Why did the Hunnic Empire Collapse?

Candidate Number = K1503508

Word Count = 10,036

1
Introduction

The story of the Hunnic Empire is one of mystery, dispute and continued fascination.

The Huns’ 80-year European tour would result in the rise and fall of the most powerful

political entity that non-Mediterranean Europe had ever seen, capable at its apogee of

mounting campaigns from Constantinople to Paris1. However, by the year 469, a mere

sixteen years after the death of Attila, the last of the Huns in Europe were seeking asylum in

the eastern Roman Empire2. Thus, story of the Huns is one that illustrates the potential power

of nomads, particularly when they unite under a common goal. Indeed, the histories of

Europe, Turkey, Persia, India and China are punctuated by military crises fuelled by

incursions of steppe nomads from their homeland3. The Huns also reveal a multitude of

challenges that faced empires of late antiquity, and more pertinently, nomadic empires

attempting to build an Empire away from the vast Eurasian steppe to which they owe their

heritage.

Precisely whereabouts on this enormous expanse of land that the Huns were based

before their migration to Europe is one of many current unanswerable questions. Joseph de

Guignes thought it almost self-evident that they were the descendants of the Xiongnu,

warlike nomads with whom the Chinese had fought so bitterly for many years4. However, de

Guignes’ views were based on a definition of identity which holds little weight in modern

scholarly circles; he wrote a political history, and overlooked key features that historians

have come to agree were vital to shaping identities in the age of late antiquity5. Regardless of

where you feel the Huns originated, both the sheer size of the steppe and the connectivity

1
P. Heather, ‘The Huns and Barbarian Europe’, in M. Mass (eds), The Cambridge
Companion to the Age of Attila (Cambridge, 2014), 209.
2 P. Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians

(Oxford, 2005), 279.

3
N. Faulkner, A Marxist History of the World (London, 2013), 50.
4
O. Maenchen-Helfen, ‘Huns and Hsiung-Nu’, Byzantion, 17 (1945), 222.
5 Ibid.

2
between eastern and western institutions and ideologies it has facilitated throughout history

illustrates the need for a Eurasian perspective when judging the societal, cultural and political

characteristics of the Hunnic imperium. The Hunnic Empire must be viewed as a diverse

conglomerate of peoples under a variety of political banners, and not in the simplistic terms

with which they were so often painted by contemporary Roman commentators. An effective

Eurasian perspective will take the Huns on their own terms, outside the value systems and

presuppositions of western peoples, and will allow an understanding of the Hunnic Empire as

a tributary state, distinct from a conventional Roman style empire. Images of officials

building roads and forts to consolidate control over freshly conquered provinces must be

banished when considering the Hunnic Empire. One historian who understood the need for a

Eurasian perspective on the Huns, more so than many of his peers, is H.J. Kim6. This is not to

say his work is without major failings, many of which shall be explored in the following

thesis. Essentially, Kim argues that the Hunnic Empire was bound by sophisticated

bureaucratic and political structures, to the extent that it had the capacity to, and indeed did,

play a central role in the fall of the western Roman Empire. Kim holds that the 454 conflict at

Nedao and the imperial fallout that followed represented a squabble between Attila’s sons

over fief distributions that escalated and, crucially, could have been avoided, rather than civil

war between numerous disaffected subject peoples and their Hunnic overlords. Kim’s

inaccurate arguments and the validity with which they are often viewed illustrates the need

for a re-appraisal of Hunnic imperial collapse and thus, legitimise this study.

The following essay will assess the factors that resulted in the decline of the Hunnic

Empire. By examining the relations between the core Hunnic political body, as commented

on by Priscus, and subject peoples that together made-up the Hunnic imperium, I will stress

6M. Whittow, ‘Reviewed Work: The Huns, Rome and the Birth of Europe’, (Kim) Early
Medieval Europe, 242.

3
the exploitation of by the former over the latter, and the centrality of such relationships in the

rapid disintegration of the Hunnic Empire. In doing so, I will emphasise a reality that Kim

and others have delegitimised; the fact that, for most, the Hunnic empire represented an

involuntary federation. Then, greater attention shall be given to the relationship between the

Hunnic Empire and its Roman neighbours. I will examine the importance of wealth from the

Roman world in lubricating the creaky structures of the Hunnic Empire, and how when its

assurance became limited, these structures crumbled, to the demise of Hunnic imperial unity.

Before doing so however, we must examine and disprove arguments made primarily by Kim,

that the success enjoyed by the Huns lay in sophisticated political institutions and an effective

bureaucracy.

Hunnic Imperial Structure and Internal Politics

Given their disputed role, owing predominantly to Priscus’ often vague descriptions

of their responsibilities, it would be prudent at this point to explain the importance of logades

to Hunnic imperial administration. Priscus’ vagueness should not be taken as an indication

that logades were not of cardinal importance to the Hunnic Empire’s ability to function. It

more reflects the central concern of the embassy; Attila and his relations with Constantinople,

and to a lesser extent, Rome. Attila’s “picked men”, were, ‘the hinge upon which the entire

administration of the Hun empire turned’7. Re-enforcing this claim is Harmatta’s assertion

that they were responsible for the administration of the whole Hunnic empire8. Backed by the

threat of force that they could harness from the contingents of subject warriors provided by

the districts they often governed, their typical, and pivotal function was to manage the

relationship between the core Hunnic political body and regional heads of subject peoples of

the empire subjugated involuntarily. This took the form mainly in the collection of

7
E. Thompson, The Huns (Oxford, 1996), 193.
8
J. Harmatta, ‘The Dissolution of the Hun Empire’, Acta Archaeologica, 2 (1953), 288.

4
agricultural surpluses, usually by lower-ranking officials under the direction of logades9.

However, the Roman bureaucrat and logas Orestes demonstrates that their responsibilities

could vary. Thompson’s assertion that logades presided over territories unequal in area,

population, wealth and strategic importance10 evidences my suspicion that they enjoyed the

status of something close to a ranked king, if not the power that the position would have

brought before the unprecedented centralisation of authority during the time of Attila’s sole

rule.

The importance of logades to the Hunnic administration is not, as Kim claims,

evidence of political sophistication. In actuality, it evidences the opposite. As stressed earlier,

any worthy student of the Huns must adopt a Eurasian perspective when analysing the Huns’

political structures and bureaucracy. Even after doing so, it is difficult to accept Kim’s

argument that the system represented a sophisticated political structure which, according to

Kim, can be traced to the twenty-four governors of the Xiongnu Empire11. In his

determination to find structural political continuities between the Huns and the Xiongnu and

bolster arguments about the latter’s political sophistication shaping the former’s, Kim claims

the Huns also inherited the aristocratic institution of the six horns from their Xiongnu

ancestry12. As with his claim that logades represented something resembling ranked kingship

during Attila’s reign, the evidence Kim relies on is highly inconclusive and assumptive,

particularly in the context of Attila’s autocracy and the void between his authority and that of

his subordinate logades. Even if the Huns did derive from the Xiongnu, to ignore the

likelihood that the former would have undergone major political and organisational re-

9
H.J. Kim, ‘The Political Organisation of Steppe Empires and Their Contribution to Eurasian
Interconnectivity: The Case of the Huns and Their Impact in the Frankish West’ in H.J. Kim
and S. Adali (eds), Eurasian Empires in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (Cambridge,
2017), 22.
10
Thompson, The Huns, 182
11 H.J Kim, The Huns, Rome and the Birth of Europe (New York, 2013), 57
12 Ibid.

