TORTS and DAMAGES CASES - QUASI-DELICT
LLB-3
II. QUASI-DELICT
a. Historical Background
1. Barredo vs Garcia, 73 Phil 607
b. Definition
1. Picart vs Smith, GR L-12219, March 15, 1918
2. Cusi, et al vs PNR, GR L-29889, May 31, 1979
3. Jarco Mktg. vs CA, 321 SCRA 377
4. Child Learning vs Tagorio, 426 SCRA 236
c. Degrees of Negligence
1. Ilao-Oretar vs Ronquillo, 535 SCRA 633
2. Amado vs Rio, 95 Phil 33
d. Standard of Conduct
i. General Rule
1. Picart vs Smith, supra
2. Sicam vs Jorge, GR 159617, August 8, 2007
3. Corinthian Gardens vs Sps. Tanjuangco, GR 160795, June
27, 2008
ii. Special Circumstances
1. Hrs. of Completo vs Albayada, GR 172200, July 6, 2010
2. Pacis vs Morales, GR 169467, Feb. 25, 2010
iii. Children
1.Taylor vs Manila Railroad, 16 Phil 8
2.Jarco Mktg. vs CA, 321 SCRA 377
iv. Experts
1.Culion vs Philippines, 55 Phil 129
G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942
FAUSTO BARREDO vs SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO
FACTS:
At about 1am on May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the MALATE
TAXICAB driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a CARRETELA guided by Pedro
Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned and one of its passenger, 16
year old Faustina Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days
later. Faustino’s parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and was
eventually convicted. The court in the criminal case granted the
petition that the right to bring separate civil action be reserved.
May 7, 1939, parents of Faustino brought an action against Fausto
Barredo - the owner of the taxi and employer of Fontanilla. The suit
was based on Article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is governed by the
Revised Penal Code thus his liability is only subsidiary and that the
separate civil suit should have been file against Fontanilla primarily
and not to him.
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT:
Convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of 1year and
1day to 2years of prision correccional.
DECISON OF COURT OF APPEALS:
The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentenc of the lower court in the
criminal case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD:
NO.
He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action
against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing
Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is
more expeditious because by the time of the Supreme Court judgment
against Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property.
It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees
because it was shown that Fontanilla had multiple traffic infraction
already before he hired him - something he failed to overcome during
hearing. Had GArcia not rereserved his right to file a separate civil
action, Barredo would have been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is
not beinf sued for damages arising from criminal act but rather for his
own negligence in selecting employees.
“Art 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to
another by his faults or negligence shall be liable for damages so done.
“Art 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is
enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom another is responsible.
...Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable
for damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of
MAYORDO, M.A.
the services in which employed, or occasion of the performance of their
duties...”
JUDGMENT:
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and hereby affirmed,
with cost against the defendant-petitioner.
G.R. No. L-12219 March 15, 1918
AMADO PICART vs FRANK SMITH, JR.
FACTS:
(An appealed case base on the decision of the lower court - Court of
First Instance of Prov. Of La Union.)
On December 12, 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, Amado Picart was
riding his horse. Before he had gotten half way across, Frank Smith
approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the
rate of about 10 to 12 miles per hour. As Smith neared the bridge he
saw Picart and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He
continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave 2 more
successive blast, as it appeared to him that Picart was not observing
the rule of the road.
Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals.
However he did not move his horse to the other lane, instead he
moved his horse closer to the railing. His reason was that, he thought
he did not have sufficient time to get over the other side. The horse
(pony) did not yet exhibited fright so Snith, instead of veering to the
right while yet some distance away, continued driving towards Picart
without slowing down and when he was already near the horse he
quickly turned his car to the right side to escape. But the horse got
scared so it turned its body across the bridge; the horse was struck on
the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was
broken. The horse fell and Picart was thrown of with some violence. As
a result of its injuries the horse died and Picart received contusions
which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical
attention for several days.
RULING OF THE LOWER COURT:
Frank Smith was absolved from liability
ISSUE:
Whether or not Smith, in maneuvering his car was guilty of negligent.
RULING:
Yes.
To determine the existence of negligence in the particular case may be
stated as follows: Did the defendant (Smith) in doing the alleged
negligent act use that person would have been used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
(Gamiton ba sa uban tao ang act ni defendant kung sila ang mabutang
sa situation, if dili, liable.)
