1.

TEAM ENERGY CORPORATION (FORMERLY: MIRANT PAGBILAO CORPORATION AND SOUTHERN

ENERGY QUEZON, INC.), Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.

G.R. No. 197770, March 14, 2018

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REP. BY THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v.TEAM
ENERGY CORPORATION, Respondent.

Team Energy is a VAT-registered entity with Certificate of Registration No. 96-600-002498. It is engaged in
power generation and electricity sale to National Power Corporation (NPC) under a Build, Operate, and
Transfer scheme.
On November 13, 2002, Team Energy filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) "an Application
for Effective Zero-Rate of its supply of electricity to the NPC, which was subsequently approved.
On December 17, 2004, Team Energy filed with the Revenue District Office No. 60 in Lucena City a
claim for refund of unutilized input VAT in the amount of P83,465,353.50, for the first to fourth quarters of
taxable year 2003. On April 22, 2005, Team Energy appealed before the Court of Tax Appeals its 2003 first
quarter VAT claim of PI 5,085,320.31. The appeal was docketed as CTA Case No. 7229.
Opposing the appeal, the Commissioner averred that the amount claimed by Team Energy was not
properly documented and that NPC's exemption from taxes did not extend to its electricity supplier such as
Team Energy.

On July 22, 2005, Team Energy appealed its VAT refund claims for the second to fourth quarters of 2003 in
the amount of P68,380,033.19, docketed as CTA Case No. 7298.

GOVT: As special and affirmative defenses, the Commissioner alleged that it was imperative upon Team
Energy to prove its compliance with the registration requirements of a VAT taxpayer; the invoicing and
accounting requirements for VAT-registered persons; and the checklist of requirements for a VAT refund
under Revenue Memorandum Order No. 53-98. Furthermore, the Commissioner contended that Team Energy
must prove that the claims were filed within the prescriptive periods and that the input taxes being claimed
had not been applied against any output tax liability or were not carried over in the succeeding quarters

She maintains that Team Energy is not entitled to any tax refund or credit because it cannot qualify for VAT
zero-rating under Republic Act No. 913693 or the Electrical Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) Law for
failure to submit its ERC Registration and Certificate of Compliance. 94 She avers that to operate a generation
facility, Team Energy must have a duly issued ERC Certificate of Compliance, without which an entity cannot
be considered a power generation company and its sales of generated power will not qualify for VAT zero-
rating.95

Team energy: Team Energy argues, however, that the application of the Aichi doctrine to its claim would
violate the rule on non-retroactivity of judicial decisions.50 Team Energy adds that when it filed its claims for
refund with the BIR and the Court of Tax Appeals, both the administrative and judicial claims for refund must
be filed within the two (2)-year prescriptive period.51 Moreover, Revenue Regulations No. 7-95 did not
require a specific number of days after the 60-day, now 120-day, period given to the Commissioner to decide
on the claim within which to appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals. 52 Team Energy contends that to deny its
claim duly proven before the Court of Tax Appeals First Division "would result to unjust enrichment on the
part of the government."53
On the disallowance of some of its input VAT claims, Team Energy submits that "at the time when the
unutilized input VAT [was] incurred in 2003, the applicable NIRC provisions did not create a distinction
between an official receipt and an invoice in substantiating a claim for refund."

ISSUES:

1. whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals erred in disallowing Team Energy Corporation's claim for tax
refund of its unutilized input VAT for the second to fourth quarters of 2003 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction;

2. whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals erred in failing to recognize the interchangeability of VAT invoices
and VAT official receipts to comply with the substantiation requirements for refunds of excess or unutilized
input tax under Sections 110 and 113 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code, resulting in the
disallowance of P258,874.55; and

3. whether or not Team Energy Corporation's failure to submit the Registration and Certificate of Compliance
issued by the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) disqualifies it from claiming a tax refund/credit.

HELD:

I.

NO. The text of the law is clear that resort to an appeal with the Court of Tax Appeals should be made within
30 days either from receipt of the decision denying the claim or the expiration of the 120-day period given to
the Commissioner to decide the claim.

When Team Energy filed its refund claim in 2004, the 1997 NIRC was already in effect, which clearly provided
for: (a) 120 days for the Commissioner to act on a taxpayer's claim; and (b) 30 days for the taxpayer to appeal
either from the Commissioner's decision or from the expiration of the 120-day period, in case of the
Commissioner's inaction.