5
structuring during and after their migration to Europe is to understate the transformative

effects of migration seen in countless other historical examples. In addition, the exploitation

of subject peoples that logades oversaw, and through ostentatious displays of wealth as

described by Priscus, embodied, would encourage the fragmentation of the Hunnic imperium

at Nedao and after. As an institution, it encouraged the exploitation of subject peoples, and

acute conditions of inequality, the contribution of which shall be explored in greater detail

later in this thesis.

Kim has argued that the Hunnic Empire’s capacity for internal organisation was

extensive, and facilitated by a proficient bureaucratic base13. Under closer scrutiny however,

his arguments lose legitimacy. Drawing on Orestes as evidence, Kim wrongly assumes that

bureaucrats were rife and diffused throughout the Hunnic Empire. Evidence of bureaucratic

and logistical organisation among the Hunnic political elite is available; Attila’s secretaries

kept lists of those who had fled to the Romans14. Beyond Attila and his close commanders

however, evidence of bureaucratic structures becomes scanty. For example, the Huns

seemingly lacked anything resembling a legal system; Priscus describes Attila as the only

legal administrator, with cases brought before him for his judgement15. Further evidence for a

lack of Hunnic bureaucracy can be found in the lack of a written script to emerge from the

Hunnic state; Kelly correctly notes that the Huns did not write a single word of their own

history16. However, the most telling evidence of the Huns’ incapacity for sophisticated

political organisation comes from Attila’s subjugation of the Akatziri. Attila purged all tribal

leaders except Kuridachus and installed Ellac as their leader. The rest of the social hierarchy

13 Kim, Birth of Europe, 55

14 R. Lindner, ‘Nomadism, Horses and Huns’, Past and Present, 92 (1981), 11.
15 R.C. Blockley, The Fragmentary Classicising Historians of the Later Roman Empire

Volume II (Liverpool, 1983), 277.

16
C. Kelly, Attila the Hun: Barbarian Terror and the Fall of the Roman Empire (London,
2008), 17.

6
however, was seemingly left in place: hardly surprising, since the only alternative would have

been a total, and undoubtedly extremely complicated, social re-organisation17, requiring

levels of bureaucratic management and organisation beyond the Huns. We can view this

instance as typical of the capacity the Huns had to influence the day-to-day affairs of subject

peoples inside the Empire. Finally, the challenges of Hunnic bureaucracy would have been

re-enforced by the multilingual nature of the Hunnic Empire. While Gothic became its lingua

franca, the challenge for maintaining a bureaucracy among a sea of unfamiliar languages

would have been immensely difficult. The chief bureaucratic capability of the Huns was the

mobilisation of subject peoples for military campaigns, and the exploitation of their

agricultural surpluses. In sum, the chances of encouraging loyalty to the Hunnic state were

hindered by such ineffective, rudimentary bureaucratic and political structures.

The vulnerabilities to the Hunnic Empire that derived from this became lucid as the

Hunnic empire expanded, absorbed huge numbers of non-ethnic Hunnic subject peoples, and

became increasingly militarily dependent on them. The armies massed by Attila to invade

Gaul would probably not have amounted to half a million men, as Jordanes reports, but

would nonetheless have drawn on the full resources of the Hunnic war machine18. To leave

large numbers of non-Hunnic subject warriors at base while on campaign hundreds of miles

away would have been unfeasibly risky. The Huns limited bureaucratic and organisational

capacity resulted in them coming to depend on the non-Hunnic ethnic groups in the empire,

rather than being able to promote and spread their talent as mounted archers. Evidence of the

Huns largely abandoning their military heritage as mounted archers can be seen in Attila’s

invasions of Gaul and Italy; in both instances, he would invade in July, when the grass would

17 W. Pohl, Strategies of Distinction: The Construction of Ethnic Communities 300-800

(Leiden, 1998), 107.
18 Heather, A New History, 337.

7
have been unsuitable to support large numbers of horses19. Moreover, the unsophisticated

bureaucratic structures of the Hunnic Empire tarnished their capacity for effective large-scale

campaigning. Evidence for this can be found both in their natural success fighting in small-

raiding parties, and, conversely, in their having to flee from Italy to Hungary in 452 under

threefold attack from Aetius, Marcian’s army and sickness20. A year before, Attila had been

left ‘distraught’ by the Hunnic loses suffered at Châlons; forced to retreat to a defensive

wagon circle, the Hunnic king had to be dissuaded from making his own funeral pyre21.

Arguments that the Huns’ unsophisticated political institutions and lack of

bureaucratic development were key in the collapse of the Hunnic Empire gain weight when

one considers the sheer geographical size of the Hunnic Empire by the time of Attila’s death.

Typically, historians have failed to agree on its true extent, but I believe Attila’s empire

stretched from the Caucasus to the confines of France and Denmark22. Wolfram’s claim, ‘to

rule only makes sense if one is ruling people’23, is pertinent to any historian attempting to

understand the emergence and collapse of the Hunnic Empire, and in-keeping with the

Eurasian perspective I described earlier. While correctly noting that the Huns’ administrative

capacity would have been strengthened by absorbing Roman Danubian provinces and

Pannonia24. However, given the Hunnic Empire’s size, the presence of a few Roman

bureaucrats would not have equated to the Huns being able to influence the natural, frequent

affairs of countless subject peoples. In sum, Hunnic authority was so thinly distributed that

subject peoples were able to dislocate themselves from their yoke relatively easily when the

19 Lindner, ‘Horses and Huns’, 11.

20 O. Maenchen-Helfen, The World of the Huns: Studies in their History and Culture
(California, 1973), 140.
21 Heather, A New History, 339.
22 Thompson, The Huns, 196.
23
F. Daim, ‘Avars and Avar Archaeology’ in H.W Goetz, J. Jarnut and W. Pohl (eds), Regna
and Gentes (London, 2002), 469.
24 Kim, Birth of Europe, 55.

8
opportunity presented itself25. This owed, in part, due to the lack of loyal, ethnic Huns

available following heavy losses in the 450s to prevent subject peoples from breaking-away

from the Hunnic Empire at Nedao and after.

To illustrate the harmful consequences of imperial over-stretch further, let us turn our

attention to the imperial longevity enjoyed by the Avar Empire. As a group that settled and

established a semi-nomadic empire with their imperial heartland in the Carpathian basin,

several parallels between the Avar and Hunnic polities can be drawn to nurture our

understanding of both. Kim, a proponent of the argument that the rift between the eastern and

western halves of the Hunnic Empire was the cause and a consequence of Nedao, concedes

that even despite alleged bureaucratic sophistication, when Nedao occurred, the Hunnic

empire was poorly prepared to manage its vast western territories26. Given this, it is

impossible to escape the reality that, had the Hunnic Empire been situated exclusively around

the Carpathian basin, for example, a civil war over succession, common in nomadic empires,

may well still have occurred, but probably without large numbers of Hunnic subject peoples

with the desire and genuine possibility of obtaining independence, violently uniting against

the Huns. By contrast, through concentrating their resources in a relatively compact area

around Hungary, the Avars preserved their state for another two centuries after the Bulgar

succession27. Finally, unity around a single ‘ancient honour’ of an Avar khagan represented a

backbone of Avar identity that contributed to the longevity of their empire. Conversely,

Attila, due to the massive extent of his empire, had to rely on the loyalty of heads of subject

peoples absorbed into the Hunnic Empire, and could do little to influence grass-root identities

that lingered among new subject peoples. The presence of such identities facilitated the

25
J. Harmatta, ‘Dissolution’, 282.
26
Kim, Birth of Europe, 136.
27
Kim, Birth of Europe, 134.

9
unification of numerous different ethnic groups at Nedao, delivering a fatal blow to Hunnic

imperial prospects and unity.

