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Aristotle and Alexander on Hearing and Instantaneous Change: A Dilemma in Aristotle’s Account of Hearing ALAN TOWEY Aristotle’s account of hearing, despite its considerable influence on subsequent thought,2 has usually been discussed only as part of a wider treatment of some other subject in the context either of ancient music* or of Aristotle’s general psychology. Yet there is much to be said for a study that concentrates specifically on hearing. Such an approach accords well with Aristotle’s own advice that accounts seeking to embrace different psychological capacities in a general survey are less informative than ones which are focused on the peculiar differences of each.* More significantly, despite this apparent emphasis on autonomous explanations for each sense modality, it is clear that Aristotle himself took hearing to be in certain important respects paradigmatic of sense perception generally.® Thus a study of Aristotle’s theory of hearing can be expected to shed light upon Aristotle’s general treatment of perception. Unlike modern philosophers Aristotle is more concerned with the physics involved in perception than with epistemological concerns. It is true that, in Aristotle’s view, hearing makes a greater contribution to the acquisition of knowledge than any other sense.’ But, despite this, a study of his account of hearing will not bear directly upon the question of how the evidence of the senses is thought to form the basis of human knowledge. This is rather something which he takes for granted® in his principal discussion of perception in the De anima, where he assumes that what we see, 1 shall concentrate on Aristotle himsett in particular his discussions of hearing in the De anima edited. with Introduction and commentary by W. D. Ross (Oxford, 1961), and the De sensi et sensbil from Aristotle, Parva natural, edited by W. D. Ross (Oxford, 1935) also the commentary on the latter by the Aristotelian commentator, Alexander of Aphrodisias (foruit 205 aD), fn librum De sensu commemarium, edited P. Wendland, Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca, 3.1 (Berlin, 1901), and Alexander's own treatise De anima, edited by I. Bruns in Alexander, Pracier conmentaria scripta minora, Supplementum Aristotelicum, 2.1 (Berlin, 1887) | shall not consider the Pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata, beyond noting that Book XI contains an account of hearing close in some respects to the account given by Alexander. For a discussion of the Problemata see the anicle by Burnett inthis volume. All translations of Aristotle ate, except where otherwise state. from The Complete Works, edited by J. Barnes, 2 vols (Princeton, 1984). Translations of Alexander are 2 See especialy the chapters by Burnett and Frangenberg in tis volume, 2 There is useful treatment in E. A. Lippman, Musical Thought In Ancient Greece (Columbia, 1964), DP, 118-20; ee also A. Barker, Greek Musical Writings (Cambridge, 1984-9) Il, pp. 74-80. 4 The standard account remains J. 1. Beare, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition (Oxford, 1906). 5 De anima 13-4, 414°25-415816. Aristotle is referring to nutrition, perception and thought, but the same Principle will apply tothe five senses which constitute perception, See Alexander, De anima, p. 40,3-15. See pp. 10 below 7 See De sensu 1, 43789-15: “Hearing announces only the distinctive qualities of sound, and, to some few animals, those also of voice. Incidentally, however, it is hearing that coatribates most to the growth of intelligence. For rational discourse is a cause of insiretion in virtue ofits being audible, which iis, notin ts ‘own righ, but incidentally; since its composed af words, and each word is symbol Aristote’s most important remarks on the relationship between knowledge and pereeption occur in Posterior Analytics U9. For a recent discussion see J, Barnes, Aristotle's Posterior Analytics (Oxford, 1975), pp. 248-60. 8 ALAN TOWEY hear, smell, taste or touch falls under some determinate species,” and concentrates instead on the different task of explaining the causal mechanisms. which underlie perception. ‘The sense of hearing, and musical hearing in particular, provides the basis for Aristotle’s characterization of the various species of perceptibles, notably colours and flavours. Colours can be defined in terms of proportions of black and white which may or may not be expressible in rational numbers."° A similar story applies to the various flavours which are made up of different proportions of sweet and bitter." This view that all perceptibles can be defined as proportions!? reflects the impact made by the then recent discovery in acoustics that certain pairs of musical notes which mix together to produce a pleasing unity—i.e., a consonance (oupoavica.)—can be expressed as proportions (Adyou) of simple rational num- bers. The consonance known as the diapason, for example, is achieved by plucking two strings whose lengths are in the ratio 2:1, Aristotle takes the idea further. At one point in his explanation of perception he is prepared to describe the sense, as well as the sense object, as a proportion. It is likely that he is thinking of the sort of proportion that yields a consonance from the way he supports the idea by an appeal to a musical phenomenon: too strong a sense object, he says, destroys the sense organ just as the consonance and pitch are destroyed when the strings are struck vioiently."