
18 Depending on the type of protection system, this may result in an undesired delay in clearing the fault.
19 Three-terminal applications occasionally have at least one weak source. Therefore, care should be taken to
20 ensure that either the contribution to an internal fault exceeds the load current outfeed (discussed in clause
21 6.5.1), or the relaying system used to protect the line ison the bases obased onf the total internal fault
22 current (similar to alike a differential protection system does).
23 4.7.8 Sensitive ground overcurrent fault protection
24 Sensitive ground fault protection is used to reduce hazards for the public and protect equipment. While
25 transmission faults with fault impedance are not as common as faults in distribution systems, the severity
26 and adverse consequences of a transmission-line fault that is not detected can be significantly higher due to
27 the high energy levels that are present. This topic is further covered in a PSRC Report [65].
28 The type of system grounding and specific fault impedance determine the magnitude of ground faults.
29 Faults that contain high-impedance pose a challenge to distance relays. Directional ground overcurrent
30 relays may be set sensitive enough to detect these faults, but they could adversely impact security. The
31 balance between sensitivity and security is based on individual and company preferences. Limits exist on
32 how sensitive a relay is allowed to be set and is truly part of the “art” of protective relaying. In addition,
33 microprocessor relays provide a means to detect higher impedance faults that electro-mechanical relays
34 cannot. This allows the protection engineer to use a more sensitive ground protection setting.
35 Methods of setting directional ground overcurrent relays vary among companies, locations, etc. One
36 method sets the pickup to a small portion of a minimum expected fault current. This method inherently
37 allows for different system conditions and contingencies as well as for faults with impedance. However, it
38 may not encompass the desired sensitivity. Another method may set the ground relay for a fault with a set
39 value of impedance. Regardless of the method, setting the ground relay sensitive enough to detect faults
40 that ground impedance elements do not detect is desirable.
41 Due to an increased focus on sensitivity, factors that were previously discounted and were accounted for in
42 general tolerances have now become more important and consideration for such factors is required. These
43 factors include maximum ground current (due to system imbalance) during heavy loads, the system model,
44 mutual coupling, instrument transformer inaccuracies, single phase tripping, and contingencies.
45 The system model should be as accurate as needed to support the sensitivity of relay settings. Transmission
46 lines need to be correctly modeled; the models should include factors, such as specific cable types, series-
22
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 compensation, structure type, earth resistivity, etc. Mutual coupling should be accurately modeled with the
2 correct orientation between line segments and the correct mutual coupling affects. Under-built distribution
3 lines may also need to be considered. Data recorded from system faults may be used to validate and revise
4 the model if it becomes necessary.
5 The selection of the time delay curve is a matter of preference. However, the ground relay should
6 coordinate with the ground distance relays and other ground overcurrent relays. In order to improve the
7 coordination requirements of the ground distance protection functions, trip times for line-end ground faults
8 should be larger than zone two delay times with a margin. Coordination with other similar relays at remote
9 terminals need only be effective for fault current levels defined by the fault impedance expected in an
10 application.
11 5. Impact of system configuration on selection of protection schemes

12 This clause addresses the impact of system configuration on the selection of protection schemes: line
13 length, line design, number of line terminals, lines terminated in transformers, weak electrical systems,
14 ground path configurations, distribution taps, power flow control devices, parallel lines, high-impedance
15 return paths, and terminal configurations.
16 5.1 Length considerations
17 This clause is concerned with the influence of line length on the selection of schemes for protecting
18 transmission lines. Transmission lines may be classified as short, medium, or long.
19 A line is designated short if the source to impedance ratio (SIR) for the line is large. Transmission lines that
20 have SIR greater than four are classified as short lines. The lines that have SIR of 0.5 to four are classified
21 as medium lines. Finally, lines that have SIR of less than 0.5 are classified as long lines.
22 The per unit (pu) impedance of a line of given length varies much more with the nominal voltage of the line
23 than the impedance of the line in ohms, because the per unit impedance varies with the square of the
24 voltage.. This factor, together with the different short-circuit impedances at different voltage levels, means
25 that the nominal voltage of a line has a significant effect on the SIR which in turn influences whether the
26 line is considered “short,” “medium,” or “long.”
27 For example, consider a 500 kV line whose positive sequence reactance is 0.332 Ω per km (0.5343 Ω per
28 mile). This corresponds to a reactance of 0.000133 pu per km (0.000214 pu per mile) on 100 MVA and 500
29 kV base values. If the source impedance behind a relay terminal is 0.01 pu (corresponding to a fault level of
30 10 000 MVA), the following classification applies:
31 x Line lengths less than about 18.7 km (11.6 miles) would result in an SIR > 4 and may be classified
32 as a short line.
33 x Line lengths greater than about 150.4 km (93.5 miles) would result in an SIR < 0.5, and may be
34 classified as a long line.
35 On the other hand, a 69 kV line, whose positive sequence reactance is 0.53 Ω per km (0.853 Ω per mile),
36 might have very different length classifications. For such a line, the reactance is 0.01113 pu per km (0.0179
37 pu per mile) on a 100 MVA and 69 kV base values. If the source impedance behind a relay terminal is 0.1
38 pu (corresponding to a fault level of 1000 MVA), the following classifications apply:
39 x Line lengths less than about 2.2 km (1.39 miles) would result in an SIR > 4 and may be classified
40 as a short line.
23
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 x Line lengths greater than about 18.0 km (11.2 miles) would result in an SIR < 0.5 and may be
2 classified as a long line.
3 These examples demonstrate the importance of source impedance and nominal voltage on the classification
4 of a line as “short,” “medium,” or “long.” Further, a line can be considered short from one terminal and
5 medium or long from the other depending upon the relative strengths of the sources behind the terminals.
6 To further complicate matters, the positive and zero sequence source impedances can vary considerably
7 such that a line could be short for ground faults and medium or long for phase faults or vice-versa.
8 Although the physical length of lines is a factor in the SIR, it is inappropriate to describe the line as long,
9 medium, or short based on this consideration only.
10 5.1.1 Effect of SIR on Line Protection
11 A short line is a challenge for line protection because it makes it difficult for the relay to differentiate
12 between an in-zone fault and an out-of-zone fault. For a distance element, the higher the SIR (shorter the
13 line), the lower the restraining voltage at the relay for an out-of-zone fault. A very low voltage can be more
14 susceptible to measurement errors and transients which can result in undesired overreach of an under
15 reaching element. SIR is a way of quantifying the voltage divider circuit. For an overcurrent relay, when
16 the SIR is high, the faulted system is dominated by the source impedance and the difference between the
17 fault current magnitude for an in-zone fault and an out-of-zone fault can be smaller than the typical margins
18 used for setting the pickup. More details on short line protection issues are covered in the following
19 sections clauses and in section 5.5.5 and section 6.9. A Western Protective Relay Conference paper Formatted: Font: (Default) Times New
20 provides additional discussion on SIR (Thompson, M., and Somani, A [B96]). Roman, Font color: Auto
21 5.1.2 Calculating SIR for Determining Line Length
22 The A recommended suggested method to calculate the source impedance for the purpose of classifying
23 line length is to place a short circuit at the remote bus (boundary of the line zone) and calculate the source
24 impedance as the voltage drop from the source to the relay location divided by the fault current. For the
25 purpose of illustrating the calculation, Figure 9 shows a transmission system that has been reduced to its
26 two source equivalent with the line and transfer impedance branches. The transfer impedance branch that
27 represents the complex transmission system network surrounding the line of interest can have a significant
28 effect on the voltage at the relay for a fault at the zone boundary.
29
24
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
Fault at the line

ZTRANSFER zone boundary
VDROP_SOURCE
VX VY
ZSX ZLINE ZSY
VRELAY IRELAY
SX SY
(a) Simplified System
VDROP_SOURCE
VX = VBASE_LN VY = VBASE_LN
VRELAY
VFAULT = 0
(b) Voltage Profile While Faulted
1
2
3 Figure 9 — Method to calculate source impedance for use in determining SIR for
4 classifying line length
5
6 Equation 1 and 2 provide the source impedances for the phase and ground fault loops respectively.
VDROP _ SRC VBASE_LN VRELAY

7 ZS3PH (1)
I RELAY I RELAY
VDROP _ SRC VBASE_LN VRELAY

8 ZSSLG (2)
I RELAY I RELAY (3I 0 RELAY * k 0)
9 Where: : VBASE_LN is the system base voltage. , line to neutral, that defines voltage at the infinite bus behind
10 the source impedance in primary units.
11 VRELAY is the phase to ground voltage at the relay for a fault at the remote bus. Formatted: Indent: First line: 0"
12 IRELAY is the phase current at the relay for a fault at the remote bus.
13 3I0RELAY is the zero sequence current at the relay for a fault at the remote bus.
14 k0 is the zero sequence compensation factor for the line as defined by Equation 3.
Z0 L Z1L
15 k0 (3)
3 * Z1L
16 Where: Z1L is the positive sequence line impedance.

17 Z0L is the zero sequence line impedance.
18 The source impedances obtained by Equations 1 and 2 are used in Equation 4 to obtain the SIR. Z1 LINE is
19 used in the denominator of the equation to determine SIR as that defines the zone boundary that we
20 doshould not want tobe overreached. The positive sequence impedance (Z1) is used for both three phase
25
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 and single line to ground fault because K0 is used to define Zsrelay_SLG We use Z1 for both three-phase
2 and single-line-to-ground faults because we used K0 to define ZSRELAY_SLG.
ZS3PH ZSSLG
3 SIR 3PH or SIR SLG (4)
Z1LINE Z1LINE
4 It is often desirable to determine the SIR under N-1 conditions as well to determine if the line can get short
5 when the strongest source behind the local terminal is out of service.
6 5.1.3 Example SIR Calculation
7 For this example, we have a line between buses W and E with the parameters listed in Table 1. The fault
8 values for Terminal W are provided in Table 2. The fault values are obtained by placing a three-phase fault
9 at bus E under system normal (N-0) and with the strongest source behind the W terminal out (N-1). In this
10 case, Bus W has one strong source and one weak source connected to the bus behind the relay.
Table 1 —Line Parameters

Parameter Value
Voltage 138kV
Line Length 41.53 Miles
Z1LINE Primary 34.29Ω
11
12
13
Table 2 — Fault Values for Determining SIR for Terminal W
Parameter Value
VRelay for 3PH Fault at remote bus E under N-0 43.5kV
IRelay for 3PH Fault at remote bus E under N-0 1247A
VRelay for 3PH Fault at remote bus E under N-1 16.3kV
IRelay for 3PH Fault at remote bus E under N-1 484A
14
15 The SIR for the system normal (N-0) case for phase protection is calculated as follows:
138kV
43.5kV
16 ZS3PH_N-0 3 28.39: (5)
1247A
28.39:
17 SIR 3PH_N-0 0.8 (6)
34.29:
18 An SIR of 0.8 is greater than 0.5, which indicates that this line should be considered a medium
19 length/borderline long line under N-0 conditions.
20 The SIR for the single contingency (N-1) case for phase protection is calculated as follows:
26
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
138kV
16.3kV
1 ZS3PH_N-1 3 130.94: (7)
484A
130.94:
2 SIR 3PH_N-1 3.8 (8)
34.29:
3 An SIR of 3.8 is less than 4, which indicates that this line should be considered a medium length/borderline
4 short line under N-1 conditions.
5 Examining this line from terminal E provides the fault values in Table 3. Terminal E is connected to a
6 relatively strong bus with many lines into it.
Table 3 — Fault Values for Determining SIR for Terminal E
Parameter Value
VRelay for 3PH Fault at remote bus W under N-0 64.9kV
IRelay for 3PH Fault at remote bus W under N-0 1898A
VRelay for 3PH Fault at remote bus W under N-1 62.0kV
IRelay for 3PH Fault at remote bus W under N-1 1813A
7
8 The SIR for the system normal (N-0) case for phase protection is calculated as follows:
138kV
64.9kV
9 ZS3PH_N-0 3 7.78: (9)
1898A
7.78:
10 SIR 3PH_N-0 0.2 (10)
34.29:
11 An SIR of 0.2 is less than 0.5, which indicates that this line should be considered long under N -0
12 conditions.
13 The SIR for the single contingency (N-1) case for phase protection is calculated as follows:
138kV
62.0kV
14 ZS3PH_N-1 3 9.75: (11)
1813A
9.75:
15 SIR 3PH_N-1 0.3 (12)
34.29:
16 An SIR of 0.3 is still less than 0.5, which indicates that under N-1 conditions, the line is still long.
17 The process would be similar for calculating the SIR for ground protection.
27
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 5.2 Line design considerations
2 Transmission lines are either overhead air-insulated lines or insulated cable systems and, in some cases, are
3 combinations of air-insulated lines and insulated cables. The electrical characteristics are significantly
4 different for these lines. The characteristics of overhead air-insulated lines are well understood. Key
5 characteristics of cables are reviewed in this clause. The issues associated with electrically connected
6 double circuit lines are also reviewed in this clause.
7 5.2.1 High-voltage cables
8 The series inductance of cable circuits is typically one-half to one-third of the series inductance of
9 comparable overhead lines. The reactance to a fault will, accordingly, be lower for cable systems. This
10 should be considered in the application of distance relays for protecting short lines. As a practical
11 consideration, cable systems are frequently used in urban or metropolitan areas where short lines are
12 typical. Cables are, therefore, frequently protected using those techniques that are suitable for protecting
13 short lines and lines that have low total impedance as discussed in a PSRC Report [B59] and in a Western
14 Protective Relay Conference paper (Tziouvaras, D.A.) [B97][B97][B92].
15 5.2.2 Electrically connected double circuit transmission lines (Bifurcated lines)
16 Phase conductors of parallel transmission lines are sometimes connected together to form a single
17 transmission line. Such a line is either modeled by assuming that each phase is composed of two
18 conductors of a single bundle or, more accurately, by assuming that the two lines are two circuits connected
19 in parallel. The calculations of line impedance are simplified if it is assumed that the lines are fully
20 transposed even though they most likely are not. Since the lines configured in this manner are generally not
21 very long, it may be reasonable to neglect the effect of the lines not being transposed.
22 Fault currents and apparent impedances, as seen by relays, are affected by a fault on one phase of one of the
23 transmission line circuits. The current on the un-faultedunfaulted conductor will flow past the fault location
24 to the next jumper before crossing over; this results in an increase in the apparent impedance causing the
25 impedance relays to under-reach. The worst case occurs where the lines are connected only at their
26 terminals. This problem can be reduced by adding jumpers at intermediate locations along the line length.
27 An adequate number of jumpers will negate the effect, because all single-conductor faults will then be near
28 a jumper.
29 The effects can be studied if the jumpers near a point of interest (such as a fault near the far end) are
30 modeled as bus points and the conductors in between are treated as mutually coupled parallel lines.
31 A Western Protective Relay Conference paper (Tziouvaras, D., and H. Altuve, F. Calero) [B100] discusses
32 these topics as well as other topics such as the requirements to cover a fault where the line shorts to the
33 ground with the side closest to the jumper not faulted
34 5.3 Number of line terminals
35 The number of terminals on a transmission line is a basic and important factor when selecting a protection
36 system. A particular terminal becomes significant to the selection of the protection system if it supplies
37 current to faults on the transmission line. It is recommended that allAll terminal(s)s that can supply fault
38 current should line protection and be incorporatedneed to be considered for inclusion into the line
39 protection system.
40 5.4 Lines terminated into transformers
41 A typical line terminated into a transformer is shown in Figure 10. There are generally two approaches used
42 to protect this line and transformer combination: line current differential scheme described in 6.2.1 and
28
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 distance relay schemes described in clause 6.1.3.1 . In either case the implementation of separate
2 transformer differential protection is needed for the transformer as described in (refer to IEEE Std
3 C37.91™, C37.91™, IEEE Guide for Protective Relay Applications to Power Transformers for details on
4 transformer differential protection)[B37].
5 This section clause describes examples and protection issues of transmission lines terminated in
6 transformers and protected with instantaneous, under-reaching step distance relays (generally zone 1).
7 Additional line differential or piloted distance scheme might be required for a complete protection of the
8 system. The numerical values used for setting relays depend on the practices of utilities and are not
9 intended for use in all applications.
10 A Western Protective Relay Conference paper (Zimmerman, K. and Roth, D.) [B102] discusses lines
11 terminated into transformers.
12 Some issues, such as transformer magnetizing inrush, over-excitation, etc. are not discussed in this clause.
13 The reader should refer to the An IEEE Standard IEEE Std C37.91™, IEEE Guide for Protecting Power
14 Transformers [B37] discusses for determining the additional protection functions that are needed in such
15 cases.
Bus A ZT Bus B
kVL kVH
NCL NCH
ZL
IL
NVH
IH
VL VH
Relay A Relay B
16
Field Code Changed
Bus A ZT
kVL kVH Bus B
NCL NCH
ZL
IL
NVL NVH
IH
VL VH
Relay A Relay B
17
18
19 Figure 10 —Typical transformer-line combination
20 5.4.1 Considerations for line distance applications
21 The reach of a distance relay is measured from the location of the VTs; the fault direction is sensed by the
22 location and connections of the current transformers. In Figure 10, using the VTs and CTs on the line side
23 of the transformer, VH and IH, are preferred. In all respects, except for the transfer trip requirement, these
24 applications can be treated as normal line protection applications.
25 There are, hHowever, economic or other considerations factorsthat may dictate the use of the either or both
26 the VTs and CTs measuring the low side (Bus A side) quantities V L and IL. This These factors introduces
27 additional application considerations, which are primarily the effects of the transformer impedance, the
29
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 phase shift introduced by wye-delta transformation, tap changers, secondary impedance calculations, and
2 the availability of ground fault (zero sequence) current. Therefore, careful consideration should be given to
3 the placement of VTs and CTs for these line distance applications. This guide does not provide the
4 mathematical equations needed to compensate for the phase shift in line currents introduced by different
5 power transformers. Microprocessor relays are available that are programmed to cope with this shift.
6 This guide does not provide the mathematical equations to unscramble the phase shift introduced by the
7 power transformer and it assumes that the relay will be able to cope with it.
8 The key criteria to set any type of instantaneous, step distance relay (non-piloted, zone 1) is not to
9 overreach the remote terminal. This is done to avoid tripping for external faults behind the remote bus. The
10 under-reaching margin to apply to distance relays depends of several factors, such as: utility practices,
11 errors in the calculation of line parameters, variation of the line ground impedance throughout the year,
12 relay accuracy and CT/VT errors, among others. In the case of lines terminated in transformers, depending
13 where the CT/VTs are located, one of the relays may need to measure the combination ofof the transformer
14 and line impedance. In these cases the errors of the transformer impedance should be considered while
15 setting the relay, even though transformer impedance errors are much smaller than to the errors of the line
16 impedance. Guidance for under-reaching factors are is given in clause 6 of this Guide.
17 Following is a discussion of these considerations and 5.4.6 provides a summary of the application
18 considerations for the selected instrument transformer connections.
19 5.4.2 Preferred protection scheme: Use of VH and IH
20 The preferred method to protect lines terminated in transformers is to utilize, if available, the current and
21 voltage transformers located on the line (high voltage) side. This scheme is shown in Figure 11.
30
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
Field Code Changed
87T
Bus A ZT
kVL kVH Bus B
NCH
ZL
NCL
NVL IH NVH
VL VH
Relay A Relay B
2
3
4 Figure 11 —Preferred protection scheme for a line terminated into a transformer
5 This protection scheme separates the line and transformer into two separate measuring protection zones
6 supervised by separate relays. Both the transformer differential relay and line protection relay are high-
7 speed devices. Relays A and B are intended to detect faults on the transmission line and trip the line circuit
8 breakers at Busses A and B. The transformer differential relay, 87T, is intended to detect faults in the
9 transformer protection zone. An 87T trip initiates the tripping of line circuit breaker at Bus A and initiates a
10 direct transfer trip via a communication channel to the line circuit breaker at Bus B.
11 Line and transformer faults are easily discriminated with this approach. This approach also allows
12 automatic or manual reclosing for trips that result from line faults only. Since it is not desirable not to
13 reclose (energize) a faulted transformer, 87T operations should block reclosing at both line terminals.
14 Likewise, it is advisable to autoreclose the remote end first to avoid subjecting the transformer to additional
15 high current.
16 An alternate method to execute the transfer trip is to have the 87T operate a grounding switch located at the
17 transformer end and within the line’s protection zone. This is done to place a solid fault on the line causing
18 an operation of the line protection and tripping the circuit breakers at both line ends. Drawbacks to this
19 approach are that it applies an This approach is, however, not used by most utilities because it applies an
20 additional fault on the system and also delays the clearing of the transformer for the time it takes the
21 grounding switch to close.
22 The method shown in Figure 11 allows the selection and application of the line protection scheme
23 independent of the transformer protection scheme. If VH and IH are to be used for distance relay A, its
24 setting is not supposed to overreach the remote terminal. Distance relay B can be used to partially protect
25 the transformer (back up protection): its setting should include the totality of the line plus a good part of the
26 transformer impedance, without overreaching Bus A.
31
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 5.4.3 Using VH and IL
2 Another option for protecting a line terminated in a transformer is to use, for Relay A, the voltage of the
3 high-voltage side of the transformer, VH, and current from the low-voltage side of the transformer, IL, as
4 shown in Figure 12.
5 Wye-delta connected transformers introduce a 30° phase shift between IL and IH that needs to be taken into
6 consideration. The high side voltages and currents lead the low side voltages and currents by 30° for ANSI
7 connected transformers; therefore, 30° should be added to the measured angle of the line current IL. This
8 may be accomplished by connecting the low side CTs in delta. This correction is done in the software of
9 most some microprocessor relays.
10
Field Code Changed
87T
Bus A ZT
kVL kVH Bus B
NCL
ZL
NCL NCH
NVL IL NVH
VL VH
Relay A Relay B
11
12
13 Figure 12 —Relay connected to use VH and IL
14 The impedance reach is measured from the high or line side voltage transformer providing V H and the
15 distance relay zone-1 setting should not reach Bus B. The low or bus side current transformer ratio and the
16 power transformer ratio should be taken into account for determining the impedance relay setting.
kVL
N CL
kVH
17 Z SEC Z PRI (13)
N VH
18 Where:
32
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 kVH is the voltage on the high-voltage side of the transformer

2 kVL is the voltage on the low-voltage side of the transformer
3 NCL is the turns ratio of the CTs on the low-voltage side of the transformer
4 NVH is the turns ratio of the VTs on the high-voltage side of the transformer
5 ZPRI is the impedance seen from the high-voltage side of the transformer
6 ZSEC is the impedance seen by the relay
7 For wye-delta transformer windings zero sequence current in the transmission line cannot be measured for
8 line-side faults when low side current, IL is used for protection. Therefore, ground distance units using zero
9 sequence compensation should not be used. Also, zero sequence directional relays and zero sequence
10 (ground) overcurrent relays cannot be relied upon.
11 Negative sequence current flowing through the transformer is not blocked by the wye-delta transformation
12 as zero sequence current is. However, the negative sequence current, I H2, lags IL2 by 30° for the ANSI
13 standard transformer connection. If the CTs are connected delta on the low side to provide the + 30° phase
14 shift in phase currents then the -30° phase shift in negative sequence current is accounted for. Negative
15 sequence directional and overcurrent units will accurately perform. For using compensation factor in a
16 microprocessor relay the relay’s manufacturer may be consulted for correct implementation to assure
17 proper operation of negative sequence elements.
18 If the transformer has a tap changer, its effect on the power transformation ratio may be included in
19 Equation 13. There are no further considerations if the transformer windings are wye-wye connected and
20 there is no delta winding. When the transformer is wye-wye connected or is an auto-transformer with delta-
21 tertiary winding, the ground distance elements would under-reach during single-phase or two-phases-to-
22 ground faults.
23 5.4.4 Using VL and IL
24 The third option for protecting a line terminated in a transformer is to use the voltage of the low-voltage
25 side of the transformer, VL, and current from the low-voltage side of the transformer, IL, as shown in Figure
26 13. This is generally the more practical connection when both line side VTs and CTs are not available. The
27 impedance reach is measured from the bus side voltage transformer providing V L and the impedance setting
28 should include the entire transformer impedance ZT. Transformer impedances should be calculated very
29 accurately using transformer test reports or should be obtained from the transformer manufacturer. The
30 zone-1 reach should be set at less than ZT plus line impedance ZL, but so as not to overreach bus B.
31 This connection method has a disadvantage of limiting the reach of line protection when ZT is large
32 compared to ZL. For example, let’s set the zone-1 reach of Relay A to 0.99 ZT + 0.9ZL (pu). The multiplier
33 0.99 is used to allow for 1% positive error in the Z T measurement (actual impedance is ZT /0.99, but ZT is
34 measured). If the measured ZT had no error, the effective line reach from the transformer high side will be
35 0.9ZL - 0.01ZT. For a ZT/ZL ratio of 10, the effective line reach will be 0.8Z L. If the error in the measured
36 ZT is subtractive (actual impedance is 0.99ZT) the effective reach will be even less. As discussed in clause
37 5.4.3, the transformer taps should also be taken into account. However, the effect of the tap changer for this
38 case is even more pronounced because it not only changes the value of ZL as seen from the low side, but it
39 also changes the value of ZT (actual impedance is ZT /0.99, but ZT is measured)..
33
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
Field Code Changed
Bus A ZT Bus B
kVL kVH
NCL
ZL
NVL IL
NVL
VL
VL
Relay A Relay B
2
3 Figure 13 —Relay connected to use VL and IL
4 Consideration should be given to transformer inrush currents that would include real time simulation tests,
5 verification of relay settings, and countermeasures that cope with the phenomenon.
6 There are no further considerations if the transformer windings are wye-wye connected and there are no
7 limitations on phase or ground protection. However, for wye-delta transformer connections, the limitations
8 on ground protection with zero sequence quantities apply as discussed in clause 5.4.3. There is also no
9 requirement for phase shift correction with three-phase distance relays that compute phase distance using
10 line current and phase-to-phase voltages.
11 If the transformer is wye-wye with a delta tertiary winding, a part of the zero sequence current in the event
12 of ground faults on the line will flow in the tertiary winding and current seen by Relay A will be less than
13 the zero sequence current in the line. The relay would under-reach if the zero sequence current in the delta
14 winding is not measured and used by the relay.
15 Issues are similar at Relay B with reaching through the transformer impedance to cover all of the zone. This
16 can be a significant issue depending on the type or relays applied. A Western Protective Relay Conference
17 paper (Zimmerman, K. and Roth, D.) [B102] provides further discussion on this topic.
18 5.4.5 Using VL and IH Formatted: Subscript
19 The fourth option for protecting a line terminated in a transformer is to use the voltage of the low-voltage
20 side of the transformer, VL, and current from the high-voltage side of the transformer, IH, as shown in
21 Figure 14.
34
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
Field Code Changed
87T
Bus A ZT
kVL kVH Bus B
NCH
ZL
NCL NCH
NVL NVL IH
VL
VL
Relay A Relay B
2
3 Figure 14 —Relay connected to use VL and IH
4 Using these connections the impedance reach is measured from the low or bus side voltage transformer that
5 provides VL and the impedance setting should include the transformer impedance ZT plus line impedance
6 ZL . Zone-1 should not reach Bus B.
7 The disadvantages of having the transformer impedance in the zone-1 setting discussed in clause 5.4.3
8 apply in this case as well. Also, the high or line side CT ratio should include the power transformer ratio to
9 compute the correct secondary impedance on the low side base. The following equation can be used for this
10 purpose.
kVH
N CH
kVL
11 Z SEC Z PRI (14)
N VL
12 Where:
13 kVH is the voltage on the high-voltage side of the transformer

14 kVL is the voltage on the low-voltage side of the transformer
15 NCH is the turns ratio of the CTs on the high-voltage side of the transformer
16 NVL is the turns ratio of the VTs on the low-voltage side of the transformer
17 ZPRI is the impedance seen from the highlow-voltage side of the transformer
35
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 ZSEC is the impedance seen by the relay
2 If the transformer has a tap changer then its effect on the power transformer ratio should be included as
3 discussed in clause 5.4.3.
4 Fault direction is determined from the CT location; therefore, faults in the transformer cannot be detected.
5 For wye-delta transformer connections there is a 30° phase shift between I H and IL that should be corrected.
6 Since primary ohms are computed on the low-side base voltage (VL), IH should be shifted by -30º if an
7 ANSI standard connected transformer is used. The correction may be done by connecting the high side CTs
8 in delta for subtracting 30° from the angle of the high side phase currents. This correction is usually done
9 with compensation factors when in some microprocessor relays are used.
10 The zero sequence voltage at the line terminal cannot be measured for line faults if the transformer is wye -
11 delta connected. Therefore, ground distance units and zero sequence directional units that require zero
12 sequence voltage polarization should not be applied. Transformer neutral current or zero sequence current
13 (derived from phase currents) can be used to identify a ground fault on the line or beyond Bus B if the bus
14 side transformer winding is delta connected and the line side winding is wye connected with neutral
15 connected to ground and the CTs are wye connected.
16 Negative sequence voltage appears on both sides of a wye-delta transformer; however, VH2 lags VL2 by 30°
17 for the ANSI standard transformer connection. If the phase angle correction for phase currents with high
18 side delta connected CTs is applied as discussed above then the negative sequence phase angle is accounted
19 for. The correction may also be done with compensation factors available in microprocessor relays.
20
21 5.4.6 Application summary at transformer end
22 A summary of the application considerations for the available CT and VT connections discussed in clauses
23 5.4.2 through 5.4.5 is given in Table 4.
24
25 Table 4 —Application Considerations for CT and VT Connections for Distance Relays
Connections ZSEC=R X x Zpri Comments Formatted Table
VH IH R = NCH ÷ NVH Formatted: Left

Preferred connection
Distance is measured from VH
Will detect only line faults
VH IL R = NCL × RT ÷ NVH
Set Z1 with minimum RT - transformer tap Formatted: Left
RT = kVL ÷ kVH; Set Z2 with maximum RT - transformer tap
varies with tap changer
Distance is measured from VH
Will detect transformer and line faults
Delta-wye winding phase angle
corrections
No zero sequence relaying
36
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
VL IH R = NCH × RT ÷ NVL
RT = kVL kVH ÷ kVHkVL; Set Z2 with maximum RT - transformer tap
varies with tap changer
Distance is measured from VL
Will detect only line faults
corrections
Accuracy issues when ZT >> ZL
VL IL R = NCL × T ÷ NVH
T = 0.95 to 1.05 (assumed); varies with tap Set Z2 with maximum RT - transformer tap
changer
Distance is measured from VL
Will detect transformer and line faults
corrections
Accuracy issues when ZT >> ZL
1
2 5.4.7 Considerations for current differential applications
3 The implementation of separate transformer differential protection is recommended in IEEE Std C37.91™,
4 IEEE Guide for Protecting Power Transformers. When protecting the line with differential protection, there
5 are no issues if the current IH is used by the relay because the transformer is not in the line’s differential Formatted: Subscript
6 zone. When IL is used, the transformer is in the current differential zone; this which introduces additional
Formatted: Subscript
7 application considerationsneeds to be accounted for , which are primarily due to the wye-delta connections
8 or due to, a delta tertiary in a wye-wye and auto-transformer, and due to the tap changer.
9 In general, the effect of tap changers is easily accounted for in the differential operating current (sensitivity)
10 setting. Also many “current only” systems (differential, phase comparison, etc.) are immune to the effects
11 of tap changing. It is, hHowever, recommended to investigate investigation of the possible effects affects to
12 assure the proper application would be prudent.
13 Current differential relays can be applied normally to a two winding, wye-wye connected transformer. A
14 phase shift correction and a zero sequence current filter are required if the transformer is wye-delta
15 connected. This is generally achieved by connecting the CTs on the transformer’s wye-grounded side in
16 delta. Some relays provide settings to accommodate the phase shift and zero sequence current filtering. For
17 some relays, adequate negative sequence current should be available for detecting single phase-to-ground
18 faults on the line to assure correct operation.
19 Also, consideration of the need to restrain the differential element for inrush and overexcitation is desirable.
20 Line differential relays often send only phasor data and therefore cannot use typical harmonic methods. A
21 paper (Kasztenny, B., and Perera, R.) [B103] provides discussion on these topics.
37
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 5.5 Weak electrical systems
2 A power system may be considered weak when the source impedance is high compared to the line
3 impedance. Weak systems often have the following characteristics:
4 The magnitudes of fault currents contributed by the system are relatively low
5 At the relay location, fault currents on the protected line are generally lower than the load currents.
6 Voltage changes are large with load changes and under fault situations.
7 The magnitudes of the available polarizing currents are relatively low.
8 Weak electrical systems may be found at any voltage level, but are more prevalent at lower transmission
9 voltages. Long line transmission systems with remote generation may also have the characteristics that
10 weak systems demonstrate. When small or single unit generators are installed and are connected to a power
11 system, weak system characteristics may be created because these units are small or because they are
12 occasionally off line. These situations are particularly challenging to the application of effective protection.
13 All weak systems present several challenges to the protection engineer. Some of these are addressed in the
14 following clauses.
15 5.5.1 Contingency outage considerations
16 Different system configurations that occur as a result of system outages cause changes in source
17 impedances, network configurations and load levels resulting in changes in the levels of fault currents. For
18 example, backup sources may be connected to a system on a contingency basis, which will change
19 protection considerations. If additional protective equipment is needed to handle a contingency, proper
20 coordination between the schemes should be considered. Additional relays, modified relay settings, or
21 compromised protection/coordination (in some circumstances) may be required.
22 5.5.2 Sequential tripping
23 It is possible that all terminals of a line are connected to weak systems. Protection systems provided at all
24 terminals are not likely to see the fault on the line at its inception. For example, consider the system shown
25 in Figure 15 that experiences a fault at F. The current initially supplied through Breaker 2 is significantly
26 less than the current through Breaker 1. Therefore, the relays at Breaker 2 may not be able to sense the fault
27 at its onset. The current through Breaker 2 increases by a factor of more than 10 after Breaker 1 opens; .
28 Thus, the relays are now able to sense the fault and open Breaker 2. This sequential tripping of the line
29 circuit breakers. Another case of sequential tripping would be the amplification of fault impedance seen by
30 a distance relay at CB 1 due to high remote-end fault current infeed. The impedance measured by the relay
31 may fall into the restraining region of the relay characteristic, as long as the remote-end infeed lasts;
32 however, when the remote-end CB 2 trips, the fault current infeed ceases and the local relay is able to
33 operate and trip the local circuit breaker.
38
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
Formatted: Left
1
Field Code Changed
Bus A Bus B
F 0.05
1.0 0.10
CB 1 CB 3
ZS1 = 1.0 0.05 ZS2 = 9.75
E1 E2
ZL1 = ZL2 = 0.5
CB 2 CB 4
2
Field Code Changed
Bus A Bus B
F 0.555
0.481 0.074
CB 1 CB 3
ZS1 = 1.0 0.481 ZS2 = 9.75
E1 E2
ZL1 = ZL2 = 0.5
CB 2 CB 4
Note that all currents are given in pu values