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case,
we (Court) think that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man,
placed in the position of the defendant, would in our (Court) opinion,
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TORTS and DAMAGES CASES - QUASI-DELICT
have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught
with risk and would therefore have foreseen harm to thoe horse and
the rider as reasonable consequence of that course. Under these
circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard
against the threatened harm.
But the plaintiff (Picart) was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the
road. But as what was already stated, the defendant was also negligent
and in such case the problem always is to discover which agent is
immediately and directly responsible.
Under these circumstances, the law said that the person who has the
LAST FAIR CHANCE to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is
chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party. This in this case was Frank Smith.
JUDEGMENT:
The judgment of the lower court must be reversed and judgment is
here rendered that the Plaintiff recover from the Defendant the sum of
two hundred pesos (P200) with cost of other instances.
G.R. No. L-29889 May 31, 1979
VICTORINO CUSI and PILAR POBRE vs PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
RAILWAYS
FACTS:
On the night of October 5, 1963, Sps. Cusi and Pobre attended a
birthday party inside the United Housing Subdivision in Paranaque,
Rizal. After the party which broke up at about 11 o'clock that evening,
they proceeded home in their Vauxhall car with Cusi at the wheel.
Upon reaching the railroad tracks, finding that the level crossing bar
was raised and seeing that there was no flashing red light, and hearing
no whistle from any coming train, Cusi merely slack ened his speed
and proceeded to cross the tracks. At the same time, a train bound for
Lucena traversed the crossing, resulting in a collision between the two.
The impact threw the Cusi and Pobre out of their car which was
smashed. One Benjamin Franco, who came from the same party and
was driving a vehicle right behind them, rushed to their aid and
brought them to San Juan de Dios Hospital for emergency treatment.
Later, the Cusi and Pobre were transferred to the Philippine General
Hospital. A week later, Mrs. Cusi transferred to the Manila Doctors
Hospital where Dr. Manuel Rivera, head of the Orthopedic and
Fracture Service of the Philippine General Hospital performed on her a
second operation and continued to treat her until her discharge from
the hospital on November 2, 1963.
For these injuries, she underwent a total of four surgical opera.
Petition run for a period of two years. As a result of the fracture on her
right arm, there was a shortening of about 1 cm. of that arm. She lost
the flexibility of her wrist, elbow and shoulder. Up to the time she took
the witness stand in August, 1966, she still had an intermedullary nail
in the bone of her right arm. Likewise, Victorino Cusi suffered brain
injuries which affected his speech, memory, sense of hearing and neck
movement. For a long period, he also felt pain all over his body.
Victorino Cusi claimed that prior to the accident he was a successful
businessman. On the other hand, his wife, Pilar, was a skilled music
and piano teacher. After the accident, she lost the dexterity of her
fingers forcing her to quit her profession. She also bore ugly scars on
several parts of her body, and she suffered anxiety of a possible
miscarriage being then five (5) months pregnant at the time of the
accident.
The defense is centered on the proposition that the gross negligence
of Victorino Cusi was the proximate cause of the collision; that had he
made a full stop before traversing the crossing as required by section
56(a) of Act 3992 (Motor Vehicle Law), he could have seen and heard
the approach of the train, and thus, there would have been no
collision.
LOWER COURT’S DECISION:
Court of First Instance of Rizal ordering defendant-appellant to
indemnify the plaintiffs- appellees in the total amount of Two Hundred
Thirty-Nine Thousand and Six Hundred Forty-Eight Pesos, and Seventy-
Two Centavos (P239,648.72) for injuries received in a collision caused
by the gross negligence of defendant-appellant, plus Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Victorino Cusi was negligent and such was the
proximate cause of the collision.
HELD:
No.
The judicial pronouncement below that the gross negligence of
defendant-appellant was the proximate cause of the collision has been
thoroughly reviewed by this Court and we fully affirm the same.
Negligence has been as "the failure to observe for the protection of
the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury." By such a test, it can readily be seen that there
is no hard and fast rule whereby such degree of care and vigilance is
measured, it is dependent upon the circumstances in which a person
finds himself so situated. All that the law requires is that it is always
incumbent upon a person to use that care and diligence expected of
reasonable men under similar circumstances.
