Tha Goals of Ethnocience

Trustees of Indiana University
Anthropological Linguistics
The Goals of Ethnoscience

Author(s): Marshall Durbin
Source: Anthropological Linguistics, Vol. 8, No. 8, Ethnoscience: A Symposium Presented at the
1966 Meeting of the Central States Anthropological Society (Nov., 1966), pp. 22-41
Published by: The Trustees of Indiana University on behalf of Anthropological Linguistics
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THE GOALS OF ETHNOSCIENCE 1
Marshall Durbin
Tulane University
I. Introduction
2. Review of literature
3. Rule s
1. In this paper I am going to discuss recent developments in anthro-

pological theory which have been called 'Ethnoscience'. By anthropological
theory I mean an explanation of human behavior. By theory I mean "a set of
sentences expressed in terms of a specific vocabulary. The vocabulary,
VT,
of a theory T will be understood to consist of the extralogical terms of T,
i.e., those which do not belong to the vocabulary of pure logic . . . V may be
assumed to be divided into two subsets: primitive terms - those for which
no definition is specified - and defined terms . . . Hence, the set of sentences
asserted by T falls into two subsets: primitive sentences or postulates (also
called axioms), and derivational sentences or theorems. Henceforth, we will
assume that theories are stated in the form of axiomatized systems as here
described; i.e., by listing first the primitive and derivative terms and the
definitions for the latter, second the postulates . . . " (Hempel, 1965: 182-83).
Furthermore, regarding the social sciences specifically, a theory is an ex-
planation of some empirical phenomenon, a system of information-packed
descriptions of what we know, with high explanatory and predictive power.
The products of a theory are testable propositions which are verified through
research (Zetterberg, 1963: 1-10). Propositions relate variates to each other.
We say, "concepts posited in one segment of a culture will be found to be
operant in all other segments of a culture" and have thus uttered a proposition
that relates the two variates 'one segment of a culture' and 'other segments
of a culture'. Whether this is testable or not is not at issue here.
We may now turn to the goals of ethnoscientific theory. Goals are
determined by our own individual values and are thus always relative. They
are important since they exclusively determine the criteria used in the theory
and the subsequent methodological model which will be used to test the theory.
The two strongest requirements for an adequate anthropological theory are
(1) the theory must be able to account for the infinite variety of human behavior
and (2) that it must explain the native culture-bearer's as welt as the foreign
analyst's intuition that certain segments of the former's behavior are related
to other segments of his behavior, and that those same segments are more
22
The Goals of Ethnoscience 23
closely related to some segments than to certain others. Data from linguistic
and non-linguistic behavior will suffice as examples of the above two goals or
requirements .
In linguistic behavior each of us constantly produces daily new sentences
which we have never heard before and our listeners understand these, likewise with
out having heard these novel utterances (Chomsky, 1965). Thus I can say
"he ought tor be truthing instead of lying all the time. " Likewise, in non-
linguistic behavior, each of us performs new behavioral events which we have
never observed and observers in the form of fellow culture -bearers properly
interpret these events, likewise without having observed them prior to this
time. If at Mardi Gras, a man sits in the middle of the street peeling boiled
eggs, he is exhibiting behavior which he has never observed; yet, fellow
culture-bearers may join him and participate in the event and a nearby police-
man ignores him rather than carrying him off to jail, thus indicating a correct
interpretation of his behavior. New behavior, however, does not necessarily
have to be as bizarre as the example I have just given. It is unreasonable to
assume that we carry this novel behavior around in our minds (or in some
locus) waiting to release it at the appropriate time. This does not deny already
existent patterns, rather our problem is to explain how a finite set of patterns
can generate an infinite set of behavioral events.
Linguistically, we intuitively feel that the two sentences 'the car hit
John' and 'John was hit by the car' are related by virtue of their similarity
in meaning. Likewise in one subculture with which I am familiar it is intuitively
felt that the ceremonies of a funeral and a wedding , when they are both held
in a church, are related or similar even though superficially and in function
they are different. Similarly, many of us feel that the hierarchical structure
and the functions and duties of a university are similar to those of a business
institution. We will require of our theory that it explain these intattive feelings of
relationship. Our immediate goal is to explain these relationships in terms
of a partial theory and later to subsume the behavior of a whole culture under
one theory (Merton, 1957). A more distant goal is to explain human behavior
in its entirety regardless of social or geographical space.
Less important goals are: (1) the theory and its subsequent methodology
must be formal, (2) the theory must provide a class of explanations of behavior
and a procedure for evaluating these classes of explanations based upon the
criteria of descriptive adequacy and an internal economy which will provide
the most powerful significant generalizations, (3) the theory must assign a
structural description to each behavioral event, (4) the methodology of the
theory should specify whether each behavioral event under consideration is
well-formed or not, and (5) the theory must provide a model which accounts
for the culture-bearer's competence which will, of course, account for his
performance. Below follows a discussion of each of these requirements:
(1) The theory and its methodology must be formal, i.e., ordered rules must
be employed in order to obtain as few significant generalizations as possible.
While it is not possible to yet state that a universal of human behavior is
'rank ordering', it appears to be so. At least, it is possible to state that a
24 Anthropological Linguistics Vol. 8, No. 8
model which employs ordered rules ('serial rules') can be applied universally
to human behavior. Ordered rules and the formalism accompanying them are
important since they allow for significant generalizations and further they aid in
establishing 'natural classes' which may not be directly observable to the
culture-bearer or the analyst on immediate inspection. Furthermore, most
and perhaps all the rules must be context-sensitive (context-restricted,
Chomsky, 1965). Context-sensitive rules are opposed to context-free rules-.
(2) A theory which provides an infinite set of explanations for the data and an
evaluation procedure for selecting the most high-powered explanation is con-
sidered a stronger theory than one which provides only one explanation or
several explanations without an evaluation procedure for choosing one over
the other. The evaluation procedure used here to choose one of the infinite
number of explanations will adhere to the following criteria: (a) an explanatory
model must have explanatory adequacy, i.e., it must be able to generate,
account for and structurally describe the infinite set of data in the universe of
discourse, and (b) it must contain the greatest number of significant general-
izations under the fewest and yet preserve its descriptive
lavws possible adequacy.
(3) The theory must be able to assign a structural description to each observed
performance or set of performances regardless of the level of abstraction at
which they may occur. 3 That is, each piece of datum must be unambiguously
described. Data will have two structural descriptions only when ambiguity occurs
in meaningful contexts. This requirement may seem to be a minor point;
however it has been frequently noted that data which appear to be similar in
terms of descriptive analysis may have basic underlying structural differences.
Among some Bantu speakers, for example, there are two words for prayer
which semantically seem to be the same. However, one word is related to the
meaning of 'aboriginal prayer' and the other is related to the meaning entailed
in 'book' based upon the partial adoption of Christianity. Thus the two acts
of praying while appearing to function the same require two different structural
descriptions. Or, as has been pointed out several times, items which appear to
be radically different in meaning and in function may have very similar structural
descriptions (Levi-Strauss, 1963). (4) A specification must be made by the
theory as to whether each event which is generated by the model is well-formed
or not well-formed. Well-formed means that the behavior is communicative
in a specified context. For this reason, context-restricted rules will almost
always be utilized. Below are three types of behavior all of which dominate
the values affirmative and negative. The first is possible which operates
according to the laws of physics. No one is going to enter a room floating
without the aid of a mechanical device. The behavior is negative possible
and is not well-formed. If behavior is affirmative possible, then it may also
be negative or affirmative permissible. Negative permissible occurs in a
context in which it doesnot communicate to other culture-bearers, and is
not well-formed. For example, if a parent addresses his child as though the
child were the child's teacher in the presence of the teacher, this behavior
is negative permissible since the behavior is communicative to neither the
teacher nor the child. However, the same behavior performed in the home
in a play-acting or role-playing context would be affirmative permissible and

