TITLE VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC
07 in
MORALS
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, v.
FERMIN PUNTO,
G.R. No. 46170. September 20, 1939
Facts:
The appellant challenges the constitutionality of
Commonwealth Act No. 235, amendatory to article
195 of the Revised Penal Code on the ground that the
penalty is cruel and unusual (par. 18, Sec. 1, art. III).
The challenge is trivial. The punishment provided, far
from being cruel and unusual, is motivated by a
wholesome purpose, namely, to effectuate early
repression of on evil that, in the opinion of the
Legislature, undermines the social, moral, and
economic growth of the nation, and is best calculated
to answer the ends of precaution necessary to deter
others from the commission of like offenses
Issue:
WON Art. 195 of the RPC is not unconstitutional.
Held:
The penalty for the violation charged is prision
correccional in its medium degree. There being
present the aggravating circumstance of recidivism,
which is offset by the mitigating circumstance of plea
of guilty, the prescribed penalty should be imposed in
its medium period, that is, from two years, eleven
months, and eleven days to three years, six months,
and twenty days of prision correccional. The
maximum penalty imposed by the court is, therefore,
within the prescribed range.
THE UNITED STATES vs. PRUDENCIO
SALAVERIA,
G.R. No. L-13678 November 12, 1918
Facts:
The municipal council of Orion, Bataan, enacted, on
February 28, 1917, an ordinance which, among other
things, prohibited the playing of panguingue on days
not Sundays or legal holidays, and penalized the
violation thereof by a casero [housekeeper] by a fine
of not less than P10 nor more than P200, and by
jugadores [gamblers] by a fine of not less than P5 nor
more than P200. The justice of the peace of Orion,
when this ordinance went into effect, was Prudencio
Salaveria, The chief of police took possession of the
cards, the counters (sigayes), a tray, an P2.
money, used in the game.
Issue:
WON Salaveria is criminally liable
Held:
Yes, being a member of the Judiciary. Instead of
enforcing the law, he has scorned it. His example to
the people of Orion has been pernicious in its
influence. If gambling is to be suppressed, not only
the weak and ignorant must be punished, but those
with full knowledge of the law and the consequences
of violation. We would accordingly suggest to Courts
of First Instance that in all cases arising under the
Gambling Law or ordinances, except for unusual
circumstances, a prison sentence should be imposed,
if permitted by the law or ordinance. We further
suggest that, where the defendant has been found
guilty and is a man of station, he be given the
maximum penalty.lawphil.net
US vs Rafael
39 Phil 102
Facts:
On August 1 of the present year, 1911, and in the
jurisdiction of this municipality of Iloilo, Philippine
Islands, the said accused, Cayetano Rafael,
Perseveranda Lopez, Victor Discipulo, Victoriano
Rafael and Guillermo Juanesa did intentionally bets
in money, the game of chance called monte; in
violation of the law.
Issue:
WON there is Gambling.
Held:
Yes, The use of money in playing the prohibited
game of monte is not necessary to constitute a
violation of the law. The purpose of the law was to
prohibit absolutely the game of monte in the
Philippine Islands. The mere fact that money was or
was not used, in no way constitutes a necessary
element of the game. "Any representative of value or
of any valuable consideration or thing used in playing
the prohibited game of monte, constitutes a violation
of the law.
US v. Palma
4 Phil 547
Facts:
The appellants were convicted of playing the game of
hueteng in violation of article 343 of the Penal Code,
Santiago Palma on the ground that he was the owner
of the gambling house and Francisco Palma on the
ground that he was a player.
Issue:
WON the proof is sufficient.
Held:
Proof that the game of hueteng had been played once
in the house of a defendant is not sufficient to convict
him of being the owner of a gambling house.
US v. Filart, et al., 30 Phil 80
Facts:
Where it appeared that appellants entered into an
agreement whereby they would jointly sell to the
public 450 tickets, successively numbered from one,
up, each number representing a chance on an
automobile which was to be drawn by lot as a prize
as soon as the tickets so numbered were sold; and
that the winner of the automobile was determined in
the following manner: The numbers composing the
450, each written on a separate piece of paper, were
placed together in a box and thoroughly mixed; a boy
was selected by the appellants who placed his hand in
the box and drew out a number; this he delivered to a
person placed there by the appellants for that
purpose, who unfolded the paper and read the number
in a loud voice, while one of the appellants, with a
list of the 450 numbers referred to, struck therefrom
the number corresponding to that drawn from the
box; this being repeated until all of the numbers were
drawn from the box and stricken from the list; that
the last number drawn from the box was the winning
number and that the owner of that number won and
received the automobile as a prize.
Issue:
WON the acts Constitute Gambling.
Held:
Yes, That this was a scheme by which a result was
reached by some action or means taken in which
result man’s choice or will had no part, nor could
human reason, foresight, sagacity, or design enable
one to know or determine the result until the same
had been accomplished; and that it was a scheme for
the distribution of prizes by chance among persons
who had paid a valuable consideration for the chance
to obtain the prize; and that it was a lottery or a game
of chance within the definition found in Act No.
1757, known as the Gambling Law, and the persons
promoting the same were guilty of a violation of that
Act.
El Debate vs Topacio, 44 Phil 280
Facts:
On November 16, 1922, El Debate, a newspaper of
the City of Manila, published a full page
announcement which in translation reads as follows:
P18,000.00
HOW WIN THEM?
READ THE FOLLOWING
GRAND NUMBER CONTEST
El Debate opens on this date two contests:
The first contest is for the award of prizes for the
nearest approximate guesses as to the total number of
votes that will be cast for any of the winning
candidates for Carnival Queen either in the provinces
or in Manila. This contest will close at noon,
December 23d.
The second contest is for the award for the nearest
approximate guesses as to the total number of votes
that the Queen elect will receive for the Carnival
queenship. This second contest will close at noon of
the day in which the final canvass of the Carnival
queen contest will take place.
Issue:
WON the scheme is gambling
Held:
Yes, The purpose of El Debate in devising its
advertising scheme was to augment its circulation
and thus to increase the number of newspaper readers
in the Philippines — which is commendable. But the
advertisement carries along with it a lottery scheme
— which is not commendable.