While unification around a sole leader would encourage political and societal unity in

the Avar khaganate, Attila’s autocracy, established following his assassination of Bleda,

would play a central role in the fall of the Hunnic Empire. To understand why this was the

case, we must first consider the evolution of Hunnic political structures in the longue durée.

Responding to the ecological conditions of the steppe, well organised devolution rather than

centralised rule was a natural political form for nomadic societies28. Thus, a series of ranked

kings seems to have been the political organisation of localised Hunnic societies, even after

their migration to western Europe. Evidence of this can be found in Olympiodorus. The loss

of almost all of his work is a disaster for our understanding of both Huns and nomads

generally; he had a real eye for social distinctions29. Thankfully, his description of Charaton

as “head of the kings”30 indicates that the Huns continued to practice ranked kingship, and

provides something of a bridge for our understanding of Hunnic political evolution. Under

Attila however, the multiplicity of power sharing kings gave way to a monarch in the literal

sense of the word31.

Having established his autocracy, Attila sought to cement his position by crafting an

image of himself as unmatched in glory, a ruler of the world blessed by the gods of war with

alleged invincibility in battle32. Priscus records Attila’s disregard for luxuries that his mortal

contemporaries might draw pride from or hold importance in, adding to this image. While

28 Peter Heather, Empires and Barbarians: Migration, Development and the Birth of Europe
(London, 2009), 212.
29
E. Thompson, Attila and the Huns (Oxford, 1948), 8.
30
C.D. Gordon, The Age of Attila: Fifth Century Byzantium and the Barbarians (Michigan,
1966), 59.
31
Heather, Empires and Barbarians, 325.
32
Blockley, The Fragmentary Classicising Historians of the Later Roman Empire Volume II
(Liverpool, 1983), 283.

10
travelling to Attila’s camps, the east Roman embassy caused offence to their Hunnic

counterparts, by toasting to Valentinian as the Huns toasted Attila; Vigilas responded, that it

was not proper to compare the mystical Attila with a mere mortal in Valentinian33. In this

story and in Priscus’ history generally, we see clearly the kind of hold Attila had over his

inner circle34. By having his subordinates sing songs to the Roman embassy which celebrated

Attila’s victories and virtues in war35 he promoted himself as central in the Hunnic military

success and imperial expansion. By engraving his alleged personal qualities in Hunnic

imperial success, Attila encouraged the fragmentation of logades and vassal kings from the

Hunnic state after his death. The future of the Hunnic Empire was thrown into uncertainty by

the shocking event. Would it be able to continue in its pattern of threatening, invading and

extracting tribute from the Romans, and if so, who would replace Attila as the natural,

undisputed head of state? Ardaric, a figure prized by Attila above all other chieftains36,

seemingly asked such questions and, unable to find answers, led the Gepids to a surprising

victory at Nedao.

For those within the Hunnic Empire less convinced by Attila’s claims to invincibility

and almost mystical power, the defeat suffered at Châlons and indeterminate Italian

campaign, from which the Huns were forced to retreat, would put a substantial dent in the

great conquerors reputation37. By severely tarnishing not only Attila’s reputation, but that of

the general Hunnic military capacity he was supposed to embody, he encouraged subjects of

his empire to pursue their freedom at Nedao and after. In his review of J.B. Bury’s formative

work The Invasion of Europe by the Barbarians, Lynn Thorndike concurs with my stance,

arguing Nedao was but a sequel of Châlons, with the Gepids, Ostrogoths and Heruli who

33
Blockley, Fragmentary Classicising Historians (Liverpool, 1983), 246.
34 Heather, A New History, 332.
35 Gordon, Attila, 95.
36 Jordanes, The Origins and Deeds of the Goths (trans. Mierow), ch.38.
37
Heather, A New History, 341.

11
fought against the Huns following the lead that Theodoric and Aetius had given them 3 years

earlier38. The prospect of victory against Hunnic armies would have seemed far more realistic

with Attila, the figurehead and linchpin of Hunnic military might who had claimed personal

invincibility, dead. Jordanes summarises, there was no way whereby any Scythian tribe could

have been wrested from the power of the Huns, save by the death of Attila39. In sum,

whether subjects of the empire believed or not in Attila’s greatness, a question still debated in

historiography, the leader’s death, and the unsatisfactory results of the 450s campaigns that

preceeded it, encouraged fragmentation, either through raising concerns over the Empire’s

future, or through tarnishing the Huns’ military image and actual capacity.

To illustrate a further structural vulnerability that derived from Attila’s sole rule, let

us draw a parallel with Diocletian’s introduction of the Tetrarchy. While his motives for

doing so were varied, one central reason for the policy was to ensure that future political

stability and economic prosperity within the Roman Empire could not be thrown into

uncertainty by the death of a single emperor and the succession crises that usually followed.

Attila’s death left a power vacuum similar, in which his sons clamoured that non-Hunnic

subjects should be divided among them equally, and warlike kings and their populations

should be appropriated to them like a family estate40. In doing so, Attila’s sons encouraged

heads of non-ethnic Huns such as Ardaric to question whether their relatively privileged

positions of security in the Hunnic Empire would continue. The events of Nedao should be

viewed as a synthesis of disparate arguments made by Kim and Heather. We must accept that

former’s view that a squabble over fief distributions did occur between Attila’s sons after his

death, while remembering Heather’s argument that subject peoples took advantage of this

38
L. Thorndike, ‘Reviewed Work: The Invasion of Europe by the Barbarians’ (Bury),
American Historical Review, 565.
39
Jordanes, Origins and Deeds, ch.48.
40 Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, 144

12
disunity, united and fought for their independence from the Hunnic Empire. The

consequences of Nedao would prove disastrous for the Hunnic Empire, with several key non-

Hunnic groups whom the Huns had come to rely on militarily fragmenting from the Hunnic

state, diminishing their ability to re-assert their authority, and resigning them to being

overpowered by groups migrating from the steppe41.

Attila would demonstrate that pride always comes before a fall. The autocracy he

created was pivotal in facilitating the fall of the Hunnic Empire. Attila’s hubris in his own

talent as a strategist was reflected in both his contemplation of attacking the Persians, as

recorded by Priscus, and in his invasion of the Western Roman Empire in 451. In Attila lay

an insatiable thirst for conquest, aching to swallow up the known world42. His reckless attack

on unified Visigothic and Roman forces in 451 would damage the Huns military capacity and

reputation, contributing to the Huns imperial decline. With the benefit of hindsight, we can

assert that dealing with the Romans and Visigoths individually, or possibly recruiting the

assistance of Geiseric, who’s relations with Visigoth king Theodoric were poor, would likely

have yielded a better military result for the Huns. I suspect that if Attila had been forced to

consult with another leader or group, and had not believed wholeheartedly in the invincibility

of his armies, the future of both the western Roman Empire and the Hunnic Empire may well

have been very different. To summarise, Attila’s autocratic rule, rife with hubris, epitomized

the lack of political sophistication within the Hunnic Empire, and played a central role in its

rapid dissolution after his death.

41 A. Bell-Fialkoff, The Role of Migration in the History of the Eurasian Steppe (Hampshire,
2000), 227.
42
Heather, A New History, 335

13
Hunno-Subject Relations

For Kim, it is, ‘absolutely no accident that the Huns created the first unified empire in

European barbaricum beyond the Roman border and presented a real, viable alternative to

Roman hegemony for the peoples of Europe’43. In this attempt to depict the dissolution of the

Hunnic imperium as a squabble between Attila’s sons, Kim overlooks the fact that most

peoples who came to live under its structures were not there by choice44. The significance of

this factor’s contribution to the rapid break-up of Hunnic territories cannot be overstated.