3
4 Figure 15 —Example of sequential tripping
5 5.5.3 Fault detection
6 There may be insufficient current contribution to a fault on the protected line for a relay to reliably detect a
7 fault if the line is connected to a weak source. Special logic in pilot systems may be required in such cases.
8 This logic, known as weak infeed echo and weak infeed trip, is described in clause 6.2.5.
39
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 5.5.4 Weak source becoming a strong source
2 Varying system configurations may cause a source to become a weak or a strong source depending on the
3 generation connected at a bus. For example, a generator may be added at a location on the power system for
4 peaking only. When the peaking unit is in operation, the source may become a strong source but when the
5 peaking unit is not in operation the source becomes a weak source.
6 5.5.5 Coordinating relays on short lines (SIR>4)
7 Consider the system shown in Figure 16 in which the source impedance, ZS1 is much larger than the
8 impedances of line segments, ZL1, ZL2, and ZL3. The currents for faults on one end of a line would be nearly
9 of the same magnitude as the currents for faults on the other end of the line in this weak system. The only
10 possible differentiating feature that can be used for determining the faulted section is time if non -pilot
11 protection systems are to be used. The pickup settings at B1, B2, and B3 may be approximately the same.
12 In order to coordinate the tripping of the lines, time delay may be used to allow the relays at B3 to trip
13 before the relays at B2, and the relays at B2 to trip before the relays at B11.
14
Field Code Changed
Bus B1 Bus B2 Bus B3
1 2 3 4 5
ZS1 ZL1 ZL2 ZL3
E1
15
16
17 Figure 16 —Example of a weak system
18 5.5.6 Multi-terminal lines
19 A multi-terminal line may have a weak source at one terminal compared to the sources at other terminals.
20 The protection system, provided at the terminal that is connected to the weak source, will not detect faults
21 beyond the tap as adequately as the protection systems provided at the other terminals that are connected to
22 strong sources. Thus, the terminals connected to the strong sources may have to be disconnected before the
23 protection system provided at the line terminal connected to the weak source can detect the fault. This will
24 result in sequential tripping and, therefore, slower fault clearing than would otherwise occur. The worst
25 case would be a combination of source impedances and line lengths that would require sequential time
26 delay clearing of two of the terminals for phase and/or ground faults. Protecting a multi-terminal line with
27 more than three terminals with distance protection relays could be complicated.
28 5.6 Ground path configurations
29 Positive sequence voltage sources (generators) provide positive sequence currents for all system faults
30 whereas the unbalanced nature of a fault is the cause of negative and zero sequence voltages and currents.
31 The zero sequence currents flow from the fault to the positive sequence source through the zero sequence
32 impedance between the fault and the source when a fault involving ground occurs. The zero sequence
33 impedance is made up of one or more parallel impedances that provide a path for ground current to flow
34 from the fault back to the source. These impedances are often referred to as ground sources that are shunt
35 paths (as seen in the zero sequence equivalent circuit) for ground current to flow. This is illustrated in
40
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Figure 17 for a simple system with a single phase-to-ground fault in the Protective Relaying book
2 (Blackburn, J. L. [B11]).
3 Figure 17 shows two ground paths on the transmission system where grounding is provided by transformers
4 with both wye-grounded and delta windings. Although grounding is not the primary purpose of the power
5 transformers, they may be referred to as sources of zero sequence current. Other grounding transformers
6 such as a zigzag transformer may also be applied for the specific purpose of providing a path for zero
7 sequence current which increases the level of available ground fault currents.
8 Figure 18 (a) illustrates that because I0 current can circulate in the delta winding, zero sequence current I0
9 flows in each of the wye windings thus permitting a ground path for the 3I0 current. Figure 18 (b) shows a
10 transformer whose primary as well as secondary windings are wye-grounded connected. The neutrals of
11 both transformers are connected to the station ground mat and the ground fault current flows through the
12 transformer windings via both the neutrals as described in the Protective Relaying book (Blackburn, J. L..
13 [B11]).
41
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
Transmission Network Field Code Changed
Substation
1f-G
Generator
Step Up Transformer Auto-transformer
42
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
Field Code Changed
ZG1 ZT ZPS
Positive Sequence Network
ZG2 ZT ZPS
Negative Sequence Network
ZT ZP0 ZS0
ZG0
Ground Paths
ZT0
Zero Sequence Network

1
2 Figure 17 —Single line diagram of a system and sequence network connections for a
3 single-phase to ground fault
43
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Field Code Changed

I0 I'0
I0
I0 I0
I0 I'0 I0 I0
I0 I'0
3I0 3I'0 3I0
I0
(a) (b)
2
3 Figure 18 —Flow of zero sequence currents in delta-wye and grounded wye-grounded
4 wye connected transformers
5 5.6.1 Effectively grounded systems
6 Most transmission systems are effectively grounded because all the neutrals of the wye windings are tied
7 physically to the station ground mat thus minimizing the impedance between the neutral and the ground.
8 Although there may be no impedance between the transformer neutral and ground, the transformer may not
9 have sufficient capacity compared to the system to stabilize the phase-to-ground voltages during a fault.
10 Therefore, the IEEE Standard Std 142 [B104], IEEE Recommended Practice for Grounding of Industrial
11 and Commercial Power Systems, defines a system to be effectively grounded as follows:
12 Grounded through a sufficiently low impedance such that for all system conditions the ratio of zero-
13 sequence reactance to positive-sequence reactance is positive and not greater than 3,
X0
14 d3 (15)
X1
15 and the ratio of zero-sequence resistance to positive-sequence reactance is positive and not greater than 1.
R0
16 d1 (16)
X1
17 Std 142, IEEE Standard 142 [B104] Recommended Practice for Grounding of Industrial and Commercial
18 Power Systems, discusses methods to attain an effectively grounded system.
44
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 5.6.2 Impedance grounded systems
2 Some transmission systems do have impedance grounding for various reasons. These systems are either
3 resistance or reactance grounded and have the transformer neutrals connected to ground as shown in Figure
4 19.
5
Field Code Changed
I0 I0
I0 I0 I0 I0
I0 I0
I0 I0
I0 I0
3I0 3I0
(a) (b)
6
7 Figure 19 —Grounding transformer neutrals via a resistance and via a reactance
8 5.6.2.1 Reactance grounded systems
9 Three different types of reactance grounded systems are high reactance grounding, resonant grounding and
10 low reactance grounding.
11 High reactance grounding is not applied for transmission system grounding and was discontinued as a
12 generator grounding practice many years ago primarily for problems associated with arcing ground faults.
13 Resonant grounding is more common in Europe and other world locations than in North America. In this
14 scheme a reactor, also known as a Petersen Coil or ground fault neutralizer, with taps is sized to match the
15 total system to ground capacitance. Therefore, there will theoretically be no fault current for a phase-to-
16 ground fault and the fault arc will be quickly extinguished. Faults are cleared for about 75% of the phase-
17 to-ground faults without opening a breaker.
18 In theory, resonant grounding should significantly reduce the number of system outages, but there are some
19 disadvantages. Two of the disadvantages are:
20 The entire system, including transformers, should be fully insulated for line-to-line voltage.
45
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 The ground reactor or its tap setting should be changed for different system configurations that
2 modify the effective shunt capacitance of the system.
3 Low reactance grounding is occasionally applied at the neutral of large autotransformers with a delta
4 tertiary winding. A large autotransformer may provide a ground path resulting in a X0/X1 ratio
5 substantially less than one at that point in the system. For this case the phase-to-ground fault current would
6 be larger than the three-phase fault current. A low reactance ground would reduce the phase-to-ground fault
7 current to the three-phase fault current level or lower. Additionally, a low reactance ground may be
8 desirable to reduce ground fault current in order to reduce the impact of mutual coupling with parallel
9 circuits.
10 5.6.2.2 Resistance grounded systems
11 Resistance grounding is not typically used in transmission systems, but can reduce single phase-to-ground
12 fault currents. Line protection applications require different protection considerations than the conventional
13 effectively grounded system. When a resistor is applied between the neutral and ground, the phase-to-
14 ground fault current is more in phase with the faulted phase voltage. Also, the zero sequence current and
15 polarizing voltage are more in phase.
16 5.7 Transmission lines with distribution substation taps
17 It is a common utility practice to tap transmission lines to serve distribution load. Figure 20 shows a typical
18 power system. The impedances of segments between buses 1 4 to 5 are shown as Z41, Z1T, Z2T, Z3T, and Z25.
19 The impedance of the line segment 3T as seen by the distance relays provided at CB12 for a fault at Bus 3
20 is the voltage drop in that segment due to the currents contributed from Bus 1 plus the current contributed
21 from Bus 2 divided by the current contributed from Bus 1 only. This apparent impedance is, therefore, not
22 equal to the line impedance Z3T but is a larger value if there is current infeed from CB 21 or smaller value if
23 there is a current outfeed from CB 21. More discussion on the impact of current outfeed and current infeed
24 is provided in clauses 6.5.1 and 6.5.2. Similarly, the apparent impedance of the line segment 3T seen by the
25 relays provided at CB 21 is not equal to the impedance of that segment.
46
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
Field Code Changed
Bus 4 Bus 1 Bus 2 Bus 5
CB 41 CB 11 CB 22 CB 51
Z41 CB 12 CB 21 Z25
T
Z1T Z2T
Z3T
Bus 3
CB 31 MD 32 MD 33
M M
C CS 34
S
2
3 Figure 20 —Transmission line with a distribution substation tap
4 On a three-terminal line, the impedance “seen” by each relay will depend, in part, on the current
5 contributions from the other terminals. The impedance “seen” by a distance relay is not always the actual
6 line impedance from a relay terminal to the point of fault. The relay considerations surrounding the
7 protection relay design of the lines between CB 12, CB 21, and Bus 3 are discussed in clauses 5.7.1 through
8 5.7.7.
9 5.7.1 Length and location of tap line
10 No significant relaying problems occur because of the a tap on the line if the apparent impedance of the line
11 segment 3T is less than the impedances of line segments 1T and or 2T. Setting compromises, such as the
12 desired reach, are required for relays at CB12 if the apparent impedance of the line segment 3T as seen by
13 those relays is greater than the impedance of the line segment 2T. Similarly, setting compromises, such as
14 the reach, are required for relays at CB21 if the apparent impedance of the line segment 3T as seen by
15 those relays is greater than the impedance of the line segment 1T. This issue is further complicated if the
16 impedance of the line segment 3T is greater than the combined impedance of line segment 1T as well as the
17 impedance of the line segmentand 2T. . Depending
18 5.7.2 Length of lines on adjoining buses
19 The time delay settings for the primary protection of the tapped line may have to be increased to allow
20 backup protection on adjacent lines to operate first for faults on the adjacent line when line relay settings
47
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 for the tapped line are extended because of its tap. For the example system in Figure 20, time delay should
2 be increased for the backup protection at CB 12 to coordinate with the backup protection for CB 22 for
3 faults at and beyond about 80% of CB 22's zone 1 if the following conditions are satisfied:
4 Apparent impedance of line segment 3T as seen by relays at CB 12 for a fault on Bus 3 is greater
5 than the impedance of the line segment 2T and
6 Apparent impedance seen by relays at CB 12 for a fault on Bus 3 plus the impedance of the line
7 segment 1T is greater than the sum of the impedances of the line segments 1T and 2T plus the
8 apparent impedance of the line from Bus 2 to Bus 5 as seen by the relays at CB 22.
9 5.7.3 Relay settings limiting line loading
10 Whenever line relay settings are extended because of tapped lines, precautions should be taken to ensure
11 that the relay settings detect line faults without limiting power transfer or load carrying capabilities below
12 acceptable values. The line loadability subject is discussed in detail in the an IEEE PSRC report [B61].
13 5.7.4 Substation considerations that affect transmission line relaying
14 Generally, transmission line protection systems are not designed to see tapped transformer faults or low-
15 voltage bus faults. The protection for these two types of faults is provided at the distribution station. The
16 relays at the distribution station trip the interrupting device associated with the transformer. Where breakers
17 or circuit switchers are not used as high-side interrupting devices, the relays initiate a transfer trip signal to
18 the remote breakers. In some applications, a ground switch provided on the high-voltage side of the
19 distribution station transformer is closed, but this practice is not a desirable option. Since transmission
20 relaying is usually not set to see transformer or low-voltage bus faults, if a breaker or circuit switcher fails
21 to trip, local backup should be provided at the distribution station. This local backup can be in the form of
22 transfer trips, ground switches, or air switches. When a ground switch is used, a motor-operated isolator is
23 often connected on the transmission-line side of the ground switch and transformer to allow reclosing of the
24 transmission line after the transformer has been isolated. More discussion of this issue is available in an
25 IEEE Standardd C37.91™, IEEE Guide for Protecting Power Transformers [B37].
26 5.7.5 Use of circuit switchers for transformer protection
27 Circuit switchers rated below the high-voltage bus fault duty are sometimes used for protecting tapped
28 transformers. The circuit switcher may be blocked from tripping for high-current faults by the use of an
29 instantaneous overcurrent relay. The remote transmission line relaying should sense this particular fault and
30 initiate tripping. If the circuit switcher is not blocked for faults above its rating, the remote transmission
31 line relaying should be designed such that it trips before the circuit switcher trips.
32 5.7.6 Transformers as load taps on a transmission line
33 Transformers can be tapped off at any location on a transmission line. Figure 21, 22, and 23 show typical
34 configurations. The key protection challenges, in addition to those provided in previous clauses, indicated
35 in these situations are described below. A transformer that is not a source of phase or ground fault current
36 requires no special attention, but a transformer that is a source of phase or ground currents requires special
37 attention.
38 All tapped transformers should be provided with their own dedicated protection sys tems that operate as fast
39 as or faster than the line protection systems for faults in the transformer. These dedicated transformer
40 protection systems will either isolate the faulted transformer or, if high fault-clearing facilities are not
41 available at the tapped station, will initiate tripping of the breakers at the remote terminals of the line
42 followed by automatic isolation of the transformer by a motor-operated disconnect switch. If the transfer
43 trip is inoperable, the remote line circuit breakers are required to interrupt the fault, having been initiated by
48
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 its own measuring relays. In this some cases, the local motor operated switch can be opened to aid in
2 clearing the fault by transferring the fault to the motor operated switch as it opens. The switch becomes
3 sacrificial in nature as the fault current would probably exceed the interrupting rating of the switch but
4 would minimize the time that the transformer is experiencing the fault. Isolating the transformer
5 automatically ensures that, if the transmission line is re-energized, the faulted transformer is not re-
6 energized with the line.
7 If transformers are connected to the lines as shown in Figure 23, closing the normally open (N.O.) switch
8 will result in a multi-terminal line. Further complications will result if the lines are mutually coupled.
9
Field Code Changed
Bus A Bus B
Line
10
11 Figure 21 —Load tapped near one terminal
49
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
Bus A Bus B
Line
2
3 Figure 22 —Load tapped near center of line
50
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015

Bus A Bus B
N.O.
Bus C Bus D
2
3 Figure 23 —Switch creates the potential for parallel multi-terminal lines
4 It is usually difficult to provide instantaneous line protection that will trip for faults on the line but not trip
5 for high side faults in the tapped station unless CTs and relays are provided at the tapped station and form a
6 part of the line protection system. In view of the infrequency of such faults, it may be considered
7 acceptable to allow the line to trip simultaneously with the high side interrupting device at the tapped
8 station for such faults. The line could then be automatically or manually reclosed, restoring the
9 transmission system with the tapped station (with the fault) isolated.
10 It is important that transmission line protection coordinates with low side protection at the tapped station.
11 Low side equipment (such as distribution feeders) is usually exposed to faults more frequently than the
12 high-voltage side of the station. It is, therefore, important that the instantaneous transmission line protection
13 should not be able to sense faults on the low side of the tapped station.
14 The most critical case is when the line terminal nearest to the tapped station is connected to a strong source,
15 and the remote terminal of the line is connected to a weak source, and the infeed from the weak-source
16 terminal does not desensitize significantly the protection at the strong-source terminal for faults in the
17 tapped station.
18 5.7.7 Transformer as a source to the transmission system
19 In some instances, it is possible that a distribution station includes local generation and the distribution
20 transformer becomes a source that feeds current to a fault on the transmission line. Thus, ; the contribution
21 of the fault current contribution by of the distribution transformer should be considered in the relay
22 designsettings. The resulting infeed can cause line distance relays to under-reach. This potential exists
23 whenever generation is connected to the distribution bus, or whenever the distribution bus is connected to
24 another distribution circuit served from a different transmission line. If a positive sequence source capable
25 of supplying sustained current to a transmission fault is available from the distribution system, provision to
26 trip the source, or its feed to the transmission system, should be provided. Also, if the transformer has a
51
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 delta winding, and the high-voltage winding is connected grounded wye, the transformer will be a ground
2 source for zero-sequence currents, causing a similar under-reaching of the line ground relays.
3 If the transformer is a zero-sequence source, the resulting zero-sequence current infeed should be
4 considered when setting the remote ground distance relays or overcurrent relays. The zero-sequence current
5 infeed will desensitize both ground distance and ground overcurrent relays at the main terminals. Since the
6 presence of a zero-sequence source will also tend to reduce the zero-sequence voltage at the line terminals,
7 the performance of zero-sequence directional units should also be evaluated.
8 A transformer source to a transmission line may be delta connected on the line side and be a source of
9 positive and negative-sequence currents to a single-phase-to-ground fault until the last ground source is
10 removed from the line. Then, the line will still be energized by this source; however, no appreciable current
11 can flow due to the delta transformer winding. The delta will remain a source of positive and negative-
12 sequence current-flow if the ground source remains on the line (such as a wye grounded/delta transformer
13 tapped to the line) after the main transmission line terminals open. The positive and negative-sequence
14 source of back-feed should be eliminated for multiphase faults and for single line-to-ground faults to ensure
15 arc extinction.
16 5.8 Lines with devices for var and flow control
17 Control devices are installed on transmission lines sometimes for making the transmission system more
18 efficient and controllable; these devices may affect protection systems provided to protect the line. Some of
19 the most commonly used devices are:
20 Shunt reactors
21 Shunt capacitors
22 Series capacitors
23 Series reactors
24 Phase shifting transformers
25 Static var compensators (SVCs)
26 The application of these devices and possible problems they might create for the line protection systems are
27 briefly discussed in this clause.
28 5.8.1 Shunt reactors
29 Shunt reactors are applied on transmission lines to compensate for large line charging currents and
30 capacitive loads. Shunt reactors, whether connected to the line or the bus, should have dedicated protective
31 relays. The reactor may be switched as a unit with the transmission line, or may be connected to the bus
32 behind the line terminal. The reactor current may or may not be included in the current measured by the
33 line protection system. The shunt reactors may affect the performance of line-protection systems when the
34 reactors are located within the line protection zones.
35 Shunt reactors connected to the bus behind the line protection system will generally not have a direct effec t
36 on the line protection system. These shunt reactors are protected with dedicated protection systems.
37 Details of those protection systems are given in an IEEE Standardd C37.109™, IEEE Guide for the
38 Protection of Shunt Reactors[B43].
39 A reactor that is connected to the system within the line protection zone will compensate for some of the
40 effects of line capacitance; some protection systems are adversely affected by the line charging currents.
52
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 The line protection system should be designed to be reliable in the event that the shunt reactor is out of
2 service.
3 A reactor connected directly to the protected line allows the flow of “ring-down” currents (these are
4 oscillation currents caused by the line impedance, the shunt capacitance, and the reactor on line de-
5 energization). These ring-down currents will result in a gradually decaying line terminal voltage that may
6 affect an automatic reclosing scheme that is supervised by voltage detectors. The ring-down frequency, due
7 to partial compensation by the line reactor is usually lower than the rated frequency of the power system.
8 Any relays that sense this oscillating current should be able to accommodate the impact of the reduced
9 frequency currents and voltages. The ring-down voltages may also affect the line protection system during
10 an attempt to reclose the line, especially if there is a significant time interval between the closing of the
11 individualthree phases of the circuit breaker picking up the line. These voltages have been found to cause
12 high-speed protection systems to undesirably trip the line circuit breaker during line pickup when there is
13 dissymmetry between closings of phase as described a conference paper (Engelhardt, K., [B29] and IEEE
14 Transactions paper [B33]).
15 When a single-phase is tripped with the intent of reclosing the circuit breaker in that phase, the faulted
16 phase may still be energized due to conduction of current through the distributed capacitance between the
17 phases. This is known as secondary arc phenomenon. The arc extinguishes if the current is low, such as in
18 short lines, or lines with large spacing between phases. The time for the ionized gasses to dissipate is
19 considerably longer than the deionization time if three-phase tripping were employed. On longer lines and
20 double circuit lines, the magnitude of the secondary arc current may be too large to self self-extinguish.
21 One method used to extinguish the arc during this condition is a four-legged reactor described in a PSRC
22 Report [B57]. A neutral is formed for three-phase reactors, and the fourth reactor is connected between the
23 neutral and the ground. The reactor is sized to cause parallel resonance for the circuit feeding the fault. This
24 causes the secondary arc current magnitude to be very small, allowing the arc to self-extinguish much
25 sooner than would be the case if the four-legged reactor were not used.
26 5.8.2 Shunt capacitors
27 Shunt capacitors are used to provide additional var requirements or to increase power system voltages.
28 Usually these devices are installed on transmission or distribution buses. In general, shunt capacitors are
29 installed on the bus and do not affect the line relays. Detailed discussion is provided in IEEE Std C37.99™ ,
30 IEEE Guide for Protection of Shunt Capacitor Banks[B39].
31 When large shunt capacitors are connected behind a line terminal, high-magnitude, high-frequency currents
32 can flow from the capacitor into a close-in line fault as described in the IEEE Transactions paper
33 [B81][B81][B77]. These currents decay to a negligible value very quickly; i.e., in a few milliseconds. The
34 high frequency of these out-rush currents can cause very high voltage to be developed across CT secondary
35 windings. If high voltages due to shunt capacitor transient out-rush is a concern, surge suppression varistors
36 may be connected across the CT secondary windings as described in the conference paper (Drakos, et al.,
37 [B21]).
38 5.8.3 Series capacitors
39 Series capacitors are applied to improve stability, provide better load division on parallel transmission
40 paths, reduce voltage drop during severe system disturbances, or increase power transfer capability. The
41 capacitors may be installed at one end of the line, at both ends of the line, or at midline. The impedance
42 value of a series capacitor is typically between 25% and 75% of the line impedance. Capacitor overvoltage
43 protection is a part of capacitor bank protection as described in IEEE Standard C37.116 [B46]. The
44 overvoltage protection consists of a parallel air gap and/or a metal oxide varistor (MOV). The purpose of
45 this protection is to bypass the capacitor if fault or load current will produce voltages that are high enough
46 to damage the capacitor. A bypass breaker is also used in the design for non-fault-related capacitor
47 protection, as well as for providing flexibility of operation. Line protection schemes should also take into
48 consideration the possibility of air gap or MOV failure, unsymmetrical gap flashing, or MOV conduction.
53
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Series capacitors affect the performance of line distance relays and, therefore, distance relays specifically
2 designed to protect series compensated lines should be selected.
3 The effects of series capacitors on other relays in the nearby system should also be considered, even though
4 they are not applied directly on a series compensated line. Some utilities require a comprehensive series of
5 transient performance tests to demonstrate the speed, dependability, and security of protection systems
6 applied on lines with series capacitors, or adjacent to such lines. Clause 6.7 further discusses protection of
7 transmission lines with series capacitors.
8 5.8.4 Series reactors
9 The effects of series capacitors on other relays in the nearby system should also be considered, even though Formatted: Normal
10 they are not applied directly on a series compensated line. Some utilities require a comprehensive series of
11 transient performance tests to demonstrate the speed, dependability, and security of protection systems
12 applied on lines with series capacitors, or adjacent to such lines. Clause 6.7 discusses in more detail Formatted: Font: 10 pt
13 protection of transmission lines with series capacitors.
14 Series reactors
15 Series reactors are typically applied for better load division on parallel paths or to limit fault current levels.
16 Series reactors should often have their own protection, because especially since certain internal faults might
17 not be detected by the line relays. Also, transient disturbances during energization and de-energization
18 should be studied to prevent any possible problems. Series reactors can be bypassed with a circuit switcher
19 or another switching device. Relay setting changes are usually required when the reactor is bypassed. This
20 can be accomplished with an adaptive relay system.
21 5.8.45.8.5 Phase shifting transformers
22 Phase shifting transformers are installed to control power flow between interconnected systems or
23 parts of a system. A phase shifting transformer needs its own protection system that may consist of
24 transformer differential, neutral overcurrent, sudden pressure and other relays. Location of the CTs
25 and VTs for line protection relays with a phase-shifting transformer is important. CTs used on the
26 bus side of the transformer will be exposed to inrush currents flowing into the transformer bank, and
27 VTs on the bus side will provide voltages with different angles than the voltages from line side. VTs
28 and CTs providing voltages and currents to the line protection devices should be located in such a
29 manner that they continue to provide correct information to the protection devices when bypass
30 switches are operated to change the phase shift setting of the transformer. Further discussion on this
31 topic can be found in a Transaction paper [B12] and in IEEE Standard.C37.245 [B105].
32
33 5.8.6 Static var compensators
34 Static var compensators
35 A static var compensator uses thyristor valves to add or remove shunt connected capacitors and/or reactors.
36 SVCs are applied for var compensating, voltage control, and stability control. SVCs are usually connected
37 to buses rather than lines. These devices are protected by dedicated protection as described in PSRC Report
38 [B58] and Conference paper (Taylor, E. et al, [B94][B94][B90]. Draft Standard P1032 is expected to
39 contain discussion on SVCs when it is published [B106].
40 5.9 Parallel lines
41 Parallel lines are defined as lines that share the same structures or right of way for all, or a portion of, their
42 length. If the lines are parallel for significant distances, mutual coupling between these lines may have an
43 effect on the performance of the relay protection system. Mutual coupling of parallel lines and its
44 consideration in line protection systems is further discussed in Clause 006.4.5.
54
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Parallel lines also increase the possibility of inter-circuit (cross-country) faults, which involve one or more
2 phases of each of two or more separate circuits. These lines may or may not be of the same voltage. The
3 effects of inter-circuit faults on protective relaying vary based on the phases involved, the voltage levels,
4 and the types of relays on each of the circuits.
5 If the line protection scheme on the parallel line is thought to have falsely tripped and the fault on the
6 parallel line can be localized with fair accuracy, a line inspection should be considered. A detailed analysis
7 of the specifics of the fault may then be used in making modifications for preventing the recurrence of that
8 type of fault.
9 Because of the relatively small number of the events that cause protection problems and the large number
10 of permutations that would need to be considered, the subject of inter-circuit faults is not discussed further
11 in this guide.
12 5.10 Lines with high-impedance ground returns
13 Transmission line design factors, such as tower footing resistance and ground wire shielding, directly affect
14 the ground return impedance. This clause examines the causes of high-impedance ground returns and their
15 effects on protection systems and schemes designed to cope with high-impedance ground return effects.
16 5.10.1 Causes of high-impedance ground returns
17 Both tower footing resistance and overhead shield-wires impact the impedance of ground returns. Certain
18 faults, such as those involving trees, may also result in high resistances in the path of the ground f ault
19 current. Tower footing resistance is directly affected by the characteristics of the soil and the application of
20 ground rods and counterpoise. In areas where high soil resistivity prevails (e.g., lava flows, gravel base), it
21 may be difficult to achieve effective tower grounding.
22 Overhead shield wires generally have the effect of substantially reducing the zero-sequence impedance of
23 the line. In addition, they have the effect of significantly reducing the number of lightning flashovers. Some
24 utilities do not install overhead shield wires because of low keraunic levels, cost, and/or the limited benefit
25 of overhead shield wires in areas that have high soil resistivity.
26 Overhead shield wires reduce the effective tower footing resistance of the line by allowing ground current
27 from a flashover on one tower to flow to ground through several towers. The footing resistance of several
28 towers in parallel results in an overall reduction in effective resistance as shown in Figure 24.
29
30 Figure 24 —Parallel connection of tower footing resistances
55
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 5.10.2 Range of possible tower footing resistance
2 An average tower footing resistance of about 20 Ω may be needed if the line is to be effectively prot ected
3 from excessive lightning strikes on the line. However, tower footing resistance can vary from less than one
4 ohm to several hundred ohms. Grounding resistances, in situations where the soil resistivity is high and no
5 overhead shield wire is used, have been measured to be as high as 800 Ω. These high resistances amplify
6 the problems associated with infeed from remote terminals and weak source conditions; a detailed
7 discussion of this topic is given in [B74][B74][B70].
8 5.10.3 Effects of high grounding resistance on the operation of line protection systems
9 High-resistance ground faults present certain considerations and challenges to protecting transmission lines.
10 Some of the general factors that should be considered are as follows:
11 Ground distance protection may be adversely affected and may not be sensitive enough to operate.
12 Ground overcurrent relays may be set at levels such that they become more sensitive than distance
13 relays.
14 The operating time of protection systems could increase; however, longer fault clearing times can
15 usually be tolerated with reduced fault magnitudes.
16 It may become more difficult to identify the faulted phase if single-phase tripping and reclosing is
17 to be applied.
18 The accuracy of the fault locating techniques based on impedance measurement may be reduced.
19 An example of the response of the ground protection systems during high-resistance ground faults provided
20 by an electric power utility is shown in Figure 25.
56
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
Bus A F Bus B Field Code Changed
700
600
500
Resistive Coverage, Ohms
400
300
200
100
0
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Bus A
Bus B
Percentage Distance from Terminal A
2
57
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Figure 25 —Response of relay systems to high impedance faults at different locations on

2 the line
3 The fault resistance coverage limit is for an example 500 kV transmission line. The limit is based on the
4 assumption that the total fault current is limited only by the fault resistance with the system and
5 transmission line impedances being so small as to not be significant. The limit of about 300 ohms for a
6 mid-line fault is calculated from the total fault current being approximately 500kV/(√3*300)=962 A. For
7 the example system, at the mid line location, 50% of the current (481 A) comes from each terminal of the
8 line. 3000/5 A line CTs are used and the pickup of the ground overcurrent relay is set at 0.5 A. Allowing
9 for a dependability factor of 1.5 (the fault current being at least 150% of the pickup setting of the
10 overcurrent relay, the limit is about 300 ohms for a mid-line fault. The fault-resistance coverage limit
11 increases as the fault location moves towards the line terminals. For example, Figure 25 shows that a
12 ground fault near Terminal ‘A’ with approximately 600 ohms fault resistance would be detected. After
13 Terminal ‘A’ trips, the current in the fault resistance decreases and, therefore, the voltage drop in the fault
14 resistance decreases. The consequence is that the ground fault contribution from Terminal ‘B’ increases.
15 This causes the Terminal ‘B’ protection system to detect the fault and initiate line trip. Since this is only an
16 example of an application, actual system data should be used to evaluate the impact of fault impedance.
17 5.10.4 Substation ground sources
18 Sources of ground current for line-to-ground faults can be the same for any of the terminal configurations
19 shown in Figure 26. These sources could be station a delta-wye transformer shown in Figure 26 (a), an
20 autotransformer with the neutral grounded solidly shown in Figure 26 (b) or through a zig-zag transformer
21 shown in Figure 26 (c). A grounding transformer can be added at the substation if the ground current is not
22 sufficient to properly detect ground faults. In some cases, as in a switching station, all ground current is
23 supplied by remote sources.
24
25 Figure 26 —Substation ground sources
26 5.11 Terminal configuration considerations
27 There are six basic configurations for terminating transmission lines [B18], [B91]:
28 Single breaker
29 Breaker-and-a-half
30 Double breaker
31 Double bus
32 Ring bus
33 Transfer bus
34 The bus configurations are covered in detail in IEEE Std C37.234™, IEEE Guide for Protective Relay
35 Applications to Power System Buses[B48. ]. The reader may want to review Section 4 of the guide to
36 familiarize themselves with the variations on the bus configurations.
58
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 The various bus configurations do not typically effect affect line protection except where selection of the
2 voltage source for the line protection is concerned. Voltage sources for line protection are typically
3 connected to the substation bus or to the line-side of the circuit breaker. Selection of the voltage source
4 location is driven by cost factors, reliability, utility practices, and operational needs. For example, it may be
5 difficult to justify line-side potentials at lower voltage due to the cost of providing a three-phase voltage
6 transformer for each line position. However, on more critical high-voltage circuits, line-side potentials may
7 be required to meet reliability requirement so that a single point of failure does not result in the removal of
8 multiple line protection schemes. When synchronism checking is used, then a common approach is to
9 apply a single-phase VT on either the line or the bus and a three-phase VT on the opposite side of the
10 breaker for line protection.
11 If a line is connected to a two-breaker terminal such as a ring or breaker-and-a-half bus, a potentially long
12 forward-reaching and appropriately time-coordinated zone 3 may need to be set at the remote terminal of
13 this line for a failed breaker at the two-breaker terminal, to cut off contribution from an adjacent line or
14 transformer on the ring or breaker-and -a-half bus for a fault on the protected line. Please see clause 6.1.3
15 for more detail.
16 5.11.1 Transfer bus configuration
17 A transfer bus configuration may have an impact on the design of the line protection scheme and is shown
18 in Figure 27. Several lines are connected to the main bus by circuit breakers dedicated to protect those
19 lines. An additional circuit breaker, a bus coupler circuit breaker, is provided; this circuit breaker is used to
20 connect the main bus with the transfer bus and provide an alternative connection for each circuit. This
21 allows a circuit breaker dedicated to an incoming or outgoing circuit to be removed from service without
22 interrupting the connection of the circuit with the station.
23
24 Figure 27 —A substation with transfer bus configuration
25 The transfer bus configuration results in some additional considerations for the protection of the lines
26 terminated at the station. During a bypass operation, there are two options to protect the transferred circuit.
27 The first is to connect the CTs, status, and trip circuit of the bus coupler breaker to the relays protecting the
28 transferred circuit. This requires the use of auxiliary switches to transfer the physical relay connec tions.
29 The second option is to use relays dedicated to the bus coupler breaker to protect the transferred circuit. It
30 is necessary that these relays be set to protect any of the circuits terminated at the station, which can be
31 accomplished using multiple settings groups in modern microprocessor relays. This option is complicated
32 if communications based protection schemes are used on any of the circuits.
59
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 5.11.2 Stub bus configuration
2 In some breaker-and-a-half or ring bus configurations a transmission line may have a disconnect switch to
3 separate the line from the main bus. Opening of the disconnect switch allows line maintenance or repair
4 while the line breakers can be closed to maintain bus continuity. In this configuration, the bus section
5 between the breakers and the line disconnect is referred to as a “stub bus”. While the line is cleared for
6 maintenance, it may be grounded at or near the location the work is taking place. If the relaying potentials
7 are on the line side of the disconnect switch, any distance or directional relays will be unable to operate due
8 to a lack of a polarizing signal (i.e., no line voltage). A line current differential relay will also operate
9 incorrectly as the differential currents will not represent the actual fault currents (i.e., a stub bus fault
10 results in a tripping of the remote line breakers and a line fault results in tripping of the stub bus breakers).
11 Additional stub bus considerations are addressed in section clause 8.16 of IEEE Std C37.234™, IEEE
12 Guide for Protective Relay Applications to Power System Buses [B48] and in IEEE Std C37.243™, IEEE
13 Guide for Application of Digital Line Current Differential Relays Using Digital Communications[B49].
14 5.12 Mutual coupling considerations
15 Mutual coupling between transmission lines is common in power systems and may have a significant effect
16 on the behavior of the protection systems during faults involving ground. The positive and negative-
17 sequence mutual impedances of parallel circuits are negligible; however, the zero-sequence mutual
18 couplings are usually significant and should be considered when setting relays for detecting ground faults.
19 A close-in external fault with the second circuit open and grounded at both ends, as shown in 0Figure
20 28Figure 54, is usually considered to evaluate the effects of mutual coupling on the protection systems
21 applied to line A. The purpose is to verify that the relays do not over-reach for this condition. If the relay
22 over-reaches, remedial action should be taken, such as the reach of the under-reaching element may be
23 reduced. For example, the settings of the instantaneous overcurrent element may be increased or the reach
24 of the zone 1 ground distance relay may be reduced.
60
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
Field Code Changed
Bus A Bus B
R
3I0f
Line A 1Φ -G
S1 Z0m
OPEN OPEN
Line B
S2
3I0m
2
3 Figure 28 —Circuit open and grounded at both ends
4 An internal single-line to ground fault very close to the remote bus with both lines in operation, as shown in
5 0Figure 29Figure 55, should also be considered to ensure that the over-reaching pilot element detects the
6 fault without the need for sequential tripping. This may require that the reach of the overreaching zone be
7 increased or the residual compensation factor may be increased if this adjustment is available in the relay.
8 With the increased reach of the over-reaching element, current reversal blocking, may have to be used to
9 prevent undesired operation during current reversal.
Field Code Changed

