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PEREZ v. PLDT, G.R. No.

152048, April 7, 2009

CORONA, J.:

FACTS: Petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were employed by respondent PLDT as shipping clerk and supervisor, respectively, in Materials Management
Group.

PLDT formed a special audit team to investigate an alleged anomalous transactions at the Shipping Section. It was discovered that the Shipping Section jacked up
the value of the freight costs for goods shipped and that the duplicates of the shipping documents allegedly showed traces of tampering, alteration and superimposition.

On September 3, 1993, petitioners were placed on preventive suspension for 30 days for their alleged involvement in the anomaly. Their suspension was
extended for 15 days twice. On October 29, 1993, a memorandum was issued by PLDT dismissing the petitioners from the service for having falsified company documents.

On November 9, 1993, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal. They alleged that they were dismissed on November 8, 1993, the
date they received the above-mentioned memorandum.

The labor arbiter found that the 30-day extension of petitioners suspension and their subsequent dismissal were both illegal. He ordered respondents to pay
petitioners their salaries during their 30-day illegal suspension, as well as to reinstate them with backwages and 13 th month pay.

The NLRC reversed the decision of the labor arbiter saying that petitioners were dismissed for just cause, that they were accorded due process and that they were
illegally suspended for only 15 days (without stating the reason for the reduction of the period of petitioners illegal suspension).

CA affirmed the NLRC decision insofar as petitioners illegal suspension for 15 days and dismissal for just cause were concerned. However, it found that
petitioners were dismissed without due process. Petitioners now seek a reversal of the CA decision.

ISSUE: Were the petitioners accorded with due process? Did the respondents prove just cause for the petitioners’ dismissal?

HELD: NO. RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE JUST CAUSE AND TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS

Without undermining the importance of a shipping order or request as the basis of their liability to a cargo forwarder, the Court find respondents’ evidence
insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish the facts from which the loss of confidence (in petitioners) resulted. Other than their bare allegations and the fact that such
documents came into petitioners hands at some point, respondents should have provided evidence of petitioners functions, the extent of their duties, the procedure in the
handling and approval of shipping requests and the fact that no personnel other than petitioners were involved. There was, therefore, a patent paucity of proof connecting
petitioners to the alleged tampering of shipping documents.

The alterations on the shipping documents could not reasonably be attributed to petitioners because it was never proven that petitioners alone had control of or
access to these documents. Unless duly proved or sufficiently substantiated otherwise, impartial tribunals should not rely only on the statement of the employer that it has
lost confidence in its employee.

Respondents illegal act of dismissing petitioners was aggravated by their failure to observe due process. To meet the requirements of due process in the dismissal
of an employee, an employer must furnish the worker with two written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving to said employee a
reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been established to justify
the employer's decision to dismiss the employee.

The Court states that there is no need for a formal hearing. Further noting a difference in the standards of due process to be followed as prescribed in the Labor
Code and its implementing rules. The Labor Code, on one hand, provides that an employer must provide the employee ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself
(written or verbal) with the assistance of his representative if he so desires (ART. 277 (b)).

The omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code, on the other hand, require a hearing and conference during which the employee concerned is given the
opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him (Section 2. (d. ii.)).

In case of conflict, the law prevails over the administrative regulations implementing it. In this regard, the phrase ample opportunity to be heard can be reasonably
interpreted as extensive enough to cover actual hearing or conference. The ample opportunity to be heard standard is neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing. To
confine the employees right to be heard to a solitary form narrows down that right. It deprives him of other equally effective forms of adducing evidence in his defense.
Certainly, such an exclusivist and absolutist interpretation is overly restrictive. The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally
applicable to every imaginable situation. While a formal hearing or conference is ideal, it is not an absolute, mandatory or exclusive avenue of due process. A formal
hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested by the employee in writing or substantial evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule or practice requires it,
or when similar circumstances justify it.
In this case, petitioners were neither apprised of the charges against them nor given a chance to defend themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated
from work and served notices of termination in total disregard of their rights to due process and security of tenure.

Where the dismissal was without just or authorized cause and there was no due process, Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, mandates that the employee is entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed
from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual reinstatement.

PEOPLE V. DELA PIEDRA G.R. No. 121777. January 24, 2001

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra was charged of illegal recruitment in large scale by promising an employment abroad Maria
Lourdes Modesto y Gadrino, Nancy Araneta y Aliwanag and Jennelyn Baez y Timbol, a job to Singapore without having previously obtained
from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a license or authority to engage in recruitment and overseas placement of
workers. In fact said Maria Lourdes Modesto had already advanced the amount of P2,000.00 to the accused for and in consideration of the
promised employment which did not materialize. Thus causing damage and prejudice to the latter in the said sum.

Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman
inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos. An entrapment was then planned by
the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) headed by Capt. Mendoza and successfully arrested the accused-appellant.

Later on, in the course of their investigation, the CIS discovered that Carol Figueroa had many aliases, among them, Carol Llena and Carol
dela Piedra.

At the trial, the prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, Erlie Ramos, SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, Eileen Fermindoza, Nancy
Araneta and Lourdes Modesto and all of them positively testified that the accused offer them a job to Singapore.

The trial found the accused-appellant guilty of beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment committed in a large scale.

ISSUE:

WON Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process
clause.

HELD:

NO. Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code is not a vague provision.

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and become an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

The court cannot sustain the Appellant argument that the acts that constitute recruitment and placement suffer from overbreadth since
by merely referring a person for employment, a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment.

Evidently,appellant has taken the penultimate paragraph in the excerpt quoted above out of context. The Court, in Panis case, merely
bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of such records notwithstanding, the
Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the
language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all,
the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.

An act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty, only upon a showing that the defect is such that
the courts are unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended. x x x. In this connection we
cannot permit reference to the rule that legislation should not be held invalid on the ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any
reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it
furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and provide
the means, and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of those entrusted therewith.
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as labor or employment
referral (referring an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law
over broad. Evidently, appellant misapprehends concept of over breadth.

A statute may be said to be over broad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the
Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be
constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the
constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute

In Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections ,for instance, we struck down as void for overbreadth provisions prohibiting the posting
of election propaganda in any place including private vehicles other than in the common poster areas sanctioned by the COMELEC. We
held that the challenged provisions not only deprived the owner of the vehicle the use of his property but also deprived the citizen of his
right to free speech and information. The prohibition in Adiong, therefore, was so broad that it covered even constitutionally guaranteed
rights and, hence, void for over breadth.

In the present case, however, appellant did not even specify what constitutionally protected freedoms are embraced by the definition of
recruitment and placement that would render the same constitutionally over broad.