Later in this section, I will focus more closely on the Huns’ agricultural exploitation of

subject peoples and its consequences, but first, let us consider an alternative avenue of

Hunnic exploitation. The Hunnic Empire’s greatest strength – its ability to increase its power

by quickly consuming subject peoples and to utilising their military potential – was also its

greatest weakness45. While facilitating imperial expansion, it also encouraged revolt and

subsequent dissolution after Attila’s death. An example of the military exploitation of subject

peoples can be found in Getica, in which Jordanes describes the Gepids as losing huge

numbers of soldiers in Attila’s effort to cripple the military strength of his adversaries in the

lead up to Châlons46. The same groups of Gepids and Ostrogoths who fought for their

independence at Nedao had found themselves a generation earlier simply unable to escape the

reaches of Hunnic influence in time. Thus, Attila’s forces were far from an army of

volunteers47. I find Heather’s assertion that the successor kingdoms of the Hunnic empire

resembled complex military alliances, rather than mixed peoples, highly convincing48.

Among the countless refugees to spill from the Hunnic Empire after Nedao, new kingships

43
Kim, Birth of Europe, 59.
44
H. Harke, ‘Reviewed Work: The Huns, Rome and the Birth of Europe’ (Kim), The
Classical Review, 64 (2014), 261.
45 Heather, A New History, 362.
46 Jordanes, Origins and Deeds, ch.41.
47
Heather, Empires and Barbarians, 231.
48 Heather, Empires and Barbarians, 245.

14
were pragmatically fused, owing to the shared interest of breaking away from oppressive

Hunnic structures and short, painful lives defined by military exploitation. That the Huns’

immediate European legacy would be dominated so heavily by such ethno-genesis reflects

the exploitative conditions under which most of the Huns’ subjects had lived. One cannot

help but wonder why the post-Hunnic successor states made no effort to recapture Hunnic

territories and peoples that slid from the grasp of Hunnic dominion after Nedao unless they

were bound involuntarily to the super-structure in the first place, and heavily exploited

thereafter? I find Kelly’s assertion that the Hunnic Empire was merely, ‘a protection racket

on a grand scale’49 telling as to why subjects would strive for their freedom to deliver a fatal

blow to Hunnic imperial might at Nedao.

Priscus’ description of Attila’s subjection of the Akatziri sheds light on a Hunnic

technique of imperial expansio. More than this, the Roman role in events reveals a major

vulnerability of the Hunnic Empire, and provides further evidence of the involuntary nature

by which peoples were under the influence of the Hunnic Empire. Theodosius, aware of the

Akatziri’s strategic importance as a seemingly independent power based at Attila’s rear, and

of the group’s possible dissent towards the Hunnic Empire which would likely have been

high after Bleda’s death, sent gifts to chiefs of various tribes in an attempt to stir this proud

and valiant people to renounce any alliance with the Huns and enter into treaty with himself.

Parallels can be drawn with the Roman Empire’s successful efforts to dislodge Uldin’s

supporters and later, Gothic contingents from Hunnic forces in the 420s. However,

Kuridachus, feeling slighted and deprived of his prerogative after receiving gifts after another

unnamed Akatziri king, informed Attila. In response, Attila, after a series of battles, reduced

the whole race to subjection50. He would then install his eldest son Ellac as ruler of all

49
Kelly, Attila the Hun, 47.
50 Blockley, Fragmentary Classicising Historians, 259.

15
Akatziri tribes other than Kuridachus’, who by serenading the Hunnic leader with rhetoric to

affirm his god-like status, was spared his independence. In this fascinating encounter, we

gain insight into a unifying factor that ensured the short-natured success of the Hunnic state;

fear. Attila’s brutal subjugation of the Akatziri reveals the efficacy of the Hunnic state for

instant power and glory, but certainly not sustainability. In spreading fear through the

administration of fatal punishments for collusion with Romans, Attila ensured the fickle

support of the groups such as the Akatziri. However, once Attila died and the future of the

Hunnic state was thrown into insecurity, groups assimilated involuntarily sought their

independence from the oppressive, exploitative conditions that most subjects of the Hunnic

Empire lived under. In continuation, Constantinople’s attempt to dislodge the Akatziri from

Attila’s allegiance is telling. Clearly, the Romans believed in this potential weakness of the

Huns. Their suspicions would be vindicated at Nedao. Thus, the case of the Akatziri is one

that epitomizes the involuntary union of the Hunnic Empire, and consequent imperial

frailties.

Moreover, the abundant examples of groups and individuals attempting to defect from

the exploitative conditions of the Hunnic Empire are further evidence of involuntary nature

by which subjects were often bound to the Hunnic state, serving as prototypes of the events

of Nedao and further fragmentation thereafter. In response to Ruga’s subject them to

oppression within the Hunnic Empire, the Amilzuri, Imitari, Tounsoures, Boisci and were

among the Danubian tribes that would flee to fight on the side of the Romans51. Ruga’s

response, mimicking Attila’s re-action to the Akatziri, was to go to war with them52.

Similarly, to consolidate their power after making peace with the Romans, Attila and Bleda

marched through Scythia in the 440s, subduing tribes there and warring with the Sorogsi 53. It

51 Blockley, Fragmentary Classicising Historians, 225.

52 Blockley, Fragmentary Classicising Historians, 227.
53 Heather, Empires and Barbarians, 232.

16
is examples such as the above, particularly when considered alongside the abundance of

evidence that the Huns regarded their subjects as nothing more than slaves54, that allow us to

understand why subjects of the Hunnic Empire would eventually organise massed revolt.

Unless you’re H.J. Kim. In one of his more frustrating comparisons, Kim asks, ‘are Roman

rebels and renegades who flee into non-Roman territory an indication of Roman impotence

and lack of organisation’55? As a notable historian, Kim should use his nous to appreciate that

it depends hugely on the motivation that fleeing individuals or groups have for doing so. In

the case of the Roman Empire, we have abundant evidence for sophisticated political

institutions and effective, organised systems of leadership. For the Huns, we do not. Thus, to

make such a comparison is to totally ignore the of evidence which points to the involuntary

nature by which subjects were coerced and bound to the Hunnic Empire.

It would be reasonable to ask at this point, why subject peoples, if they were

assimilated involuntarily and exploited under the dominion of the Hunnic Empire, would not

seek to revolt more determinately with levels of conviction that we saw at Nedao, sooner?

Why did the Hunnic state have to rapidly dissolve after 454, rather than 10 years earlier, for

example? The answer to this question lies partially in the dependence of subjects of the

Hunnic Empire on their masters and oppressors. An example of this can be found in Attila’s

demands of the return of Hunnic refugees that fled to the Roman Empire. The punishment for

those who did defect was, as you might expect, designed to make an example, typically by

impaling. Indeed, Priscus travelled to Attila’s headquarters with several refugees, all of

whom new they were returning home to their deaths56. Thus, Attila’s subjects had no safe

hiding place, even if they fled to the enemy57. In sum, the loyalty of countless Hunnic

54 Thompson, Attila, 165.

55 Kim, Birth of Europe, 60.
56 Heather, A New History, 315.
57 H.N. Kennedy, Mongols, Huns and Vikings: Nomads at War (Cassell, 2002), 58.