It was in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. where this Court first
pronounced that observance of the 120+30-day periods in Section 112(D) is crucial in filing an appeal with
the Court of Tax Appeals. This was further emphasized in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque
Power Corporation where this Court categorically held that compliance with the 120+30-day periods under
Section 112 of the 1997 NIRC is mandatory and jurisdictional.

In this case, Team Energy's judicial claim was filed beyond the 30-day period required in Section 112(D). The
administrative claim for refund was filed on December 17, 2004. Thus, BIR had 120 days to act on the claim,
or until April 16, 2005. Team Energy, in turn, had until May 16, 2005 to file a petition with the Court of Tax
Appeals but filed its appeal only on July 22, 2005, or 67 days late. Thus, the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc
correctly denied its claim for refund due to prescription.

A claim for input VAT refund or credit is construed strictly against the taxpayer. Accordingly, there
must be strict compliance with the prescriptive periods and substantive requirements set by law
before a claim for tax refund or credit may prosper. The mere fact that Team Energy has proved its excess
input VAT does not entitle it as a matter of right to a tax refund or credit. The 120+30-day periods in Section
112 is not a mere procedural technicality that can be set aside if the claim is otherwise meritorious. It is a
mandatory and jurisdictional condition imposed by law. Team Energy's failure to comply with the
prescriptive periods is, thus, fatal to its claim.

II.

NO. Claimants of tax refunds have the burden to prove their entitlement to the claim under substantive law
and the factual basis of their claim. Moreover, in claims for VAT refund/credit, applicants must satisfy the
substantiation and invoicing requirements under the NIRC and other implementing rules and
regulations.

This Court reiterates that to claim a refund of unutilized or excess input VAT, purchase of goods or properties must be supported by VAT invoices, while purchase of

services must be supported by VAT official receipts.

Our VAT system is invoice-based, Strict compliance with substantiation and invoicing requirements is
necessary considering VAT's nature and VAT system's tax credit method, where tax payments are based on
output and input taxes and where the seller's output tax becomes the buyer's input tax that is available as tax
credit or refund in the same transaction. It ensures the proper collection of taxes at all stages of distribution,
facilitates computation of tax credits, and provides accurate audit trail or evidence for BIR monitoring
purposes.

The Court of Tax Appeals further pointed out that the noninterchangeability between VAT official receipts
and VAT invoices avoids having the government refund a tax that was not even paid.

Thus, the Court of Tax Appeals properly disallowed the input VAT of P258,874.55 for Team Energy's
failure to comply with the invoicing requirements.

III.

NO. Team Energy's claim for unutilized or excess input VAT was anchored not on the EPIRA Law but on
Section 108(B)(3) of the 1997 NIRC, in relation to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 6395 or the NPC's
charter, before its repeal by Republic Act No. 9337.

Considering that Team Energy's refund claim is premised on Section 108(B)(3) of the 1997 NIRC, in relation
to NPC's charter, the requirements under the EPIRA are inapplicable. To qualify its electricity sale to NPC
as zero-rated, Team Energy needs only to show that it is a VAT-registered entity and that it has
complied with the invoicing requirements under Section 108(B)(3) of the 1997 NIRC, in conjunction
with Section 4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95.

In sum, the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc found proper the refund of P11,161,392.67, representing
unutilized input VAT attributable to Team Energy's zero-rated sales for the first quarter of 2003. This
Court accords the highest respect to the factual findings of the Court of Tax Appeals considering its developed
expertise on the subject, unless there is showing of abuse in the exercise of its authority. This Court finds no
reason to overturn the factual findings of the Court of Tax Appeals on the amounts allowed for refund.

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The April 8, 2011 Decision and July 7, 2011 Resolution of the Court
of Tax Appeals En Banc in CTA EB No. 603 are AFFIRMED.

PEN: For a judicial claim for Value Added Tax (VAT) refund to prosper, the claim must not only be filed within
the mandatory 120+30-day periods. The taxpayer must also prove the factual basis of its claim and comply
with the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) invoicing requirements and other appropriate revenue
regulations. Input VAT payments on local purchases of goods or services must be substantiated with VAT
invoices or official receipts, respectively.

2. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. COVANTA ENERGY PHILIPPINE HOLDINGS, INC. G.R. No.
203160, January 24, 2018, J. REYES, JR

Facts:

The CIR issued Assessment Notices against CEPHI for deficiency value-added tax (VAT) and expanded
withholding tax (EWT representing CEPHI's VAT and EWT liabilities for the taxable year 2001.

