Mano Po Chinese Filipino PDF

Conditions of Visibility: Resignifying the "Chinese"/"Filipino" in "Mano Po" and "Crying Ladies"
Author(s): Caroline S. Hau

Source: Philippine Studies, Vol. 53, No. 4, Identity/Politics (2005), pp. 491-531
Published by: Ateneo de Manila University
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Conditions of Visibility:
Resignifying the "Chinese'T'Fiiipino"
in Mano Po and Crying Ladies
Caroline S. Hau
withcommerce,
identified
Historically , andcommunism
capital , andlong
definedby its problematic relationshipwithPhilippine nationalism,
"Chineseness" hasbeen overthelastthree decadesin line
reconfigured
withthegeopolitical,demographic, economic, social,andcultural trans-
ofthePhilippine
formations andsociety.
nation-state Thisarticle analyzes
thepotentials and limitsof"Chineseness" in suchfilmsas Mano Po
andCryingLadies,which drawon thediscourse ofnational integration
tosituatethe"Chinese Filipino"within the territorialboundaries and
conceptualparameters the
of Filipino nation-state.The also
films point,
however,to thewaysin which"Chineseness" and "Chineseidentity"
havecometoepitomize regional,ratherthanstrictly national,capitalist
andculturalflowsthatthenation-state seekstocapture andappropriate,
butalwaysat theriskofbeingtransformed bythese flows.Where Mano
Po attempts to reterritorialize
"Chineseness" byembedding "Chi-
the
neseFilipino" withinthePhilippine nation,CryingLadiesseekstode-
fuse the class tensionsand nationalistresentment ignitedby
deterritorialized
"Chineseness"byturning "Chinese" flowsandconnec-
tionsintonewsources ofsocialpowerandcapital.
KEYWORDS : Chinese,film,integration,regionalization,capital
In a short span of three years, from December 2002 to December

2005, five major filmsthat prominentlyfeaturedthe ethnic Chinese
were released in the Philippines.Regal Entertainment's
Mano Po (2002,
Figure 1) was the top box-office draw at the Metro Manila Film Fes-
tival (MMFF), grossingP65 million (Daza 2003; the entryon "Regal
Films" in Wikipediaputs the figureat P67.2 million) and garnering
PHILIPPINE
STUDIES
53, no.4 (2005):491-531
492 PHILIPPINE 53,no.4 (2005)
STUDIES
twelveawards (includingBest Picture,Actor,Actress,Director,Screen-

play, and Story). The critical and commercial success of Mano Po
spawned a franchise of unrelated "sequels." Mano Po 2: Mj Home
(2003) was the MMMFF People's Choice for Best Picture,and picked
up five other prizes,while Mano Po 3: My hove (2004) received seven
(notablyBest Picture,Actress,and Actor).Ako Legal Wife : Mano Po 4, a
comedyinspiredby the plot and dialogue of Mano Po 2, was released
in 2005 and won the Best Actressand Best SupportingActressawards.
Mano Po 2 lost the 2003 MMFF Best Picture Award to the highly
touted CryingLadies, which bagged a total of eleven local and interna-
tional awards and took in P65 millionat the local box office(Salterio
2004).
Regal Entertainment producer"Mother" Lily Monteverdedescribed
Mano Po as a "dream project" (Arcellana 2002, 10), born out of her
desireto pay tributeto her parents,the copra tycoonand Fujian-born
Domingo Yuchu and Sorsogon-bornProfetizaBuban, by recastingtheir
romance into an exemplaryChinese-Filipino familysaga. Spanning
some fortyyears,this "rags to riches" (ibid.) epic is narratedby the
rebelliousthirddaughterof a Chinese immigrant, who had marrieda
Filipinaagainstthe wishes of his parents,chosen to setde down in the
Philippinesand, withhis wife'shelp,foundeda copra empirethateven-
tuallyexpandedinto a conglomerate.Monteverdesharedthe creditwith
screenwriter Roy Iglesias for craftingthe storiesof Mano Po 2, about
the three squabblingwidows and multiplehouseholds of a murdered
Chinese-Filipinotycoon;Mano Po 5, about an intrepidanticrimecru-
sader torn between her familyand her long-lostlover; and Ako Legal
Wife:Mano Po 4 , which, according to Monteverde, was inspired by
"people I know in the Chinese-Filipinocommunity"(Red 2005).
There is more to the issue than a simple case of translatinga Chi-
nese-Filipinoproducer'slife experiencesand observationsinto movies
about the "Chinese" in the Philippines.Screenwriter Roy Iglesias cred-
ited his Mano Po serieswith "cementfing the Filipinos']love affairwith
Asia" (Cabreza 2004, 1). The filmheralded the "Asian renaissancein
Philippinepop culture":a mere fivemonthsafterthe release of Mano
Po, the Taiwanese TV drama Liu XingHua Yan (Meteor Garden, origi-
nally broadcast in 2001), based on the Japanese comic {manga)by
HAU
/CONDITIONS
OFVISIBILITY 493
Kamio Yoko, HanajoriDango (Boys over Flowers,1992-2003), sparked

a "chinovela" craze centeringon the drama'sfourmale stars,all mem-
bers of the Taiwanesepop band F4 (FlowerFour). Iglesias arguedthat,
while the advent of the heavilypromoted chinovelas contributedto
"Asianizing"Filipinomoviegoers,thisAsianizationwas mediatedby the
global success of Asian cultureindustriesthatchurnedout the martial
artsmovies of the 1970s, the gangsterand action movies of the 1980s,
the Mainland Chinese epics of the 1990s, and other culturalproducts
such as music,manga,animé(animatedcartoons),magazines,and fash-
ion. Philippinecinema has traditionallytaken its cues fromindustrial
behemothHollywood'snod of recognitionand approval:Mano Po has
been comparedto the 1993 Chinese-American filmJoyLuck Club (Chen
2002), and is
Iglesias quoted elsewhereas sayingthatViva Films' Vic
del Rosario "was sure 'Mano Po' would be a hit because [Taiwanese
director]Ang Lee's 'CrouchingTiger,Hidden Dragon' [2000] scored in
Hollywood" (Cabreza 2004, 3). But the astoundingpopularityof F4
and Korean dramasespeciallyin China,Japan,Vietnam,the Philippines,
Singapore,Malaysia,and Thailand throwslighton the gatheringweight
and forceof the regionalcirculationand consumptionof Asian cultural
products.
UnitelProductions'blockbusterCrying Ladies (2003, Figure2), which
focuses on Filipino professionalmournersworkingat a Chinese wake
Figure1. ManoPo (2002)
Figure2. Crying
Ladies(2003)
494 PHILIPPINE
STUDIES
53,no.4 (2005)
and funeral,similarlyrode the crest of the "Asian" wave. Novice di-

rector Mark Meily submittedthe original screenplay,"Bayad Luha"
(which can be translatedas "Pay for Tears" or "Pay with Tears"), to
the workshop run by noted scriptwriter Armando Lao in 2000. He
subsequendypersuaded "megastar"Sharon Cuneta to accept the lead
role in the movie by tellingher that "it would be the kind of role
Gong Li [the Chinese actress and formermuse of internationally
acclaimedChinese directorZhang Yimou] would portray"(Cu Unjieng
2004, 9).
Iglesiasand Meily'sstatements underscorethe confluenceof national,
regional, and global forcesand circuitsof culturalcommodityproduc-
tion,marketing, and circulationin contributing to the success of films
likeMano Po and Crying Ladies. That these commoditiesare in the form
of images and signs atteststo the existenceof multibillion-dollar "im-
age production industries"powered by flexibleaccumulation and oper-
ating within and across nationallysegmented culture markets. These
media industriesare capable of turningimages and signsof geopolitical
and culturaldifferencesinto commodities that can be consumed by
populationsacross vast stretchesof space (Harvey 1990, 290ff.),even
as theynow also mediate the productionof commoditiesfor local-
and increasingly regional(Otmazgin2005)- markets.
Chinese Filipinos such as the Monteverdesof Regal Entertainment
and Robbie Tan of Seiko Films are among the Philippineentertainment
industry'smost prominent,prolific,and powerfulfilmdistributors, pro-
ducers,and starmakers.(In fact,one of the charactersin Crying Ladies
dreams of being discoveredby an "intsik" [Chinese] producer.)More
the factthatculturalproductsencode meaningdemands seri-
crucially,
ous contemplation.What kinds of realities,but also what kinds of
dreams,wishes, and fantasiesdo filmslike Mano Po and Crying Ladies
speak to or speak of? What forms of association and identification
do
theyinviteand orchestrate?How much are these meaningsbound up
with "being Chinese,"and in specificrepresentations of the "Chinese"
who figureas principalsubjects in and of these films?What are the
thathave enabled the
conditionsof visibility(and perhaps invisibility)
"Chinese" to emergeas cinematicsubjectsof representation? Who are
these "Chinese"?
HAU/CONDITIONS
OFVISIBILITY 495
This articlelinksrepresentations of "Chineseness"in recentPhilippine

cinemato the constructionand transformation of the "Chinese" in the
Philippines.Variouslyidentifiedwith commerce,capital, and commu-
nism at differentpoints in Philippinehistory,and long definedby its
problematicrelationshipwithPhilippinenationalism,"Chineseness"has
been reconfiguredover the last threedecades in line with the shifting
geopolitical,demographic,economic, social, and culturalterrainof the
Philippinenation-state. This articlelocates the politicsof "Chineseness"
not onlyin "Chinese" everydaylifeand negotiations, but in a Philippine
nation-statein the throesof profoundtransformation. It situatesthese
seemingly local, national developments withinthe broader global and
especiallyregion-wide(East Asian) capitalistdevelopment,and looks at
how the politics of "Chinese" ethnicityand representationare impli-
cated in emergent,market-mediatedforms of national and regional
identification and consciousness.Representationsof the "Chinese" in
such filmsas the Mano Po series and Crying Ladies draw on, while also
popularizing, the state'sadoption of a discourse of nationalintegration
-
thatseeks to domesticatethe "Chinese" historically constructedas the
"other" of the Filipino nationin order to embed the "Chinese"
more firmly withinthe territorial boundariesand conceptualparameters
of the Filipinonation-state, or, to paraphrasethe popular integrationist
to
slogan, help the "Chinese" find their"place under the Philippine
sun." These cinematicrepresentations, however,also point to the ways
in which"Chinese culture"and "Chineseness"have also come to epito-
mize regional,ratherthan strictlynational,capitalistflows which the
nation-stateseeks to captureand appropriate,but alwaysat the riskof
being transformedby these flows. Competing "Chinese" imaginarles,
which reinforcethe historicalconflationof "Chinese" and capital,in-
formthe pluralistdiscourseof citizenshipand nationalbelongingpropa-
gated by advocates of integrationas well as the Philippinestate,while
indexingmultipleidentifications and recalcitrant longings,desires,and
fantasiesthatexceed the bounds and claims of Filipinonationness.
Integratingthe "New Chinese"