17
subjects was ensured, until collective resistance seems to have been organised and executed

to the demise of the Hunnic imperium at Nedao, by conditions of dependence.

The polar experiences of two non-ethnic Huns, absorbed involuntarily into the Hunnic

Empire as slaves, lend further insight into the complex relationship of inter-dependence

between subject peoples and their Hunnic masters. Firstly, Priscus encountered a former

Roman merchant, swept into the Hunnic Empire when Viminacium fell, who by supplying

unspecified but presumably abnormally large quantities of booty to Onegesius, obtained his

freedom. Then, in an atypical case of social mobility within the Hunnic Empire, he went on

to revel in the upper echelons of Hunnic society58. Despite obtaining his freedom however,

the former merchant stayed on in the household of Onegesius; his experience indicates that,

even after being set free, slaves continued to depend on their former masters and often stayed

on in their households59. As to why one might continue to depend on their former master, we

need only to consider that slaves could be transported hundreds of miles from their

homelands during their assimilation into the Hunnic Empire, and the possibility of forging a

new life from scratch outside the patronage of their former masters would typically have been

unfeasible. In a separate incident, we have a less fortunate slave, bound to the Hunnic Empire

following the sack of Sirmium. The slave hoped to obtain his freedom by building high-

quality baths worthy of Attila for the Hunnic king, but was disappointed, and fell into a

deeper condition of slavery60. In this episode, we see that the slim hope of obtaining freedom

by performing a noteworthy deed could encourage unity to and co-operation with the Hunnic

state by exploited subject peoples. However, when the opportunity for independence

presented itself, they did not hesitate to organise successful, massed resistance at Nedao and

after; clearly, the costs of assimilation tended to outweigh the benefits.

58 Heather, A New History, 362.

59 Harmatta, ‘Dissolution’, 303.
60 Blockley, Fragmentary Classicising Historians, 265.

18
 For the oppressed but silent majority of the Hunnic Empire’s citizens, especially those

non-ethnic Huns, subjugated involuntarily and exploited agriculturally, the vast quantities of

moveable wealth that Attila extracted from his Roman neighbours would not permeate their

echelons. Within the framework of political centralisation which saw the isolated bands of

fourth-century nomads evolve into a vast empire in the fifth century, Hunnic society would

demonstrate dynamism, evolving and reaching a pinnacle of inequality by the time of Attila.

For the Huns, the success of their predatory administration depended on regular tribute, and

ensuring the maximum cost effectiveness of subjugated populations. Thus, when a city was

captured, the booty was not distributed evenly; the most powerful among the Huns received a

disproportionately larger share61. Thompson found the explanation for rapid rise and faster

fall of the Hunnic Empire in the growth of inequality to argue that it is only in terms of the

development of Hunnic society, rather than the genius of a single man, that we can identify

why the Hunnic Empire fell as quickly as it did62. Thompson’s 1948 work was one of

considerable originality and enduring influence, so much so that Patrick Howard linked the

lack of originality in British historical circles on the Huns for decades after its initial

publication to Thompson’s seminal piece63. However, through not recognising the harmful

consequences of Attila’s autocracy, as described earlier in the essay, on Hunnic political

stability, Thompson underestimates the significance of the role played by Attila in the Hunnic

Empire’s collapse. This misguidance can be explained by his Marxist affinity with the class

structure of societies and their material culture. Although Thompson may overstate the

overall impact of Hunnic societal developments on the Empire’s dissolution, I find his

argument that sharp differences in wealth appeared among the Huns and their subjects,

61 Thompson, Attila, 161.

62
Thompson, Attila, 41.
63
C. King, ‘Reviewed Work: The Huns’ (Thompson/Heather), Central Asiatic Journal, 41
(1997), 144.

19
though perhaps not differences in class64 convincing as a central factor in the fall of the

Hunnic imperium. The narrative of Priscus’ encounter with the former-Roman merchant from

Viminacium illustrates that to recognise an individual as a Hun was to grant that person a

substantial increase in rights, opportunities and social standing. Therefore, as a predatory

state, it was not in the interests of the Hunnic Empire to allow a parity of wealth and

opportunity among its citizens; doing so would have undermined nature of Hunnic imperial

expansion.

Agricultural exploitation became a vital condition within Hunnic society, and the

Huns came to rely on subjugated peoples for sustenance65. I find the number of stringent,

non-negotiable demands made by Attila and Bleda at Margus in 43566 for the return of those

that fled from the Huns to the Romans to be good evidence of the dependence of the Huns on

such groups for feeding their armies. Further evidence of such dependence can be found in

Olympiodorus’ description of the struggles of feeding Hunnic mercenaries in the service of

Honorius67. Due to the conditions of poverty and exploitation that defined the lives of

countless subject peoples in Hunnic territories, when the opportunity for independence came

at Nedao, many took it, rebelling against the Hunnic state. However, we can define and

explain the Hunnic imperial collapse beyond the events at Nedao. Equally relevant is how it

failed to re-establish control over territories and peoples formerly under their dominion after

Nedao. They were unable to do so primarily because key imperial forces and consistent

supplies of food that had filled out and then fed Hunnic armies had gone, thus ensuring that

the forces under Hernack and Dengizich were swept aside by an influx of new and powerful

nomadic migrants68. Unable to recapture a foothold in western Europe from which they might

64 Thompson, Attila, 177.

65 Harmatta, ‘Dissolution’, 282.
66 Heather, A New History, 301.
67
Thompson, Attila, 47.
68 Bell-Fialkoff, The Role of Migration, 227.

20
have been better able to reconquer lost territories and now-free peoples, Hunnic imperial

dissolution was confirmed.

In his defence of the Huns’ political structures being sophisticated and central to the

empire, Kim claims that Nedao was not a rejection of the Hunnic political system, but more a

squabble over fief distributions that escalated and could have been avoided. For evidence, he

cites that many Goths were still under the authority of the Huns as late as Dengizich’s

invasion of the eastern Roman Empire in the late 460s69. There are three major issues with

this argument that deserve consideration. Firstly, Kim ignores the fact that the ease with

which subjects could break from the Hunnic Empire depended heavily on the distance that

separated them from centres of Hunnic authority70. Given their proximity to Ellac’s hub of

influence and power in the eastern half of the Hunnic Empire, we shouldn’t be surprised that

some Goths should have found it impossible to escape Hunnic dominion, and thus remained

in Hunnic armies. Secondly, Kim overlooks two other Gothic contingents who would

maximise the opportunity presented to break free from Hunnic dominion71; one group, the

Amal-Goths, would go on to establish the kingdom of Ostrogothic Italy, not stopping to

consider returning and rekindling Hunnic imperial glory. The final major fault with Kim’s

argument is that, when judged alongside the abundance of evidence pointing to the

exploitative conditions of the Hunnic state, subsequent growth of inequality and the struggles

for independence by numerous subject peoples after the death of Attila, it begins increasingly

to look like an isolated incident, at conflict with a tide of change moving in the opposite

direction.

69
Kim, Birth of Europe, 86.
70
Heather, Empires and Barbarians, 235.
71
Heather, A New History, 356.

21
Romano-Hunnic Relations

Romano-Hunnic interaction played a pivotal role in the rise and fall of the Hunnic

imperium. Moveable Roman wealth funded political centralisation among the Huns, laying

the foundations for the conditions of Attila’s rule. Indeed, it was only through continually

extracting tribute that a Hunnic war-lord could ensure the loyalty of his subordinate chiefs72.