The evils to society arising from the encouragement
of the gambling spirit have been recognized here and
elsewhere. Experience has shown that the common
forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous
when placed in contrast with the widespread
pestilence of lotteries. The former are confined to a
few persons and places, but the latter infest the whole
community; they enter every dwelling; they reach
every class; they prey upon the hard-earned wages of
the poor; they plunder the ignorant and simple.
US vs Jose, 34 Phil 715
Facts:
The municipality of Gasan, on the Islands of
Marinduque advertised for proposals to furnish the
municipality with street lamps. The defendant, in
answer to such advertisement, submitted a
proposition in writing by which he agreed to furnish
the municipality the lamps at a price therein named.
He was at that time a member of the municipal
council.
Issue:
WON the crime has been committed.
Held:
No, The submission, by a member of a municipal
council, of a proposition to do certain work for the
municipality, which proposition was never accepted,
is not a violation of article 28 of the Municipal code,
which punishes an officer of a municipality who
becomes interested in any contract work of the
municipality.
US vs Reyes, 23 Phil 41
Facts:
The accused did not represent a lottery and that the
sole purpose of the accused in printing the lottery
tickets and disposing of them was to secure money by
fraudulent representation.\
Issue:
WON the crime has been committed.
Held:
Yes, it is not necessary that the lottery ticket be
genuine, as it is enough that they be given the
appearance of lottery tickets.
US v. Samaniego, 16 Phil 663
Facts:
On 25th day of November, 1907, in the city of
Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Manuel
Samaniego did then and there willfully lie with and
have sexual intercourse with the said accused, Juana
Benedicto de Perez, who was then and there, as the
said accused Manuel Samaniego then and there well
knew, a married woman and the lawfully wedded
wife of Jose Perez Siguenza; and the said accused
Juana Benedicto de Perez, being then and there a
married woman and the lawfully wedded wife of the
said Jose Perez Siguenza, did then and there lie with
and have sexual intercourse with the said accused,
Manuel Samaniego.
Issue:
WON it constitute grave scandal.
Held:
No, The acts complained of lack many of the
elements essential to bring them within the purview
of the article of the Penal Code invoked by the
prosecution. Every act that was in anywise public
fails entirely of those qualities which offend modesty
and good morals by "grievous scandal or enormity."
The occurrence at the residence on the night of the
6th of November did not have that publicity which is
required by the article of the Penal Code referred to.
U.S v. Catajay, 6Phil 399
Facts:
It appears, however, that the acts complained of were
committed at night, in a private house, and at a time
when no one was present except the accused, the
mistress of the house, and one servant, and we are of
opinion that these circumstances do not constitute
that degree of publicity which is an essential element
of the crime defined and penalized in article 441 of
the Penal Code.

Issue:
WON it constitute grave scandal
Held:
Yes, That it is an essential element of the crime
defined and penalized therein that the acts
complained of resulted in a grave public scandal.
Pp v. Kottinger
45 Phil. 352
Facts:
Accused Kottinger’s camera business was raided.
Among the material confiscated were some pictures
that show Filipino inhabitants in their native dress.
Using these items, he was charged of violating
section 12 of Act No. 277. His pictures were being
used as post cards as non- Christians of natives of the
country.
Issue:
Whether accused violated Section 12 of Act No. 277?
Held:
Although Philippine Laws do not define what
obscenity means, the Court defined obscene or
obscenity as “something offensive to chastity,
decency or delicacy”. There are two tests whether
something is obscene: (1) whether it corrupts the
mind of the viewers to such immoral influences; (2)
or it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men
as an indecency. In the case at bar, the pictures
merely portrayed the inhabitants in their native dress
as testified by UP Professor.
Pp v. Go pin
G.r. No. L-7491. August 8, 1955
Facts:
Go Pin, an alien and a Chinese citizen, was charged
with a violation of Art. 201 of the Revised Penal
Code for having exhibited in the City of Manila at the
Globe Arcade, which are allegedly indecent and/or
immoral.
Issue:
Whether the effect of that paintings and pictures of
women in the nude, including sculptures of that kind
are not offensive because they are made and
presented for the sake of art?
Held:
In this case the pictures were not used exactly for
art’s sake but for commercial pictures. The persons
who went to the art exhibit was satisfying their
morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, including the
youth who because of their immaturity are not in a
position to resist and shield themselves from the ill
and perverting effects of these pictures.
PEOPLE vs. APARICI
52 OG 249
Facts:
The accused was caught while performing in a theater
wearing nylon patches to cover her breasts and nylon
panty. She avers that she was performing and artistic
hula-hula dance to portray a widow who lost her
husband after being killed by a Japanese. However the
crowed watching were howling and cheering to
continue her performance because they were sexually
aroused.
Issue:
WON accused is guilty of Article 201 of the RPC
Ruling:
The test of obscenity is whether the tendency of the
matter charged as obscene is to deprave or corrupt
those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences. The test therefore was satisfied with the
crowds reaction. Her defense that the crowd was of
lower class was not supported by any proof. Moreover
it doesn’t matter what class the crowd belonged to.
What is important is 'paricci while performing the
hula-hula dance was able to induced or encourage the
crowd to think of immoral acts. She is therefore guilty
of obscenity
PEOPLE vs. PADAN (101 PHIL. 749)
FACTS:
In September 1953 accused Jose Fajador as the
manager and Ernesto Reyes as ticket collector and or
exhibitor hired their co-accused Marina Palan and
Cosme Espinosa to act as performers or exhibitionists.
In fact, they actually performed sexual intercourse in
the presence of many spectators, thereby exhibiting or
performing highly immoral and indecent acts.

ISSUE:
Whether they violated Art. 201 of the RPC
HELD:
The Supreme Court has had occasion to consider
offenses like the exhibition of still or moving pictures
of women in the nude, which it condemned for
obscenity and offensive to morals. In those cases, one
might yet claim that there was involved the element of
art; that connoisseurs of the same, and painters and
sculptors might find inspiration in the showing of
pictures in the nude, or the human body exhibited in
sheer nakedness as models in tableaux vivants (silent
and motionless group of people arranged to represent
a scene or incident).
But an actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by
acts of lasciviousness, can have no redeeming features.