Mano Po is not the firstmainstreamFilipinomovie to paint a nuanced
portraitof the "Chinese." In 1973, three Filipino writers,including
STUDIES
Chinese-FilipinoHerman Tiu Laurel and an uncreditedRickyLee, co-

wrotethe screenplayforDragnet , a crimeaction movie (starringJoseph
Estrada) thatreactedagainstthe anti-Chinesesentimentsof the timeby
offeringa sympatheticportraitof the "Chinese." Three years later,
Eddie Romero's masterpiece GanitoKami Noon, Paano KayoNgajon?
(1976) made a place for the "Chinese" in Philippinehistory.Its por-
trayalof the heroic Intsik Liu, a nineteenth-century JackieChan who
befriendsand sacrificeshis life forprotagonistKulas Ocampo, marksa
departurefromthe abject alien (Ah Tek in Lino Brocka's Maynila,Sa
Mga Kuko ngUwanag [1987]), comic relief (rangingfrom Chiquito's
loveableMr. Wongin the eponymousseriesto Mike de Leon's powerful
femalemovie producer-cum-Chinese Mafia agentin KakabakabaKa Ba?
[1980]), and victim (kidnapped in Erik Matti'sEkis [1999]) who popu-
late Philippinecinema (see Hau 2000a, 233-35).
GanitoKami Noon, Paano KayoNgajon? was one of the firstmain-
streamfilmsto articulatethe integrationist stancebroached by academ-
ics (McCarthy 1975, 22) and later taken up so prominently by
organizationssuch as Kaisa para sa Kaunlaran1and by Mano Po. It is
not an accident that Romero's film was released one year after
FerdinandMarcos signedLetterof Instruction(LOI) 270 whichimple-
mentedthe mass naturalizationof the Chinese, more than 60 percent
of whom applied for naturalization(Wang 2003, 330). Signing LOI
270 in conjunctionwith the normalizationof diplomaticrelationsbe-
tweenthe Philippinesand the People's Republic of China, Marcos was
not merelyfollowingAmericanPres. Richard Nixon's lead in seeking
rapprochement withChina. His new Asia policy,formulatedin the late
1960s in lightof the imminentexpirationof the Laurel-LangleyAgree-
mentand the declineof Philippinetradewiththe U.S. (hithertothe pri-
marytradingpartner),soughtto strengthen Philippinetradelinkswith
Asian and socialistcountries(Lim 2001, 278). In addition,the Marcos
governmentneeded to secure oil supplies fromChina to deal with the
1973 oil crisis,and to underminethe Communist movement in the
Philippinesby askingChina to adopt a "hands-offpolicy" towardPhil-
ippine internalaffairs(Lim 2001, 281; Tiglao 1990c, 71).
The mass naturalizationof the PhilippineChinese led to the acquisi-
tion of Filipino citizenship by a substantialportion of the Chinese
HAU
/CONDITIONS
OFVISIBILITY 497
population,whose changingdemographicprofileduringthe postwar

era made naturalization an attractiveoption.The Chinese who came of
age in the 1960s constitutedthe largestgroup of Chinese,but also the
firstto lack directand substantialcontactwith a China that had gone
Communist,and the firstto receiveuniversity educationand have wide
social contactswith non-Chinese(Wickberg1997, 170-71). Mass natu-
ralizationlegallyincorporatedthe Chinese"alien" into the Filipinonation;
by relyingon the administrative and presidentiallegislativeprocess, it
relaxedthe conditionsfor acquiringcitizenship,which in previous de-
cades had been difficult and protracted.2Citizenshipenabled a number
of Chinese to move out of the commercialniche and join the profes-
sional class (as lawyers,doctors,architects,
engineers),even producinga
numberof Chinese-Filipinoculturalworkers(writers, visual artists,film-
makers).
More important,mass naturalization entaileda shiftin the discourse
of nationalismaway frommonoculturalistand melting-potclaims of
assimilation,routinelyassociatedwithideas of absorptionand amalgam-
ation,towarda strictly politicaldefinitionof nationalbelonging,which
held that ethnicor minoritygroups could be "integrated"into Philip-
pine societywhile preservingtheirculturalidentities(Cariño 1988, 47).
The ascendancyof the integrationdiscourseover assimilationwas a
productnot only of domesticpolicy and social change but of interna-
tionaldevelopments,scholarlydebates,and politicalstruggles.The after-
math of the world wars and decolonizationsaw importantchanges in
the discourses,technologies,and models of race management(Goldberg
2002, 211). Race came to be recoded in "colorblind" terms as prob-
lems of illegalmigrationand criminality (cf. ibid., 212-13), on the one
hand, and replaced by the de-essentializedbut amorphous categoryof
culture,on whichthe emergentdiscourseof ethnicity was based, on the
other hand. Integrationwas firstused in discussions of apartheidin
South Africain 1940, and gained groundthroughthe African- American
civilrightsactivismin the segregatedAmericanSouth in the 1950s and
1960s. Racial democracyin Brazil, ethnicpluralismin Europe, and of-
ficialmulticulturalism(a policy firstimplementedin Switzerlandbefore
gainingcurrencyin Canada and Australiain the late 1960s and early
1970s and, less successfully,in Great Britainin the 1990s) sought to
STUDIES
allay fearsof the viabilityof nationalidentityin countrieswhere mass

immigration had createdsizeable and distinctculturalcommunities. The
integrationistdiscoursearguedthatthe "uniqueness" of culturalgroups
does not detractfrompeaceful coexistenceand meaningfulexchanges
among these groups withina singlepolity,and the "cultures"of these
groups enrichthe nationalcultureratherthan impede its development.
The call for integrationshaped the scholarshipon the Chinese in
SoutheastAsia, even as scholarlyworks provided ammunitionfor the
reformulation of state policies on the "Chinese." In the firstfew de-
cades of the postwar period, Southeast Asian states were concerned
with stabilizingtheirregimesand viewed the presence of Communist
China and the politicalactivismof Chinese populationsin theirterrito-
ries as externaland internalthreats,which had to be addressedthrough
a combinationof repression,containment,and control. State policies
and practicesformulatedthe "Chinese Question" by constructingthe
"Chinese" as the "other" of the nationalcommunity(forthe Philippine
case, see Hau 2000b and n.d.), but stateswere also engagedin modern-
ization projects that requiredthe selectiveinclusion and exclusion of
Chinese minoritieswho played an importantrole in theirrespective
economies (cf. Ong and Nonini 1997, 7). Scholarlydebates reflected,
but also effected,the evolution of state policies and practices.In his
surveyof the field,Wang Gungwu (2003, 221-47) notes that scholar-
ship on Chineseness before the 1950s worked withinthe parameters
definedby what he calls nationalistand historicalidentity,beforegiving
way to the preoccupationwith framingChinesenessthroughthe study
of local, communal,and culturalidentityin the 1950s and 1960s and
the reconfiguring of culturalidentityinto "ethnicidentity"as well as the
popularity of class analysisin the 1970s.
Effortsof organizationssuch as Kaisa para sa Kaunlaran to pro-
mote integrationas an alternativeto assimilation,along with similar
advocacies by other organizationsand individuals,have contributedin
no smallmeasureto mainstreaming stance(Hau 2000a;
the integrationist
see also Cariño 1988). Mano Po leans heavilyon the Kaisa platformin
the finalsegmentof the film,in which the youngChinese-Filipinoartist
Jimmyedits his documentary.Entitled"Tsinoy: A History,"the docu-
mentaryemploysthe blanketterm "Tsinoy,"a label closely identified
HAU/CONDITIONS
OFVISIBILITY 499
with Kaisa advocacy.The documentaryopens with a montageof Fili-

pino nationalheroes of Chinese ancestryfeaturedin actualKaisa-Angelo
King Heritage Center exhibits as examples of prominenthistorical
"Tsinoys."The storyline also amplifiestheintegrationistmessagethrough
the selflessactionsof Richelle,the black sheep who defiesthe wishes of
her familyand patriotically involvesherselfin the affairsof the nation.
When she is apprehendedat a drug den, she agrees to work as a civil-
ian agent to uncover the identityof a leading Filipino drug dealer.
Despite pressurefromher familynot to testifyagainstthe drugdealer,
who turnsout to be a PhilippineNational Police directorand a long-
time "friend"of the family,she puts her own life (and her family's)in
danger;to compound matters,she fallsin love with her Filipinopolice
handler,RafaelBala. The integrationist messageis spelledout at the end
of the film,when Bala's voiceover tells the audience: "Pinatunayanni
Richelle sa akin na hindi ka kailangangipinanganaksa Pilipinas para
magingPinoy" (Richelleproved to me thatyou don't have to be born
in the Philippines to be a Filipino). The finalwords in the filmalso
echo this point: "Bagama't magkakaibaang ating pinanggalingan,iisa
ang ating kinabukasan" (Even though our origins are different,we
sharein the same future).
In addition,criticalreceptionof Mano Po has tended to situatethe
politicsof the film'sdepictionof the new Chinese,now labeled "Chi-
nese Filipino"to distinguish themfromthe old Chinese,3squarelywithin
the integrationistdiscoursepropounded by Kaisa. While criticizingthe
filmfor reinforcingthe stereotypeof the Chinese as wealthy,reviews
neverthelesslauded Mano Po forpromoting"more dialogue and under-
standingbetween Chinese Filipinos" (Dy 2003, 15; See 2003), for ac-
cording"mainstreamrespectability" to Chinese Filipinos(Zulueta 2002),
for showing that the "Chinese belong among the Filipinos of whom
they are inescapably a part" (David 2002), and- directlyborrowing
fromKaisa parlance- servingas a "testament"to the "heroic efforts"
of the Chinese to findtheir"place in the Philippinesun" (Chen 2002).
The struggleof "Chinese Filipinos"fortheir"place in the Philippine
sun" is a legacy of economic nationalismand politicaldisenfranchise-
ment,which restricted"Chinese" presencein areas such as retailtrade
while making the acquisition of citizenship extremelydifficult,pro-
STUDIES
tracted,and expensive,double moves thathelped consolidatethe Fili-

pino elites' command over politics and the uppermostreaches of the
economy.It is not the "pure Chinese" but the sociallydominantand
politicallypowerfulclass of Filipinoand mestizofamiliesthatowns and
controlsthe biggestcompaniesin the Philippines(Cariño 2001, 108; see
also Rivera1995, 9). Nevertheless,mass naturalization qualifiedChinese
Filipinos to move into the areas that had been sealed off fromthem.
Despite the periodic political and economic crises that afflictedthe
Philippines,enough capitalisttransformation was takingplace to enable
a small numberof Chinese Filipinosto engage in capital accumulation
on a farlargerscale thanhad been possible,resultingin the absorption
of a strataof "Chinese" into the changingPhilippineclass structure,
increasinglycharacterizedby a small concentrationof "new rich" and
the creation of new middle classes (Pinches 1996, 103-33; Pinches
1999, 275-301). A good numberof taipan fortuneswere consolidated
in the postwarperiod,as Chinese-Filipinobig business expanded from
manufacturing(where big merchantshad shiftedfollowingthe retail
tradenationalization act in the 1950s) into real estate,finance,and other
economic activities.Small and medium-sizeenterprises,however,have
had to contendwiththe challengesof fiercecompetitionamong them-
selves and fromnon-ChineseFilipinosand foreigners, and the threatof
"tradeconcentration"(Dannhaeuser2004, 2) in areas such as the retail
tradesector.
Changes in class structurefurthercementthe conflationof Chinese
ethnicity withcapitaland renderthe "Chinese" not onlyvisible,but also
vulnerable,as evidentin the kidnappingphenomenon(Hau 2000a). The
visibilityof the "Chinese" is partlyconditionedby the visible effectof
"Chinese" capitalnot just on the economy,but on the Philippineurban
landscape,withthe sari-sari and family-owned neighborhoodstoresgiv-
ing way to malls, departmentstores,supermarkets,and high rises. A
reportin the New YorkTimeslinks space, visibility, and "Chinese" vul-
nerability:"The highlyvisiblerole of the Chinesein Philippineeconomic
-
growth the Chinese-owned shopping malls and high rises that are
transforming Manila- have made them obvious targetsof extraction"
(Mydans 1996).
HAU/CONDITIONS
OFVISIBILITY 501
While Chinese visibilityhad historicallybeen conditioned by the