Undisputably, the warning devices installed at the railroad crossing
were manually operated; there were only 2 shifts of guards provided
for the operation thereof. On the night of the accident, the train for
Lucena was on an unscheduled trip after 11:00 P.M. During that
precise hour, the warning devices were not operating for no one
attended to them.
The signal devices were wholly manually-operated; there was an
urgent need for a flagman or guard to man the crossing at all times. As
it was, the crossing was left unattended to after eleven o'clock every
night and on the night of the accident. The Court cannot in all reason
justify or condone the act of the defendant-appellant allowing the
subject locomotive to travel through the unattended crossing with
inoperative signal devices, but without sending any of its employees to
operate said signal devices so as to warn oncoming motorists of the
approach of one of its locomotives. It is not surprising therefore that
MAYORDO, M.A. LLB-3
the in operation of the warning devices created a situation which was
misunderstood by the riding public to mean safe passage.
After a thorough perusal of the facts attendant to the case, this Court
is in fun accord with the lower court. Plaintiff-appellee Victorino Cusi
had exercised all the necessary precautions required of him as to avoid
injury to -him and to others. We find no need for him to have made a
full stop; relying on his faculties of sight and hearing, Victorino Cusi
had no reason to anticipate the impending danger.
JUDGEMENT:
The judgment of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the total amount of damages shall bear legal interest
at six per cent (6%) from the rendition of the decision dated March 26,
1968.
G.R. No. 129792 December 21, 1999
JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION, LEONARDO KONG, JOSE TIOPE
and ELISA PANELO vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO C.
AGUILAR and CRISELDA R. AGUILAR
GR No. 150920, November 25, 2005
CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC. and SPS. EDGARDO L. LIMON and
SYLVIA S. LIMON, vs. TIMOTHY TAGARIO, assisted by his parents
BASILIO TAGORIO and HERMINIA TAGORIO
FACTS:
Timothy Tagoria was a grade IV student at Marymount School, an
academic institution operated and maintained by Child Learning
Center, Inc. (CLC). One afternoon, he found himself locked inside the
boy’s comfort room in Marymount. He started to panic so he banged
and kicked the door and yelled for help. No help arrived. He then
decided to open the window to call for help. As he opened the
window, Timothy went right through and fell down three stories.
Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious
multiple physical injuries.
He, assisted by his parents, filed a civil action against the CLC, the
members of its Board of Directors which includes the Spouses Limon.
They claim that the school was negligent for not installing iron grills at
the window of the boy’s comfort room. CLC, in its defense, maintained
that there was nothing defective about the locking mechanism of the
door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or
negligence.CLC further maintained that it had exercised the due care
and diligence of a good father of a family to ensure the safety, well-
being and convenience of its students.The trial court ruled in favor of
the respondents. The respondents proceeded their appeal to the Court
of Appeals who affirmed the trial court’s ruling in toto.
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT:
The court a quo found in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners
CLC and Spouses Limon to pay respondents, jointly and severally,
P200,253.12 as actual and compensatory damages, P200,000 as moral
damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages, P100,000 as attorneys fees
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TORTS and DAMAGES CASES - QUASI-DELICT
and the costs of the suit. The trial court disregarded the corporate
fiction of CLC and held the Spouses Limon personally liable because
they were the ones who actually managed the affairs of the CLC.
COURT OF APPEALS:
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the school was negligent for the boy’s accidental fall.
RULING:
YES.
In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff
has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages
suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or
some other person for whose act he must respond; and (3) the
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and
the damages incurred.
Fault, in general, signifies a voluntary act or omission which causes
damage to the right of another giving rise to an obligation on the part
of the actor to repair such damage. Negligence is the failure to observe
for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand.
Fault requires the execution of a positive act which causes damage to
another while negligence consists of the omission to do acts which
result in damage to another.
The fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the
window shows that the door could not be opened from the inside.
That sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the
door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor. The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the accident was of such
character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened
except for the defendants negligence; (2) the accident must have been
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged with the negligence
complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors
of their school toilets are at all times in working condition. The fact
that a student had to go through the window, instead of the door,
shows that something was wrong with the door.
As to the absence of grills on the window, petitioners
contend that there was no such requirement under the Building Code.