Bus A Bus B
R
3I0f
Line A 1Φ -G
S1 Z0m
Line B
3I0f S2
10
11
61
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
2 Figure 29 —An internal fFault near remote terminal
3 A close-in fault on the line side of the open breaker on the protection system applied to line A, shown in
4 0Figure 30Figure 56 should be considered as well.
5
Field Code Changed
Bus A Bus B
R
3Iof
Line A
S1 Zom S2
OPEN 1Φ -G
Line B
3Iof
6
7 Figure 30 —Close-in fault near end
8 Sometimes, parallel lines have a common bus at one terminal but are connected to different buses at the
9 other terminal as shown in 0Figure 31Figure 57. A fault close to the end of the mutually coupled section on
10 the line whose circuit breaker is open should be considered for evaluating the impact of mutual coupling on
11 ground fault protection systems. This also applies to mutually coupled lines that are not connected to a
12 common bus at either terminal as shown in 0Figure 32Figure 58.
62
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
Field Code Changed

Bus A Bus B
R
3Iof
Line A
S1 Zom S2
1Φ -G
Bus C Line B
OPEN
3Iof
S3
1
2
3 Figure 31 —Mutually coupled lines with one common bus
63
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
Field Code Changed
Bus A R Bus B
3Iof
Line A
S1 Zom S2
Bus C Line B Bus D
OPEN 1Φ -G
3Iof
S3 S4
2
3 Figure 32 —Mutually coupled lines without a common bus
4 Two transmission lines that operate at different voltages and have different zero sequence current sources
5 are mutually coupled sometimes as shown in 0Figure 33Figure 59. The effect of ground faults on the higher
6 voltage line can be the determining factor for the setting of relays for ground fault protection of the healthy
7 lower voltage line. The setting calculations for the ground fault protection system should be based on the
8 maximum external fault current that can be different from the remote-bus-fault current for mutually
9 coupled lines. Faults at the end of the mutually coupled section are often more important than the line end
10 faults for lines that are mutually coupled for a portion of their length.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
Bus A Bus B Field Code Changed
R
3Iof
S1 S2
Zom
3Iof
OPEN
S3 S4
1Φ- G
2
3 Figure 33 —Mutually coupled lines at different voltages and different ground source
4 Sequentially cleared faults can also cause problems in mutually coupled lines. The induced zero-sequence
5 current in an unfaulted, mutually coupled line can suddenly change direction in such cases. This sudden
6 reversal can cause problems on schemes that use zero-sequence polarized directional ground relays without
7 current reversal logic.
8 Zero-sequence voltage reversal can also cause problems. The effect is caused by zero-sequence current in
9 an unfaulted line that is mutually coupled to a faulted line when the zero-sequence sources at the ends of
10 the faulted and unfaulted lines are not strongly tied together. The induced current in the unfaulted line can
11 cause zero-sequence voltages at each end to have opposite polarity from each other, and can cause zero-
12 sequence (current or voltage) polarized directional ground overcurrent relays at both ends of the line to
13 identify it as a fault on the protected line. This can cause undesirable tripping of the unfaulted line,
14 especially in the directional comparison schemes [B6][B6][B6]). Phase comparison and current differential
15 schemes are not susceptible to the problems of zero-sequence mutual effect, because any influence from
16 this source manifests itself in the form of a "through" current.
17 The following guidelines are useful to avoid incorrect operation of the ground overcurrent relays caused by
18 the mutual coupling effect.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 x Consider using current reversal logic in directional comparison schemes if zero-sequence

2 polarization is used for directional ground overcurrent protection.
3 x Consider using negative-sequence polarized directional ground overcurrent relays, current
4 differential relays, or phase comparison pilot schemes.
5 x Consider using directionally controlled instantaneous ground overcurrent relays.
6 x Consider the application of relays with selectable setting groups.
8 6. Relay schemes
9 Non-pilot, pilot and special relay schemes used for protecting transmission lines are described in this
10 clause. Polarization of directional ground overcurrent relays and problems associated with multi-terminal
11 lines are also discussed. These are followed by considerations for protecting series compensated lines,
12 single-phase tripping and application of distance relays to short transmission lines. Finally, relay
13 considerations for system transients and application of multifunctional relays are addressed.
14 6.1 Non-pilot schemes
15 Non-pilot type protection schemes include overcurrent relay schemes, directional overcurrent schemes and
16 distance protection schemes. Overcurrent relay schemes are described in clause 6.1.1, overcurrent
17 directional relay schemes are described in clause 6.1.2, and distance protection schemes are described in
18 clause 6.1.3.
19 6.1.1 Non-directional overcurrent relay schemes
20 Overcurrent protection is the simplest and least expensive form of fault protection that can be applied for
21 protecting transmission lines. The operating principles of these schemes depend only on magnitude of the
22 current applied to the relay. Two overcurrent elements are typically applied in each of the three phases.
23 One is the time-overcurrent element (TOC); the operating time of this element could be fixed or could be
24 inversely proportional to the current magnitude. The other is an instantaneous overcurrent element (IOC);
25 this element operates with no intentional time delay. Often, two additional elements are also included. One
26 is a ground time overcurrent element and the other is an instantaneous ground overcurrent element.
27 Connections of a three-phase overcurrent relay including the ground overcurrent facility are shown in
28 Figure 34Figure 34Figure 28. Various shapes of time-overcurrent characteristics that may be used are
29 shown in Figure 35Figure 35Figure 29.
30 Phase currents or sequence currents can be used as the operating quantity. Phase overcurrent relays operate
31 for all possible fault types; the pickup settings of these relays should be higher than the current supplying
32 maximum expected normal or emergency load. Negative and zero-sequence overcurrent relays do not
33 operate for balanced loads or for three-phase faults; they can, therefore, be set for pickup currents less than
34 the expected load currents.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
2 Figure 34 —Connections for overcurrent phase and ground relay
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
68
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
Field Code Changed

100
Moderately Inverse
Inverse
Very Inverse
Extremely Inverse
10
Time
0.1
1 10 100
Multiples of PU
1
2 Figure 35 —Time overcurrent curve shape comparison
3 Instantaneous tripping can be applied if the pickup point of the instantaneous unit can be set higher than the
4 maximum contribution to faults outside the protected line. The percentage of a line that can be protected by
5 an instantaneous overcurrent varies with line length and source impedance. Time delays are generally
6 required to achieve coordination with downstream protective devices if an entire non-radial line is to be
7 protected. Figure 36Figure 36Figure 30 shows an example of coordination between a relay with a time and
8 instantaneous element (the primary relay), and an upstream (backup relay) with only a time element. The
9 pickup point of the instantaneous unit must be set with sufficient margin so the relay will neither operate
10 for out-of-zone faults, external faults on mutually coupled lines, low-side faults on tapped transformers, nor
11 on transformer magnetizing inrush current for tapped transformers on the line. With respect to transformer
12 magnetizing inrush, ground instantaneous overcurrent elements must be set above maximum inrush only if
13 the transformer is connected wye-grounded on the high side or for a grounded autotransformer with a
14 closed delta tertiary. Coordination of ground instantaneous overcurrent elements for transformer
15 magnetizing inrush is not required if the transformer is delta-connected on the high side.
16 The pickup value of the time element should be set to prevent tripping for the maximum load current that
17 can flow in the line in either direction. The time adjustment (time dial setting) should be set to produce the
18 fastest operating time that will not cause loss of coordination with upstream and downstream relays. The
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 effect of varying the time adjustment is illustrated in Figure 37Figure 37Figure 31 for a typical time
2 overcurrent relay. Details of standards inverse time characteristics are given in IEEE Std C37.112™, IEEE
3 Standard Inverse-Time Characteristic Equations for Overcurrent Relays[B45].
4
5 Figure 36 —Coordination of time overcurrent relays
6 Non-directional overcurrent relay schemes find limited application on transmission lines because
7 transmission lines usually have energy sources connected to at least two terminals. The non-directional
8 relays have to be coordinated with protective devices both in front of and behind the line terminal. This
9 makes the coordination of non-directional relays an impossible task in many applications. These relays are
10 sometimes applied only at the terminal that contributes higher fault currents.
11 Non-directional overcurrent relays can be applied on long transmission lines if the contribution of fault
12 current to faults in the reverse direction (behind the terminal) is limited to small magnitudes because of the
13 impedance of the long line. Also, the magnitudes of fault currents for close-in faults in the forward
14 direction are much higher than the magnitudes of currents for faults beyond the remote terminal. In such
15 applications, instantaneous, non-directional phase and ground overcurrent protection can provide very fast
16 and secure detection of close-in faults.
17 Overcurrent relay schemes are used primarily on distribution and sub-transmission feeders where load and
18 fault currents flow in one direction (e.g., on radial feeders) and where the cost of protection equipment is
19 desired to be low. The choice of a time overcurrent characteristic is based on sources, lines, and loads. In
20 general, the characteristic of the relays applied at a line terminal should closely match with the
21 characteristics of the downstream protective devices so that proper coordination is achieved at all fault-
22 current levels.
23 Overcurrent relays that are set to under-reach (similar to the setting of a zone 1 distance relay) also operate
24 instantaneously. The settings of these relays should be such that they do not operate for any fault external to
25 the line under any power system operating condition. The setting of all under-reaching, instantaneous
26 overcurrent relays becomes a complicated issue if system impedances and infeeds can change significantly
27 under normal operating conditions. The setting of under-reaching, zero-sequence and ground instantaneous
28 overcurrent functions is also complicated by the presence of mutually coupled lines (see clause 006.4.5 for
29 further discussion of the impact of mutual coupling of lines).
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
2 Figure 37 —Varying time adjustment on overcurrent relay characteristic curves
3 6.1.2 Directional overcurrent relay schemes
4 A basic directional overcurrent relay scheme usually consistss of three or four measured time overcurrent
5 elements. The three phase elements can be used to calculate the residual ground current or a fourth
6 measured element in the neutral leg can be used., one for each phase, and one for residual current. The
7 overcurrent elements are either supervised or controlled by polarizing inputs that may be voltages, currents ,
8 or both. This arrangement providesallows the ability to the relay to operate for current flows due to faults
9 on the line-side or, if so specified, for current flows due to faults onor t the bus-side of the relay.
10 An overcurrent element is free to operate for any current in excess of its pickup setting. A directional unit
11 uses a polarizing input in addition to the current. There are two options are generally used for combining
12 the operation of the overcurrent and directional units. The first option is to allow the circuit to be tripped if
13 and only if both units operate. The second option is to control the input to the overcurrent element
14 preventing its operation unless the directional element operates. In an electromechanical relay scheme, for
15 example, a directional relay contact can be installed in the shading coil circuit of an overcurrent relay to
16 control the operation of the overcurrent relay. This is often referred to as “torque control” because the
17 directional element controls the operating torque of the overcurrent relay.
18 One advantage of directional-torque control of the input over supervising the output of an instantaneous
19 overcurrent element is that there is no race between reset of the instantaneous overcurrent element and
20 operation of the directional element during current reversals. The directional element must operate before
21 the instantaneous element can operate.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Phase directional relays are polarized by phase voltages while the ground directional relays are commonly
2 polarized with zero-sequence voltages, currents or both, or negative-sequence voltages. Other methods of
3 polarizing can also be used as discussed in clause 6.4.4. Zero-sequence voltage is obtained from the
4 broken-delta secondary of grounded-wye VTs that provide 3V0 as shown in Figure 38Figure 38Figure 32.
5 In microprocessor-based relays, the 3V0 is calculated internally from the three phase-voltages applied to
6 them as inputs. Zero-sequence current polarization is only possible if there is a ground current source at the
7 bus; zero sequence current polarization is further discussed in clause 6.4.2. Negative-sequence polarized
8 directional units are often applied when zero-sequence mutual coupling effects cause zero-sequence
9 directional units to lose directionality.
10 The time overcurrent and instantaneous units used in directional overcurrent relay schemes are virtually
11 identical in operation and design to those used in non-directional overcurrent relay schemes except that the
12 operation of one or both units is controlled or supervised by the directional unit.
13 Instantaneous trip units, which themselves may or may not be directional can be added to the scheme to
14 provide high-speed relay operation for close-in faults. Input currents to these relays are provided from CTs
15 located at the line terminal.
16 Negative-sequence relays can supplement the four basic overcurrent elements where needed. Three-phase
17 devices may sum the currents internally to produce negative-sequence and residual operating quantities
18 without the need for additional CT connections.
19 The procedure for coordinating directional overcurrent relays is similar to that used for coordinating
20 overcurrent relays. Fault coverage and/or operating times may be affected by network changes. The time
21 delay requirements often make them unsuitable for transmission line protection without using other
22 protection systems, such as transfer trip facilities. They are used, however, on lower voltage networks
23 especially for ground fault protection. The process of verifying coordination between the local relay and
24 the relays at the remote bus should take into consideration the instantaneous element applied for ground
25 fault protection of the remote line. If the coordination between the protected line and the remote line is
26 developed using the current resulting from a fault just beyond the remote line instantaneous ground or
27 distance relay, fault currents will be somewhat lower at the local terminal, resulting in better coordination
28 margins. In addition, if the remote bus has additional sources, the effects of infeed from these sources
29 improve coordination margin. The local relay will reach less into the remote line as the current at the local
30 terminal is lower.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
73
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
High Voltage Field Code Changed

a
b
c
G
Voltage Transformers
or Devices
G
Secondary
a
b
c
3V0
G
X Y
Vag
G 3V0
Alternate if Double Secondary X Y
Voltage Transformers or Devices
are Not Available
Vag
Vcg Vbg
Vbg
VXY = 3V0
Vcg Phasors for a Phase “a” to Ground Fault

1
2
3 Figure 38 —Zero-sequence polarizing voltage source
4 Instantaneous directional ground overcurrent elements are often used in pilot scheme applications to
5 provide sensitive communications-assisted ground fault protection. Phase directional overcurrent relay
6 schemes are used primarily on distribution and subtransmission feeders when fault and/or load current can
7 flow in either direction. Directional relays are required at the terminal having the weaker source behind it,
8 usually the receiving end of a line. The pickup of the phase time overcurrent elements has to be set higher
9 than maximum load current expected to flow in the forward direction, but may be set below the normal
10 load current in the reverse direction. Regardless of the particular method chosen, the pickup settings should
11 be as low as possible for fault detection sensitivity, but with sufficient margin above any non-fault related
12 current flows. The instantaneous element pickup, time current characteristic, and time adjustment setting
13 requirements are similar to those of the non-directional overcurrent relays, with only faults in the forward
14 direction being considered. Directional ground overcurrent relays are commonly applied on all types of
15 transmission lines. The time overcurrent elements are often used for backup protection. High set
16 instantaneous ground directional elements are often used for direct tripping for close-in ground faults. The
17 topic of close-in faults is further discussed in clause 6.3.2.
18 Automatic reclosing is a special case of a system configuration change, as it represents a non-typical

19 operating scenario where one terminal of the line is closed while the other end is open as shown in Figure
20 33. Instantaneous directional ground protection can cover a significant percentage of the line. A reclose of
21 a remote line onto a close-in fault (with its remote end open or closed) is often the external fault simulation
22 used to set the local terminal relay, as the loss of this line’s source will tend to force more ground current
74
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 through the terminal being set. A setting method for the local terminal relay that takes into consideration
2 the possible special configurations presented by reclosing and other typical maintenance outages would be
3 a solution to undesirable over-trips.
Bus A Bus B Ground Fault Bus C

to Set Relay
Setting Reclose
Relay Here Ground Open
Here
4 Sources?
Field Code Changed
Bus A Bus B Ground Fault Bus C
to Set Relay
Setting Reclose
Open
Relay Here Here
Ground
Sources?
5
6 Figure 39 —Reclosing
7 Removal of large remote ground sources during maintenance outages can have the same effect as that of
8 reclosing. The result is that more ground current will flow from the local terminal thus impacting
9 overcurrent settings by possibly allowing overreach conditions. If the directional ground relay setting takes
10 into account the loss of the strongest remote source, then during normal operation, with all ground sources
11 in service, the relay’s reach will be shorter. Company practices vary, but generally, a shorter reach is
12 preferred to that of possibly over-tripping when the source is removed.
13 Also, the grounding of a transmission line that is mutually coupled to the protected line for maintenance
14 activities can make a significant change to the network fault current distribution. The relay settings need to
15 account for this scenario as the mutual coupling effect can significantly impact ground relay operation.
16 Power system modifications due to switching or maintenance can result in substantial changes to the
17 anticipated fault current flows. The switching duration can be brief and may not justify a complete settings
18 recalculation or the performing of a new coordination study immediately prior to the modification. The
19 effect of such single contingency temporary changes to the power system can be included in the initial
20 settings calculations with specific attention to possible over reaching of instantaneous elements.
21 A typical method employed for contingency analysis uses short circuit analysis software that removes
22 network elements sequentially to analyze the effects of such outages. The choice of which network
23 elements are removed varies by the settings philosophy but should have the goal to identify the
24 contingencies that have significant impact. Frequently, loss of the network elements adjacent to the relay
25 location will significantly change ground fault currents, thus affecting the ground fault relays’ applications
26 and settings.
27 Philosophy regarding the removal of significant zero sequence current sources such as three winding and
28 auto-transformer banks with delta tertiary windings, as well as generator step-up transformers, can vary due
29 to the response such outages may initiate. Some utilities may consider the outage of these significant
30 elements to be an event that prompts the recalculation of nearby relay settings or the utilization of pre-
31 loaded alternate relay settings groups in the relays.
32 A PSRC report [B65] is a helpful reference for applying directional ground relays to transmission lines.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 6.1.3 Distance relay schemes
2 Distance relays operate by using voltage and current to determine if a fault is in the protection zone of the
3 relay. These relays are available for detecting phase faults as well as for detecting ground faults. The
4 characteristics of these relays can be shown on R-X diagrams. The values of the positive and zero-sequence
5 impedances of the transmission line they protect are used to set these relays. The impedances of two-
6 terminal transmission lines are known parameters that are practically constant. The reach of these relays is
7 largely insensitive to network changes. However, on multi-terminal lines and transmission lines with
8 tapped lines, the apparent impedance is affected by network changes.
9 The term "impedance relay" is often used interchangeably with the term "distance relay," although it is only
10 a convenient convention. Actually, there are several distance relay characteristics, of which the impedance
11 relay is only one. The basic distance relay characteristics are as follows:
12 Impedance: The impedance characteristic, shown in Figure 40Figure 40Figure 34 (a), does not take into
13 account the phase angle between the voltage and the current applied to it. For this reason, the impedance
14 characteristic in the R-X plane is a circle with its center at the origin. The relay operates when the measured
15 impedance is less than the setting (i.e., it is within the circle). This unit, when used to trip, should be
16 supervised by a directional unit or be time delayed.
17 Mho: The characteristic of a self-polarized mho relay, shown in Figure 40Figure 40Figure 34 (b), is a circle
18 whose circumference passes through the origin. The relay operates if the measured impedance falls within
19 the circle.
20 Offset mho: The characteristic of an offset mho relay in the R-X plane, shown in Figure 40Figure 40Figure
21 34 (c), is a circle that is shifted and includes the origin, thus providing better protection for close-in faults in
22 the forward as well as reverse directions. This unit, when used to trip, may be supervised by a directional
23 unit or may be time-delayed if it is not intended for operating during faults in the reverse direction.
24 Reactance: This characteristic, shown in Figure 40Figure 40Figure 34 (d), measures only the reactive
25 component of impedance. The characteristic of a reactance relay in the R-X plane is a straight line parallel
26 to the R axis. The reactance relay should be supervised by another function to ensure directionality and to
27 prevent tripping under load.
28 Quadrilateral: The quadrilateral characteristic has four sides as shown in Figure 40Figure 40Figure 34 (e).
29 This characteristic can be achieved by combining directional and reactance characteristics with two
30 resistive reach blinder characteristics.
31 Lenticular: The lenticular characteristic, shown in Figure 40Figure 40Figure 34 (f), is similar to the mho
32 relay, except it is lens-shaped rather than circular, thus reducing the sensitivity of the relay to load.
33 Polygon: The polygon characteristic, shown in Figure 41Figure 41Figure 35, is an extension of the
34 quadrilateral characteristic in which the characteristic can be tailored to suit the needs for special
35 applications.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
2 Figure 40 —Impedance, Mho, Offset Mho, Reactance, Quadrilateral and Lenticular
3 Characteristics implemented in distance relays
77
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
2 Figure 41 —Polygon characteristic implemented in distance relays
3 Numerous other distance relay characteristics have been designed by combining the above-described basic
4 impedance characteristics. The response of the various characteristics is affected by the polarizing signal
5 used in them.
6 6.1.3.1 Step-distance schemes
7 Non-pilot application of distance relays is called step-distance protection. Several zones are set up to
8 protect a transmission line and provide backup protection of remote bus (buses) and some portions of the
9 lines emanating from the remote bus. The first zone, designated as zone 1, is normally set to trip with no
10 intentional time delay. To avoid unnecessary operation for faults beyond the remote terminal, zone 1
11 functions are usually set for approximately 80–90% of the transmission line impedance. The intent of
12 making the setting less than the full line impedance setting is to prevent over-reaching. This over-reaching
13 can be due to the effect of load, the effect of fault impedance, effect of fault contribution from the remote
14 terminal, non-symmetrical construction where some fault loops are lower impedance, or the effect oferrors
15 in settings, calibrations, or instrument transformers errors.
16 The second zone, designated as zone 2, is set to protect the remainder of the line plus an adequate margin.
17 Zone 2 relays need to be time delayed to coordinate with relays at the remote bus. Typical time delays are
18 in the order of 15–30 cycles of the fundamental frequency although, depending on the application, they
19 may be set faster or slower. This time delay prevents instantaneous clearing of the local terminal for faults
20 beyond the remote terminal of the line. The reach setting of zone 2 may vary depending on the application.
21 In general, zone 2 settings should never over-reach any zone 1 relay protecting other transmission lines
22 emanating from the remote terminal. If this over-reach is unavoidable, coordination can be maintained by
23 providing additional time delay to the zone 2 that is over-reaching, as shown in Figure 42Figure 42Figure
24 36. The minimum setting for the zone 2 that ensures full coverage of the line, with safety margin, is usually
25 120% of the line impedance. In some cases, if there is no concern with reaching beyond the zone 1
26 elements at the remote terminal, the zone 2 may be set with a much higher margin. For example, in the case
27 of short lines, settings as high as 200% of the line, or higher, may be helpful in increasing dependability of
28 the protection system.
29 Even though the transmission line is fully protected with zone 1 and zone 2 relays, a third forward-reaching
30 zone is often employed. This zone 3 is applied as remote backup for relay or station failures at the remote
31 terminal. This relay should be time delayed to coordinate with the zone 1 and zone 2 relays protecting other
32 lines emanating from the remote bus. Sometimes it is necessary to coordinate the zone 3 relay with
33 overcurrent relays protecting distribution load tapped from a transmission line. The relay should detect any
34 fault for which it is expected to provide backup and not limit the load carrying capability of the line. The
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 setting of the zone 3 relay ideally will cover (with adequate margin and with consideration for infeed, if
2 required) the protected line, plus all of the longest line emanating from the remote station.
3 A possible problem with very long zone 3 (and sometimes zone 2) settings is that there may be insufficient
4 margin to ensure that the apparent impedance due to heavy load does not enter the operating characteristic
5 of the distance relay as described in a PSRC Report [B61]. When considering the apparent impedance of
6 the load, the maximum steady state load is not always the worst case to be considered. It is sometimes
7 necessary to consider minimum apparent impedance due to stable system swings, temporary line overloads,
8 and heavy loads under reduced system voltage. If load considerations or other problems prevent a sensitive
9 enough setting, other forms of backup protection may be applied, or some form of sequential tripping may
10 be used. To employ sequential tripping, typically the remote infeed source terminal would have protective
11 relays set to trip and remove the infeed effect. With the infeed removed, the zone 3 should then be applied
12 to cover the longest remote line with adequate margin.
13
14 Figure 42 —Backup long line to short line
15 6.1.3.2 Zone 1 extension distance schemes
16 The zone 1 extension scheme requires no pilot channel and derives its name from the fact that the zone 1
17 functions are set to normally reach beyond the remote terminal of the transmission line. Simplified logic for
18 the scheme is as shown in Figure 43Figure 43Figure 37.
19
20 Figure 43 —Extension of zone 1
21 The extension of the zone 1 is controlled by the output from an automatic reclosing relay that is an essential
22 part of this technique. No output is produced by automatic reclosing relay during normal operating
23 conditions and the zone 1 setting reaches beyond the remote terminal of the transmission line.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 High-speed tripping is initiated at both terminals of the line when a fault occurs within the overreaching
2 zone 1 on the transmission lineelement. Outputs from the automatic reclosing relays at both terminals
3 reduce the reach of zone 1 to values similar to those used by step-distance schemes (see clause 6.1.3.1 for
4 the usual reach of zone 1) and then reclose the circuit breakers energizing the line. The line circuit breakers
5 trip if the fault still persists and is in the zone 1 reach from both termina ls. The protection now acts like
6 step-distance protection described in clause 6.1.3.1.
7 All lines adjacent to the fault are tripped for a fault that occurs beyond the remote terminal of a line but is
8 within the reach of the extended zone 1 setting of the line. This, however, causes the settings of extended
9 zone 1 to be reduced to usual step-distance protection levels before the circuit breakers are reclosed. The
10 fault (if it still exists) is now beyond the pulled back reach so that automatic reclosing restores to service all
11 un-faultedunfaulted lines. If the fault is permanent and is located near a line terminal, the relay nearest to
12 the fault will trip without time delay after a reclosing attempt and the relays at the remote terminals will trip
13 after a time delay.
14 The scheme is dependable because it provides fast tripping for faults anywhere on the transmission line
15 without the use of a communications channel. It is insecure because it trips the line for all external faults
16 that are in the reach of the extended zone 1 setting. Note that all lines within reach of a common fault, and
17 using this type of scheme, will be tripped simultaneously for that fault. However, due to the in-feed effect,
18 the overreach of the extended Zone 1 is greatly reduced and typically extends along a small percentage of
19 the line out of the remote station such that close-in faults are usually the only ones at risk for over-tripping.
20 Given that in-feed can contribute to the security of the scheme, it is typically applied on tightly networked
21 systems (i.e., networks with many interconnecting transmission lines).
22 6.1.3.3 Relay elements in step-distance schemes
23 The distance from the relay location to a line fault can be determined by measuring positive sequence
24 impedance of the line from the relay location to the fault. The distance measurement is consistent because
25 the positive sequence impedance per unit length of a homogenous line is constant. The distance to the fault
26 can also be determined by measuring the zero-sequence impedance of the line when a ground fault occurs;
27 but, unfortunately, the zero-sequence impedance per unit length of a line is not constant because the
28 moisture in the ground all along the line may not be the same and / or the geological formation of the
29 ground may not be same all along the line. It is, therefore, chosen to measure the positive sequence
30 impedance of the line from the relay location to the fault.
31 Three relay elements are needed for detecting multi-phase faults in each zone if electromechanical or solid-
32 state devices are used. The voltages and currents applied to the elements are listed in Table 5. Similarly,
33 three relay elements are needed for detecting single-phase-to-ground faults in each zone. The voltages and
34 currents applied to these elements are listed in Table 6.
35
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1
2 Table 5 —Voltages and currents applied to distance relays for detecting multi-phase faults
Relay Element Type of Fault Voltage Applied Current Applied
Phase A and Phase B VA-VB IA-IB
1.
Phase A, Phase B and Ground VA-VB IA-IB
Phase B and Phase C VB-VC IB-IC
2.
Phase B, Phase C and Ground VB-VC IB-IC
Phase C and Phase A VC-VA IC-IA
3.
Phase C, Phase A and Ground VC-VA IC-IA
3 Table 6 —Voltages and current applied to distance relays for detecting phase-ground faults
Relay Element Type of Fault Voltage Applied Current Applied
1. Phase A to Ground VA IA + 3kI0k
2. Phase B to Ground VB IB + 3I0k3kI0
3. Phase C to Ground VC IC + 3I0k3kI0
4 The constant k in this table is the ratio of line impedances (Z0 – Z1) and / 3Z1.
5 NOTE—Other operating principles, such as compensator relaying to detect multi-phase faults are discussed in [B26].
6 Also schemes with one compensator relay and one ground directional overcurrent relay have been used to detect all
7 types of faults on transmission lines.
8 6.2 Pilot schemes
9 Pilot schemes use communication channels to send information from the local relay terminal to the remote
10 relay terminal. This information is used to achieve high-speed tripping for faults occurring on 100% of the
11 protected line. Both current differential schemes and directional comparison schemes are common. Current
12 differential systems transmit to and receive from the remote terminal(s) information on the current that can
13 be used to determine magnitudes and phase anglesof the phase angles and, in some cases, both the
14 magnitude of the currents and their phase angles. The systems that exchange current phase angles or their
15 deviations are called phase comparison systems systems. Current differential and phase comparison
16 protection schemes include both ac pilot wire relays and digital current differential relays. Distance relays
17 are also arranged in pilot schemes using a communication channel to transmit binary information.and the
18 systems that exchange information of magnitudes and phase angles of currents are called differential
19 protection systems. Current differential protection schemes include both AC pilot wire relays and digital
20 current differential relays.
21
22 6.2.1 Current differential schemes
23 A basic current differential scheme is shown in Figure 44Figure 44Figure 38. Information from the relay at
24 the remote terminal is provided to the local relay using a communications channel. This information is
25 compared with the corresponding information collected by the local relay. When there is no fault on the
26 line, the difference between the two sets of information should be zero or equal to the tapped loads on the
27 line. In practice, this may not be the case due to CT errors, ratio mismatch, and line charging currents.
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1 Information concerning both the phase and the magnitude of the currents at each terminal are needed at all
2 terminals for comparing the magnitude and phase angles and performing differential measurements. A
3 current differential scheme, therefore, requires a communication channel suitable for the transmission of
4 this data. A current differential scheme can operate for internal faults even for zero infeed at one or more of
5 the terminals provided the total current is greater than the sensitivity of the differential protection system.
6 There are two main types of current differential systems. The first type combines the currents at each
7 terminal into a composite signal and compares these composite signals through a communication channel
8 to determine if there is a fault in the line being protected. An example of this type of system is the AC ac
9 pilot wire protection scheme described in Section clause 6.2.2 The second type samples individual phase
10 currents at each terminal, converts the samples to a digital signal, and transmits these signals between
11 terminals to determine if a fault is present on the line. The second type of differential system, referred to as
12 phase segregated line differential relays, includes most digital current differential relays. Specific
13 measuring principles used in digital current differential protection schemes include percentage differential,
14 charge comparison, and alpha plane principles. Detailed descriptions of these operating principles are are
15 available in the new IEEE Std C37.243™ , IEEE Guide for Application of Digital Line Current Differential
16 Relays Using Digital Communications[B49].
17 Current differential schemes tend to be more sensitive than distance type schemes because they respond
18 only to the currents in the protected line. However, tapped loads on the line must either be included as
19 specific currents summed in the differential scheme or the relay current trip setting must be de-sensitized to
20 compensate for any tapped loads that are not included in the current summation. Since current-only
21 schemes require no potential to operate, they are not affected by system swing conditions or any problems
22 introduced via the potential inputs, such as the failure of a voltage-transformer fuse. On the other hand,
23 these schemes have no inherent remote backup capabilities.
24 The integrity of the communication channel is very important to the operation of current differential
25 schemes and, for this reason, the communication channel should be highly reliable. Because the trip logic
26 in current differential schemes generally does not rely on permissive or blocking elements, channel
27 communications losses may cause misoperations; therefore, current differential protection schemes employ
28 communications channel supervision to block potential misoperations from loss of communications.
29 The advantages of current differential schemes are summarized below:
30 x No voltage transformers needed

31 x Good for multi-ended lines
32 x Can detect high resistance faults
33 x Immune to power swings, current reversals, and high load flows
34 x Uniform trip time for all line faults without misoperation due to overreach
35 x No problems with series compensation
36 x Simple to set with no coordination problems
37 A summary of the disadvantages of current differential schemes includes:
38 x No inherent remote backup capability
39 x Trip current setting may need to be de-sensitized to account for tapped line load
40 x Cost and complexity of communications channel having suitable requirements for the scheme
41 x Trip output must be disabled for loss of communications
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1 Current differential schemes often include an interface withneed a communication channel for exchanging
2 information that may bsuch ase power system frequency signals, audio tones, or digital dataand binary data,
3 like a transfer trip. Communications media can be metallic pilot wires, dedicated fiber optic links,
4 T1(E1)/SONET (Synchronous Digital Hierarchy) communications networks, or Ethernet networks. Some
5 digital current differential schemes have been operated on audio tones over leased telephone lines or
6 digital microwave. Some AC pilot wire relays have been operated over digital channels via an analog to
7 digital interface. Power line carrier channels are generally not used for current differential relaying because
8 they either do not have the bandwidth required by these schemes or there are other technical limitations of
9 power line carrier that makes it unsuitable for the particular application.
10
11 Figure 44 —Current differential protection of a transmission line
12 6.2.2 AC pilot-wire relays
13 Traditional pilot-wire relays use a pair of metallic wires as the medium for sending information from one
14 terminal to the other. The communication is in the form of signals at power-system frequency. Pilot-wire
15 relays that are used traditionally on short lines are easy to apply. The traditional electromechanical pilot-
16 wire relays are one of two basic types, circulating-current types and opposed-voltage types, such as shown
17 in Figure 45Figure 45Figure 39 and Figure 46Figure 46Figure 40 respectively. More details of these
18 schemes are given in many references, such as (Elmore, W. A., Ed [B26]) , [B76] and Transactions paper
19 [B84][B84][B80]. Both schemes use mixing networks to convert the currents in the three phases and the
20 residual current to a single quantity so as to transmit the composite information on two pilot-wires. It is
21 necessary to take care to protect against the dangers associated with ground potential rise.
22 Some users have converted pilot-wire communication links to optical fiber links in conjunction with fiber
23 optic interfaces. This avoids the problems of ground potential rise and induced voltages.
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1
2 Figure 45 —Schematic connections of a circulating-current pilot-wire scheme
3
4 Figure 46 —Schematic connections of an opposed-voltage pilot-wire scheme
5 6.2.3 Phase comparison schemes
6 The Phase phase comparison technique compares the phase angle of the currents at the two terminals of the
7 protected line. The CTs and relays are connected as shown in Figure 47Figure 47Figure 41. The currents in
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1 the relays at the two terminals are essentially equal and 180° out-of-phase when an external fault occurs on
2 the power system; the relays interpret this situation as an external fault and do not initiate a trip. On the
3 other hand, the currents are essentially in phase if a fault is on the protected line; the relays interpret the
4 phase coincidence as a fault on the line and initiate the tripping of the circuit breakers controlling the line.
5 A secure communication channel between the two line terminals is needed for this protection scheme to
6 perform its intended function. This channel could be over a medium such as power-line carrier, metallic
7 pair, leased telephone lines, microwave, or fiber optics. Communication lines with automatic change in
8 path delays due to route switching may result in reduction of relay security. Utilities can have control of
9 the route switching of communication lines they own but are not likely to have control of route switching
10 of leased communication lines.
11 Phase comparison systems need inputs from the CTs associated with the line terminals. A composite
12 sequence-current filter network provides a single-phase voltage output proportional to positive, negative,
13 and zero-sequence currents in the line except for the segregated phase comparison systems. The relay
14 converts the single-phase voltage output to a square wave (local square wave) during a fault condition and
15 keys the channel to the remote terminal for comparison of the local single-phase voltage output with the
16 received signal (remote square wave). Relay logic delays the local square wave by the duration equal to the
17 channel time to provide a reasonably accurate comparison.
18 Phase comparison logic can be configured as either blocking or permissive. Un-blocking phase comparison,
19 which is a special type of permissive scheme, is generally used if power line carrier is the communication
20 medium.
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1
Field Code Changed
R R
CB A CB B
F1 F2 F3
INTERNAL FAULT, F2
EXTERNAL
FAULTS, F1 & F3
FAULT CURRENT AT A FAULT CURRENT AT B