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 14560, 36 SCRA 394 (November 19, 2001)

Facts: burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond


any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to
1. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada), the highest-ranking constitute a crime.
official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining
and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by RA What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is
7659.. only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series
2. Estrada wishes to impress the Court that the assailed law is which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at
so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every
distinct line which divides the valid from the other act alleged in the information to have been committed by
constitutionality infirm. That there was a clear violations of the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or
the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth.
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
3. No. It is malum in se. The legislative declaration in RA No.
Issue/s: 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a
1. Whether or not the Plunder Law is unconstitutional for malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently
being vague. immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it
2. Whether or not Plunder Law requires less evidence for does not matter that such acts are punished in a special
providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore law, especially since in the case of plunder that predicate
violates the rights of the accused to due process. crimes are mainly mala in se.
3. Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum Its abomination lies in the significance and implications of the
prohibitum. subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and
Ruling: economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to
develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses.
1. No. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted
because general terms are used therein, or because of the the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine
employment of terms without defining them. There is no Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture
positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the of corruption, dishonesty, green and syndicated criminality that so
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the
Congress’ inability to so define the words employed in a psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the
statute will not necessary result in the vagueness or money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any
ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds
or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government,
distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law. and in turn, the very survival of people it governs over.
It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a Note:
statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain, and ordinary
acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature • A statute establishing a criminal offense must define the
intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words. offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is
Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against
reference to every other part. the specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face,
There was nothing vague or ambiguous in the provisions of R.A. i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving
7080 clause or by construction.
• The “Reasonable Doubt” standard has acquired such
2. No. The legislature did not in any manner refashion the exalted statute in the realm of constitutional law as it
standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the measure the prohibited acts.
crime with which he is charged.

• A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lack


comprehensible standards that men of common Issue
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is Whether or not a penal statute may be assailed for being vague as
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects it violates applied to petitioners.
due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid;
and it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying Held
out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle. The first may be “saved” by proper No. A limited vagueness analysis of the definition of “terrorism” in
construction, while no challenge may be mounted as RA 9372 is legally impossible absent an actual or imminent charge
against the second whenever directed against such against them.
activities.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite A statute or acts suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lack
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.
“vagueness” doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude.
A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as applied”
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to challenge. “Facial” challenge is an examination of the entire law,
one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual
protected speech. The theory is that “[w]hen statutes regulate or operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests that its very existence may cause others not before the court to
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. Under
prosecution, the transcendent value of all society of constitutionally no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial
protected expression is deemed to justify along attacks on overly challenge. If facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the
broad statutes with no requirement that the persons making the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by possible.
a statute draw with narrow specificity. The possible harm to society
in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is PEOPLE VS. CAYAT
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others
may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. Facts:
“Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy,
This do not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general receive, have in his possession, or drink, any intoxicating liquors of
in terorrem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial any kind.” The law, Act No. 1639, exempts only the so-called
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be native wines or liquors which the members of such tribes have
prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In been accustomed to take.
the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area
of free speech. Issue: Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one
prosecuted and sentenced for violation of said law.

Southern Hemisphere vs Anti-Terrorism Council Held:

No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of


Facts which is that the classification under the law must rest on real or
substantial distinctions. The distinction is reasonable. The
The case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of classification between the members of the non- Christian and the
RA 9372, “An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from members of the Christian tribes is not based upon accident of birth
Terrorism,” aka Human Security Act of 2007. Petitioner-organizations or parentage but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The
assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected “communist term ‘non-Christian tribes’ refers to a geographical area and more
fronts” by the government, whereas individual petitioners invoke directly to natives of the Philippines of a low grade civilization
the “transcendental importance” doctrine and their status as usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.
citizens and taxpayers. The distinction is reasonable for the Act was intended to meet the
peculiar conditions existing in the non- Christian tribes” The
prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to
insure peace and order in and among the non- Christian tribes has
Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like often resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the
“widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” efforts of the government to raise their standards of life and
and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are civilization. This law is not limited in its application to conditions
existing at the time of the enactment. It is intended to apply for all Himagan vs. People
times as long as those conditions exist. The Act applies equally to all
members of the class. That it may be unfair in its operation against
a certain number of non- Christians by reason of their degree of
culture is not an argument against the equality of its operation nor
affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established.

FACTS: Himagan is a policeman assigned in Camp Catititgan, Davao City. He was charged for the murder of and attempted murder.

Pursuant to Sec 47 of RA 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder case. The law provides that “Upon the filing of a

complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by

law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated.

Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. Himagan

assailed the suspension averring that Sec 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90)

days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation

of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws .

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the Constitution.

HELD: No. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or

administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the

badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative

discussions. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his

victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the

accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the

suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

RULING: Yes. The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions


impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored
legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS v. substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility,
QUISUMBING under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.

If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the


FACTS: International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires
presumption is that these employees perform equal work. If the
both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying
employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that
the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
employee to explain why he receives less or why the others
receive more. That would be adding insult to injury.
In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not
accorded local-hires including housing, transportation, shipping
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden.
costs, taxes, home leave travel allowance and a salary rate 25%
There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more
more than local hires based on “significant economic
efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have
disadvantages”
similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under
similar working conditions.
The labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all
faculty members of the School, contested the difference in salary
Hence, the Court finds the point-of-hire classification employed by
rates between foreign and local-hires.
respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of
foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is
The Union claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by
no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by
the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher
foreign-hires and local-hires.
salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal protection
clause to justify its claim of parity.
Garcia vs. Drilon G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013 Jurisdiction of Family Courts committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where
the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of
January 29, 2018 the complainant.
FACTS: Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in remains possessed of authority as a court of general original
behalf of her minor children, a verified petition before the RTC of jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal,
Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) special proceedings, land registration, guardianship,
against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is settled that RTCs have
9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, “this
psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial
on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the
her children and of financial support. criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.” The
Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty,
violence against the private respondent and her children exists or is international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO effective for thirty (30) days. instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in
all RTCs. We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA that, “plainly the
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial
Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have
support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed
jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law,
new acts of harassment against her and their children, private
for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior
respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex
courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in
parte.
issue.” Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part
The RTC issued a TPO, effective for thirty (30) days. as follows:

Petitioner filed before the CA challenging (1) the constitutionality of SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal
xxx
protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in
the civil case for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.” 2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,
as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
The CA dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the
orders of lower courts in:
constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil
case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family
question.
Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is “inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality.” xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the
ISSUE:
earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection
Whether or not the Family Court has jurisdiction on the issue of order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to
constitutionality of a statute. determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.
DUMLAO vs. COMELEC