Despite mistakenly tracing the institution to the Xiongnu, Kim is correct in noting that the

presence of logades was not unique to Attila’s rule73. Thompson’s identification that logades

existed during Uldin’s sack of Thrae in 408 lends weight to this assertion74. More

importantly, the strategy employed by the Roman to dissipate the threat posed by Uldin

illustrates a major Achilles heel in relying on logades in the context of Romano-Hunnic

interaction. By arranging private conversations with the subordinate leaders75 in Uldin’s army

and offering them gifts, the Romans encouraged many of Uldin’s followers to desert him;

Uldin himself only escaped across the Danube with difficulty76. Thus, in this fascinating

episode, we gain insight into the awareness in Roman political circles of the potentially fickle

bonds which had kept the Huns under Uldin unified, and thus, we become aware of a

structural weakness of the Hunnic Empire. That is, as shall be explored in the following

section, its reliance on wealth from the Roman world, to lubricate the operations of its creaky

structures77. Constantinople’s attempt to bribe the Akatziri into revolt against Attila, and the

stripping of Goths from Hunnic forces in the 420s provide further evidence of the flimsy

nature of an empire propped up by regular influxes of moveable wealth. Attila ensured the

fickle loyalty of logades, which was in itself vital to the Hunnic administration, by delivering

72
A.H.M Jones, ‘Reviewed Work: A History of Attila and the Huns’ (Thompson), The
Classical Review 63 (1949), 67.
73
Kim, Birth of Europe, 58
74
Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, 193
75
Thompson, The Huns, 33
76 Ibid.
77 Heather, Empires and Barbarians, 254.

22
wealth from the Roman world. Like the Huns, the Avar Empire relied on streams of revenue

to ensure political centralisation and political unity; gold payments from the eastern Roman

Empire were vital in allowing the khagan to win the initial loyalty of an army, and then

continued military and political backing from this vital subordinate base78.

That his logades remained loyal to him, and shared in the Hunnic political identity,

lends credence to Barth’s valid noting that ethnic groups are often purely self-created,

artificial entities, formed to protect specific political and economic interests79. The unstable

nature of the loyalty of logades to Attila and the regime, was indicative of the fact that the

alliance existed largely because Attila could provide more gifts on a larger scale than anyone

else. The loyalty of Edeco can be taken as indicative of that his fellow logades; after being

approached by Chrysaphius, he confessed to Attila almost at once, and Priscus suggests he

may never have intended murdering his master at all80. Of course, one must remember that

Priscus visited Attila and made such notes at a time when the latter’s power, both within the

Hunnic Empire and over its neighbours, was at its pinnacle, thus the idea of a subordinate not

having full confidence in or loyalty to the Hunnic king must have been close to

unfathomable. Kim fails to identify the importance of Roman gold, or the potential lack of it

in the future, in encouraging key figures in the Hunnic empire to splinter from the the Hunnic

Empire after Attila’s death. Ardaric is the only significant name at Nedao other than Ellac.

Our knowledge of him derives from Jordanes, who describes him, alongside Valamer, as one

of most honoured members of Attila’s court81. Jordanes’ work must be very carefully

interpreted, given his intention of producing an embellished history of the Goths. Thus, his

description of the Goth Valamer as key in Hunnic political circles may be a hyperbole,

78
Pohl, Regna and Gentes, 573.
79
Kim, Birth of Europe, 7.
80
Thompson, Attila (1948), 164.
81 Jordanes, Origins and Deeds, 106.

23
written with the intention of presenting a more palatable, respectable history of the Goths to

please Theodoric. However, the fact that he had no reason to really embellish or flatter

Ardaric means his assertion will be taken at face-value. In Ardaric, we see an example of

someone who had clearly lost faith in the ability of the Hunnic empire, which under Attila,

had evolved fully, on foundations laid by his immediate predecessors, from an economy

centred around pastoral nomadism to one dependent on predatory extortion82, to continue in

this vein. Thus, he encouraged the Gepids within the Hunnic Empire to successfully rebel.

Moveable wealth obtained via interaction with the Roman world was vital in

encouraging political centralisation, and the transformation of the Huns from independently-

acting war-bands and tribes into a unified, coherent polity acting under the instruction of one

leader. Once such centralisation had been achieved, it allowing logades to distinguish

themselves from lesser Hunnic horsemen83, and gave such Hunnic horsemen the opportunity

to distinguish themselves from non-Hunnic subjects, vital in a society that seemingly placed

real importance on rank and status. As explored earlier, Priscus noted Attila’s disregard for

high-value items, describing Attila as having used wooden plates and goblets at his

banquets84. We can understand Priscus’ surprise at Attila’s behaviour better by contemplating

the ambassador’s references to the ostentatious displays of wealth made by logades present.

According to Priscus, ‘neither the sword that hung at his (Attila’s) side nor the fastening of

his barbarian boots nor his horse’s bride was adorned, like those of the other Scythians, with

gold or precious stones or anything else of value’85. A separate network that logades could

explore for enrichment was via embassies beyond the Hunnic frontiers. Berichus, having sat

immediately to Attila’s left and described by Priscus as one of the leading men and rulers of

82 C. Barnes, ‘Rehorsing the Huns’, War and Society, 34 (2015), 3.

83
Thompson, The Huns, 192.
84 Blockley, Fragmentary Classicising Historians, 284
85
Blockley, Fragmentary Classicising Historians, 285

24
many village in Scythia, was sent on an embassy that’s express purpose was to receive gifts

from the Romans86. Moreover, the reliance of logades, the cornerstone of Hunnic imperial

unity, on interaction with the Roman Empire can also be seen in demands made by the Huns

to be able to sell prisoners to Roman merchants. It certainly represented a profitable industry;

in 443, the price of a prisoner was raised to twelve solidi87. Finally, frequent demands by

Attila that the Huns should be allowed to access Roman markets points to the importance of

influxes of Roman luxury goods for logades to be able to distinguish themselves from other

ethnic Huns, and for ethnic Huns being able to distinguish themselves from non-Hunnic

subjects.

As well as demanding access to Mediterranean markets, Attila’s logades would

encourage new conquests in which they might be able to increase their wealth. In the case of

the invasions of Gaul and Italy, with harmful consequences. As a predatory, parasitic warring

state, the Hunnic imperium was destined to expand until it collapsed. Indeed, we can

visualise both an over-stretch of greed and ambition that drove the Hunnic empire to its first

major battlefield defeat at Châlons, and the moral-sapping Italian campaign the following

year. Attila’s motives for the invasion of Gaul have been heavily debated. However, the

pressure of Attila’s hordes, intent on looting, was central in encouraging the Huns’ leader to

prematurely to undertake another yet predatory war. Indeed, there were times when the Huns

in Upper Italy moved very slowly because their carts were loaded with so much gold 88. I

believe Attila’s invasion of Gaul first, rather than Italy, is sufficient evidence to delegitimise

claims that it was for the hand of Honoria. For Kim, the Battle of Catalaunian Plains

represents at best a pyrrhic victory for the Western Roman Empire. However, if we interpret

the conflict correctly and see it as a major defeat for Attila, the damage to Attila’s till then

86 Blockley, Fragmentary Classicising Historians, 293

87 Thompson, The Huns, 178.
88
Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, 132.

25
virtually stainless military record, buoyed by his successful assault on the eastern Roman

Empire in 447 and his image and reputation, may have encouraged people to distance

themselves from the Hunnic state, or believe that the chances of them obtaining freedom

were more realistic than before his disastrous invasion of the western Roman empire.