conflationof Chinesenesswithcommerceand money,4the difference is
that "Chineseness" is no longer identifiedsimplyor necessarilywith
mercantilecapital,but is now associated with large-scalestrategiesof
accumulationthe scope of which extendsbeyond the territorial bounds
of the Philippine nation-stateand is characterizedby unprecedented
diversity, and mobility(cf. Nonini and Ong 1997, 3-4).5 The
flexibility,
scale of "Chinese" capitalis suggestedin Mano Po by the way in which
Luis and Elisa Go are able to parlay theircopra business into food
manufacturingand other ventures,now consolidated under the "Go
Group of Companies" and presided over by their eldest daughter
Vera (MaricelSoriano). The labor of the merchant,routinelydenigrated
as parasitical(fora critique,see Hau n.d.), is transmuted into the magic
of large-scaleand endless capitalistaccumulation,the abilityof capital
to be fruitful and multiplyand generatefabulóuswealth and opportu-
nitiesfor displayand consumptionfarin excess of what the wealthof
the "Chinese" merchantused to command. This magical quality of
Chinese capital is capturedby filmicmontage.In Mano Po 2, Antonio
Chan confidendytells his wife Sol, "Madali pela dito Manila" (Money
easy here Manila),when theyfirstmove to Chinatownand, in the next
shot,miraculouslysecures,presumablythroughhis "Chinese network,"
a P250,000 loan from,of course, China Banking Corporation. The
shot of the "Golden Dragon" sign being hoisted atop theirstore dis-
solves into a shot of the spacious warehousein which Antonio super-
vises the preparationof a shipmentfor Korea.
The mainstreamingof a pluralistand accommodationiststance on
nationalidentityis bound up with the shiftingstrategiesover threede-
cades of the Philippinestate (see Aguilar 1999, 315-20). Adopting an
integrationist stance enables the state to pursue its policy of attracting
capital and technical flows, especially fromthe emergentEast Asian
region,whichwill be discussedin detailin the nextsection.In hopes of
generating much-needed income, the state has resorted to com-
modifyingcitizenship by grantingpermanent residencyto moneyed
foreignersin hopes of attractinginvestment.It has also sought to
reterritorialize
the flowsof Filipinomigrantworkersand setdersabroad
STUDIES
by deployingthe term balikbayan to referto Filipino immigrantsand

their descendants (Szanton Blanc 1996). Relying on a discourse of
"Filipino values" that supposedly underpin "family,communal, and
nationalties" connecting"Filipinos" (especiallyin the U.S. and Canada)
who have become naturalized citizens as well as their second- and
third-generation offspringto the Philippines,Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
signedthe Dual CitizenshipAct to "extendmore economic and politi-
cal opportunitiesto Filipinos overseas in the name of national unity,
solidarityand progress" (Philippine Daily Inquirer2003). The state ac-
knowledges its relianceon the remittances of overseas Filipinoworkers
by relabelingthe OFWs as OFIs or "Overseas FilipinoInvestors."The
effortto generaterevenuesis even more pronouncedin the state'spe-
riodicprogramsforlegalizing"illegalaliens" (overwhelmingly definedas
"Chinese"). The Alien Social IntegrationAct (ASIA) of 1995, for ex-
ample,undertookto bring"illegalaliensinto the mainstream, and make
-
themactiveparticipants[in the country's]development" participation
here being interpreted monetarytermsof P200,000 per Chi-
in strictly
nese, P50,000 for spouses, and P25,000 for dependents,with the state
expectingto earn P40 billion (Manila Chronicle 1995).
The state endeavors to reterritorializethe flows of people, capital,
and skills by relyingon the discourse of national development and
recoding these deterritorializedflows as "Filipino" so as to channel
theminto the bounds of the Philippinenation-state.6 But its notion of
nationness cannot avoid the contaminationof money,which breeds
fear and suspicion about the commodificationof citizenshipand the
loosening of the bonds between state and nation, territory, and Fili-
pinoness.
For instance,resentmentof so-called balikbayanand professional
OFWs, most oftenvoiced by the middleclasses and intelligentsia (Hau
2004, chaps. 5 and 6), fuelspublic debates over "brain drain" and has
made a nationalist"sacrifice" (or, rather,"virtue") out of the act of
stayingput in the Philippinesinstead of seekingopportunitiesabroad.
These anxietiesare induced by the capacityof deterritorialized "Fili-
pino" flows to create new sources of social power and social
reproduction(in mattersof fashion,taste,and public opinion) thatcan-
not be fullycontrolledor coopted eitherby the stateor by the Filipino
HAU/CONDITIONS
OFVISIBILITY 503
eliteand middleclasses.Afterall, these flowshave seen immigrants and

OFWs acquire middle-or upper-classstatuswithoutgoing throughthe
longstanding channelsof middle-classand elitesocializationwithinPhil-
ippine society; even though they registerin elite consciousness as
nouveaux richesand parvenus,theyeffordessly commandpublic atten-
tion as objects of admirationand emulation.That these flows come
from"outside,"not to mentiontheirrelativeproximityto geopolitical
powers (especiallyAmerica) that affordsthem unmediated access to
sources of symboliccapital,endows themwith a cachet thatrivalsthat
of the socially dominant and cosmopolitan Filipino elite, part of
whose own prestigelies in theircommand over the languages,signs,
gestures,and objects fromthe "outside" (see Cannell 1999, 222).
But these anxietiesare not exclusivelya productof the "narcissism
of small difference"(to borrow fromFreud's "The Taboo of Virgin-
ity" [1975]), of elite and middle-classself-perceptionand worthbeing
challenged by those who are most like them, and the redirectionof
theirfeelingsof hatred,envy,and aggression toward those who are
"nearly-we." Popular sentimentsare not entirelyfreeof ambivalence,
for example in questions of language use. Elite dominationhad long
been securedthroughthe use of English,but the disseminationof Fili-
pino and other Philippinelanguages throughthe mass media and the
marketover the past decades has unsettledthe preeminenceof English
as the language of social power and privilege,and has marked out
spaces in which the use of English- deliberatelyand ironicallyex-
pressed as "spokeningin dollars"- can be interpretedas an assertion
of unwarrantedsuperiority, and provoke resentmentand perhaps even
outrightviolence. Class disparityin the Philippinesis a "daily,tangible
experience":class differenceis "particularizedin a thousand material
objects," such as "canned peaches versus boiled sweet potato, plate
glass versus nipa tiles,the air-conditionedchill of supermarketaisles
versusthevillagestore" (Cannell1999, 20). In "standard"Englishversus
"barok" English,one riskshumiliationby havingher grammatical errors
or accent (of which she is often unaware) exposed by someone else
who claims a bettercommand of English. Differenceis particularized
not just by objects, but by persons on whom varyingdegrees of cul-
tivationare imputed.The violence of spokeningin dollars inheresin
STUDIES
the act of speaking,which not only distances the speaker fromthose

who cannot speak it well or with the rightaccent,but forcesthe latter
into the uncomfortablepositionof riskingmockeryand humiliationby
another.These embodied differences - of which languageis but one-
that divide the rich fromthe poor have catalyzedmany of the politi-
cal and social crises that periodically wrack the Philippines. Most
important,celebrationsof the deterritorialization of Filipinonationness
run up againstthe enforcedrootednessof the majorityof Filipinos,the
most indigentamong whom remainconfinedwithinthe boundariesof
a nation-state the legitimacy of whichis constantlyput into questionby
its inabilityto fulfillits obligationto safeguardthe "Filipino people" it
claims to represent.
If the continuingconflationof "Chinese" with capital makes the
"new Chinese" the visibleembodimentof class difference(despiteevi-
dence of class disparitiesand social divisions among "the Chinese"),
how can "Chineseness" be purged of its alien attributesand domesti-
cated for Filipino consumption?
Regional Flows and the Resi(g)nification

of "Chinese" Mestizoness
The way Mano Po goes about domesticatingthe alien "Chinese" is by

foregrounding mestizonessas the definingcharacteristicof the "Chinese
Filipino."The film,in fact,marksthe resignification of the "Chinese
in
mestizo" contemporaryPhilippineimagination. From the late nine-
teenthcenturyonward,the "Chinese mestizo" had been a slidingsigni-
fier that could be articulated with either "Filipino" or "Chinese"
interests,and could thereforedisappear7into either"Chinese" or "Fili-
pino" (Hau 2000a). The disappearanceof the "Chinese mestizo" into
"Filipino"or "Chinese" took place alongsidethe alienationof the "Chi-
nese" fromthe Filipinonationalcommunityand was crucialto the de-
velopment of Philippine nationalism (Hau 2000a, 133-76). The
historicalfigureswho appear at the end of Mano Po as "Tsinoys" do
not, for example, fitthe definitionof "ethnic Chinese" advanced by
Kaisa para Kaunlaran,whichhas activelyembracedChinese mestizosas
Tsinoyson the basis of theirChinese ancestry.8 The mestizo'scapacity
HAU/CONDITIONS
OFVISIBILITY 505
to mediatethe social hierarchyof the colonizer and colonized, of "in-

viewed as its most important
siders"and "outsiders,"is characteristically
historical attribute (see Rafael 2000). What is interesting about
mestizonesswas its subsequentdelinkingfrom"Chinese" in the popular
imagination,so that for most of the postindependenceyears,the term
"mestizo" mainlysignified"white" (definedas North and Latin Ameri-
can and European) ratherthan "Chinese" ancestry.
With East Asian regional economic development and the rise of
China over the past three decades, however, bicultural "Chinese"
now appear to take on the attributes of the Chinese mestizos
(Wickberg 1997, 177) because the term "Chinese" is no longer de-
fined solely by its problematicplace withinthe nation,but by its addi-
tional revaluingas a signifierof not just global but regionallyspecific
capitalistdevelopment.This revaluationwas partlytriggeredby the ex-
plosion of studies of overseas Chinese business and networksin the
1980s and 1990s, and the deploymentof this type of scholarshipfor
political and ideological affirmationsof "Chinese capitalism" and its
role in the economic growth and dynamismof the region (Pinches
1999, 16).
The emergent"East Asian" region,withporous and shifting bound-
aries stretchingfrom China, Japan, and South Korea to Taiwan, the
Philippines,and Hong Kong to Vietnam,Thailand,Indonesia,Malaysia,
Singapore, and Brunei, is largely the creation of market forces
(Katzensteinand Shiraishi1997). It is characterizedby the increasing
densityof networksof crossborderlinkages (both formaland infor-
mal), interdependence,cooperation,and collaborationin the realmsof
trade and investment,technologyand production,financialservices,
transportation and communication,population flows,popular culture,
and disease control(Pempel 2005, 2). Regionaleconomic integration in
East Asia under the shadow of the Americanimpérium(Katzenstein
2005) and in the wake of Japaneseeconomic success has seen the rise
of China and the "Four Dragons" (Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan,
and Singapore). That four of the economies of East Asia- China,
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore- are populated mainlyby "Chi-
nese," that severalothers- Japan,Korea, Vietnam- are thoughtto be
influencedby Confucianthought(whichstressesstrongfamily, commit-
STUDIES
ment to education, dependence on kinship,collective welfarerather

