A.M. OCA No.
03-1800-RTJ November 26, 2004 hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is
CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE ALEJADRINO C. CABEBE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18,
Batac, Ilocos Norte, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The instant administrative case stemmed from the sworn complaint 1 dated
January 15, 2003 of Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño of the
Department of Justice, against Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe,2 then Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte. The charges are
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and
partiality.
In his complaint, Chief State Prosecutor Zuño alleged that Criminal Case No.
3950-18 for illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs was filed with
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte against Rey Daquep
Arcangel, Victorino Gamet Malabed, William Roxas Villanueva, all police
officers, Jocelyn Malabed Manuel and Pelagio Valencia Manuel. Upon
arraignment, all the accused, assisted by their counsel de parte, pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. On March 14, 2001, the prosecution filed with this
Court a petition for change of venue but was denied in a Resolution dated
August 13, 2001.3 On October 8, 2001, the accused filed a motion for
reconsideration.4 In the meantime, the proceedings before respondent's court
were suspended.
On May 6, 2002, the accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking as ground the
right of the accused to a speedy trial. On November 5, 2002, respondent judge
motu propio issued an Order5 granting bail to the accused, fixing the bail for
each at P70,000.00 in cash or property bond at P120,000.00, except for
accused Evelyn Manuel whose bail was fixed at P20,000.00 in cash.
Respondent judge issued the Order without the accused's application or
motion for bail.
The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration.6 Instead of acting
thereon, respondent judge issued an order inhibiting himself from further
proceeding with the case, realizing that what he did was patently irregular.
Complainant thus prays that respondent judge be dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits and be disbarred from the practice of law.
In his comment,7 respondent denied the charges. While admitting that he
issued the Order dated November 5, 2002 granting bail to the accused without
any hearing, "the same was premised on the constitutional right of the accused
to a speedy trial." There was delay in the proceedings due to complainant's
frequent absences and failure of the witnesses for the prosecution to appear
in court, resulting in the cancellation of the hearings. The prosecution did not
object to the grant of bail to the accused.8 He added that the administrative
complaint filed against him is purely harassment. It is not the appropriate
remedy to question his alleged erroneous Order. Accordingly, and considering
his forty (40) years of government service, he prays that the administrative
complaint be dismissed.
On March 26, 2003, respondent judge compulsorily retired.
In his Report dated July 7, 2003, Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez
found respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law and
recommended that a fine of P20,000.00 be imposed upon him, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
In our Resolution9 dated August 25, 2003, we directed that the complaint be
re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and required the parties to
manifest whether they are submitting the case for resolution on the basis of
the pleadings filed. Both parties submitted the required manifestations that
they are submitting the case for decision on the basis of the records.
In Docena-Caspe vs. Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas,10 we held that jurisprudence is
replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing, whether
summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail, especially in cases involving
offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, where
bail is a matter of discretion. Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory
in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion.11 It must be stressed
that the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion,
strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a
matter of judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the latter
to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine
whether the evidence of guilt is strong.12 In fact, even in cases where there is
no petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.13
There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the accused without
conducting a hearing, in violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, quoted as follows:
"Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. – At the hearing of an
application for bail filed by a person who is in custody for the
commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that
evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail
hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial
but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness
for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the
Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify."
"Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. – In the application for
bail under section 8 of this Rule, the court must give reasonable
notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his
recommendation. (18a)"
In Cortes vs. Catral,14 we laid down the following rules outlining the
duties of the judge in case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing
of the application for bail regardless of whether or not
the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that
the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion
(Section 7 and 8, id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the
accused upon the approval of the bail bond (Section 19,
id.); otherwise the petition should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing, the court's order
granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence of the
prosecution and based thereon, the judge should formulate his own conclusion
as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough to indicate the guilt
of the accused.15
Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and procedure enumerated
in Cortes.16 He did not conduct a hearing before he granted bail to the accused,
thus depriving the prosecution of an opportunity to interpose objections to the
grant of bail. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or weakness of
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, he should have conducted a
hearing and thereafter made a summary of the evidence of the prosecution.
The importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be
downplayed, these are considered aspects of procedural due process for both
the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial
of bail.17
Neither did respondent require the prosecution to submit its recommendation
on whether or not bail should be granted.
He maintains that the prosecution did not object to the grant of bail to the
accused, hence, he cannot be held administratively liable for not conducting a
hearing.
In Santos vs. Ofilada,18 we held that the failure to raise or the absence of an
objection on the part of the prosecution in an application for bail does not
dispense with the requirement of a bail hearing. Thus –
 "Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to interpose an patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith and malice,23 which
objection to the granting of bail to the accused will not justify such are not present here.
grant without hearing. This Court has uniformly ruled that even if
We thus find respondent judge guilty of violation of Supreme Court Rules,
the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose any
specifically Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the grant
objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to
of bail. This administrative offense is considered a less serious charge,
conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions from
punishable under Section 9(4) and Section 11(B-2), Rule 140 of the same
which it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or lack of it,
Rules, thus:
against the accused. Where the prosecutor refuses to adduce
evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the "Sec. 9. Less Serious Charges. – Less serious charges include:
court may ask the prosecution such questions as would ascertain
the strength of the State's evidence or judge the adequacy of the x x x
amount of bail. Irrespective of respondent judge's opinion that the
"4. Violation of Supreme Court Rules, directives, and circulars;
evidence of guilt against the accused is not strong, the law and
settled jurisprudence demand that a hearing be conducted before x x x
bail may be fixed for the temporary release of the accused, if bail is
at all justified. "Sec. 11. Sanctions. – x x x

Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no "B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the
objection to the grant of bail to the accused, the respondent judge following sanctions shall be imposed:
therein should nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing 1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not
and diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter was less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
not in fact contesting the bail application. In addition, a hearing was
also necessary for the court to take into consideration the 2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00."
guidelines set forth in the then Section, 6, Rule 114 of the 1985
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe, now retired, is
Rules of Criminal Procedure for the fixing of the amount of the bail,
found guilty of violation of Supreme Court Rules and is hereby fined in the sum
Only after respondent judge had satisfied himself that these
of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), the same to be deducted from his
requirements have been met could he then proceed to rule on
retirement benefits.
whether or not to grant bail."
SO ORDERED.
Clearly, therefore, respondent judge cannot seek refuge on the alleged
absence of objection on the part of the prosecution to the grant of bail to the
accused.

Respondent judge contends that the accused were entitled to their right to a
speedy trial, hence, he granted bail without a hearing. He blames the
prosecution for the delay.

Respondent's contention is bereft of merit. There is no indication in the records

of the criminal case that the prosecution has intentionally delayed the trial of
the case. Even assuming there was delay, this does not justify the grant of bail
without a hearing. This is utter disregard of the Rules. The requirement of a
bail hearing has been incessantly stressed by this Court. In the same vein, the
Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be conversant with the law and the
Rules and maintain professional competence; and by the very nature of his
office, should be circumspect in the performance of his duties. He must render
justice without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. Obviously,
respondent failed to live up to these standards.

It bears reiterating that respondent is being charged with knowingly rendering

unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and partiality. We ruled that in
order to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order,
respondent judge must have acted in bad faith, with malice or in willful
disregard of the right of a litigant.19 A perusal of the records, specifically the
assailed Order, hardly shows that any of these incidents has been proven.

On the charge of gross ignorance of the law, suffice it to say that to constitute
such infraction, it is not enough that the subject decision, order or actuation of
the judge in the performance of his official duties is contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud,
dishonesty or corruption. 20 In Guillermo vs. Judge Reyes, Jr.21 we
categorically held that "good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or
improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with
ignorance of the law can find refuge." In Villanueva-Fabella vs. Lee,22 we ruled
that "a judge may not be held administratively accountable for every erroneous
order he renders. For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed
order of a judge must not only be erroneous; more important, it must be
motivated by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred or some other similar motive."
Complainant, having failed to present positive evidence to show that
respondent judge was so motivated in granting bail without hearing, can not
be held guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