RULING: 95 SCRA 392


L-52245
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the
January 22, 1980
constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special
courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, Facts: Petitioner Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya,
otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of 1997,” family courts who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner Dumlao specifically
domestic violence against women and children. In accordance with questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as
said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process
of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of guarantees of the Constitution which provides that “….Any retired elective
several key cities identified. provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have
To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which
9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective
Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of local office from which he has retired.” He likewise alleges that the provision
VAWC defined under the latter law, viz: is directed insidiously against him, and is based on “purely arbitrary
grounds, therefore, class legislation.
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family
Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of
Issue: Whether or not 1st paragraph of section 4 of BP 22 is valid.
violence against women and their children under this law. In the
absence of such court in the place where the offense was
Held: In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a the taxing ordinance’s enacted, the company was the only sugar
provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from central in Ormoc City. The classification, to be reasonable, should
running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing
challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as the
emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared present company, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even
himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax
virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very because the ordinance expressly points only to the company as
reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged the entity to be levied upon.
provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection, neither does
it permit of such denial.
Philippine Judges Association Vs. Prado
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is
proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That 227 SCRA 703
constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based G.R. No. 105371
upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the November 11, 1993
purpose of the low and applies to all those belonging to the same class.
Facts: The Philippine Postal Corporation issued circular No. 92-28 to
WHEREFORE, the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 implement Section 35 of RA 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from
is hereby declared valid. the SC, CA, RTCs, MeTCs, MTCs and Land Registration Commission and
with certain other government offices. It is alleged that RA 7354 is
Villegas vs Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho (1978) discriminatory becasue while withdrawing the franking privilege from
judiciary, it retains the same for the President & Vice-President of the
Philippines, Senator & members of the House of Representatives,
Facts: The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537 COMELEC, National Census & Statistics Office and the general public. The
requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic and respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is
consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal protection
programs of the government and another country, and members of clause.
religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite mayor’s
permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the City of Issue: Whether or Not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
Manila. The permit fee is P50, and the penalty for the violation of
the ordinance is 3 to 6 months imprisonment or a fine of P100 to Held: The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
P200, or both. process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice
and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in
Issue: Whether the ordinance imposes a regulatory fee or a tax. Article III Section 1 of the Constitution to provide for amore specific
guarantee against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
Held: The ordinance’s purpose is clearly to raise money under the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the
guise of regulation by exacting P50 from aliens who have been
due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an
cleared for employment. The amount is unreasonable and excessive
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the
because it fails to consider difference in situation among aliens
equal protection clause. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or
required to pay it, i.e. being casual, permanent, part-time, rank-and-
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
file or executive.
and responsibilities imposed. What the clause requires is equality among
[ The Ordinance was declared invalid as it is arbitrary, oppressive equals as determined according to a valid classification. Section 35 of RA
and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus 7354 is declared unconstitutional. Circular No. 92-28 is set aside insofar
deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore
violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution. Further, the ordinance does not lay down any criterion Biraogo v. Truth Commission (2010) | Equal Protection Clause
or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion, thus
conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted powers. ] G.R. No. 192935, 637 SCRA 78, December 7, 2010
Doctrines:

1. For a classification to be valid, it should be


Ormoc Sugar vs Treasurer of Ormoc City (1968)
applicable to future conditions as well.
2. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it
should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for
Facts: In 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed
being unconstitutional.
Ordinance 4, imposing on any and all productions of centrifuga
sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. in Ormoc City a municpal
tax equivalent to 1% per export sale to the United States and other
foreign countries. The company paid the said tax under protest. It
subsequently filed a case seeking to invalidate the ordinance for Facts:
being unconstitutional.
1. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth
Issue: Whether the ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Commission of 2010 (PTC).
2. PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
Held: The Ordinance taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and President, which is tasked to investigate reports of graft
exported by the Ormoc Sugar Co. Inc. and none other. At the time of
and corruption and to submit its finding and FACTS:
recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a
3. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from petition for certiorari and prohibition against the COMELEC for
such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their
of an information in our courts of law. certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions.
4. Petitioners filed a case alleging the constitutionality of E.O. In this defense, the COMELEC avers that it only copied the
No. 1 for it violates the equal protection clause as it provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.
selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration as if ISSUE:
corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past and present, who Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.
may be indictable. It does not apply equally to all members
of the same class such that the intent of singling out the HELD:
“previous administration” as its sole object makes the PTC
an “adventure in partisan hostility. NO.
5. They argue that the search for truth behind the reported
cases of graft and corruption must encompass acts In the Fariñas case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006
committed not only during the administration of former repealing Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving
President Arroyo but also during prior administrations undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with appointive
where the “same magnitude of controversies and officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions
anomalies” were reported to have been committed against between the two and pronounced that there was no violation of
the Filipino people. the equal protection clause.
6. They assail the classification formulated by the
respondents as it does not fall under the recognized However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on
exceptions because first, “there is no substantial distinction the equal protection clause was an obiter dictum since the issue
between the group of officials targeted for investigation by raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didn’t squarely
Executive Order No. 1 and other groups or persons who challenge Sec. 66.
abused their public office for personal gain; and second,
the selective classification is not germane to the purpose of Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective
Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption.” officials. Applying the 4 requisites of a valid classification, the
proviso does not comply with the second requirement – that it
Issue: must be germane to the purpose of the law.
WON E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection clause. The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the
use of a governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or
Held: even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the electorate.
The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency,
• Yes, E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for being violative integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the
of the equal protection clause. danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by
• The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The
investigate and find out the truth “concerning the reported restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil
cases of graft and corruption during the previous servants to the electorate arena, while still in office, could result in
administration” The intent to single out the previous neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they
administration is plain, patent and manifest. would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office
work.
• the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a
class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive
class of its own. Not to include past administrations posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the government
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the certificate of candidacy for the election. This scenario is absurd
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the
selective retribution. government to wield influence in the political world.
• While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it
should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices,
being unconstitutional. whether they be partisan or non partisan in character, whether
they be in the national, municipal or brgy. level. Congress has not
shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right
involved on such a sweeping scale.
Quinto V. COMELEC

COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed


their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their League of Cities v. Comelec
positions.
Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills
converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the
act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act the national taxes to local government units.
No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local
the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a
a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino no resort to any statutory construction.
Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt
solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an
despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the Government Code.
12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on
exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting
24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the a law passed in the 13th Congress.
11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the
Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written
in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to clause.
the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to
approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator PICHAY V. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (2012)
Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective
ODES no power to try and decide cases’ E.O. No. 13 empowering it is
sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a
unconstitutional
common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the
P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. FACTS
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive
cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in
Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the
February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7
Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more
June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on
particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s
signature.
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to IAD-ODESLA a complaint-affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner
determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water
approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA
Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive Secretary
the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the
Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr. requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their
same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under
respective written explanations under oath. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed
Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving
Issue: the same transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues: al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause. ISSUE
Held: Whether E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for abrogating unto an administrative office a
We grant the petitions. quasi-judicial function through and E.O. and not through legislative enactment by
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Congress.
Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
HELD
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to
the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, NO.
because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills
became law more than five years later. The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department
under E.O. 292. In the case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora the Court
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all
affirmed that the President's authority to carry out a reorganization in any branch or
the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code
agency of the executive department is an express grant by the legislature by virtue
and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
of Section 31, Book III, E.O. 292 (the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President,
subject to the policy of the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President." ODESLA shall "perform powers, functions and duties xxx, of PAGC."

The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear
President to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." administrative cases or complaints against
The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain
effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped all presidential appointees in the government" and to "submit its report and
and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives recommendations to the President." The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and
and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the recommendatory body to the President, not having the power to settlecontroversies
President. (Emphasis supplied) and adjudicate cases. As the Court ruled in Cariño v. Commission on Human
Rights, and later reiterated in Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission:
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division
specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
President under his continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own court of justice, or even a quasi- judicial agency or office. The function of receiving
office pursuant to E.O. 292. evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at
The President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.
transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and
(3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the
President Proper but still within the Office of the Ombudsman.

President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did not encroach upon the
President to Departments or gencies, and vice versa. Ombudsman's primary jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the complaint
affidavit filed against him notwithstanding the earlier filing of criminal and
The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on administrative cases involving the same charges and allegations before the Office of
the one hand and Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects the Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and
employees' tenurial security but also insofar as it touches upon the validity of the prosecute cases refers to criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to
reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions undertaken fall within the administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the
limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O. 12, it Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation being conducted by
was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the ranks of another investigatory agency. Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman
Presidential Assistant II and I, respectively,9 and was placed directly "under the Act of 1989.
Office of the President."10 On the other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions
of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office within the Office of the President While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existence of
Proper.11 Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the President Proper, the probable cause and the adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the
reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the investigative authority of the IAD- ODESLA is limited to that of a fact-finding
ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292. investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain so until acted upon
by the President.
What actions does reorganization include?
Finally, petitioner doubts that the IAD-ODESLA can lawfully perform its duties as
The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New, Separate and Distinct an impartial tribunal, contending that both the IAD-ODESLA and respondent
Office. Secretary Purisima are connected to the President. The mere suspicion of partiality
will not suffice to invalidate the actions of the IAD-ODESLA. Mere allegation is
The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and not equivalent to proof. Bias and partiality cannot be presumed. Petitioner must
distinct office as the duties and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body present substantial proof to show that the lAD-ODES LA had unjustifiably sided
were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an existing office within the Office against him in the conduct of the investigation. No such evidence has been
of the President Proper. The reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of presented as to defeat the presumption of regularity m the performance of the fact-
the administrative structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third finding investigator's duties. The assertion, therefore, deserves scant consideration.
division – the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division – through which ODESLA
could take on the additional functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of doubtful and argumentative one.39 Petitioner has failed to discharge the burden of
government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which IS indubitably a valid exercise of the
responsibility between them. It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of President's continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
Remman Enterprises, Inc. and Chamber of Real Estate and Builder’s
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with Association v.
quasi-judicial powers.
Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service and Professional
while the term "adjudicatory" appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA Regulation Commission
cannot try and resolve cases, its authority being limited to the conduct of
investigations, preparation of reports and submission of recommendations. E.O. 13 The Court will not declare a statute as unconstitutional when its regulation is an
explicitly states that the IAD-
unavoidable consequence of a reasonable regulatory measure. objected to the "exploitation" of his life and demanded
in writing for certain changes, corrections and
FACTS deletions in the movie. After some bargaining as to the
amount to be paid Lagunzad and Vda. de Gonzales,
executed a "Licensing Agreement" whereby the latter as
This case involves a petition for review under Rule 45 on the subject of the Real LICENSOR granted Lagunzad authority and permission to
Estate Service exploit, use, and develop the life story of Moises
Padilla for purposes of producing the picture for
Act of the Philippines. R.A. 9646 (Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines) was consideration of P20,000.00.Lagunzad paid Vda. de
passed. Its purpose is to professionalize the real estate service sector under regulatory Gonzales the amount of P5,000.00. Subsequently, the
scheme of licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners. movie was shown indifferent theaters all over the
The supervision was likewise lodged under the authority of the Professional country. Because petitioner refused to pay any
Regulatory Commission (PRC). The law required that companies providing real additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement, Vda. de
estate services must transact with the employ of duly licensed real estate brokers. Gonzales instituted the present suit against him praying
Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the law, alleging that it violates the due for judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay
process clause and infringes the ownership rights of real estate developers enshrined her the balance of P15,000.00, with legal interest from
in Art. 428 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, they claim that it violates the equal of the Complaint; and 2) to render an accounting
protection clause as owners of private properties are allowed to sell their properties of the proceeds from the picture and to pay the
without the need of a licensed real estate broker. The provisions in question are – corresponding 2-1/2% royalty there from, among others.
Petitioner contended in his Answer that the episodes in
o Section 29. Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate Service. life of Moises Padilla depicted in the movie were
matters of public knowledge and occurred at or about the
same time that the deceased became and was a public
o Section 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service. figure; that private respondent has no property right
over those incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was
The RTC denied the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. without valid cause or consideration and constitutes an
infringement on the constitutional right of freedom
ISSUES AND HOLDING of speech and of the press; and that he paid private
respondent the amount of P5,000.00 only because of the
coercion and threat employed upon him. As a
1. Whether the assailed provisions are in violation of the due process clause,
counterclaim, petitioner sought for the nullification of
particularly substantive due process. No.
the Licensing Agreement, Both the trial court and the CA
ruled in favor of Vda. deGonzales.
The requirements for substantive due process are –
ISSUES
1. Lawful government purpose; and 2. Reasonable means necessary for the Whether or not the fictionalized representation
accomplishment of the lawful purpose. The lawful purpose of R.A. 9646 is to of Moises Padilla is an intrusion upon his right to
professionalize the real estate service and increase its standards. The law recognizes privacy notwithstanding that he was a public figure.
the role of real estate practitioners in spearheading the continuous flow of capital, in Whether or not Vda. de Gonzales., the mother, has any
boosting investor confidence, and in promoting national progress. The requirement of property right over the life of Moises Padilla
employing a duly licensed real estate broker for transactions is reasonable as it merely considering that the latter was a public figure.
regulates the conduct of business, and does not curtail the exercise of petitioners’ Whether or not the Licensing Agreement constitutes an
ownership rights.Lastly, there is a substantial distinction between real estate infringement on the constitutional right of freedom of
developers and owners of private who want to sell their private property. Unlike speech and of the press.
individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their own property, real estate
developers sell lots, houses and condominium units in the ordinary course of HELD
business, a business which is highly regulated by the State to ensure the health and YES, being a public figure ipso facto does not
safety of home and lot buyers. automatically destroy in toto a person's right to
privacy. The right to invade as person's privacy to
MANUEL LAGUNZAD, petitioner, vs.MARIA SOTO VDA. DE disseminate public information does not extend to a
GONZALES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. fictional or novelized representation of a person, no
matter how public a figure he or she may be. In the case
at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts
to present a true-to-life story of Moises Padilla,
FACTS petitioner admits that he included a little romance in
Petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, a newspaperman, began the the film because without it, it would be a drab story of
production of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story" torture and brutality.
portraying the life of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty
YES, Lagunzad cannot dispense with the need for
candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the Municipality
prior consent and authority from the deceased heirs to
of Magallon, Negros Occidental and for whose murder,
portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life and in
Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party
that of his mother and the members of his family. As
then in power and his men were tried and convicted.The
held in Schuyler v. Curtis" a privilege may be given the
emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises
surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his
Padilla, there were portions which dealt with his private
memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the
and family life including the portrayal in some scenes,
living, to protect their feelings and to prevent a
of his mother, Maria Soto, private respondent herein, and
violation of their own rights in the character and
of one "Auring" as his girl friend. Padilla’s half
memory of the deceased."
sister, for and in behalf of her mother, Vda.de Gonzales,
NO, Lagunzad claims that as a citizen and as a In the case at bar, the interest’s observable are the
newspaperman, he had the right to express his thoughts in right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right
film on the public life of Moises Padilla without of -freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking
prior restraint. The right of freedom of expression, into account the interplay of those interests, and
indeed, occupies a preferred position in the "hierarchy considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing
of civil liberties." It is not, however, without Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of
limitations. One criterion for permissible limitation on such agreement will have to be upheld particularly
freedom of speech and of the press is the "balancing-of- because the limits of freedom of expression are reached
interests test." The principle requires a court to take when expression touches upon matters of essentially
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of private concern
interests observable in a given situation or type of
situation."