CEPHI protested the assessments however, the CIR issued another Assessment Notice assessing CEPHI for
deficiency minimum corporate income tax (MCIT likewise for the taxable year 2001. This assessment lead to
CEPHI filing a protest on the MCIT assessment.

The protests remained unacted upon. Thus, CEPHI filed separate petitions before the CTA, seeking the
cancellation and withdrawal of the deficiency assessments.

While the case was pending, CEPHI filed a Supplemental Petition on informing the CTA that it availed of the
tax amnesty under R.A. No. 9480. CEPHI afterwards submitted a Supplemental Formal Offer of Evidence,
together with the documents relevant to its tax amnesty.

The CTA Second Division partially granted the petitions of CEPHI with respect to the deficiency VAT and MCIT
assessments for 2001. Since tax amnesty does not extend to withholding agents with respect to their
withholding tax liabilities. Unsatisfied with the ruling of the CTA Second Division, the CIR elevated the matter
to the CTA en banc The CIR was of the position that CEPHI is not entitled to the immunities and privileges
under R.A. No. 9480 because its documentary submissions failed to comply with the requirements under the
tax amnesty law.

The CTA en banc upheld the ruling that, without any evidence that CEPHI's net worth was underdeclared by
at least 30%, there is a presumption of compliance with the requirements of the tax amnesty law. For this
reason, CEPHI may immediately enjoy the privileges of the tax amnesty program.

GOVT: CEPHI's failure to provide complete information in its Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net worth
(SALN), particularly the columns requiring the Reference and Basis of Valuation, is sufficient basis to
disqualify CEPHI from the tax amnesty program.25 The CIR also alleged that there is no period of limitation in
challenging CEPHI's compliance with the requirements of the tax amnesty program. 26

TP: that CEPHI submitted all the documentary requirements for the tax amnesty program. CEPHI is entitled
to the immunities and privileges of the tax amnesty program

Issue:
Whether or not CEPHI is entitled to the immunities and privileges of the tax amnesty program under RA 9480
Held:
Yes, CEPHI is entitled to the immunities and privileges of the tax amnesty program upon full compliance with
the requirements of R.A. No. 9480.
it is undisputed that CEPHI submitted all the documentary requirements for the tax amnesty program. The
CIR argued that CEPHI cannot enjoy the privileges because its SALN failed to comply with the requirements of
R.A. No. 9480.
It is evident from CEPHI's SALN that the information statutorily mandated in R.A. No. 9480 were all reflected
in its submission to the BIR. While the columns for Reference and Basis for Valuation were indeed left
blank, CEPHI attached schedules to its SALN, which provide the required information under R.A. No. 9480.
More importantly, CEPHI's SALN is presumed true and correct, pursuant to Section 4 of R.A. No. 9480. 39This
presumption may be overturned if the CIR is able to establish that CEPHI understated its net worth by the
required threshold of at least 30%.

However, aside from the bare allegations of the CIR, there is no evidence on record to prove that the amount
of CEPHI's net worth was understated. Parties other than the BIR or its agents did not initiate proceedings
within one year from the filing of the SALN or Tax Amnesty Return, in order to challenge the net worth of
CEPHI. Neither was the CIR able to establish that there were findings or admissions in a congressional,
administrative, or court proceeding that CEPHI indeed understated its net worth by 30%.

Considering that CEPHI completed the requirements and paid the corresponding amnesty tax, it is considered
to have totally complied with the tax amnesty program. As a matter of course, CEPHI is entitled to the
immediate enjoyment of the immunities and privileges of the tax amnesty program. 42Nonetheless, the Court
emphasizes that the immunities and privileges granted to taxpayers under R.A. No. 9480 is not absolute. It is
subject to a resolutory condition insofar as the taxpayers' enjoyment of the immunities and privileges
of the law is concerned. These immunities cease upon proof that they underdeclared their net worth by
30%.

Unfortunately for the CIR, however, there is no such proof in CEPHI's case. The Court, thus, finds it necessary
to deny the present petition. While tax amnesty is in the nature of a tax exemption, which is strictly construed
against the taxpayer,43 the Court cannot disregard the plain text of R.A. No. 9480.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated March 30,
2012 and Resolution dated August 16, 2012 of the CTA en banc in CTA EB Case No. 713 are AFFIRMED.

