QUASHA VS. SEC 2.

WON resolution of the issues w/o a full blown hearing on the merits deprived
G.R. No. L-47536 / MAY 31, 1978 / TEEHANKEE, J./ADMIN-Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies/JMB
NATURE Resolution
PETITIONERS William H. Quasha
RESPONDENTS Securities and Exchange Commission and Manila Polo Club Inc.
SUMMARY. The SEC Hearing Officer denied the application of Quasha for injunctive relief,
to restrain the sale of proprietary shares of Manila Polo Club, on December 22, 1977 (at the
height of the Christmas holidays) and a few days before the deadline given by the Club to its
members in buying such shares. Quasha, without appealing to the SEC En Banc, raised the
case to the SC. The SC held that the filing of the petition was proper, since the appeal to the
SEC En Banc was not a remedy plain, speedy, and adequate enough.
DOCTRINE. The filing of an appeal to the SEC En Banc within 30 days is not a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy, when the denial of the Hearing Officer was rendered just a few days
before the deadline of the event sought to be enjoined and during the height of the
Christmas holidays.
FACTS.
 Quasha filed complaints with the SEC against the filing of Manila Polo Club’s (MPC)
Amended Articles of Incorporation and Amended By-Laws converting it into a
proprietary club, alleging that such amendments would enable the members to
appropriate the club’s property and use it as their contribution to the ‘new’ club,
essentially negating the accrued contributions of past and present members’ (including
his) money, time, effort and foresight for a paltry proprietary membership fee (plus
they allegedly had not been adopted by the required two-thirds vote).
 Manila Polo fixed December 28, 1977 the deadline for purchasing proprietary shares.
 SEC through a hearing officer denied such injunctive relief for lack of merit only on
December 22, 1977.
 Hence this petition with prayer for a restraining order enjoining MPC from selling
proprietary shares (the latter later issued by the Court on Dec. 27, 1977).
 The SEC raised as an issue the fact that Quasha failed to exhaust all administrative
remedies before the filing of this petition, alleging that Quasha should have first
appealed with the SEC en banc.
petitioner of due process – YES
 The questions raised by petitioner in his pending complaints with respondent
commission warrant “a full­blown trial on the merits” after which the main issues may
be duly adjudicated as contended by him, and since respondents likewise concur in this
stand, the case will be remanded to respondent commission for such trial and
determination on the merits, (e.g. Assuming that the club may properly be converted
into a proprietary club, should a relatively new member not proportionally pay more for
a proprietary share than others who have been supporting the club (and previously paid
special assessments for 10, 20, or 30 years?)
 The temporary restraining order issued by the Court shall be lifted, subject to the
condition advanced by respondent commission that should the questioned
amendments be annulled after trial on the merits of the case before it, “all payments
made pursuant to the nullified conversion into a proprietary club would be refunded to
the members” who purchased the proprietary shares. In fairness to petitioner and
others similarly situated, as well as all others who did not or were not able to purchase
the questioned proprietary shares before the original December 28, 1977 deadline,
respondent club is ordered to grant them an extended period of at least two (2) weeks
after notice within which to purchase the proprietary shares, whether under protest (in
petitioner’s case) or not, subject of course as in the case of the previous purchasers to
the final outcome and determination of the case pending before respondent
commission.
DECISION.
Case remanded to respondent commission for a full trial and hearing and determination on
the merits and restraining order lifted immediately.
NOTES.
The limited time in this case is an exception to the requirement of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Time was of the essence.

ISSUES & RATIO.