than individualgood, and social networks),and the visible economic
role playedby "overseasChinese" communitiesin manySoutheastAsian
countries(Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines) and in
China's economic growth - all of these have generatedinterestin "Chi-
nese" links to regionalcapitalism.The term "Chinese capitalism"has
been used to characterizecapitalistaccumulationin the PacificRim.
One of the popular argumentsconcerningthe role of the "Chinese"
in East Asian developmentis that"China" itselfis no longerlimitedto
MainlandChina and its officialstateand culturalboundaries(Ang 1998,
225). Some scholars now advocate the use of the term "Cultural
China" to encompass not just the societies populated by "Chinese"
(Taiwan,Hong Kong, Singapore),but also "overseas Chinese" commu-
nitiesin Southeast Asia, and intellectualsor professionalsworkingin
China or on the Chinese world (Tu 1991, 22). This idea of "Cultural
China" serves to directattentionnot to Mainland China as "core," but
ratherto the so-called "periphery"of smallerAsian countriesand the
so-called "Chinese diaspora" in SoutheastAsia thatare now viewed as
enginesof capitalistdevelopment.This idea assumes thateven though
the "Chinese" have been physically separatedfrom"China"- the source
of "Chinese culture"- nonetheless theyhave not lost theirsense of
"Chinese identity"(Wu 1991, 160). Anotherterm,"GreaterChina,"has
gained currencyas a descriptionof the shared identitygeneratedby
interactionsamong Chinese-languagespeakingpopulationsin different
countriesin East Asia, mainlythroughthe circulationof popular cul-
turalproducts such as music, films,and TV shows and throughthe
disseminationof informationand the youthculture(Chun 1996, 127).
The "Chinese" can now be viewed in a positivelightand even as ob-
jects of desire,as evidentin the currentpublic clamorforgeneric"East
Asian"-looking (i.e., chinitofeaturesand a differentshade of "white"
skin)Taiwaneseand Korean telenovelaactorswho play rich,successful,
and/or powerfulmen and foregroundthe attractionsof affluentEast
Asia as the leading growth center of the global capitalist world
economy.
Terms like "Cultural China" and "Greater China" are imaginable
because theyrelyin part on culturalexplanationsto account for both
HAU/CONDITIONS
OFVISIBILITY 507
the economic success and the culturaldistinctiveness of the "Chinese."9

"Chinese" culturaltraitsand factorsare said to operatein the formof
mian^i(face),xinyong or connections),family-
(trust),guanxi(relationships
centeredkinship structures,and ideologies that supposedly form the
bulwarks of "Chinese" business and the "Confucian" or "Chinese
model" of East Asian capitalism,and ethnic-basedsocial, business,and
transnationalnetworks.These culturalexplanationsare activelypropa-
gatedby the popularmedia (includingjournalism),scholarship, stateslike
Singapore,schools and books, everyday"observations" at the ground
level, and to some extentby the self-representation of those who call
themselves"Chinese." Businessmanagementschools and theirtextbooks
now routinelyuse guanxi,mianzi,and xinyongto describeChinese eco-
nomic practices,arguingthatthese culturaltraitsare necessaryto ensure
harmonious work relations in familyfirmsand make good manage-
mentdecisions (Yao 2002, 12). Cultureis constructed,authorized,insti-
tutionalized,and subjected to differentpolitical uses. In Singapore,
Confucianismis used as a stateideology to explainits achievementof
economic growthand modernizationthroughan "Asian way." In Tai-
wan, the governmenthas soughtto legitimizeits claim thatit is the true
representative and guardianof Chinese culture.
But thereare clear limitsto "culturalist"perspectiveson "Chinese"
identityand economic power.Many of the culturalexplanationsassume
thatChinese are a linguisticand culturalgroup who evince remarkable
culturalcohesion and economic power. But to speak of "Chinese cul-
ture" is to immediatelyraise the questions: what is Chinese and how
Chinese is "Chinese" culture?The question of who is "Chinese" is a
difficultand contentiousissue consideringthat "Chinese" is oftende-
finedas the majority"Han" population who constitute94 percentof
the MainlandChinese population,even thoughthe non-Han population
is spread out over 60 percentof Chinese territory (Wu 1991, 167). The
Bai people of Yunnan asserttheirdifferencefromotherChinese,even
thoughthese differencesare pardydefinedand promotedby the Chi-
nese state policy on minoritypeoples. The peranakanof Indonesia call
themselvesChinese, even though many of them no longer speak any
Chinese language. In Papua New Guinea, poor Chinese are oftennot
counted as Chinese,but are considerednative(ibid.,170-76). Mainland
STUDIES
Chinese call themselvesHanren (referringto the Han Dynasty),but

many overseas Chinese call themselvesTangren (people of the Tang
Dynasty)and referto theirhomeland as Tangshan (Tang mountains),
whichis not China, but theirlocal village(s).A politicsof Chinese lan-
guage is at work in thatMandarinis consideredthe officiallanguage,
while otherChinese tonguesare referredto as "dialects" to marktheir
subordinationto the officiallanguage,even thoughmanyof these dia-
lects are mutuallyunintelligible.As for "Chinese" dominance of the
SoutheastAsian economies,the figurescited oftenrevealnothingabout
how the amounts were arrivedat (Hodder 2005, 8-9; 25-26 n.l).
In the Philippine case, the fabled "Chinese networks"- routinely
invoked in accounts of PhilippineChinese economic success- across
theAsian regiondo not reallyhold conceptualand empiricalwater.Chi-
nese-Filipinoinvestmentsin China do not relyon preexistingethnic-
based linkageswith Filipino-Chinese,other overseas Chinese, or even
Mainland Chinese capital,but on the formulationby the Chinese gov-
ernmentof policies specifically to make investmentattractivefor over-
seas Chinese (Gomes and Hsiao 2001, 15). Theresa Chong Cariño
(2001, 111) shows that, among Chinese big business, there is more
evidence of competitionthan cooperation,10and joint ventureswith
Hong Kong or Taiwanese companies are based on considerationsof
expertise,technology,and capital ratherthan common ethnicties. She
also arguesthatthe diversification of Chinese-Filipinobusinessis not a
"method of rationalizingbusiness, but of hedging against economic
downturnsor vulnerabilities in situationsof higheconomic and political
volatility"(ibid., 117). Neither is thereanythingessentially"Chinese"
about Chinese business practices,given the heterogeneity of business
stylesemployed by the biggest Chinese companies. No research has
ascertainedwhethersmall-and medium-scale"Chinese" enterprises share
a "culturalstyle"of business management(ibid.,23).
Neitherare "Chinese" culturaltraitssuch as thrift, industry,
persever-
ance, and sacrifice uniquely "Chinese." Not only are theyproducedand
reinventedin specifichistoriesand societiesand not onlyare their"eth-
nic" originsuncertain,theyhave been reifiedso as to serve as ideologi-
cal justificationsfor authoritarianismand againstsocialism. In this
formulation,so-called "Confucian" values and practices are said to
OFVISIBILITY
HAU/CONDITIONS 509
ground a historicalformof capitalism,which had hithertobeen con-

strainedby socialism but which, allowed to flourishin nonsocialist
"Greater China" (Singapore,Hong Kong, Taiwan, and "overseas Chi-
nese" communitiesin SoutheastAsia) and in a post-MaoistChina now
undergoingcapitalisttransformation,allegedlyconstitutesa superiorcapi-
talism to that which developed in the West because of the former's
communitarian(as opposed to individualist)ethos (see Dirlik 1997;
Cheah 2001). The problemwith using culturalexplanationsto account
forChineseeconomic successin East Asia is thattheseexplanationsrely
on simplistic,homogeneous notions of "Chinese culture"or "values"
transmittedunproblematically over time. They do not explain exactly
how culturalfactorstake shape and function(or failto function),under
conditionsmarkedby contingency, to mediateentrepreneurship by in-
vesting the "makingof business" {guoshengyi)with social and existential
meaning(Yao 2002, 99).
It is not possible to adopt a unifiedand homogeneous notion of
"Chinese" cultureand assume thatthis cultureis equally shared by all
ethnicChinese. Rather,"Chineseness" is part of a politicsof ethnicity
by which states,communities,and individualsattemptto constructor
inculcatenational and ethnicidentitiesfor different purposes. Culture
and identity are subjectto negotiationand contestationas theyare selec-
tivelychosen, continuallyreinvented,adapted,resisted,or circumvented
by even self-defined"Chinese" in the course of theireverydaylives.
What is ironicis thatusing cultureto explaincapitalistdevelopmentin
Asia coincideswith effortsby individualAsian countriesto disentangle
national politics fromquestions of culturalidentity.Even though the
mythsof "Chinese" capitalismand culturedo not withstandserious
scrutinyand historicalexperience,these ideologicalconstructionsretain
theirpoliticaland popular appeal.
What standsout in Mano Po is its deploymentof mestizonessas the
metaphorfor the hybridity of "Chinese Filipino" identity.Since most
Filipinosare likelyto view mestizoand "pure" Chinese as simply"Chi-
nese," internaldistinctionsbetween "pure" and "mixed" ancestrymat-
ter less in currentFilipino ideas of the "Chinese" than in historical
termslike mestizoand the Hokkien tsutsiya . Althoughpopular Filipino
notions of the "Chinese" do not always concern themselves with
510 PHILIPPINE
STUDIES
53,no.4 (2005)
blood lineage,thishoweverdoes not mean thatthe "Chinese" is com-