Nevertheless, the fact is that such window, as petitioners themselves
point out, was approximately 1.5 meters from the floor, so that it was
within reach of a student who finds the regular exit, the door, not
functioning. Petitioners, with the due diligence of a good father of the
family, should have anticipated that a student, locked in the toilet by a
non-working door, would attempt to use the window to call for help
or even to get out. Considering all the circumstances, therefore, there
is sufficient basis to sustain a finding of liability on petitioners part.
Petitioners argument that CLC exercised the due diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees is not decisive. Due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees is applicable where the employer is being
held responsible for the acts or omissions of others under Article 2180
of the Civil Code. In this case, CLCs liability is under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, premised on the fact of its own negligence in not ensuring
that all its doors are properly maintained.
JUDMENT:
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly granted and the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50961 dated
September 28, 2001 and November 23, 2001, respectively, are
MODIFIED in that petitioners Spouses Edgardo and Sylvia Limon are
absolved from personal liability. The Decision and Resolution are
AFFIRMED in all other respects. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 172406
CONCEPCION ILAO-ORETA v. SPOUSES EVA MARIE and BENEDICTO
NOEL RONQUILLO, et al.
Respondent spouses Eva Marie Ronquillo and Noel Benedicto
Ronquillo had not been blessed with a child despite several years of
marriage. They thus consulted petitioner Dr. Concepcion Ilao-Oreta,
an obstetrician-gynecologist-consultant and chief of the Reproductive
Endocrinology and Infertility Section at the St. Luke‘s Medical Center.
Dr. Ilao-Oreta advised Eva Marie to undergo a laparoscopic procedure
whereby a laparascope would be inserted through the patient‘s
abdominal wall to get a direct view of her internal reproductive organ
in order to determine the real cause of her infertility.
The procedure was scheduled on April 5, 1999 at 2:00 p.m. to be
performed by Dr. Ilao-Oreta. Eva Marie, accompanied by Noel,
checked in at the St. Luke‘s Medical Center and underwent pre-
operative procedures including the administration of intravenous fluid
and enema. However, Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not arrive at the scheduled
time for the procedure and no prior notice of its cancellation
was received. It turned out that the doctor was on a return flight from
Hawaii to, and arrived at 10:00 p.m. of April 5, 1999 in, Manila.
The Ronquillo spouses filed a complaint against Dr. Ilao-Oreta and the
St. Luke‘s Medical Center for breach of professional and service
contract and for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Batangas
City.
They prayed for the award of actual damages including alleged loss of
income of Noel while accompanying his wife to the hospital, moral
damages, exemplary damages, costs of litigation, attorney‘s fees, and
other available reliefs and remedies.
RTC:
Finding that the failure of the doctor to arrive on time was not
intentional, awarded Eva Marie only actual damages in the total
amount of P9,939 and costs of suit. It found no adequate proof that
Noel had been deprived of any job contract while attending to his wife
in the hospital.
COURT OF APPEALS:
MAYORDO, M.A. LLB-3
Finding Dr. Ilao-Oreta grossly negligent modified the trial courts
decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the trial Courts decision dated March 9, 2001 is
affirmed, subject to the modification that the amount of actual
damages, for which both defendants-appellees are jointly and
severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants, is increased to P16,069.40.
Furthermore, defendant-appellee Dr. Ilao-Oreta is also held liable to
pay plaintiff-appellants the following:
(a) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(b) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(c) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Dr. Ilao-Oreta is guilty of gross negligence for her
failure to arrive at the scheduled time for the procedure
HELD:
No.
Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise
slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to
avoid them. It is characterized by want of even slight care, acting or
omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious
indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be
affected.
The records show that before leaving for Hawaii, Dr. Ilao-Oreta left an
admitting order with her secretary for one of the spouses to pick up,
apprised Eva Marie of the necessary preparations for the procedure,
and instructed the hospital staff to perform pre-operative treatments.
These acts of the doctor reflect an earnest intention to perform the
procedure on the day and time scheduled.
The records also show that on realizing that she missed the scheduled
procedure, Dr. Ilao-Oreta, upon arrival in Manila, immediately sought
to rectify the same.
Noel admitted that indeed Dr. Ilao-Oreta called him up after she
arrived in Manila as related by her.