Case 2A.
AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. vs. CAPULONG
GR No. L-82380, April 29, 1988
GR No. L-82398, April 29, 1988

DOCTRINE: The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the
circumstances of this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy."

CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE – that words are used in such a circumstance and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantial evils that a lawmaker has a right to prevent.

BALANCING OF INTERESTS TEST- the courts should balance the public interest served by legislation on one hand and the freedom of
speech (or any other constitutional right) on the other. The courts will then decide where the greater weight should be placed.

FACTS:

Petitioner McElroy, an Australian Film maker, and AYER PRODUCTIONS, his movie production company envisioned, for
commercial viewing and for Philippine and International Release, the historic peaceful struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA.

The proposed Motion picture entitled "The Four Day Revolution" was endorsed by the MTRCB and other government agencies
consulted.

Ramos also signified his approval of the intended film production. It is designed to be viewed in a six-hour mini-series television play,
presented in a "docu-drama" style, creating four fictional characters interwoven with real events, and utilizing actual documentary
footage as background.

David Williamson is Australia's leading playwright and Professor McCoy (University of New South Wales) is an American historian
have developed a script.

Private Respondent Ponce Enrile declared that he will not approve the use, appropriation, reproduction and/or exhibition of his
name, or picture, or that of any member of his family in any cinema or television production, film or other medium for advertising or
commercial exploitation.

Petitioners acceded to this demand and the name of Enrile was deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film
the projected motion picture. However, a complaint was filed by Enrile invoking his right to privacy is unlawfully intruded.

Petitioner contended that:

• the freedom to produce and film includes in the freedom of speech and expression; and

• the subject matter of the motion picture is one of public interest and concern and not on the individual private life of respondent
Senator.

RTC Judge Ignacio Capulong ordered for the desistance of the movie production and making of any reference to plaintiff or his family and
from creating any fictitious character in lieu of plaintiff which nevertheless is based on, or bears substantial or marked resemblance to
Enrile. Hence the appeal.

ISSUES:
a. Whether or not the Freedom of Speech/ Expression includes freedom to film and produce motion pictures.
b. Whether or not the Right to Privacy of Respondent Enrile is violated by the Motion Picture of “Four Day Revolution”.

RULING:

• Yes. Freedom of Speech includes the freedom to film and produce motion pictures and to exhibit such motion pictures in
theaters or to diffuse them through television. Along with press, radio and television, motion pictures constitute a principal
medium of mass communication for information, education and entertainment.

This freedom of Speech is available in our country both to locally-owned and to foreign-owned motion picture
companies.

• No. The projected motion picture “The Four Day Revolution” does not constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent’s
right of privacy.

In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of freedom of
expression invoked by petitioner taking into account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular
circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the
validity of such agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when
expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern." Whether the “balancing of interest test” or the “clear and
present danger test” be applied in respect of the instant Petitions, the Court believes that a different conclusion must here be
reached.

Neither private respondent nor the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely look like. There
was, in other words, no “clear and present danger” of any violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully
assert.

The subject matter of “The Four Day Revolution” relates to the non-bloody change of government which took place at
EDSA. Clearly such subject matter is one of public interest and concern or even international interest. The subject matter relates
to a highly critical state in the history of this country and thus passed into the public domain and as an appropriate subject for
speech and expression and coverage by any form of mass media. The synopsis provided by petitioner does not relate to the
individual life and certainly not the private life of respondent Ponce Enrile. The “Four Day Revolution” is not principally about,
nor is it focused upon, the man Juan Ponce Enrile.