In it, there is no room for art. One can see nothing in it
but clear and unmitigated obscenity, indecency and an
offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it
does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a
corrupting influence especially on the youth of the
land. Thus, considering the seriousness of the crime,
the relatively severe penalty imposed by the trial court
is proper.
Fernando v CA G.R. No. 159751 December 6,
2006
Facts:
Acting on reports of sale and distribution of
pornographic materials, officers of the Philippine
National Police CIDG conducted police surveillance
on the store bearing the name of Gaudencio E.
Fernando Music Fair (Music Fair). On May 5, 1999,
Judge Perfecto Laguio of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 19, issued Search Warrant No. 99-
1216 for violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code against petitioner Gaudencio E. Fernando and a
certain Warren Tingchuy. The warrant ordered the
search of the store for copies of New Rave, Hustler,
IOU magazine, and VHS tapes. On the same day,
police officers of the PNP-CIDG NCR served the
warrant on Rudy Estorninos, who, according to the
prosecution, introduced himself as the store attendant
of Music Fair. The police searched the premises and
confiscated twenty-five (25) VHS tapes and ten (10)
different magazines, which they deemed
pornographic.
Issue:
Whether the appellate court erred in affirming the
petitioners’ conviction.
Held:
No. Petition dismissed. As obscenity is an unprotected
speech which the State has the right to regulate, the
State in pursuing its mandate to protect, as parens
patriae, the public from obscene, immoral and
indecent materials must justify the regulation or
limitation.
One such regulation is Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code. To be held liable, the prosecution must
prove that (a) the materials, publication, picture or
literature are obscene; and (b) the offender sold,
exhibited, published or gave away such materials.
Necessarily, that the confiscated materials are obscene
must be proved.
Also, “that which shocks the ordinary and common
sense of men as an indecency.” The disclaimer was
whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend
upon the circumstances of the case, and that
ultimately, the question is to be decided by the
judgment of the aggregate sense of the community
reached by it.
However, the pictures here in question were used not
exactly for art’s sake but rather for commercial
purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic
qualities of said pictures were being commercialized
so that the cause of art was of secondary or minor
importance. Gain and profit would appear to have
been the main, if not the exclusive consideration in
their exhibition; and it would not be surprising if the
persons who went to see those pictures and paid
entrance fees for the privilege of doing so, were not
exactly artists and persons interested in art and who
generally go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy
and improve their artistic tastes, but rather people
desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste,
and lust, and for love [of] excitement, including the
youth who because of their immaturity are not in a
position to resist and shield themselves from the ill and
perverting effects of these pictures
PEOPLE VS SITON
GR No. 169364
FACTS:
That on or about November 14, 2003, Evangeline
Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano wandered and
loitered around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets, Davao
City, without any visible means to support herself nor
lawful and justifiable purpose. They were charged
with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 of the RPC.
ISSUE:
WON the crime charged is proper
HELD:
Yes. Vagrancy under Article 202 of the Revised Penal
Code offers no guidelines or any other reasonable
indicators to differentiate those who have no visible
means of support by force of circumstance and those
who choose to loiter about and bum around.
In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph
(2), which defines a vagrant as any person found
loitering about public or semi-public buildings or
places, or tramping or wandering about the country or
the streets without visible means of support. This
provision was based on the second clause of Section 1
of Act No. 519 which defined vagrant as every person
found loitering about saloons or dramshops or
gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the
country without visible means of support. The second
clause was essentially retained with the modification
that the places under which the offense might be
committed is now expressed in general terms public or
semi-public places.
Article 202 of the RPC were crafted to maintain
minimum standards of decency, morality and civility
in human society. These laws may be traced all the
way back to ancient times, and today, they have also
come to be associated with the struggle to improve the
citizens quality of life, which is guaranteed by our
Constitution.
U.S v.VALERIANO MOLINA
G.R. No. L-7529
November 19, 1912
FACTS:
The defendant was discharged from Bilibid Prison
after serving a short sentence for a violation of the
Opium Law; that from that time until the date of his
prosecution on this charge of vagrancy, he had been
engaged in no legal occupation, and was without any
apparent means of support other than that supplied him
by his mother; that he is an able-bodied man of 33
years of age; that he habitually neglected to apply
himself to any lawful calling, and that he spent his time
in loitering about the streets and frequenting cockpits.
ISSUE:
Whether the appeal to reverse conviction of the
accused should be granted?
HELD:
NO. The Supreme Court did not find that the claim
by this able-bodied man, 33 years of age, that he was
living on the charity of his mother, can be said to rebut
the other evidence in the record which tended to
disclose that he had no apparent means of support. He
had no legal or moral claim upon his mother for
support, and indeed, from the indications in the record
as to the scanty means possessed by the mother, it
would appear that it was his final duty to aid her rather
than to call upon her for aid.
U.S v. WILLIAM C. HART
G.R. No. L-8848
November 21, 1913
Facts:
The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were
found guilty on a charge of vagrancy under the
provisions of Act No. 519. All three appealed and
presented evidence showing that each of the
defendants was earning a living at a lawful trade or
business sufficient enough to support themselves.
Issue:
Whether Hart, Miller and Natividad are guilty of
vagrancy?
Held:
Considering that the argument of the Attorney-
General would suggest a lack of logical classification
on the part of the legislature of the various classes of
vagrants and since it was proven that all three of the
defendants were earning a living by legitimate means
at a level of comfort higher than usual, Hart, Miller
and Natividad were acquitted.
U.S v. De la Cruz
38 Phil 677
Facts:
Defendant, in the heat of passion, killed his querida
upon catching her red-handed in the arms of another.
Trial Court convicted defendant of homicide and
sentenced him to 14 years 8 months 1 day of reclusion
temporal.
Issue:
Whether there is a extenuating or mitigating
circumstances present?
Held:
Yes, defendant acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation
when he caught his querida in carnal communication
with a mutual acquaintance.
Art. 203 - Who are public officers
G.R. No. L-2971 April 20, 1951
FELICIANO MANIEGO y CATU, petitioner,
vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
FACTS:
That on February 27, 1947, the accused, although
appointed as a laborer, had been placed in charge of
issuing summons and subpoenas for traffic violations.
