G.R. No. 168317. November 21, 2011.*
must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate
DUP SOUND PHILS. and/or MANUEL TAN,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CIRILO A.
PIAL, respondents.
Remedial Law; Appeals; Jurisdiction of the Court in
cases brought before it via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
limited to reviewing errors of law.—The Court finds it
proper to reiterate the well-established rule that the
jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it via Rule
45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law.
However, one of the admitted exceptions to this rule is
where the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the
Labor Arbiter, the Court, in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction, may look into the records of the case and
reexamine the questioned findings.
Labor Law; Termination of Employment; The settled
rule in labor cases is that the employer has the burden of
proving that the employee was not dismissed or if dismissed,
that the dismissal was not illegal and failure to discharge
the same would mean that the dismissal is not justified and
therefore illegal.—The settled rule in labor cases is that the
employer has the burden of proving that the employee was
not dismissed, or, if dismissed, that the dismissal was not
illegal, and failure to discharge the same would mean that
the dismissal is not justified and, therefore, illegal. In the
instant case, what betrays petitioners’ claim that private
respondent was not dismissed from his employment but
instead abandoned his job is their failure to prove that the
latter indeed stopped reporting for work without any
justifiable cause or a valid leave of absence. Petitioners
merely presented the affidavits of their office secretary
which narrated their version of the facts. These affidavits,
however, are not only insufficient to prove their defense but
also undeserving of credence because they are self-serving.
Same; Same; The consistent rule is that the employer
must affirmatively show nationally adequate evidence that
the dismissal was for a justifiable cause; In addition, the
employer must also observe the requirements of procedural
due process.—The consistent rule is that
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
462
462 SUPREME
COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
DUP Sound Phils. vs.
Court of Appeals
the employer must affirmatively show rationally
adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable
cause. In addition, the employer must also observe the
requirements of procedural due process. In the present case,
petitioners failed to submit sufficient evidence to show that
private respondent’s dismissal was for a justifiable cause
and in accordance with due process.
Same; Same; Abandonment; It is a settled rule that
failure to report for work after a notice to return to work has
been served does not necessarily constitute abandonment;
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified
refusal of an employee to resume his employment;
Factors to be Considered for a Valid Finding of
Abandonment.—Neither may private respondent’s refusal
to report for work subsequent to the Labor Arbiter’s
issuance of an order for his reinstatement be considered as
another abandonment of his job. It is a settled rule that
failure to report for work after a notice to return to work has
been served does not necessarily constitute abandonment.
As defined under established jurisprudence,
abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified
refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It
is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for
termination of employment by the employer. For a
valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be
present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear
intention to sever employer-employee relationship,
with the second as the more determinative factor
which is manifested by overt acts from which it may
be deduced that the employee has no more intention
to work. The intent to discontinue the employment
and unjustified.
Same; Same; Under the existing law, an employee who
is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights.—Under the
existing law, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights. Article 279 of the Labor Code clearly
provides that an employee who is dismissed without just
cause and without due process is entitled to backwages and
reinstatement or payment of separation pay in lieu thereof.
Article 223 of the same Code also provides that an employee
entitled to reinstatement shall either be admitted back to
work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior
to his dismissal or separation, or, at the option of the
employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. It is established
in
463
VOL. 660, 463
NOVEMBER 21,
2011
DUP Sound Phils. vs.
Court of Appeals
jurisprudence that reinstatement means restoration to
a state or condition from which one had been removed or
separated. The person reinstated assumes the position he
had occupied prior to his dismissal. Reinstatement
presupposes that the previous position from which one had
been removed still exists, or that there is an unfilled
position which is substantially equivalent or of similar
nature as the one previously occupied by the employee.
Same; Same; Reinstatement; Reinstatement is no
longer viable where, among others, the relations
between the employer and the employee have been so
severely strained, that it is not in the best interest of
the parties, nor is it advisable or practical to order
reinstatement, or where the employee decides not to be
reinstated.—This Court has ruled in many instances that
reinstatement is no longer viable where, among others, the
relations between the employer and the employee have been
so severely strained, that it is not in the best interest of the
parties, nor is it advisable or practical to order
reinstatement, or where the employee decides not to be
reinstated. In the instant case, the resulting circumstances
show that reinstatement would be impractical and would
hardly promote the best interest of the parties. Resentment
and enmity between petitioners and private respondent
necessarily strained the relationship between them or even
provoked antipathy and antagonism as shown by the acts of
the parties subsequent to the order of reinstatement.
Same; Same; Separation Pay; Where reinstatement is
no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month salary for every year of service should be
awarded as an alternative.—Where reinstatement is no
longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one
(1) month salary for every year of service should be awarded
as an alternative. This has been the consistent ruling in the
award of separation pay to illegally dismissed employees in
lieu of reinstatement.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Isidoro L. Padilla for petitioners.
Licerio S. Zamora, Jr. for respondents.
464
464 SUPREME COURT
REPORTS
ANNOTATED
DUP Sound Phils. vs. Court
of Appeals
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are
the Decision1 dated November 24, 2004 and
Resolution2dated May 16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 81251. The CA nullified and
set aside the June 30, 2003 Decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR
CA No. 033103-02, while the CA Resolution denied
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
The instant petition arose from a complaint for
illegal dismissal filed by herein private respondent
Cirilo A. Pial (Pial) on November 5, 2001 with the
NLRC, Quezon City. In his Position Paper, Pial alleged
that he was an employee of herein petitioner DUP
Sound Phils. (DUP), which is an entity engaged in the
business of recording cassette tapes for various
recording companies; petitioner Manuel Tan (Tan) is
the owner and manager of DUP; Pial was first
employed in May 1988 until December 1988; on
October 11, 1991, he was re-employed by DUP and was
given the job of “mastering tape”; his main function
was to adjust the sound level and intensity of the music
to be recorded as well as arrange the sequence of the
songs to be recorded in the cassette tapes; on August
21, 2001, Pial got absent from work because he got sick;
when he got well the following day and was ready for
work, he called up their office in accordance with his
employer’s policy that any employee who gets absent
shall first call their office before reporting back to
work; to his surprise, he was informed by the office
secretary that the latter was instructed by Tan to tell
him not to report for work until such time that they
will advise him to do so; after three weeks, without
receiving any notice, Pial again called up their office;
this time the office secretary advised him to look for
another job because, per instruction of Tan, he is no
longer allowed to work at DUP; Pial asked the office
secretary regarding the reason why he was not allowed
to return to his job and pleaded with her to accept him
back, but the secretary simply reiterated Tan’s order
not to allow him to go back to work. Pial prayed for the
payment of his unpaid service incentive leave pay, full
backwages, separation pay, moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney’s fees.3
In their Position Paper, herein petitioners DUP and
Tan denied the material allegations of Pial contending
that on or about January 1996 they hired Pial as a
laborer; on August 21, 2001, the latter failed to report
for work following an altercation with his supervisor
the previous day; on September 12, 2001, Pial called up
their office and informed the office secretary that he
will be going back to work on September 17, 2001;
however, he failed to report for work on the said date;
petitioners were subsequently surprised when they
learned that Pial filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against them; Pial was never dismissed, instead, it was
his unilateral decision not to work at DUP anymore;
Tan even offered him his old post during one of the
hearings before the NLRC hearing officer, but Pial
refused such offer or any other offer of amicable
settlement.4
On July 25, 2002, the Labor Arbiter (LA) handling
the case rendered a Decision5 declaring Pial to have
been illegally dismissed and ordering DUP and Tan to
reinstate him to his former position and pay him
backwages, cost of living allowance, service incentive
leave pay and attorney’s fees.
On appeal, the NLRC, in its Decision promulgated
on June 30, 2003, modified the Decision6 of the LA by
deleting the award of backwages and attorney’s fees.
The NLRC ruled that there was no illegal dismissal on
the part of DUP and Tan, but neither was there
abandonment on the part of Pial.
Pial filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the
NLRC denied it in its Resolution8 dated October 7,
2003.
Pial then filed a special civil action
for certiorariwith the CA.9
On November 24, 2004, the CA issued its presently
assailed Decision setting aside the June 30, 2003
Decision of the NLRC and reinstating the July 25, 2002 The petition lacks merit. case, what betrays petitioners’ claim that private
Decision of the LA. At the outset, the Court finds it proper to reiterate respondent was not dismissed from his employment
DUP and Tan filed a Motion for Reconsideration, the well-established rule that the jurisdiction of this but instead abandoned his job is their failure to prove
but the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution Court in cases brought before it via Rule 45 of the that the latter indeed stopped reporting for work
dated May 16, 2005. Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of without any justifiable cause or a valid leave of
Hence, the instant petition for review law.11However, one of the admitted exceptions to this absence. Petitioners merely presented the affidavits of
on certiorari based on the following grounds: rule is where the findings of the NLRC contradict those their office secretary which narrated their version of
THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE HONORABLE of the Labor Arbiter, the Court, in the exercise of its the facts. These affidavits, however, are not only
COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND equity jurisdiction, may look into the records of the insufficient to prove their defense but also undeserving
SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE. case and reexamine the questioned findings.12 of credence because they are self-serving.14
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS In this case, while the LA, the NLRC, and the CA Moreover, considering the hard times in which we
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
were unanimous in their finding that private are in, it is incongruous for private respondent to
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
respondent is not guilty of abandonment, the NLRC’s simply give up his work without any apparent reason
IN REVERSING THE DECISION OF [THE] NLRC AND,
THUS, REINSTATING THE LABOR ARBITER’S finding that private respondent was not illegally at all. No employee would recklessly abandon his job
DECISION. dismissed is contradictory to the ruling of the Labor knowing fully well the acute unemployment problem
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS Arbiter and the CA that petitioners are guilty of illegal and the difficulty of looking for a means of livelihood
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION dismissal. Hence, the Court deems it proper to nowadays. Certainly, no man in his right mind would
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION reexamine the above factual findings. do such thing.15
IN NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION PRIVATE After a review of the records at hand, the Court Petitioners further claim that private respondent’s
RESPONDENT PIAL’S ADAMANT REFUSAL TO finds no cogent reason to depart from the concurrent absence caused interruption in the workflow which
RETURN TO HIS WORK WITHOUT VALID REASON findings of the Labor Arbiter and the CA that private caused damages to the company. It is, thus, logical that
DURING AND AFTER THE PENDENCY OF THE respondent was illegally dismissed. Like the Labor petitioners would have wanted private respondent to
INSTANT CASE.10
Arbiter, the NLRC and the CA, this Court cannot give return to work in order to prevent further loss on their
_______________
7 Id., at pp. 98-106. credence to petitioners’ claim that private respondent part. In such a case, they could have immediately sent
8 Id., at pp. 23-24. abandoned his job. private respondent a notice or show-cause letter at his
9 Id., at pp. 2-15. The settled rule in labor cases is that the employer last known address requiring him to report for work,
10 Rollo, p. 8.
467
has the burden of proving that the employee was not or to explain his absence with a warning that his
VOL. 660, 467 dismissed, or, if dismissed, that the dismissal was not failure to do so would be construed as abandonment of
NOVEMBER 21, 2011 illegal, and failure to his work.
_______________ _______________
DUP Sound Phils. vs. Court 11 Union Industries, Inc. v. Vales, G.R. No. 140102, February 9, 13 Salvaloza v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
of Appeals 2006, 482 SCRA 17, 22. 182086, November 24, 2010, 636 SCRA 184, 194; Leopard Integrated
12 Luna v. Allado Construction Co., Inc., G.R. No. 175251, May Services, Inc. v. Macalinao, G.R. No. 159808, September 30, 2008, 567
Petitioners’ basic contention in the instant petition 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 262 citing Abel v. Philex Mining SCRA 192, 197; Macahilig v. National Labor Relations Commission,
is that the CA erred in finding that they terminated Corporation, G.R. No. 178976, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 683, 691-692. G.R. No. 158095, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 375, 384.
private respondent’s employment, much less illegally, 14 Henlin Panay Company v. National Labor Relations
and that private respondent failed to prove that he was Commission, G.R. No. 180718, October 23, 2009, 604 SCRA 362, 369.
discharge the same would mean that the dismissal is 15 Hantex Trading Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148241,
terminated from his employment. not justified and, therefore, illegal.13 In the instant September 27, 2002, 390 SCRA 181, 189.
However, petitioners failed to do so. Moreover, if
private respondent indeed abandoned his job,
petitioners should have afforded him due process by
serving him written notices, as well as a chance to
explain his side, as required by law. It is settled that,
procedurally, if the dismissal is based on a just cause
under Article 28216 of the Labor Code, the employer
must give the employee two written notices and a
hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the
employee before terminating the employment: a notice
specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought, a
hearing or an opportunity to be heard and, after
hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the
decision to dismiss.17 Again, petitioners failed to do
these. Thus, the foregoing bolsters private
respondent’s claim that he did not abandon his work
but was, in fact, dismissed.
The consistent rule is that the employer must
affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that
the dismissal was for a justifiable cause.18 In addition,
the employer must also observe the requirements of
procedural due process. In the pre-
_______________
16 Art. 282. Termination by employer.—An employer may
terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee
of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection
with his work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed
in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against
the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or
his duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
17 R.B. Michael Press v. Galit, G.R. No. 153510, February 13,
2008, 545 SCRA 23, 35; Metro EyeSecurity, Inc. v. Salsona, G.R. No.
167637, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 375, 391.
18 Lima Land, Inc. v. Cuevas, G.R. No. 169523, June 16, 2010,
621 SCRA 36, 52; Metro Construction, Inc. v. Aman, G.R. No. 168324,
October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 335, 344.
sent case, petitioners failed to submit sufficient
evidence to show that private respondent’s dismissal
was for a justifiable cause and in accordance with due
process.
The Court also agrees with private respondent that
petitioners’ earnestness in offering re-employment to
the former is suspect. It was only after two months
following the filing of the complaint for illegal
dismissal that it occurred to petitioners, in a belated
gesture of goodwill during one of the hearings
conducted before the NLRC, to invite private
respondent back to work. If petitioners were indeed
sincere, they should have made their offer much
sooner. Under circumstances established in the instant
case, the Court doubts that petitioners’ offer would
have been made if private respondent had not filed a
complaint against them.
Neither may private respondent’s refusal to report
for work subsequent to the Labor Arbiter’s issuance of
an order for his reinstatement be considered as
another abandonment of his job. It is a settled rule that
failure to report for work after a notice to return to
work has been served does not necessarily constitute
abandonment.19 As defined under established
jurisprudence, abandonment is the deliberate and
unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his
employment.20 It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a
just cause for termination of employment by the
employer.21 For a valid finding of abandonment, these
two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report
for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason;
and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee
_______________
19 Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 154503, February 29, 2008, 547 SCRA 220,
239.
20 Forever Security & General Services v. Flores, G.R. No. 147961,
September 7, 2007, 532 SCRA 454, 468; Nueva Ecija Electric
Cooperative, (NEECO) II v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 157603, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA 169, 182.
21 City Trucking, Inc. v. Balajadia, G.R. No. 160769, August 9,
2006, 498 SCRA 309, 315.
471
VOL. 660, 471
NOVEMBER 21, 2011
DUP Sound Phils. vs. Court
of Appeals
relationship, with the second as the more
determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts
from which it may be deduced that the employee has
no more intention to work.22 The intent to discontinue
the employment must be shown by clear proof that it
was deliberate and unjustified.23In the instant case,
private respondent claimed that his subsequent
refusal to report for work despite the Labor Arbiter’s
order for his reinstatement is due to the fact that he
was subsequently made to perform the job of a
“bodegero” of which he is unfamiliar and which is
totally different from his previous task of “mastering
tape.” Moreover, he was assigned to a different
workplace, which is a warehouse, where he was
isolated from all other employees. The Court notes that
petitioners failed to refute the foregoing claims of
private respondent in their pleadings filed with the
CA. It is only in their Reply filed with this Court that
they simply denied and brushed off private
respondent’s assertion that he was made to work as a
“bodegero.” The Court is, thus, led to conclude that
petitioners’ failure to immediately refute the claims of
private respondent is an implied admission thereof. In
the same vein, the Court treats petitioners’ belated
denial of the same claims of private respondent as
mere afterthought which is not worthy of credence.
Under the existing law, an employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights.24 Article 27925 of the
Labor Code clearly provides that an employee who is
dismissed without just cause and without due process
is entitled to backwages and reinstatement or payment
of separation pay in lieu thereof.26
_______________
22 Camua, Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
158731, January 25, 2007, 512 SCRA 677, 682.
23 E.G. & I. Construction v. Sato, G.R. No. 182070, February 16,
2011, 643 SCRA 492.
24 Cabatulan v. Buat, G.R. No. 147142, February 14, 2005, 451
SCRA 234, 247.
25 Art. 279. Security of Tenure.—In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.
26 Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines, Inc., G.R.
No. 178524, January 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 500, 506.
27 Pfizer, Inc. v. Velasco, G.R. No. 177467, March 9, 2011 645
SCRA 135.
28 Id.
29 Id.
Article 223 of the same Code also provides that an
employee entitled to reinstatement shall either be
admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or
separation, or, at the option of the employer, merely
reinstated in the payroll. It is established in
jurisprudence that reinstatement means restoration to
a state or condition from which one had been removed
or separated.27 The person reinstated assumes the
position he had occupied prior to his
dismissal. Reinstatement presupposes that the
28
previous position from which one had been removed
still exists, or that there is an unfilled position which
is substantially equivalent or of similar nature as the
one previously occupied by the employee.29Based on the
foregoing principles, it cannot be said that petitioners
intended to reinstate private respondent neither to his
former position under the same terms and conditions
nor to a substantially equivalent position. To begin
with, the notice that petitioners sent to private
respondent requiring the latter to report back for work
is silent with regard to the position or exact nature
they wanted the private respondent to assume. Indeed,
as it turned out, petitioners had other plans for private
respondent. Thus, private respondent’s assignment to
a different job, as well as transfer of work assignment
without any justification therefor, cannot be deemed as
faithful compliance with the reinstatement order.
As earlier discussed, private respondent may not be
faulted for rejecting what petitioners claim as
compliance with the order to reinstate the former given
the totally different nature of the job he was afterwards
given and the conditions and working environment
under which he was to perform such job. Thus, private
respondent found it unacceptable to work for
petitioners. That he was placed in an untenable
situation which practically left him with no choice but
to leave his assigned task also shows the strained
relations that has developed between the parties.
This Court has ruled in many instances that
reinstatement is no longer viable where, among others,
the relations between the employer and the employee
have been so severely strained, that it is not in the best
interest of the parties, nor is it advisable or practical to
order reinstatement, or where the employee decides
not to be reinstated.30 In the instant case, the resulting
circumstances show that reinstatement would be
impractical and would hardly promote the best interest
of the parties. Resentment and enmity between
petitioners and private respondent necessarily
strained the relationship between them or even
provoked antipathy and antagonism as shown by the
acts of the parties subsequent to the order of
reinstatement. Besides, private respondent expressly
prayed for an award of separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement from the very start of the proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter. By so doing, he forecloses
reinstatement as a relief by implication.
_______________
30 City Trucking, Inc. v. Balajadia, supra note 21, at p.
317; Golden Ace Builders v. Talde, G.R. No. 187200, May 5, 2010, 620
SCRA 283, 289; AFI International Trading Corp. (Zamboanga
Buying Station) v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 173256, October 9, 2007, 535
SCRA 347, 355; Cabatulan v. Buat, supra note 24.
Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an
option, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
salary for every year of service should be awarded as
an alternative. This has been the consistent ruling in
the award of separation pay to illegally dismissed
employees in lieu of reinstatement.31
Private respondent, however, failed to prove his
allegation that he was employed by petitioners since
1991. On the other hand, petitioners were able to
present evidence to show that private respondent was
employed only in January 1996. Hence, private
respondent’s separation pay must be reckoned from
January 1996, when he began working with
petitioners, until finality of this Decision, consistent
with established jurisprudence.32
With respect to private respondent’s backwages, the
same shall be reckoned from the date he was illegally
dismissed on August 22, 2001 until finality of this
Decision, in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.33
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
The November 24, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals, which reinstated the July 25, 2002 Decision
of the Labor Arbiter, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION to the effect that, instead of
reinstatement, petitioners are directed to pay private
respondent separation pay equivalent to one month
salary for every year of service from January 1996 until
finality of this
_______________
31 Diversified Security, Inc. v. Bautista, G.R. No. 152234, April
15, 2010, 618 SCRA 289, 296; Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases
Philippines, Inc., supra note 26, at p. 507.
32 Genuino Ice Co. v. Lava, G.R. No. 190001, March 23, 2011, 646
SCRA 385; Javellana, Jr. v. Belen,G.R. Nos. 181913/182158, March
5, 2010, 614 SCRA 342, 352-353; Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast
Foods v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 172149, February 8, 2010, 612
SCRA 10, 26-27; Rasonable v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 117195, February 20, 1996, 253 SCRA 815, 823-824.
33 Javellana, Jr. v. Belen, supra;Cabatulan v. Buat, supra note
24, at pp. 246-248.
475
VOL. 660, 475
NOVEMBER 21, 2011
DUP Sound Phils. vs. Court
of Appeals
Decision. Petitioners are also ordered to pay private
respondent backwages counted from August 22, 2001
until finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Abad,
Perez**and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed with
modification.
Note.—An illegally dismissed employee is entitled
to either (1) reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay,
if reinstatement is no longer viable; and (2) backwages.
(Sari-Sari Group of Companies, Inc. vs. Piglas Kamao
[Sari-Sari Chapter],561 SCRA 569 [2008])

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