1. WON petitioner failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing with the
court – NO

Time was of the essence, and so appeal to the SEC en banc was not a plain, speedy,
and and adequate remedy.
 In view of the extremely limited time, with the commission’s hearing officer having
issued his questioned order denying injunctive relief only on December 22, 1977 at the
height of the Christmas holidays with just a few days before the scheduled deadline of
December 28, 1977, petitioner properly filed the present petition directly with this Court
without going through the prescribed procedure of filing an appeal with respondent
Commission en banc within the 30-day reglementary period since such recourse was
obviously not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
 REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 112708-09 / MAR 29, 1996 / REYES, J.B.L., J. / ADMIN-JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISIONS-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES / RPNICOLAS
NATURE: Petition for Review of decision of Sandiganbayan
PETITIONERS: Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG)
RESPONDENTS: Sandiganbayan, Sipalay Trading Corp. and Allied Banking Corp.
SUMMARY. PCGG issued sequestration orders against Sipalay Trading Corp. and Allied
Banking Corp. Two separate petitions were filed by Sipalay and Allied before the SC
assailing the sequestration orders. It was referred to the Sandiganbayan. PCGG filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Sandiganbayan denied the motion and voided orders against Sipalay and Allied.
DOCTRINE. A direct action in court without prior exhaustion of administrative remedies,
when required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on a motion to dismiss grounded
on lack of cause of action. The only effect of noncompliance with this rule is that it will
deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss.
If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can take
cognizance of the case and try it.
FACTS.
 Petitioner PCGG issued separate sequestration orders against Sipalay Trading
Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation, allegedly part of Lucio Tan’s ill-gotten
wealth.
 2 separate petitions were filed by Sipalay and Allied before the SC assailing the
sequestration orders. The SC referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper
disposition.
 The petitions were jointly heard. The Sandiganbayan ordered the submission by PCGG
of its formal evidence in writing, but the latter instead filed a Motion to Dismiss. This
motion to dismiss came nearly 7 years after Sipalay and Allied originally filed their
petitions before the SC. The ground was Sipalay’s and Allied’s alleged failure to
exhaust administrative remedies.
 The PCGG argued that Sipalay and Allied should have first appealed the sequestration
orders to the Office of the President before challenging them in court, invoking the
PCGG Rules and Regulations.
 The Sandiganbayan denied the motion and voided the orders issued against Sipalay
and Allied.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON Sandiganbayan’s denial of PCGG’s motion to dismiss is proper. –YES
Hardly can it be disputed that a direct action in court without prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies, when required, is premature, warranting its dismissal on a
motion to dismiss grounded on lack of cause of action. The Court approves of the filing
of a motion to dismiss based upon failure to state a cause of action at any stage of the
proceedings.
As a general rule, a motion to dismiss is interposed before the defendant pleads (Sec 1
Rule 16 Rules of Court). However, there is no rule or law prohibiting the defendant from
filing a motion to dismiss after an answer had been filed. On the contrary, Section 2 of
Rule 9, expressly authorizes the filing of such motion at any stage of the proceedings
when it is based upon failure to state a cause of action.
These principles, at first impression, appear to favor the PCGG. Sections 5 and 6 of the
PCGG Rules and Regulations indeed provide an administrative mechanism for persons
or entities contesting the sequestration orders issued against them.
Section 5. - Who may contest - The person against whom a writ of sequestration or
freeze or hold order is directed may request the lifting thereof in writing, either
personally or through counsel within 5 days from the receipt of the writ of order.
Section 6. - Procedure for Review of writ or order - After due hearing or motu propio for
good cause shown, the Commission may lift the writ or order unconditionally or subject
to such condition as it may deem necessary, taking into consideration the evidence and
circumstances of the case. The resolution of the Commission may be appealed by the
party concerned to the Office of the President of the Philippines within15 days from
receipt thereof.
Neither an initial request before the PCGG for the lifting of the sequestration orders nor
an appeal to the Office of the President was made by Sipalay and Allied before they
filed their respective petitions in court. The PCGG’s motion to dismiss was anchored on
lack of cause of action, albeit filed beyond the period to answer.
However, the peculiarities of this case preclude the rightful application of the principles
aforestated. The Sipalay and Allied petitions were both filed on the third quarter of
1986, while the PCGG decided to file its motion to dismiss only in the middle of 1993.
Nearly 7 years came to pass in between that so much has already transpired in the
proceedings during the interregnum. Sipalay and Allied had rested their cases, and the
PCGG had finished presenting all its witnesses, not to mention other various motions
and incidents already disposed of by the Sandiganbayan, with special attention to the
numerous postponements granted the PCGG for presentation of its evidence which
prevented an earlier termination of the proceedings. The motion to dismiss came only
at the penultimate stage of the proceedings where the remaining task left for the PCGG
was to file its written formal offer of evidence as required by the Sandiganbayan.
Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect
the jurisdiction of the Court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line of decisions.
The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant
of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the
proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can take cognizance of the
case and try it.
The length of time the PCGG allowed to drift away and its decision to file its motion to
dismiss only at the homestretch of the trial hardly qualify as “proper time.” Such tarried
maneuver made the PCGG guilty of estoppel by laches - “Laches has been defined as
the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could nor should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.”
With its undenied belated action, 7 years in the making at that, it is only proper to
presume with conclusiveness that the PCGG has abandoned or declined to assert what
it bewailed as the Sipalay and Allied petitions’ lack of cause of action. “Proper time”
cannot mean nor sanction an unexplained and unreasonable length of time such as 7
years. The leniency extended by the Rules (Rule 9, Section 2, Rules of Court) and by
jurisprudence in allowing a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action filed
 after the answer or at any stage of the proceedings cannot be invoked to cover-up and
validate the onset of laches - or the failure to do something which should be done or to
claim or enforce a right at a proper time which, in this case, was one of the PCGG’s
follies. Indeed, in matters of timeliness, “indecent waste” is just as reprehensible as
“indecent haste.”
Another equally forceful reason warranting the denial of the PCGG’s motion to dismiss
is that this case falls under two recognized exceptions to the general rule of prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies, and the Sandiganbayan’s brief but lucid
disquisition on one exception merits this Court’s approval.
“The rule on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply to petitioners’
case. This rule, which is based on sound public policy and practical considerations, is not
inflexible. It is subject to many exceptions, to wit: (i) where there is estoppel on the part
of the party invoking the doctrine; (ii) where the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (iii) where there is unreasonable delay
or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; and (iv) where the
question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of
justice. x x x there was no absolute necessity of appealing respondent PCGG’s
resolution to the Office of the President, as purportedly required by Section 6 of the
PCGG Rules and Regulations, inasmuch as respondent PCGG seemed to have exhibited
indifference towards petitioners’ pleas for the lifting of the sequestration and search
and seizure orders. Official inaction or unreasonable delay, as heretofore intimated, is
one of the exceptions to the rule on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Hence,
under the circumstance, petitioners may not be faulted for seeking relief directly from
the courts.”
The other exception is the first in the enumeration, i.e., “where there is estoppel on the
part of the party invoking the doctrine,” consisting in the PCGG’s being guilty of
estoppel by laches which has just been discussed in great length. In answer therefore to
the first key issue, this Court rules in the affirmative. The denial of the PCGG’s motion
to dismiss was in order.