pletelyfreeof the racialisttaintof not being kadugo(of one's blood)
or kalahi(of one's "race"). For thisreason,the assertionof mestizoness
is especiallymeaningfulto "Chinese Filipinos" who are concerned to
stresstheirdouble heritage.At the same time,theirpreferenceforus-
ing the English word "Chinese" as a "neutral"term of self-reference
has to do with the fact that Chineseenjoys a regional/globalcurrency
thatthe locallyorientedtsinoy and traditionallyloaded intsiklack. Mano
Po holds up the crosscultural marriageas the emblematicrepresentation
and resolutionof the historically entangledbut fraughtrelationshipbe-
tween "Chinese" and "Filipinos." It is not content to argue that the
intermingling of Filipinoand Chineseculturesis a social fact;it seeks to
make the cominglingof culturesan incontestablegeneticreality. Roman-
tic love that defies the deep-rootedracial prejudicesof both Filipinos
and Chinese leads to the successfulcreationof a familyunitcomposed
of a Chinese fatherand Filipino mother (or, less frequendy,Filipino
fatherand Chinese mother)and theirchildren.This foregrounding of
the culturalmestizonessof the "Chinese Filipino"throughthe metaphor
of biological mestizoness allows the "Chinese Filipino" to claim a
"Chineseness"thatis indissolublytied to "Filipinoness"withoutmaking
"Chinese" reducibleto "Filipino." In effect,this enables the "Chinese
Filipino"to be safely"Filipinized"withoutcurtailing its abilityto medi-
ate, if not acquire, the externalsources of social power createdby the
expanding"Chinese" regionaland global economy.In Mano Po, the Go
familyfortuneis founded on a Filipino-Chinese marriage,and the
union of the thirddaughterand her Filipinopolice lover not only con-
tinues that crossculturaltraditionbut makes theiroffspring"natural"
beneficiariesof the privilegesand opportunitiesthat accrue to their
multipleclaims of belonging.
To some extent,the resi(g)nification of mestizonessis rooted in the
demands of the market.Women are the targetaudiences and female
actorsthe main attractionsof familydramas.11 The Mano Po filmswere
to
expensive make, and they needed to recoup theirbig budgets by
capitalizingon bankable stars,many of whom, in line with the tradi-
tionalFilipinopreferenceforlightskincolor,are mestizos.At the same
time,thesemestizoshave to be coded securelyas "Chinese" in the eyes
HAU OFVISIBILITY
/CONDITIONS 511
of the moviegoers,hence the filmmakers' decision to resortto contriv-

ances such as makingthemwear silkChinese costumesor extensiveeye
makeupand prostheses.In Mano Po 2, the decision to cast Christopher
de Leon was explained away in the filmby havinghis charactertrace
his ancestryto a BritishArmyofficerstationedin China.
But, farmore important,the resi(g)nification of Chinese mestizoness
allows the "new Chinese" to be internallydifferentiated from other
mestizoand Filipinoeliteswhile simultaneously layingdown the condi-
tions for a reconsolidationof elite symboliccapital and power. "Chi-
nese" mestizonessdoes not simplyempowerthe "Chinese Filipino" to
mediatebetweenthe Philippines,on the one hand, and Spain, America,
Europe or the cosmopolitan West, on the other hand. The
"Chineseness" of the "Chinese Filipino" now grantsher access to the
equally cosmopolitan but also specificallyregional social capital pro-
duced by culturaland economic flowsoriginating fromEast Asia. Even
thoughMano Po oftendepictsthe Chinese cultureof the past as being
feudal,traditional,and backward,the emergenceof China as an eco-
nomic powerhouse and the association of "Chineseness" with "thor-
oughlymodern Asian'" affluence(to use a phrase fromSzanton Blanc
1996) have made the "Chinese" an object of fascinationand aspiration
even fornon-"Chinese"Filipinos.This has led even some ethnicSouth-
east Asian Chinese to selectivelyresinifythemselvesby restoringtheir
Chinese surnamesand acquiringa Chinese-languageeducation.The de-
cision of the mestizo scion of the polygynousAntonio Chan to take
up Asian Studiesin Mano Po 2, forexample,atteststo the elites'grow-
ing inclinationto partakeof the benefitsand opportunitiesaffordedby
the growingsignificanceof "Asia" as a region of economic growth.
Corazon Aquino's 1988 visit to Hongjian Village in Fujian Province,
China, ancestralhome of her great-grandfather, broughtthe Chinese
Question out of the closets of the Filipinoelite,even thoughacknowl-
edgmentof Chinese ancestryhas not completelybecome a social and
politicalasset.12
The resi(g)nificationof "Chinese" mestizoness may be read as a
symptomof the fissuresin the ideology of elite domination.Michael
Pinches (1999) has arguedthatthe ideologicalleadershipof the Filipino
elitehas come under pressurein recentdecades because of the contin-
512 PHILIPPINE
STUDIES
53,no.4 (2005)
ued failureof the Philippinesto liftitselfout of its economic malaise.

Scholarslike YoshiharaKunio (1995) have even blamed Filipinounder-
developmenton the Philippinestate'srepressionof the Chineseminority.
To this extent,Chinese entrepreneurship has come to connote positive
associationsof dynamismand industry(Pinches 1999, 287), which the
eliteshave perforceto ideologicallycoopt. The shockwavegeneratedin
1995 by the Metro Pacific Corporation- an Asian conglomerate
chairedby a Filipino,Manuel Pangilinan,and an arm of the Sino-Indo-
nesian Salim Group, which led a 16-memberconsortiumthatincluded
MalaysiantycoonRobertKuok to outmaneuverAyala Land by bidding
P30.2 billion for the 117-hectarechunk of Fort Bonifacio- demon-
stratedthe "money power" of SoutheastAsian capitalistsnow operat-
ing transnational^ and in the Philippines. But lest this creates the
mistakenimpressionthat"Asian" capitalsignifiespurely"Chinese" capi-
tal,we need only rememberthatethnicChinese tycoonsin the Philip-
pines have also formedprofitableallianceswith the Philippineelite in
their business ventures,as did Henry Sy with the Ayalas and John
Gokongwei with the Lopezes (Tiglao 1990a, 70). When Metro Pacific
ran agroundduringthe Asian financialcrisis,its Fort Bonifacio shares
were eventuallybought by Ayala Land in partnershipwith Evergreen
Holdings (of the Campos Group). Moreover, all but one of the Chi-
nese-Filipinotycoons (and all of whom were alreadyFilipino citizens
well beforethe 1975 mass naturalizationof Chinese) are not members
of the Chinese Chambers of Commerce, as the most successfulChi-
nese-Filipinofirmsare preciselythe ones thathave reliedleast on "Chi-
nese" ties (Cariño 2001, 114). In otherwords,upper-class"Chinese" are
able to move and mix in the highestFilipino social circles. Further-
more, a Chinese-Filipino tycoon like Emilio Yap (owner of Manila
was able to foil the bid of the Malaysian state-linked(now
'Bulletin)
state-owned)conglomerateRenong to take over the Manila Hotel by
benefitingfromFilipino nationalistsentiments,which figuredin the
SupremeCourt's decision to declare the Manila Hotel a "nationalpat-
rimony"in 1997 and give preferenceto Filipinobidders.And while the
identificationof Chinese withmoneyrendersthe Chinese vulnerableto
accusationsof capital flight,a numberof Filipinos and Chinese Filipi-
nos have argued againstthe fear of Chinese capital flightby pointing
HAU
/CONDITIONS
OFVISIBILITY 513
out thatmost of the Chinese stood by the Philippinesduringits most

troubledtimesinsteadof fiinnelingtheirmoneyabroad (Tiglao 1990b,
68)- an argumentthat sets up a moral contrast between the "old
money" Spanish mestizo familiesand the "new money" Chinese.
Racist sentimentsmay continueto color elite evaluationof the Chi-
nese new rich,who are deridedfortheirnouveau richetastelessness, but
the culturalauthorityinterminably enjoyedand exerted by the old mes-
tizo Spanish and Filipino elites can no longer be fullyexercised over
"Chinese" claims to an alternative(but not necessarilyoppositionalor
subversive)modernityand aesthetics(Pinches 1999, 294-95; Ong and
Nonini 1997). In lightof the Philippines'deepeningintegration into the
East Asian regional economy, the resi(g)nification of Chinese
mestizonessis part of an ongoing process of elite reconsolidationof
symboliccapital and power throughthe integrationof the "Chinese"
and, by extension,"Chinese" identificationwithEast Asian capital,into
the bounds of the Philippineofficialnationalimaginary.
The Limits of "Chineseness"
But if Mano Po identifiesthe potentialsof "Chinese" identification

with
a changing,pluralistPhilippinestateand withregionalcapitalism,it also
exposes the limitsof this multipleidentification.
Foremost among the limitsis the mediationof "Chinese" dealings
with the state and its various agencies and representativesby money.
Mano Po shows how the Chinese attemptedto overcome theirvulner-
abilityby relyingon theirown familyfor support,and on theirmoney
to circumventstaterepressionand exploitation.Money is the main cur-
rencyforestablishing"Chinese" connectionswith- or, more accurately,
for "speaking"to- Filipinos,especiallystateofficials;it may be consid-
ered a form of lingua franca by which "Chinese" (Filipinos, too!)
speak to the state.The ForrestGumpshots of the apolitical Go patri-
arch Don Luis hobnobbing with various presidentsand government
officials testifyto the everydayChinese survival tactic of forming
guanxirelationswith the state to ensureprotectionof theirbusinesses
and interests.In Mano Po, when Philippine National Police director
Dioscoro Blanco- a long time "protector"of the family - complains
STUDIES
to Daniel Go (Tirso Cruz III) about his daughterRichelle'splan to tes-

tifyin courtand identifyBlanco as the notoriousCťWhite Sky" involved
in drug smugglingand pushing,Go hands him a check for P5 million
with the words: "Tanggapin mo ang pagpaumanhin ko" (Accept my
apologies). In Mano Po 2, Johnson (JayManalo), the son-in-law of
murderedbusinessmanAntonio Chan, pays the investigating detective
P2 million to implicateChan's firstwife,Sol, in the murdercharges,
but Sol's daughter,Grace, pays the same cop a bag full of money to
expose this scam. When the cop protests that his life is on the line
("Buhayko ang nakatayadito,ma'am"), she replies,while handingover
the bag: "Paniguro ng kinabukasanmo" (Insurance for your future).
In Mano Po, the exchangebetweenVera and her sisterRichelle'sboy-
friend,police officerRafael,hingeson "Chinese" relianceon moneyto
problems,especiallywhen the problemtakesthe formof
solve difficult
the state and its claims, or, in this case, the Vera's youngest sister
Richelle's love affairwith the cop, with whom she is workingon a
drug smugglingexposé. Here, Vera triesto get Rafael (Raf) to break
off his relationswithher sister.
Vera: Wala ka ng perangmapagpala sa kanya.(You won't be able

to milkher of any more money.)
Raf: Alam mo, ang problema sa mga taong katulad mo na
mayaman,ang tinginmo sa lahatna bagay,maykatumbasna
pera. (You know,theproblemwithrichpeople likeyou is that
you thinkeverything has a price.)
Vera: Talaga namangginagatasanmo kamingmga Chineseeh. (But
you reallydo milkus Chinese.)
Raf: Kung ganyanang tinginmo sa amin,bakitnamandito ka pa
sa Pilipinas? (If this is what you thinkof us, why are you
stillin the Philippines?)
Vera: Amininmo na, talagangangpera lang ang tinginmo sa aming
mga Chinesedi ba? (Admitit, you onlythinkof the Chinese
in termsof money.)
Raf: Bakit ganyan ang tingin mo sa sarili mo? Dito ka na
pinanganak,dito ka na lumaki,ang kabuhayanninyonandito
na. Pilipinona rin kayo.(Whydo you see yourselfthisway?
HAU
/CONDITIONS
OFVISIBILITY 515
You wereborn here,you grewup here,yourlifeis here.You