PEN: Under RA 9480 Upon the taxpayer's full compliance with the requirements of filing the documents the
taxpayer is immediately entitled to the enjoyment of the immunities and privileges of the tax amnesty
program

3. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner vs. LANCASTER PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.

(G.R. No. 183408; July 12, 2017)

FACTS:

The CIR issued letters of authority (LOA) to revenue officers to examine Lancaster's books for FY 1997-1998.
Later, the CIR issued deficiency inco me tax assessment (DITA) against Lancaster for FY 1998-1999.
Moreover, the CIR flagged Lancaster's alleged deviation from generally accepted accounting principles in
using a "cropping year" not in line with its FY. Finally, Lancaster applied for deductions for the taxable year in
which the tobaccos crops were realized not in the FY in which the expenses were incurred. The CIR
disallowed these deductions.

On appeal, the CTA resolved that there was excess of authority on the part of the CIR and its revenue officers,
citing the disparity in coverage between the LOA and the DITA. However, this issue was never raised by
Lancaster.

Govt: the Crop-Basis method of reporting income may be used by a farmer engaged in producing crops which
take more than one (1) year from the time of planting to the time of gathering and disposing of crop, in such a
case, the entire cost of producing the crop must be taken as deduction in the year in which the gross income
from the crop is realized and that the taxable income should be computed upon the basis of the taxpayer's
annual accounting period, (fiscal or calendar year, as the case may be) in accordance with the method of
accounting regularly employed in keeping with the books of the taxpayer. Furthermore, it did not comply
with the generally accepted principle of proper matching of cost and revenue.

the CIR argues that the revenue officers did not exceed their authority when, upon examination. Additionally,
the CIR posits that Lancaster did not raise the issue on the scope of authority of the revenue examiners at any
stage of the proceedings before the CTA and, consequently, the CTA had no jurisdiction to rule on said issue.

LANCASTER: Lancaster replied11 to the PAN contending, among other things, that for the past decades, it has
used an entire 'tobacco-cropping season' to determine its total purchases covering a one-year period from 1
October up to 30 September of the followingyear (as against its fiscal year which is from 1 April up to 31 March
of the followingyear);that it has been adopting the 6~month timing difference to conform to the matching
concept (of cost and revenue); and that this has long been installed as part of the company's system and
consistently applied in its accounting books.12

Invoking the same provisions of the law cited in the assessment, i.e., Sections 4313 and 4514 of the National
Internal Revenue Code (NJRC), in conjunction with Section 4515 of Revenue Regulation No. 2, as amended,
Lancaster argued that the February and March 1998 purchases should not have been disallowed. It
maintained that the situation of farmers engaged in producing tobacco, like Lancaster, is unique in that the
costs, i.e., purchases, are taken as of a different period and posted in the year in which the gross income from
the crop is realized. Lancaster concluded that it correctly posted the subject purchases in the fiscal year
ending March 1999 as it was only in this year that the gross income from the crop was realized.

ISSUE:

I.

WON THAT PETITIONER'S REVENUE OFFICERS EXCEEDED THEIR AUTHORITY IN INVESTIGATING THE
PERIOD NOT COVERED BY THEIR LETTER OF AUTHORITY.

II.

WON COURT OF TAX APPEALS EN BANC ERRED IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO CANCEL AND WITHDRAW
THE DEFICIENCY ASSESSMENT ISSUED AGAINST RESPONDENT.

RULING:

The CTA En Banc did not err when it ruled that the BIR revenue officers had exceeded their authority.

On both counts, the CIR is mistaken.

the jurisdiction of the CTA is not limited only to cases which involve decisions or inactions of the CIR on
matters relating to assessments or refunds but also includes other cases arising from the NIRC or related laws
administered by the BIR. 28

the CIR may authorize the examination of any taxpayer and correspondingly make an assessment whenever
necessary.31 The powers granted by law to the CIR are intended, among other things, to determine the
liability of any person for any national internal revenue tax.

it is clear that the issue on whether the revenue officers who had conducted the examination on Lancaster
exceeded their authority pursuant to LOA may be considered as covered by the terms "other matters" under
Section 7 of R.A. No. 1125 or its amendment, R.A. No. 9282. The authority to make an examination or
assessment, being a matter provided for by the NIRC, is well within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of
the CTA.

IN ADDITION THE CTA may resolve an issue which was not raised by the parties. the CTA is not bound by the
issues specifically raised by the parties but may also rule upon related issues necessary to achieve an orderly
disposition of the case.