It appears furthermore, that the accused had been
permitted to write motions for dismissal of prescribed
traffic cases against offenders without counsel, and to
submit them to the Court for action, without passing
through the regular clerk. On the day in question, Felix
Rabia, the complainant herein, appeared and inquired
from the accused about a subpoena that he received.
He was informed that it was in connection with a
traffic violation for which said Rabia had been
detained and given traffic summons by an American
MP.
According to Felix Rabia and Agent No. 19 (La
forteza) of the National Bureau of Investigation, the
accused informed Rabia that the latter was subject to a
fine of P15; that Rabia inquired whether the same
could be reduced because he had no money, and that
the accused informed Rabia that he could fix the case
if Rabia would pay him P10; which Rabia did and the
accused pocketed.
ISSUE:
WON the accused is a public officer.
HELD:
There can be no question that petitioner was a public
officer within the meaning of article 203, which
includes all persons "who, by direct provision of law,
popular election or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of public
functions in the Philippine Government, or shall
perform in said government or any of its branches,
public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate
official or any rank or class." That definition is quite
comprehensive, embracing as it does, every public
servant from the highest to the lowest. For the
purposes of the Penal Code, it obliterates the standard
distinction in the law of public officers between
"officer" and "employee".
Morifosque vs People
G.R. No. 156685
July 27, 2004
Facts:
On or about October 13, 1990 in Legazpi City,
petitioner Nazario Morifosque accused a public officer
being a qualified member of the Police Force of
Legazpi City, now under the Philippine National
Police, taking advantage of his official/public
position.
On October 13, 1990 at around 5:00 in the afternoon,
Hian Hian Yu Sy and her husband, Arsenio Sy, went
to the office of Captain Alberto Salvo, Chief of the
Intelligence and Operating Division stationed at the
Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) in Region 5, to
report the robbery of Shellane tanks at the gasoline
station of her father, Yu So Pong, and the alleged
extortion attempt by petitioner, Police Sergeant
Narciso Marifosque, in exchange for the recovery of
the lost items. Captain Salvo and his men set up a plan
to entrap the petitioner. Hian Hian Yu Sy prepared the
pay-off money in the amount of P4,800.00 and listed
down the serial numbers of the bills. The pay-off was
scheduled at 7:00 in the evening of that day in Golden
Grace Department Store which was owned by Yu So
Pong. At around 6:15 p.m., Captain Calvo and his men
arrived at the target area and strategically positioned
themselves outside the Golden Grace Department
Store to await the arrival of the suspect.
Shortly thereafter, petitioner Marifosque arrived on
board a tricycle. He went inside the store and
demanded the money from Hian Hian Yu Sy and Yu
So Pong. The latter handed to him the marked money,
which was wrapped in a newspaper. When petitioner
stepped out of the store, Arsenio Sy gave the pre-
arranged signal, whereupon the arresting operatives
swooped down upon the suspect and arrested him.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused is a public officer
Held:
There is no question that petitioner was a public officer
within the contemplation of Article 203 of the Revised
Penal Code, which includes all persons "who, by direct
provision of law, popular election or appointment by
competent authority, shall take part in the performance
of public functions in the Philippine Government, or
shall perform in said government or any of its
branches, public duties as an employee, agent or
subordinate official or any rank or class." At the time
of the incident, petitioner was a police sergeant
assigned to the Legazpi City Police Station. He
directly received the bribe money from Yu So Pong
and his daughter Hian Hian Yu Sy in exchange for the
recovery of the stolen cylinder tanks, which was an act
not constituting a crime within the meaning of Article
210 of the Revised Penal Code. The act of receiving
money was connected with his duty as a police officer.
Art. 204 – Knowingly rendering unjust judgment
GATAMCO vs CHAN SENG, et.al.
46 PHUIL 542
STA.MARIA vs UBAY
87 SCRA 179
[G.R. No. 9600. October 1, 1914. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
EUGENIO GACUTAN, Defendant-Appellant.
FACTS:
On July 20, 1912, Elias Pagulayan was charged before
the accused, a justice of the peace in and for the pueblo
of Solana, Cagayan Province, with the theft of a horse
belonging to one Pascua; that on or about July 31,
1912, the accused promised Pascua that, in
consideration of the delivery to him of a female
carabao worth P80 he would decide the case against
Pagulayan regardless of the evidence; that said
carabao was delivered in pursuance of that agreement;
that Gacutan, fulfilling his promise, did on August 12,
1912, convict the said Pagulayan of the crime of
larceny and sentence him to six months’
imprisonment, to pay the costs, and to indemnify
Pascua in the sum of P50, the value of the horse
alleged to have been stolen; that the sentence imposed
was not executed for the reason that on August 23,
1912, the accused transferred the cause to the Court of
First Instance, the same, under Act No. 2030 of the
Philippine Legislature, not being within his
jurisdiction. Gacutan, the accused, was, on the 2d of
October, 1913, convicted of bribery in the Court of
First Instance of Cagayan, it having been found that he
accepted from Pascua a carabao as a bribe in
consideration of which he agreed to and subsequently
did decide a criminal case then pending before him
against Pagulayan and in favor of the people without
regard to the evidence upon which the same was
founded.
ISSUE:
WON the conviction of the accused and sentencing
him as he was sentenced was proper.
HELD:
We do not believe that the conviction can stand.
The information is based on article 347 of the Penal
Code which provides that "any judge who shall
knowingly render an unjust decision against the
defendant, etc.," shall be punished as provided
therein.
Moreover, it does not appear that the accused knowing
rendered an unjust judgment even if we concede that
the judgment was unjust. The mere fact that the court
may not have had jurisdiction of the subject matter of
the action does not necessarily establish the fact that
his judgment was unjust. He may have been honestly
mistaken with respect to his jurisdiction. In fact, this
seems to have been precisely the case, for, on being
informed of the existence of the law depriving his
court of jurisdiction in such cases, he immediately set
aside his judgment of conviction and sent the case to
the Court of First Instance for trial.
DIEGO vs CASTILLO
436 SCRA 67
FACTS:
Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de
Perio, Jr., both Filipinos, solemnized before then
Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City. Jorge filed a
Decree of Divorce in Texas. Crescencia Escoto using
the name Lucena Escoto married Manuel P. Diego
before the Rev. Fr. Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan
City. The sister of Manuel P. Diego filed a criminal
case of bigamy against Escoto. The RTC rendered a
judgment of acquittal since state failed to prove guilt
beyond whisper of a doubt and gave credence to the
defense of the accused that she acted without any
malicious intent for believing in good faith that her
marriage was already annulled by a foreign judgment.