Consistently accessing moveable wealth, either through tribute or plunder, was vital

in securing not only the loyalty of logades. Mimicking a strategy often used by the Romans,

Attila distributed booty captured in his campaigns among regional kings within the Hunnic

empire, giving them further incentive to consent to his rule89. The loyalty of such regional

kings to the Hunnic imperium was of paramount importance; given that it lacked the

bureaucratic capacity and political sophistication to manage its subjects’ day-to-day affairs90,

the core Hunnic polity relied heavily on the regional heads of subject peoples to keep their

armies manned and their mouths fed. Thus, the relationship was more balanced and inter-

dependent than it might appear at first glance. Within the imperial hierarchy, such individuals

would have ranked below logades but above those that made-up ethnic groups subdued and

bound to the Hunnic imperium during its years of expansion and consolidation. Evidence for

this aforementioned distribution of wealth can be found among burial sights of Germanic

regional kings in the Hunnic Empire. Before the wealth that the Huns gained access to

through treaties such as Margus and Anatolius, gold had been a rare find in Germanic

archaeological remains91. However, two generations of archaeological work since 1945 have

done much to better our understanding of the Hunnic Empire’s material culture, and while

certain ambiguities, chiefly the extent to which the Huns may have adopted the material

culture of their Germanic subjects as well as their names and language, remain, our picture of

the Hunnic Empire as reliant on access to and some diffusion of gold among regional leaders

89 Heather, Empires and Barbarians, 236.

90 Heather, Empires and Barbarians, 233.
91 Heather, Empires and Barbarians, 236.

26
of its subjects has become much clearer. This is not to say that the picture painted by Priscus

following his visit to Attila’s camps of an empire in harmony, bound by relative wealth and

security was accurate. However, as chiefs of regional tribes, particularly those farther from

the core Hunnic camps as visited by Priscus, were largely autonomous92 due to the limited

bureaucratic capacities of the central Hunnic political body, it was in the interests of the

Hunnic political core to ensure their loyalty, in the same manner that a slave-master must be

aware that to maximise profits, his possessions must have some incentive not to revolt and

disturb his business. I find Heather’s analogy linking Hunnic imperial dissolution following

Nedao and the peeling of an onion accurate and validating of my picture of the Hunnic

Empire’s collapse93. Realising that the Hunnic Empire’s capacity to continue as a largely

unified, predatory military entity seemed to be vanishing amidst squabbles between Attila’s

sons and demands for separation from the oppression that defined Attila’s expansion,

regional kings would have splintered from the Hunnic Empire, with those furthest from the

centre, and probably least likely to have enjoyed the wealth that Attila and his close

subordinates managed, abandoning ship first.

To bolster my arguments on the importance of Roman gold for the Hunnic imperial

administration’s military, societal and political health, let us consider Kim’s admittedly fair

noting that the Huns did not receive regular payments from the Romans till roughly the year

43094. For Kim, it is inexplicable that the Hunnic Empire should have relied on Roman gold,

when in his eyes, they had unified and colluded to become masters of a vast expanse of

territory around the Carpathians without regular Roman payments95. Upon deeper

consideration, this argument is highly flawed. In actuality, the Huns obtained wealth that was

92 Kennedy, Huns, 38.

93 Heather, Empires and Barbarians, 254.
94
Thompson, The Huns, 177.
95 Kim, Birth of Europe, 48.

27
critical in the unification of independently-acting Hunnic war-bands through several

networks before Ruga would compel the Romans to agree to pay the annual sum of 350

pounds of gold around the year 430. The Huns reportedly took their full share in the

plundering and devastation of the north Balkan provinces in the period after Adrianople’96.

The laments of Saint Jerome following the Hunnic raid of the eastern Roman Empire in 395

shed light on the wealth obtained, largely in the form of slaves, during the event, which

would again have helped with the political centralisation that manifested in the name Uldin

emerging. Alternatively, the Huns served as the mercenaries of various Roman Emperors.

Uldin for example, would bring Gainas’ head to the East Romans, a feat for which we can

assume he was handsomely paid. In addition, he fought under Stilicho during Radagaisus’

invasion of Italy in 406. Not only did he receive healthy payments for this, Uldin was able to

sell prisoners at one solidi a head, providing a further injection of wealth97. One cannot help

but admire the Huns making their own work as mercenaries, having in all likelihood

precipitated Radagaisus’ invasion of Italy in the first place. The Avars consolidated their

authority around the Carpathians before the death of Justinian by serving as mercenaries in

the service of the eastern Roman Empire98. This demonstrates the capacity for nomadic

European Empires to thrive by acting as mercenaries, but also re-enforces my stance that

influxes of moveable wealth were central in the imperial success of both the Avar and Hunnic

Empires.

We can understand better the rapid transformation of the Huns from a conglomeration

of autonomous fourth-century tribal pastoralists into the fifth century imperial confederation

before regular payments of Roman gold by considering the harsh ecological conditions of the

steppe, and the improvement that the lands of western Europe represented as a place to live.

96 Thompson, The Huns, 30.

97 Thompson, The Huns, 38.
98 Pohl, Regna and Gentes, 469.

28
Historians have extensively debated when the Huns seem to have settled in western Europe,

chiefly due to Zosimus making a real mess of the sections that would have death with

Olympiodorus; however, the Huns were seemingly occupying the Middle Danube region

west of the Carpathians by the 420s.99 The opportunity to partake in the wealth of the Roman

world and access levels of development with which the Huns were unfamiliar is the most

convincing argument for the initial movement of firstly Hunnic war-bands and then

subsequent larger, mixed Hunnic population groups. The bareness of the steppe seemingly

shaped the Huns’ primitive levels of political and economic development; bunched

populations on the steppe would have put excessive pressure on the land and generated

economic disaster. Consequentially, their numbers were few and scattered, their social

organisation loose and non-hierarchical100. Regular payments of gold however, encouraged

the centralisation and unification of enough Hunnic groups to facilitate expansion into new

lands and subjugation of new peoples. Their suspicions and hopes were confirmed; the grass

on the other side (of the Black Sea) genuinely was greener, and safer. On the steppe, their

poverty lent no margin of safety; draught meant almost certain death. Harsh winters could be

equally dangerous, as the death of over 10 million horses, sheep and cattle101, animals the

Huns absolutely relied on for subsistence, during one Mongolian winter as recently as 2010,

would demonstrate. The Carpathian basin not only offered more stable ecological conditions,

but it was also ‘ideally suited for protection against more powerful groups who usually

dominated the central Eurasian steppes’102. To summarise, alongside the injections of wealth

for Roman mercenary service and the offerings of further wealth, the above factors

99 P. Heather, ‘The Huns and the End of the Roman Empire in Western Europe’, English
Historical Review (1995), 16
100 Faulkner, Marxist History, 50
101 T. Branigan, Mongolia: How the Winter of ‘White Death’ Devastated Nomads’ Way of

Life (The Guardian, July 2010).

102 Pohl, Regna and Gentes, 577.

29
demonstrate why the independently-acting groups of Huns collectivised and built something

resembling an empire before the treaties of Margus and Anatolius. To conclude, the era of

Hunnic interaction with the Roman world, beginning with their service as mercenaries and

ending with the unsuccessful demands of Dengizich that Constantinople should pay tribute to

remaining Huns, was centred around the Huns seeking to make profit from. Extortion and

demands for tribute became constituted cottage industries, providing the wherewithal of their

daily life.