, the trial court observed that LOAauthorized the BIR officers to examine the books of account of Lancaster for
the taxable year 1998 only or, since Lancaster adopted a fiscal year (FY), for the period 1 April 1997 to 31
March 1998. However, the deficiency income tax assessment which the BIR eventually issued against
Lancaster was based on the disallowance of expenses reported in FY 1999, or for the period 1 April
1998 to 31March1999. The CTA concluded that the revenue examiners had exceeded their authority when
they issued the assessment against Lancaster and, consequently, declared such assessment to be without
force and effect.

The audit process normally commences with the issuance by the CIR of a Letter of Authority. The LOA gives
notice to the taxpayer that it is under investigation for possible deficiency tax assessment; at the same time it
authorizes or empowers a designated revenue officer to examine, verify, and scrutinize a taxpayer's books
and records, in relation to internal revenue tax liabilities for a particular period.34

Nonetheless, a valid LOA does not necessarily clothe validity to an assessment issued on it, as when the
revenue officers designated in the LOA act in excess or outside of the authority granted them under said LOA.

The taxable year covered by the assessment being outside of the period specified in the LOA in this case, the
assessment issued against Lancaster is, therefore, void.

II.

The CTA En Banc correctly sustained the order cancelling and withdrawing the deficiency tax assessment.

To recall, the assessment against Lancaster for deficiency income tax stemmed from the disallowance of its
February and March 1998 purchases which Lancaster posted in its fiscal year ending on 31 March 1999 (FY
1999) instead of the fiscal year ending on 31March1998 (FY 1998).

other methods approved by the CIR, even when not expressly mentioned in the NIRC, may be adopted if such
method would enable the taxpayer to properly reflect its income. Section 43 of the NIRC authorizes the CIR to
allow the use of a method of accounting that in its opinion would clearly reflect the income of the taxpayer. An
example of such method not expressly mentioned in the NIRC, but duly approved by the CIR, is the 'crop
method of accounting'

In the present case, we find it wholly justifiable for Lancaster, as a business engaged in the production and
marketing of tobacco, to adopt the crop method of accounting. A taxpayer is authorized to employ what it
finds suitable for its purpose so long as it consistently does so, and in this case, Lancaster does appear to have
utilized the method regularly for many decades already

Considering that [Lancaster] is engaged in the production oftobacco, it applied the crop year basis in
determining its total purchases for each fiscal year. Thus, [Lancaster's] total cost for the production of its
crops, which includes its purchases, must be taken as a deduction in the year in which the gross income is
realized. Evident from the foregoing, the crop year basis is one unusual method of accounting wherein the
entire cost of producing the crops (including purchases) must be taken as a deduction in the year in which the
gross income from the crop is realized. Since the petitioner's crop year starts in October and ends in
September of the following year, the same does not coincide with petitioner's fiscal year which starts in April
and ends in March of the following year. However, the law and regulations consider this peculiar situation
and allow the costs to be taken up at the time the gross income from the crop is realized, as in the instant
case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed 30 April 2008 Decision and 24 June 2008 Resolution of
the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc are AFFIRMED. No cost

PEN: the jurisdiction of the CTA is not limited only to cases which involve decisions or inactions of the CIR on
matters relating to assessments or refunds but also includes other cases arising from the NIRC or related laws
administered by the BIR. the CIR may authorize the examination of any taxpayer and correspondingly make
an assessment whenever necessary. other methods approved by the CIR, even when not expressly mentioned
in the NIRC, may be adopted if such method would enable the taxpayer to properly reflect its income.

4. Procter & Gamble Asia PTE LTD v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. no. 205652, September
6, 2017, J. Caguioa.

Facts: P&G is a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Singapore and is
maintaining a Regional Operating Headquarter in the Philippines. On March 22, 2007 and May 2, 2007, P&G
filed applications and letters addressed to the BIR requesting the refund or issuance of tax credit certificates
(TCCs) of its input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales covering the taxable periods of January 2005 to
March 2005, and April 2005 to June 2005.

On March 28, 2007, P&G filed a petition for review with the CTA seeking the refund or issuance of TCC in the
representing input VAT paid on goods or services attributable to its zero-rated sales for the first quarter of
taxable year 2005. On June 8, 2007, P&G filed with the CTA another judicial claim for refund or issuance of
TCC representing its unutilized input VAT paid on goods and services attributable to its zero-rated sales for
the second quarter of taxable year 2005. The two CTA cases were consolidated by the CTA division upon
P&G’s motion.