* The phenomenon Aristotle is here attempting to explain is the failure of the sense faculties to perceive sense objects that are excessively strong. A loud and violent sound, he has said earlier in the De anima," is in’a way inaudible, connecting this with the fact that something excessively bright is invisible (but in a different way from darkness) and an excessively strong flavour destroys the sense of taste. The theory he offers in explanation is based on the idea that any sense faculty, i., the faculty a perceiver possesses which enables him to receive the forms of sense objects, is itself a proportion or blend in the way that two mixed musical notes are blended to make a third note. This theory has other uses. Aristotle also employs it to explain why plants cannot perceive despite their being endowed with souls just like animals. The explanation which Aristotle gives, that plants lack a mean which can receive the De anima 116 gives the special objects of the fist four a8 colour, sound, taste and flavour respectively (touch is ascribed a variety of objets) but no proot i attempted the intention being insead to suggest a way of Gefining the different senses: see R. Sorabj,“Adstlle on Demarcating the Five Senses" in Articles on Aristo 4. Pyschiology and Aesthetics, edited by J. Barnes, M. Schofield and R, Sorabji (London, 1979), p. 76. Aristotle does try in De sens 6, 44520-44620, 19 prove that there is only a determinate range of species for the abjects ofeach sense. But he assumes without question tha such qualities must be regarded as species: see sh, W See especialy De sensu 3, 439°19~440%. 50 Tid 4 442412-25, "© Thal iy all de proper or special prcepibes (ss xa eoGne), defined by Arisole at De anima IL6, 418811=12, as those objects of sense pereeptble to sense which cannot be pecsived by another sense and aout which deception is impossible 1 Tidy 12, 424°26~32. What he probably has in mind is the fact that when the two stings in the right proportion to produce a consonance are sick to0 violently they no Tonger produce notes of the exact pitch required. 14 Thi, 10, 422920-34 ARISTOTLE AND ALEXANDER ON HEARING. 9 forms of perceptible objects, is obscure," but clearly related to the doctrine that the sense faculty is a proportion. Obscure too is the argument on which his proportion theory rests, which generalizes from hearing musical notes of varying pitch to hearing in general, and then from hearing in general to all the other senses.'* Although the argument is less than compelling, Aristotle’s strategy of treating hearing as a paradigm of sense perception generally is clear. One particularly difficult notion—the idea that the sense, as well as the sense object, is a proportion—is justified by the doctrine that the sense and its object are one and the same thing. Thus if sound—the object of hearing—is a consonance and hence a proportion, the sense of hearing too must be a proportion, This identification of a sense with its object, on which the proportion theory depends, is explained in a passage which again draws upon the paradigmatic status of the sense of hearing: ‘The activity of the sensible object and that of the sense is one and the same activity, and yet the distinction between their being remains, Take as an illustration actual sound and actual hearing: A man may have hearing and yet not be hearing, and that which has a sound is not always sounding. But when that which can hear is actively hearing and that which can sound is sounding, then the actual hearing and the actual sound come about at the same time (these one might call respectively hearkening and sounding).!7 It is no accident that Aristotle chooses to explain what might be called the single activity doctrine by reference to the example of hearing. Such an explanation is more persuasive than it would have been if vision had been the example, For, even though Aristotle undoubtedly intends this doctrine to apply to all the senses, and thus to vision no less than to hearing, there is something strange about this doctrine as applied to the case of seeing colour, as is marked by the fact that there is no natural expression in either Greek or English for the activity of a coloured object that corresponds to our seeing it, in the way that sounding corresponds to hearing. There are of course countless problems of interpretation associated with the various doctrines I have adumbrated here. My present purpose is not to attempt to resolve these, but rather to underline the theoretical richness which Aristotle achieves by taking hearing as the paradigm of sense perception."* Clearly, however, by making so much of his account of perception depend upon the paradigm of hearing, Aristotle commits himself to supplying an account of hearing itself which is satisfying and coherent as it stands. If other things are to 4 thid. 112, 42483242403, There is @ good discussion in D. K. W. Modrak, Aristotle, the Power of Per- ception (Chicago, 1987), p. 58. ‘© A. Barker, ‘Aristotle on Perception and Ratios", Phronesis, 26 (1981), pp. 248-66, questions the view that there isa generalization from hearing vocal sounds to hearing sounds in general and from there to sensing in general. Modrak, Aristotle (n. 15 above), pp. 60-1, criticizes this attempt to save Aristotle from an apparently Invalid deductive argument and suggests charitably that Aristotle intends a “aot very persuasive” argument from induction, 2 De anima I2, 425°26~42641. The single activity doctrine has a second important use as a means of answering those of Aristotle's predecessors who espoused the subjectivism of denying that colours can exist in the absence of seeing. Aristotle accuses them of over-simplification, What they sid was true of actual colour ‘but not potential colour: see De anima II, 426522-5. "S Por further benefits ofthe theory tha senses re proportions see Modrak, Aristole(n, 15 above), pp. 61-2.