As to the charge of partiality, we find no evidence to sustain the same. It is

merely based on complainant's speculation. Mere suspicion that a judge is
partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing evidence to prove
this charge. The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO
MUÑOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge
Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These are: (1) the
Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muñoz, private
respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002 denying the
motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government
of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the Philippine
Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders
were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution
granting bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British
Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of
Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the People’s Republic of China
and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with
three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in
violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201
of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to
defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997
and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted,
he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department
of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ
then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which,
in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the
provisional arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest
against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and
detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the
validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring
the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on
certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court
of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition
of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private
respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition
of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to
Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part, private
respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed
by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order
denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail
in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further
hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided
by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of
the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent
judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to
post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil
liberties. The petition for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that
accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the
issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself
amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear
for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will
be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and
discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before
this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors
handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any
time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before
this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and
personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if
the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in
favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation
be noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above
Order, but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or
statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right
being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to
bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee;
and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of
one’s liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not
be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve
the question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G.
Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez,
a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional
provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only
in criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional
provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation
of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings
because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss
of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6,
September 17, 1971, per Fernando, J., later CJ). It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where
the presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended"
does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available
only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application "only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the
constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that
the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in
nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondent’s case.
However, this Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1)
the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who,
in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition; (2) the higher
value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the
corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the
rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law
on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the
worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly,
the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of
international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the subjects
of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards
the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials
after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual
defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war, crimes
against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg
principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events
show that the individual person is now a valid subject of international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international
organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human rights.
Thus, on December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and
all the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a
treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now
recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the
international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court,
in granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the
Constitution,3the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of
the land. In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and
ratified. Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of
every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations,
committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article
II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines,
therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every
person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested
can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to
every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to
bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to
criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various international treaties
giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life
and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an
individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal
proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as
deportation and quarantine,4 have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our
eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not
limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only.
This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in
criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has been allowed in this
jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of
administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of
the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human
rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing
deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration was
granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee had
committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to treat him
as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and
that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery
used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail
was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of
Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal
criminal charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality
of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon
the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s right to
bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should
not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is
no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person
detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction
must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under
these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the
Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition
Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the Philippines
with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable
the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal
investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on
him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created
by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime
within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to
surrender him to the demanding state.8 It is not a criminal proceeding.9 Even
if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its
nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such
punishment may follow extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence
wholly to treaty obligations between different nations.11 It is not a trial to
determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee.12 Nor is it a
full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.13 Its
object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime
and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial
or punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the
following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential
extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition
is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of P.D.
No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate
arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best serve the
interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state
"in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the accused,
pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from
provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the accused
if a request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all
earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to
arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the
demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary detention" may be
a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the
detention should be reasonable.

Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999,
and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court
ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over
two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any
standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his
fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of liberty
which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee,
however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for
bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.

The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as
that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is
premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused.
As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary
presumption in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of
extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant
and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential
extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive
from justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears
the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be
granted bail.

The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the

Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into
with the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with
these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose
of extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its
treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights
to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed,
not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the
Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his
right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is
satisfactorily met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in

granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in
criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil
cases. While administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence
used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of
extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed
"clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in
extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The
potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is
not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence

to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be
remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be
granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial

court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis
of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the
cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter,
conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010
JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his
release to guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required,1 is
the answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to be
done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the "dubious
interval," often years long, between arrest and final adjudication?2 Bail acts as
a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in
pretrial liberty and society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at
trial.3
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been
sentenced to prison must typically begin serving time immediately unless, on
application, he is admitted to bail.4 An accused not released on bail is
incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and
proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty
to pay a debt to society he has never owed.5 Even if the conviction is
subsequently affirmed, however, the accused’s interest in bail pending appeal
includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his
case and avoidance of potential hardships of prison.6 On the other hand,
society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an
individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious
enough to warrant prison time.7 Other recognized societal interests in the
denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of the accused’s flight from
court custody, the protection of the community from potential danger and the
avoidance of delay in punishment.8 Under what circumstances an accused
may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the
interests of society and those of the accused.9
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail
pending appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the
exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the
fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be
exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons,
considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court.10
The Facts
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste
was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime
of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and
one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.11
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.12 Pending appeal, he filed
an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced
age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of
flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail.13 It invoked the
bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to
extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised "with grave
caution and only for strong reasons." Citing well-established jurisprudence, it
ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner
needing medical care outside the prison facility. It found that petitioner
… failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued
confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in
danger. x x x Notably, the physical condition of [petitioner] does not prevent
him from seeking medical attention while confined in prison, though he clearly
preferred to be attended by his personal physician.14
For purposes of determining whether petitioner’s application for bail could be
allowed pending appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of
petitioner’s conviction. It made a preliminary evaluation of petitioner’s case and
made a prima facie determination that there was no reason substantial enough
to overturn the evidence of petitioner’s guilt.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.15
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his
application for bail, considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of
bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was
present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court
is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted
to an appellant pending appeal.
The Issue
The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending
appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of
imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the
grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted
absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may
be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court.
However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the
nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can
only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue
on provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail
subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six
(6) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled
upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the
following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without
a valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation,
parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability
of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime
during the pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
resolution of the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either
case. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned
in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an
application for bail by an appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a
penalty of more than six years’ imprisonment should automatically be granted.
Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and
substantive rules.
Basic Procedural Concerns Forbid Grant of Petition
Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court to assail the denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent application
for admission to bail pending appeal. While the said remedy may be resorted
to challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is proper only where the
interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.16
Other than the sweeping averment that "[t]he Court of Appeals committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s application for bail pending
appeal despite the fact that none of the conditions to justify the denial thereof
under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present, much less proven by the
prosecution,"17 however, petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of
Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his
claim that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the absence
of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that the Court
of Appeals committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal by denying his
application for bail on the ground that the evidence that he committed a capital
offense was strong.
We disagree.
It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution
without or in excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to
be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal
in a case such as this where the decision of the trial court convicting the
accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is
exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioner’s urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal.
Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner’s application for bail pending
appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not simply an error in judgment but
it is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction.18 Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse
of discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.19 It must be so
patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In
other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear
showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.20
Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending appeal,
the Court of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously and whimsically. No
capriciousness or arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion was ever imputed
to the appellate court. Nor could any such implication or imputation be inferred.
As observed earlier, the Court of Appeals exercised grave caution in the
exercise of its discretion. The denial of petitioner’s application for bail pending
appeal was not unreasonable but was the result of a thorough assessment of
petitioner’s claim of ill health. By making a preliminary appraisal of the merits
of the case for the purpose of granting bail, the court also determined whether
the appeal was frivolous or not, or whether it raised a substantial question. The
appellate court did not exercise its discretion in a careless manner but followed
doctrinal rulings of this Court.
At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeal’s erroneous application
and interpretation of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, the
extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings
or erroneous conclusions of law or fact.21 In this connection, Lee v. People22 is
apropos:
… Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent
court lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are
not correct. Its questioned acts would at most constitute errors of law and not
abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not
to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings and
conclusions. An interlocutory order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition
only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon
this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice
of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not
only delay the administration of justice but will also unduly burden the
courts.23 (emphasis supplied)
Wording of Third Paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 Contradicts
Petitioner’s Interpretation
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the
penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding
six years. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the
said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or
commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of
the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense
while under probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating
the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another
crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not
present. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of
the said circumstances.
The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in
the commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an
authority in remedial law:
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may
be summarized in the following rules:
xxx xxx xxx
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is
imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any
other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter
of discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and
any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar
circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by
said court (Sec. 5); x x x24 (emphasis supplied)
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in
remedial law, is of the same thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court
of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
bail becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six
(6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the
enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present then bail shall be denied.25 (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means
that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section
5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny
bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if the bail-
negating26 circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are
absent. In other words, the appellate court’s denial of bail pending appeal
where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself,
constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a
more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the
enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other
option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the
appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will
thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending
appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the
determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine
whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise
sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail
pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the
appellant’s case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound
discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other
than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including
the demands of equity and justice;27 on the basis thereof, it may either allow
or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within the second scenario, the
appellate court’s stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be
primarily focused on the determination of the proof of the presence of any of
the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is so
because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to
deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said
circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail.
Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent
sound discretion approach.
Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two
different situations that are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114. Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the
import of the said provision and trivializes the established policy governing the
grant of bail pending appeal.
In particular, a careful reading of petitioner’s arguments reveals that it
interprets the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all
situations where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is
imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the grant
of bail pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion, that is,
one restricted to the determination of whether any of the five bail-
negating circumstances exists. The implication of this position is that, if any
such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be
granted pending appeal.
Petitioner’s theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-
finding body whose authority is limited to determining whether any of the five
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists.
This unduly constricts its "discretion" into merely filling out the checklist of
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances
where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is
imprisonment exceeding six years. In short, petitioner’s interpretation severely
curbs the discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular
factual issue — whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances is present.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as "choice."28 Choice occurs
where, between "two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of
options)," there is "more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the
outcome left to the decision maker."29 On the other hand, the establishment of
a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion.30 Thus, by severely
clipping the appellate court’s discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere
fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where
the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment
exceeding six years, petitioner’s theory effectively renders nugatory the
provision that "upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission
to bail is discretionary."
The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this
case) to rule on applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve
the exercise of judgment on the part of the court. The court must be allowed
reasonable latitude to express its own view of the case, its appreciation of the
facts and its understanding of the applicable law on the matter.31 In view of the
grave caution required of it, the court should consider whether or not, under all
circumstances, the accused will be present to abide by his punishment if his
conviction is affirmed.32 It should also give due regard to any other pertinent
matters beyond the record of the particular case, such as the record, character
and reputation of the applicant,33 among other things. More importantly, the
discretion to determine allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal
necessarily includes, at the very least, an initial determination that the appeal
is not frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact which must be
determined by the appellate court.34 In other words, a threshold requirement
for the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro forma and merely
intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable issue.35 This must be so;
otherwise, the appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting
appeals made for the purpose of taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail
pending appeal. Even more significantly, this comports with the very strong
presumption on appeal that the lower court’s exercise of discretionary power
was sound,36 specially since the rules on criminal procedure require that no
judgment shall be reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals except for
substantial error.37
Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting
the bail-negating circumstances to those expressly mentioned, petitioner
applies the expressio unius est exclusio alterius38 rule in statutory
construction. However, the very language of the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 contradicts the idea that the enumeration of the five situations therein
was meant to be exclusive. The provision categorically refers to "the
following or other similar circumstances." Hence, under the rules, similarly
relevant situations other than those listed in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 may be considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail
pending appeal.
Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to
unreasonable or senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from