DECISION.
The petition is dismissed.
 PAAT V CA
G.R. No. 111107/ January 10, 1997/ Torres, Jr., J../ADMIN – Express Conferment of Judicial Review/Miggy
NATURE PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
PETITIONERS Paat and Layugan of DENR
RESPONDENTS CA and Spouses De Guzman
SUMMARY. The truck of de Guzman was seized for failure to produce the required
documents for the forest products found in the truck. The spouses de Guzman filed a letter
of reconsideration which went to the Secretary of DENR. Pending resolution, however, they
filed a suit for replevin in the court. SC held that the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not observed.
DOCTRINE. Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a
pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes
afforded him.
FACTS.
 The truck of Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR because the driver could not
produce the required documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck.
o The truck was on its way from Cagayan to Bulacan
 Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO)
in Aritao, Cagayan, issued an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner 15
days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited.
 Spouses failed to submit an explanation so Regional Executive Director Rogelio
Baggayan of DENR ordered the forfeiture of the truck, pursuant to Section 68-A of
Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277.
 The spouses de Guzman filed a letter of reconsideration which went to the Secretary of
DENR after Baggayan denied this.
 Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin was filed by the private
respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan in RTC
Cagayan
 RTC Cagayan issued a writ ordering the return of the truck
 Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court
contending that private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. They averred that the truck was under administrative seizure
proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277.
 Spouses de Guzman claimed that the case is an exception upon the justification that (1)
due process was violated because they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2)
the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR
and his representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized
in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners
was not used in the commission of the crime
o RTC: denied the motion to dismiss; MR likewise denied
o CA: sustained RTC decision
ISSUES & RATIO.
2. WON administrative remedies have been exhausted – NO
Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he
should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within
his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power can
be sought. The premature invocation of court’s intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action.
Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for
lack of cause of action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not
without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy
entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of cases is not
an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the
peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is
disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely
a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a department
secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be
unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject
matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency
of judicial intervention
In the case at hand, the controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR. private
respondents clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to
avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case. By appealing to him, they
acknowledged the existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and open to
them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, seek the court’s intervention by filing an
action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the pendency of an administrative
proceedings.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and
regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the
primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources. By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand
unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its
jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private
respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative
agency’s prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to
arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence
3. WON private respondents’ arguments are valid. – NO.
Re: violation of due process: Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but
simply an opportunity or right to be heard. In administrative proceedings moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Private respondents were
undisputedly given the opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of
reconsideration
Re: illegality of the confiscation: Sec 68-A of PD 705 authorizes the the Department Head or
his duly authorized representative, to order the confiscation of any forest products illegally
cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by
land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in accordance
with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. The phrase “to dispose of the
same” is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the
government.