Moreso, Private respondent Enrile is a public figure (which gives the public a legitimate interest of his doings, his affairs, his
character and has become a public “personage”), in other words he is a celebrity. To be included in this category are those who
have achieved some degree of reputation by appearing before the public. This includes public officers, famous inventors and
explorers, war heroes and even ordinary soldiers, an infant prodigy, in short anyone who has arrived at a position where public is
focused upon him as a person. Private respondent Enrile is a public figure because of his participation as principal action in the
culminating events of the change of government. The right of privacy of a public figure is necessarily narrower than that of an
ordinary citizen.

But it must be noted that the proposed motion picture is required to be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation of
events. This serves as a line of equilibrium in this case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression and the
right of privacy. There must be no presentation of the private life of the unwilling private respondent and certainly no revelation
of intimate or embarrassing personal facts. Portrayal of the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution should be
related to the public facts of the EDSA Revolution.

ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996


Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta
Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Facts:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X)
which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and
consent.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her
husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the
drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his
alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed
against her husband.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;

Held:
(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by
her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed
by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in
ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his
right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify
for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the
other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of CAMILO L. SABIO v.

HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, et al.


G.R. No. 174340 17 October 2006,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. (En Banc)

[Congress Power of Inquiry]

FACTS:
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to appear as resource
persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on
Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: “No
member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.

RULING:
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of Representatives,
but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees and
it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to
the committees.
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The Court’s
high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is
broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the
operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the
power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.”
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the
PCGG members and staff from the Congress’ power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any
provision granting such exemption. The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends “to government agencies created by
Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG belongs to this
class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or establishes
methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles.

Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the
Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec.
28), and the right of access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.

Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies (G.R. No. 167173)

Facts:
Senator Enrile delivered a privilege speech denouncing SCB-Philippines for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of the
Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799) and urging the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the
occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Upon motion of Senator Pangilinan, the speech was referred to respondent, which
through its Chairperson Senator Angara, set an initial hearing and invited petitioners herein to attend the hearing. Petitioners via letter
stressed that there were pending cases in court allegedly involving the same issues subject of the legislative inquiry, thereby posing a
challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent committee to proceed with the inquiry.
Legislative investigation commenced but with the invited resource persons not being all present, Senator Enrile moved for the issuance of
subpoena and an HDO or to include such absentees to the Bureau of Immigrations’ Watch List. During the hearing, it was apparent that
petitioners lack proper authorizations to make disclosures and lack the copies of the accusing documents being mentioned by Senator
Enrile. Thus, when hearing adjourned, petitioners were later served with subpoenas by respondent.
Petitioner now seeks that respondent committee be enjoined from proceeding, citing Bengzon Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,
claiming that since the issue is already preempted by the courts, the legislative investigation is an encroachment upon the judicial
powers vested solely in the courts.
Issue:
Whether the investigation in aid of legislation by respondent committee encroaches upon the judicial power of the courts
Ruling: NO.
The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the said resolution, exposes the error in petitioners’ allegation that the
inquiry, as initiated in a privilege speech by the very same Senator Enrile, was simply “to denounce the illegal practice committed by a
foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities x x x.” This fallacy is made more glaring when we consider that, at the conclusion of
his privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate “to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the
occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future.”
Indeed, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar
the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the
convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which
the power of legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
Neither can the petitioners claim that they were singled out by the respondent Committee. The Court notes that among those invited as
resource persons were officials of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). These
officials were subjected to the same critical scrutiny by the respondent relative to their separate findings on the illegal sale of
unregistered foreign securities by SCB-Philippines. It is obvious that the objective of the investigation was the quest for remedies, in
terms of legislation, to prevent the recurrence of the allegedly fraudulent activity.
Wherefore, the petition for prohibition is DENIED for lack of merit.
REPUBLIC V EUGENIO

Facts: Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an application to inquire into or examine the deposits or investments
of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong before the RTC of Makati, Branch 138, presided by Judge (now Court of Appeals Justice)
Sixto Marella, Jr. The application was docketed as AMLC No. 05-005. The Makati RTC heard the testimony of the Deputy Director of the
AMLC, Richard David C. Funk II, and received the documentary evidence of the AMLC. [14] Thereafter, on 4 July 2005, the Makati RTC
rendered an Order (Makati RTC bank inquiry order) granting the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine the subject bank accounts of
Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong, the trial court being satisfied that there existed p]robable cause [to] believe that the deposits
in various bank accounts, details of which appear in paragraph 1 of the Application, are related to the offense of violation of Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act now the subject of criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan as attested to by the Informations, Exhibits
C, D, E, F, and G Pursuant to the Makati RTC bank inquiry order, the CIS proceeded to inquire and examine the deposits, investments and
related web accounts of the four.[16]
Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, Dennis Villa-Ignacio, wrote a letter dated 2 November 2005,
requesting the AMLC to investigate the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several other entities involved in the nullified contract. The letter
adverted to probable cause to believe that the bank accounts were used in the commission of unlawful activities that were committed a
in relation to the criminal cases then pending before the Sandiganbayan. Attached to the letter was a memorandum on why the
investigation of the [accounts] is necessary in the prosecution of the above criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan. In response to the
letter of the Special Prosecutor, the AMLC promulgated on 9 December 2005 Resolution No. 121 Series of 2005, [19] which authorized the
executive director of the AMLC to inquire into and examine the accounts named in the letter, including one maintained by Alvarez with
DBS Bank and two other accounts in the name of Cheng Yong with Metrobank. The Resolution characterized the memorandum attached
to the Special Prosecutors letter as extensively justif[ying] the existence of probable cause that the bank accounts of the persons and
entities mentioned in the letter are related to the unlawful activity of violation of Sections 3(g) and 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as
amended.
Issue: Whether or not the bank accounts of respondents can be examined.
Held: Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically legislated. Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself
prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts may be examined by any person, government official, bureau or offial; namely when:
(1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and (4) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter
of the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by this Court as constituting
an additional exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality, and there have been other similar recognitions as well.
The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11, the AMLC may inquire into a bank account upon order of
any competent court in cases of violation of the AMLA, it having been established that there is probable cause that the deposits or
investments are related to unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a money laundering offense under Section 4 thereof.
Further, in instances where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to kidnapping for ransom, [certain
violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and
murder, then there is no need for the AMLC to obtain a court order before it could inquire into such accounts. It cannot be successfully
argued the proceedings relating to the bank inquiry order under Section 11 of the AMLA is a litigation encompassed in one of the
exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act which is when money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. The orientation of
the bank inquiry order is simply to serve as a provisional relief or remedy. As earlier stated, the application for such does not entail a full-
blown trial. Nevertheless, just because the AMLA establishes additional exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act it does not mean that the
later law has dispensed with the general principle established in the older law that all deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking
institutions in the Philippines x x x are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature. Indeed, by force of statute, all bank
deposits are absolutely confidential, and that nature is unaltered even by the legislated exceptions referred to above.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs.
FLORENCIO M. REYES, OFFICER-IN-CHARGE, and RENE DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
A.M. No. P-08-2535. June 23, 2010.

