1. PEOPLE VS. JUDGE AYSON [175 SCRA 216; G.R. NO.

85215; 7 JUL 1989]

Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its
Baguio City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of
plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted.
That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and
Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine
Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by
Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit
team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating
that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however
this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos.
Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’ written
admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken
without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit
those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied.
Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence
the admission and statement of accused.

Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-
incrimination (only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a
different crime charged- not present in case at bar).

This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is
not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself.” It prescribes an "option of refusal
to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be
claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the
witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to
disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to
refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must
claim it and could be waived.
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the
accused include:

1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free
will shall be used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer
or make a statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by
the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used
against him.

2. PEOPLE VS DELA CRUZ G.R. No. 181545

Facts:
Appellant Mark Dela Cruz was found guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 after he allegedly sold prohibited drugs to the poseur-
buyer. The prohibited drugs were handed to appellant by companions identified to be
an alias Amay and an alias Tabo. Appellant denied the charge and said that he was
arrested after refusing to give information about Amay, whom the police were after. His
testimony was corroborated by other witnesses.

Lower court gave weight to the testimony by the poseur-buyer and upheld the
presumption of regularity in the operation conducted by the officers.

Appellant appealed, questioning the identity of the shabu allegedly confiscated from him
in view of Section 21 (1) of RA No. 9165 (inventory of seized drugs) and Section 21 (3) of
the same law(certification of the forensic laboratory examination results).

Ruling:
The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identities of
the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.

Citing jurisprudence, the failure of the police to comply with the procedure in the
custody of the seized drugs raised doubt as to its origins.

The chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be. TheCourt believed that the prosecution failed to clearly establish the chain
of custody of the seized plastic sachets, containing shabu from the time they were first
allegedly received until they were brought to the police investigator. There were no
records to show that the procedural requirements in Section 21 were complied with.

The presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the constitutional right of

presumption of evidence in view of the circumstances. “The presumption of regularity is
merely just that--a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when
challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.”

The appellant was acquitted.

3.

4. People vs. Lugod [GR 136253, 21 February 2001]

Facts: A case of rape with homicide was filed against the accused, Clemente John Lugod,
for allegedly raping the eight-year old girl victim, Nairube J. Ramos and dumping her
dead body in the grassy coconut plantation area.
On September 15, 1997 at around 7:00 p.m., Helen Ramos, the victim’s mother, was
asleep in her house together with her husband and their children, Nimrod, Neres and
Nairube. At around 12:30 a.m., they noticed that Nairube was gone. The backdoor of
their house was left open where a pair of slippers that did not belong to the family was
found. In the morning, the police began their search for Nairube wherein a panty
belonging to the victim was found, as well as a black collared shirt belonging to the
accused, Lugod. Witnesses testified that both slippers and the shirt were worn by Lugod.
Lugod was then brought to the police station where he was temporarily incarcerated.
Although he admitted to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube, Lugud refused
to make a statement regarding the same.
On September 19, 1997, the Vice-Mayor visited the accused in his cell. In the course of his
conversation with Lugod, Lugod allegedly confessed to the commission of the offense.
Lugod was charged for rape with homicide. After trial, Lugod was found guilty and was
sentenced to death. Hence, the automatic review.

Issue: Whether or not Lugod’s alleged confession can be used against him?

Held: At the time of his arrest, records reveal that accused-appellant was not informed
of his constitutional rights to remain silent and his rights to counsel. There is also no
evidence to indicate that he intended to waive these rights. Consequently, the accused-
appellant’s act of confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube without
the assistance of counsel cannot be used against him for having transgressed accused-
appellant’s rights under the Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our Constitution which
cannot be disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed may be.

Even if we were to assume that accused-appellant was not yet under interrogation and
thus, not entitled to his constitutional rights at the time he was brought to the police
station, the acts of accused-appellant subsequent to his apprehension cannot be
characterized as having been voluntarily made considering the peculiar circumstances
surrounding his detention. Amidst such a highly coercive atmosphere, accused-
appellant’s claim that he was beaten up and maltreated by the police officers raises a
very serious doubt as to the voluntariness of his alleged confession.

In addition, the records do not support the confession allegedly made by the accused-
appellant to the Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Cavinti. Records show that the Mayor of
Cavinti did not testify in the criminal trial. Moreover, the testimony of the Vice-Mayor
with respect to the alleged confession made by the accused-appellant is not conclusive.
As can be seen from the testimony of the Vice-Mayor, accused-appellant merely
responded to the ambiguous questions that the Vice-Mayor propounded to him. He did
not state in certain and categorical terms that he raped and killed Nairube. In fact, the
Vice-Mayor admitted that the accused-appellant did not tell him that he raped and killed
Nairube.