2
3 Figure 47 —Phase comparison relaying
4 6.2.3.1 Single phase-comparison
5 A positive half-cycle of the local square wave is compared with a corresponding positive half-cycle of the
6 square waves received from the remote terminal by single phase-comparison schemes; this comparison is
7 performed by the relays at both terminals of the line. Single phase-comparison can be configured either in a
8 blocking mode or in a permissive mode.
9 A single phase-comparison system requires two fault detectors, one for keying the carrier on-off and the
10 other for tripping, when the scheme is configured in a blocking mode. The carrier start is set more
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1 sensitively than the tripping unit. There is a possibility of tripping delay of one half -cycle because the
2 comparison of only positive half-cycles is performed. The remote signal is received and the comparison
3 blocks tripping if a fault is beyond the remote terminal. A trip is initiated at a terminal if no signal is
4 received from the remote terminal. The consequence is that the phase comparison blocking system
5 produces a trip output if a fault on the protected line causes failure of the communication channel.
6 A single phase-comparison requires one fault detector, a pilot channel, and breaker status logic (or a low set
7 current detector) when configured in permissive mode. The sequence current fault detector allows the local
8 square wave to key the channel on and off at 60 Hz during a fault. A trip condition is satisfied when the
9 local and remote received square waves are essentially in phase. An open line terminal will cause a
10 constant permissive signal to be sent, thus allowing the closed end to trip for a faulted line. This form of
11 phase comparison is very secure in that a loss of channel does not result in tripping the line. A dependable
12 channel, such as direct on baseband analog microwave, should be used.
13 6.2.3.2 Dual phase-comparison
14 The logic of a dual phase-comparison system that requires a duplex channel for communication is shown in
15 Figure 48Figure 48Figure 42. This logic performs the comparison, like the single phase-comparison
16 system, during both half-cycles of the power system sine wave. This provides statistically faster tripping
17 times than the single phase-comparison systems provide. Dual phase-comparison systems use frequency-
18 shift channel equipment for transmitting signals continuously. Therefore, carrier start equipment is not
19 needed.
20 A dual phase-comparison system keys the carrier to its “mark” frequency when the local square wave goes
21 positive and keys to its “space” frequency when the square wave is negative. Comparison of the local
22 square wave to the received frequency from the remote terminal of the line indicates if the fault is on the
23 protected line or is external to the protected line. Relay logic allows delaying the local square wave by
24 duration equal to the channel time as is done in single phase-comparison systems. When power line carrier
25 is used for communication, the communication signal may be lost during an internal fault. For this reason,
26 unblocking version of the permissive scheme should be applied (more discussion of unblocking version is
27 provided in clause 6.2.4.6).
28
Field Code Changed
Local Pos.
AND
Remote Pos.
TIMER
OR LOGIC Trip
CIRCUIT
Local Neg.
AND
Remote Neg.
29
30 Figure 48 —Dual phase comparison logic
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1 6.2.3.3 Segregated phase-comparison
2 Segregated phase-comparison systems work in a manner similar to the systems described in clauses 6.2.3.1
3 and 6.2.3.2 except that the composite sequence-current filter network is eliminated. Square wave
4 representations of phase currents are transmitted to the remote end, where they are compared to the locally
5 generated square waves for coincidence. The comparison is done on each half-cycle. A decision is made to
6 trip the line if the waves are coincident for more than 4 ms.
7 An internal fault may not cause the line current at a terminal that is connected to a weak source to reverse
8 direction during a line fault especially if the other terminal is connected to a strong source. A phase-
9 comparison scheme that looks at phase relationships of currents only would not detect a fault because phase
10 of the current at the terminal connected to a weak source did not reverse.
11 Offset keying scheme in which the width of the waveform is a function of the magnitude of the current at
12 the line terminal can take care of this problem. The trip decision is still based on the coincidence of the
13 local and remote square waves. Since magnitude information is present in the system, the relay responds
14 properly to outfeed conditions. Since the information on currents in the phases is kept separately, this
15 system can incorporate single-phase tripping schemes.
16 6.2.4 Directional comparison schemes
17 Directional comparison schemes use directional phase overcurrent relays, directional ground overcurrent
18 relays, and distance relay functions that have inherent directional properties. The following issues are
19 important when setting such relays for use in directional comparison schemes.
20 The main consideration in setting over-reaching (RO) directional ground overcurrent function is that it
21 should not operate due to normal steady state unbalances. Over-reaching ground overcurrent relays may be
22 set quite sensitively so that they operate for faults remote from the protected line because steady state
23 unbalances are usually quite small. The correct operation of the over-reaching ground overcurrent
24 protection relies on pilot logic for preventing operation during external faults.
25 Zone 2 relays are usually set to over-reach the remote terminal of the protected line with at least the same
26 margin as the margin used in the case of step-distance schemes. There is, however, no concern for
27 coordination with relays at the remote terminal protecting other equipment. The zone 2 relay in a pilot
28 scheme may be set to over-reach the line with greater margin than is set in step-distance schemes if it does
29 not also trip directly through a timer. There is no need to consider step time coordination with other
30 protection systems, because pilot-assisted zone 2 relays do not trip for faults in adjacent equipment. If there
31 is no concern for operating on load, zone 2 relays in pilot-assisted schemes that are set to over-reach with
32 large margins may provide faster tripping than similar schemes in which a minimum margin is used but
33 may also be more susceptible to misoperation on stable swings. The use of a minimum margin, however,
34 reduces the possibility of a false trip in the case of failure to receive the blocking signal.
35 Directional comparison schemes may have to accommodate current reversals that accompany sequential
36 tripping of circuit breakers for faults on one of the parallel lines. This typically applies to ground
37 directional overcurrent elements, but can also occur if zone 2 is set too long. See Clause 6.2.4.8 for more
38 details on current reversal guard logic.
39 Some pilot schemes use reverse-looking elements; these elements should be set to “see” farther than the
40 forward-looking over-reaching function at the remote terminal. The positive sensitivity margin is required
41 for forward and reverse overcurrent elements in a pilot scheme, because the line impedance does not affect
42 the relative magnitude of current in each terminal for an external fault. This setting ensures that the
43 reverse-looking blocking function will always work if required to prevent undesired tripping of the
44 forward-looking function. The reverse-looking distance relay element setting should include adequate
45 margin to ensure that it actually “sees” farther than the remote forward-looking relay. For three-terminal
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1 lines, where fault current may flow out of two terminals for an external fault, this division of fault current
2 should be considered in setting the reverse-looking relay elements to ensure a positive sensitivity margin.
3 In all cases, the speed and characteristics of reverse-looking elements should be checked to ensure that they
4 are at least as fast and sensitive as the forward-looking elements provided at the remote terminals. This
5 check should include verifying pickup levels (i.e., the reverse element should be set to pick up at a lower
6 value than the remote forward reaching element) and directional polarization methods. It is very important
7 that the directional element be polarized using the same technique, for example zero-sequence or negative-
8 sequence or current polarizations at both line terminals. The selection of the directional polarization
9 method can be an issue in relays that automatically select the directional polarization based upon measured
10 quantities. Slight differences in the measured values at the line terminals can result in the automatic
11 selection of different directional polarization methods at each line terminal. Therefore, it may be best to
12 select a single directional polarization method in some applications.
13 6.2.4.1 Direct under-reaching transfer trip
14 The simplified logic for a direct under-reaching transfer trip (DUTT) scheme is shown in Figure 49Figure
15 49Figure 43. This scheme requires under-reaching (RU) functions only, and is usually applied with a
16 frequency shift keying (FSK) channel. With this type of channel, the GUARD frequency is transmitted
17 during quiescent conditions, and the transmitter is keyed to the TRIP frequency whenever one of the RU
18 functions operates. Phase distance elements are used almost exclusively for the detection of multiphase
19 faults, whereas ground distance or directional ground overcurrent elements are used for the detection of
20 ground faults. The RU functions should overlap in reach; otherwise there would be a dead zone on the line
21 where no faults would be detected.
22 For ground elements, changes in the power system can result in reduced fault current contributions from the
23 line terminal which causes a reduction in the effective reach of the directional ground overcurrent elements.
24 Consequently, it may not be possible to use directional ground overcurrent functions because it may not be
25 possible to set them toelements that meet provide the required overlapreach. due to changes in power
26 system resulting reduced fault current contribution from the line terminal causing a reduction in the
27 effective reach of the directional ground overcurrent element.
28 For internal faults within the overlap zone, the RU functions at each end of the line will operate and trip the
29 breaker directly. At the same time, the RU function will key its respective transmitter to send a direct
30 transfer TRIP signal to the remote terminal of the line. Receipt of the TRIP signal will also initiate tripping
31 of the breaker. The scheme operates at high speed for close-in faults. It, however, does not operate for
32 faults beyond the reach of the RU elements if the remote circuit breaker is open or if the remote
33 communication channel is inoperative. For this reason, DUTT schemes are often used only as a
34 supplement to other pilot tripping schemes.
35 The DUTT received signal is converted to a trip without any local supervision. As such its channel
36 requires more security than those schemes whose channels are supervised by a local measuring element.
37 Security of the protection system may be jeopardized if only one communication channel is used at each
38 terminal because an erroneous output from the channel would initiate an instantaneous trip. This scheme is,
39 therefore, often applied with dual channels where both outputs should initiate trip to provide security.
40 Security can be further enhanced by requiring that one channel shifts up in frequency, while the other
41 channel shifts down in frequency to initiate a trip. Time-delayed backup tripping functions are added to trip
42 the line for faults beyond the reach of the RU functions when the remote circuit breaker is open. The
43 channel can be monitored on a continuous basis because the GUARD signal is transmitted continuously.
44 The consequence is that the channel check-back equipment is not required.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
RU Field Code Changed
RU
CB 1 Protected Line CB 2
TRIP TRIP
CB 1 CB 2
RU RU
OR OR
RCVR RCVR
XMTR XMTR
RU – underreaching trip function, must be set to reach short of remote terminal

and must overlap in reach with RU at remote terminal.
2
3 Figure 49 —Direct under-reaching transfer trip
4 6.2.4.2 Permissive under-reaching transfer trip
5 The permissive under-reaching transfer trip (PUTT) scheme requires both over-reaching (RO) and under-
6 reaching (RU) functions. Simplified logic for the PUTT scheme is shown in Figure 50Figure 50Figure 44.
7 Consider that the RU functions at both terminals are set to reach 80% of the line and RO functions are set
8 to reach well beyond the remote terminals. The RU units at both terminals would operate if a fault occurs
9 on the middle 60% of the line and circuit breakers at both terminals are tripped. The RU unit at Bus 1 does
10 not operate if a fault is on the protected line but is beyond the reach of that RU unit. The RO unit at Bus 1
11 operates indicating that the fault is either on the protected line beyond the reach of the RU unit or on a line
12 emanating from the remote terminal. The RU unit provided at Bus 2 detects the line fault and transmits this
13 information to the protection system at Bus 1. The circuit breaker tripping is then permitted.
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1 This scheme is similar to the DUTT scheme, except that the signal sent is a permissive signal and tripping
2 at each terminal is supervised by the RO units. A PUTT scheme is ineffective for faults beyond the RU
3 reach near the open terminal when the remote breaker is open.
4 This scheme is identical to the DUTT scheme, except that tripping at each terminal is supervised by
5 protection units that are set for zone 2 reach. Open breaker keying of the transfer trip transmitter should be
6 used as discussed in clause 6.2.4.1. Simple echo-keying for PUTT scheme is ineffective for faults beyond
7 the RU reach near the open terminal because the RU element will not key a signal to be echoed.
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1
RO
RU
RO
TRIP TRIP
CB 1 CB 2
RU RU
OR OR
XMTR XMTR
RO AND AND RO
RCVR RCVR
RU – underreaching trip function, must be set to reach short of remote terminal and must
overlap in reach with RU at remote terminal.
RO – overreaching trip function, must be set to reach beyond remote end of line.
2
3 Figure 50 —Permissive under-reaching transfer trip scheme
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1 6.2.4.3 Permissive over-reaching transfer trip
2 The permissive over-reaching transfer trip (POTT) scheme requires RO functions. Phase distance functions
3 are used almost exclusively for the detection of multiphase faults, whereas ground distance functions or
4 directional overcurrent functions responding to ground faults, including zero- and negative-sequence
5 elements, are used for the detection of ground faults. The POTT scheme is usually sometimes applied with
6 a frequency shift (FSK) channel, in which the GUARD frequency is sent in standby and TRIP frequency by
7 an output from the RO functions. Simplified logic for the POTT scheme is shown in Figure 51Figure
8 51Figure 45.
9 Detailed discussions on channel type use (FSK), single / dual frequency applications, role of guard signal
10 and responses to loss of guard are given in the IEEE Std Standard C37.93™, IEEE Guide for Power
11 System Protective Relay Applications of Audio Tones over Telephone Lines[B38].
12
13 Figure 51 —Permissive underover-reaching transfer trip scheme
14 For a fault anywhere on the protected line, both RO functions at both terminals of the line operate and
15 provide an input to the comparatorAND gate. At the same time, the RO functions key the transmitter to the
16 TRIP signal. Receipt of the TRIP frequency at each terminal and an output from the RO function will cause
17 the AND gatecomparator to produce an output to initiate tripping. For external faults, the RO function at
18 only one end of the line operates and there is no output from the AND gatecomparators; thus, tripping is
19 not initiated at either terminal.
20 The scheme is very secure in that it does not trip for any external fault if the channel is inoperative.
21 Conversely, the scheme lacks dependability because it does not trip the line for an internal fault if the
22 channel is inoperative. The scheme may not trip at high speed for close-in faults at the terminals connected
23 to strong sources because the fastest tripping time that can be expected depends on the slowest function for
24 an internal fault. Some means should be used to key the transmitter at an open breaker if tripping is to be
25 initiated for faults seen at the other terminals. Breaker 52b keying is commonly used to provide this
26 requirement. Breaker 52b keying is inherently delayed 1–2 cycles to prevent a line from tripping for a relay
27 operation at the remote breaker for an external line or bus fault. Time-delayed backup tripping can be
28 provided because the scheme uses RO functions. The GUARD signal is transmitted continuously during
29 active as well as quiescent conditions and, therefore, the channel can be monitored on a continuous
30 basis.Alternatively, open breaker echo or weak feed echo functions, as described in 6.2.4.7, can be applied.
31 Distance elements protect the line in the event of failure of communication between the terminals. These
32 elements are set to trip after a time delay so as to coordinate with the protection systems provided on the
33 lines emanating from the remote terminal.
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1 6.2.4.4 Zone acceleration
2 Simplified logic for the zone acceleration scheme is shown in Figure 52Figure 52Figure 46. This scheme
3 requires the use of RU functions that have the capability of changing their reach when a permissive signal
4 is received from the remote terminal of the line. The RU functions are set to overlap in reach to avoid a
5 dead spot on the line. This generally requires the use of ground distance functions for the detection of
6 ground faults and phase distance functions for detecting multiphase faults. The scheme is usually applied
7 with an FSK channel. The channel is operated at the GUARD frequency during quiescent conditions and is
8 keyed to the TRIP frequency by operation of any of the RU functions.
9
RU
TRIP TRIP
CB 1 CB 2
RU RU
Extend Reach of RU Extend Reach of RU

RCVR RCVR
XMTR XMTR
RU – underreaching trip function, must be set to reach short of remote terminal

and must overlap in reach with RU at remoter terminal.
It must be capable of being switched in reach.
10
11 Figure 52 —Zone acceleration scheme
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1 Tripping is initiated and the channel is keyed to the TRIP frequency when a fault occurs within the overlap
2 zone of the RU functions. Receipt of the TRIP frequency extends (accelerates) the reach of the RU
3 functions to a value greater than the line impedance. This extension in reach has no further effect because
4 tripping has already been initiated at both terminals of the line. The RU function at a terminal operates and
5 trips the circuit breaker controlling the line at that terminal if the fault is close to the terminal and keys its
6 transmitter to the TRIP frequency. Receipt of the TRIP frequency at the other terminal extends the reach of
7 its RU function that now detects the fault and initiates tripping. None of the RU functions operate for
8 external faults; therefore, tripping is not attempted at any terminal.
9 This scheme is very secure because it does not trip the line for external faults regardless of the state of the
10 channel. Conversely, it does not trip the line for end zone faults if the channel is inoperative. Time -delayed
11 backup should be relied on to trip for this condition. High-speed tripping for close-in faults is provided at
12 the terminals connected to strong sources. Tripping for end zone faults depends on the operation of the
13 remote RU function; it is then delayed by the channel operating time, propagation time, and operating time
14 of the extended RU function. Because the GUARD signal is transmitted continuously, the channel can be
15 monitored on a continuous basis.
16 6.2.4.5 Directional comparison blocking
17 Simplified logic for a directional comparison blocking scheme is shown in Figure 53Figure 53Figure 47.
18 This scheme requires over-reaching tripping functions (RO) and blocking functions (B). Distance functions
19 are used almost exclusively for detecting multiphase faults. Either ground distance functions or ground
20 directional overcurrent functions are used for detecting ground faults. An (OFF-ON) communications
21 channel is typically used with this type of scheme. The transmission line is used often as the
22 communications medium. Audio tone over leased phone lines, microwaves, and fiber optic media are also
23 used sometimes. The transmitter is normally in the OFF state when the transmission line is functioning
24 normally but is keyed to the ON state by the operation of a blocking function. Receipt of a signal from the
25 remote terminal applies the NOT input to the comparator to BLOCK it from producing an output.
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1
RO B Field Code Changed
B RO
TRIP TRIP
CB 1 CB 2
TL1 TL1
RO C C RO
AND AND
O O
RCVR RCVR
B XMTR XMTR B
RO – overreaching trip function, must be set to reach beyond remote end of line.
B – blocking function, must be set to reach beyond overreaching trip function at remote end of line.
C – coordination time, required to allow time for blocking signal to be received
(set equal to channel time plus propagation time plus margin).
2
3 Figure 53 —Directional comparison blocking scheme
4 The tripping functions are set to reach beyond the remote terminal of the transmission line with sufficient
5 margin so that they detect faults anywhere on the transmission line. The blocking functions are used to
6 detect faults that are not on the protected line but the remote tripping functions are capable of detecting.
7 The blocking functions are, therefore, set to reach further behind the terminal than the tripping function at
8 the remote terminal reaches.
9 A blocking function operates and keys its transmitter to send a blocking signal to the remote terminal if
10 there is a fault on the bus side of the relay. Receipt of the blocking signal from the remote terminal applied
11 to the comparator AND gate produces a low output from the AND gatecomparator; the circuit breaker,
12 therefore, is restrained from tripping. A coordinating timer TL1 is required to allow time for a blocking
13 signal to be received from the remote terminal. It is set to compensate for channel time, signal propagation
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1 time, and for any difference in operating time that might result if the remote blocking function is slower
2 than the local tripping function.
3 One or more tripping functions operate when there is a fault on the transmission line. The outputs of the
4 carrier tripping functions, which could be any of the forward pilot elements, are applied to the AND
5 gatetheir respective AND gatescomparators (ANDs). The blocking functions do not operate because the
6 fault is not ouintside the protection zone and no transmitter is keyed. The AND gatescomparators at both
7 terminals now produce outputs that allow the TL1 at each terminal to time out and then initiate tripping.
8 The coordination problems between the blocking function at one terminal and the tripping function at the
9 remote terminal is reduced if both functions operate on the same principle ensuring that the blocking
10 function is at least as fast and sensitive as, or faster and more sensitive than, the tripping function that is
11 further away from the fault. Some directional comparison blocking schemes use a non-directional element
12 to start the carrier block signal, particularly for ground faults, and then use a forward directional element to
13 stop (or squelch) the carrier block signal. This allows faster tripping by setting timer TL1 shorter because
14 non-directional elements are usually faster than directional elements. A paper by Tucker, W., et. al.,
15 [B108] discusses issues applicable when using dissimilar relays.
16 This scheme is very dependable because it operates for faults anywhere on the protected line even if the
17 communication channel is out of service. But, it lacks security because it over-reaches and trips for fault
18 beyond the remote terminal if the communication channel is not working. This scheme does not require
19 breaker 52b switch keying, or any other means of switch keying, when the remote breaker is open to permit
20 tripping for faults anywhere on the line. It provides high-speed tripping (dependent on coordinating time
21 delay) for most source and line conditions. However, it may not trip the terminals of the transmission line
22 connected to a weak source if the fault levels are below the sensitivity of the tripping relays. Because a
23 communication channel is required to be keyed only during external faults, there is no way to monitor the
24 channel continuously. A channel check-back system is, therefore, used if it is desired to check the channel
25 on a periodic basis. The RO functions can be used to drive timers so that time-delayed backup tripping can
26 be provided for faults within reach of the RO functions.
27 6.2.4.6 Directional comparison unblocking
28 When power line carrier is used as the communication medium with a permissive over-reaching directional
29 comparison scheme, the possibility exists that the carrier signal may be attenuated or may not be received
30 as a result of a fault on the line. If this occurs, tripping is not permitted because the permissive signal has
31 not been received. To overcome this possibility, unblocking logic can be provided in the receiver. When the
32 signal is lost, the unblocking logic will produce a permissive signal from the receiver that will last for a
33 short period of time (typically 150–300 ms).
34 If the signal loss is due to a fault, at least one of the RO permissive trip functions will be picked up. Thus,
35 tripping will be initiated when the unblocking output is produced. If none of the permissive trip functions
36 are picked up, the channel locks itself out 150–300 ms after the signal is lost and will stay locked until the
37 GUARD signal returns for a preset amount of time.
38 6.2.4.7 Hybrid schemes (with echo logic)Directional comparison hybrid (unblocking

39 scheme with echo logic)
40 The directional comparison hybrid permissive schemes uses both tripping and blocking functions. Phase
41 distance functions are used almost exclusively for detecting multiphase faults. Ground distance functions or
42 directional ground overcurrent functions are used for detecting ground faults. The communication channel
43 is keyed by the RO functions or by the receipt of a permissive signal from the remote terminal, with no
44 concurrent output of the blocking functions (B) at the local terminal. The latter method of keying is referred
45 to as “channel repeat” or “echo” keying. Simplified logic for the hybrid scheme is shown in Figure
46 54Figure 54Figure 48. . See clause 6.2.4.8 for more detailed discussion on echo logic.
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1
RO B Field Code Changed
B RO
TRIP TRIP
CB 1 CB 2
TL1 TL1
RO C C RO
AND 0 0 AND
RCVR RCVR
OR XMTR XMTR OR
B AND AND B
RO – overreaching trip functions, must be set to reach beyond remote end of line.
B – blocking functions, must be set to reach beyond overreaching trip functions at remote end of line.
2
3 Figure 54 —Hybrid Permissive scheme (with echo logic)Directional comparison hybrid
4 scheme
5 NOTE—The local circuit breaker tripping is supervised by an under-voltage relay.
6 For an internal fault that is detected by the RO functions at each terminal of the line, the scheme works just
7 like a POTT scheme described in clause 6.2.4.3. or DCUB scheme described in clause 6.2.4.6. The RO
8 functions key their respective transmitters and initiate tripping when the permissive signal is received from
9 the remote terminal.
10 This scheme, unlike the POTT normal permissive scheme, initiates a trip when only one terminal detects
11 the fault. This is done by using the echo circuit. For example, consider a fault on the line that is detected by
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1 the RO function at terminal 1 only (Breaker 2 might be open, or the source at terminal 2 might be very
2 weak; details on tripping at this weak infeed terminal are discussed in clause 6.2.4.85. The RO functions at
3 terminal 1 detect the fault and send a permissive signal to terminal 2; the transmitter is keyed by the receipt
4 of the permissive signal, and circuit breaker 2 is tripped because the blocking relay elements have not
5 operated. The hybrid permissive scheme, in this respect, works in a similar manner as the a blocking
6 scheme.
7 One or more of the RO functions operate and key the respective transmitter to the permissive frequency for
8 an external fault. Receipt of the permissive signal does not cause tripping at the remaining terminals
9 because the RO functions at those terminals do not operate. The received permissive signal is not repeated
10 because one or more of the blocking functions operated to block the repeat.
11 6.2.4.8 Weak infeed and echo logic used in hybrid permissive schemes Comment [DGL1]: Change to 6.2.4.8 ???
12
13 6.2.5 Weak infeed and echo logic Comment [DGL2]: Change to 6.2.4.8 ???
14 The logic shown in Figure 49 55 illustrates one method for initiating tripping at a terminal of the
15 transmission line connected to a weak or open source. The logic shown outside the dashed box represents
16 the conventional logic used in POTT and directional comparison unblocking schemes. The logic shown
17 inside the dashed box represents the supplemental weak infeed tripping and echo keying logic. Weak infeed
18 tripping logic requires echo keying logic to echo a permissive TRIP or unblocking signal back to the strong
19 source terminal and reverse blocking elements to block echo for an external fault.
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1
21 (forward) Field Code Changed
OR 1 KEY
67 (forward)
Permissive Trip AND 1 TRIP

Receive
X ECHO
21 (reverse) AND 2
OR 2 Y KEY
67 (reverse)
TL WEAK
27L AND 3 INFEED
OR 3 0 TRIP
59N or 50N
2
3 Figure 55 —Weak infeed and echo key logic
4 Echo keying logic can be used independent of the weak infeed tripping logic. For example, echo keying
5 logic may be used at either line terminal as an alternative to 52b open-breaker keying; or it may be used at a
6 weak infeed source terminal simply to speed tripping at the strong source terminal, where sequential
7 tripping would occur at the weak terminal after the strong source is removed. The weak infeed terminal
8 source, as the term implies, is too weak to supply sufficient fault current to operate conventional distance or
9 directional overcurrent relay elements for faults on the protected line. The remote line terminal is assumed
10 to have a sufficiently strong source to operate conventional relays. Successful sequential tripping requires
11 that the weak infeed terminal source should become sufficiently strong to permit conventional relays to
12 operate after the circuit breaker at the strong source terminal has tripped. If the weak source remains too
13 weak to operate conventional relays, then either direct transfer tripping is required from the strong source
14 terminal, or weak infeed logic is needed at the weak source terminal.
15 The weak infeed logic varies with the relay and the manufacturer of the relay. One variation of the weak
16 infeed logic is described in this clause. This logic requires additional relay elements at the weak source
17 terminal to supplement the conventional forward reaching distance and directional overcurrent relay
18 elements. A phase under-voltage relay (27L), a residual overvoltage relay (59N), or a sensitive residual
19 overcurrent relay (50N) is required to detect the occurrence of a fault. Because these elements operate for
20 internal and external faults, reverse reaching distance (21) or directional overcurrent (67) relays are needed
21 to block keying and tripping for faults on the bus side of the relay.
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1 The logic at the weak infeed terminal works as follows. None of the forward reaching relays operate but a
2 permissive trip is received from the remote terminal because of a fault on the line or a fault on the bus-side
3 of the weak infeed terminal. If the reverse reaching relays do not operate, AND2 produces an output to
4 echo key the transmitter, permitting the strong infeed terminal to trip with minimal time delay. A pickup/
5 dropout timer on the echo key output ensures that the echoed signal duration is shorter than the echo delay
6 to prevent keying signal lockup. AND2 further provides one of the inputs to AND3, which has a second
7 input provided by a drop in phase voltage (27L pickup), a rise in residual voltage (59N pickup), or the
8 presence of a small amount of zero-sequence current (50N pickup). If the output of AND3 persists for the
9 pickup time of the security timer (TL) tripping is initiated at the weak infeed terminal of the line.
10 If the fault is behind the weak infeed terminal, the reverse reaching relay elements operate to block echo
11 keying and weak infeed tripping. The reverse reaching relay elements are required for the echo keying
12 logic, even if weak infeed logic is not used.
13 In summary, the weak infeed logic TRIP output asserts when the following three conditions occur
14 simultaneously:
15 o A permissive signal is received from the strong remote terminal, indicating that a fault has been
16 detected by the forward reaching relay elements located there.
17 o There is no output from the reverse reaching relay elements at the weak infeed terminal, indicating
18 that the fault is not behind the weak terminal.
19 o There is a drop in phase voltage or neutral over-voltage is detected at the weak terminal indicating
20 that a fault exists.
21 There is no output from the reverse reaching relay elements at the weak infeed terminal, indicating that the
22 fault is not behind the weak terminal.
23 There is a drop in phase voltage or neutral over-voltage is detected at the weak terminal indicating that a
24 fault exists.
25 The following are some advantages of the weak infeed and echo keying logic:
26 Scheme dependability is improved because it permits tripping, via the echo feature, at any line
27 terminal where the fault is detected, regardless of whether the forward reaching relay elements at
28 the other terminals operate. This feature eliminates the need to continuously key the transmitter
29 when the line circuit breaker is open.
30 The scheme is secure in that it will not trip for any fault if the channel is inoperative.
31 The scheme provides logic to initiate fast tripping of the weak infeed terminals of the line thereby
32 avoiding delayed sequential tripping or no tripping.
33 6.2.4.9 Current reversal guard logic for parallel lines used with schemes with overreaching
34 elements
35 6.2.6 Current reversal guard logic for parallel lines
36 Pilot schemes may have to accommodate sequential tripping of circuit breakers for faults on one of the
37 parallel lines shown in Figure 5056. A fault on one line is seen by the relays at both ends of the faulted line
38 as well as by the relays at both ends of the unfaulted line. The fault initially appears to be behind the relays
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1 provided on the unfaulted line at Bus A but appears to be a forward fault to the relays provided on that line
2 at Bus B terminal. Circuit breaker 3 would trip first because the fault is close to this terminal of the faulted
3 line. The current flow now changes direction in the un-faultedunfaulted line causing the relays protecting
4 this line at the Bus A terminal CB 1 to see a forward fault and trip undesirably if the permissive signal is
5 still being received from the remote terminal CB 2. Most relaying systems use a current reversal guard
6 logic function, also known as transient blocking logic, to introduce time delay for stabilizing the protection
7 system during fault current reversal. This is accomplished by signal continuation in the directional
8 comparison blocking scheme. Identification of a fault as a reverse fault introduces a time-delayed reset of
9 the blocking carrier. In the case of the POTT or unblocking systems, the pilot signal is used to permit a trip.
10 A time delay is used to allow the trip functions at Bus B and the transmitted permissive signal to reset
11 through the current reversal logic circuitry. DUTT and PUTT systems do not require current reversal
12 blocking because of the the distance units that control the channel are set to reach up to 80-90 % of the line
13 only.
14
Field Code Changed
Bus A Bus B
CB 1 CB 2
VS VR
Fault
15 CB 3 CB 4
16 Figure 56 —A system with parallel lines