An administrative case is filed against Judge Silverio
Q. Castillo for Knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment under Article 204[7] of the Revised Penal
Code
ISSUE:
W/N Castillo should be liable against Article 204[7]
of the Revised Penal Code
HELD:
NO. Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is
FINED P10,000 with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. The law requires that (a) the offender
is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case
submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is
unjust; (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust. Even
assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused,
he still cannot be administratively charged lacking the
element of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose· As a
matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his
official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action,
even though such acts are erroneous.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations are sufficient defenses in
which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can
find refuge. The error committed by respondent Judge
being gross and patent, the same constitutes ignorance
of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary
action
Art. 205 Judgment rendered through negligence
Evangelista v. Hon. Baes, 61 SCRA 67
Facts:
The judge may be suspended or removed in the same
manner and upon the same grounds as judges of the
Court of First Instance. Because Evangelista's letter is
not sworn to, does not set out facts constituting any
alleged serious misconduct or inefficiency of the
respondent, and merely requests this Court to order the
agrarian court to decide a certain case within a
specified period, the said letter may not properly be
treated as an administrative complaint.
Issue:
WON the acts is punishable.
Held:
No, although there may be abuse of discretion in
issuing an order, it does not necessarily follow that
there is bad faith or that said abuse of discretion
signifies ignorance of the law on the part of a judge.
Yaranon v. Judge Rubio, 66 SCRA 67
Facts:
Administrative complaint against respondent Judge
Antonio Rubio of the Municipality of Inopacan Leyte
for alleged (1) incompetence and/or ignorance of the
law and (2) delaying justice. Respondent who is now
dead, having died on May 15, 1975, denied all the
charges. We could have dismissed this case for being
academic, but We have decided to make this resolution
of exoneration in order to clear his name and to entitle
his widow and legal heirs to receive what is due them
under the law.
Issue:
WON the Judge should be charge of knowingly
rendering an unjust judgement.
Held:
No, mere error of judgment cannot serve as basis for a
charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,
where no proof or even allegation of bad faith, or ill
motive, or improper consideration,
ART. 206 Unjust interlocutory order
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Maynila
Railroad Company v. Yard Crew Union, et al., 109
Phil 143
Facts:
On March 7, 1955, the Kapisanan Ng Mga
Manggagawa Sa Manila Railroad Company,
hereinafter called Kapisanan, filed a petition (Case No.
237-MC), praying that it be certified as the exclusive
bargaining agent in the Manila Railroad Company,
hereinafter called Company. A decision was
promulgated on September 29, 1956, affirmed by the
Court en banc on January 16, 1957, in which the
respondent Court found three unions appropriate for
purposes of collective bargaining. After the decision
had become final, Case No. 491-MC was filled on
September 20, 1957, amended on August 13, 1958, by
the Manila Railroad Yard Crew Union, praying that it
be defined as a separate unit; Case No. 494-MC, on
September 25, 1957, amended on August 13, 1958, by
the Station Employees' Union, praying that it be
constituted as a separate bargaining unit, and Case No.
507- MC, on November 30, 1957, by the Railroad
Engineering Department Union, praying that it be
defined as a separate bargaining unit. All asked that
they be certified in the units sought to be separated.
The respondent unions are legitimate labor
organizations with certificates of registration in the
Department of Labor.
Issue:
WON the test for interlocutory order is complied with.
Held:
No, The test in determining whether an order or
judgment is interlocutory or final is "Does it leave
something to be done in the trial court with respect to
the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if
it does not, it is final". Having in view the avowed
purpose of the orders in question, as heretofore
exposed, one should not stretch his imagination far to
see that they are clearly interlocutory, as they leave
something more to be done in the trial court and do not
decide one way or the other the petitions of the
respondent unions. We are, therefore, constrained to
hold, as we do hereby hold, that the present appeals or
petitions for review by certiorari, are not authorized
by law and should be dismissed (Section 2, Rule 44,
Rules of Court). There is, moreover, nothing, under
the facts obtaining in these cases and the law on the
subject, which would warrant this Court to declare the
orders under consideration, illegal.
ART. 207. Malicious Delay in the administration of
Justice
US v. Mendoza, 23 Phil. 194
Facts:
For the foregoing reasons, and in view of the
preliminary investigations made by the justice of the
peace of Paniqui, the provincial fiscal, on September
5, 1910, filed an information in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac, charging Vicente Mendoza as
accessory after the fact in the crime of arson. After due
trial, judgment was rendered on May 22, 1911,
whereby the defendant was sentenced to the penalty of
two years four months and one day of presidio
correccional, to the accessories, with allowance of
one-half of the time of his detention, and to payment
of the costs; from which judgment he appealed. Had
the accused barrio-lieutenant incurred responsibility
by his conduct, he should have been charged with the
crime of "prevaricacion" under article 355 of the Penal
Code, for neglect of the duties of his office by
maliciously failing to move the prosecution and
punishment of the delinquent.
Issue:
WON there is Malicious Delay.
Held:
No, there are indications that the fire was accidental
and, if so, the acquittal of the accused in the other case
was perhaps due to the lack of proof of his guilt as an
incendiary and to the fact that the acts charged do not
constitute a crime. Therefore, upon this hypothesis,
and because the alleged incendiary was acquitted, it is
neither proper nor possible to convict the defendant,
Mendoza, as accessory after the fact, of Bernabe
Mangunay, who was acquitted of the said crime of
arson.
People v. Mina, 65 Phil 621
Facts:
The provincial fiscal having filed a motion in the
above- entitled case praying for the dismissal of the
case, and the court having found meritorious the
reasons alleged therein, said case is hereby dismissed,
as prayed, with costs de oficio, and the bond filed for
the temporary release of the accused is hereby ordered
cancelled.
Issue:
WON there is Malicious Delay.