are also Filipino.)
Vera: Tinuringmo ba kamingkagayaniyo?Sa sampungkinidnap,
ilan ang Chinese?O baka naman talagangnagkataonlamang
mas maramisa amin ang gusto ninyongkidnapin?(Did you
treatus just like one of you?For everyten kidnappings, how
many are Chinese? Or is it just a coincidencethatyou want
to kidnap more of us?)
Raf: Maglabankayo,magkaisakayo...Ang problemasa inyo,wala
kayongtiwalasa amin.(Fightback,unite...The problemwith
you is you don't have faithin us.)
Vera: Five million,Mr. Rafael Bala.
Raf: Sa ginagawamongiyan,iniinsultomo ang sarilimo. (You in-
sultyourselfby doing this.)
This exchangediscloses,among otherthings,a "nationalist"logic at

work in a number of spectacularkidnappingincidentsthat victimize
richethnicChinese.13But it also revealsthe two characters'fundamental
ambivalencetowardthe nation.Raf's attitude,which oscillatesbetween
affirmationof the "Filipinoness"of the Chinese ("Pilipinona rinkayo")
and resentmentof the rich ("mga taong katulad mo na mayaman"),
reflectsthe tensionwithinFilipinonationalismbetweenthe capacityfor
inclusivenessof the Filipinonation,on the one hand,and the exclusions
generatedby class that create deep divisionswithinthe nation,on the
otherhand (Hau 2000a). Vera's responses,which stronglynegate Raf's
(and the state's)good intentions,also lay bare the limitsof nationalism
by justifyingChinese lack of trustin the stateauthoritieswho have tra-
ditionallyexploitedthe discourse of nationalismto fleece the Chinese.
Her cynicismindicates the extentto which the Chinese- historically
identifiedwith money- have relied on money to speak and act for
thempreciselybecause the nationalistrhetoricand practiceof citizenship
and belongingare not just inadequateto shieldthe Chinese againstha-
rassmentbut oftenserve as the veryinstruments of extortion.In Mano
Po 3, the daughterof anticrimecrusaderLilia Chiong Veloso tells her
aunt at the police stationthat the police were asking for money,and
when the aunt confronts the police about fleecing the Chinese
STUDIES
("Pinagiinitanninyodahil Chinese" [You're puttingthe heat on us be-

cause we're Chinese]), the irate police respond by sayingthat theyare
doing theirjob, and expresstheirresentment of the rich("Paninindigan
namin ito" [We stand by this]). Lilia herselfexplodes when she hears
the released kidnap gang leader,a cop, declare brazenlyhis innocence
on television.
While moneyhas the capacityto transformethnicChinese into kid-
nap victims,it can also be used to pursue a brand of justicenot often
available in officialcourts. In talkingto the authoritiesto tryto find
theirfather'skillerin Mano Po 2, daughterJanet(CarmenVillaroel)asks
her sisterGrace (JudyAnn Santos): "Magkano daw para may masabi
sila?" (How much does it take to make them speak?) Money can be
themaininstrument forexactingvengeance:when Lilia is fearedmissing,
her son attemptsto interrogatethe chief kidnap suspect by offering
money,and, when the suspect laughs it off, tells him: "Kung may
kinalamankayo,alam namin kung saan ka nakatuntun"(If you have
anythingto do with [her disappearance].. .we know where you are).
But if moneycan buy justiceand protectionnot obtainablefromthe
state, the roots of Chinese vulnerabilityalso lie in the capacity of
moneyto provoke popular resentmentand retribution. When Antonio
Chan is murdered, the family findsit hard to believe that the murder
is a random act of robbery.Even the police begin theirinvestigation
by askingif Chan had firedor humiliatedan employee.Class relations
being so contentiousin the Philippines,Chinese capitalistsbecome vul-
nerableto a formof "nationalist"vengeance,14 which crosses over class
ressentimentinto retributionaimed at redressingthe shame and loss of
dignitycaused by humiliationor rejection.
The threatand terrorof stateviolence and popular vengeance thus
expose the limitsof "Chinese" belonging.In Mano Po i, Lilia loses her
firstlove Michael (Christopherde Leon) when the latter'sfamilymi-
grates to the U.S. to escape harassmentby the state afterMichael is
detainedforpossession of anti-Marcosdocumentsand involvementin
the anti-Marcosmovement.
Thus, howevercarefulMano Po may be in adumbratingthe integra-
tion of ethnicChinese into the Filipinonation,the factthatcharacters
like Vera make the decision not to leave the Philippinesindicatesthat,
HAU/CONDITIONS
OFVISIBILITY 517
had the rescue operationsended in tragedy,the Gos may "choose" to

leave afterall, as millions of workingFilipinos have done in lightof
the failureof the stateto deliverwelfare,security, and prosperity to the
Filipino population. The situationof the second sister,JulietGo-Co,
whose husband plans to set up business in Shanghai,underscoresthe
way in which "Chinese," like the capitalwithwhich theyhave become
identified, have the potentialto createnew channelsof flowsthatmay
potentiallybreach and exceed the boundariesof the nation-state.
Like Mano Po, CryingLadies weaves togethermultiple,conflicting
strandsof associationssurrounding moneyand its identification withthe
"Chinese." But whereasMano Po looks at Pinoy-Chineserelationsfrom
the perspectiveof the Chinese Filipino,Crying Ladiesviews Pinoy-Chi-
nese interactionsfromthe viewpointof Filipinos.Not surprisingly, the
Crying Ladies brand of happy ending provides an altogetherdifferent
resolutionof the problemof Chinese identification withmoney.Where
Mano Po attemptsto reterritorialize "Chineseness" by embeddingthe
"Chinese" withinthe Philippinenation,Crying Ladiesattemptsto defuse
the class tensionsand nationalistresentment ignitedby "Chineseness"by
turning deterritorialized "Chinese" flows and connectionsinto sources
of Filipino self-advancement. In otherwords,whereasMano Po puts a
premium on the value of Chinese Filipinoattachment to the Philippines,
Crying Ladies suggeststhatthe value of being Chinese Filipinolies pre-
in
cisely its abilityto mediateconnectionswiththe outside,especiallythe
Philippines'economicallybetter-performing East Asian neighbors,and in
so doing provide capital and opportunitiesthat Filipinos can tap.
Crying Ladies followsthreeFilipinoprofessionalmournershiredby a
young Chinese Filipino, Wilson Chua (Eric Quizon), to work at his
father'swake. The main protagonist,Stella (Sharon Cuneta), had once
been jailed for estafa,and findsout that the dead man forwhom she
must crywas the one who had her jailed. Stella comes off as a trick-
ster figurewhose main preoccupation is with money,be it to obtain
money or evade the obligations entailed by monetaryexchange. The
estafa case is an example of her attemptto escape monetaryobliga-
tions by passing bouncing checks,but so is Stella's ploy of gettinga
free jeepney ride. Stella also exploits an ongoing workers' strike
(directedat a corporationwith the revealingname of El Rico, "The
STUDIES
Rich") to collect contributionsfromher fellowbus passengers.Stella's

laborious effortsto make money are mirroredin her predilectionfor
gambling,the allure of which lies in its promise of generatingmoney
out of thinair throughthe machinationsof luck (sumrte).
Here, money,or the threatof its absence, weighs heavilyon Stella
and her family.Stella's disillusionmentwith the abilityof the state to
provide services and a decent livingis summed up in her frustrated
exclamationat the repeated blackouts: "Brownout na naman, anong
klasenggobyernoto!" (Brownoutsagain, what kind of governmentis
this!)Her inability waysand her perennialindebt-
to give up her trickster
edness from gambling and from constantly asking for bale (cash
advance) fromher Chinese employer(whose own businessis not flour-
ishing)forceher to relinquishher son to her ex-husbandand his second
wife,who plan to relocate to Cagayan de Oro (note the referenceto
gold) and offerthe child a stable familyenvironmentand a future.
Stella'sneed to earn a livingforcesher to leave her son undersomeone
else's care;when a firebreaksout, Stellateeterson the brinkof hysteria
at the thought that her son may have been trapped alone in their
house. Stella's attemptsto apply for a job abroad as a culturalsinger
are thwartedby the state in the formof a black mark on her record
kept by the National Bureau of Investigation(NBI). Not surprisingly,
her thoughtsare almostalwaysof money- moneyproblemseven enter
her subconsciousin the formof an extendeddream sequence in which
Stella by sheer luck wins a slot as a contestantat a "Salapi o Salakot"
TV game show.
The gamblingand tricksterisms she engages in are but small-scale
versions of speculative capital that is generatedin such "legitimate"
venues as the stockmarketand real estate.While gamblingoperateson
the premiseof magical accumulation,the odds againstwinningoften
end up impedingcapitalaccumulation.15 The magicalqualitiesof capital,
the abilityof capital to multiplymanifold,are spotlightedat the dead
Chinese capitalist'swake- each day of the wake, a calligrapherwrites
down in Chinese charactersthe amount of donation in the tens of
thousands of pesos from familyfriendsof the dead man. Not only
can money enable the dead Chinese's widow to buy grief (Wilson's
motherat one point sharplytells Stella and her friendsthat theyare
HAU/CONDITIONS
OFVISIBILITY 519
being paid to mourn,not joke and laugh) to ensureher husband'ssafe

passage to paradise,it allows the young Chinese Filipino son to con-
tinue payinglip service to a dyingtraditionhe no longer believes in.
More, the death of the capitalistdoes not truncatecapitalaccumulation,
but inspiresyet anotherround of accumulation.Professionalmourn-
ing- now "subcontracted"to Filipinos because thereis no more Chi-
nese labor for hire and because the practiceitselfis dyingout in the
Chinese community - is a commodificationof the ideology that seeks
to marrywealthwith virtue:those who are rich also have to earn vir-
tue by being good and helpful,so thatthe outpouringof grieffollow-
ing their death assures them an easier passage to heaven. Money
supplementsprivategriefby securingthe meritand virtueof the dead.
Stella's one-dimensionalview of the dead man is complexifiedby
the testimonialsof the dead man's friends,but theirpositiveportraits
of the man are sealed off from her by her inabilityto understand
Hokkien.The use of Chinese languagesin the Philippinesettingis one
of the primarymarkersof "Chinese" alienness. Conversations con-
ducted in Hokkien among "Chinese" in frontof Filipinos have been
known to elicitFilipino jokes about "Binebenta na tayo" (We're being
sold), remarksthat derive theiramusement/reproachvalue fromthe
commonsensicalidentificationof "Chineseness" with commercialand
capitalistexchange.16Crying Ladies, like the Mano Po films,strivesto ren-
der the "Chinese" scrutableby providingsubtided translationsof the
Hokkien dialogues. But the fact that these dialogues are translated
(sometimesnot accurately)into English ratherthan Filipino reinforces
class differencein linguistictermsby linkingHokkien to the language
of power and privilegein the Philippinesand, in so doing,makingthe
act of speakingHokkien equivalentto "spokeningin dollars" in their
common allusion to money and exchange.17
But Crying Ladiesis also at pains to defusethe potentialantagonisms
generatedby class-coded ethnic difference,but it does so by distin-
guishing the "new Chinese" from the "old Chinese." Although the
"Chinese" family'sgriefspeaks to Stella across the chasm of theirclass
differences,and moves her, class reconciliationin the filmis mainly
posited throughStella's deepening friendshipwith the dead Chinese's
male heir,Wilson,whose businessconnectionsgranther access to Chi-
520 PHILIPPINE
STUDIES
53,no.4 (2005)
nese moneyand, most important,connections.18 Unlikehis dead father,