The evidence then shows that Dr. Ilao-Oreta, who had traveled more
than twice to the United States where she obtained a fellowship in
Reproductive Endocrinology and Infertility was indeed negligent when
she scheduled to perform professional service at 2:00 p.m. on April 5,
1999 without considering the time difference between the Philippines
and Hawaii.
The doctor act did not, however, reflect gross negligence as defined
above
JUDGMENT:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision appealed from is
MODIFIED in that
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TORTS and DAMAGES CASES - QUASI-DELICT
1. The award to respondents-spouses Noel and Eva Marie
Ronquillo of actual damages is REDUCED to P2,288.70, to
bear interest at a rate of 6% per annum from the time of
the filing of the complaint on May 18, 1999 and, upon
finality of this judgment, at the rate of 12% per annum
until satisfaction; and
2. The award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys
fees is DELETED.
G.R. No. L-6870. May 24, 1954.
ELENA AMEDO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RIO Y OLABARRIETA,
INC., Defendant-Appellee.
1. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACT; CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL
TO HOLD EMPLOYER LIABLE. — The employer shall be liable to
compensate his employee for a personal injury sustained by him
from an accident if the accident (1) arises out of the
employment; (2) happens in the course of the employment; and
(3) is not caused by the notorious negligence" of the employee.
2. ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS MUST CONCUR BEFORE EMPLOYEE CAN
RECOVER. — Where the death of an employee was due to an
accident which took place" in the course of" but did not "arise
out of" his employment, he is not entitled to the benefits of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act.
3. ID.; ID.; "NOTORIOUS NEGLIGENCE ILLUSTRATED. —
"Notorious negligence" has been held to be tantamount to
"gross negligence", which, in turn, has been defined as "want of
even slight care and diligence." Jumping into the sea, one mile
and a half from the seashore, to recover a fallen 2-peso bill, is an
open and reckless disregard of one’s safety and the resulting
death is undoubtedly caused by notorious negligence.
FACTS:
Elena Amedo sought to collect from defendant Rio y Olabarrieta,
Inc., the sum of P2,038.40 as compensation for the death of her
son, Filomeno Managuit, who worked for the defendant as a
seaman of the M/S Pilar II.
The main allegation of said original complaint was:
"That on May 27, 1949 at about 11:30 o’clock in the morning,
while the deceased Filomeno Managuit was on board M/S ’Pilar
II’ as such seaman, he jumped into the water to retrieve a 2-peso
bill belonging to him, and as a consequence of which, he was
drowned."
On November 1, 1950, defendant filed a motion to dismiss upon
the ground that said allegation does not show that the death of
plaintiff’s son was due to an "accident arising out of and in the
course of employment," and that, accordingly, the complaint
does not state a cause of action. This motion was granted and
the complaint dismissed.
A motion for the reconsideration of this order having been
denied, plaintiff appealed to this Court.
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, paragraph 4 of which
alleges:
"That on May 27, 1949, at or about 11:30 o’clock in the morning
while the said Filomeno Managuit was in the course of his
employment, performing his duties as such ordinary seaman on
defendant’s M/S ’Pilar II’, which was anchored then about 1 1/2
miles from the seashore of Arceli Dumarang, Palawan, his two-
peso bill was blown by the breeze into the sea and in his effort to
retrieve the same from the waters he was drowned."cralaw
virtua1aw library
A motion to dismiss this amended complaint upon the ground of
failure to state a cause of action was granted and the case,
consequently, dismissed without costs. A reconsideration of this
action having been denied, the case is once again before us on
appeal.
Plaintiff’s claim is admittedly predicated upon Act No. 3428,
otherwise known as the Workmen’s Compensation Act.
"SEC. 2. Grounds for compensation. — When any employee
receives a personal injury from any accident arising out of and in
the course of the employment, or contracts any illness directly
caused by such employment, or the result of the nature of such
employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums
and to the persons hereinafter specified.."
"SEC. 4. Injuries not covered. — Compensation shall not be
allowed for injuries caused (1) by the voluntary intent of the
employee to inflict such injury upon himself or another person;
(2) by drunkenness on the part of the laborer who had the
accident; (3) by notorious negligence of the same."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Pursuant to these provisions — in so far as pertinent to the case
at bar — three conditions are essential to hold an employer
liable to compensate his employee for a personal injury
sustained by him from an accident, namely: (1) the accident
must arise out of the employment; (2) it must happen in the
course of the employment; and (3) it must not be caused by the
"notorious negligence" of the employee.