Re: truck not being used in committing crime: confiscation of forest products by the ‘court’
in a criminal action has long been provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist,
the power of confiscation cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section
68, then Section 68-A would have no purpose at all. Moreover, petitioners did not eliminate
the possibility that the truck was being used in the commission of another crime, that is, the
breach of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended by E.O 277 (Cutting, gathering and/or collecting
timber or other forest products without license shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC).

DECISION.
Petition Granted
 LOPEZ vs. CITY OF MANILA
G.R. No. 127139 / FEB 19, 1999 / QUISIMBING, J. / ADMIN – EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES / RCTMAINES
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a RTC decision
PETITIONERS Jaime Lopez
RESPONDENTS City of Manila and Hon. Benjamin Vega (RTC Judge)
SUMMARY. RA 7160 or the Local Government Code (passed in 1992) required city assessors
to conduct a general revision of real property every 3 years. However, it was not enforced in
Manila until 1995 when an ordinance implementing the same was enacted. After
implementation, Lopez’ tax for land and improvements increased. Lopez then filed a
complaint to declare the ordinance null and void for being unjust, excessive and
confiscatory. Manila moved for the dismissal of the case because of the failure of Lopez of
exhausting administrative remedies. The SC denied the petition because the case does not
fall under the exceptions of the said doctrine.
DOCTRINE. Where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an administrative
board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be sough only after exhausting all remedies
provided, the reason resting upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given the
chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide
it properly.
FACTS.
 Section 219 of Ra 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires the
conduct of the general revision of real property.
 The revision of real property assessments prescribed therein was not yet
enforced in the City of Manila. Upon receipt of Memorandum Circular No.
04-95 from the Bureau of Local Government Finance relating to the failure
of most of the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, including
the City of Manila, to conduct the general revision of real property and
after obtaining the necessary funds from the City Council, the City
Assessor began the process of general revision based on the updated fair
market values of the real properties.
 The City Assessor’s Office submitted the proposed schedule of fair market
values to the City Council for its appropriate action. The council then
enacted Manila Ordinance No. 7894 which was approved.
 With the implementation of the ordinance, the tax on the land owned by
the Lopez was increased by 580% and 250% in the improvements in his
property. Hence he filed a special proceeding for the declaration of nullity
of the City of Manila Ordinance No. 7894 for being “unjust, excessive,
oppressive or confiscatory.”
 Manila Ordinance No. 7905 took effect thereafter, reducing by fifty
percent (50%) the assessment levels for the computation of tax due. The
new ordinance amended the assessment levels provided by Section 74,
paragraph (A) of Manila Ordinance No. 7794.
 Lopez’ tax increase was then reduced to only 155% and 82%, respectively.
 Despite the amendment brought about by Manila Ordinance No. 7905, the
controversy proceeded.
 The RTC dismissed the case for failure of the petitioner to exhaust
administrative remedies.
ISSUES & RATIO.
4. WON the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with
in this case – NO.
As a general rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an
administrative board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be sought only after
exhausting all remedies provided. There are only a few exceptions and this case
does not fall in any of them.
The reason rests upon the presumption that the administrative body, if given the
chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and
decide it properly. Therefore, where a remedy is available within the administrative
machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only
to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the matter by itself
correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts.
“One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers which
enjoins upon the judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming
primarily within the competence of other department. x x x
There are a number of instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial
action validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptional cases are:
(1) when the question raised is purely legal,
(2) when the administrative body is in estoppel;
(3) when the act complained of is patently illegal;
(4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention;
(5) when the claim involved is small;
(6) when irreparable damage will be suffered;
(7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
(8) when strong public interest is involved;
(9) when the subject of controversy is private land; and
(10) in quo-warranto proceeding.
The instant petition does not fall within any of the exceptions above-mentioned.
Doctrine of administrative remedies, Taxation –
Courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulations of activities coming under the
special technical knowledge and training of such agencies; the question of WON a tax is
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is essentially a question of fact.
DECISION.
Petition DENIED.
NOTE.
From the C2016 Reviewer:
Remedies available in this case:
(1) Petition to the Secretary of Justice, assailing the validity of the ordinance,
(2) Appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals after paying in protest, assailing the
propriety of the assessment.
 GARCIA v. CA
GR No. 100579/ JUNE 6, 2001/ VITUG, J./ ADMIN – Exhaustion of administrative remedies/RLAurellano
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA
PETITIONERS Leandro Garcia
RESPONDENTS CA, Philippine Coconut Authority Governing Board, and Josefel Grajeda
SUMMARY. Petitioner Garcia is charged by an Investigation Committee of the Philippine
Coconut Authority (PCA) of bad things. He was preventively suspended. Garcia’s counsel