While the cases were pending in the CTA, on October 6, 2010, the CIR v. Aichi case
Based on this, the CTA Division dismissed the case of P&G for being prematurely filed. According to the CTA
Division, P&G failed to observe the 120-day period granted to the CIR. Its judicial claims were prematurely
filed. P&G moved for reconsideration, and after denial, it elevated the matter to the CTA en banc. P&G claims
that the Aichi ruling should not be applied retroactively. The CTA en banc affirmed the division in toto on.
P&G moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Meanwhile, on February 2013, the case of CIR v. San Roque
was promulgated, saying that an exception from the mandatory and jurisdictional.

GOVT: The CIRs contention are the following: 1.) insists that the plain language of Section 112(C) of the NIRC,
demands mandatory compliance with the 120+30-day rule; and P&G cannot claim reliance in good faith with
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03.
2.) The CIR argues that BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was already repealed and superseded on November 1,
2005 by (RR 16-2005), which echoed the mandatory and jurisdictional nature of the 120-day period under
Section 112(C) of the NIRC. Thus, P&G cannot rely, in good faith, on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 because its
judicial claims after RR 16-2005 took effect

P&G: P&G avers that its judicial claims for tax refund/credit was filed with the CTA Division on March 28,
2007 and June 8, 2007, after the issuance of BIR Ruling No.DA-489-03 on December 10, 2003, but before the
adoption of the Aichi doctrine on October 6, 2010. Accordingly, pursuant to the Court's ruling in San Roque, its
judicial claims with the CTA was deemed timely filed.

P&G further contends that the CTA En Banc gravely erred in applying the Aichi doctrine retroactively.
According to P&G, the retroactive application of Aichi amounts to a denial of its constitutional right to due
process and unjust enrichment of the CIR.29
ISSUE: whether the CTA En Banc erred in dismissing P&G's judicial claims for refund on the ground of
prematurity.

RULING:

YES. There is no dispute that the 120-day period is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that the CTA does not
acquire jurisdiction over a judicial claim that is filed before the expiration of the 120-day period. There are,
however, two exceptions to this rule. The first exception is if the Commissioner, through a specific ruling,
misleads a particular taxpayer to prematurely file a judicial claim with the CTA. Such specific ruling is
applicable only to such particular taxpayer. The second exception is where the Commissioner, through a
general interpretative rule issued under Section 4 of the Tax Code, misleads all taxpayers into filing
prematurely judicial claims with the CTA. In these cases, the Commissioner cannot be allowed to later
on question the CTA's assumption of jurisdiction over such claim since equitable estoppel has set in as
expressly authorized under Section 246 of the Tax Code.

BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 is a general interpretative rule because it was a response to a query made, not by a
particular taxpayer, but by a government agency tasked with processing tax refunds and credits

In this case, records show that P&G filed its judicial claims for refund on March 28, 2007 and June 8, 2007,
respectively, or after the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, but before the date when Aichiwas
promulgated. Thus, even though P&G filed its judicial claim without waiting for the expiration of the 120-day
mandatory period, the CTA may still take cognizance of the case because the claim was filed within the
excepted period stated in San Roque. In other words, P&G's judicial claims were deemed timely filed and
should not have been dismissed by the CTA.

The Court further held that while RR 16-2005 may have re-established the necessity of the 120-day period,
taxpayers cannot be faulted for still relying on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 even after the issuance of RR 16-
2005 because the issue on the mandatory compliance of the 120-day period was only brought before the
Court and resolved with finality in Aichi.38

PAN: the issue on the mandatory compliance of the 120-day period was only brought before the Court and
resolved with finality in Aichi. the 120-day period is jurisdictional and mandatory, however it allows
exceptions to its application. The first exception is if the Commissioner, through a specific ruling, misleads a
particular taxpayer to prematurely file a judicial claim with the CTA. Such specific ruling is applicable only to
such particular taxpayer. The second exception is where the Commissioner, through a general
interpretative, misleads all taxpayers into filing prematurely judicial claims with the CTA. In these
cases, the Commissioner cannot be allowed to later on question the CTA's assumption of jurisdiction
over such claim since equitable estoppel has set in.