17
18 6.2.76.2.5 Superimposed principle relay and directional traveling wave relay
19 Principles of superimposing pre-fault and fault currents and directional traveling wave have been proposed
20 and implemented in solid-state and numerical relays. These principles are described in reference [B20].
21 6.2.8 Remote breaker operation detection scheme (loss of load)
22 Loss of load or remote-circuit-breaker operation-detection logic can be used to speed up fault clearing for
23 faults beyond the reach of the zone 1 distance relay or the instantaneous directional ground overcurrent
24 relay. This scheme is typically applied when communications for pilot relaying is not available.
25 When a fault occurs at the remote end of the protected line, zone 1 of the remote end protection operates
26 without intentional time delay. This will result in changes of the currents of the unfaulted phase(s) from
27 load current to line charging currents if the fault is other than a three-phase or three-phase-to-ground fault.
28 At the same time, the relay would see the fault current in the faulted phase(s). If this condition exists for a
29 specified time (0.5-1.0 cycle), a decision is made that the remote circuit breaker has opened. The relay then
30 operates in a similar way to a POTT scheme and trips the local circuit breaker without any additional time
31 delay. This scheme can operate incorrectly for faults on other lines if the load currents of the unfaulted
32 phases drop below the load current threshold setting. The issues to be considered should include:
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1 o Because of the principle of operation described above, the remote breaker operation detection
2 scheme will not operate for three-phase faults.
3 The remote circuit-breaker operation-detection scheme should not be considered equivalent to a pilot
4 scheme, although it offers some of the improvements of pilot schemes.
5 Tapped load on the transmission line may prevent application of this scheme.
6 The combination of load current and unbalanced fault current can cause low current in one phase, which
7 might cause this scheme to operate for a fault on an external circuit.
9 6.3 Other protection schemes
10 Several other protection schemes are being used at this time. Several schemes are described in this clause.
11 6.3.1 Power swing considerations
12 Power swing is a variation in power flow which occurs when the generator rotor angles are advancing or
13 retarding relative to each other in response to changes in load magnitude and direction, line switching, loss
14 of generation, faults, and other system disturbances. Power swings can considerably reduce the voltage at
15 the line terminals, considerably increase line currents, and slightly change frequency as measured. As a
16 result power swings can pose both security and dependability problems for many of the line protection
17 functions.
18 Elevated currents and depressed voltages can resemble fault conditions and therefore can jeopardize
19 security of distance, undervoltage and overcurrent functions. Changes in frequency can reduce accuracy of
20 polarization and directional methods that rely on memorized values of the polarizing quantities. Security of
21 some of the protection methods, such as line current differential, is not affected by power swings. Clause
22 6.3.1.2 briefly describes the need of power swing blocking for typical line protection functions.
23 During power swings many line protection functions could also experience decrease in their dependability
24 as compared with no-swing conditions. Clause 6.3.1.3 briefly describes protection dependability issues
25 during power swings.
26 Clause 6.3.1.1 lists practical methods for detecting power swings. From this perspective one distinguishes
27 between stable and unstable power swings. A power swing is considered stable if the generators do not slip
28 poles and the system reaches a new state of equilibrium, i.e. an acceptable operating condition. An unstable
29 power swing results in a generator or group of generators experiencing pole slipping, called an out of step
30 condition, for which some corrective action should be taken. One of such corrective actions associated with
31 line protection is a controlled separation of out of phase systems by tripping the connecting transmission
32 line (-s). References A conference paper (Elmore, W. A.[B24]) and a PSRC Report [B62] describe details
33 of the out of step tripping considerations.
34 Typically, a power swing relay element can be used to:
35 detect a power swing (stable or unstable) with the application to secure protection functions that
36 might be susceptible to swings (power swing blocking);
37 detect an unstable power swing with the application to separate the system by tripping the
38 transmission line (out of step tripping); and often
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1 detect a fault during a power swing with the application to de-assert the power swing block and/or
2 adjust selected line protection functions in order to re-gain some dependability for faults during the
3 power swing.
4 Typically the above elements of power swing protection (power swing blocking, out of step tripping,
5 unblocking on faults during swings) are applied in a coordinated manner considering system issues with a
6 specific system-wide objective in mind
7 6.3.1.1 Power swing detection
8 Traditional power swing detection methods respond to the rate of change of the apparent impedance are
9 described in a conference paper (Elmore, W. A [B24]) and a PSRC Report and [B62]. Faults result in
10 sudden changes of the impedance while swings change the apparent impedance at a relatively lower rate.
11 Often, only the positive-sequence apparent impedance is monitored by the power swing elements.
12 The rate of impedance change can be monitored by measuring the amount of time the impedance spends in
13 pre-defined areas of the impedance plane.
14 These areas can be shaped as circular, rectangular or resistive blinders [B62]. In any case the most outer
15 region used for swing detection should not overlap with the load area, and the most inner region should
16 safely encompass the operating zone of the protection functions that use the power swing block signal for
17 security. For this reason, the concentric circular shapes better suit applications with mho distance functions
18 and the rectangular shapes allow better coordination with quadrilateral distance functions. The resistive
19 blinder method does not limit the swing detection regions along the reactance axis and for this reason it
20 may be considered easier to apply.
21 The methods based on the pre-defined areas of the impedance plane can operate in two or three steps. A
22 two-step method declares a swing when the apparent impedance enters the area between the outer and inner
23 shapes and stays there for a pre-defined period of time (a single-timer method). A three-step method
24 increases security of power swing detection by requiring the impedance to enter and stay in the area
25 between the outer and middle shapes, and subsequently move and stay between the middle and inner shapes
26 (a two-timer method). In this way a more accurate detection of the persistent and slow movement of the
27 apparent impedance is accomplished.
28 Classical power swing detection methods based on the pre-defined areas on the impedance plane are
29 affected by system impedances while the power swing phenomenon itself reflects only interactions of the
30 generator rotors. This dependence complicates settings of the power swing elements. Proper application of
31 the power swing elements requires dynamic system models with properly selected contingencies in order to
32 determine possible trajectories of the apparent impedance during swings so that the impedance shapes can
33 be set, and determining the rate of change of the impedance so that the element’s timers can be set [B62].
34 A newer method uses a continually updated dZ/dt measurement of the rate of change of impedance [B62].
35 This replaces the simplistic monitoring of the rate of change via timing in the pre-defined areas of the
36 impedance plane. The dZ/dt values between the minimum and maximum thresholds indicate a swing. High
37 values of dZ/dt point to discontinuity events such as faults, and low values of dZ/dt point switching events
38 such as faults, and low values of dZ/dt point to existing yet not cleared faults. This method is less
39 dependent on the location of the impedance trajectory during swings and less prone to false operation
40 during system faults.
41 Another new method uses a swing center voltage to detect power swings [B62][B62][B62]. Voltages and
42 currents at a line terminal allow a relatively precise estimation of a quantity proportional to the voltage at
43 the swing center (SCV). The rate of change of the SCV magnitude is a good approximation of the rate of
44 change of the relative angle between the systems. The method responds to a continually updated dSCV/dt
45 measurement.
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1 Both the dZ/dt and dSCV/dt methods allow relatively reliable detection of faults occurring during power
2 swing conditions (power swing unblocking).
3 6.3.1.2 Power swing blocking
4 Power swing blocking is applied to avoid random operation of protection elements due to power swings
5 and allow enough time for system protection to rectify the abnormal system condition. A PSRC report
6 provides more details on this subject [B64].
7 Current-only functions such as current differential and phase comparison are relatively secure during power
8 swings because during a swing the currents at all line terminals sum up to zero (neglecting charging
9 currents, CT errors and similar effects).
10 Directional comparison schemes are typically affected adversely unless they use current only elements (for
11 example, current polarized ground directional overcurrent); another option is to use elements that are more
12 immune to swings (for example, negative-sequence directional overcurrent).
13 Overcurrent and voltage functions may be jeopardized depending on their pickup and time delay settings.
14 Generally, more margins in the pickup thresholds compared with load and longer time delays make these
15 functions less prone to misoperation during power swings. Negative-sequence and zero-sequence
16 overcurrent protection functions are secure during power swings, unless an open phase condition in the
17 protected line or in vicinity, or an external fault, causes considerable current unbalance. This unbalanced
18 current is subjected to a power swing the same way a positive-sequence current is, and therefore may result
19 in misoperation of the negative-sequence or zero-sequence based functions.
20 Distance functions are affected through a combination of lower apparent impedance and memory
21 polarization, if applied as described in the book by Cook, V., [B16] and in a PSRC Report [B64].
22 Instantaneous under-reaching directly tripping zones may be affected. Instantaneous over-reaching zones
23 and reverse looking blocking zones working in directional comparison schemes may be affected as well.
24 Time delayed distance functions may be immune to swings if their time delay is long enough to ride
25 through the period of time when the apparent impedance stays inside their operating characteristics.
26 Application of power swing blocking increases the integrity of the power system. In order to avoid
27 disrupting such large integral systems under major power system disturbances beyond their design limits, it
28 is beneficial to apply proper system protection including controlled separation via out of step tripping.
29 6.3.1.3 Protection dependability during power swings
30 Power swings decrease dependability of many protection functions even if these functions are left
31 operational, or if blocked, become unblocked upon detecting a fault during a power swing. This is
32 particularly true during severe or unstable swings. When, during a line fault, the equivalent systems are
33 considerably out of phase they will feed currents toward an internal fault that are out of phase. This current
34 flow pattern can impact dependability of many protection functions.
35 In general the following issues impact dependability during power swings:
36 Directional elements may not perform well during swings. For example, during an unstable power
37 swing it is extremely challenging to detect direction of a three phase fault. Negative-sequence
38 directional elements will be affected if there is a pre-existing system unbalance (e.g. open pole).
39 Line terminal currents due to power swings may reach a value of a few times the CT nominal rating
40 and may flow considerably out of phase creating similar effects as the load current during no-swing
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1 conditions. This includes for example an infeed/outfeed effect for distance functions or extra
2 restraint for differential functions.
3 Memory polarization or usage of incremental protection quantities may cause problems - the
4 memorized values reflect positions of the equivalent sources from the past while the protected
5 system swing is changing its angular position.
6 Increasing dependability during power swings can be achieved through the combination of several items
7 summarized below and discussed in more detail in a PSRC Report [B62]:
8 Canceling the block from the power system blocking element upon detecting a fault during a power
9 swing.
10 Using negative-sequence elements to detect unbalanced faults.
11 Using phase distance elements with time delay to detect three-phase balanced faults. These
12 elements can be quadrilateral with narrow blinders to allow better time coordination for a swing
13 entering the characteristic.
14 Using non-directional distance elements with time delay to ensure detection of close-in faults,
15 particularly three-phase faults during unstable swings.
16 Application of the above measures to regain dependability during power swings may result in decreased
17 security and unintended operation for external faults.
18 In many instances the decrease in dependability is temporary. When the stable swing subsides, or when the
19 unstable swing reaches a point of the sources being in synchronism many protection functions will operate
20 within their specifications.
21 Detailed descriptions of the power swing and out-of-step protection are given in a couple of PSRC Reports
22 [B62] and [B64].
23 6.3.2 Switch onto a fault
24 Protection from switching onto a fault is provided to supplement distance protection schemes for close-in
25 three-phase faults that might not be detected because of the location of the VTs and lack of memory when a
26 transmission line is energized from a bus. This protection system becomes operational if the line circuit
27 breaker is opened. It then uses non-directional overcurrent relays that provide instantaneous tripping
28 immediately following the closing of the line circuit breaker. Sometimes, voltage level detectors are also
29 included in the scheme for increasing security and avoiding operation of the system on load pickup. These
30 protection systems are also called close into fault systems. These systems are especially necessary when
31 line-side VTs are used for distance relays. The system remains operational in a small time-window in
32 which it trips the circuit breaker if a fault is detected. The use of non-directional impedance relays has also
33 been introduced for tripping the line when switched onto a fault. Switching onto fault logic can also be
34 used to clear the line with overreaching elements when the lead breaker closes and the remote breaker is
35 still open.
36 6.3.3 Fault detector supervision
37 Fault detector supervision is used to enhance the security of a protection scheme. When used in this
38 function, the fault detector is placed in series with other protective devices trip circuits, only allowing the
39 device to operate if a fault is present on the system. It was originally used in electromechanical protection
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1 schemes to prevent relay operation on loss of voltage, inadvertent tripping during relay testing, and
2 incorrect operation during line-energization, or to enhance the seismic performance of a relay system. Since
3 fault detector supervision does increase the security of any system, it is still in common use in static and
4 microprocessor-based systems. The optimum setting is below minimum expected fault current and above
5 maximum expected load current; but the setting should always be below the minimum expected fault
6 current irrespective of the expected load current.
7 6.3.4 Remote breaker operation detection scheme (loss of load)
8 Loss of load or remote-circuit-breaker operation-detection logic can be used to speed up fault clearing for
9 faults beyond the reach of the zone 1 distance relay or the instantaneous directional ground overcurrent
10 relay. This scheme is typically applied when communications for pilot relaying is not available.
11 When a fault occurs at the remote end of the protected line, zone 1 of the remote end protection operates
12 without intentional time delay. This will result in changes of the currents of the unfaulted phase(s) from
13 load current to line charging currents if the fault is other than a three-phase or three-phase-to-ground fault.
14 At the same time, the relay would see the fault current in the faulted phase(s). If this condition exists for a
15 specified time (0.5-1.0 cycle), a decision is made that the remote circuit breaker has opened. The relay then
16 operates in a similar way to a POTT scheme and trips the local circuit breaker without any additional time
17 delay. This scheme can operate incorrectly for faults on other lines if the load currents of the unfaulted
18 phases drop below the load current threshold setting. The issues to be considered should include:
19 o Because of the principle of operation described above, the remote breaker operation detection
20 scheme will not operate for three-phase faults.
21 o The remote circuit-breaker operation-detection scheme should not be considered equivalent to a
22 pilot scheme, although it offers some of the improvements of pilot schemes.
23 o Tapped load on the transmission line may prevent application of this scheme.
24 o The combination of load current and unbalanced fault current can cause low current in one phase,
25 which might cause this scheme to operate for a fault on an external circuit.
26 6.4 Directional ground overcurrent relay polarization
27 There are several methods available to polarize directional ground overcurrent relays. These methods and
28 the issues associated with them are addressed in clauses 6.4.1 through 6.4.56.4.56.4.6. .A PSRC report
29 further discusses polarization [B67].
30 6.4.1 Zero-sequence voltage polarization
31 Some directional ground overcurrent relays determine if a fault is on the line side of the relay or on the bus
32 side of the relay by comparing the phasor relationship between the zero-sequence currents flowing in the
33 protected line (3I0) and the zero-sequence voltage (3V0) at the relay location. The zero-sequence voltage is
34 derived from the secondary voltages of VTs or capacitance voltage transformers (CVTs) by using a broken-
35 delta connection as shown in Figure 32.
36 The magnitude of the zero sequence voltage at the relay location depends on the location of the fault,
37 impedance of the zero sequence source behind the relay location, and the sequence impedances of the
38 transmission line. The zero sequence voltage at substations with large solidly-grounded transformer-banks
39 (small zero-sequence source impedance) should be checked for remote faults to ensure that an adequate
40 magnitude of 3V0 is present for proper operation of the ground directional systems. Modern ground
41 directional relays are very sensitive, so this may not present a problem unless a standing zero-sequence
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1 voltage is present due to relay voltage source inaccuracies or due to inherent imbalance of system voltages
2 caused by non-transposed lines.
3 Another method of polarization should be used if the magnitude of 3V0 is too low for some system fault
4 conditions. Refer to clauses 6.4.2 through 6.4.4 for other polarization methods which could be used.
5 An incorrect 3V0 measurement at a relay can cause incorrect operation of the ground directional relay. The
6 neutral of the VT secondary should be wired to the relay neutral and should be grounded at only one
7 location to ensure that the 3V0 measured at the relay location is correct. This issue is discussed further in
8 IEEE Standard C57.13.3™ [B107], IEEE Guide for Grounding of Instrument Transformer Secondary
9 Circuits and Cases.
10 Three issues concerning the grounding of the secondary circuit of VTs are as follows:
11 o The potentials at different locations of a ground mat are different. The 3V0 measured by the relay
12 during a ground fault would be different from the 3V0 at the secondary terminals of the VTs if the
13 neutral of the VT secondary circuits and the neutral of the voltage circuit of the relay are grounded
14 at different locations.
15 Current would flow in the neutral wire of the secondary circuit of VTs if the neutral wire is grounded at
16 more than one location. This could result in different voltages at the neutral of the VTs and neutral of the
17 voltage circuit of the relay during a ground fault.
18 A relay could measure incorrect 3V0 because of a shift in the potential of its neutral if it is not grounded or
19 it is not electrically connected to the neutral of the secondary windings of the VTs. This shift is shown as a
20 phasor diagram in Figure 51.
21 The relay establishes its own neutral and the measured 3V0 is as expressed in the following
22 equationEquation 15, if it determines the zero sequence voltage from phase voltages provided to the relay.
23 3V0 Van Vbn Vcn (15)
24 Where:
25 V0 is the zero sequence voltage

26 Vxn is the phase to neutral voltage; subscript x denotes phase a, b or c
27 This is not the same as the 3V0 determined from phase to ground voltages that can be expressed by the
28 following equation.
29 3V0 Vag Vbg Vcg (16)
30 Where:
31 Vxg is the phase to ground voltage; subscript x denotes phase a, b or c
32 This is the correct zero sequence voltage at the measurement location. It is important to appreciate that the
33 positive and negative sequence voltages are not affected by the neutral shift.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 System fault studies should be conducted to verify that adequate 3I0 flows for faults at all locations of the
2 protection zone. Also, relays should be selected with setting ranges that provide adequate sensitivity.
4
5 Figure 57 —Neutral-actual and ground shift
6 6.4.2 Zero-sequence current polarization
7 Zero-sequence current polarization is commonly applied at substations where a power transformers that can
8 provide polarizing current, Ipol, is are available. This method of polarization compares the phase angle of
9 the zero-sequence current flowing in the polarizing source (transformer neutral) with 3I0 flowing in the line.
10 This method works only if the current used for polarization flows in the same direction regardless of the
11 fault location. Figure 57Figure 57Figure 52 shows an example of polarizing sources for various power
12 transformer configurations. Only the delta-wye grounded transformer shown in Figure 57Figure 57Figure
13 52 (a) or a wye grounded/wye grounded/delta transformer shown in Figure 57Figure 57Figure 52 (e) and
14 (f)f), but using parallel neutral cts, provides inadequate ground polarizing current for lines connected to the
15 wye windings of the transformer. Current flowing in the neutral of an autotransformer is broadly also used
16 as a current polarization source. , however, there are application criteria that must be met. None of the
17 other transformer configurations shown in Figure 57Figure 57Figure 52 are suitable for using current
18 polarization because they do not always provide or allow for a ground current path. CTs within the tertiary
19 windings of autotransformers may be a suitable source of ground polarization current in many situations.
20 Guidelines for the use of tertiary winding CTs are contained in an IEEE standard IEEE Std C37.110™,
21 IEEE Standard for the Application of Current Transformers Used for Protective Relaying Purposes [B44].
22 Three-winding transformers that may be suitable for providing Ipol are also described in the book by
23 Blackburn, J. L. [B10].
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
Inadequate Field Code Changed

Adequate Source
Source
(a) Ipol (b) I=0
Inadequate Inadequate
Source Source
(c) Source may (d) Source may

be open be open
Adequate Adequate
Source Source
LOAD
(e) (f) LOAD
Inadequate
Source Inadequate
LOAD Source
Masked Masked
LOAD
by load (h)
(g) by load
Inadequate Inadequate
Source Source
Ungrounded No V0
Present in
No V0 Present Aux
Primary Voltage
in Secondary of Aux VT
(i)
(j)
1
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
2 Figure 58Figure 57 —Suitable Adequate and unsuitable Inadequate polarizing sources
3
4 Certain three-winding transformers may be suitable for providing Ipol [B10]. However, iIn some cases, the
5 relative direction of Ipol may change depending on the location of the fault. Figure 58Figure 58Figure 53
6 (a) shows the current flows for a fault at Bus C and Figure 58Figure 58Figure 53 (b) shows the current
7 flows for a fault at Bus B. The direction of the flow of current in the neutral of the autotransformer shows
8 that the current flow in the transformer neutral is not suitable as a polarizing quantity for this case. Figure
9 52 (e) and (f) also show inadequate sources, but can be made adequate by using three summed cts in each
10 phase. Studies should be conducted, therefore, to ascertain the suitability of zero-sequence current
11 polarizing sources. One of the voltageAnother polarization methods should be used if an adequate source of
12 Ipol is not available.
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1
2 Figure 59Figure 58 —Changes in polarizing source for ground fault
3 6.4.3 Negative-sequence polarization
4 Negative-sequence directional relays determine the direction of a fault from the phase angles of the phasors
5 of the negative sequence voltage, V2, and the negative sequence current in the line, I2 at the relay location.
6 The negative-sequence voltage is derived from the secondary voltages of VTs or CVTs by using a
7 negative-sequence filter in a protective relay. Untransposed transmission systems or improperly adjusted
8 relay voltage sources present an inherent negative-sequence voltage (as they present an inherent zero
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1 sequence voltage) that could be of a magnitude that may be sufficient to incorrectly polarize negative-
2 sequence directional relays. Users should routinely check the standing negative (and zero) sequence voltage
3 of VTs and CVTs during maintenance and take corrective actions if these standing voltages are sufficient to
4 cause problems for the polarizing process. Negative-sequence polarized directional relays have the
5 following several major advantages over zero-sequence polarized directional relays.:
6
7 Negative-sequence polarized relays are insensitive to zero-sequence mutual coupling associated with
8 protection of parallel transmission lines. This coupling can occasionally cause a zero-sequence polarized
9 directional relay to lose directional integrity in cases where the mutually coupled lines have a different
10 zero-sequence source at one or both ends of the line, as illustrated in Figure 57 through Figure 59..
11
12 There is often more negative-sequence current than zero-sequence current for remote ground faults with
13 high fault resistance. This allows higher sensitivity with reasonable and secure sensitivity thresholds.
14 Negative-sequence current is accurately obtained from line-to-line quantities and is not affected by zero-
15 sequence currents in the line.
16 The use of negative sequence polarizing eliminates the need to connect another source, besides the currents
17 and voltages, to the relay. The
18 Nnegative sequence polarization method works quite well in most applications. However, the level of
19 negative-sequence voltage measured at the relay terminals can be very low when the negative-sequence
20 source behind the relay terminal is strong (low negative-sequence source impedance). An exceptionally low
21 level of V2 is likely to be experienced for remote faults. Some negative-sequence directional relays use a
22 compensated negative-sequence voltage to overcome this problem.
23 There is a coupling between the positive and negative sequence networks when lines are not transposed.
24 The impact of this coupling increases when the line is heavily loaded; this could cause considerable
25 negative sequence currents to flow in the line. These currents may appear to negative sequence directional
26 relays at both terminals of the line to be currents due to an internal fault leading to undesired tripping of the
27 line.
28 6.4.4 Other polarization methods
29 Other polarization methods exist in addition to zero-sequence voltage, zero-sequence current, and negative-
30 sequence polarization. Dual polarizing is a method where the residual ground current measured at the relay
31 is polarized by both a polarizing current measured at a grounding transformer and/or the zero-sequence
32 voltage measured at the relay. This method can be advantageous because polarizing current generally
33 provides good sensitivity for remote faults, and polarizing voltage can alternately be used if the polarizing
34 current is removed from service. Negative-sequence impedance polarization, zero-sequence impedance
35 polarization, and virtual polarization are other methods that are used. Finally, voltage compensation is a
36 method which provides operating current (3I 0 or 3I2) compensation to the polarizing voltage (3V0 or 3V2)
37 in instances when greater sensitivity of the polarizing quantity is necessary to detect forward faults.
38 6.4.5 Mutually coupled transmission line considerations Formatted: IEEEStds Paragraph
39 Mutual coupling between transmission lines is common in power systems and may have a significant effect
40 on the behavior of the protection systems during faults involving ground. The positive and negative-
41 sequence mutual impedances of parallel circuits are negligible; however, the zero-sequence mutual
42 couplings are usually significant and should be considered when setting relays for detecting ground faults.
43 A close-in external fault with the second circuit open and grounded at both ends, as shown in Figure 54, is
44 usually considered to evaluate the effects of mutual coupling on the protection systems applied to line A.
45 The purpose is to verify that the relays do not over-reach for this condition. If the relay over-reaches,
46 remedial action should be taken, such as the reach of the under-reaching element may be reduced. For
47 example, the settings of the instantaneous overcurrent element may be increased or the reach of the zone 1
48 ground distance relay may be reduced.
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Formatted: IEEEStds Paragraph
1
2Figure 60 —Circuit open and grounded at both ends
3 An internal single-line to ground fault very close to the remote bus with both lines in operation, as shown in
4 Figure 55, should also be considered to ensure that the over-reaching pilot element detects the fault without
5 the need for sequential tripping. This may require that the reach of the overreaching zone be increased or
6 the residual compensation factor may be increased if this adjustment is available in the relay. With the
7 increased reach of the over-reaching element, current reversal blocking, may have to be used to prevent
8 undesired operation during current reversal.
9
10Figure 61 —An internal fault near remote terminal
11 A close-in fault on the line side of the open breaker on the protection system applied to line A, shown in
12 Figure 56 should be considered as well.
13
14Figure 62 —Close-in fault near end
15 Sometimes, parallel lines have a common bus at one terminal but are connected to different buses at the
16 other terminal as shown in Figure 57. A fault close to the end of the mutually coupled section on the line
17 whose circuit breaker is open should be considered for evaluating the impact of mutual coupling on ground
18 fault protection systems. This also applies to mutually coupled lines that are not connected to a common
19 bus at either terminal as shown in Figure 58.
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1
2Figure 63 —Mutually coupled lines with one common bus
3
4Figure 64 —Mutually coupled lines without a common bus
5 Two transmission lines that operate at different voltages and have different zero sequence current sources
6 are mutually coupled sometimes as shown in Figure 59. The effect of ground faults on the higher voltage
7 line can be the determining factor for the setting of relays for ground fault protection of the healthy lower
8 voltage line. The setting calculations for the ground fault protection system should be based on t he
9 maximum external fault current that can be different from the remote-bus-fault current for mutually
10 coupled lines. Faults at the end of the mutually coupled section are often more important than the line end
11 faults for lines that are mutually coupled for a portion of their length.
12
13Figure 65 —Mutually coupled lines at different voltages and different ground source
14 Sequentially cleared faults can also cause problems in mutually coupled lines. The induced zero-sequence
15 current in an unfaulted, mutually coupled line can suddenly change direction in such cases. This sudden
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1 reversal can cause problems on schemes that use zero-sequence polarized directional ground relays without
2 current reversal logic.
3 Zero-sequence voltage reversal can also cause problems. The effect is caused by zero-sequence current in
4 an unfaulted line that is mutually coupled to a faulted line when the zero-sequence sources at the ends of
5 the faulted and unfaulted lines are not strongly tied together. The induced current in the unfaulted line can
6 cause zero-sequence voltages at each end to have opposite polarity from each other, and can cause zero-
7 sequence (current or voltage) polarized directional ground overcurrent relays at both ends of the line to
8 identify it as a fault on the protected line. This can cause undesirable tripping of the unfaulted line,
9 especially in the directional comparison schemes [B6]. Phase comparison and current differential schemes
10 are not susceptible to the problems of zero-sequence mutual effect, because any influence from this source
11 manifests itself in the form of a "through" current.
12 The following guidelines are useful to avoid incorrect operation of the ground overcurrent relays caused by
13 the mutual coupling effect.
14 o Consider using current reversal logic in directional comparison schemes if zero-sequence Formatted: IEEEStds Paragraph, No bullets
15 polarization is used for directional ground overcurrent protection. or numbering
16 Consider using negative-sequence polarized directional ground overcurrent relays, current differential Formatted: IEEEStds Paragraph
17 relays, or phase comparison pilot schemes.
18 Consider using directionally controlled instantaneous ground overcurrent relays.
19 Consider the application of relays with selectable setting groups.
20 6.4.66.4.5 Different polarization sources at the line terminals
21 Undesired tripping can occur on transmission lines protected by a directional comparison pilot scheme for
22 remote ground faults where different polarizing methods are used at the two terminals of the line as
23 described in a conference paper (Elmore, W.A. and Price, E.D [B28]). Figure 59Figure 59Figure 60 shows
24 a three bus system in which the transmission line from Bus-A to Bus-B is protected by a directional
25 comparison pilot scheme. The relay RA provided at the Bus-A terminal of the line is a protection system
26 that uses zero sequence voltage and current for directional polarization. The relay RB provided at the Bus-
27 B terminal of the line is a relay that uses negative sequence voltage and current for directional polarization.
28 Both systems would see a remote fault on the line from Bus-A to Bus-C, or the line from Bus-B to Bus-C,
29 as a fault in the forward direction on the line they protect and undesirably trip the transmission line from
30 Bus-A to Bus-B. The tripping results if the negative and zero sequence currents flowing in opposite
31 directions in the protected line and the situation appears at both terminals to be an internal fault. The root
32 cause is that different directional polarizing methods are used at the line terminals in this case.
33 This undesired tripping of a line would not occur if line and system negative and zero sequence impedances
34 are identical. Normally these impedances are not identical and, therefore, ground faults in small sections of
35 the remote system parallel to the line appear as internal faults.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
Field Code Changed
Bus A Bus B
RA I0 Polarization I2 Polarization RB
S1 S2
1Φ-G
BUS C
S3
2
3
4 Figure 59 —A single phase to ground fault and ground fault relays on an adjacent line
5 6.5 Problems associated with multi-terminal lines
6 There are two challenges in applying protection for multi-terminal lines as discussed in a PSRC Report
7 [B51]. They are:
8 Trip all terminals simultaneously for an internal fault at any location on the line with any expected
9 distribution of current.
10 Do not trip any terminal for an external fault at any location on the system with any expected distribution of
11 current.
12 These challenges are further complicated by the very large number of line configurations with varying
13 numbers of terminals, lengths of lines, and capacities of energy sources and levels of loads. The protective
14 systems that are used for two-terminal lines may be, however, adapted for use on multi-terminal lines, by
15 choosing appropriate settings or by using additional hardware or software.
16 6.5.1 Current outfeed
17 Multi-terminal lines create the possibility of a current outfeed condition. Current outfeed occurs when, due
18 to system source, load and impedance conditions, current flows out at one or more terminals of a line
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 during an internal fault. This outfeed condition may cause delay in operation or may result in sequential
2 operation of protection systems at different terminals for some types of relays and communication systems
3 used with them. It is possible that some relays and pilots may not operate at all when current outfeed
4 occurs.
5 Figure 60Figure 60Figure 61 shows an example of an outfeed condition. Distance and directional relays
6 may be affected by the outfeed current at Bus-B. Consider that the phase angles of all the impedances are
7 identical and the phase angles of all currents shown in this figure are identical as well so that the
8 calculations remain simple and straight forward.
9 The apparent impedance seen by the relay at Bus-A is 1.5 Ω due to the outfeed current at Bus-B. This
10 measured value is less than the actual impedance to the fault that is 2.0 Ω. A reverse-looking, or blocking,
11 distance or directional relay at Bus-B would “see” an internal fault as an external fault, and may prevent the
12 pilot protection from operating for this internal fault.
13
Field Code Changed
Bus A Bus C
Fault
CB A IA = 1.0 IC = 0.5 CB C
ZA = 1.0 ZC = 1.0
ZB = 0.0
IB = 0.5
IDE = 0.5
ZDE = 1.0
Actual Impedance from Bus A
to the Fault = 2.0 Ohms CB E
CB B CB D
Bus B
EA (I X ZA) + (IC X ZC)

APPARENT IMPEDANCE = = A = 1.5 Ohms
IA IA
14
15
16 Figure 60 —Current outfeed
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 6.5.2 Current infeed
2 Multi-terminal lines create the likelihood of a current infeed condition. This infeed condition may cause a
3 distance relay not to see a fault beyond the location where the infeed of current occurs until the fault is
4 isolated from the bus closest to the fault.
5 Figure 61Figure 61Figure 62 shows a condition in which there is a current infeed from Bus-B when there is
6 a fault on the line near Bus-C. Consider that the phase angles of all the impedances are identical and the
7 phase angles of all currents shown in this figure are identical as well so that the calculations remain simple
8 and straight forward.
9 A distance relay at Bus-A terminal of the line would see an apparent impedance of 3.0 ohms; this is greater
10 than the actual impedance to the fault. Current infeed has the effect of causing a distance relay to under-
11 reach for all faults beyond the location where the infeed of current occurs. The distance relay could
12 interpret an internal fault as a fault beyond the remote bus that is Bus-C in this case.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
Field Code Changed
Bus A Bus C
Fault
IA = 0.5 IC = 1.0
ZA = 1.0 ZC = 1.0
CB A CB C
ZB = 1.0
IB = 0.5
Actual Impedance from Bus A

to the Fault = 2.0 Ohms
CB B
Bus B
EA (I X ZA) + (IC X ZC)

APPARENT IMPEDANCE = = A = 3.0 Ohms
IA IA
2
3 Figure 61 —Current infeed
4 6.5.3 Relay applications on multi-terminal lines
5 This clause covers the issues that concern relay applications on multi-terminal lines, and briefly discusses
6 several communication based relay schemes to protect such lines.
7 6.5.3.1 Distance relay setting considerations
8 Multi-terminal lines cause complications in the setting of both under-reaching and over-reaching distance
9 relays. Zone 1, or under-reaching elements, should be set so as not to reach the nearest terminal without
10 considering the effects of current infeed from other terminals. This limitation may cause the application of
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 some of the zone 1 elements to be ineffective on multi-terminal lines that have two of their terminals close
2 together.
3 It might also result in a section of the line not covered under zone 1 of any relay as discussed in PSRC
4 Report [B51]. One such case is shown in Figure 62Figure 62Figure 63. The thick lines show the parts of the
5 system covered by zone 1 elements. Clearly, the highlighted section of the line becomes a “blind spot”; the
6 zones 1 relays provided at the two terminals of the line are not able to detects faults in this spot. Under-
7 reaching schemes cannot be employed for such cases. Protecting multi-terminal lines with more than three
8 terminals is usually not possible even with over-reaching elements.
9 It can become a difficult problem to protect a multi-terminal line that has more than three terminals. Zone
10 2 elements are normally set to cover those portions of the protected line that are not covered by zone 1. For
11 multi-terminal lines, this setting requires that the effects of infeed and fault resistance be considered. The
12 settings required to cover the entire protected line with some margin could be large since the infeed current
13 can be quite significant. However, if the infeed is not present or is removed by the tripping of a circuit
14 breaker, this large setting may cause the zone 2 to reach beyond the zone 1 relays protecting the lines
15 emanating from the remote bus. If this happens, it may be necessary to coordinate the zone 2 timer of the
16 three terminal line with the zone 2 timer of the remote line to maintain coordination. It is also important to
17 ensure that the large setting does not restrict the ability of the line to handle expected load.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
Field Code Changed
Bus A Bus D
CB A ZEF = 1.7 CB D
E F
ZAE = 1.7 ZDF = 0.5
ZBE = 0.3 Blind Spot