Admittedly, the death of Filomeno Managuit was due to an
accident.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the cause of death of Filomeno was casued by
his own negligence.
HELD:
YES.
It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea, one mile and a
half from the seashore of Arceli, Dumarang, Palawan, Filomeno
failed to exercise "even slight care and diligence," that he
displayed a "reckless disregard of the safety" of his person, that
he could not have been but conscious of the probable
MAYORDO, M.A. LLB-3
consequences" of his carelessness and that he was "indifferent,
or worse, to the danger of injury."
Hence, there is more reason to hold that his death was caused
by his notorious negligence.
G.R. No. 159617, August 8, 2007
ROBERTO C. SICAM and AGENCIA de R.C. SICAM, INC. vs. SPOUSES
JORGE
FACTS:
On different dates, Lulu Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry with
Agencia de R. C. Sicam located in Parañaque to secure a loan.
On October 19, 1987, two armed men entered the pawnshop and took
away whatever cash and jewelry were found inside the pawnshop
vault.
On the same date, Sicam sent Lulu a letter informing her of the loss of
her jewelry due to the robbery incident in the pawnshop. Respondent
Lulu then wroteback expressing disbelief, then requested Sicam to
prepare the pawned jewelry for withdrawal on November 6, but Sicam
failed to return the jewelry.
Lulu, joined by her husband Cesar, filed a complaint against Sicam with
the RTC of Makati seeking indemnification for the loss of pawned
jewelry and payment of AD, MD and ED as well as AF.
The RTC rendered its Decision dismissing respondents’ complaint as
well as petitioners’ counterclaim. Respondents appealed the RTC
Decision to the CA which reversed the RTC, ordering the appellees to
pay appellants the actual value of the lost jewelry and AF. Petitioners
MR denied, hence the instant petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUE: are the petitioners liable for the loss of the pawned articles in
their possession? (Petitioners insist that they are not liable since
robbery is a fortuitous event and they are not negligent at all.)
HELD: The Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
YES.
Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is
otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the
obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be
responsible for those events which could not be foreseen or which,
though foreseen, were inevitable.
Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not
foreseeable or avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event
should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly
believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The
mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee
the same.
To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the
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TORTS and DAMAGES CASES - QUASI-DELICT
failure of the debtor to comply with obligations must be independent
of human will;
(b) It must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the
caso fortuito or, if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
(c) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the
debtor to fulfill obligations in a normal manner; and,
(d) The obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation
of the injury or loss.
The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests
on him who invokes it. And, in order for a fortuitous event to exempt
one from liability, it is necessary that one has committed no
negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss.
Sicam had testified that there was a security guard in their pawnshop
at the time of the robbery. He likewise testified that when he started
the pawnshop business in 1983, he thought of opening a vault with
the nearby bank for the purpose of safekeeping the valuables but was
discouraged by the Central Bank since pawned articles should only be
stored in a vault inside the pawnshop. The very measures which
petitioners had allegedly adopted show that to them the possibility of
robbery was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen and
anticipated. Sicam’s testimony, in effect, contradicts petitioners’
defense of fortuitous event.
Moreover, petitioners failed to show that they were free from any
negligence by which the loss of the pawned jewelry may have been
occasioned.
Robbery per se, just like carnapping, is not a fortuitous event. It does
not foreclose the possibility of negligence on the part of herein
petitioners.
Petitioners merely presented the police report of the Parañaque Police
Station on the robbery committed based on the report of petitioners’
employees which is not sufficient to establish robbery. Such report
also does not prove that petitioners were not at fault. On the contrary,
by the very evidence of petitioners, the CA did not err in finding that
petitioners are guilty of concurrent or contributory negligence as
provided in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty
of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner
contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
**
Article 2123 of the Civil Code provides that with regard to pawnshops
and other establishments which are engaged in making loans secured
by pledges, the special laws and regulations concerning them shall be
observed, and subsidiarily, the provisions on pledge, mortgage and
antichresis.