kept asking hearings to be moved, not attending hearings, asking for extensions, ganyan.
PCA Board resolved that the time that Garcia wasted will not be counted in the period of
preventive suspension (max 90 days as per PCA rules). Garcia goes to RTC to contest the
order. RTC grants, CA reverses. SC upholds CA: administrative remedies not exhausted.
DOCTRINE. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through
court action cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies would have first
been exhausted. The doctrine does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority
to resolve, or interfere in, a controversy the jurisdiction over which is lodged initially with an
administrative body, like the PCA Board and its Investigation Committee, of special
competence
FACTS.
 The Philippine Coconut Authority Governing Board (PCA Board) passed Resolution no.
109-88 (resolution)
o The resolution created an Investigation Committee which would look into a complaint
against petitioner Garcia, for irregularities he committed
 Garcia is the administrator of PCA
o The PCA Board changed the composition of the Investigation Committee twice
 Investigation Committee found prima facie evidence against Garcia after formal hearings.
They recommended 1) filing of formal charges against Garcia; and 2) that Garcia be placed
in preventive suspension upon filing of the formal charge
 PCA Board subsequently fiiled an administrative complaint against Garcia for dishonesty,
falsification, grave misconduct, and violation of RA 3019.
o Garcia was also placed under preventive suspension
 Garcia’s counsel asked for stenographic notes, and requested a period of 15 days within
receipt of the notes to file his answer. Another 30 day extension was given.
 Meanwhile, hearings were set, and Garcia was notified. Garcia’s counsel requested for a
resetting of the hearing, stating that he was not available. On the day of the hearing itself
however, he submitted Garcia’s answer.
o On the second rescheduled day of hearing, Garcia’s counsel moved to create a new
investigating committee to hear the case.
 This motion was denied
o Garcia’s counsel did not attend anymore hearings despite due notice
 The PCA Board then, resolved that the period of delay resulting from requests for
extensions of time, postponement of scheduled hearing, and other related requests shall
not be counted in computing the period for preventive suspension (Resolution 046-89)
o Same resolution advised Garcia that his resumption of office shall require prior notice
of reinstatement
o Note that under CSC rules, preventive suspension can only last for 90 days, but any
delay in the disposition of the case due to the fault, negligence, or petition of
respondent (Garcia in this case) shall not be counted n the period of suspension (Sec.
42, PD 807)
 After receiving the above resolution, Garcia filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition with a writ of preliminary injunction in the RTC
o TC granted the writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining the PCA Board from
implementing the above resolution
 Garcia subsequently filed a motion with the TC praying for a creation of a new
investigating committee, and that the current Investigation Committee be prevented
from conducting further proceedings.
o After receiving evidence, TC issued a 20-day TRO on the proceedings of the
Investigation Committee, but did NOT order the creation of a new Investigation
Committee
 6 days after the expiration of the 20-day TRO, Investigation Committee (respondent
Grajeda is head) submitted a resolution to the PCA Board finding Garcia guilty, and
the he be meted the penalty of forced resignation
o PCA Board approved and adopted this resolution
 MOAR injunctions filed by Garcia to stop the implementation of the above resolution
o TC issued another 20-day TRO until question of WON Garcia had been deprived of due
process is resolved. Hearing was scheduled to receive evidence
o On the day of the hearing, the PCA Board sought reconsideration of the TRO, as the
resolution sought to be enjoined had already been implemented
 TC issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the PCA Board from implementing
the resolution that found Garcia guilty, and forcing him to resign as a penalty
 PCA Board appealed the above writ, as well as the other write of preliminary injunction to
the CA
 CA: Appeal granted, TC writs set aside
ISSUES & RATIO.
5. WON the TC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writs of preliminary injunction
– YES, as Garcia’s recourse to the TC was premature and precipitate
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court
action cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies would have first been
exhausted. The doctrine does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to
resolve, or interfere in, a controversy the jurisdiction over which is lodged initially with an
administrative body, like the PCA Board and its Investigation Committee, of special
competence
Records show that Garcia filed the petition with the TC while the investigation was still
ongoing. Even after a decision by the PCA Board had been rendered, Garcia would still
have recourse by appealing to the CSC.
Garcia contends: the resolution of the Investigation Committee fnding Garia guilty was
issued with GAD because the TC’s resolution of the prayer for a creation of new
committee+injunction was still pending
 Court says: it was shown that the TC miscalculated the expiration of the first 20-day TRO.1
Thus, when the Investigation Committee issued the resolution finding Garcia guilty, there
was no longer any legal restraint from proceeding with the investigation.
When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive Department of the
government, but nevertheless, a litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the same, the
judiciary shall decline to interfere.
The observance of the mandate regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies is a sound
practice and policy which should not be ignored. The doctrine insures an orderly procedure
and withholds judicial interference until the administrative process would have been allowed
to duly run its course. Even comity dictates that unless the available administrative remedies
have been resorted to and appropriate authorities given an opportunity to act and correct
the errors committed in the administrative forum, judicial recourse must be held to be
inappropriate and impermissible.