ZCF = 0.4
of 1 pu
CB B
Bus B CB C
Bus C
All Impedances are in per unit values

2
3 Figure 62 —A case of unsuitability of under-reaching distance scheme
4 Over-reaching elements that are part of a pilot scheme are normally set to detect faults on the entire
5 protected line; all current infeeds are considered in this process. The coordination with elements protecting
6 adjacent lines is not normally a problem. The load transfer capability is not an issue either in most cases. A
7 typical setting for the over-reaching functions would be at least 125% of the largest apparent impedance to
8 the remote terminals. This additional margin is important to ensure the operation of the protection system is
9 consistent and is without unnecessary delay. These are two important operational features for pilot
10 schemes.
11 The setting of zone 3 elements on multi-terminal lines is quite complex. The setting depends on the
12 protection requirements assigned to the zone 3 relay and the configurations of the stations at the remote
13 terminals of the multi-terminal line. The setting may require the consideration of the infeed within the
14 protected line, as well as any infeed that can flow into the remote terminal from other sources. Generally,
15 the effectiveness of zone 3 as remote backup protection is limited for most multi-terminal lines; this
16 requires that local backup or other forms of redundancy be applied.
17 It may be necessary to reduce the settings of over-reaching elements to allow for sequential operation if
18 infeed requires the settings of those relays to be so large that they would restrict load transfer capability of
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 the line or would result in losing coordination with protection systems on adjacent lines. Sequential
2 operation requires that all faults are detected by at least one of the terminals. The terminal that detects the
3 fault is allowed to trip, which removes its infeed contribution and allows the other terminals to detect the
4 fault and trip. This sequential operation adds significant time delays and may be unacceptable for many
5 applications.
6 6.5.3.2 Direct under-reaching transfer trip scheme
7 Refer to Clause 6.2.4.1 for discussion on two-terminal DUTT schemes. A multi-terminal application
8 follows the same principles.
9 Zone 1 relays of a direct under-reaching scheme trip the local circuit breaker and key a direct transfer trip
10 to the remote terminals. All internal faults should be seen by the zone 1 relays for this scheme to protect the
11 line. This scheme does not trip the local circuit breaker for faults near the remote terminal if the circuit
12 breaker at that terminal is open unless provisions are made to handle this situation. It is necessary for the
13 zone 1 elements to overlap in order for all faults to be cleared properly. These observations are identical to
14 the application of direct under-reaching protection systems on two terminal lines.
15 6.5.3.3 Permissive under-reaching transfer trip scheme
16 Refer to Clause 6.2.4.2 for discussion on two-terminal POTT schemes. A multi-terminal application
17 follows the same principles.Zone 1 relays trip the local circuit breaker and key a permissive trip to the
18 remote terminals. A trip is also initiated at a terminal if the zone 1 relay does not operate at that terminal
19 but trip signal keyed at the remote terminal is received and an over-reaching function operates at the local
20 terminal. It is necessary that zone 1 relay provided at one of the line terminals operate and the over -
21 reaching relays at the other terminals see the fault for this scheme to disconnect the faulted line from the
22 system.
23 6.5.3.4 Permissive over-reaching transfer trip scheme
24 The operation of the over-reaching function at a line terminal keys the permissive channel in this scheme.
25 Tripping is initiated only if the local relay detects a fault and a permissive TRIP signal is received from all
26 the remote terminals. The reach of the permissive tripping functions is set to see all internal faults for all
27 infeed conditions. This is a very secure scheme because all terminals should see the fault before tripping is
28 initiated. It may not be possible to set the over-reaching relays at one or more terminals to see all faults on
29 the line if the infeed is weak at one or more terminals or the reach is limited by the maximum load to be
30 transmitted on the line. In such cases, weak infeed logic would be a good alternative before choosing a
31 different relay scheme. Refer to 6.2.4.3 for discussion on two-terminal POTT schemes.
32 A situation can arise when POTT is applied to a multi-terminal line in which the line is energized from one
33 terminal while all other terminals are open. There is a possibility that the line may be closed into a fault.
34 The logic should ensure that each open terminal echos to all other terminals on the receipt of a permissive
35 signal; the logic should not require permission to be received from all terminals because this will not occur
36 for the reason that only one terminal has closed into the fault and all other terminals are open.
37 The permissive over-reaching transfer trip (POTT) with echo and weak-infeed tripping scheme is a
38 combination of the best features of the POTT and directional comparison blocking schemes. This
39 combination may solve some of the problems associated with pilot relaying of multi-terminal lines. As in a
40 POTT scheme, tripping is initiated when a local over-reaching relay operates and a permissive signal is
41 received from all the remote terminals. The same concerns regarding current distribution at the tap point
42 mentioned in clause 6.5.3.5 apply to POTT with echo and weak feed logic.
43 It is sometimes possible that the over-reaching relays may not be set to reach beyond all terminals for all
44 conditions because of the infeed effects or other considerations. The POTT with echo and weak-infeed
45 tripping scheme provides high-speed tripping at all terminals, even if the over-reaching relay operates at
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 only one terminal in such cases. This is accomplished via the channel repeat and weak infeed tripping logic.
2 The channel echo logic typically keys a permissive signal to the remote terminals if a permissive signal is
3 received and no local blocking function operates. The weak infeed tripping logic initiates tripping if a
4 permissive signal is received from both remote terminals and no local blocking function operates. This
5 scheme provides the security of the POTT scheme and the dependability of the directional comparison
6 blocking scheme.
7 6.5.3.5 Directional comparison blocking scheme
8 This scheme typically uses an ON-OFF type of channel that is keyed for external faults and, therefore, this
9 scheme uses the blocking functions at all terminals. Tripping is initiated if a local over-reaching distance
10 relay operates, and a blocking signal is not received. Tripping is prevented at all terminals of the line if a
11 blocking function operates at any of the line terminals. The over-reaching distance functions are set to see
12 all internal faults for all infeed conditions for this scheme to initiate high-speed tripping at all terminals.
13 Sequential fault clearing occurs if at least one over-reaching distance relay sees the fault and no blocking
14 units operate, and if the remaining terminals see the fault after the remote circuit breaker opens. Refer to
15 Clause 6.2.4.5 for discussion on two-terminal DCB schemes.
16 For multi-terminal schemes,Ccurrent outfeed conditions may cause blocking of all terminals during internal
17 faults if the current outfeed exceeds the pickup of the carrier start element. For external faults, outfeed may
18 result in a current division at the tap point such that the blocking terminal may see less current than the
19 tripping terminal resulting in lack of coordination.
20 6.5.3.6 Phase comparison protection
21 Phase comparison protection of multi-terminal lines may use individual phase currents, or a composite
22 signal that is derived from the sequence components of the phase currents as the operating quantity just like
23 it is done for protecting two-terminal lines. The phase angles of the individual currents or of the composite
24 signal are compared via a communication channel. The current magnitude may be used by fault detectors to
25 improve system security. The relay currents during an external fault are approximately equal in magnitude
26 in two-terminal lines. These currents are out-of-phase for external faults and in phase for internal faults. On
27 a three-terminal line, the currents at the three relay locations may vary both in magnitude and phase angle
28 and, therefore, phase comparison is not normally a good choice for protecting multi-terminal lines.
29 6.5.3.7 Current differential protection
30 Current differential can also be applied to multi-terminal lines and is discussed in IEEE Std C37.243™,
31 [B49].
32
33 6.5.4 Transformer terminated taps
34 The effect of a transformer-terminated tap on transmission line relaying depends on the transformer
35 location with respect to the other terminals, the transformer connections, and the location of circuit breakers
36 at the transformer. If the transformer is a zero-sequence source, the resulting zero-sequence current infeed
37 should be considered when setting the remote ground distance relays or directional overcurrent relays. The
38 performance of the ground directional overcurrent relays and line differential relays should also be
39 evaluated because the presence of a zero-sequence source tends to reduce the zero-sequence voltage at the
40 line terminals.
41 6.6 Application considerations of distance relays
42 There are several application considerations that are important when distance relays are used to protect
43 transmission lines. Five major concerns are discussed in clauses 6.6.1 through 6.6.5.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 6.6.1 Influence of load and fault resistance on distance relays
2 Distance relays discriminate between load and fault conditions by measuring both the magnitude and angle
3 of the impedance presented to them. Figure 63Figure 63Figure 64 illustrates the importance of measuring
4 the angle, as well as the magnitude, of the impedance. The self-polarized mho relay whose characteristic is
5 shown in this figure operates if the measured impedance is inside the circle. It can be seen that a fault near
6 the end of the transmission line (even with some resistance in the fault) presents to the relay an impedance
7 with a much larger angle than the angle for a heavy load that may have the same magnitude of impedance.
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jX
Transmission Line
Impedance Locus
Fault Fault
Location Resistance
ce
an
ed
p
Im
ult
Fa
Load
Impedance
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
jX Field Code Changed
Transmission Line
Impedance Locus
Fault
Location
Fault
Resistance
e
nc
da
Load
pe
Im
Impedance
ult
Fa
1
2 Figure 63 —Effect of angle of impedance presented to a distance relay
3 The effect of the reduced angle of the load-impedance is that this impedance is outside the reach of the
4 distance relay. It is important in the application of distance relays to ensure that the impedance of the
5 maximum load (smallest impedance) presented to the relay is outside the operating characteristic with some
6 margin for security. The apparent impedance presented by loads should be considered under the smallest
7 possible power factor and the lowest possible voltage and, if applicable, under power swing conditions.
8 The mho circle increases in diameter if the impedance setting is increased; this takes the mho circle closer
9 to the load impedance. A major contributing factor to the wide area disturbance that happened in North
10 America in August 2003 is known to be the undesirable operation of over-reaching zones under system
11 stressed conditions. The follow up investigations of this major disturbance prompted the North American
12 Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to require that severe loading of the system at a reduced voltage
13 level should not result in the load impedance to encroach into the impedance characteristics of relays
14 provided to protect lines as specified in NERC Standard PRC-023 [B85][B85][B85][B81]. Several
15 methods that shape the characteristics of impedance relays to achieve this objective are described in the
16 clause 6.6.1.1.
17 Figure 63Figure 63Figure 70Figure 64 shows that as the fault resistance increases, it becomes progressively
18 more difficult to discriminate between a fault with high resistance and load. A variety of methods are used
19 to allow a distance relay to detect faults with high resistance, without operating under load conditions. It is
20 beyond the scope of this guide to discuss all these methods, but two of the most common ones are the use
21 of specially shaped characteristics and special polarization techniques described in clauses 6.6.1.1 and
22 6.6.1.2 respectively.
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1 6.6.1.1 Specially shaped characteristics
2 There are a large number of specially shaped characteristics (some of which are described in clause 6.1.3)
3 that can be used to make a distance relay more sensitive to faults with high resistance, while trying to
4 maintain insensitivity to heavy loads. The principle by which special characteristic shapes achieve this can
5 be understood by considering a quadrilateral characteristic shown in Figure 64Figure 64Figure 71Figure
6 65.
7 The impedance as seen by the relay moves along the load line as the load increases. The distance relays
8 with the mho and quadrilateral characteristics cause undesired operation if the load impedance reaches the
9 impedances represented by L and K, respectively. Figure 64Figure 64Figure 71Figure 65 also shows that
10 the quadrilateral characteristic achieves good fault resistance coverage while providing higher immunity to
11 load. The resistive reach may be decreased further for the relay with the quadrilateral characteristic to
12 reduce sensitivity to the load. However, this will cause the relay to be less sensitive to some faults inside
13 the mho operating zone with a large fault resistance.
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1
Quadrilateral
Characteristic
Zf
Mho
Characteristic
K L
Load Line
A R
2
3 Figure 64 —Quadrilateral characteristic
4 Numerical relays use specially shaped load blinders or load encroachment units, based on sequence element
5 unbalances, that are both designed to allow more coverage along the resistance axis of the impedance
6 plane for faults and less resistance coverage for loads. The blinder is basically formed from an impedance
7 circle, with radius set by the user and two straight lines crossing through the origin of the impedance plane.
8 This allows the relay to cut the area of the impedance characteristic that may result in an operation under
9 maximum dynamic load conditions as shown by the cone-type blinders in Figure 65Figure 65Figure
10 72Figure 66.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 The radius of the circle is made less than the minimum dynamic load impedance and the blinder angle is
2 usually set half way between the worst case power factor angle, and the line-impedance angle as shown in
3 Figure 66Figure 65Figure 73Figure 67.
4
OPERATE
RESTRAIN
R
RESTRAIN
OPERATE
5
6 Figure 65 —Cone type load blinder
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
jX
Field Code Changed
RESTRAIN
ocus
edance L
Blinder
OPERATE angle
Line Imp
Blinder
Load area
Blinder impedance
R
setting
2
3 Figure 66 —Blinder to avoid load encroachment trip
4 In the case of a fault on the line, it is not necessary to avoid the impact of load. It is desirable if the blinder
5 is, therefore, bypassed for the faulted phase allowing the full mho characteristic to become effective as now
6 shown in Figure 687466. Also, the disabled blinder characteristic is shown on the side in dotted lines in
7 Figure 67 for reference only. The load encroachment blocking element can be bypassed if unbalance is
8 detected indicating that the system is faulted. A method can use the ratio of I2/I1 > threshold to bypass the
9 load encroachment blinders. The typical I2/I1 ratio threshold setting with this method is 10% negative
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 sequence current. Alternatively, a negative sequence overcurrent element can be used to bypass the load
2 encroachment blinder.
3 Phase under-voltage detectors are can be used to govern switching of the blinders.In the case of a fault on
4 the line, it is not necessary to avoid the impact of load. The blinder is, therefore, bypassed for the faulted
5 phase allowing the full mho characteristic to become effective; the relay characteristic now is as shown in
6 Figure 68. The expanded relay characteristic is shown in this figure. Also, the disabled blinder
7 characteristic is shown on the side in dotted lines for reference only.
8 The use of Pphase under-voltage detectors are is another method used to govern switching of the blinders.
9 When a fault occurs, the voltage is less than that experienced during normal operation of the power system.
10 Because low voltage is an indication of a fault on that phase, the protection system overrides the blinder
11 action and allows the distance zones to trip according to the entire zone shape. The under-voltage setting
12 should be lower than the lowest phase-to-neutral voltage under heavy power flow and depressed system-
13 voltage conditions. The typical maximum voltage setting is 70% of the nominal phase-to-neutral voltage.
14 This approach usually does not constrain the loadability limits of transmission lines. The benefit of
15 disabling the blinder is that the resistive coverage for faults near the relay location is higher.
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1
RESTRAIN Expanded
characteristic
Blinder
e Locus
angle
pedanc
Blinder
OPERATE
Line Im
Load Area
R
Blinder impedance
setting
2
3
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Figure 67 —Removal of load blinder for faults

2 Blinders and Lenticular lenticular characteristics are, shown in Figure 68Figure 68Figure 75Figure 69.
3 Lenticular characteristics have also been used traditionally to allow more loadability so that blinders would
4 not be necessary.to block the operation of impedance relays due to the load-impedance encroaching into the
5 relay characteristic. The Both of these impact of using these characteristics can impact fault coverage and
6 on the coverage of fault resistance requirements should be reviewed for all aspects of their intended
7 functions.
8
9 Figure 68 —The use of blinders with a mho characteristic and a lenticular characteristic
10 6.6.1.2 Special polarization techniques
11 There are a number of polarization techniques that can be used to increase sensitivity to faults with high
12 resistance while improving directionality and retaining immunity to load in addition to the specially shaped
13 characteristics as discussed in conference paper (Giuliante, A. T , et al,[B31]). Two techniques commonly
14 used are cross polarization and memory polarization. An example of cross polarization is the use of
15 quadrature polarization for ground distance functions. The directional element is quadrature polarized when
16 A-phase relay uses A-phase current and VBCvoltageVbc voltage. Quadrature polarization is helpful under Formatted: Subscript
17 unbalanced fault conditions, such as single line-to-ground, phase-to-phase, and phase-to-phase-to-ground.
18 In order to supply a voltage for close-in three-phase faults, many relays have a type of polarization voltage
19 called memory-polarizing voltage. Memory polarization is also helpful for balanced three-phase faults. The
20 effect of both techniques is to expand the operating characteristic, as shown in Figure 69Figure 69Figure
21 70.
22 It appears from Figure 69Figure 69Figure 70 that a relay with an expanded characteristic might operate
23 under load conditions, as well as for faults behind the relay. The expanded characteristic shown in this
24 figure, however, applies for faults in the forward direction only; a different characteristic applies for faults
25 in the reverse direction. The expansion due to quadrature polarization applies to unbalanced conditions
26 only; therefore, quadrature polarization does not increase the sensitivity to balanced load impedances. The
27 expansion of the characteristic due to the quadrature polarization lasts for the duration of the fault; the
28 expansion due to memory polarization, however, lasts effectively as long as the memory polarization time
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 constant. Memory polarization does not allow operation under load conditions because load conditions are
2 steady state conditions of the power system.
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1
Fault
Location
Fault
Resistance
e
nc
da
pe
Im
ult
Fa
e
danc
Impe
Load
Expanded Characteristic due to

Quadrature or Memory Polarization
2
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Figure 69 —Expanded mho characteristic due to polarization techniques
2 6.6.1.3 Influence of combined effect of load and fault resistance on an impedance

3 measurement
4 Operation of a distance relay may be significantly influenced by the combined effect of load and fault
5 resistance. The distance relay may operate incorrectly for a forward external fault or may not operate for an
6 internal fault if the value of the fault resistance is too large. The value of the fault resistance may be
7 particularly large for ground faults that represent the majority of faults on overhead lines. Discussion in
8 clause 6.6.1 assumed that the fault resistance appears to a distance relay as a resistive component of the
9 measured impedance. This is not, however, generally true. The distance relay response to faults with fault
10 resistance depends on a relay characteristic (shape and reach in the resistive direction) and the impedance
11 measurement technique. This clause describes the impact of load and fault resistance on the impedance
12 measurement.
13 Figure 70Figure 70Figure 71 shows two power systems interconnected by a homogeneous transmission line
14 that connects Buses G and H. The two power systems are shown by their equivalent generators and source
15 impedances. The transmission line, whose impedance is ZL, is shown to have a fault through a resistance,
16 Rf.
17
Isf VGf VHf Irf Field Code Changed
Zs mZL (1-m)ZL Zr
Vs G H Vr
Rf If
18
19 Figure 70 —A single line diagram of two systems connected by a line experiencing a fault
20 The impedance ZG measured by a relay at terminal G for the fault is given by Equation 17. The voltages
21 and currents used in this discussion are phase-to-phase quantities used for phase-to-phase and phase-to-
22 phase-to-ground faults as listed:
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
VGf
ZG
I sf
mZ L u I sf R f I f
1 I sf (17)
§I ·
mZ L R f ¨¨ f ¸¸
© I sf ¹
mZ L R f k s
2 Where:
3 VGf is the voltage at bus G during the fault

4 IGfIsf is the current from bus G to the fault
5 If is the total fault current
6 ks is the ratio of If and Isf
7 ZL is the total line impedance
8 m is the distance of the fault from bus G as a fraction of the line length
9 Rf is the fault resistance
10 The ratio of the fault current, If, and the current at the relay location, Isf, describes the effect of infeed from
11 the remote terminal to the fault on the apparent impedance seen by a distance relay. Generally, the effect of
12 the remote infeed magnifies the apparent resistance of the fault, because I f is always larger than or equal to
13 Isf.
14 The effect of remote infeed does not only increase the apparent resistance of the fault, it may also change
15 the angle of the apparent fault impedance. If ks is a complex number, the fault resistance appears as an
16 impedance with a reactive component that can be inductive or capacitive depending on the argument of k s.
17 This argument is zero if the currents Isf, and If are in phase. This is the case if the infeed fault current from
18 the remote source, Irf, is either zero or is in phase with the relay current, Isf. The influence of the sign of the
19 argument of ks on the measured impedance is shown in Figure 71Figure 71Figure 72. A large value of fault
20 resistance causes the relay at terminal G to sense a fault that should be within the reach of the relay as a
21 fault outside the reach of the relay. The relay may operate incorrectly if the argument of k s is negative and
22 the fault is outside the reach in the forward direction.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
Rf for (ks) > 0
Rf for (ks) = 0
Rf for (ks) < 0
G
R
2
3 Figure 71 —Influence of remote infeed on distance measurement
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 6.6.1.4 Influence of fault resistance and load on the quadrature-polarized mho

2 characteristic
3 The impact of the combined effect of load and fault resistance on the operation of distance relays depends
4 on the relay characteristic. An example of a typical quadrature-polarized ground distance mho unit is
5 analyzed for a phase-A to ground fault to illustrate this phenomenon. The operating characteristics for load
6 and no-load cases are shown in Figure 72Figure 72Figure 73. The operating and polarizing signals for a
7 phase comparator unit that operates when the operating signal lags the polarizing signal by 90 degrees to
8 270 degrees are given by Equations18 and 19, respectively.
§ Z Z L1 ·
9 VOP VGfa ¨¨ I Gfa L 0 I Gf 0 ¸¸Z C (18)
© Z L1 ¹
10 VPOL jVGbc (19)
11 Where:
12 IGfa is the phase-a current flowing from bus G to the fault

13 IGf0 is the zero-sequence current flowing from bus G to the fault
14 VGfa is the phase-a voltage at bus G during the fault
15 VGbc is the phase-b to phase-c voltage at bus G during the fault
16 ZL0 is the zero-sequence impedance of the line from bus G to bus H
17 ZL1 is the positive-sequence impedance of the line from bus G to bus H
18 ZC is the impedance setting of the relay
19 j is the operator that advances a phasor by 90 degrees
140
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
jX H
ZC = impedance setting Field Code Changed
Z0S = offset impedance
ZC
Characteristic
with load
Characteristic
with no load
G
R
Z0S
L
2
3 Figure 72 —Influence of load on mho relay characteristic
4 The operating characteristic of the relay has an offset, represented by impedance AL GL in Figure 72Figure
5 72Figure 73. The offset impedance, Zos, can be expressed as in Equation 20.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
2d s 2 Z s 2 d s 0 Z s 0
1 Z os (20)
Z I
2d s 2 L 0 d s 2 L
Z L1 I Gf 0
2 Where:
3 ds0 is the current distribution factor in the zero-sequence network

4 ds2 is the current distribution factor in the negative-sequence network
5 IGf0 is the zero-sequence current flowing from bus G to the fault
6 IL is the load current flowing from bus G to Bus H before the occurrence of the fault
7 ZL0 is the zero-sequence impedance of the line from bus G to bus H
8 ZL1 is the positive-sequence impedance of the line from bus G to bus H
9 Zs0 is the zero-sequence impedance of the source
10 Zs2 is the negative-sequence impedance of the source
11 The distribution factors represent the ratio of the change in the current at the relay caused by the fault (fault
12 current minus the prefault load current) to the total fault current.
13 The offset characteristic increases with increase of the source impedances that adjusts the characteristic to
14 larger fault resistance. The characteristicoffset also depends on the load current, IL. In Figure 72Figure
15 78Figure 73, the no-load case (IL = 0) is compared to the load case. The characteristicoffset for the no-load
16 case is represented by the distance from point A G to point K.
17 6.6.1.5 High resistance faults
18 Fault resistance is usually small in the case of phase-to-phase faults. On the other hand, ground faults
19 usually introduce high resistance in the fault loop. The most common faults on overhead lines are ground
20 faults that are caused by flashover of an insulator. The fault loop for ground faults includes tower
21 impedance, tower footing resistance, and arc resistance. Tower footing resistance can vary from less than
22 one ohm to several hundred ohms. This is discussed in detail in clause 5.10.
23 The fault resistance may be particularly large in the case of tree contacts and conductors lying on the
24 ground. The problem with tree contacts may be reduced by appropriate maintenance of the transmission
25 lines. Distance relays cannot be set sensitive enough to detect these high-resistance faults. For this reason,
26 sensitive ground overcurrent relays are used.
27 Arc resistance depends on the magnitude of fault current and the length of the arc. The resistance is
28 inversely proportional to a function of the current-magnitude and directly proportionally to a function of the
29 arc length. Since the length of the arc varies with time due to wind and magnetic forces, it is difficult to
30 estimate the maximum length; the minimum length is sometimes assumed to be the distance between
31 conductors or from a conductor to the nearest location of the supporting structure.
32 Various references such as the books by Elmore, W. A [B26], Mason, C. R [B80][B80][B76] and by GE
33 Alstom [B87][B87][B83] give different formulas to calculate the arc resistance. The following two
34 formulas have been derived from the noted references and converted to metric units. The books by
35 Blackburn, J. L, Reference [B11] and [B26][B26][B26] gives the arc voltage of 440 V/ft for currents in
36 excess of 100 A; this leads to Equation (21).
142
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
L
1 R arc 1444 (21)
I
2 Where:
3 I is the current in the arc in amperes.

4 L is the estimated length of the arc in meters.
5 Rarc is the resistance of the arc in ohms.
6 1444 is a constant in volts per meter length of the arc
7 Reference The book by Mason, C. R., [B80][B80][B76] gives an identical equation that give arc voltage of
8 550 V/ft for currents in excess of 1000 A; This leads to Equation 22Error! Reference source not found.
9 after a conversion to metric units, where the new constant in volts per meter length of the arc is 1804.
L
10 R arc 1804 (22)
I
11 These two examples demonstrate that no exact formula exists for calculating arc resistance per m unit
12 length of the arc. This is not a severe limitation, because there is also no precise method of determining arc
13 length (outside of laboratory conditions). A conservative approach would be to make generous assumptions
14 about arc length and use a formula that gives maximum resistance for the assumed length.
15 6.6.2 Possible loss of directionality on external phase-to-phase-to-ground faults
16 Zero-sequence current compensation in the operating quantity of ground distance relays is used to allow the
17 ground distance relay to measure the positive-sequence impedance of the line from the relay location to the
18 fault. However, this zero-sequence current compensation factor can cause misoperation of the forward-
19 looking element of the unfaulted phase during an external double line-to-ground fault [B3][B3][B3]).
20 Consider the three-terminal line application shown in Figure 73Figure 79Figure 74. Although the three
21 terminal example is shown, this issue applies to two-terminal lines as well.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1
Bus B Field Code Changed
Bus A BCG
Protected Line
CB 1 CB 2 CB 3
Z1 = 6.0 86o Z0 = 18.0 76o
E1 E2
Line Tap 90% from Bus A to Bus B CB 4
Z1 = 1.0 90o CB 5 Z1 = 6.087o
Z0 = 1.0 90o Bus C Z0 = 18.0 76o

o
E1 = 67V 0o Z1 = 1.0 88 CB 6 E2 = 67V 0o
o
Z0 = 2.0 85
E3
E3 = 67V 0o
2
3 Figure 73 —External phases B and C to ground fault on a three-terminal line
4 The impedances shown in this figure are in ohms as seen by the relays and the voltages are in volts as seen
5 by the relays. The currents and voltages at Circuit Breaker 3 for the external BCG fault on Bus B are shown
6 in Table 7.
7 Table 7 —Currents and voltages at circuit breaker 3

Sequence currents and voltages Phase voltages and currents
I1=26.6 A ‫ ס‬93° IA=0.3 A ‫ ס‬-96°
I2=19.1 A ‫ ס‬-89° IB=42.5 A ‫ ס‬-13°
I0=7.8 A ‫ ס‬-81° IC=40.0 A ‫ ס‬-161°
V1=28.0 V ‫ ס‬-1.3° VAG=84.0 V ‫ ס‬-1.3°
V2=28.0 V ‫ ס‬-1.3° VBG=0.0 V ‫ ס‬0°
V0=28.0 V ‫ ס‬-1.3° VCG=0.0 V ‫ ס‬0°
8
9 The operating and polarizing signals for a typical ground-mho-distance relay can be expressed by
10 Equations 23 and 24
11 VOP I A Z R1 k0 I 0 Z R 0 VAG (23)
12 VPOL VAG (24)
13 Where:
14 IA, IB and IC are the phase A, phase B and phase C currents respectively
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 I1, I2 and I0 are the positive, negative and zero sequence currents respectively
2 VA, VB and VC are the phase A, phase B and phase C voltages respectively
3 V1, V2 and V0 are the positive, negative and zero sequence voltages respectively
4 ZR1 is the positive sequence impedance setting of the relay
5 ZR0 is the zero sequence setting of the relay
6 k0 is the zero sequence current compensation factor for the mho function (k0= ZR0/ ZR1)
7 The voltage phasors that form the operating signal for a phase-A mho-ground-distance relay (at CB3 in
8 Figure 73) are shown in Figure 74 when the positive sequence reach of the relay is set at 6 ohmsThe
9 voltage phasors that form the operating signal for a phase-A mho-ground-distance relay are shown in
10 Figure 75 when the positive sequence reach of the relay is set at 6 ohms. The polarizing signal, VPOL = 67 ‫ס‬
11 0°, is assumed to be equal to the pre-fault value of VAG. Note that the magnitude of k0I0ZR0 k0I0ZR0 is larger
12 than that of the restraint voltage VAG and, therefore, this unit will operate.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
146
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
Field Code Changed
(IAZR1) = 1.8V /-11O
Magnified View
-VAG
VPOL
k0 I0 ZR0
OPERATING SIGNAL
1
2 Figure 74 —Operating signal for external phase-B and phase-C to Ground fault on a three-
3 terminal line
4 For the conditions of this example, the positive sequence impedance reach of the function is set to only
5 100% of the positive sequence impedance of the protected line; , this This setting is unrealistically short
6 for an over-reaching distance function. The choice of the polarizing signal for the ground distance relay
7 has little effect on performance of the relay in this situation. Other means, therefore, are needed to prevent
8 incorrect operation; . for For example, a ground-directional relay may be used to supervise the mho relay.
9 Also, all three ground distance elements may be blocked from operating for multiphase faults if two or
10 more ground distance elements assert. This would then leave the phase distance elements, which do not
11 overreach on multiphase faults, to operate.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 6.6.3 Consideration of voltage transfer for distance relays
2 Voltages to distance relays may be provided from a location other than on the protected line. This
3 arrangement is not recommended but isonly sometimes used as errors could exist due to differences in
4 voltages. Bus arrangements, such as double bus or breaker-and-a-half, may use a transfer scheme that
5 switches the potential source from one bus to the other for the relays on a line. The transfer scheme may be
6 automatic or manual. Distance relays that lose their voltage source during a transfer operation should
7 remain secure during the transfer.
8 The security of the relays could be maintained by using current supervision functions, with the current level
9 detector set above load current, or by using loss of potential (LOP) logic. When relying on LOP logic, the
10 user should ascertain that the relay logic will correctly respond to the three-phase loss of potential and
11 block tripping during a manual transfer. If an automatic transfer scheme is used, the user should also
12 ascertain the LOP logic responds correctly, remembering that a fault may have caused the low-voltage
13 initiating the transfer and the fault may or may not be in the protection zone of the relay.
14 6.6.4 Loss of voltage
15 Loss of voltage can occur due to blown VT fuse(s) and the voltage is depressed voltage due to close-in
16 faults. These issues are discussed in this clause. .
17 A PSRC Report further discusses this voltage topic [B68].
18 6.6.4.1 Loss of voltage due to a blown VT fuse
19 The voltage connections and circuits of distance relays are generally protected by fuses or circuit breakers.
20 These protective devices are connected between the VT secondary windings and the relay terminals. A fuse
21 blows or the circuit breaker opens due to a fault on the VT connections or the circuit connected to the VT.
22 Distance relays have a tendency to operate when one or more voltages are lost. The following techniques
23 are usually used to inhibit the operation of distance relays and/or give an alarm when the voltage circuit
24 becomes open circuited.
25 o Instantaneous overcurrent units set higher than load current (referred to as fault detectors) can be
26 used to prevent tripping for a blown fuse during normal load conditions if relays do not have to
27 operate on less than load current. The trip output of the overcurrent and impedance relays are
28 applied to an AND gate whose output is used to trip the circuit.
29 Measurement of voltage across each fuse can be used to prevent tripping. Under normal conditions, the Formatted: Normal
30 measuring circuit of the voltage-monitoring relay is short-circuited by the fuse and is not energized. A
31 voltage across the input circuits of the voltage-monitoring relay appears when one or more fuses are
32 removed or are blown; the relay operates and prevents tripping.
33 Voltage supervision can also be accomplished by using sequence voltages and currents. Negative and zero-
34 sequence voltages and currents are measured at the distance relay terminals. The distance protection is
35 blocked when negative or zero-sequence voltage is present without the presence of negative or zero-
36 sequence current. This technique, however, does not detect the loss of all three voltages. If this is required,
37 the technique described in item a, item b or item d should be used in conjunction with this method.
38 It is also possible to identify loss of voltage on all three phases by using a separate function that monitors
39 the increase in current while the voltages collapse. In practice, the relay determines the presence of
40 superimposed currents that are changes in the current applied to the relay. These superimposed currents are
41 determined by subtracting from the present instantaneous value of the current the value of the current that
42 was observed exactly one cycle earlier. There are very little changes in currents under normal load
43 conditions and, therefore, the values of superimposed currents are very small. During a fault, the
44 superimposed currents are large and loss of voltage function is not invoked.
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 In cases where voltage circuits are protected by circuit breakers, auxiliary contacts from these circuit
2 breakers can be used to indicate the opening of the breaker and, therefore, inhibit the operation of distance
3 protection.
4 6.6.4.2 Depressed voltages due to close-in faults
5 The voltage supplied to the relay is small or even zero when a fault occurs very close to the relay location.
6 The impedance measured by the relay is zero for a fault in the forward direction as well as for a fault in the
7 reverse direction and loses its directional ability. This can be corrected by using memory action, or by
8 supplementing the applied voltage to the relay with a proportion of the voltage of the healthy phase(s). This
9 latter technique is known as cross polarization [B31].
10 Cross polarization, however, is not effective if a close-in fault involves all three phases causing all three-
11 phase voltages to collapse to zero. Memory action can be applied to make a meaningful determination of
12 the direction of the fault. In memory action, the polarizing voltage is the prefault voltage of the faulted
13 phases. Most distance relays incorporate cross polarization, memory action, or both to handle close-in
14 faults.
15 Neither memory action nor cross polarization works if a line is switched on and a close-in, three-phase fault
16 exists on the line if the VTs are on the line side of the circuit breaker. Overcurrent relays are used to
17 supplement the distance relays to contend with such circumstances. This issue is also discussed in clause
18 6.3.2.
19 6.6.5 Role of directional ground overcurrent protection used in conjunction with ground
20 distance relays
21 Directional ground overcurrent protection may be applied for backup protection to impedance relays and
22 sometimes specifically to provide sensitive protection for ground faults. The inclusion of zero sequence
23 instantaneous units, within most applications of direction comparison pilot schemes, provides excellent
24 sensitivity without having to be concerned about faults beyond the protected line. However, when pilot
25 relaying is not available, the directional ground overcurrent protection setting should take into account
26 various causes for zero sequence current flow in transmission lines, such as zero-sequence currents due to
27 load and system unbalance. Setting levels should be a compromise between security against undesirable
28 trips for system unbalances and dependability of tripping all faults on the protected line.
29 The coordination of all elements that are used in a protection scheme must be checked against each other.
30 This checking is easier when only one type of element is used. However, most protection schemes use a
31 combination of definite-time and time-overcurrent functions that include both impedance and overcurrent
32 elements. The use of time-current plots can be useful to determine coordination, especially for definite-
33 time and time-overcurrent elements. However, impedance elements are not generally plotted with
34 overcurrent curves, but must be considered in overall coordination. Therefore, a secure approach would be
35 to do the following: (1.) coordinate the overcurrent elements at the local terminal with the distance
36 elements at the remote terminal, (2.) coordinate the overcurrent elements at the local terminal with the
37 overcurrent elements at the remote terminal, (3.) coordinate the distance elements at the local terminal with
38 the distance elements at the remote terminal, and (4.) coordinate the distance elements at the local terminal
39 with the overcurrent elements at the remote terminal.
40 A PSRC Report further discusses this topic [B65].
41 6.7 Relay considerations for series compensated lines
42 Series capacitors are applied to improve stability, provide better load division on parallel transmission
43 paths, reduce transmission losses, reduce voltage drop on severe system disturbances, or increase power
44 transfer capability as discussed in a Transactions paper (Jancke, G., Fahlen, N., and Nerf, O.,
45 [B69][B69][B65]. The impedance of a series capacitor usually varies between 25% and 75% of the line
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1 impedance. The capacitors may be installed at one end of the line, both ends of the line, or somewhere in
2 the middle of the line.
3 Over-voltage protection is provided on the capacitor bank. This protection consists of a parallel air gap
4 and/or a MOV [B17]. The purpose of this protection is to limit the voltage across the capacitor bank during
5 faults or excessive load currents so that the capacitors are not damaged. A bypass breaker may also be used
6 in the design for protecting the air gap and/or the MOV from prolonged exposure to excessive current
7 flows, as well as to provide flexibility to the operating personnel. Detailed information on protection of
8 series-capacitor banks is provided in IEEE Std C37.116™ [B46], IEEE Guide for Protective Relay
9 Application to Transmission-Line Series Capacitor Banks.
10 Line protection schemes should take into consideration the possibility of air gap or MOV failure,
11 unsymmetrical gap-flashing, or MOV conduction as discussed in conference papers (Alexander, G. E., et
12 al,[B1] and (Elmore, W. A., and Andersson, F., [B25]). Current differential and phase comparison
13 protection schemes generally work properly when applied to series compensated lines., Allowing for the
14 line charging currents may result in reduced sensitivity of the relay unless the relay includes features to
15 compensate for line charging currents. Since the series compensated lines are usually long and heavily
16 loaded lines, phase relationship of currents at the two terminals should be evaluated carefully for
17 determining the relay settings.
18 Special care should be taken in choosing and setting distance relays as discussed in a IEEE Transactions
19 paper [B79][B79][B75] because the impedance of the protected line is modified by the series capacitor and
20 varies depending on the state of the air gap and /or MOV conduction. However, the effects of the series
21 capacitors are not limited to the power system frequency. The effects of the series capacitors on other
22 relays in the nearby system should also be considered, even though they are not applied directly on a series
23 compensated line.
24 6.7.1 Current inversion
25 A current inversion is where the current is somewhat inverted in phase angle from where it would be
26 otherwise if the circuit was primarily inductive. This condition occurs when the current for an internal fault
27 appears to be entering at one end of the line and leaving at the other end This can happen for a fault at
28 location 2 shown in Figure 75Figure 75Figure 76 if the source reactance, XA, is less than the capacitive
29 impedance, XC. This may be an impractical condition for a bolted fault because the large fault current
30 would ensure rapid bypassing of the capacitors. However, in the case of a single-line-to-ground fault with
31 large values of fault resistance, the fault impedance can reduce the fault current below the bypass level. A
32 current inversion can affect the performance of both distance protection and phase comparison protection.
33 It is preferable, from a protection point of view, for the series capacitor size and location to be selected such
34 that XA is always larger than XC. Locating the series capacitor some distance away from the line terminal
35 reduces the probability of XA becoming less than XC.
36 Settings can overcome the issue of current inversion by setting fault detectors in distance schemes or
37 thresholds in phase comparison schemes above the expected export current level. Current differential relay
38 schemes generally have no problems as the differential current is high. Where series compensation is
39 applied to parallel lines or to back to back lines, a greater possibility for inversions exist at different fault
40 locations..
41 6.7.2 Voltage inversion
42 A voltage inversion occurs for a fault near a series capacitor when the impedance voltage from the VTs that
43 provide voltage tosupply the relay to the fault is capacitive. As a result, the voltage applied to the relay will
44 be close to 180° out-of-phase from what would be considered the "normal" position. Because distance
45 relays are designed to work on inductive systems, this voltage reversal can have an adverse effect on the
46 relay performance.
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1 Consider the system shown in Figure 75Figure 75Figure 76 (a) and assume that a distance function is
2 applied at Station A, looking toward Station B, and that its potential, V r2, is supplied from the line side of
3 the series capacitor.
4 The voltage applied to the relay for a three-phase bus fault at location 1 shown in Figure 75Figure 75Figure
5 76 (c), is the drop across the series capacitor and, consequently, is reversed in phase compared to the phase
6 normally encountered for forward faults on an inductive system. A phasor diagram for this condition, with
7 the relay reach Z greater than the capacitive reactance, X C, is shown in Figure 76Figure 76Figure 77.
8 The distance function will operate when the operating quantity (IZ - V) and the polarizing quantity are
9 substantially in phase. Many distance relays use some degree of memory polarization (shown as prefault
10 voltage, E, in Figure 76Figure 76Figure 77 as well as some degree of actual voltage at the relaying location,
11 Vr2 shown in Figure 76Figure 76Figure 77. The duration of memory polarization is normally limited to the
12 time required for an instantaneous decision as to the direction and location of the fault. It is now apparent
13 that the performance of a distance relay in the presence of voltage inversion depends on the type of
14 polarization. For instance, if a relay is polarized with memory of full prefault voltage in combination with
15 actual relay voltage, and has a finite memory time, the following two conditions should be noted.
16 o The polarizing voltage is initially in phase with the source voltage, E, if the memory voltage is
17 larger than the actual relay voltage. The distance relay will not operate in this case as long as the
18 memory voltage lasts.
19 o On the expiry of the memory time, the polarizing voltage becomes equal to the applied voltage, and
20 the distance function operates.
21 On the expiry of the memory time, the polarizing voltage becomes equal to the applied voltage, and the Formatted: No Spacing
22 distance function operates.
23 A similar condition can occur for an internal fault at location 2 shown in Figure 75Figure 75Figure 76 (b) Formatted: Font: 10 pt
24 when the relay is supplied potential Vr1 from the bus side of the series capacitors. The following two
25 conditions should again be noted.
26
27 o The polarizing voltage is initially in phase with the operating quantity (IZ - V) because of the
28 memory. For this condition, the distance function operates as long as the memory voltage lasts.
29 o After the expiry of the memory time, the polarizing voltage becomes equal to the applied voltage,
30 and the distance functions do not operate anymore.
31 The polarizing voltage is initially in phase with the operating quantity (IZ - V) because of the memory. For
32 this condition, the distance function operates as long as the memory voltage lasts.
33 After the expiry of the memory time, the polarizing voltage becomes equal to the applied voltage, and the
34 distance functions do not operate anymore.
35 A voltage reversal can also occur in the zero and negative-sequence networks if the net impedance, from
36 the location from where the relay receives the voltage back to the source, is capacitive. Consider the system
37 in Figure 75Figure 75Figure 76 (a). For a single line-to-ground fault at location 3, the negative and zero-
38 sequence voltages at location 2, from where the relay receives the potential are reversed if the source
39 reactance is less than the reactance of the series capacitor. Figure 75Figure 75Figure 76 (d) shows the
40 voltage profile for the negative-sequence network, assuming that XA is less than XC. A negative-sequence
41 directional function using that potential and looking toward station B would not operate correctly for this
42 condition because of the voltage reversal. The directional function can be designed with compensating
43 features to overcome the effects of voltage reversal so that the relay operates properly for these conditions.
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1 The voltage on the bus side of the capacitor is not reversed; hence, a directional function that uses the bus
2 side potential operates correctly for this condition. However, for a single line-to-ground fault at 2, the
3 potential on the bus side of the series capacitor will be reversed and, therefore, an uncompensated
4 directional function at that location will not operate properly. A relay with a compensated function,
5 however, operates correctly. The difficulties in ensuring correct response of directional functions illustrate
6 another difficulty in protecting systems where X A is less than XC, and reinforce the desirability of designing
7 the capacitor application such that XA is always larger than XC.
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Field Code Changed