5. G.R. No. 216161 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PHILIPPINE-ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC.,,

On 16 December 2003, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN)
against respondent covering deficiency taxes for the taxable year 2001. 4 On 28 March 2004, the BIR issued a
Final Assessment Notice (FAN) against respondent, respondent requested for reconsideration of the FAN
issued by the BIR. On 8 November 2006, the BIR issued a Final Decision on Disputed Assessment (FDDA) and
demanded full payment of the deficiency tax assessment from respondent. 6 On 12 April 2007, the FDDA was
served through registered mail.
On 19 July 2007, respondent filed with the BIR an application for the abatement of its tax liabilities for the
taxable year 2001. the BIR denied respondent's application for tax abatement on the ground that the FDDA
was already issued by the BIR and that the FDDA had become final and executory due to the failure of the
respondent to appeal the FDDA with the CTA. The BIR contended that the FDDA had been sent through
registered mail on 12 April 2007 and that the FDDA had become final, executory, and demandable because of
the failure of the respondent to appeal the FDDA with the CTA within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
FDDA.

In a letter dated 19 September 2007,9 respondent informed the BIR that it already paid its tax deficiency on
withholding tax through the Electronic Filing and Payment System of the BIR and that if was also in the
process of availing of the Tax Amnesty Program to settle its deficiency tax assessment for the taxable year
2001. On 21 September 2007, respondent complied with the requirements of RA 9480. In a letter dated 29
January 2008, the BIR denied respondent's request and ordered respondent to pay the deficiency tax

GOVT: In a second letter dated 16 July 2008, the BIR reiterated that the FDDA had become final and
executory for the failure of the respondent to appeal the FDDA with the CTA within the prescribed period of
thirty (30) days. The BIR demanded the full payment of the tax assessment and contended that the
respondent's availment of the tax amnesty under RA 9480 had no effect on the assessment due to the finality
of the FDDA prior to respondent's tax amnesty availment. On 1 August 2008, respondent filed a Petition for
Review with the CTA assailing the letter of the BIR dated 16 July 2008. The CIR asserts that the finality of its
assessment, particularly its FDDA is equivalent to a final and executory judgment by the courts, falling within
the exceptions to the Tax Amnesty Program under Section 8 of RA 9480

PHIL-ALUM: avers that it is entitled to the tax amnesty upon its submission of the required documents

ISSUE: Whether respondent is entitled to the benefits of the Tax Amnesty Program under RA 9480.—YES

RULING: YES.

A tax amnesty is a general pardon or intentional overlooking by the State of its authority to impose penalties
on persons otherwise guilty of evasion or violation of a revenue or tax law. It partakes of an absolute
forgiveness or waiver by the government of its right to collect what is due it and to give tax evaders who wish
to relent a chance to start with a clean slate. A tax amnesty, much like a tax exemption, is never favored nor
presumed in law. The grant of a tax amnesty, similar to a tax exemption, must be construed strictly against
the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. 18

Court held that the taxpayer's completion of the requirements under RA 9480, as implemented by DO 29-07,
will extinguish the taxpayer's tax liability, additions and all appurtenant civil, criminal, or administrative
penalties under the National Internal Revenue Code, to wit:

Considering that the completion of these requirements shall be deemed full compliance with the tax amnesty
program, the law mandates that the taxpayer shall thereafter be immune from the payment of taxes, and
additions thereto, as well as the appurtenant civil, criminal or administrative penalties under the NIRC of
1997, as amended, arising from the failure to pay any and all internal revenue taxes for taxable year 2005 and
prior years

. Section 8(f) is clear: only persons with "tax cases subject of final and executory judgment by the courts" are
disqualified to avail of the Tax Amnesty Program under RA 9480. There must be a judgment promulgated by a
court and the judgment must have become final and executory. Obviously, there is none in this case. The
FDDA issued by the BIR is not a tax, case "subject to a final and executory judgment by the courts" as
contemplated by Section 8(f) of RA 9480. The determination of the tax liability of respondent has not
reached finality and is still not subject to an executory judgment by the courts as it is the issue pending before
this Court

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 19 May 2014 Decision and the 5 January 2015
Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in CTA EB No. 994.

6. G.R. No. 185115 February 18, 2015 NORTHERN MINDANAO POWER CORPORATION, vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, .