Sub-issue: WON this case is an exception to the principle of exhaustion of

administrative remedies (as contended by Garcia) – NO
There is no question that the petitioner Committee and PCA Board acted in the exercise
of their jurisdiction in conducting the administrative investigation of private respondent
Garcia. Under Civil Service Law and Rules exclusive original jurisdiction is lodged in the
administrative agency, and appeal is available to the Commission on Civil Service. The rule
is that where a law has delineated the procedure by which administrative appeal or
remedy could be effected, the same should be followed before recourse to judicial action
can be initiated

MPSTA vs. Laguio, Jr: The petitioners’ obvious remedy was NOT to halt the administrative
proceedings but, on the contrary, to take part, assert and vindicate their rights therein,
see those proceedings through to judgment and if adjudged guilty, appeal to the Civil
Service Commission

6. WON administrative due process was violated by the PCA Board - NO, Garcia was
afforded ample opportunity to submit his case
He filed an answer to the administrative complaint - there is no question that petitioner
was accorded the right to confront his witnesses. He was also able to present his defense
and his refusal to attend the scheduled hearings, despite due notice, was at his own peril.
The essence of due process to him was that opportunity to be heard.

Garcia contends: PCA Board’s hearing to determine a prima facie case against him was no
required

Court says: There is nothing in the law which prohibits the conduct of a formal hearing or
investigation

Garcia complains: Investigation Committee biased against meee :’(

Court rolls eyes: Investigation Committee composition changed twice already. Garcia was
accommodated to the fullest. In addition, documentary evidence submitted by PCA Board
were not questioned by Garcia before the TC, CA, or here, the SC.

DECISION.
Petition denied. Decision and reso of CA affirmed

NOTES

1issued July 26, TC thought it would expire Sept. 11, but actually expired Aug 15, like wtf TC can you
count