Held:
No, The duty imposed upon the provincial fiscal in
such cases is either to go forward with the prosecution
or to move the court to dismiss the complaint, and in
either event to move with the promptitude necessary
to secure the right of the accused to a speedy trial. It
is, in part, to aid him in determining the course to be
adopted at this stage of the proceedings that provision
is made in section 2 of Act No. 302 for official
investigations by provincial fiscals. But it is to be
observed that it is expressly provided that: ’This
section shall not be construed to authorize a provincial
fiscal to act as justice of the peace in any preliminary
investigation, but only as authorizing him to secure the
attendance of witnesses before him in making
necessary investigation for the purpose of instituting
or carrying on criminal prosecutions.
Vda. De Bagatua, et al., v. Revilla and Lomines, 104
Phil 392
Facts:
Upon receipt of said complaint, the Assistant City
Attorney of Quezon City, acting for the City Attorney,
conducted a preliminary investigation which lasted for
several days, during which occasions both parties were
duly represented by counsel. Testimonial as well as
documentary evidence was presented and after the
parties had filed their respective memoranda, the
Assistant City Attorney, in a memorandum addressed
to the City Attorney recommended the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit. Accordingly, the
complaint was dismissed.
Issue:
WON there is Malicious Prosecution.
Held:
No, appellants in charging that there was a grave abuse
of discretion involved herein bring out the fact that the
preliminary investigation elicited no improper motive
on the part of said complainants (appellants) to accuse
Pangilinan of the offense charged, and thus considered
the dismissal of the complaint as erroneous. The
absence of motive alone is not sufficient to presume
the existence of a prima facie case. The circumstances
and evidence on record must be taken together before
such a conclusion may be arrived at. We have gone
over the report or memorandum of the Assistant City
Attorney and from the facts established by the
preliminary investigation conducted by him as well as
the reasons given for the dismissal of the complaint,
we could glean nothing that would reveal or tend to
reveal any semblance of abuse perpetrated by
respondents and appellees.
People vs. Malabanan, 62 Phil 786
Facts:
In July, 1933, appellant was municipal president of the
of San Juan, Province of Batangas, and was engaged
in raising funds for the construction of a ward in the
provincial hospital for tubercular patients.
Notwithstanding all his efforts to secure contributions,
he was unable to approximate the quota which had
been set for his town by the provincial authorities, and
he therefore on July 22, and July 29, organized and
held cock-fights, neither day being authorized by law
for such purposes.
Issue:
WON there is Malicious Prosecution.
Held:
No, It is not clear whether the government is claiming
the right to punish appellant because he did not
institute prosecution against himself for organizing a
cock-fight on a day other than those permitted by law
or, under the last clause, that it was his duty to have
prosecutions instituted against all who attended the
cock-fights and bet money thereon.
ART. 209. Betrayal of Trust by an attorney or
solicitor
People vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 115439, July
16, 1997
Facts:
Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting
Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del
Sur. Respondent Paredes was successively the
Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor
of the same province, and is at present a Congressman.
Respondent Sansaet was a practicing attorney who
served as counsel for Paredes in several instances
pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the
present recourse.
Issue:
WON there is a betrayal or Trust.
Held:
No, it does not appear that respondent Sansaet has at
any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude. Thus, with the confluence of all the
requirements for the discharge of this respondent, both
the Special Prosecutor and the Solicitor General
strongly urge and propose that he be allowed to testify
as a state witness. This Court is not unaware of the
doctrinal rule that, on this procedural aspect, the
prosecution may propose but it is for the trial court, in
the exercise of its sound discretion, to determine the
merits of the proposal and make the corresponding
disposition.
ART. 210. Direct Bribery
People vs. Sope, 75 Phil 810
Facts:
The Court made the pronouncement that it is very
logical that the prosecuting attorney, being the one
charged with the prosecution of offenses, should
determine the information to be filed and cannot be
controlled by the offended party.
Issue:
WON Bribery exist.
Held:
No, because the gift must be either voluntarily offered
by a private person or solicited by the public officer
here, all the elements are absent.
US v. Gimenea, 24 Phil 470
Facts:
They were convicted them of conspiring to possess
and to distribute unlawful drugs, the judge ordered a
new trial because, under Cruz, the jury could not
convict respondents unless it believed they had joined
the conspiracy before the police seized the drugs, and
it had not been so instructed. The new jury convicted
respondents, who appealed.
Issue:
WON the act constitutes direct bribery.
Held:
No, inorder to commit direct bribery all the requisites
must concur. That the act constituting the crime relates
to the exercise of the office which the public officer
discharges.
U.S. vs Richards
No. 2024, 30 October 1906
FACTS:
Richards, veterinarian of the Board of Health,
received a sum of money from S.A. Reich, an importer
of Mules from China. Such money was said to be
given by the latter as he believed that it was customary
for the merchants to pay gratuities to public officials
and he only took into consideration that Richards came
right away to examine his mules thus saving him a lot
of expenses.
ISSUE:
May Richards be convicted of Direct Bribery?
RULING:
No. In order to convict a person of a violation of this
article it is necessary to prove that he received money
or other article of value, and having received it, agreed
to do an unlawful act, or that a promise or offer was
made to him to give him money if he would commit
an unlawful act and that he did agree to commit the
unlawful act in consideration of the promise or offer.
It is not necessary in either case that the evidence show
an express promise. It is sufficient if from all the
circumstances in the case such promise can be implied.
But in this case, there is insufficient evidence to say
that there be a promise, expressed or implied between
Richards and Reich.
People vs Abesamis
GR No. L-5284, Sep 11, 1953
FACTS:
Eduardo Abesamis was then the Justice of the Peace
of Echague and Angadanan, Isabela demanded and
received P1,100.00 from Marciana Sauri with the
agreement that he would dismiss the case for Robbery
in Band with Rape against Emiliano Castillo, son of
Sauri, which was then pending in his Court.
ISSUE:
Is the act of Judge Abesamis constitutes Direct Bribery
under Art. 210 of the Revised Penal Code?
RULING:
No. To fall within the first paragraph of Art 210, the
act which the public officer has agreed to perform
must be criminal. To dismiss a criminal complaint, as
Judge Abesamis is alleged to have agreed to do in the
present case, does not necessarily constitute a criminal
act, for the dismissal may be proper, there being no
allegation to the contrary. The second paragraph,
however, distinguishes between two cases: one in
which the act agreed to be performed has been
accomplished, but there is telling whether the
information is for one or the other. The information
is, therefore, defective in that aspect.