Conclusion

The Hunnic Empire’s chances of establishing lasting imperial health and stability

were heavily undermined by unsophisticated political structures and an ineffective

bureaucracy. The extent of this bureaucracy was to maximise the military potential of subject

peoples, and to exploit them for their agricultural surpluses. This supreme “strength”,

essential to Hunnic military and economic vitality, was also their greatest weakness. Such an

ineffective bureaucracy meant the Huns came to rely heavily on the military strength these

peoples provided. The Huns could not have existed or built the immense empire that they did

without access to such critical resources. As their dependency grew, so did the Huns’

vulnerability. The unification of previously independently-acting war-bands into a coherent,

organised entity was obviously crucial in their rise. During the reign of Attila however, this

centralisation would reach unprecedented and unsustainable levels; hubris was both

encouraged and facilitated by Attila’s unquestionable authority. Finally, we see in the case of

the Huns the prudence of leaders blessed with the foresight to avoid imperial over-extension

in the pursuit of glory; Hadrian springs to mind.

Prosper of Aquitaine’s noting that, after Attila’s death, ‘great struggles to take control

of his kingdom arose among his sons, and then the consequent defections of some of the

30
tribes who used to be subjects of the Huns provided motives and opportunities for wars’103.

Why subject peoples were willing to revolt in such numbers, and then unwilling to try to re-

establish the Huns’ former military might once the dust around the unspecified battlefield of

Nedao had cleared, can be explained by the exploitative hold the Huns had enjoyed over such

subject peoples. To an extent, the development of Hunnic seemingly ran parallel with the

slave-holding society of the Romans, but owing to the fact the Huns did not pass beyond a

rudimentary stage of either slavery or feudal relations, their society had no definite character

of its own. Conditions of dependency would paper over the cracks of involuntary federation,

as would the protection afforded to Hunnic subjects from external threats. However,

Ardaric’s victory at Nedao, and further fragmentation thereafter, would clearly illustrate that

for most of the Huns’ subjects, the costs of involvement within the imperial structure were

not worth the benefits.

Access to wealth and luxuries from the Roman world would incentivise the Huns’

migration to Europe, result in political centralisation following their migration and allow the

Huns to overcome their traditional economic dependence on nomadic pastoralism, with

disastrous consequences for countless subject peoples of Europe, forced into years of

exploitation. The influx of gold would act as a smokescreen to mask the Huns’ lack of

sophisticated political institutions and capacity for logistical organisation. It ensured the

highly temporary, fickle loyalty of various logades and regional kings, and thus doomed the

Huns to political disintegration following any event to disturb peace and prosperity within the

Hunnic Empire. Attila’s death proved sufficient.

103B. Mingarelli, ‘Collapse of the Hunnic Empire: Jordanes, Ardaric and the Battle of Nedao’
(Ottawa Univ. thesis, 2018), 56

31
Thus, several of the features that made the Huns strong and gave them their famous, if often

misunderstood, role in history, also contributed to their imperial downfall. To conclude, we

must posit the question, was Hunnic imperial collapse inevitable? Nikolay Kradin argued that

most steppe empires typically last between 100 and 150 years104, research Kim ran with and

attempted to justify his thesis that the Hunnic Empire was certainly no less sophisticated than

other nomadic empires, for many of which we have more concrete evidence for political and

bureaucratic sophistication. For me, Hunnic imperial collapse was extremely likely, due to its

reliance on regular influxes of moveable wealth, its tendency for exploitation and involuntary

assimilation and the absence of effective bureaucratic structures that could ensure success in

large-scale military campaigns. Had the Huns’ political evolution occurred at a slower and

more assured rate, perhaps its future may have been different. I would recommend that this is

explored by other historians. To conclude, the Huns lacked the various appeals that the

Romans could offer for potential citizens, with assurance and imperial longevity defining the

latter, but not the former.

Bibliography

104 Kim, Birth of Europe, 91

32
Primary Sources:

 Blockley, R.C. The Fragmentary Classicising Historians of the Later Roman Empire
Volume II (Liverpool, 1983).

 Gordon, C.D, The Age of Attila: Fifth Century Byzantium and the Barbarians
(Michigan, 1966).

 Jordanes, The Origins and Deeds of the Goths (trans. Mierow).

https://people.ucalgary.ca/~vandersp/Courses/texts/jordgeti.html

Secondary Sources:

 Barnes, C, Rehorsing the Huns’, War and Society, 34 (2015), 1-22

 Bell-Fialkoff, Andrew The Role of Migration in the History of the Eurasian Steppe
(Hampshire, 2000).

 Branigan, T, Mongolia: How the Winter of ‘White Death’ Devastated Nomads’ Way
of Life (The Guardian, July 2010).

 Daim, Falko, ‘Avars and Avar Archaeology’ in H.W Goetz, J. Jarnut and W. Pohl
(eds), Regna and Gentes (London, 2002).

 Faulkner, N, A Marxist History of the World (London, 2013).

 Harke, H, ‘Reviewed Work: The Huns, Rome and the Birth of Europe’ (Kim), The
Classical Review, 260-262.

 Harmatta, J, ‘The Dissolution of the Hun Empire’, Acta Archaeologica, 2 (1953),

282-303.

 Jones, A.M.H, ‘Reviewed Work: A History of Attila and the Huns’ (Thompson), The
Classical Review 63 (1949), 67-70.

 Heather, Peter, Empires and Barbarians: Migration, Development and the Birth of
Europe (London, 2009).

 Heather, Peter, ‘The Huns and Barbarian Europe’, in M. Mass (eds), The Cambridge
Companion to the Age of Attila (Cambridge, 2014).

 Heather, Peter, The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the
Barbarians (Oxford, 2005).

 Heather, Peter, ‘The Huns and the End of the Roman Empire in Western Europe’,
English Historical Review (1995), 4-41.

33
 Kelly, C, Attila the Hun: Barbarian Terror and the Fall of the Roman Empire
(London, 2008).

 King, C, ‘Reviewed Work: The Huns’ (Thompson/Heather), Central Asiatic Journal,

41 (1997), 144.

 Kim, H.J, The Huns, Rome, and the Birth of Europe (New York, 2013).

 Kim, H.J, ‘The Political Organisation of Steppe Empires and Their Contribution to
Eurasian Interconnectivity: The Case of the Huns and Their Impact in the Frankish
West’ in H.J. Kim and S. Aladi (eds), Eurasian Empires in Antiquity and the Early
Middle Ages (Cambridge, 2017).

 Lindner, R, ‘Nomadism, Horses and Huns’, Past and Present, 92 (1981), 3-19.

 Maenchen-Helfen, O, ‘Huns and Hsiung-Nu’, Byzantion, 17 (1945), 222-243.

 Maenchen-Helfen, O, The World of the Huns: Studies in their History and Culture
(California, 1973).

 Mingarelli, B, ‘Collapse of the Hunnic Empire: Jordanes, Ardaric and the Battle of
Nedao’ (Ottawa Univ. thesis, 2018).

 Pohl, W, ‘A Non-Roman Empire in Central Europe: the Avars’ in H.W Goetz, J.

Jarnut and W. Pohl (eds), Regna and Gentes (London, 2002).

 Pohl, W, Strategies of Distinction: The Construction of Ethnic Communities 300-800

(Leiden, 1998).

 Thompson, E, Attila and the Huns (Oxford, 1948).

 Thompson, E, The Huns (Oxford, 1991).

 Thorndike, L, ‘Reviewed Work: The Invasion of Europe by the Barbarians’ (Bury),

American Historical Review, 565-569.

 Whittow, Mark, ‘Reviewed Work: The Huns, Rome and the Birth of Europe’, (Kim)
Early Medieval Europe, 242-245.

34