DAR v. APEX INVESTMENT
G.R. No. 149422/ APR 10, 2003 / SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J./ADMIN-JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMIN
DECISIONS-EXHAUSTION OF ADMIN REMEDIES/CUSTODIO
NATURE Petition for Review on Certiorari
PETITIONERS Department of Agrarian Reform
RESPONDENTS Apex Investment & Financing Corp (now SM Investment Corp)
SUMMARY. Some Apex-owned lots were subjected to compulsory acquisition without its
knowledge, as notices were sent to its old office address. When Apex found out, it filed a
Protest but PARO did not immediately act on it and waited a year before forwarding the
same to DAR. DAR, on the other hand, merely required the submission of additional
evidence. Meanwhile, the TCTs were already cancelled and transferred to the Republic and
to a farmer-beneficiary. DAR answered that there was failure to exhaust administrative
remedies but the SC held that:
DOCTRINE. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and is
flexible depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial
settings of a case. Among others, it is disregarded where a) there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and b) the administrative action is patently
illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
FACTS.
 Apex (now SM Investments Corp) owns several lots in Dasmariñas, Cavite. The Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office of Dasma (MARO) initiated compulsory acquisition proceedings
over those lots pursuant to RA 6657 (CARL).
 1994: MARO sent a Notice of Coverage and Notice of Acquisition to respondent’s office.
However, Apex denied having received the same since it was no longer holding office
there.
 1997: Apex learned of the compulsory acquisition proceedings from the Dec 11, 1998 issue
of the Balita. DAR sent Apex a Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition dated July 24,
1977, offering to pay P229K as compensation.
 1998: Apex filed with PARO a Protest rejecting the offer and contending that the lands are
not covered because they were classified as residential even prior to the effectivity of the
law. Apex also filed a supplemental protest with a) Certification issued by the Regional
Irrigation Manager stating that the lots are not covered by any irrigation project and b)
Certification by Municipal Engineer attesting that the lots are within the residential zone.
 Feb 1999 (more than a year after the filing of the Protest): PARO forwarded to DAR the
protest together with the records of the acquisition proceedings.
 June 1999: DAR required Apex to submit TCTs and certification from HLURB, such was
received on June 21. However, Apex learned that on June 24, the Registry of Deeds
cancelled one of its titles and issued another in the name of the Republic and another one
was already in the name of a farmer beneficiary, Angel Umali.
 This prompted Apex to file with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying
that the compulsory acquisition proceedings over its landholdings be declared void and
that the TCT issued to Umali be cancelled.
 DAR alleged that Apex failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing its
petition. Hence, the same should be dismissed.
 CA: Granted Apex’s petition. Acquisition null and void ab initio.
ISSUES & RATIO.
7. WON Apex violated the principle of exhaustion of remedies– NO.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and is flexible
depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings
of a case. Among others, it is disregarded where, as in this case, (a) there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and (b) the administrative
action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Records show that PARO did not take immediate action on the Protest and it took more
than a year to forward the same to DAR. DAR has only required Apex to submit from time
to time supporting documents. Meanwhile PARO had already caused the cancellation of
the titles. Obviously, petitioner might continue to alienate respondent's lots during the
pendency of its protest.
In Natalia Realty v DAR, the court held that given the official indifference which, under the
circumstances could have continued forever, the landowners had to act to assert and
protect their interest. They need not wait until the DAR acted on their protests.
8. WON Apex was deprived of due process– YES.
Section 16 of the law provides that for acquisition purposes, DAR must send notice to the
owners by personal delivery or registered mail and post the same in a conspicuous place.
In Roxas v CA, the court held that for a valid implementation 2 notices are required: 1)
Notice of Coverage and invitation to preliminary conference and 2) Notice of Acquisition.
They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process.
The implementation of CARL is an exercise of the State’s police power and the power of
eminent domain. To the extent of the retention limits to the landowners police power.
To the extent that owners are deprived of lands eminent domain.
DAR does not dispute that Apex did not receive the Notices. DAR alleged that it could not
effect personal service because of the change in juridical name. Still, there was no
showing of service by registered mail. The signature on the receipt was illegible.
It is thus safe to conclude that respondent was not notified of the compulsory acquisition
proceedings. Clearly, respondent was deprived of its right to procedural due process. It is
elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property, he should be informed of
the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is premised.
9. WON the lands are residential– INCONCLUSIVE.
This factual issue was never determined below, thus the court cannot conclude
DECISION.
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that DAR is to conduct appropriate proceedings to
determine WON the lands are residential.
 ACUZAR v. JOROLAN
G.R. No. 151908/ August 12, 2003 / YNARES -SANTIAGO, J./EXHAUSTION OF ADMIN REMEDIES
/MMMANALO
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of CA decision
PETITIONERS SMART Communications Inc.
RESPONDENTS National Telecommunications Commission
SUMMARY. NTC issued memorandum circulars which gave benefits to telco consumers. The
telco companies countered by filing a TRO against the NTC. Also,the telcos went straight to
the courts to question the validity of the memorandum circulars. The state questioned their
choice of appeal by invoking the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the exhaustion of
administrative remedies. On appeal to the SC, the latter held in favor of the telcos on the
ground that the aforementioned doctrines do not apply when questioning an act done by an
agency in a quasi judicial function. Hence, the petitioners were correct in filing the case
immediately with the trial court.
DOCTRINE. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation
issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative
remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial
function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-
legislative power.
FACTS.
 Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, NTC issued on June 16,