1 Protective Gap 3 (a)
A XA XL XB
B XA = Source
2 Impedance at A
XB = Source
Impedance at B
VA VB
XC = Capacitor
Impedance
XL = Line Impedance
Vr1 Vr2
(b)
VA VB Positive Sequence
Voltage Profile for
a 3 phase fault at 2
A Vr1 B
(c)
VA VB Positive Sequence
Voltage Profile for
Vr2 a 3 phase fault at 1
A B
(d)
Vr2 Negative Sequence
Voltage Profile for
A Vr1 V3f B a fault at 3
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1
2 Figure 75 —Voltage inversion in a series compensated line
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If
IZ
Vr2
E (pre-fault)
IZ - V
2
3 Figure 76 —Phasor diagram of the voltage inversion example
4 6.7.3 System transients
5 The fault current may include a significant transient ac component with a frequency that is determined by
6 the impedance of the series capacitors and the system inductance. The frequency of this transient is
7 generally lower than the fundamental frequency of the system, because the value of X C is less than the
8 value of total impedance to the fault. In theory, the transient could be higher than the fundamental
9 frequency fault near location 2 in Figure 75Figure 75Figure 76 if XC is greater than XA; however, the high
10 currents developed during a fault on such a system would cause operation of the series capacitor protection.
11 The bypassing of the series capacitor would preclude the higher frequencies.
12 A simple approach to setting distance relays on series compensated lines is to set them based on the
13 “compensated impedance” of the transmission line. This approach is usually too simplistic in that it deals
14 only with fundamental frequency signals and ignores the effects of the low-frequency transients. The
15 effects of low-frequency transients on the impedance measured by the distance relay are discussed in
16 conference papers (Alexander, G. E., [B1], (Elmore, W. A., and Andersson, F.,[B25], and
17 [B83][B83][B79]. In [B1], a case is presented in which the zone 1 will operate for any reach setting applied
18 to the zone 1 function. Figure 5 of [B25] shows the transient impedance plot for a compensated line. The
19 low-frequency transients of a series compensated system cause the spiraling of the impedance trajectory;
20 this spiraling, in turn, may cause the zone 1 units to over-reach. In Example I 1 of [B83][B83][B79], it is
21 shown that the zone 1 reach had to be reduced to approximately 50% of the “compensated impedance” in
22 order to prevent operation due to the low-frequency transients; thus, the setting of the zone 1 function
23 cannot be based solely on the fundamental frequency “compensated impedance” of the line. The exact
24 nature of these low-frequency transients varies with the power system and fault location. Transient tests of
25 protection systems on lines with series compensation, and on lines adjacent to series compensated lines, are
26 usually very helpful in ensuring reliable applications and settings. These transient tests should include full
27 modeling of the transmission system around the capacitor, the series capacitor, and its overvoltage
28 protection systems so that all relevant transient signals are included in the tests.
29 6.8 Single-phase tripping and Reclosing
30 In a single-phase tripping scheme, only the faulted phase of the transmission line is opened for a single
31 line-to-ground fault, while all phases are tripped for any multi-phase fault. Two ends of the transmission
32 line remain connected by two phases when a single phase to ground fault occurs and single-phase tripping
33 takes place to isolate the fault. The single pole that was tripped would typically reclose after a time delay.
34 Stability studies typically show that there is improvement in system stability and power transfer capability
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1 when single-phase tripping is applied. Detailed discussions of this subject and the various schemes used to
2 accomplish single-phase tripping are provided in a PSRC Report [B57] and IEEE Transactions paper
3 [B90][B90][B86].
4 Application of single-phase tripping requires attention to a number of details that are not considered for
5 three-phase tripping schemes, or that need special consideration for single-phase tripping. These include
6 Faulted phase selection

7 Arc deionization
8 Automatic reclose considerations
9 Pole disagreement
10 Effects of unbalanced currents
11 6.8.1 Benefits
12 De-energizing only the affected phase in case of single phase to ground faults on a line while keeping the
13 two healthy phases connected, preserves - at least partially - system topology that has several benefits.
14 Some of the benefits are as follows:
15 o System stability is generally improved by maintaining, even though at a reduced power level,
16 power transfer during the autoreclose dead time.
17 o Although the three-phase trip remains the worst stability case to be accounted for, considered
18 consideration statistically of single-phase tripping and reclosing improves system response
19 particularly under already reduced margins or pre-existing contingencies.
20 o Reclosing from a single-phase trip creates lower power surges for connected generators, and
21 reduces the negative impact on turbine shafts.
22 o Reclosing from a single-phase trip does not require checking for synchronism to ensure successful
23 re-connection of parts of the system that approach angular stability limits.
24 o Switching overvoltages are reduced when single-phase tripping and reclosing is adopted.
25 Reclosing from a single-phase trip creates lower power surges for connected generators, and reduces the
26 negative impact on turbine shafts.
27 Reclosing from a single-phase trip does not require checking for synchronism to ensure successful re-
28 connection of parts of the system that approach angular stability limits.
29 Switching overvoltages are reduced when single-phase tripping and reclosing is adopted.
30 These benefits need to be weighed against the increased complexity of single-phase tripping protection
31 applications, and capabilities of the installed circuit breakers.
32 6.8.2 Requirements
33 Single-phase tripping and reclosing applications impose extra requirements on both circuit breakers and
34 relays. Circuit breakers need to have mechanisms for implementing single-phase tripping and closing. The
35 former is achieved by having three independent trip coils and mechanisms controlled individually by the
36 tripping relays, and the latter is achieved typically by a single close coil that acts towards closing all phases
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1 that are open at the time. In addition, circuit breakers need to report their positions to the tripping relays on
2 a per phase basis for pole discrepancy protection, open phase detection and other applications.
3 Several protective functions need to accommodate the application of single-phase tripping. First, certain
4 protection functions, like ground settings, may be exposed to misoperation during single-phase-open
5 conditions, and require special treatment to avoid over-tripping. An equally important issue is that
6 protection coverage should be maintained for the two phases that remain energized during the single-phase
7 autoreclose cycle. Certain protection principles, such as directional overcurrent functions or some advanced
8 distance protection comparators, respond differently to faults superimposed on the pre-existing single-
9 phase open condition. These functions need to be designed with the single-phase tripping and reclosing
10 applications in mind.
11 The second issue is that trip commands may be issued by a number of protection functions that lack the
12 capacity to identify the affected phase / or phases. Distance functions are may not be perfect in identifying
13 the affected phase. Therefore, phase selection logic is needed for fast and reliable identification of single-
14 phase-to-ground faults.
15 The capability of the monitoring of the circuit breakers for to reclosing reclose is the third issue. Tripping
16 single-phase with no capabilities to re-close is not alloweddesirable from a long term power transfer
17 perspective, and should be converted into a three-phase trip. Alternatively or additionally, pole discrepancy
18 logic should be used to prevent prolonged single-phase open condition should the circuit breaker fail to
19 close or open one phase inadvertently.
20 The fourth issue is that several auxiliary protection and control functions need to be augmented to support
21 single-phase tripping and reclosing, such as Breaker breaker Failurefailure, Open open Phase phase
22 Detectiondetection, Loss loss of Potentialpotential, and Autoreclosing autoreclosing functions. The
23 breaker-failure and open-phase-detection functions need to identify failed breaker operations or open phase
24 conditions on a per phase basis. The single-phase versions of autoreclosure typically support elaborate
25 sequences depending on the fault type and shot count. Loss-of-potential detectors may require blocking
26 from the open-phase function to avoid spurious operation during single-phase autoreclose dead time.
27 AnotherThe fifth issue concerns the arc de-ionization and dead time. These factors need to be accounted
28 for when considering single pole tripping/ reclosing as The timing of the reclose cycle may need to be
29 lengthened to allow the arc more time to extinguish and allow the system more time to stabilize that
30 instantaneous reclosing may not allow.
31 The need for extra control issues for implementing single-phase tripping is the fifth sixth issue. Treatment
32 of the middle breaker in breaker-and-a-half applications is a good example. Assuming a second fault occurs
33 on a parallel line during single-phase open condition after tripping single-phase on the protected line,
34 control logic should be worked out between the two relays to solve the issue of tripping and reclosing the
35 middle breaker by the two protection zones that overlap at that breaker.
36 Due to the numbers and complexity of issues and requirements associated with single-phase tripping and
37 reclosing, it is strongly discouraged to apply generic line protection relays for single-phase tripping using
38 programmable logic. Instead, specialized line protection relays developed and tested for the single-phase
39 operation should be used.
40 6.8.3 Phase selection issues and techniques
41 All protection principles, except for the phase segregated line current differential and phase comparison
42 schemes, lack the ability to provide reliable phase selection. For example, phase distance comparators
43 supervising phases A-B and C-A loops may pickuppick up during a phase-A-to-ground fault pointing
44 incorrectly to a double-line-to-ground fault. This is because of the inherent mechanism of distance
45 comparators. This happens to all generic mho and quadrilateral impedance relays unless extra checks,
46 effectively in a form of phase selection, are implemented for supervising the impedance loop
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1 measurements. Sensitive ground directional functions responding to sequence quantities, such as negative-
2 sequence overcurrent, or zero-sequence wattmeter type directional relays, lack the ability to identify the
3 affected phase(-s).
4 Phase selection logic is either embedded in distance functions, or is provided as a stand-alone supervising
5 element detached from the tripping functions. In the latter case, the phase selector can be conveniently used
6 to supervise any short-circuit protection function configured to trip single phase, including advanced
7 applications such as single-phase tripping from a weak-infeed logic.
8 Phase selectors are sensitive and as fast as the protection functions. Phase selection methods tend to be
9 proprietary solutions with no single dominating approach. Phase selectors often use either symmetrical
10 components in the line currents, or incremental voltages and currents (superimposed components) to meet
11 the speed and sensitivity requirements.
12 Evolving faults impose extra requirements on phase selectors and single-phase tripping protection schemes
13 in general. Correct response under such conditions when the internal and external faults occur
14 simultaneously or near simultaneously is a technical challenge. Without communication, the remote relay
15 would indicate a multi-phase fault when simultaneous internal and external single-line-to-ground faults
16 occur and, therefore, would incorrectly trip all three phases. Pilot-aided schemes that use multiple bits for
17 communication (multiple carrier sub-channels) can solve this problem or at least improve accuracy of
18 single-phase tripping. This is accomplished by allowing the local relay to transmit some amount of extra
19 information related to the fault type in addition to the plain permission to trip.
20 6.8.4 Single-phase open condition
21 Single-phase open condition should be considered when engineering single-phase tripping applications.
22 Dependability requirements demand that tripping functions reach certain buses in either the primary or
23 backup modes when single-phase open conditions occur. For this purpose, short circuit programs used for
24 calculating the settings should include provisions for superimposing single-phase open conditions and short
25 circuits. Such requirements may be more difficult to meet compared with three-phase tripping applications.
26 Traditional distance comparators such as mho or reactance characteristics were originally devised assuming
27 no pre-existing open phase conditions. With one phase open, these protection functions may respond
28 unexpectedly to load and short circuit conditions.
29 Ground distance relay of the de-energized phase and the relays of the two associated phase-to-phase loops
30 see low voltage and/or voltage ringing due to the reactors during an open phase condition when line-side
31 VTs are used. This could result in nuisance operation of the distance functions during the dead -time used in
32 single-phase tripping and reclosing. Therefore, as a typical solution, the three impedance loops are
33 selectively blocked from the open phase detector during the single-phase open condition.
34 Significant levels of zero-sequence and negative-sequence currents are present due to the unbalanced power
35 transfer during the single-phase open conditions. The voltages measured from line-side VTs also include
36 significant zero-sequence and negative-sequence voltage components. These unbalanced voltages and
37 currents are not caused by a short circuit (a shunt unbalance) but may impair the performance of the relay
38 schemes, such as security, dependability or both, during the dead-time used in single-phase tripping and
39 reclosing schemes. The examples of protection functions affected in this manner include reactance line of
40 the quadrilateral characteristic polarized from the zero- and negative-sequence currents, explicit zero- or
41 negative-sequence directional supervision of the impedance functions, phase selector designed to respond
42 to symmetrical currents, current reversal or switch-off transient logic based on unbalanced currents.
43 Typically, distance comparators are adjusted in order to maintain secure and dependable performance
44 during single-phase autoreclosure dead time on detecting the single-phase open condition.
45 Polarization for distance functions should take into account the single-phase open condition. Regardless of
46 the location of the voltage source (line or bus side VTs) one voltage signal is acquired from the point that is
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1 isolated from the two energized conductors of the protected line. This creates inconsistent patterns between
2 voltages and currents during internal and external faults. For example during an external ground fault in the
3 phase that is tripped and yet to be reclosed, the bus voltage may become depressed with no phase current
4 measured in the open phase, but extra zero-sequence current flowing in the two energized phases. Or,
5 during three-phase external faults all three voltages may become symmetrically lowered while the currents
6 follow a pattern typical for a double-line-to-ground fault.
7 Ground directional functions such as negative- and zero-sequence directional overcurrent, or zero-sequence
8 wattmeter type, are affected by open phase condition and are usually blocked during a single-phase open
9 condition. Alternatively, their pickup levels are elevated during the open phase condition to make sure
10 these functions respond to a fault and not unbalanced load components. Another solution is to use
11 incremental (superimposed) components in the symmetrical currents and voltages during open phase
12 conditions.
13 Single-phase open condition affects operation of power swing blocking / out-of-step tripping and load
14 encroachment elements as well. These are the two other key functions that are typically based on measuring
15 the apparent impedance. Either the loop impedances (typically phase loops only) or positive-sequence
16 impedances are measured for the purpose of power swing and load encroachment detection. When using
17 phase loop measurements, two out of three loops should be inhibited because one of the currents and/or
18 voltages does not signify the actual load on the line. When using the positive-sequence impedances, the
19 impact depends on the location of the voltage source (use of bus or line side VTs). Tripping single phase
20 shifts the apparent positive-sequence impedance on the impedance plane and may affect the power swing
21 blocking / out-of-step tripping functions.
22 Transients associated with shunt reactors provided on the line-side of the circuit breakers and capacitances
23 of the line play an important role in the performance of distance relays. The discharge voltage waveform is
24 relatively slowly damped and has a frequency that is only a few Hz lower than the fundamental frequency.
25 This may create a problem for frequency measurement and tracking / compensation algorithms – a given
26 relay may track to an inaccurate frequency, which results in lower accuracy of numerical protection and
27 problems with memory polarization. Often, the ringing voltages are dynamically removed from frequency
28 calculations during single-phase open condition.
29 An open phase condition at the remote terminal is a special case to consider; this can happen due to
30 misoperation of a relay or malfunction of the circuit breaker at the remote terminal. The local relay would
31 not declare an open phase based on the local information (circuit breaker status and/or current flow) and
32 would continue to keep all impedance loops operational. This situation, when combined with a reverse
33 external fault, may lead to a false trip due to the loss of directional integrity caused by the current pattern
34 resulting from the remote open-phase. Some relay designs attempt to detect the remote open-phase
35 condition based on the locally available signals. If phase discrepancy logic is used, this potentially
36 dangerous condition is typically eliminated.
37 Detection of the open phase condition is typically accomplished by monitoring the current and/or circuit
38 breaker status. Detection of the open phase condition is typically accomplished by monitoring the current
39 and/or circuit breaker status. The former should include provision to cancel the line charging current for
40 better sensitivity and accuracy.
41 Open-phase detectors for dual-breaker terminals need to handle extra conditions. The basic logic calls for a
42 given phase to be open in both circuit breakers in order to declare this phase open for applications such as
43 loop-selective blocking of the distance functions. With one circuit breaker out of service, its position is
44 ignored and the other circuit breaker is considered only as in a single circuit-breaker configurations.
45 6.8.5 Line protection methods and single-phase trip initiation
46 Current-only phase-segregated protection methods such as line current differential and phase comparison
47 combine the tripping and phase selection capabilities. They are not affected by evolving faults and could be
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1 used directly for tripping individual phases of the circuit breakers. Mixed-mode current differential or
2 phase comparison functions require stand-alone phase selectors.
3 Distance and ground directional functions call for special treatment when used for single-phase tripping.
4 This pertains to both phase selection capabilities and security/dependability during the single phase open
5 time as described in clause 6.8.4.
6 As a rule single phase tripping is initiated only from instantaneous protection functions, such as pilot -aided
7 schemes, under-reaching zone 1, zone 1 working in a zone extension mode, or high-set overcurrent
8 functions. Rarely, single phase tripping is initiated from backup functions, over-reaching time-delayed zone
9 2 in particular. Zone 2 applications bring only marginal benefits, as the success rate is low when reclosing
10 after a prolonged fault. Reclosing after tripping in a backup mode is a problematic approach regardless if
11 single- or three-phase trip mode is implemented.
12 With sensitive current-based or voltage-aided phase selectors it is possible to initiate single-phase tripping
13 from weak-infeed protection schemes, i.e. effectively using voltage symptoms for tripping with the
14 assistance of a communication scheme. Single-phase trip commands are supervised by monitoring the
15 capacity of the circuit breaker to close. If the breaker is not capable to re-close, single-phase trip requests
16 are converted into three-phase trip commands.
17 6.8.6 Autoreclose initiation
18 Single-phase autoreclosing in addition to three-phase autoreclosing is used to improve the chances of

19 successful reclosures following single- and multiphase faults as well as evolving faults.
20 A typical autoreclosing scheme supports multiple operating modes which control the behavior of the
21 scheme in the following:
22 initiating a single-phase or three-phase operation,

23 responding to an evolving fault during the single-phase dead time by tripping three phases or
24 locking out,
25 dynamically adjusting timers depending on the fault type and shot count, etc.
26 The following issues review the single-phase and three-phase autoreclosing options.:
27 o Different dead times are required for single-phase and three-phase autoreclosing schemes.
28 o Typically single-phase trips call for longer times because the capacitive coupling of the two
29 energized phases with the faulted phase keep feeding the arc making it more difficult for the air at
30 the fault location to de-ionize.
31 A typical single-phase autoreclosing scheme, for single phase faults, trips the faulted phase but then trips
32 all three phases and locks out if the fault evolves to multi-phase or if a second fault occurs before the
33 reclose cycle is complete. Some utilities may choose to trip three phase but continue with the reclose
34 schedule once the second fault occurs. If for some multi multi-phase faults, reclosing is desired, then for
35 those faults the scheme trips three phases and continues with the reclose schedule when the second fault
36 occurs during the dead time used in the scheme. The selected option depends on the protection philosophy
37 of the utility. The timers usually are adjusted to account for the occurrence of the second fault if the option
38 of continuing the autoreclosing procedure is selected.
39
40 In breaker-and-a-half and ring bus applications, the middle breaker between two adjacent lines zones
41 should be treated carefully. It may happen that a circuit breaker is ordered to open a phase following a fault
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1 on one of the lines. A single-phase fault may occur on another line before the autoreclose sequence is
2 completed. The second fault may call for the circuit breaker to trip a different phase now. This would cause
3 the problem of when the tripped phases should be closed because only one control is available for closing
4 all three phases of the circuit breaker. As a result a convenient solution is to trip all three phases of the
5 middle circuit breaker when the second single-phase trip command is placed and re-close this circuit
6 breaker after successful autoreclosing sequence is finished on both lines.
7
8 Single-phase autoreclosing does not require checking for synchronism of the systems connected to the two
9 terminals of the line. High-speed autoreclosing may also be done without performing a synchrocheck.
10 Delayed three-phase trip and reclose procedures usually require synchrocheck supervision.
11
12 The single-phase autoreclosing scheme may be configured to use a pre-selected terminal to test the line.
13 The second terminal would check line-side voltage before reclosing. A three-phase trip is initiated and the
14 autoreclosing is locked out if the voltage does not recover within the set phase-discrepancy timer.
15
16 In general, a variety of operating modes and philosophies could be used for reclosing after single-phase
17 tripping. The schemes are complex and should be carefully studied before they are applied.
18 6.8.7 Breaker failure consideration
19 Breaker failure functions need to be specially designed to support single-phase tripping operations. The
20 following are some of the important features of breaker failure schemes. IEEE Std. C37.119™ [B47]
21 provides discussion on this topic.
22 o Independent initiating signals and timers are needed for each phase of the circuit breaker.
23 The neutral current often monitored in three-phase breaker-failure schemes should not be used in single-
24 phase breaker failure schemes. It is preferable to monitor all three currents independently.
25 The circuit breaker status information for each phase should be provided independently for each phase.
26 The re-trip function, if integrated with the breaker-failure function to avoid an inadvertent clearance of
27 large breaker fail zones, should be provided on a per phase basis.
28 Failure of a circuit breaker to trip when called for, even if detected for a single-phase trip and reclose
29 operation during an already activated single-phase autoreclosing procedure, should be executed as a three-
30 phase trip for the circuit breakers surrounding the failed circuit breaker.
31 It is always a prudent approach to apply phase discrepancy logic, particularly for circuit breakers that can
32 be controlled from two adjacent zones each potentially tripping and reclosing one of the three phases. A
33 typical scheme monitors the circuit breaker and trips all three phases after the expiration of a set time upon
34 detecting phase discrepancy indicating that all phases did not close.
35 6.8.8 Single-phase tripping and reclosing logic
36 Single-phase tripping and reclosing requires careful coordination of numerous functions in a multi-function
37 scheme, such as tripping elements, phase selection, autoreclosure, open-phase detection and circuit breaker
38 failure. The trip/close logic becomes more complex as well. Therefore typical single-phase tripping relays
39 support a pre-defined logic to initiate, coordinate and execute the fine tuned steps of single-phase tripping.
40 6.9 Application of distance relays to short lines
41 The problems associated with the use of distance relays for protecting short lines can be attributed to the
42 low voltages available to the distance relay for faults on the line [B2] and [B67] when the source-
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1 impedance to line-impedance ratio (SIR) is high. A conference paper (Alexander, G. E., [B2]) and a PSRC
2 Report [B71] further discuss this topic.
3 6.9.1 Source-to-line impedance ratio
4 For a detailed discussion of SIR, rRefer to Clause 5.1, that discusses SIR in detail.
5 6.9.2 Speed of operation
6 Figure 77Figure 77Figure 78 shows operating speed versus fault location for different SIRs of a typical
7 distance relay. This figure shows that the concept that operating speed of a relay becomes slower as the
8 SIR increases. Slower speed could make the application of distance relays un-acceptable because of power
9 system stability considerations. The latter would be a problem if the duration for which the memory circuit
10 is effective becomes shorter than the relay operating time; for example a line protection relay could operate
11 for faults on the bus side of the relay.
12
13 Figure 77 —The concept of operating time as a function of fault location
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1 6.9.3 Directional integrity
2 The directional integrity of distance relays when the system voltage is depressed depends on the duration of
3 the memory circuit; this duration is typically a few cycles of the fundamental frequency. Decreased voltage
4 reduces the operating speed of the relay and it is possible that the memory circuit action may expire before
5 the relay operates.
6 There are other causes for the reduction of the speed of operation of the relay. Some distance relay
7 determine the direction of the fault by comparing the phase angles of the operating quantity, say (IZ – V),
8 and the polarizing quantity, Vpol. These relays could operate for a close-in three-phase fault just behind the
9 relay if the phase of the polarizing voltage reverses because of the VT transients during this zero -voltage
10 fault if no memory action is used.
11 6.9.4 Transient over/under-reach
12 A small value of IZ compared to transient voltage of the CVT for a fault at the limit of relay reach could
13 cause the relay to under-reach (if the CVT output is higher than it should be for a short duration) or over-
14 reach (if the CVT output is lower than it should be for a short duration). An obvious solution to the under-
15 reaching problem is to set the over-reaching distance element significantly beyond the protected line in
16 pilot schemes. This would increase the operating quantity and thus improve the reliability and speed of the
17 distance-based scheme. Care should be taken to ensure that this extended setting does not cause the relay to
18 operate under heavy load conditions. One solution to the over-reach problem is to shorten the zone 1 reach
19 of the relays and provide adequate margin for CVT transient voltage. However, many solid state and
20 computer-based relays incorporate filters and logic that reduce this problem in most cases.
21 6.9.5 Minimum settings of distance relays
22 The problem of low settings of line distance relays is that for lines that are very short or have a high SIR,
23 available fault current and voltage at the relay location may not provide adequate operating margins. All
24 distance relays have minimum settings criteria that should be met for proper operation. The following
25 concerns should be addressed:
26 o Impedance characteristic: Minimum fault operating currents should be known; usually, the shorter
27 the reach setting, the greater is the minimum current required for the relay to operate. The reach of
28 the relay decreases with lower relay voltages as is shown in Figure 78Figure 79Figure 79 causing
29 the relay to under-reach.
30 o Directional action: Minimum polarizing voltages should be known. Sensitivities in the range of 1%
31 of rated voltage may be required; however, at this sensitivity, incorrect operations may occur for
32 reverse faults due to the effect of voltage drop in the arc at the fault.
33 o Memory action: Memory circuits of the relay are used for low-voltage conditions by supplying a
34 prefault voltage for polarizing. This circuit may have memory action that lasts only for a few cycles
35 of the fundamental frequency.
36 o Operating time: Tripping time may vary with the distance to the fault, relay setting, fault current
37 magnitude, and the magnitude of relay voltage, prior to the fault. Usually, the lower the ratio of the
38 apparent impedance to impedance setting, the faster the operating speed of the relay, except for low
39 current conditions. Under conditions of low current, the operating speed of the relay may actually
40 decrease.
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1 o Maximum torque angle: Cable circuits may have a very small line impedance angle, especially for
2 pipe-type cables. This may require a maximum torque angle that is not available on the relay and,
3 thus, necessitate using a different maximum torque angle or use a different impedance
4 characteristic, for example use a quadrilateral relay instead of a mho relay.
5 o Continuous ampere rating: A user should be aware of the continuous operating characteristics for a
6 particular setting. It is possible for a setting to violate the continuous ampere rating, especially if
7 the relay is an electromechanical style.
8 o CT and VT errors: It is possible for a marginal setting to be unusable because of errors in the CTs
9 and VTs. CT and VT errors may further reduce the available quantities to the relay where available
10 system voltages and currents are low.
11 o Relay settings: Arc impedance should be incorporated in the settings for Zones 2 and 3 when mho
12 characteristics are used to protect the line. It may not be possible to increase the zone 1 reach
13 because of possible over-reach beyond the remote terminal, although some relays automatically
14 adapt to this need.
15 Directional action: Minimum polarizing voltages should be known. Sensitivities in the range of 1% of rated
16 voltage may be required; however, at this sensitivity, incorrect operations may occur for reverse faults due
17 to the effect of voltage drop in the arc at the fault.
18 Memory action: Memory circuits of the relay are used for low-voltage conditions by supplying a prefault
19 voltage for polarizing. This circuit may have memory action that lasts only for a few cycles of the
20 fundamental frequency.
21 Operating time: Tripping time (Figure 80) may vary with the distance to the fault, relay setting, the fault
22 current magnitude and the magnitude of relay voltage prior to the fault. Usually, lower the ratio of the
23 apparent impedance to impedance setting faster is the operating speed of the relay except for low current
24 conditions. Under conditions of low current, the operating speed of the relay may actually decrease.
25 Maximum torque angle: Cable circuits may have a very small line impedance angle, especially for pipe-
26 type cables. This may require a maximum torque angle that is not available on the relay and, thus,
27 necessitate using a different maximum torque angle or use a different impedance characteristic, for example
28 use a quadrilateral relay instead of a mho relay.
29 Continuous ampere rating: A user should be aware of the continuous operating characteristics for a
30 particular setting. It is possible for a setting to violate the continuous ampere rating, especially if the relay
31 is an electromechanical style.
32 CT and VT errors: It is possible for a marginal setting to be unusable because of errors in the CTs and VTs.
33 CT and VT errors may further reduce the available quantities to the relay where available system voltages
34 and currents are low.
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1 Relay settings: Arc impedance should be incorporated in the settings for Zones 2 and 3 when mho
2 characteristics are used to protect the line. It may not be possible to increase the zone 1 reach because of
3 possible over-reach beyond the remote terminal, although some relays automatically adapt to this need.
4
Field Code Changed
1.0
Zapparent in per unit of relay setting
5
0 Vrelay in per unit 0.1
6 Figure 78 —Apparent relay reach vs.versus relay voltage
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90% Location of Fault in

50% Percent of Relay Setting
0%
Operating Time
Irelay in per unit

2
3 Figure 79 —Variation of operating time with distance to fault
4 It may be necessary to perform fault studies under minimum conditions to confirm that the relay functions
5 properly. If the relay does not meet the minimum requirements, alternative relay schemes, such as current
6 differential, phase comparison, or pilot-wire, should be considered.
7 6.10 Relay considerations for system transients
8 6.10.1 Nature of transients
9 Sporadic dampened phenomena occur in electrical systems; these phenomena are generally described as
10 transients and surges. These two terms are synonymous and interchangeable and are referred to as
11 "transients" in this clause. A PSRC Report discusses the topic of distorted waveforms associated with
12 transients [B66].
13 Transients that may be dampened oscillatory or may be unidirectional occur when some changes take place
14 in an electrical circuit, such as the opening or closing of a switch or circuit breaker. Transients may
15 originate in the primary equipment of a power system, in the secondary control equipment, or in the
16 instrument transformers connecting the two. This clause discusses the nature of the transients, their origin
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1 and their impact on protection systems. The following types of transients are discussed in clauses 6.10.2
2 through 6.10.5.
3 Transients in the primary equipment that are converted faithfully to secondary circuits by
4 instrument transformers; these are referred to as primary transients.
5 Transients in the primary equipment that influence the secondary control wiring by inductive or
6 capacitive coupling; these are referred to as coupled transients.
7 Transients in the instrument transformers due to the nature of their performance; these are referred
8 to as instrument transformer transients.
9 Transients in the secondary equipment; these are referred to as secondary transients.
10 6.10.2 Primary transients
11 The transients in the primary equipment are in several forms, such as: dc offset, frequency transients,
12 asymmetrical breaker phase closing, and transformer inrush.
13 dc offset in current described in clause 6.10.2.1,

14 dc offset in voltage described in clause 6.10.2.2,
15 high frequency transients described in clause 6.10.2.3,
16 low frequency transients described in clause 6.10.2.4
17 asymmetrical breaker phase closing described in clause 6.10.2.5
18 transformer inrush 6.10.2.6
19 6.10.2.1 DC offset in the current
20 When a fault occurs, a dc offset may be present in the current because no instantaneous change of current
21 can occur in an inductive circuit, and because the current must lag the voltage by the power factor angle of
22 the system. The dc offset decays with a time constant equal to the L/R ratio of the system supplying the
23 fault. The magnitude of the initial offset depends on the point on wave at which the fault is initiated.
24 Figure 80Figure 80Figure 81 (a) shows a fault current initiated about 4530° before a negative peakvoltage
25 zero crossing, in a system with a time constant of 100 ms.
26 Figure 80Figure 80Figure 81 (b) shows a fault initiated at a negative current peakvoltage zero crossing, in a
27 system with a time constant of 50 ms. It can be seen that the magnitude of the symmetrical current is the
28 same, while the initial offset is larger, and the decay rate is faster than in the previous figure. This transient
29 is often referred to as “transient dc offset.”
30 Transient dc offset has the potential to cause over-reach of instantaneous line protection systems. However,
31 the phenomenon is well understood, and modern line protection systems are usually designed to effectively
32 reject the dc component. Otherwise, the manufacturer should be able to provide application instructions to
33 accommodate its presence by choosing suitable settings. Transient dc offset can also cause transient
34 saturation of CTs; this is discussed further in clause 6.10.2.4.
35 6.10.2.2 DC offset in the voltage
36 The voltage applied to a line relay may contain a decaying dc component if the source and line impedances
37 have different L/R ratios. Examples of applications where this effect might be present include a resistance-
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1 grounded system supplying overhead lines, or a source comprised composed of overhead lines supplying a
2 cable circuit. This dc offset may have some effect on the accuracy of the reach of distance relays, and
3 should be discussed with the relay manufacturer in cases where significant dc offset in the voltage is a
4 possibility.
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2.0 Field Code Changed

1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.1 0.2
-0.5
Time (s)
-1.0
-1.5
Voltage (V) Current (A)
-2.0
(a) Partial offset, T = 100ms
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
0.1 0.2
-0.5
Time (s)
-1.0
-1.5
Voltage (V) Current (A)
-2.0
(b) Full offset, T = 50ms