But while the information is insufficient to hold Judge
Abesamis for trial for direct bribery under the first or
second paragraph of Article 210, it is a sufficient
indictment for indirect bribery under Article 211.
U.S. vs Navarro
No. 1586, 09 April 1904
FACTS:
Felipe Navarro, the acting sanitary inspector for the
City of Manila Board of Health received P3.50 from
Tiong Siaco and San Kaco in the end that the former
should abstain from reporting to his superior that the
two Chinamen had violated the health ordinances and
regulations of the City of Manila.
ISSUE:
Is Navarro guilty of Direct Bribery?
RULING:
Yes. Article 383 of the Penal Code, reads as: "When
the purpose of the gift received or promised was that
the public official should abstain from performing an
act which he should perform in the exercise of the
duties of his office …”. Navarro daily inspects the
house of the Chinamen and will them that it was dirty
and will collect money from Tiong Siaco for him “not
to report” the result of the said inspection to the
Sanitary Board.
18. U.S. vs Jader
No. 339, 18 July 1902
FACTS:
Damaso Jader, as cabeza de barangay and teniente of
the barrio of the town of Candelaria, accepted cocks,
hens, bamboo, and other articles under promise to
relieve the persons from whom he had obtained them
of the obligation to perform certain duties which they,
as citizens, were required to perform.
ISSUE:
Is Jader guilty of Bribery?
RULING:
No, he committed the crime of Estafa, and not of
Bribery. The articles received by Jader were not
offered to him nor were they donated by the five
taxpayers of his department for the purpose of
corrupting him and in order to induce him to omit the
performance of his duty, but were demanded by the
defendant, who thereby abused his office as cabeza de
barangay and teniente of the barrio.
G.R. No. L-58889 July 31, 1986
NATHANIEL S. MANIPON, JR., petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Second Division composed of
HON. BERNARDO P. FERNANDEZ as Acting
Presiding Justice and HON. BUENAVENTURA J.
GUERRERO and HON. MOISES C. KALLOS, as
Associate Justices, respondents.
FACTS:
Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., a deputy sheriff of the Court
of First Instance of Baguio City and Benguet, Branch
IV, was assigned to enforce an order of the Minister of
Labor dated October 31, 1979 directing the Sheriff of
Baguio City or his deputy to execute the decision of
the labor arbiter in NLRC Case No. RB-1-C-1428-79
entitled "Longog Tabek, et al vs. Harry Dominguez et
al" and to make a return within thirty (30) days from
said date. The labor arbiter's decision ordered Harry
Dominguez, a building contractor and the then
municipal mayor of Tadian, to pay Longog Tabek and
the other judgment creditors the amount of P2,720.00
with interest, as the balance of their work contract.
Pursuant to that assignment, Manipon on November 9,
1979 sent a notice to the Commercial Bank and Trust
branch [Comtrust] in Baguio City garnishing the bank
accounts of Dominguez. The bank agreed to hold the
accounts. For one reason or another, Manipon did not
inform the labor arbiter of the garnishment nor did he
exert efforts to immediately satisfy the judgment under
execution. On November 12, 1979, Dominguez sought
Manipon's help in the withdrawal of the garnished
account. Manipon told Dominguez that the money
could not be withdrawn.
However, on December 27, 1979 when the two met
again at the Office of the National Intelligence and
Security Authority [NISA] in Baguio City, Manipon
told Dominguez that he "can remedy the withdrawal
so they will have something for the New
Year." Dominguez interpreted this to mean that
Manipon would withdraw the garnished amount for a
consideration. Dominguez agreed and they arranged to
meet at the bank later in the afternoon. After Manipon
left, Dominguez confided the offer to NISA Sub-
Station Commander Luisito Sanchez. They then
hatched up a plan to entrap Manipon by paying him
with marked money the next day.
In its decision dated September 30, 1981, the
Sandiganbayan found accused Nathaniel S. Manipon,
Jr., 31, guilty of direct bribery.
ISSUE:
WON the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting him of
direct bribery, in not giving credence to the defense
theory that there was novation of the money judgment
and in admitting illegally-obtained evidence.
HELD:
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210
of the Revised Penal Code consists of the following
elements: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2)
that he received directly or through another some gift
or present, offer or promise; (3) that such gift, present
or promise has been given in consideration of his
commission of some crime, or any act not constituting
a crime, or to refrain from doing something which it is
his official duty to do, and (4) that the crime or act
relates to the exercise of his functions as a public
officer. The promise of a public officer to perform an
act or to refrain from doing it may be express or
implied.
It is not disputed that at the time of the commission of
the crime Manipon was the deputy sheriff of the Court
of First Instance of Benguet and Baguio assigned to
implement the execution order issued in NLRC Case
No. RB-1-C-1428-79. It is also not disputed that
Manipon garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez
at Comtrust and that he lifted the same on December
28, 1979 after which he received P l,000.00 from
Dominguez.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
DACUMAS vs SANDIGANBAYAN
195 SCRA 833
Timoteo Garcia vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 155574November 20, 2006
Facts:
TIMOTEO A. GARCIA, GILBERT G. NABO, being
then public officers or employees of the LTO, borrow
units Asian Automotive
Center’s Service Vehicle knowing that said
corporation regularly transacts with the accused’s
LTO Office for the registration of its motor vehicles,
in the reporting of its engine and chassis numbers as
well as the submission of its vehicle dealer’s report
and other similar transactions which require the
prior approval and/or intervention of the said
accused Regional Director and employee. Ma.
Lourdes Miranda, the complainant, whose child was
run over an killed in a vehicular accident; the driver of
the ill-fated motor vehicle was accused Nabo,
subordinate of Garcia. Miranda successfully traced the
said vehicle and eventually discovered the existence of
numerous delivery receipts in the files and possession
of the Company own by certain Aurora Chiong; and
that said discovery led to the institution of the subject
criminal cases against herein accused. Mrs Chiong
recounted that accused Garcia has a farm, and he
would need a vehicle to transport water thereto. For
this purpose, he would, on a weekly basis, borrow
from the Company a motor vehicle, either by asking
from her directly through telephone calls or through
Yungao, her Liaison Officer. Every time accused
Garcia would borrow a motor vehicle, the Company
would issue a delivery receipt for such purpose, which
has to be signed by the person whom accused Garcia
would send to pickup the motor vehicle.