The provision on pledge, particularly Article 2099 of the Civil Code,
provides that the creditor shall take care of the thing pledged with the
diligence of a good father of a family. This means that petitioners must
take care of the pawns the way a prudent person would as to his own
property.
In this connection, Article 1173 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the
omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the
provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply.
If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father
of a family shall be required.
We expounded in Cruz v. Gangan that negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do; or
the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do. It is want of care required by the circumstances.
A review of the records clearly shows that petitioners failed to
exercise reasonable care and caution that an ordinarily prudent
person would have used in the same situation. Petitioners were guilty
of negligence in the operation of their pawnshop business. Sicam’s
testimony revealed that there were no security measures adopted by
petitioners in the operation of the pawnshop. Evidently, no sufficient
precaution and vigilance were adopted by petitioners to protect the
pawnshop from unlawful intrusion. There was no clear showing that
there was any security guard at all. Or if there was one, that he had
sufficient training in securing a pawnshop. Further, there is no
showing that the alleged security guard exercised all that was
necessary to prevent any untoward incident or to ensure that no
suspicious individuals were allowed to enter the premises. In fact, it is
even doubtful that there was a security guard, since it is quite
impossible that he would not have noticed that the robbers were
armed with caliber .45 pistols each, which were allegedly poked at the
employees. Significantly, the alleged security guard was not presented
at all to corroborate petitioner Sicam’s claim; not one of petitioners’
employees who were present during the robbery incident testified in
court.
Furthermore, petitioner Sicam’s admission that the vault was open at
the time of robbery is clearly a proof of petitioners’ failure to observe
the care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly
demanded.
The robbery in this case happened in petitioners’ pawnshop and they
were negligent in not exercising the precautions justly demanded of a
pawnshop.
G.R. No. 160795 June 27, 2008
CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs.SPOUSES
REYNALDO and MARIA LUISA TANJANGCO, and SPOUSES FRANK and
TERESITA CUASO, respondent.
G.R. No. 172200 July 6, 2010
THE HEIRS OF REDENTOR COMPLETO and ELPIDIO ABIAD, Petitioners,
vs. SGT. AMANDO C. ALBAYDA, JR., Respondent.
MAYORDO, M.A. LLB-3
G.R. No. 169467 February 25, 2010
ALFREDO P. PACIS and CLEOPATRA D. PACIS, Petitioners, vs. JEROME
JOVANNE MORALES, Respondent.
DOCTRINE:
A higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his
possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely
dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances.
Such person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities
has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury
being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business
which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous
weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care.
FACTS:
Alfredo Pacis and Cleopatra Pacis filed a civil case for damages against
Jerome Jovanne Morales. Spouses Paceis are the parents of Alfred, 17
y.o. who died in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and
Ammunitions Store (gun store) in Baguio City. Morales is the owner.
Alfred died due to a gunshot wound in the head which he sustained
while he was at gunstore. The bullet which killed Alfred was fired from
a gun brought in by a customer of the gun store for repair. The gun,
was left by Morales in a drawer of a table located inside the gun store.
Morales as in Manila at the time. His employee Armando Jarnague,
who was the regular caretaker of the gun store was also not around.
Jarnague entrusted to Matibag and Herbolario a bunch of keys which
included the key to the drawer where the gun was kept. It appears
that Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the gun from the
drawer and palced it in top of the table. Attacted by it, Alfred got hold
of it. Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. Alfred followed but it
went off the bullet hitting Alfred.
The trial court held Morales civilly liable for the death of Alftred under
A2180 in relation to A2176, ruling that the accidental shooting of
Alfred which caused his death was partyl due to the negligence of
Morales’ emplyee – Matibag. CA reversed, ruling that there was no
employee-employer relationship because Matibag was not under the
control of Morales with respect to the means and methods in the
performance of his worK, thus A2180 cannot apply. And even if
Matibag was an employee, Morales still cannot be held civilly liable
because there is no negligence can be attributed to Morales because
he kept the gun.
ISSUE:
WON Morales is civilly liable?
RULING:
YES.
Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair
and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not
loaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, Morales
himself was negligent.
Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms and
Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in the business of
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TORTS and DAMAGES CASES - QUASI-DELICT
purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain
basic security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his
License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled.