2000 Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and
regulations on the billing of telecommunications services and thus
provided benefits for mobile consumers such as grace periods for payment
of bills, prompt delivery of bills, free voicemail calls, a 2-year expiry date
for sim cards, lower billing rates, and a 2 year expiry period for sim cards if
unused.
 The Memorandum Circular was published in a newspaper of general
circulation and the benefits provided to consumers took effect 90 days
after the effectivity.
 On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile
telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained measures to
minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone
units. It ordered CMTS to comply with measures such as strict security
measures in the application for postpaid plans.
 This was followed by another Memorandum dated October 6, 2000
addressed to all public telecommunications entities, which reminded them
of the period of validity of prepaid cards and the billing unit pursuant to
the Billing Circular.
 On October 20, 2000, Islacom and Piltel filed an action against the NTC
and its commissioners before the RTC for declaration of nullity of the
memorandums, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and TRO.
 They alleged that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of
consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction
belongs to the DTI under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the
Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the
constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due
process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the
viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity
and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the
requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance
announcement are unreasonable.
 The RTC issued a TRO enjoining the NTC from implementing the Billing
Circular and the Oct. 2000 Memorandum. In the meantime, NTC and its
co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of
petitioners’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies. NTC's motion was
denied and the RTC issued a writ of prelim. injunction, enjoining NTC from
implementing the assailed MC and Memo while the case was pending.
 The NTC filed before the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition, which
was granted. The CA annulled the RTC's orders. The CA ruled that the NTC
and not the regular courts has jurisdiction over the case, that the
petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
 The petitioners appealed with the SC, arguing that the CA's ruling is
erroneous because the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of
admin remedies do not apply since the present case is for legal
nullification of a purely administrative regulation and involves only
questions of law. They argue that the second aforementioned doctrine
does not apply when the administrative action is complete and effective,
where there is no other remedy, and the petitioner stands to suffer grave
and irreparable injury. The petitioners further pointed out that they had in
fact exhausted all admin remedies available to them.
ISSUES and RATIO:
1. WON the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies? NO
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before
going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative
agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and
not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative
power.
Even assuming arguendo that the principle applies in this case, the records
reveal that petitioners sufficiently complied with this requirement. Even during
the drafting and deliberation stages leading to the issuance of the Billing Circular,
petitioners were able to register their protests to the proposed billing guidelines.
They submitted their respective position papers setting forth their objections
and submitting proposed schemes for the billing circular. After the same was
issued, petitioners wrote successive letters asking for the circular's suspension
and reconsideration. These letters were not acted upon until October 6, 2000,
when respondent NTC issued the second assailed Memorandum implementing
certain provisions of the Billing Circular. This was taken by petitioners as a clear
denial of the requests contained in their previous letters, thus prompting them
to seek judicial relief.
2. Whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies? NO
In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the
administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in
cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to
an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to
the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered. The
doctrine applies where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes
into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues
which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence
of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.
However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.
Pursuant to the Constitution, the determination of whether a specific rule or set of
rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is
within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. This is within the scope of judicial
power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate
action the validity of the acts of the political departments.
In the case at bar, the assailed NTC orders were issued pursuant to the NTC's
quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in
invoking the judicial power of the RTC to assail the constitutionality and
validity of the said issuances. Petitioners averred that the Circular contravened
Civil Code provisions on sales and violated the constitutional prohibition against
the deprivation of property without due process of law. These are within the
competence of the trial judge. Contrary to the finding of the CA, the issues raised
in the complaint do not entail highly technical matters. Rather, what is required of
the judge who will resolve this issue is a basic familiarity with the workings of the
cellular telephone service, including prepaid SIM and call cards – and this is
judicially known to be within the knowledge of a good percentage of our
population – and expertise in fundamental principles of civil law and the
Constitution
RULING: CA decision reversed and set aside. RTC decision reinstated. Case
remanded to RTC for further proceedings.
Notes:
On the difference between quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-
making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in
delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an
administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid
down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial
manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where
the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out
their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies are required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence,
and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and exercise of
discretion in a judicial nature.