1
2 Figure 80 —DC offset in current: (a) half offset, T = 100 ms; (b) full offset, T = 50 ms
3 6.10.2.3 High-frequency transients
4 These types of transients accompany the energization or short circuit of components containing shunt
5 capacitance, such as transmission lines, cables, and shunt capacitor banks. These transients are usually in
6 the kilohertz region and can be removed easily by using filters to ensure that they do not impact on the
7 performance of protection systems. However, the frequency of the transients may approach a few multiples
8 of the fundamental frequency during disturbances on long EHV and UHV lines and may be more difficult
9 to filter out. The filtering causes a delay in the operation of protection systems and, in some cases the delay
10 may be significant. Protection systems designed for high-speed operation usually incorporate special
11 designs that reduce the effect of filter delays as discussed in an IEEE Transactions paper [B86][B86][B82]
12 and a Canadian Journal article [B91][B91][B87].
13 6.10.2.4 Low-frequency transients
14 Transients with a frequency lower than the fundamental frequency of the power system may result from the
15 effects of series capacitors (more details are given in 6.7) and shunt reactors. Transients that contain
16 frequencies of the same order of magnitude as fundamental frequency may also occur in systems with high-
17 voltage cables. Low-frequency transients may require that special filters be used in the protection systems
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1 used in those applications as discussed in an IEEE Transactions paper [B86][B86][B82] and a Canadian
2 Journal article [B91][B91][B87].
3 Generator rotor angle oscillations also cause low-frequency transients that may affect protection systems.
4
5 6.10.2.5 Asymmetrical breaker phase closing
6 Asymmetrical closing of circuit breakers may be a result of unavoidable differences in operating time, or as
7 a deliberate effort to reduce the effects of switching transients. The period of asymmetry is itself a transient
8 unbalance with fundamental frequency. If the asymmetry exists for an appreciable portion of the operating
9 time of the protection system, the series unbalance may appear as an unbalanced short circuit as discussed
10 in an IEEE Transactions paper [B8]. This is of particular concern when the asymmetry happens on a circuit
11 breaker that is closing the second terminal of a transmission line to pick up load, since the unbala nce
12 current may be sufficient to pick up sensitive ground overcurrent relays. Systems used to protect
13 transmission lines should be designed to accommodate the maximum expected unbalances.
14 6.10.2.6 Transformer inrush
15 Inrush currents flowing into transformers connected as taps on transmission lines contain currents of the
16 fundamental frequency. These currents are usually lower in magnitude than the fundamental frequency
17 currents due to a fault on the LV terminals of the transformer. Therefore, if the line protection system is
18 able to remain secure for such faults, the transients would not normally result in undesirable operation of
19 the line protection system. If the transformer inrush currents contain significant amounts of negative or
20 zero-sequence currents, they may cause undesired operation of sensitive overcurrent relays intended to
21 detect high-resistance ground faults. These ground overcurrent relays may have to be desensitized or
22 restrained by second harmonic components to override the transformer inrush phenomenon. Inrush currents
23 flowing in to delta connected transformer windings do not contain significant levels of zero-sequence
24 currents.
25 6.10.3 Coupled transients
26 Protection systems for transmission lines should be designed and installed to operate correctly in the
27 presence of coupled transients. IEEE Std C37.90.1™, IEEE Standard Surge Withstand Capability (SWC)
28 Tests for Protective Relays and Relay Systems describes tests that ensure a consistent degree of immunity
29 to such transients for protection systems. Transient coupling mechanisms, effects, and mitigation are
30 discussed in more detail in a book by Elmore, W. A., [B26].
31 6.10.4 Instrument transformer transients
32 Conventional line protection systems primarily use coupling capacitor VTs (capacitance voltage
33 transformers (CVT) and wire wound VTs and CTs. Applications of non-conventional instrument
34 transformers are not included in this guide.
35 Wire-wound VTs do not usually produce transients that affect protection systems. However, the secondary
36 circuit of a CVT contains inductive and capacitive components that, when subjected to a sudden change in
37 the primary voltage, introduce a dc offset component into the secondary voltage as well as a component of
38 lower than the fundamental frequency. The result of these anomalies can cause the relay to lose directional
39 integrity, over-reach, or respond slower than expected. CVT transients in general reduce the fundamental
40 component of fault voltage and can cause distance relays to calculate a smaller than actual apparent
41 impedance to the fault with potential tendency of over-reach for a zone 1 fault. The relay design may be
42 such as to reject the undesirable transients, or the manufacturer may be able to provide application
43 instructions to alleviate these effects by the choice of suitable settings. The transient performance of a CVT
44 is affected by the following factors.
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1 High or extra high capacitance CVTs, higher step down transformer ratios, and CVTs with passive
2 ferroresonance suppression circuits display a better transient response.
3 Small resistive burden, found in microprocessor relays, improves the CVT transient response if the
4 burden on the CVT is predominantly resistive and is not excessive.
5 Higher system impedance ratio (SIR) results in worse CVT transients for faults at the same
6 location.
7 Fault initiation angle influences the shape of CVT transients and the resulting transient is worse for
8 faults at a voltage zero crossing.
9 The voltage provided by a CVT to a distance relay just after the inception of a fault is less than the voltage
10 that would have been provided by an ideal voltage transformer if it were installed at the relay location. The
11 result is that the impedance calculated by a numerical relay or interpreted by a solid-state or
12 electromechanical relay is less than the correct value. Distance relays, therefore, over-reach at the inception
13 of a fault. However, the voltage output of the CVT increases to the true value in about two cycles of the
14 fundamental frequency and the impedance seen by the relay becomes close to the true value. Several
15 industry documents For a more complete discussion of discuss CVT transient response: see Conference
16 papers by Hou, D., and Roberts, J., [B34], IEEE Transactions papers [B52], [B52], [B53], [B86] and PSRC
17 Report [B60] and [B86][B86][B82].
18 CT transient saturation results in less than ideal reproduction of the primary current. This type of saturation
19 is caused by fault currents of very high magnitudes combined with high L/R ratios or currents of very-low
20 frequency (such as transient dc offset). Depending on the relay design, CT saturation may result in
21 undesirable tripping of differential protection systems, under-reach of overcurrent or distance relays, or
22 failure to operate, in extreme cases. CTs should be properly sized to produce sufficiently accurate
23 secondary currents for the required length of time so that the protection systems may operate correctly. CT
24 transient performance is discussed in more detail in [B50].
25 Figure 81Figure 81Figure 82 shows the phasors of polarizing voltage, and I FZS used in implementing a self
26 polarized mho relay for detecting a fault in its protection zone. The phase angle between the phasors of
27 VPOL and (IUZS - VPOL) is less than 90 degrees and, therefore, the relay operates. If the CT saturates, its
28 output reduces and the magnitude of the phasor representing the current is now smaller in magnitude than
29 the magnitude of the phasor when the CT does not saturate. The phase angle of the phasor also changes but
30 to a much smaller value. The phase angle between V POL and (ISZS - VPOL) now becomes greater than 90
31 degrees as is shown in Figure 81Figure 81Figure 82. The relay, therefore, does not operate for a fault in the
32 operating zone of the relay. In other words, the relay under-reaches when CT saturation occurs.
33 The impact of CT saturation is a risk of under-reaching of distance elements for faults near the relay reach
34 and a minor delay in the operation of the corresponding zone 1 element. However, as the fault location
35 approaches the relay reach on lines of moderate length, the fault current magnitude decreases which
36 reduces the chances of CT saturation. For larger reach, such as zone 2 or zone 3 elements, particularly in
37 communication-assisted schemes (POTT, DCB, etc.), CT saturation has a limited impact on the final result,
38 aside from a slight delay in the operating time of the protection system as discussed in an SEL paper
39 (Mooney, J. B. [B99][B99][B94].
40 CT transient performance is discussed in more detail in IEEE PSRC Report [B50].
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173
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
Field Code Changed

Locus of (IZs) phasor as IF Phasor representing
CT saturates fault current
VPOL Phasor representing
polarizing voltage
Zs Replica impedance
IuZs setting of the relay
Is Phasor CT output when
CT is not saturated
Iu Phasor CT output when
CT is saturated
θs
IsZs
θu
VPOL
Locus of current phasor

as CT saturates
IF
1
2 Figure 81 —Impact of CT saturation on a self-polarized mho relay
3 6.10.5 Secondary transients
4 A transient originating in the secondary equipment affects protection systems used to protect transmission
5 lines to the same extent as most other protection systems. High-magnitude, high-frequency transients can
6 be generated by the interruption of an inductive current (such as the coil of an auxiliary relay). Such
7 transients can cause incorrect operation of protection systems, or even damage them. IEEE Std C37.90.1™
8 [B31], IEEE Standard Surge Withstand Capability (SWC) Tests for Protective Relays and Relay Systems
9 describes tests that ensure a consistent degree of immunity of protection systems to such transients.
10 7. Concluding remarks
11 Several areas have been improved in this revision. Most notably:
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PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Several clauses have been revised for uniformity of style and ease of understanding the issues
2 discussed in them.
3 Enhanced fundamental discussions.
4 Better defined the technical discussion about length considerations.
5 Updated relay schemes with current technology.
6 Added Annex A that describes system studies.
7 This guide is intended to assist protection engineers and technologists in effectively applying relays and
8 protection systems to protect transmission lines.
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1 Annex A
2 (informative)
3 System Studies Needed for Setting Relays
4 A.1 Fault System studies
5 System studies are a basic calculation tool of the protective relaying engineer. There are two types of
6 studies; fault studies and special studies. Many utilities perform general fault studies annually and update
7 them when system changes occur. These are primarily planning studies. Fault studies are an essential tool
8 for relay engineers as they work toward protecting the system for all faults and abnormal conditions. The
9 special studies are conducted when relay settings are to be determined or when they are needed to support
10 system operations.Fault studies are a basic calculation tool of the protective relaying engineer. There are
11 two types of studies; general fault studies and special studies. Many utilities perform general fault studies
12 annually and update them when system changes occur. These are primarily planning studies. The special
13 studies are conducted when relay settings are to be determined or when they are needed to support system
14 operations.
15 A.1.1 General fFault study
16 Fault studies, or short circuit studies, are developed at 60 Hz from a load flow where the system was
17 linearized around an operating point. Fault studies are performed by using software packages. Preparation
18 of a general fault study is akin to the annual power flow preparation. It is used as the basis for detailed
19 studies, including screening for over-dutied breakers as well as in facility studies when generator owners
20 petition transmission owners for connection studies. Accurate fault studies depend on short circuit models
21 that are continually updated and often compared to actual system faults. For example, if single pole
22 tripping is applied, then the short circuit currents with the pole open may be required to be calculated.
23 Often the software packages include relational data bases that allow the user to catalog and control relay
24 settings. Additionally, these programs provide graphical outputs for coordination of relays including time
25 versus current curves for time overcurrent relays and impedance plots for distance relays.
26 General fault studies are performed by using software packages. Many were previously developed in-house
27 but are now conducted by using software packages that are available from numerous venders. The
28 commercially available packages include computational improvements over those that were created in-
29 house. Often the packages include relational data bases that allow the user to catalog and control relay
30 settings. Additionally, these programs provide graphical outputs for coordination of relays including time
31 versus current curves for time overcurrent relays and impedance plots for distance relays.
32 One necessary function of a fault study program is the calculation of impedances of transmission lines,
33 transformers, generators, motors, capacitor banks, etc. from system parameters. The user inputs nameplate
34 data for the equipment and engineering design data for the transmission lines. Transmission engineering
35 design data includes tower and right-of-way geometries, spacing and tower footing resistances, and often
36 conductor sag. A positive and zero sequence “lumped impedance” model is calculated for the transmission
37 line. Often the geometries vary from tower to tower. The relay engineer should input all the necessary
38 details. The most complicated calculation is the zero sequence impedance calculation. It is complicated due
39 to the mutual coupling effect of transmission lines on the same towers and to a lesser extent other
40 transmission lines on the same right-of-way. Often engineering judgment is used in arriving at the
41 “lumped” impedance parameters. Another uncertainty is often the differences in the parameters due to
42 differences between the line “as designed” and “as constructed”. Often the differences of the parameters of
43 the line “as constructed” from "as designed" are ascertained by comparing the actual fault data with the
44 data obtained from fault studies after the line goes into service. It is difficult to develop zero-sequence
45 models of high voltage cables. The fault study software may not be able to calculate the zero sequence
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1 impedance of a pipe type cable. Zero sequence impedance for pipe type cables varies with fault current
2 flowing on the pipe. Techniques have been presented that do take into account the zero sequence
3 impedance for pipe type cables as discussed in a PSRC Report [B59] and a conference paper
4 [B97][B97][B92].
5 There are also difficulties in detailed modeling of transformers in many situations. For example, it ma y not
6 be possible to calculate the zero sequence impedances of four-winding transformers and zero sequence
7 models of phase angle regulating transformers from the nameplate data. In such cases, the relay engineer is
8 required to work with the designers of the transformer to arrive at a model of a transformer for use in the
9 zero-sequence network. Generator data is usually available for an accurate model. Developing models of
10 large motors, such as synchronous motors, can be a challenge especially if the subtransient data is not
11 available or if the motor has been rewound.
12 Preparation of a general fault study is akin to the annual power flow preparation. It is used as the basis for
13 detailed studies including screening for over-dutied breakers as well as in facility studies when generator
14 owners petition transmission owners for connection studies.
15 A.1.2 Special studies
16 Special studies, such as transient stability, load flow and load flow , and short circuit studies, are used to
17 help in the application of relays and relay schemes and determining the relay settings. These studies prove
18 that plans and operations meet the criteria established by the regulating agencies, such as NERC. These
19 studies are usually done separately. Data requirements and conservative, worst case assumptions for
20 modeling are different for each type of study. Transient stability studies which simulate transient response
21 in the time domain are useful for setting breaker failure timing, out of step tripping or blocking schemes,
22 and Remedial Action Schemes (formerly Special Protection Schemes)Special Protection Schemes. Load
23 flow studies are for steady state analysis and help determine equipment load carrying requirements under
24 normal and contingency situations.
25 Fault studies, or short circuit studies, are also a steady state analysis that are the primary tool for relay
26 engineers to determine relay settings and coordination. Relay quantities are filtered to eliminate the
27 transient components of the signals and allow the relays to respond to steady state quantities. This allows
28 for a much more accurate measurement. There are some key differences between the fault study model and
29 the load flow model. One is that fault study models use a conservative assumption of low ambient and
30 operating temperatures, which leads to lower resistance values and higher conductor, switch, and
31 transformer ratings. Another key difference is that load flow study models use a worst case assumption of
32 high ambient and operating temperatures. Also, mutual coupling and zero sequence quantities are
33 important for fault studies but not for load flow studies.
34 Fault studies are an essential tool for relay engineers as they work toward protecting the system for all
35 faults and abnormal conditions. When setting relays the relay engineer starts with certain criteria. Relay
36 engineers utilize individual fault studies and engineering judgment to meet these criteria. Most often the
37 depth of study depends on the configuration of the system under study. For example, a fault at the most
38 distant end of a line (i.e., just on the line side of a remote bus) will yield an entirely different set of fault
39 current and voltage values before and after the remote line breaker opens. The relay engineer needs to
40 account for this in the settings. Mutual inductance can cause the relay to under-reach the remote end when
41 breakers are closed and then over-reach when breakers open. There are a myriad of conditions to consider
42 assuring trip dependability and system security. All of these modeled conditions depend on an accurate
43 fault study, one that is continually updated and often compared to actual system faults. As another
44 example, the criteria may state that the zone 2 impedance relay is to have 125% margin for all first and
45 second contingencies for a line end fault and for any fault on a tap off the line. Fault studies are used to
46 determine apparent impedances for faults at the end of the line tap or for the simulation of high impedance
47 faults. Most modern short circuit programs can be automated to run a preset sequence of faults and outages,
48 determine suggested relay settings from preset criteria, and determine relay operation. Short circuit
49 programs can also be useful in checking relay coordination for a given area of the power system. Hence,
177
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 fault studies are used in various ways to assist the relay engineer in ensuring that all faults within the
2 protected zone are cleared.
3
4
5
6
178
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 Annex B
2 (informative)
3 Bibliography
4 Bibliographical references are resources that provide additional or helpful material but do not need to be
5 understood or used to implement this standard. Reference to these resources is made for informational use
6 only.
7 [B1] Alexander, G. E., Andrichak, J. G., Rowe, S. D., and Wilkinson, S. B., "Series Compensated Line
8 Protection-A Practical Evaluation," Fifteenth Annual Western Protective Relay Conference, October 1988
9 [B2] Alexander, G. E., Andrichak, J. G., and Tyska, W. Z., "Relaying Short Lines," Eighteenth Annual
10 Western Protective Relay Conference, October 1991
11 [B3] Alexander, G. E., and Andrichak, J. G., "Ground Distance Relaying: Problems and Principles,"
12 Eighteenth Annual Western Protective Relay Conference, October 1991
13 [B4] Alexander, G. E., Andrichak, J. G., and Rowe, S. D., "Evaluating Line Relaying Schemes in Terms
14 of Speed, Security, and Dependability," Twenty-?-first Annual Western Protective Relay Conference,
15 October, 1994
16 [B5] Alexander, G. E., and Andrichak, J. G., "Application of Phase and Ground Distance Relays to Three
17 Terminal Lines," Forty-ninth Annual Texas A&M Protective Relay Conference, April 1996
18 [B6] Alexander, G. E., and Andrichak, J. G., "Distance Relay Fundamentals," Twenty-third Annual
20 [B7] Angell, D., Arjona, D., and Beaudreau, D., "Present EHV Line Protection Choices-One Utility's
21 Perspective," Twenty-first Annual Western Protective Relay Conference, October 1994
22 [B8] Barnes, H. C., and McConnell, A. J., "Some Utility Ground-Relay Problems," AIEE Transactions,
23 Vol. 74, pp. 417-428, June 1955
24 [B9] Benmouyal, G., and Chano, S., "Characterization of Phase and Amplitude Comparators in UHS
25 Directional Relays," IEEE Summer Meeting, Denver, CO., 1997
26 [B10] Blackburn, J. L., "Ground Relay Polarization," AIEE Transactions Part III: Power Apparatus and
27 Systems, December 1952
28 [B11] Blackburn, J. L., Protective Relaying: Principles and Applications. New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc.,
29 1987
30 [B12] Bladow, J., and Montoya, A., "Experience with Parallel EHV Phase Shifting Transformers," IEEE
31 Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 6, no. 3, pp 1096-1100, July 1991
32 [B13] Bolduc, L., "GIC observations and studies in the Hydro-Québec power system", Journal of
33 Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics, Vol. 64, Issue 16, pp. 1793-1802
34 [B14] Cavero, L. P., "Adaptive Distance Relay Characteristics," Twenty-?-first Annual Western Protective
35 Relay Conference, October 1994
36 [B15] Chamia, M., and Liberman, S., "Ultra High Speed Relay for EHV/UHV Transmission Lines-Devel-
37 opment, Design and Application," IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. PAS-97, no.
38 6, pp. 2104-2116, November/December 1978
39 [B16] Cook, V., Analysis of Distance Protection. Letchworth: Research Studies Press, and New York: John
40 Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1985
179
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 [B17] Courts, A. L., Hingorani, N. G., and Stemler, G. E., "A New Series Capacitor Protection Scheme
2 Using Nonlinear Resistors," IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. 97, no. 4, pp. 1042 -
3 1052, July/August 1978
4 [B18] Design Guide for Rural Substations, US Department of Agriculture, Rural Utilities Service, RUS
5 Bulletin 1724-300, June 2001
6 [B19] Dierks, A., and McElray, J., "Analyzing Polarization of Impedance Relays," Fiftieth Annual Georgia
7 Tech Protective Relay Conference, May 1996
8 [B20] Dommel, H. W., and Michels, J. M., "High Speed Relaying Using Traveling Wave Transient
9 Analysis," IEEE PES Winter Meeting, A78214-9, New York, January/February 1978
10 [B21] Drakos, et al., "Back to Back Switching of Large 230 kV, Grounded Y Capacitor Banks, Field Tests-
11 Analysis of Results and Application Guidelines," Proceedings, CEA, Engineering and Operating
12 Conference, March 1983
13 [B22] Dzieduszko, J. W., "Combined Sequence Phase Comparison Relaying," Twenty-third Annual
15 [B23] IEC 61850 standard, "Communication Networks and Systems in Substations" International
16 Electrotechnical Commission, 3 rue de Varembé, Geneva, Switzerland, 1998
17 [B24] Elmore, W. A., "The Fundamentals of Out-of-Step Relaying," Thirty-fourth Annual Conference for
18 Protective Relay Engineers, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, April 1981
19 [B25] Elmore, W. A., and Andersson, F., "Overview of Series Compensated Line Protection Philosophies,"
20 Seventeenth Annual Western Protective Relay Conference, October 1990
21 [B26] Elmore, W. A., Ed. Protective Relaying Theory and Applications. New York, Basel, Hong Kong:
22 Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1994
23 [B27] Elmore, W., Calero, F., and Yang, L., "Evolution of Distance Relaying Principles," Forty-eighth
24 Annual Texas A&M Protective Relay Conference, April 1995
25 [B28] Elmore, W.A. and Price, E.D., "Polarizing fundamentals", Annual Conference for Protective Relay
26 Engineers, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, April 2000
27 [B29] Engelhardt, K., "EHV Shunt Reactor Protection-Application and Experience," Tenth Annual
29 [B30] Engler, F., Lanz, O. E., Haggli, M., and Bacchini, G., "Transient Signals and Their Processing to
30 Ultra High Speed Directional Relay for EHV/UHV Transmission Line Protection," IEEE Transactions on
31 Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. PAS-104, pp. 1463-73, 1985
32 [B31] Giuliante, A. T., McConnell, J. E., and Turner, S. D., "Considerations for the Design and
33 Application of Ground Distance Relays," Forty-eighth Annual Texas A&M Protective Relay Conference,
34 April 1995
35 [B32] Griffin, C.H., "Principles of Ground Relaying for High Voltage and Extra High Voltage
36 Transmission Lines," Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. PAS-102, no. 2, pp. 420-432,
37 February 1983
38 [B33] Henville, C. F., and Jodice, J. A., "Discover Relay Design and Application Problems Using Pseudo-
39 transient Tests," IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 1444-1452, October 1991
40 [B34] Hou, D., and Roberts, J., "Capacitive Voltage Transformers Transient Overreach Concerns and
41 Solutions," Twenty-second Annual Western Protective Relay Conference, October 1995
42 [B35] IEEE Std 643™, IEEE Guide for Power Line Carrier Applications
43 [B36] IEEE Std C37.90.1™, IEEE Standard Surge Withstand Capability (SWC) Tests for Protective
44 Relays and Relay Systems
45 [B37] IEEE Std C37.91™, IEEE Guide for Protective Relay Applications to Power Transformers
180
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 [B38] IEEE Std C37.93™, IEEE Guide for Power System Protective Relay Applications of Audio Tones
2 over Voice Grade Channels
3 [B39] IEEE Std C37.99™, IEEE Guide for the Protection of Shunt Capacitor Banks
4 [B40] IEEE Std C37.100™, IEEE Standard Definitions for Power Switchgear
5 [B41] IEEE Std C37.102™, IEEE Guide for Generator Protection
6 [B42] IEEE Std C37.104™, IEEE Guide for Automatic Reclosing of Line Circuit Breakers for AC
7 Distribution and Transmission Lines
8 [B43] IEEE Std C37.109™, IEEE Guide for the Protection of Shunt Reactors
9 [B44] IEEE Std C37.110™, IEEE Guide for the Application of Current Transformers Used for Protective
10 Relaying Purposes
11 [B45] IEEE Std C37.112™, IEEE Standard Inverse-Time Characteristic Equations for Overcurrent Relays
12 [B46] IEEE Std C37.116™, IEEE Guide for Protective Relay Application to Transmission-Line Series
13 Capacitor Banks
14 [B47] IEEE Std C37.119™, IEEE Guide for Breaker Failure Protection of Power Circuit Breakers
15 [B48] IEEE Std C37.234™, IEEE Guide for Protective Relay Applications to Power System Buses
16 [B49] IEEE Std C37.243™, IEEE Guide for Application of Digital Line Current Differential Relays Using
17 Digital Communications
18 [B50] IEEE PSRC Report, "Transient Response of Current Transformers," IEEE Transactions on Power
19 Apparatus and Systems, Vol. 96, no. 6, November/December 1977
20 [B51] IEEE PSRC reportReport, "Protection Aspects of Multi-terminal Lines," IEEE Special Publication
21 79TH0056-2-PWR, 1979, reprinted in Protective Relaying for Power Systems, New York: IEEE press,
22 1980
23 [B52] IEEE PSRC Report, "EHV Protection Problems," IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and
24 Systems, Vol. 100, no. 5, pp. 2399-2406, May 1981
25 [B53] IEEE PSRC Report, "Transient Response of Coupling Capacitor Voltage Transformers-IEEE
26 Committee Report," IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. 100, no. 12, pp. 4811-
27 4814, December 1981
28 [B54] IEEE PSRC Report, "Automatic Reclosing of Transmission Lines," IEEE Transactions on Power
29 Apparatus and Systems, Vol. 103, no. 2, pp. 234-245, February 1984
30 [B55] IEEE PSRC Report, "Shunt Reactor Protection Practices," IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus
31 and Systems, Vol. 103, no. 8, pp 1970-1976, August 1984
32 [B56] IEEE PSRC Report, "The Effects of Solar Magnetic Disturbances on Protective Relaying," IEEE
33 Special Publication 90TH0357-PWR, July 1990
34 [B57] IEEE PSRC Report, "Single-Phase Tripping and Auto Reclosing of Transmission Lines," IEEE
35 Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 182-192, January 1992
36 [B58] IEEE PSRC Report, "Static VAR Compensator Protection," IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery,
37 Vol. 10, no. 3, pp. 1224-1233, July 1995
38 [B59] IEEE PSRC Report, "Protective Relaying Considerations for Transmission Lines with High Voltage
39 ac Cables," IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 83-96, January 1997
40 [B60] IEEE PSRC Report, "Mathematical Models of Current, Voltage, and Coupling Capacitor Voltage
41 Transformers", IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 62-67, 2000
42 [B61] IEEE PSRC Report, "Transmission Line Protective Systems Loadability", Prepared by Working
43 Group D6 of the Line Protection Subcommittee, 2001
181
PC37.113/D8.07. AUG 2015
1 [B62] IEEE PSRC Report, "Power swing and out-of-step considerations on transmission lines", Prepared
2 by Working Group D6 of the Line Protection Subcommittee, 2005
3 [B63] IEEE PSRC Report, "Justifying Pilot Protection on Transmission Lines," A report to the Line
4 Protection Subcommittee, Power System Relaying Committee, IEEE Power Engineering Society, Prepared
5 by Working Group D8, January 2008.
6 [B64] IEEE PSRC Report, "Performance of Relaying during Wide-Area Stressed Conditions", Prepared by
7 Working Group C12 of the System Protection Subcommittee, 2008.
8 [B65] IEEE PSRC Report, "Transmission Line Applications of Directional Ground Overcurrent Relays",
9 Prepared by Working Group D24 of the Line Protection Subcommittee, 2014.
10 [B66] IEEE PSRC Report, "Distance Element Response to Distorted Waveforms", Prepared by Working
11 Group D25 of the Line Protection Subcommittee, 2013
12 [B67] IEEE PSRC Report, " Considerations in Choosing Directional Polarizing Methods for Ground
13 Overcurrent Elements in Line Protection Applications', Prepared by Working Group D3 of the Line
14 Protection Subcommittee, 2014
15 [B64][B68] IEEE PSRC Report, “Loss of ac Voltage Considerations for Line Protection”,
16 Prepared by Working Group D7 of the Line Protection Subcommittee, 2006
17 [B65][B69] Jancke, G., Fahlen, N., and Nerf, O., "Series Capacitors in Power Systems," IEEE
18 Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. 94, no. 3, pp. 1138-1149, January/June 1971
19 [B66][B70] Johns, T., Martin, M. A., Barker, A., Walker, E.P., and Crossley, P. A., "A New
20 Approach to EHV Direction Comparison Protection Using Digital Signal Processing Techniques," IEEE
21 Transactions on Power Systems, Vol. PWRD-1, no. 2, April 1986
22 [B67][B71] Korejwo, E., Synal, B., and Trojal, J., "Short HV Transmission Line Protection
23 Problems," IEEE Second International Conference on Developments in Power System Protection, 1980
24 [B68][B72] Kudo, H., Sasaki, H., Seo, K., Takahashi, M., Yoshida, K. and Maeda, T.,
25 "Implementation of a Digital Distance Relay Using an Interpolated Integral Solution of a Differential
26 Equation," IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 1475-1484, October 1988
27 [B69][B73] Kumm, J. J., and Schweitzer, E. O., "Statistical Comparison and Evaluation of
28 Pilot Protection Schemes," Twenty-third Annual Western Protective Relay Conference, October 1996
29 [B70][B74] Lefrancois, M. J., "Mica 500 kV Protection-A Segregated Phase Comparison
30 System with Special Features for High Tower Footing Resistance," Fifth Annual Western Protective Relay
31 Conference, October, 1978
32 [B71][B75] Mansour, M. M., and Swift, G. W., "A Multi-processor Based Traveling Wave
33 Relay-Theory and Realization," IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. PWRD-1, pp. 272-279, 1986
34 [B72][B76] Marttila, R. J., "Directional Characteristics of Distance Relay mho Elements: Part
35 I-A New Method of Analysis," IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. PAS-100, no. 1,
36 pp. 96-102, January 1981
37 [B73][B77] Marttila, R. J., "Directional Characteristics of Distance Relay mho Elements: Part
38 II-Results," IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. PAS-100, no. 1, pp. 103-113,
39 January 1981
40 [B74][B78] Marttila, R. J., "Effect of Transmission Line Loading on the Performance
41 Characteristics of Polyphase Distance Relay Elements," IEEE Transactions On Power Delivery, Vol. 3, no.
42 4, pp. 1466-1474, October 1988
43 [B75][B79] Marttila, R. J., "Performance of Distance Relay mho Elements on MOV-
44 Protected Series Compensated Transmission Lines," IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 7, no. 3,
45 pp. 1167-1178, July 1992
182
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1 [B76][B80] Mason, C. R., The Art and Science of Protective Relaying. New York: John
2 Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1956
3 [B77][B81] McCauley, M., Pelfrey, D. L., Roettger, W. C., and Wood, C. E., "The Impact of
4 Shunt Capacitor Installations on Power Circuit Breaker Application," IEEE Transactions on Power
5 Apparatus and Systems, Vol. 99, no. 6, pp. 2210-2222, November/December 1980
6 [B78][B82] McLaren, P. G., Swift, G. W., Zhang, Z., Dirks, E., Jayasinghe, R. P., and
7 Fernando, I., "A New Directional Element for Numerical Distance Relays," IEEE Transactions on Power
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10 Relay Models Simplify Relay Application Studies," Twentieth Annual Western Protective Relay
11 Conference, October 1993
12 [B80][B84] Neher, J. H., and McConnell, A. J., "An Improved A-C Pilot-Wire Relay," AIEE
13 Transactions, pp. 12-17 and pp. 638-643, 1941
14 [B81][B85] NERC Standard PRC-023-1, Transmission Relay Loadability, Reliability
15 Standards for Bulk Electric Systems of North America, North American Electric Reliability Corporation,
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18 Distorted Transient Wave Forms," IEEE Transactions on Power Delivery, Vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 2025-2031,
19 October 1989
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23 multi-terminal transmission lines", IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting, June 2005
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25 Nineteenth Annual Western Protective Relay Conference, October 1992
26 [B86][B90] Shperling, B. R., and Fakheri, A., "Single-Phase Switching Parameters for
27 Untransposed EHV Transmission Lines," IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. 98,
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32 Utility/Cogeneration Interconnections," Twentieth Annual Western Protective Relay Conference, October
33 1993
34 [B89][B93] Strang, W. M., "Polarizing Sources for Directional Relaying," Sixteenth Annual
35 Western Protective Relay Conference, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, October 1989
36 [B90][B94] Taylor, E. R., Jr., Whyte, I. A., Brennen, M. B., and Bonk, J. J., "Static VAR
37 Generator Application and Protection Considerations," Thirty-fourth Annual Texas A&M Relay
38 Conference, April 1981
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40 Pennsylvania, USA, 1964
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18 Commercial Power Systems, discusses methods to attain an effectively grounded system.
19 [B105] IEEE Std C37.245™, IEEE Guide for the Application of Protective Relaying for
20 Phase Shifting Transformers
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22 [B107] IEEE Std C57.13.3™, IEEE Guide for Grounding of Instrument Transformer
23 Secondary Circuits and Cases.
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26 Annual Conference for Protective Relay Engineers, College Station, TX, April 2014.
27
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PC37.113/D8.07.

1 Abstract: Information on the concepts of protection of ac transmission lines is presented in this

The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.

Copyright © 2014 by The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.

PDF: ISBN 978-0-XXXX-XXXX-X STDXXXXX

IEEE prohibits discrimination, harassment, and bullying.

1 Important Notices and Disclaimers Concerning IEEE Standards Documents

19 Comments on standards should be submitted to the following address:

20 Secretary, IEEE-SA Standards Board

38 Updating of IEEE Standards documents

4 Richard TaylorDon Lukach, Chair

45 [To be supplied by IEEE]

46 Balloter1 49 Balloter4 52 Balloter7

58 [To be supplied by IEEE]

63 SBMember1 66 SBMember4 69 SBMember7

75 <Name>, DOE Representative

1 IEEE Standards Program Manager, Document Development

5 Several areas have been improved in this revision. Most notably:

5 2. Normative references ......................................................................................................................................... 2

6 3. 3. Definitions, device numbers and abbreviations ........................................................................................... 2

18 5. Impact of system configuration on selection of protection schemes ....................................................... 2322

43 7. Concluding remarks .......................................................................................................................... 173128126

45 Annex B (informative) Bibliography ................................................................................................... 178131129

1 Guide for Protective Relay Applications

16 3. 3. Definitions, device numbers, and abbreviations

34 Quadrilateral characteristic: A distance relay characteristic on an R-X diagram created by a directional

38 3.2 Device numbers

1 3.3 Acronyms and abbreviations

2 AT audio tones (pilot-wire)

47 4.1 Transmission line

14 4.2 Single line representation of lines and equipment

5 4.3 Zone of protection

7  Generator protection zone (a)

1  Line protection zone (d)

8 4.4 Line relaying selection

31 Various engineering practices can enhance dependability. These include:

1  application of redundant relay systems with independence of design

6 Security can be enhanced by various practices, such as:

27 4.4.1 Factors influencing line relaying selection

30 4.4.1.1 Impact of Line Faults on the Power System

3 4.4.1.1.1 Fault-clearing time requirements

9 4.4.1.1.2 Line length

12 4.4.1.1.3 Capacity of sources

18 4.4.1.1.4 Line configuration

21 4.4.1.1.5 Line loading

3  limiting fault current damage by reducing fault clearing times

19  the number of communication systems required,

31 4.4.1.3 Failure modes

10 4.4.1.4 Protective scheme design compromises

23 4.4.1.5 Past practices

29 4.4.1.6 Old versus new technologies

37 4.4.1.7 The future

1 4.5 Redundancy and backup considerations

16 4.6 Autoreclosing methods

32 4.7 Effects of load on line relay applications and settings

35 4.7.1 Phase overcurrent relays

41 4.7.2 Ground overcurrent relays

3 4.7.3 Directional overcurrent relays

7 4.7.4 Phase distance relays

13 4.7.5 Ground distance relays

27 4.7.6 Pilot systems--two terminal lines

16 4.7.7 Pilot systems--three terminal

23 4.7.8 Sensitive ground overcurrent fault protection

7 Generator protection zone (a)

1 Line protection zone (d)

1 application of redundant relay systems with independence of design

3 limiting fault current damage by reducing fault clearing times

19 the number of communication systems required,

VDROP _ SRC VBASE_LN VRELAY

VDROP _ SRC VBASE_LN VRELAY

1 kVH is the voltage on the high-voltage side of the transformer

13 kVH is the voltage on the high-voltage side of the transformer

1 ZSEC is the impedance seen by the relay