FACTS:

Judge Sta. Romana of Branch 31 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, requested the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime
Laboratory Office (CLO) to conduct a drug test on Rene De Guzman, clerk of his court, for the latter’s alleged irresponsibility and queer
behavior. The results from the CLO yielded a positive result of drug use on the part of De Guzman.
Thereafter, a complaint for gross misconduct filed against him, where it was alleged that
Judge Romana would often have to remind him about the transmittal of records of appealed cases for more than a dozen times as he was
in charge of the preparation and transmission of the records on appeal
De Guzman would just dismiss the subject in ridicule and with the empty assurance that the task is as good as finished
He did not transmit the records of PP v. Mangan
The following matters what was probably prompted Judge Sta. Romana to have De Guzman undergo a drug test
On September 2007, the Court required De Guzman to comment on the charge of misconduct relative to the alleged use of prohibited
drugs. Notwithstanding, De Guzman failed to file his comment. De Guzman complied with the Court’s directive only on March, 2008
claiming that he failed to comply because he lost a copy of the resolution. De Guzman’s comment was referred to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, to which the OCA submitted a recommendation of De Guzman’s dismissal from the service.

ISSUE:

Whether de Guzman should be dismissed from service

RULING:

We adopt the findings and recommendation of the OCA.

MINOR ISSUES (in lower font size, not related to separation of powers)
We note that De Guzman is adept at ignoring the Court’s directives.

REASON of the COURT: In his letter-explanation in the administrative matter relative to the delay in the transmittal of the records
of Criminal Case No. 1144-G, he requested for a period of 10 days or until November 15, 2004 within which to submit the
Affidavit of George Caoile (Caoile), the retired Stenographer, as part of his comment. However, despite the lapse of five months,
De Guzman still failed to submit Caoile’s affidavit. Subsequently, we furnished him with a copy of the April 18, 2005 Resolution
wherein we mentioned that we are awaiting his submission of the affidavit of Caoile which shall be considered as part of his (De
Guzman’s) comment.

Nine months from the time he undertook to submit the affidavit of Caoile, De Guzman has yet to comply with his undertaking.
Thus, on August 10, 2005, we required De Guzman to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt for such failure. Unfortunately, De Guzman merely ignored our show cause order. Finally, on January 24, 2007, or after
the lapse of one year and two months, De Guzman submitted the affidavit of Caoile. Similarly, we also required De Guzman to
file his comment within 10 days from notice as regards the allegation that he was using prohibited drugs. However, he again
ignored our directive as contained in the Resolution of September 17, 2007. Thus, on January 23, 2008, we required him to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt for such failure. By way of explanation, De Guzman submitted a letter dated March
12, 2008 wherein he claimed that he failed to file his comment on the charge of misconduct because he allegedly lost his copy
of the said September 17, 2007 Resolution. Finally, on August 27, 2008, we required De Guzman to manifest whether he is
willing to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings submitted. As before, he failed to comply with the same. As
correctly observed by the OCA, De Guzman has shown his propensity to defy the directives of this Court.

De Guzman’s use of prohibited drugs has greatly affected his efficiency in the performance of his functions. De Guzman did not refute the
observation of his superior, Judge Sta. Romana, that as a criminal docket court clerk, he (De Guzman) was totally inept and incompetent.
Hence, to get across his displeasure and dissatisfaction with his job performance, Judge Sta. Romana gave De Guzman an unsatisfactory
rating. Moreover, De Guzman’s efficiency as a custodian of court records is also totally wanting.
In the same vein, Reyes also put forth the absurd behavioral manifestations of De Guzman. According to Reyes, Judge Sta. Romana would
always remind De Guzman to prepare and transmit the complete records of the appealed cases. However, De Guzman would only make
empty assurances to perform his task. Notwithstanding the reminders of his superiors, De Guzman would still fail to transmit the records.
Instead, he would report the next day and jubilantly declare that the problem has been solved at last.

In fine, we agree with the OCA that by his repeated and contumacious conduct of disrespecting the Court’s directives, De Guzman is
guilty of gross misconduct and has already forfeited his privilege of being an employee of the Court. Likewise, we can no longer
countenance his manifestations of queer behavior, bordering on absurd, irrational and irresponsible, because it has greatly affected his
job performance and efficiency. By using prohibited drugs, and being a front-line representative of the Judiciary, De Guzman has exposed
to risk the very institution which he serves. It is only by weeding out the likes of De Guzman from the ranks that we would be able to
preserve the integrity of this institution.

MAJOR ISSUE (related to separation of powers):


Two justices disagree with the majority opinion. They opine that the Court’s action in this case contravenes an express public policy, i.e.,
"imprisonment for drug dealers and pushers, rehabilitation for their victims." They also posit that De Guzman’s failure to properly perform
his duties and promptly respond to Court orders precisely springs from his drug addiction that requires rehabilitation. Finally, they state
that the Court’s real strength is not in its righteousness but in its willingness to understand that men are not perfect and that there is a
time to punish and a time to give a chance for contrition and change.

However, the legislative policy as embodied in Republic Act No. 9165 in deterring dangerous drug use by resort to sustainable programs
of rehabilitation and treatment must be considered in light of this Court’s constitutional power of administrative supervision over courts
and court personnel. The legislative power imposing policies through laws is not unlimited and is subject to the substantive and
constitutional limitations that set parameters both in the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.

As such, it cannot limit the Court’s power to impose disciplinary actions against erring justices, judges and court personnel. Neither
should such policy be used to restrict the Court’s power to preserve and maintain the Judiciary’s honor, dignity and integrity and public
confidence that can only be achieved by imposing strict and rigid standards of decency and propriety governing the conduct of justices,
judges and court employees. Likewise, we cannot subscribe to the idea that De Guzman’s irrational behavior stems solely from his being
a drug user. Such queer behavior can be attributed to several factors. However, it cannot by any measure be categorically stated at this
point that it can be attributed solely to his being a drug user. Finally, it must be emphasized at this juncture that De Guzman’s dismissal is
not grounded only on his being a drug user. His outright dismissal from the service is likewise anchored on his contumacious and
repeated acts of not heeding the directives of this Court. As we have already stated, such attitude betrays not only a recalcitrant streak of
character, but also disrespect for the lawful orders and directives of the Court.
JEFFREY NACAGUE vs. SULPICIO LINES, INC.(2010)

Petitioner: Jeffrey Nacague


Respondent: Sulpicio Lines

FACTS:

Respondent Sulpicio Lines, Inc. hired Nacague as "hepe de viaje" or the representative of Sulpicio Lines on board its vessel M/V Princess of the World.

Sulpicio Lines received an anonymous letter reporting the use of illegal drugs on board the ship.

Ceasar T. Chico, a housekeeper on the ship, submitted a report regarding the drug paraphernalia found inside the Mopalla Suite Room and the threat on his
life made by Nacague and Chief Mate Reynaldo Doroon after he found the drug paraphernalia.

Sulpicio Lines sent a notice of investigation to Nacague informing him of the charges against him for use of illegal drugs and threatening a co-employee.

When the ship docked in the port of Manila on, some crew members of the ship, together with Nacague, were subjected to a random drug test. They were
taken to S.M. Lazo Medical Clinic and were required to submit urine samples. Nacague was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

Sulpicio Lines subjected Nacague to a formal investigation. Nacague denied using illegal drugs.

5 days after the random drug testing, Nacague went to Chong Hua Hospital in Cebu City to undergo a voluntary drug test. The drug test with Chong Hua
Hospital yielded a negative result. Nacague submitted this test result to Sulpicio Lines. However, Sulpicio Lines still terminated him from the service for the
reason of finding him culpable of grave misconduct and loss of trust and confidence due to his positive drug result.

Feeling aggrieved, Nacague filed a complaint for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal and for reinstatement with backwages.

LA rendered a decision in favor of Nacague and declared that Sulpicio Lines illegally dismissed Nacague.
REASON OF LA: The drug test result from S.M. Lazo Clinic was questionable because the clinic is not accredited by the Dangerous Drug Board and not
under its supervision.

NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.


REASON OF NLRC: Nacague, who was performing a task involving trust and confidence, was found positive for using illegal drugs, he was guilty of serious
misconduct and loss of trust and confidence.
MR denied.

CA affirmed NLRC’s decision.


REASON OF CA: Sulpicio Lines complied with both the procedural and substantive requirements of the law when it terminated the employment of Nacague.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the termination was valid.

RULING:

NO. Sulpicio Lines failed to clearly show that Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs. The lack of accreditation of S.M. Lazo Clinic made its drug test
results doubtful.

Section 36 of R.A. No. 9165 provides that drug tests shall be performed only by authorized drug testing centers. Moreover, Section 36 also prescribes that
drug testing shall consist of both the screening test and the confirmatory test.
The law is clear that drug tests shall be performed only by authorized drug testing centers.In this case, Sulpicio Lines failed to prove that S.M. Lazo Clinic is
an accredited drug testing center. Sulpicio Lines did not even deny Nacague’s allegation that S.M. Lazo Clinic was not accredited. Also, only a screening test
was conducted to determine if Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs. Sulpicio Lines did not confirm the positive result of the screening test with a
confirmatory test. Sulpicio Lines failed to indubitably prove that Nacague was guilty of using illegal drugs amounting to serious misconduct and loss of trust
and confidence. Sulpicio Lines failed to clearly show that it had a valid and legal cause for terminating Nacague’s employment. When the alleged valid cause
for the termination of employment is not clearly proven, as in this case, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.

BRICCIO A. POLLO v. CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID. G.R. No. 181881. October 18, 2011.

FACTS:

CSC Chairperson Karina David received a document from an anonymous source, making her aware that there is a corrupt official in the
Commission. She then formed personnel and directed them to back up all the files of the computers found therein.

David found, in Bricio Pollo, petitioner, legal pleading or documents that are related to administrative cases and were for on the behalf of
parties who were facing charges. David inferred that he was willfully aiding their adverse interests and it was a practice that he pursued
regularly.

Pollo argued that he was not even a lawyer to pursue such acts. He also asserted that the CSC conducted a fishing expedition and his
right to privacy was violated and that the source of the complaint was anonymous. The CSC charged Pollo in violation of RA 6713. After
some motions filed to the CSC, he filed his motion to the CA wherein he was ordered to be dismissed of his governmental duties. The CA
ruled that the search was legal because in their capacity as employers, the government agencies could validly conduct search and
seizure in the governmental workplace without meeting the “probable cause” or warrant requirement for search and seizure.

ISSUE: Whether there was illegal search.

RULING:

The SC ruled in favor of the CSC. Basing their decision on other cases, the SC asked whether Pollo has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office and computer files and was the search reasonable in its inception and scope.

On regards the first inquiry, the SC found that he had no actual expectation of privacy on his work computer. He did not have a separate
office space nor did he use a password for his computer. He would have visitors which he let them use his computer. The CSC also
implemented a policy that its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything on their office computers, and
that the CSC may monitor their use. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were
used only for such legitimate business purposes.

On the second inquiry, the SC said that the search Pollo's files were conducted in connection with investigation of work-related
misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint. A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at
inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related
misconduct.
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,
vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as
Chief, Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte, Respondents
G.R. No. 193636; July 24, 2012 (SERENO, J.:EN BANC)
FACTS
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission to
Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country." The body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission, was formed to
investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling
them permanently in the future. Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the President a
confidential report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private Armies’ Report to the President" (the Report).

Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her
aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information
gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.
Thru local TV news (July 2010) and print media, Gamboa’s name had been tagged as one of those politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG. Gamboa
averred that her association with a PAG also appeared on print media. As a result, she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of
personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to
harassment and police surveillance operations.
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte. In her Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a) destruction of the
unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the damage
done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents from making baseless
reports.
ISSUE: Whether the forwarding of information or intelligence report gathered by the PNP to the Commission is an intrusion to Gamboa’s right to privacy,
thus, rendering the remedy of writ of habeas data proper.
HELD: NO.
PRINCIPLE: The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on
the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
GAMBOA’S RIGHT TO PRIVACY NOT VIOLATED
It is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of
dismantling them permanently. Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing powers and functions accorded to the Zeñarosa
Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities.
One of those individuals is herein petitioner Gamboa. This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report
listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zeñarosa
Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the
existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the
former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
The fact that the PNP released information to the Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the
opportunity to refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial
component of intelligence-gathering and investigation.1âwphi1 Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was
used to update information on individuals associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the field. Thus, safeguards were put in
place to make sure that the information collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
REMEDY OF WRIT OF HABEAS DATA NOT PROPER
Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to
address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and
improper.
Disposition of the Case: Instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial CourtOF Laoag City, insofar as it denies
Gamboa the privilege of the writ of habeas data, is AFFIRMED.

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