adopting petitioner’s interpretation that, where the penalty imposed by the trial
court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be granted if none of
the listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal
in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment
will be more lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed
six years. While denial or revocation of bail in cases where the penalty
imposed is more than six years’ imprisonment must be made only if any of the
five bail-negating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases where
the penalty imposed does not exceed six years imprisonment may be denied
even without those conditions.
Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail pending
appeal be more accessible to those convicted of serious offenses, compared
to those convicted of less serious crimes?
Petitioner’s Theory Deviates from History And Evolution of Rule on Bail
Pending Appeal
Petitioner’s interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history and
evolution of the provisions on bail pending appeal.
The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6,
Rule 110 of the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of
First Instance. — After judgment by a municipal judge and before
conviction by the Court of First Instance, the defendant shall be
admitted to bail as of right.
Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First
Instance. — After conviction by the Court of First Instance,
defendant may, upon application, be bailed at the discretion of the
court.
Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. — A capital offense, as the term is
used in this rule, is an offense which, under the law existing at the
time of its commission, and at the time of the application to be
admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. — No person in custody for the
commission of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the
evidence of his guilt is strong.
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114
of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody,
shall before final conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right,
except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which,
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when
evidence of guilt is strong.
Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. — A capital offense, as the term is
used in this Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the
time of its commission, and at the time of the application to be
admitted to bail, may be punished by death. (emphasis supplied)
The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative Circular
No. 2-92 dated January 20, 1992 as follows:
The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down
in Section 3 of Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, which provides:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody, shall before
final conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged
with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital
offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be
entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he appeals the case to this Court
since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the offense
charged is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well
as pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the
following policies concerning the effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the
law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail is punishable by a penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial
court of the offense charged or of a lesser offense than that charged
in the complaint or information, he may be allowed to remain free
on his original bail pending the resolution of his appeal, unless the
proper court directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of
the Rules of Court, as amended;
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense
which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is
out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser
offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the same
rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;
3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense
which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is
out on bail and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense
charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be
placed in confinement pending resolution of his appeal.
As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now
pending appeal before his Court where the accused is still on provisional
liberty, the following rules are laid down:
1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused
within ten (10) days from notice to the court of origin. The
bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court of the fact of
surrender, after which, the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered
by this Court;
2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the
National Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police as
the accused shall remain under confinement pending resolution of
his appeal;
3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid
period of ten (10) days, his bond shall be forfeited and an order of
arrest shall be issued by this Court. The appeal taken by the
accused shall also be dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the
Revised Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his
bail. (emphasis supplied)
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94
dated August 16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the said
rules as follows:
SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. — All persons in custody shall: (a) before
or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right,
with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law
of this Rule. (3a)
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional
liberty under the same bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not
more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail
previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of his
bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation,
parole, under conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal,
the accused may commit another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on
motion and with notice to the adverse party. (n)
SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. — A capital offense, as the term is used
in these Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, maybe
punished with death. (4)
SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of
the criminal prosecution. (emphasis supplied)
The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114 were
thereafter amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now.
The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a
more restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful
adherence to the bedrock principle, that is, bail pending appeal should be
allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a
non-capital offense by the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional
Trial Court) discretionary. The 1988 amendments made applications for bail
pending appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail before final
conviction in trial courts for non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable by
reclusion perpetua was a matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a
matter of right at any stage of the action where the charge was not for a capital
offense or was not punished by reclusion perpetua.39
The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail
pending appeal (of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more stringent rules on the
matter of post-conviction grant of bail.
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly
identifying which court has authority to act on applications for bail pending
appeal under certain conditions and in particular situations. More importantly,
it reiterated the "tough on bail pending appeal" configuration of Administrative
Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on
Criminal Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right
before final conviction.40 Under the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion
upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant to the "tough
on bail pending appeal" policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions
mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those
circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for
an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where
bail is prohibited.
Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail
pending appeal? What is more in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam
view of bail pending appeal? Is it a rule which favors the automatic grant of
bail in the absence of any of the circumstances under the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due
consideration of all relevant circumstances, even if none of the circumstances
under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?

The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail

pending appeal parallels the approach adopted in the United States where our
original constitutional and procedural provisions on bail emanated.41 While this
is of course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows that our treatment
of bail pending appeal is no different from that in other democratic societies.

In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of
bail pending appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion —
particularly with respect to extending bail — should be exercised not with laxity
but with caution and only for strong reasons.42 In fact, it has even been pointed
out that "grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in
granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in
Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5."43

Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:

The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that

bail should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty
or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it
would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been
tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in
prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show
error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued
that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction
that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail
than before conviction.44 (emphasis supplied)

As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon,
the Court declared in Yap v. Court of Appeals45 (promulgated in 2001 when
the present rules were already effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is
"a matter of wise discretion."

A Final Word

Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1

After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates

and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.46 From then on, the grant
of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such
discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance
of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach.
This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the
rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It
is likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial determination that the accused
should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his
conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is
especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate
sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-
conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may
be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions.
Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-
wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and
court processes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits,
the appeal of petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
32159, with dispatch.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial
is ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal
case. The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of the
accused’s propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary
to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at
trial.1
The Case
Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
to assail and annul the resolutions dated July 14, 20142 and August 8,
20143 issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-
0238, where he has been charged with plunder along with several others.
Enrile insists that the resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix
Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Antecedents
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several
others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported
involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).4 On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014,
Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental
Opposition,6 praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should
probable cause be found against him. The motions were heard by the
Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its Consolidated Opposition.7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbaya n issued its resolution denying Enrile’s
motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity
considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed
under the custody of the law.8 Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the
arrest of Enrile.9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on
confined at the Philippine National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his
medical examination.10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital
,11 and his Motion to Fix Bail ,12 both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by
the Sandiganbayan on July 8, 2014.13 In support of the motions, Enrile argued
that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet
established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was
charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal
, not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and
physical condition must further be seriously considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first assailed resolution
denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail, disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the
Court shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong
against accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only
then will the Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court. In fact,
accused Enrile has not filed an application for bail. Necessarily, no bail hearing
can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to
ask the Court to fix his bail.
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him bail because while
he is charged with plunder, "the maximum penalty that may be possibly
imposed on him is reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua." He anchors this
claim on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that
he is over seventy (70) years old and that he voluntarily surrendered.
"Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged against Enrile is not
punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus bailable."
The argument has no merit.
x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating circumstance/s is not
taken into consideration. These circumstances will only be appreciated in the
imposition of the proper penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty
of the offense charged. x x x
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix his bail
because he is not a flight risk and his physical condition must also be seriously
considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being a flight risk are
among the factors that are considered in fixing a reasonable amount of bail.
However, as explained above, it is premature for the Court to fix the amount
of bail without an anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused
Enrile is not strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce Enrile’s Motion to
Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.14
On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued it s second assailed resolution
to deny Enrile’s motion for reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014
resolution.15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his petition for certiorari ,
namely:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as
a matter of right. Enrile may be deemed to fall within the
exception only upon concurrence of two (2) circumstances: (i)
where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, and (ii)
when evidence of guilt is strong.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that
Enrile, if ever he would be convicted, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter
of right.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that
evidence of Enrile’s guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is
entitled to bail as a matter of right.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.16
Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail
as matter of right; th at it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show
clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be
excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to
establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age
and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with
proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he
should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over
the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.
In its Comment ,17 the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is
discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it
is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is
strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail
considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.
Ruling of the Court
The petition for certiorari is meritorious.
1.
Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed
innocent
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.18 The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee
of due process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released
on bail,19 and further binds the court to wait until after trial to impose any
punishment on the accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from
committing additional crimes.[[21] The purpose of bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial
court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the
accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism
to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or
during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence
at trial.23
2. Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion
The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights)
of the Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable
by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 11424 of the Rules
of Court , as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.
A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the
law existing at the time of its commission and the application for admission to
bail, may be punished with death.25
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any
criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense,
or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and
the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under
arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the
guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his
right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of
his guilt is strong.26 Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is
strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit
Trial Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no
jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to
conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for
an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment when
evidence of guilt is not strong.28
On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by
the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment;29 or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under
paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or
has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of hi s case indicate the probability of
flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime
during the pendency of the appeal.
3. Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or
reclusion perpetua is subject to judicial discretion
For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not
evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the
discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in Concerned Citizens
v. Elma ,30 "such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to
ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not
he should be granted provisional liberty." It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail
cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the
trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution.31The
indispensability of the hearing with notice has been aptly explained in Aguirre
v. Belmonte, viz. :32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this Court already ruled
in People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al. that a hearing is mandatory before bail can
be granted to an accused who is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without
any hearing on the motion asking for it, without bothering to ask the
prosecution for its conformity or comment, as it turned out later, over its strong
objections. The court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and the
affidavits of three policemen, not one of whom apparently witnessed the killing.
Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued the questioned ruling was
intended only for prima facie determining whether or not there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime was committed and
pinpointing the persons who probably committed it. Whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still has to be established
unless the prosecution submits the issue on whatever it has already
presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt,
the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally entitled as the
accused to due process.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of
evidence and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among
them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character and reputation
of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the
accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the accused is a fugitive from
justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in other cases. (Section
6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate
these guidelines in an ex-parte determination where the Fiscal is neither
present nor heard.
The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of
the court, should primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt
against the accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing means:
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence
of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is
merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On such
hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry
as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further
evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The course of inquiry may be left
to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such
evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
thoroughness in the examination and cross examination.33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is charged with a capital
offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
the trial judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v.
Catral,34 to wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify
the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require
him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
 3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is no t strong, discharge the accused
upon the approval of the bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise
petition should be denied.
3. Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail
We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of
two mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely:
that he was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the
offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.35
Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the Prosecution, whose
Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that –
8. As regards the assertion that the maximum possible penalty that might be
imposed upon Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the presence of two
mitigating circumstances, suffice it to state that the presence or absence of
mitigating circumstances is also not consideration that the Constitution
deemed worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is "charged with an offense
punishable by." It is, therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense
that has bearing and not the possibility of mitigating circumstances being
appreciated in the accused’s favor.36
Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or not Enrile’s averment
on the presence of the two mitigating circumstances could entitle him to bail
despite the crime alleged against him being punishable with reclusion
perpetua ,37 simply because the determination, being primarily factual in
context, is ideally to be made by the trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided
by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court.
The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international
community arising from the national commitment under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to:
x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and
dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II
of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines,
therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every
person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested
can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other
words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to
every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to
bail.38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as
value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not
only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a
clear and convincing showing: (1 ) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or
a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances.39
In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately
surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the
risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal
disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise,
has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We
also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been
charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already
evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and
was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as
a flight risk.40 With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives,
his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake,
he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling
justification for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not
recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of
the Philippine General Hospital (PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient
who was found during the medical examinations conducted at the UP-PGH to
be suffering from the following conditions:
(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood pressure levels on
multiple drug therapy; (Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease composed of the
following :
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease with
carotid and vertebral artery disease ; (Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications; (Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial
calcifications. (Annex 1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat)
documented by Holter monitoring ; (Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip
syndrome; (Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular s/p
laser of the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular injections;
(Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber
intraocular lens. (Annexes 3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology uncertain) in
2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented
enlarged prostate on recent ultrasound).42
Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or
collectively, could pose significant risk s to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1)
uncontrolled hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart
complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could
lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events, especially under stressful
conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary artery disease,
because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack under stressful
conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be triggered
by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen
exposure) which could cause a deterioration in patients with asthma or
COPD.43
Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that Enrile’s advanced age and
ill health required special medical attention. His confinement at the PNP
General Hospital, albeit at his own instance,44 was not even recommended by
the officer-in-charge (O IC) and the internist doctor of that medical facility
because of the limitations in the medical support at that hospital. Their
testimonies ran as follows:
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of
Senator Enrile at the Philippine National Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the continued confinement of
Senator Enrile at the PNP Hospital ?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot give him the best.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused, Senator
Enrile, are you happy or have any fear in your heart of the present condition of
the accused vis a vis the facilities of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can handle it but probably if
the condition of the patient worsen, we have no facilities to do those things,
Your Honor.45
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged,
should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his
continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to
endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his health and
life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the
trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The
Court has already held in Dela Rama v. The People’s Court:46
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a
meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the
objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending
the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail – whose
existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of
judicial notice – that the courts can already consider in resolving the application
for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.49 The Court thus balances the scales
of justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal
appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees
of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the
objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the accused during the trial; and
unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile health and
advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as
the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari , connotes whimsical and
capricious exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or lack of
jurisdiction.50 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.51 WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari ;
ISSUES the writ of certiorari ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the
Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14
CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL
RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon
posting of a cash bond of ₱1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS
the immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile from custody unless he
is being detained for some other lawful cause.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:

x x x [ U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the

illness of the prisoner,

independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity

of the law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge and
the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to
admit the prisoner to bail ;47

xxx

Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the
effect that the petitioner "is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type
of pulmonary tuberculosis, and chronic, granular pharyngitis," and that in said
institute they "have seen similar cases, later progressing into advance stages
when the treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail;" taking into
consideration that the petitioner’s previous petition for bail was denied by the
People’s Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering from quiescent
and not active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the People’s Court in
sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical examination and
diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was evidently to verify whether
the petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly
in deciding his petition for bail; and considering further that the said People’s
Court has adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited in our
above-quoted resolution, in several cases, among them, the cases against Pio
Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino (case No. 3527), in which the said
defendants were released on bail on the ground that they were ill and their
continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to their health
or endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently hold that the People’s
Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to re lease the petitioner
on bail.48

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then

enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better
attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will
not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly ,
will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.