Yungao testified that the names and signatures of the
persons who actually received the Company’s vehicles
were reflected on the faces of the delivery receipts.
The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed decision
convicting petitioner of fifty-six counts of violation of
Section 3(b) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner be convicted of Direct
Bribery charged in the information?
Held:
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210
of the Revised Penal Code constitutes the following
acts: (1) by agreeing to perform, or by performing, in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present an
act constituting a crime, in connection with the
performance of his official duties; (2) by accepting a
gift in consideration of the execution of an act which
does not constitute a crime, in connection with the
performance of his official duty; or (3) by agreeing to
refrain, or by refraining, from doing something which
is his official duty to do, in consideration of any gift or
promise. In the case under consideration, there is utter
lack of evidence adduced by the prosecution showing
that petitioner committed any of the three acts
constituting direct bribery. The two prosecution
witnesses did not mention anything about petitioner
asking for something in exchange for his performance
of, or abstaining to perform, an act in connection with
his official duty. In fact, Atty. Aurora Chiong, Vice-
President and General Manager of the Company,
testified that the Company complied with all the
requirements of the LTO without asking for any
intervention from petitioner or from anybody else
from said office. From the evidence on record,
petitioner cannot likewise be convicted of Direct
Bribery. Indirect bribery is committed by a public
officer who shall accept gifts offered to him by reason
of his office. The essential ingredient of indirect
bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal
Code is that the public officer concerned must have
accepted the gift or material consideration. The
alleged borrowing of a vehicle by petitioner from the
Company can be considered as the gift in
contemplation of the law. To prove that
petitioner borrowed a vehicle from the Company for
56 times, the prosecution adduced in evidence 56
delivery receipts allegedly signed by petitioner’s
representative whom the latter would send to pick up
the vehicle. We, however, find that the delivery
receipts do not sufficiently prove that petitioner
received the vehicles considering that his signatures
do not appear therein. In addition, the prosecution
failed to establish that it was petitioner’s
representatives who picked up the vehicles. If
the identity of the person who allegedly picked up the
vehicle on behalf of the petitioner is uncertain, there
can also be no certainty that it was petitioner who
received the vehicles in the end.
Art 211. Indirect Bribery
20. Pozar vs CA
G.R. No. L-62439, 23 October 1984
FACTS:
Pozar, being then an applicant for probation after he
was convicted of an offense, gave Mr. Danilo
Ocampo, the City Probation Officer, the sum of
P100.00.
ISSUE:
Did Pozar violates Art 212 of the Revised Penal Code?
RULING:
No. The procedure for processing Pozar’s application
for probation in the Probation Office was not precise,
explicit and clear cut. And since he is a foreigner and
quite unfamiliar with probation rules and procedures,
there is reason to conclude that he was befuddles, if
not confused so that his act of providing and advancing
the expenses for whatever documentation was needed
further to complete and thus hasten his probation
application, was understandably innocent and not
criminal.
Cabrera vs Pajares
A.M. Nos. R-278-RTJ & R-309-RTJ, 30 May 1986
FACTS:
Atty. Enrico Cabrera said he gave P1,000.00 to Judge
James Pajares because the latter asked for it and he was
unduly strict, preventing the former from making
statements during the trial of his case which Judge
Cabrera was trying. After 2 months, Pajares again told
him that he needed money. Cabrera decided to
denounce Pajares to the authorities, and asked the
assistance of the NBI in entrapping Pajares.
ISSUE:
Is Judge Pajares guilty of Indirect Bribery?
RULING: Held:

Yes. Judge Pajares accepted the money. There is No. The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as
reason to believe that he accepted the money and that defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is
he knew it was being given to him by reason of his that the public officer concerned must have accepted
office. After receiving the envelope with the money, the gift or material consideration. There must be a
the Pajares did not really try to return it to Cabrera, as clear intention on the part of the public officer to take
he claims he did, but that instead he placed it between the gift so offered and consider the same as his own
the pages of his diary. property from then on, such as putting away the gift
for safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical
Formilleza vs Sandiganbayan receipt unaccompanied by any other sign,
159 SCRA 1
circumstance or act to show such acceptance is not
sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime
Facts:
of indirect bribery has been committed. An
Petitioner was the personnel supervisor of the National examination of the seven photographs that were
Irrigation Administration (NIA) in Tacloban City. Her allegedly taken immediately after the passing of the
duties include processing of appointment papers of money shows that the petitioner was standing up when
employees. She was charged for her alleged refusal to the PC agents apprehended her. There was no picture
attend to the appointment papers of a certain Mrs. showing petitioner to be seated which should be her
Mutia, a coterminous employee. Mrs. Mutia testified position immediately after the money was handed to
that petitioner asked from her some money as a her under the table. None of the photographs show the
consideration. Attempts to entrap petitioner then petitioner in the process of appropriating or keeping
ensued. Petitioner and Mrs. Mutia supposedly agreed the money after it was handed to her.
to meet at the canteen. Some of their officemates —
Mrs. Sevilla and a certain Mrs. Dimaano — joined
them in the canteen. They occupied two square shaped
tables joined together. The petitioner sat at the head of
the table with Mrs. Mutia seated at her left, Mrs.
Dimaano at her (the petitioner’s) right and Mrs. Sevilla
at the right of Mrs. Dimaano. Member of the
Philippine Constabulary (PC) brought along a camera
in order to take photographs of the entrapment. The
marked money was folded altogether. After the money
had been delivered and received, pictures were taken,
one of them depicting the accused held by member of
the PC on the left hand and another showing the
accused also held on the left hand by one of the PC
men, and the complainant, Mrs. Mutia, drinking from
a glass. The petitioner was arrested by the soldiers
despite her objections to the entrapment. She denied
having accepted the supposed bribe money. The case
was brought to the respondent court which ruled that
the crime committed by the petitioner was not Direct
Bribery as defined in Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code cited in the Information but Indirect Bribery as
defined under Article 211 of the same code.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was properly convicted of

the crime of indirect bribery?