As a gun store owner, Morales is presumed to be knowledgeable
about firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded
weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to
others. Morales has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store
are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate
from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready access
defensive use.
In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault.
Before accepting the defective gun for repair, Morales should have
made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident.
Indeed, Morales should never accept a firearm from another person,
until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that
the weapon is completely unloaded
Clearly, Morales did not exercise the degree of care and diligence
required of a good father of a family, much less the The bullet which
killed Alfred was fired from a gun brought in by a customer of the gun
store for repair.
Choice of claim of petitioners
This case for damages arouse out of the accidental shoting of
Alfred. Under A1161 of the Civil Code petitioners may enforce their
claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime
under Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent
civil action for damages under the Civil Code.
In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the
homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an
independent civil action for damages against respondent whom they
alleged was Matibag’s employer. Petitioners based their claim for
damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
DISPOSITIVE: Morales is civilly liable to petitioners because he was
negligent.
G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910
DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE MANILA ELECTRIC
RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at
sea; he was also able to learn some principles of mechanical
engineering and mechanical drawing from his dad’s office (his dad was
a mechanical engineer); he was also employed as a mechanical
draftsman earning P2.50 a day – all said, Taylor was mature well
beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of
Manila Electric power plant where they found 20-30 blasting caps
which they took home. In an effort to explode the said caps, Taylor
experimented until he succeeded in opening the caps and then he
lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion of the caps
causing severe injuries to his companion and to Taylor losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the
caps exposed to children, they are liable for damages due to the
company’s negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.
HELD:
No.
The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or
some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and
the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in
disposing off the caps which they used for the power plant, and that
said caps caused damages to Taylor. However, the causal connection
between the company’s negligence and the injuries sustained by
Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the
explosion of the caps as he even, in various experiments and in
multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that
led to the explosion and hence the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more
mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age;
he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a
mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and
the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well
qualified to take care. The evidence of record leaves no room for
doubt that he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which
he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his
attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His
attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his
efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of
his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the
contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about.
Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to
anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous.
“The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to
him through his own fault, and that he cannot demand reparation
therefor from another.”
G.R. No. L-32611 November 3, 1930
CULION ICE, FISH AND ELECTRIC CO., INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.PHILIPPINE MOTORS CORPORATION, defendant-appellant.
FACTS:
Culion Ice and Fish was the registered owner of the motor schooner,
Gwendoline, which it uses for its fishing trade. In order to save costs in
running the boat, Culion Ice decided to have the engine changed from
gasoline consumer to a crude oil burner. Quest, general manager of
Philippine Motors, a domestic corporation engaged in machinery
MAYORDO, M.A. LLB-3
engines and motors, agreed to do the job. Upon inspection, Quest
came to conclusion that a carburetor needed to be installed. In the
course of the work, it was observed that the carburetor was flooding
and that the gasoline and other fuel was trickling freely to the floor
but this concern was dismissed by Quest. During the boat’s trial run,
the engine stopped and upon being started, a back fire occurred which
then instantly spread and finally engulfed Gwendoline. The crew
members safely escaped but Gwendoline was destroyed. Culion Ice
moved for the recovery of the damages against Philippine Motors. The
trial court ruled for Culion Ice. Philippine Motor asserts that the
accident was not due to the fault of Quest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Quest was negligent.
RULING:
YES.
When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things
requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he
fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the
particular work which he attempts to do. The proof shows that Quest
had had ample experience in fixing the engines of automobiles and
tractors, but it does not appear that he was experienced in the doing
of similar work on boats. For this reason, possibly the dripping of the
mixture form the tank on deck and the flooding of the carburetor did
not convey to his mind an adequate impression of the danger of fire.
But a person skilled in that particular sort of work would, we think
have been sufficiently warned from those circumstances (risks) to
cause him to take greater and adequate precautions against the
danger. In other words Quest did not use the skill that would have
been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engines
on boats. There was here, in our opinion, on the part of Quest, a
blameworthy antecedent inadvertence to possible harm, and this
constitutes negligence. The burning of the Gwendoline may be said to
have resulted from accident, but this accident was in no sense an
unavoidable accident. It would not have occurred but for Quest’s
carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the
injury was accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from
blame.
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