who can no longer speak for himselfand whose good characterand
human frailtiesare spoken of in private and mainlyin Hokkien, the
culturallymestizoWilson is "Filipino" enough to be able to communi-
cate withStella across the barriersof class, language,and ethnicity, but
his added value for Stella inheres in his "Chinese" connections.The
dead fatherremainsas alien to Stella as the Philippinestateitself:she
knows him only as the intsikwho had put her in jail and who, she
hears,once had someone beaten up for failureto pay his or her debt.
Her encounterwith the son of the dead Chinese proves more reward-
ing: Wilson gives her a fatbonus and subsequendyintroducesher to a
Japanese production company looking to hire karaoke video talents.
Stella finallyestablishesherselfas an award-winning video actressand
presumablybegins earninga decent living.
Crying'Ladiestracksthe socializationof Stella fromtrickster(whose
attemptsto conjure money are penalized as inappropriateby the sys-
tem) into karaoke talent(whose wage-determinedcontractlabor, now
appropriate,buys her social respectability).Stella's tricksterways are
attemptsto evade the strictures of a statethathas failedto alleviatethe
miseriesof the majorityof its population. (Similarly, her enterprising
Filipino neighbor sidesteps Philippine laws prohibitinggamblingby
buying unclaimed cadavers and staging fake funeralsas a frontfor
gambling. Fake mourning and its commodified ritualshave become a
form of livelihood.) If the dead "Chinese" had once acted as an
agent of her penalizationby the state,his "Chinese-Filipino"heir be-
comes the agent of her socialization into the culture of chance and
dream of upward mobility,all withoutrecourse to state intervention.
Crying Ladies makes the "Chinese" the exemplarof accumulationand
theepitomeof regionalflows.Stella'sconnectionswithWilson Chua are
vitalto her social upliftment and legitimacy because it is Wilson'sguanxi
networking with fellow East Asian entrepreneurs, such as theJapanese
videoke producer,that lead to Stella's discoveryas an actress and de-
liveryfromthe drudgeryand inadequatelivingof manual labor. More
crucially,thisguanxinetworkenables her to circumventthe penaltiesof
a permanentblack markon her NBI recordwhich had long prevented
HAU
/CONDITIONS
OFVISIBILITY 521
her frombeing able to work abroad. In the fantasyworld conjuredup

by Crying Ladies, a personal guaranteefromWilson is enough to per-
suade theJapaneseproducerto overlook Stella'sestafaconvictionand
judge her not on the basis of the state'spenalizingof her past actions
but on her talent,potential,and "true" worthas a human being.Ironi-
cally,then,this form of meritocracyis dependent preciselyon "Chi-
nese" connectionsthathave oftenbeen viewed as typicalof East Asian
capitalismyet also stigmatizedas "market corruption"because they
bypass stateregulationand legitimation.
CryingLadies and Mano Po anchor theirplots on the stereotypical
identificationof the "Chinese" with capital. Yet these filmsalready
stand at a distancefromthe nationalismof anti-Chinesefilmssuch as
Lino Brocka's Maynila,Sa Mga Kuko ngUivanag (see Hau 2000a), not
because Chinese ethnicityis no longer conflatedwith capital (on the
contrary,theidentification is closernow thanever),but because the kind
of commercialethos thatprioritizescapitalaccumulationand consump-
tion has become a lot more pervasive,and is embraced by growing
numbersof Filipinoswho, throughinternaland international migration,
findthemselveslivingand workingin urban market-mediated environ-
ments.
Mano Po and Crying Ladies show that,while Pinoy-Chineserelations
are viewed differently by non-Chinese Filipinos (as opportunitiesfor
tapping "Chinese" capital and regional "Chinese" networks)and by
Chinese Filipinos (as opportunities for demonstrating "Chinese"
embeddednessin the Filipino nation while also appropriatingregional
"Chinese" flows),these two seeminglyopposite views are integralas-
pects of two mutuallydetermining processes- the concomitantrevalu-
ation of both "Chineseness" and "Filipinoness." The imperativefor
integratingthe Chineseinto the nationis pardyconditionedby the Phil-
ippine state'sdesire to utilize"Chinese" capital and connectionsin the
regionand beyond.The Chinese Filipino'sperceivedaccess to regional
and global capitalin turnadds to the social and culturalcapitalof being
"Chinese" and "Filipino" in the Philippines.The Filipino now findsin
eitherher "Chinese" ancestryor her "Chinese" neighbora means of
identifyingwith emergent,affluent"Asia" even as she or a memberof
STUDIES
her familyis part of a diaspora thatincludes Chinese Filipinos.Grow-

ing regionalidentificationon the part of the Philippinestate,the "Chi-
nese," and the "Filipino" does not erase nationness;it reinventsit.
But despitethe growingvisibility and desirabilityof "Chinese" entre-
preneurialand social power embodied by the hybrid"new Chinese,"
the category"Chinese" itselfremainsdeeplyentangledwiththe issue of
class,whichdefinesits fraughtrelationshipwiththe Filipinonationand
which can potentiallyreactivatedeep-seatedambivalenceabout, if not
resentment of and violenceagainst,alien capital/ists.
Adoptingtheview-
point of Chinese Filipinoswho are particularlysensitiveto the real and
potentialeffectsof this ambivalence,Mano Po attemptsto resolve this
issue by providinga politicallyacceptable resolutionthat anchors the
"Chinese" firmlyto the territorialbounds and narrativesof the Philip-
pine nation-state.Even as bolsters the commonplace view of the
it
transnationalityof "Chinese" networksthroughits account of second
daughter JulietGo-Co's husband'sconnectionsin Shanghai,the filmopts
to conclude by reaffirmingthe rootedness of the Chinese Filipino
withinthe Philippines,hence its recourseto endingthe storywitheldest
daughterVera's decision to foregoher plan to move to Canada forher
peace of mind following the traumatic kidnapping of her sisters:
"Umalis man ako sa Pilipinas,sa ayaw'tgusto ko, dala ko pa rin ang
Pilipinas. Kaya bakit ko pa aalisan ang di ko namang lubusang
matatakasan?"(Even if I were to leave the Philippines,whetherI like it
or not, I carrythe Philippineswith me. So why should I leave what I
cannot completelyescape anyway?)
CristinaSzanton Blanc has commentedon the Chinese-Filipinoun-
ease with fullyembracingthe regionalnarrativesand models of Asian
modernity(and mobility)propounded by emergenteconomies such as
Malaysiaor Singapore,notingthatTaiwaneseinvestments in the Philip-
pines have been resistedby both Chinese and non-Chinesewho view
them as economic competitionand quoting Chinese-Filipinomembers
of Kaisa para sa Kaunlaran as saying:"How can we emphasize our
Chinesenesswhen we stillneed to make ourselvesacceptableto a Fili-
pino electorate?"(Szanton Blanc 1997, 272, 275).
This inabilityto embrace enthusiastically East Asian modernitymay
also have to do with the kind of position occupied by the Philippines
HAU/CONDITIONS
OFVISIBILITY 523
withinthe region. Unlike the other countries,the Philippineshas not

been privyto the kind of dramaticeconomic growththat shaped the
mythof the "East Asian economic miracle." A World Bank (1993)
report,in fact,omittedthe Philippinesfromthe list of Asia's "miracle
economies." Periodicallybuffetedby politicaland economic crises,the
Philippinesmade the historicdecision in the mid- to late 1970s to of-
ficiallyexportits labor,a sizeable percentageof which,heavilyfeminized
and concentratedin domesticwork and services,is now based in East
Asia. Filipino effortsto partakeof East Asian affluenceare shadowed
by the realityof Filipinoworkers - mainlyfemale - providingthe labor
thatshoresup a numberof East Asian economies,feminizedlabor that
uncovers the undersideof exploitationof foreignand native labor by
stateand privatesectoraliketo underwrite the so-calledAsian economic
miracle.This asymmetry in economic relationsbetweenthe Philippines
and its more prosperousEast Asian neighborsdoes not only take the
form of a gendered division of labor and a division between skilled
and "unskilled"labor (Hau 2004, 227-70), but assumes a racial cast in
the contrastbetween "Chinese" employerand "Malay" employee.
Not immuneto the contagionof regionalfantasiesof capitalistsuc-
cess and consumption,the Philippinestatehas been largelyunsuccessful
in realizingits mission of nationaldevelopment.Under the administra-
tion of Fidel Ramos (1992-1998), the Philippinesattemptedto generate
growthratessimilarto those in the neighboringcountriesby initiating a
series of financialliberalizationprogramsin hopes of being able to
benefitfrom the windfallof capital flows and investmentssweeping
throughthe region.With the Philippinestate alreadyso colonized by
privateintereststhat it had not been able to reinventitselfalong the
lines of the developmentalstate regimesin Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan, a combinationof circumstance,happenstance,and structural
constraintsensuredin the 1990s that"[a]fterprotesting vehementlythat
it is an East Asian economy,not a Latin Americanone, the Philippines
returnedto the region'sardentembraceby being swept into the Asian
currencycrisis" (Montes 1999, 263).
Seen in thislight,the ongoingresignifications öf Chinesenessremain
fraught with tension. The Philippines'positionwithinthe international
capitalist order does not allow it to fullyand uncriticallyembrace the
STUDIES
regionaldiscourse of urban middle-classconsumptionand economic

growth.Moreover,the viabilityof the regiondepends on its abilityto
sustain economic growthand offerstabilityand prosperity(Shiraishi
2006, 268)- the yawninggap between the rich and poor and between
urban and rural populations within and, equally important,between
nationsmay engendersocial crises and rekindlenationalistsentiments,
whichelitescan capitalizeon to protecttheirvestedinterestsand which
ordinarypeople can draw on in order to articulatetheirdemands for
social justice.The figureof the "Chinese," like the dead capitalistin
CryingLadies, bears the embers of nationalistambivalence and still
hauntsthe new orthodoxyof pluralismand nationalintegration. While
Crying Ladies imagines a scenario in which class differencesand the
potential conflicts sparked by class disparitycan be doused by the
twinneddiscoursesof meritocracy and chance, and Mano Po celebrates
the culturalhybridity and enrichmentwroughtby nationalintegration,
the filmscannot fullypaper over "Chinese" vulnerability to statevio-
lence,popularvengeance,and the demand for social justiceon the part
of those,"Chinese" and non-"Chinese"alike,whose everydaylives give
the lie to the fantasies of accumulation and consumer satisfaction
peddled by the ideology of global capitalisttriumph.
Notes
I thankIna Cosio forherinvaluablehelpin obtaining
someof thematerials for
thisarticle,
andJojoAbinales, JunAguilar,RobbyKwanLaurel,and especially
TakashiShiraishi
fortheircomments andencouragement. Allerrorsin thisarticle
aremyresponsibility.
1. See Hau 2000a foran analysis
of Kaisa'sdeploymentof thediscourseof
citizenship.
2. It remainedexpensive,though:The P6,000to PI 0,000feerequired
forappli-
cationbarredindigent Chinesefromacquiring Filipinocitizenship.
3. Kaisa has arguedfortheneedto distinguish between"ChineseFilipinos"
and"Filipino-Chinese":
refers
Filipino-Chinese or olderChinesewhoarepredominantly
to thetraditional
Chinesein identity Whenusedin namesof organi-
butFilipinoin citizenship.
zations,it meansthatthesegroupshavemembers who areeitherChineseor
Filipinocitizens,i.e. Filipino-ChineseChambersof Commerce,Filipino-
HAU
/CONDITIONS
OFVISIBILITY 525
ChineseFirePrevention Association, etc.ChineseFilipinorefers to theyoung,