Petitioner is engaged in the production sale of electricity as an independent power producer and sells
electricity to National Power Corporation (NPC). It allegedly incurred input value-added tax (VAT) on its
domestic purchases of goods and services that were used in its production and sale of electricity to NPC. For
the 3rd and the 4th quarters of taxable year 1999, petitioner’s input VAT totaled to ₱2,490,960.29, while that
incurred for all the quarters of taxable year 2000 amounted to ₱3,920,932.55. 4

Petitioner filed an administrative claim for a refund on 20 June 2000 for the 3rd and the 4th quarters of
taxable year 1999, and on 25 July 2001 for taxable year 2000 in the sum of ₱6,411,892.84. 5

Thereafter, alleging inaction of respondent on these administrative claims, petitioner filed a Petition 6 with the
CTA on 28 September 2001.

The CTA First Division denied the Petition and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit

GOVT: The Court in Division found that the term "zero-rated" was not imprinted on the receipts or invoices
presented by petitioner in violation of Section 4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95. Petitioner failed to
substantiate its claim for a refund and to strictly comply with the invoicing requirements of the law and tax
regulations

TP: that the Tax Code does not require that the word "zero-rated" be imprinted on the face of the receipt or
invoice. He further pointed out that the absence of that term did not affect the admissibility and competence
of the receipt or invoice as evidence to support the claim for a refund

ISSUE:WON MINDANO MAY CLAIM FOR THE REFUND/ TAX CREDIT No. 7-95 which expanded the
statutory requirements for the issuance of official receipts and invoices found in Section 113 of the 1997 Tax
Code by providing for the additional requirement of the imprinting of the terms "zero-rated" is
unconstitutional.

Company invoices are sufficient to establish the actual amount of sale of electric power services to the
National Power Corporation and therefore sufficient to substantiate Petitioner’s claim for refund

RULING:

NO. Well-settled is the rule that the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter may, at any time, be raised by
the parties or considered by the Court motu proprio.10 Therefore, the jurisdiction of the CTA over petitioner’s
appeal may still be considered and determined by this Court.

In this case, petitioner had until 30 September 2001 and 31 December 2001 for the claims covering the 3rd
and the 4th quarters of taxable year 1999; and 31 March, 30 June, 30 September and 31 December in 2002 for
the claims covering all four quarters of taxable year 2000
For the claims covering the 3rd and the 4th quarters of taxable year 1999 and all the quarters of taxable
year2000, petitioner filed a Petition with the CTA on 28 September 2001.

Both judicial claims must be disallowed.

RR 7-95, which took effect on 1 January 1996, proceeds from the rule-making authority granted to the
Secretary of Finance by the NIRC for the efficient enforcement of the same Tax Code and its amendments. In
Panasonic Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, we
ruled that this provision is "reasonable and is in accord with the efficient collection of VAT from the covered
sales of goods and services." Moreover, we have held in Kepco Philippines Corporation v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue that the subsequent incorporation of Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95 in Section 113 (B) (2) (c) of
R.A. 9337 actually confirmed the validity of the imprinting requirement on VAT invoices or official receipts –
a case falling under the principle of legislative approval of administrative interpretation by reenactment.

In fact, this Court has consistently held as fatal the failure to print the word "zero-rated" on the VAT invoices
or official receipts in claims for a refund or credit of input VAT on zero-rated sales, even if the claims were
made prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9337. Clearly then, the present Petition must be denied.

Finally, as regards the sufficiency of a company invoice to prove the sales of services to NPC, we find this
claim is without sufficient legal basis. Section 113 of the NIRC of 1997 provides that a VAT invoice is
necessary for every sale, barter or exchange of goods or properties, while a VAT official receipt properly
pertains to every lease of goods or properties; as well as to every sale, barter or exchange of services.

The Court has in fact distinguished an invoice from a receipt m Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Manila
Mining Corporation:15

A "sales or commercial invoice" is a written account of goods sold or services rendered indicating the prices
charged therefor or a list by whatever name it is known which is used in the ordinary course of business
evidencing sale and transfer or agreement to sell or transfer goods and services.

A "receipt" on the other hand is a written acknowledgment of the fact of payment in money or other
settlement between seller and buyer of goods, debtor or creditor, or person rendering services and client or
customer.

A VAT invoice is the seller's best proof of the sale of goods or services to the buyer, while a VAT receipt is the
buyer's best evidence of the payment of goods or services received from the seller. A VAT invoice and a VAT
receipt should not be confused and made to refer to one and the same thing. Certainly, neither does the law
intend the two to be used

PEN:

7. G.R. No. 172509 February 4, 2015 CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE