[RULE 126, SEC.
13] Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches
incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a
warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the
Rules of Court.
PEOPLE VS. COGAED
June 30, 2014, G.R. No. 200334
LEONEN, J.
FACTS: Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag from Barangay Lun-Oy and during a
checkpoint, the driver of the jeepney he rode made a signal to the police telling that Cogaed
was carrying marijuana inside Cogaed’s bag; the police officer then approached Cogaed and
asked the accused about the contents of his bags. Cogaed replied that he did not know what
was inside and that he was just transporting the bag in favor of Marvin, a barriomate. Cogaed
subsequently opened the bag revealing the bricks of marijuana inside. He was then arrested by
the police officers.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and seizure; and, whether the marijuana confiscated
is admissible as evidence.
HELD: NO. There is no valid search and seizure; thus, the marijuana confiscated shall not be
admissible as evidence.
As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of Article
III, Section 2 of the Constitution are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of
probable cause that can only be determined by a judge.
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. The known
jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:
(1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
(2) Seizure of evidence in “plain view,”
(3) Search of a moving vehicle;
(4) Consented warrantless search;
(5) Customs search;
(6) Stop and frisk; and
(7) Exigent and emergency circumstances.
The search involved in this case was initially a “stop and frisk” search, but it did not comply
with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution.
“Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law
enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the
commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy
of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the
concept of “suspiciousness” present in the situation where the police officer finds himself or
herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. It does not
have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a “genuine reason to
serve the purposes of the “stop and frisk” exception.
The “stop and frisk” search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of
detecting dangerous weapons.
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation
for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was not even
the person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the
person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that
he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This
should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid
search warrant.
Likewise, the facts of the case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The
apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was
made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or
was about to commit a crime. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers
that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time. Also, Cogaed was not an
escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last allowable
warrantless arrest.
There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did
not object when the police asked him to open his bags. Appellant’s silence should not be
lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was
any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee.
The Constitution provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this rule
prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing
expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence
because it is “the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” It ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s person,
houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.
Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his
bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to
convict Cogaed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BELEN MARIACOS
GR NO. 188611 June 16 2010
FACTS:
October 27, 2005 in Brgy Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with secret agent of the Barangay
Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana had been loaded in a
passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned 3 bags
and 1 plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with O.K. marking. PO2
Pallayoc boarded the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. He found bricks of
marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He them asked the other passengers about the owner of
the bag, but no one know.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with other
passengers. Unfortunately, he did not noticed who took the black backpack from atop the
jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and 3 other bags were
already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up with the women and introduced
himself as a policeman. He told them that they were under arrest, but on the women got
away.
DOCTRINES:
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES: The right of the People
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
Judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
Purpose: MOVING VEHICLE (WARRANTLESS SEARCH)
This has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for
the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought.
This is no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless
searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause when a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extension search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as
long as officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the
vehicle to be searched.
MALUM PROHIBITUM
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited drugs, the
ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated
marijuana is not necessary.
Appellant’s alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defence. Lack of criminal
intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime charge is malum
prohibitum
:HELDFirstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution is misplaced. At the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents of the
suspicious bags, there was no identified owner. He asked the other passengers atop the
jeepney but no one knew who owned the bags. Thus, there could be no violation of the
right when no one was entitled thereto at that time.
Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a search of a
moving vehicle has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles
makes it possible for the vehicle to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc could not be expected to
secure a search warrant in order to check the contents of the bags which were loaded on
top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant would have been of no use
because the motor vehicle had already left the locality.13
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of
certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search
had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the seizure of evidence in plain view.
It is well to remember that in the instances we have recognized as exceptions to the
requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary that the officer effecting the arrest or
seizure must have been impelled to do so because of probable cause. The essential
requisite of probable cause must be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can
be lawfully conducted.17 Without probable cause, the articles seized cannot be admitted
in evidence against the person arrested.18
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to induce a cautious man to believe that
the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the existence of such facts
and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place
to be searched.19
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arres
MICLAT v PEOPLE

August 31, 2011 | Peralta, J. | Petition for Review on Certiorari | Warrantless Arrests - Plain
View

PETITIONERS: Abraham Miclat , Jr y Cerbo

RESPONDENT: People of the Philippines

SUMMARY: Police operatives conducted a surveillance operation in Caloocan City after

being informed of drug-trading activities. The informant of the police directed them to the
residence of the accused. PO3 Antonio then positioned himself at the perimeter of the house,
while the rest of the members of the group deployed themselves nearby. Through a small
opening in the curtain-covered window, PO3Antonio peeped inside and saw accused arranging
several pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed to be containing shabu. At the same
instance they arrested the petitioner. Accused claimed that he was watching TV with his father
and sister when the police operatives barraged themselves into their house, and that the seizure
was unlawful. SC denied the petition saying that the seizure was lawful under the plain view
doctrine.

DOCTRINE: Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to
have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in
evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view
is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer
must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across
a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its
discovery inadver
FACTS:November 8, 2002, 1PM: Police Inspector Jose Valencia called upon his subordinates
after being informed of drug-trading activities in Bagumbong, Caloocan City involving the
accused – Abraham Miclat.
3:50PM: The informant directed the surveillance team to the residence of the accused. PO3
Rodrigo Antonio positioned himself at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the
members of the group deployed themselves nearby.
Through a small opening in the curtain-covered window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and there
at a distance of 1½ meters, he saw Abe arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which
he believed to be containing shabu. Slowly, he inched his way in by gently pushing the door
as well as the plywood covering the same.
Upon gaining entrance, PO3 Antonio introduced himself as a police officer while Abe on the
other hand, after being informed of such authority, voluntarily handed over Antonio 4 pieces
of small plastic sachets he was earlier sorting out. He was then arrested.
Accused claimed that he was just watching TV with his father and sister when they heard a
commotion prompting them to go down and check. He said that one of the operatives kicked
him when he tried to resist the arrest, and that shabu was only planted on him when he was
already arrested. Accused also claimed that the arrest and seizure was unlawful.
ISSUE/S:
WON the warrantless arrest was valid – YES
WON the seized drugs were admissible– YES
RULING: Appeal DENIED.
RATIO:
Sec 5(a) Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that a warrantless
arrest is reasonable and valid when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Two elements must be present in order to
fall under this: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
The established facts reveal that Miclat was caught in flagrante delicto and the police
authorities effectively made a valid warrantless arrest.
The right against warrantless searches and seizure is subject to legal and judicial exceptions.1
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a
judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including
the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner
in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of
the articles procured.
The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the plastic sachets from the petitioner was not only
incidental to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within the purview of the “plain view” doctrine.
(See doctrine)
An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. Petitioner was caught
in the act of arranging the heat-sealed plastic sachets in plain sight of PO3 Antonio and he
voluntarily surrendered them to him upon learning that he is a police officer.
Since petitioner’s arrest is among the exceptions to the rule requiring a warrant before
effecting an arrest and the evidence seized from the petitioner was the result of a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest, which incidentally was in plain view of the arresting
officer, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove
petitioner’s guilt of the offense charged.
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687
Roan’s house was searched by virtue of a search warrant and the said search was performed by
military authorities. During their search, the authorities found a Colt Magnum revolver and 18
live bullets which they confiscated and served as bases for the charge of illegal possession of
firearms. However, the application of said search warrant was based on the accounts of two
witnesses. The applicant did not have personal knowledge of said firearm.
Facts:
1. A search warrant was issued by respondent judge (Gonzales) on May 10, 1984. Application
for the said search warrant was personally led by PC Capt. Mauro Quillosa. Together with
Quillosa were two witnesses (Esmael Morada and Jesusµohilida), who presented to
respondent judge their respective afidavits. The application was not yet subscribed and sworn
to, as such respondent Judge proceeded to examine Quillosa on the contents of the application
to ascertain if he knew and understood the same. Afterwards, Quillosa subscribed and swore
the said application before respondent.
2. Petitioner’s (Jose²no Roan) house was searched two days after the issuance of the search
warrant. The said search was performed by military authorities. Despite none of the articles
listed in the warrant was discovered, the officers who conducted the search found one Colt
Magnum revolver and 18 live bullets which they confiscated. The said items served as bases
for the charge of illegal possession of firearms against the petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not a search warrant be annulled on the ground that it violates the privacy of
one person’s house
Ruling/Decision:
1. To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the
judge or some authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. There must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be
seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant. Probable cause, as
described by Judge Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, refers to “such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched. The probable cause must refer to only one specific offense.
2. The applicant (Capt. Quillosa) was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis
of mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him as required by settled
jurisprudence.
3.It is axiomatic that the magistrate must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or
pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must
not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and
justification of the application
Sps Marimla vs People
Facts: Special Investigator (SI) Ray Lagasca filed for a search warrant to search the
house of petitioners and certain premises on Maria Aquino St., Pampanga both for
violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425. All requisites for the issuance of a valid
search warrant were met. After searching petitioners’ house they were able to seize
various amounts of dried flowering tops and cash at around 15,000. An information
for violation of RA 6425 was filed against Petitioners, who in turn filed a motion to
quash search warrants and to suppress evidence illegally seized.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the court had jurisdiction to issue the search warrant
2. Whether or not the application for the search warrant was defective considering
that it was not personally endorsed by the NBI Head but only by the Deputy Director
3. Whether AM No. 99-10-09 SC enacted on Jan 25, 2000 was repealed when the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000? And that the
latter should govern the case.
Ruling:
(1) The public prosecutor was able to point out that the search warrant issued by
Judge Mario Guaria III, the Executive Judge of the Manila Regional Trial Court, is in
order considering that AM 991009SC allows or authorizes executive judges and vice
executive judges of the Regional Trial Court of Manila and Quezon City to issue
warrants which may be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction in cases
where the same was filed and, among others, by the NBI.
(2) Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, an
assistant head or other subordinate in every bureau may perform such duties as may
be specified by their superior or head, as long as it is not inconsistent with law.
Director Wycocos act of delegating his task of endorsing the application for search
warrant to Deputy Director Nasol is allowed by the above quoted provision of law
unless it is shown to be inconsistent with any law. Thus, Deputy Director Nasols
endorsement had the same force and effect as an endorsement issued by Director
Wycoco himself
(3) They argue that the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took effect on
December 1, 2000, should have been applied, being the later law. Hence, the
enforcement of the search warrant in Angeles City, which was outside the territorial
jurisdiction of RTC Manila, was in violation of the law.
A.M. No. 991009SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of
the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants
involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of
firearms on application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOCTF, and REACTTF.
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the application for
search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a
crime was committed, and (b) for compelling reasons, any court within the judicial
region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is
known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
A.M. No. 991009SC provides that the guidelines on the enforceability of search
warrants provided therein shall continue until further orders from this Court. In fact,
the guidelines in A.M. No. 991009SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03802SC entitled
Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of Executive Judges And Defining
Their Powers, Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in
the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and
Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Petition is dismissed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
VALENTINO C. ORTIZ, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
September 27, 1994, in CA-G.R. SP No. 301291. The decretal portion of the assailed
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly the respondent courts Order of
25 January 1993 is hereby SET ASIDE and the firearms and ammunition irregularly
and unreasonably seized pursuant to the search warrant of 13 August 1992 are
declared inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding, consequently to
be disposed of by the respondent court pursuant to applicable law.
SO ORDERED.[1]
The facts of the present case, as adopted from the findings of the Office of the
Solicitor General, are as follows:
On August 13, 1992, operatives of the Philippine National Police- Special
Investigation Service Command (PNP-CISC) were conducting a surveillance of
suspected drug-pushing activities at the Regine Condominium, Makati Avenue,
Makati City. Among their targeted suspects was private respondent Valentino Toto
Ortiz. Spotting the latter alighting from his Cherokee jeep and noting that he had a
suspiciously bulging pants pocket,[2] the police officers immediately moved in and
accosted him. Ortiz was frisked and yielded an unlicensed .25 caliber Raven
automatic pistol SN-930291 with one magazine and seven rounds of live .25 caliber
ammunition. A search of his vehicle resulted in the retrieval of a sealed cellophane
packet of methylamphetamine hyrdrochloride or shabu from the glove compartment.
The police then took private respondent into custody.
Later that same day, the PNP-CISC applied for a search warrant against private
respondent for violation of P. D. 1866[3] with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of
Paraaque, Branch 77. Supporting the application were the depositions of two police
officers asserting that they had personal knowledge that private respondent was
keeping in his residence at 148-D Peru Street, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque,
Metro Manila, the following unlicensed firearms: Baby armalite M-16;[4] Shotgun, 12 g;
pistol cal. 9mm; pistol cal. 45 and with corresponding ammunitions (sic) [5]
On the same day, the MTC judge issued Search Warrant No. 92-94
commanding the PNP officers to make an immediate search at any reasonable
hour of the day or night of the house/s, closed receptacles and premises
above-described and forthwith seize and take possession[6] the personal
property subject of the offense described in the warrant.
Armed with aforesaid warrant, a PNP CISC-Special Investigation Group (SIG)
team, accompanied by a representative of the MTC judge and a barangay security
officer, went to private respondents residence in Paraaque at about 7:30 P.M.
of the same date to search said premises. Private respondents wife and their childs
nanny were both present during the search, but neither consented to be a witness
to the search. The search resulted in the seizure of the following unlicensed
firearms and ammunition:
Private respondents wife signed a receipt for the seized firearms and
ammunition.
On August 17, 1992, a return of search warrant was executed and filed by the
police with the issuing court.
At the preliminary investigation, the investigating state prosecutor ruled the
warrantless search of private respondents person and jeep in Makati invalid for
violating his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.[8] However, the prosecutor found the search conducted in Paraaque valid.
On August 25, 1992, private respondent was charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, in Criminal Case No.92-5475, with violating Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866. The information alleged:
That on or about August 13, 1992 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused,
did then and there, wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
CONTRARY TO LAW.[9]
On September 25, 1992, private respondent moved for reinvestigation alleging
that the dismissal of the charges against him arising from the illegal search and
seizure in Makati also applied to the search conducted in his house in Paraaque. The
trial court denied the same. Private respondent moved for reconsideration and
deferral of arraignment, but said motions were likewise denied.
On November 23, 1992, private respondent moved to quash the search warrant
on the following grounds: (1) that he was not present when his house was searched
since he was then detained at Camp Crame; (2) that the search warrant was not
shown to his wife; and (3) that the search was conducted in violation of the witness-
to-search rule. The trial court denied the motion to quash for lack of merit.
On February 5, 1993, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals, CA-
G.R. SP No. 30129, for certiorari and prohibition of the order of the trial court denying
his motion to quash search warrant.
On September 27, 1994, the appellate court promulgated its decision declaring
as inadmissible in evidence the firearms and ammunition seized pursuant to Search
Warrant No. 92-94.
 Hence, the instant case anchored on the following assignments of error:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT AT 7:30 P.M. WAS
UNREASONABLE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE WARRANT ITSELF
AUTHORIZED SEARCH AT NIGHT.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT VIOLATED SECTION 7
RULE 126 OF THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NO
RETURN WAS PREPARED WHEN ANNEX G WAS PREPARED AND
SUBMITTED BY CHIEF INSP. JESUS A. VERSOZA, GROUP COMMANDER
OF SIG, CISC, CAMP CRAME.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE PROSECUTION INVOKED A PRESUMPTION WITHOUT SHOWING BY
LEGALLY ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS
IMPLEMENTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
Petitioners grounds for this petition may be reduced to one issue: Whether or
not the court a quo erred in holding that the firearms and ammunition seized from
private respondents house are inadmissible as evidence for being the fruits of an
illegal search.
The appellate court ruled the search wanting in due process for having been
done at an unreasonable time of the evening causing inconvenience to the occupants
of private respondents house, especially as there was no showing how long the
nighttime search lasted. The court a quo applied the doctrine in Asian Surety &
Insurance Co. v. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312 (1973), where we invalidated a nighttime
search conducted on the basis of a warrant which did not specify the time during
which the search was to be made.
Before us, petitioner contends that Asian Surety is inapplicable since the search
warrant specified that the search be made at a reasonable hour of day or night.
The rule governing the time of service of search warrants is Section 8 of Rule
126 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 8. Time of making search. The warrant must direct that it be served in the day
time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place
ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at
any time of the day or night.
The general rule is that search warrants must be served during the daytime.
However, the rule allows an exception, namely, a search at any reasonable hour of
the day or night, when the application asserts that the property is on the person or
place ordered to be searched. In the instant case, the judge issuing the warrant relied
on the positive assertion of the applicant and his witnesses that the firearms and
ammunition were kept at private respondents residence. Evidently, the court issuing
the warrant was satisfied that the affidavits of the applicants clearly satisfied the
requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The rule on issuance of a
search warrant allows for the exercise of judicial discretion in fixing the time within
which the warrant may be served, subject to the statutory requirement [10] fixing the
maximum time for the execution of a warrant. [11] We have examined the application
for search warrant,[12] and the deposition of the witnesses supporting said
application,[13] and find that both satisfactorily comply with the requirements of Section
8, Rule 126. The inescapable conclusion is that the judge who issued the questioned
warrant did not abuse his discretion in allowing a search at any reasonable hour of
the day or night. Absent such abuse of discretion, a search conducted at night where
so allowed, is not improper.[14]
As prescribed in Adm. Circular No. 13 of the Supreme Court dated October 1,
1985:
e. Search warrants must be in duplicate, both signed by the judge. The duplicate copy
thereof must be given to the person against whom the warrant is issued and
served. Both copies of the warrant must indicate the date until when the warrant shall
be valid and must direct that it be served in the daytime. If the judge is satisfied that
the property is in the person or in the place ordered to be searched, a direction may
be inserted in the warrants that it be served at any time of the day or night;
But was the time during which the search was effected reasonable?
Petitioner submits that 7:30 P.M. is a reasonable time for executing a search
warrant in the metropolis. We find no reason to declare the contrary. The exact
time of the execution of a warrant should be left to the discretion of the law
enforcement officers.[15] And in judging the conduct of said officers, judicial notice may
be taken not just of the realities of law enforcement, but also the prevailing conditions
in the place to be searched. We take judicial notice that 7:30 P.M. in a suburban
subdivision in Metro Manila is an hour at which the residents are still up-and-about.
To hold said hour as an unreasonable time to serve a warrant would not only hamper
law enforcement, but could also lead to absurd results, enabling criminals to conceal
their illegal activities by pursuing such activities only at night.[16]
The policy behind the prohibition of nighttime searches in the absence of
specific judicial authorization is to protect the public from the abrasiveness of
official intrusions.[17] A nighttime search is a serious violation of privacy. [18] In
the instant case, there is no showing that the search which began at 7:30 P.M.
caused an abrupt intrusion upon sleeping residents in the dark [19] or that it
caused private respondents family such prejudice as to make the execution of
the warrant a voidable act. In finding that the duration of the search could have
caused inconvenience for private respondents family, the appellate court
resorted to surmises and conjectures. Moreover, no exact time limit can be
placed on the duration of a search.[20]
But was the witness-to-search rule violated by the police officers who conducted
the search notwithstanding the absence of private respondent and despite the refusal
of the members of his household to act as witnesses to the search?
The witness-to-search rule is embodied in Section 7 of Rule 126, which reads:
Sec. 7. Search of house, room, or premise, to be made in presence of two
witnesses. No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in
the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the
absence of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality.
Petitioner submits that there was no violation of the aforementioned rule
since the searchers were justified in availing of two witnesses of sufficient age
and discretion, after respondents wife and maid refused. The regularity of the
search is best evidenced by the Certification of Orderly Search and the receipt
of the property seized signed by respondents wife.
We find merit in the petitioners argument that private respondents wife
had no justifiable reason to refuse to be a witness to the search and that her
refusal to be a witness cannot hamper the performance of official duty. In the
absence of the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family,
the witness-to-search rule allows the search to be made in the presence of two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. There
was no irregularity when the PNP-CISC team asked the bailiff of the Paraaque
court and the barangay security officer to act as witnesses to the search. To
hold otherwise would allow lawful searches to be frustrated by the mere refusal
of those required by law to be witnesses.
In our view, the conduct of the nighttime search was reasonable under the
circumstances in this case. The unlicensed firearms and ammunition taken
from private respondents residence pursuant to Search Warrant No. 92-94, are
admissible in evidence against private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision dated
September 24, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP 30129 is REVERSED
and NULLIFIED. The firearms and ammunition seized from the residence of the
Valentino C. Ortiz, pursuant to the search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Paraaque, dated August 13, 1992, shall be admissible as evidence in
proceedings instituted by the State.
SO ORDERED.
People of the Philippines v. Zenaida Bolasa
Facts:
An informer told the police that an illegal transaction of prohibited drugs were
being conducted at a certain house in Sta. Brigida St. Karuhatan Valenzuela Metro Manila.
PO3 Salonga and Carizon together with SPO1 Fernando Arenas immediately proceed to the
said house. Upon reaching the house, they peeped through a small window and saw a man
and woman repacking suspected marijuana. They enter the house and introduce themselves
as police officers and confiscated the tea bag and other drug paraphernalia.Afterwhich, the
police officers arrested the two,Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto de los Reyes. Upon examination
by the NBI, the tea bags were confirmed as marijuana. Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto de los
Reyes were charged with violation of Sec.8 of Article II of Republic Act 6425 otherwise
known as Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The RTC convicted them of the crime charged.
Accused Bolasa asserts that the search and her arrest was illegal. She insists that
the trial court should not regard the testimony of PO3 cCarizon credible because he does not
have personal knowledge regarding the conduct of the arrest and search making his
testimony a hearsay.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest and seizure were valid
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that the arrest was invalid because the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-apellants had
just committed, were committing or about to commit a crime. The arresting officers also
have no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor have a reasonable ground to
believe that the accused committed the crime. And accused appellants were not prisoners
who have escaped from a penal establishment.
With respect to the seizure of the tea bags,the court held that it is also invalid
because the objects were not seized in plain view. There was no valid intrusion and the
evidence was not inadvertently discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped through
the window to ascertain the activities of appellants inside the room. In like manner, the
search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless arrest,
a customs search, or a stop and frisk situations.
The court stated that the arresting officers should have first conducted a
surveillance considering that the identities and addressed of the suspected culprits were
already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of
probable cause, they should have secured a warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and
seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was also illegal. Every
evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against the accused-
appellants.
The Court held that the State cannot in a cavalier fashioni ntrude into the persons of its citizens as well as
into their houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint.
The Court held that the State cannot in a cavalier fashioni ntrude into the persons of its citizens as well as
into their houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision protects the privacy and sanctity of the
person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint
The Court enumerated the exceptions as follows:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in plain view. The elements of the plain view doctrine are: (a) a
prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered
by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle s inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable causethat the occupant
committed a criminal activity
;4. Consented warrantless search
;5. Customs search
;6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.
Citing the Rules of Criminal Procedure on lawful warrantless arrest, the Court stated that an
arrest is lawful even in theabsence of a warrant
:(a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to
commit an offense in his presence;(
b) when an offense has in fact been committed and he has reasonable ground to believe that
the person to be arrested hascommitted it; and,
FACTS:
Ruben Montilla was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act for transporting
marijuana.
It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended at around
4:00 A.M. of June 20, 1994 near a waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran, Dasmariñas,
Cavite by SPO1 Concordio Talingting and SPO1 Armando Clarin, both members of the Cavite
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement toanother. (A person charged
with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as
proof of the commission of the offense
PEOPLE VS. MONTILLA
January 30, 1998 | Regalado, J. | Arrests; Warrantless Arrests; In flagrante delicto
PETITIONER: People of the Philippines
RESPONDENT - Appellant: Ruben Montilla
SUMMARY: A reliable informant told the police that a person was going to arrive in
Dasmarinas from Baguio City, transporting marijuana. Ruben Montilla was in a waiting shed
when the police apprehended him, suspecting that he was the person referred to by the
informant. They proceeded with the search when Ruben confirmed he just arrived from
Baguio City. He was charged, and eventually found guilty by the RTC, of transporting
prohibited drugs. According to the Supreme Court, his arrest was valid. The element of
transporting drugs was obviously satisfied. The policemen were no longer able to get a
warrant because the information given to them was “sketchy” and they did not even know
the name of the person to be arrested.
PEOPLE VS MONTILLA
DOCTRINE: A legitimate warrantless arrest, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with
authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those
that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. On the other hand, the
apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting an arrest, which
could be classified as one of the permissble arrests set out in Section 5 (a). These instances
have been applied to arrests carried out on persons caught in flagrante delicTO
Philippine National Police Command based in Dasmariñas. Appellant, according to the two
officers, was caught transporting 28 marijuana bricks contained in a traveling bag and a
carton box, which marijuana bricks had a total weight of 28 kilos.
These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer in the arrest of
appellant. According to the police, the informant was “reliable” because he was involved in
past operations. That informer, according to Talingting and Clarin, had informed them the
day before, or on June 19, 1994 at about 2:00 P.M., that a drug courier, whom said informer
could recognize, would be arriving somewhere in Barangay Salitran, Dasmariñas from Baguio
City with an undetermined amount of marijuana.
He claimed during the trial that while he indeed came all the way from Baguio City, he
traveled to Dasmariñas, Cavite with only some pocket money and without any luggage. His
sole purpose in going there was to look up his cousin who had earlier offered a prospective
job at a garment factory in said locality, after which he would return to Baguio City. He never
got around to doing so as he was accosted by SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin at Barangay
Salitran.
In the present appellate review, appellant disputes the trial court’s finding that he was legally
caught in flagrante transporting the prohibited drugs.
weapons, and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. On the
other hand, the apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause in effecting
an arrest which could be classified as one in cadence with the instances of permissible arrests
set out in Section 5(a). These instances have been applied to arrests carried out on persons
caught in flagrante delicto.
SPO1 Clarin recounted that the informer told them that the
marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag and carton box which appellant was
carrying at the time. The officers thus realized that he was their man even if he was simply
carrying a seemingly innocent looking pair of luggage for personal effects. Accordingly, they
approached appellant, introduced themselves as policemen, and requested him to open and
show them the contents of the traveling bag, which

ISSUE/S: W/N the appellant was validly arrested in flagrante – YES.

RULING: RTC’s judgment affirmed, modified only insofar as the penalty imposed is
concerned.

RATIO:

Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act clearly prohibits the transport of drugs. By the
mere act of transporting marijuana, the appellant has already violated the statute. There was
no need to present the civilian informer because his testimony would have been merely
corroborative of the declarations of SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin.

Appellant contends that the marijuana bricks were confiscated in the course of an unlawful
warrantless search and seizure. He calls the attention of the Court to the fact that as early as
2:00 P.M. of the preceeding day, June 19, 1994, the police authorities had already been
apprised by their so-called informer of appellant’s impending arrival from Baguio City, hence
those law enforcers had the opportunity to procure the requisite warrant.  Even
assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, this would be beside the point for,
under these circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed
enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an
indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him
by name.

Informant is reliable because he has been involved in past operations.

A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting

police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous
FACTS

The petitioner was charged for violation of Section 11, Article II2 of RA 9165. The Information states that on or about August 20,
2002, the petitioner was found to possess one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 grams of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu. The petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment.3

PO1 Eric Tan (Tan) was the lone witness for the prosecution. As stated in the RTC decision, he testified that on August 20, 2002,
at around 8:50 in the evening, their Chief, P/Chief Supt. Alfredo C. Valdez, ordered him and civilian agent (C/A) Ronald Tangcoy
(Tangcoy) to go to the South Wing, Roxas Boulevard. While proceeding to the area onboard a mobile hunter, they saw the
petitioner crossing a "No Jaywalking" portion of Roxas Boulevard. They immediately accosted him and told him to cross at the
pedestrian crossing area.

The petitioner picked up something from the ground, prompting Tangcoy to frisk him resulting in the recovery of a knife.
Thereafter, Tangcoy conducted a thorough search on the petitioner's body and found and confiscated a plastic sachet containing
what he suspected as shabu. Tangcoy and Tan executed a sinumpaang salaysay on the incident.4

HELD:

there must be and arrest first before the search

The indispensability of the intent to arrest an accused in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest was emphasized in Luz
vs. People of the Philippines.30 The Court held that the shabu confiscated from the accused in that case was inadmissible as
evidence when the police officer who flagged him for traffic violation had no intent to arrest him. According to the Court, due
to the lack of intent to arrest, the subsequent search was unlawful. This is notwithstanding the fact that the accused,
being caught in flagrante delicto for violating an ordinance, could have been therefore lawfully stopped or arrested
by the apprehending officers.

In the light of the discussion above, the respondent's argument that there was a lawful search incident to a lawful warrantless
arrest for jaywalking appears to be an afterthought in order to justify a warrantless search conducted on the person of the
petitioner. In fact, the illegality of the search for the shabu is further highlighted when it was not recovered immediately after
the alleged lawful arrest, if there was any, but only after the initial search resulted in the recovery of the knife. Thereafter,
according to Tan, Tangcoy conducted another search on the person of the petitioner resulting in the alleged confiscation of
the shabu. Clearly, the petitioner's right to be secure in his person was callously brushed aside twice by the arresting police
officers.31 chan roble svi rtual lawlib rary