mostly native-born ethnic Chinese who identifythemselves as Filipinosfirst,
but stillmaintaintheirChineseculturalidentity. (Kaisa para sa Kaunlaran
2005).
Tsinoy, on theotherhand,is usedsomewhat looselyto encompassevennational
heroesof Hokkiendescentwho didnotidentify themselves as "Chinese."While
notingtheinadequacy of thesetermsto accountforhowthe"Chinese"is figured
as foreign and/orFilipino(see Hau 2004,15-62),thisarticleemploystheterm
"ChineseFilipino"to directly alludeto theabovedefinition whilealsointerchang-
ingitwiththeterm"newChinese.""New Chinese"is oftenusedbyscholarsto
referto Chinesewho migrated frompost-Maoist China,and thiscategory of
"Chinese"sometimesservesto distinguish new immigrants fromsecond-or
third-generation "ChineseFilipinos" (whohavebeenknownto differentiate them-
selvesfromrecent migrants bypejoratively to thelatter
referring as chekm or "G.I.
[genuine butthisarticle
intsik]"), deliberately uses"Chinese," "newChinese," and
"oldChinese"to playup theslippages between terms like"ChineseFilipino," "Fili-
pino-Chinese," intsik,
tsinoy, and G.I./chekm.
tsutsiya, I define"newChinese"as a
formof "Chinese"identification (rather thanan established identity) thatemerged
outof thepost-Marcos eraandthetransnationalization of "ethnicChinese"busi-
ness and populations."Old Chinese"refersto older formsof identifying
"Chineseness" withcommerce, capital, andcommunism, mostnotably crystallized
in theconstruction of "Chinese"as the"other"of Filipinonationalism. Concep-
tualslippages maycreateconfusion, butitis precisely theseambiguities thatmake
"Chineseness" suchan eminently usefulandexploitable termof (self-identifica-
tion,whichcanbe appropriated, or for
reinvented,deployed different political,eco-
nomic,cultural, andpersonalprojects.
4. See Hau 2000b (152-65)fora theoretical discussionof thevisibility and
"alienation" of theChinesemerchant.
5. This is not to saythat Chinese capitalin thepastwas solelyconfined
withinone nation-state; thesize of contemporary "Chinese"capital,however,
dwarfs thatof earlier"Chinese"capital, andtheamountofinvestment abroadhas
also expanded.
6. On theconceptsof deterritorialization andreterritorialization, see Deleuze
andGuattari 1983.
7. On theChinesemestizoas a "specialkindof Filipino," see Wickberg 1964
and 1965.On thefluidity of "Chinesemestizo"identity, see Chu 2002.
8. "Ethnic Chinesearepeoplewithsomemeasurable degreeof Chineseparent-
age,who can speakand understand at leastone Chinese dialect,whohavereceived
a minimum of Chinese-language education, and who have retained someChinese
customsandtraditions enough to consider themselves and be considered bytheir
neighbors as Chinese" (Kaisa para sa Kaunlaran 2005). Some of the historical
STUDIES
"Tsinoys including JoséRizal,werenotcompletely immuneto anti-"Chinese"

racism. Fora compelling discussionoftheracialist castof ilustrado
nationalism, see
Aguilar 2005.
9. Fora usefuloverview andcritique of the"cultural andstructural accommo-
dation"thatorganizes thestudyof overseasChinese,see Hodder2005.
10. Dannhaeuser 2005 has also notedthesamephenomenon of intraethnic
competition among ethnic Chinese small- and medium-scale entrepreneurs in
Dagupan.
11.ManoPo showcasestheparticipation ofwomenin "Chinese"bigbusiness
in thePhilippines its
through depiction of the Filipinamatriarch and theeldest
Chinesedaughter-CEO. In ManoPo 3, theprotagonist strongwoman is a cel-
ebrated activistandanticrime crusader.Buttheemphasis on thedeadpatriarch and
hisdisavowed eldestson in ManoPo 2, andthesubordination of seconddaugh-
terJulietinManoPo, pointto thecircumscribing of the"Chinese"family bypatri-
archalelements working in and the
through highly personalized conflictscentering
on romantic love,filial
piety, andfamily duty. Evenas theManoPo filmsshowthe
strong women characters defying patriarchal"Chinesetradition," theirplotsand
characterizations continueto locatetheidealsof passionand family withinthe
orbitof malevalidation andheterosexuality. In Crying Ladies, whichcelebrates fe-
malebonding, thewomen's careerandlifetrajectories arepropelled bytheir connec-
tionsto themale-dominated church,videoproduction company, andfilmstudio.
12.The threat of "Chinese"alienness is stillusedas a weaponin political cam-
paignsand economiccompetition. AlfredoLim'spresidential candidacywas
doggedbychallenges fromopponents whoquestioned hisFilipinocitizenship on
thebasisof hisChineseancestry. Similar challenges wereleveledagainstWilliam
Gatchalian byhisbusinessrivals.
13.The visibilityof "Chinese"kidnapvictims does notpreclude thefactthat
kidnappers havebecomea lotmore"democratic" in theirchoiceofvictims, target-
ingrichandpoor,Filipinos andforeigners alike.
14.Forthelinkbetween nationalism andvengeance via thepolitics of transla-
tionandforeignness, see Rafael2005.
15. For an illuminating discussion of gambling anditsrelationship to capital,
labor,elitedomination, and thestatein thecontextof colonialPhilippines, see
Aguilar1998.
16. In ManoPo, RafaelBala'sfather expresses hisreservations abouthisson's
relationship withRichelleGo bypointing to sucha discomfort whenhe tells
Rafael:"KapagusapngIntsiksa harapmo,maiilang ka" (If Chinesewerespoken
in front of you,youwillbe putoff).Publicconversations in Hokkienmayalso
provoke"ching-chong-chang" mimicry whichdisrupts spokenHokkienwithono-
matopoeicechoesthatemptythelanguageof itscontent whilehighlighting the
discordant foreignness of its sound- a formof unsolicited participationin the
absenceof translation.
OFVISIBILITY
HAU/CONDITIONS 527
17.The linguistic
identificationof HokkienwithEnglishworksdifferently in
theManoPo scenessetin "feudal"Chinaamongtheindigent "Chinese."In the
"old" Chinascenes,Englishsubtitles merely markspokenHokkienas thealien
tongue of an alienculture.But when used in scenessetin thePhilippines,they
workto displacethepotentially moredisturbing aliennessof the"Chinese"Taga-
log of theeldergeneration of "Chinese."Because"Chinese"-accented, broken
Tagalog risksprovokinglaughter or,worse,ridiculefrom the Hokkien
audience, is
quarantinedfrom "Chinese" Tagalogbybeing rendered as and
written, therefore
safelyunaccented andforthemostpartgrammatically English.Giventhe
correct,
absence(or,moreaccurately, death) of the"Chinese" pastand in Crying
patriarch
LadiesandtheChinese-Filipino characters'
command of fluentTagalog,Hokkien
functionsas an exclusive
insider'slanguage likeEnglish.
18. Althoughthefilmaccordsmoreattention to threefemaleprotagonists
ratherthanto youngChineseFilipino, theirstories
unfoldagainst thebackdrop of
theChinesefuneral. The Chinaman's wakeservesas a catalystforthetransforma-
tionof thethreewomen's livesandcareers. The has-been actress(HildaKoronel)
receivesmuch-needed validationfroma fan,and the churchworker(Angel
Aquino)heedsherfriends' adviceanddecidesto giveup herrelationship withher
adultererboyfriend.
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Conditions of Visibility: Resignifying the "Chinese"/"Filipino" in "Mano Po" and "Crying Ladies"

Author(s): Caroline S. Hau

In a short span of three years, from December 2002 to December

twelveawards (includingBest Picture,Actor,Actress,Director,Screen-

Kamio Yoko, HanajoriDango (Boys over Flowers,1992-2003), sparked

Figure1. ManoPo (2002)

and funeral,similarlyrode the crest of the "Asian" wave. Novice di-

This articlelinksrepresentations of "Chineseness"in recentPhilippine

Integratingthe "New Chinese"

Chinese-FilipinoHerman Tiu Laurel and an uncreditedRickyLee, co-

population,whose changingdemographicprofileduringthe postwar

allay fearsof the viabilityof nationalidentityin countrieswhere mass

with Kaisa advocacy.The documentaryopens with a montageof Fili-

tracted,and expensive,double moves thathelped consolidatethe Fili-

While Chinese visibilityhad historicallybeen conditioned by the

by deployingthe term balikbayan to referto Filipino immigrantsand

eliteand middleclasses.Afterall, these flowshave seen immigrants and

the act of speaking,which not only distances the speaker fromthose

Regional Flows and the Resi(g)nification

The way Mano Po goes about domesticatingthe alien "Chinese" is by

to mediatethe social hierarchyof the colonizer and colonized, of "in-

ment to education, dependence on kinship,collective welfarerather

the economic success and the culturaldistinctiveness of the "Chinese."9

Chinese call themselvesHanren (referringto the Han Dynasty),but

ground a historicalformof capitalism,which had hithertobeen con-

blood lineage,thishoweverdoes not mean thatthe "Chinese" is com-

of the moviegoers,hence the filmmakers' decision to resortto contriv-

ued failureof the Philippinesto liftitselfout of its economic malaise.

out thatmost of the Chinese stood by the Philippinesduringits most

The Limits of "Chineseness"

But if Mano Po identifiesthe potentialsof "Chinese" identification

to Daniel Go (Tirso Cruz III) about his daughterRichelle'splan to tes-

Vera: Wala ka ng perangmapagpala sa kanya.(You won't be able

You wereborn here,you grewup here,yourlifeis here.You

This exchangediscloses,among otherthings,a "nationalist"logic at

("Pinagiinitanninyodahil Chinese" [You're puttingthe heat on us be-

had the rescue operationsended in tragedy,the Gos may "choose" to

Rich") to collect contributionsfromher fellowbus passengers.Stella's

being paid to mourn,not joke and laugh) to ensureher husband'ssafe

nese moneyand, most important,connections.18 Unlikehis dead father,

her frombeing able to work abroad. In the fantasyworld conjuredup

her familyis part of a diaspora thatincludes Chinese Filipinos.Grow-

withinthe region. Unlike the other countries,the Philippineshas not

regionaldiscourse of urban middle-classconsumptionand economic

ChineseFirePrevention Association, etc.ChineseFilipinorefers to theyoung,

"Tsinoys including JoséRizal,werenotcompletely immuneto anti-"Chinese"

Cheah,Pheng.2001. Chinesecosmopolitanism in twosensesand postcolonial

pines.In Geopolitics EssaysonPhilippine

Pempel,T. J.2005. Introduction. In Remapping East Asia: Theconstructionof a

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