is well-formed, since it communicates to other culture-bearers that which is
intended to be communicated. When behavior is affirmative permissible, it
may also be affirmative or negative acceptable. This dichotomy is usually
called deviant and non-deviant behavior. Both affirmative and negative acceptable
are well-formed since they both communicate, but a distinction must be made
between them. Affirmative and negative acceptable behavior will be noted as
to what the society under investigation considers deviant and non-deviant. A
theory, then, must specify when behavior is well-formed and when it is not
well-formed and which type of well-formedness or non-well-formedness is
present. Unfortunately, explanatory theories of language have concentrated
very little upon the well-formedness and non-well-formedness of language
data. Undoubtedly all linguistic behavior can be well-formed given the proper
context. The context usually mentioned is that of a 'normal situation' which
is not operationally defined. (5) The model must account for the competence
of the culture-bearer, not just his performance (Chomsky, 1965). A per-
formance model will always be finite, whereas, as theoretical implications
show us, human behavior is potentially infinite. The culture-bearer's com-
petence is his knowledge about his socio-physical universe and how he manipulates
it. That is, a well-motivated theory of Ethnoscience in particular must be
able to construct a model of this knowledge rather than a model of behavioral
data description as has been carried on heretofore. The model will be ableto
account for and explain all observed data and further be able to generate and
predict yet unobserved data. This is not to say that there necessarily will be
any isomorphism between the model and what occurs in the culture-bearer's
brain. No such claim is made and this remains as a field for further examination
by the neuro-physiologist.
There are a number of assumptions which have been held here which
are stated below: (1) ordered context-sensitive rules can be applied to all
human behavior, (2) humans operate with a finite mechanism which gives
rise to an infinite variety of behavior, (3) a competence theory is different
from a performance theory and the latter is inadequate in terms of an explan-
atory theory since it has no generative power, (4) human behavior can be structurally
described and explained in much the same way and by the same sort of scientific
model as used for the rest of the universe, (5) all of culture including language
is communicative either to other culture-bearers or proprioceptively, and
this process of communication can be approached through meaning acquired
by a set of questions, and (6) that the intuition of the native speaker as well
as that of the analyst will be sufficient to arrive eventually at a model of the
culture-bearer's competence. On this latter point, Chomsky (1965: 20- 21)
says
" . .. one may ask whether the necessity for present day linguis-
tics [anthropology, MD] to give such priority to introspective evi-
dence and to the linguistic [cultural, MD] intuition of the native
speaker [culture-bearer, MD] excludes it from the domain of science.
The answer to this essentially terminological question seems to

have no bearing at all on any serious issue. At most, it determines
how we shall denote the kind of research that can be effectively
carried out in the present state of our technique and understanding.
However, this terminological question actually does relate to a
different issue of some interest, namely the question whether the
important feature of the successful sciences has been their search
for insight or their concern for objectivity. The social and behavioral
sciences provide ample evidence that objectivity can be pursued with
little consequent gain in insight and understanding. On the other hand,
a good case can be made for the view that the natural sciences have,
by and large, sought objectivity primarily insofar as it is a tool for
gaining insight (for providing phenomena that can suggest or test
deeper explanatory hypotheses).
In any event, at a given stage of investigation, one whose con-
cern is for insight and understanding (rather than for objectivity
as a goal in itself) must ask whether or to what extent a wider range
and more exact description of phenomena is relevant to solving the
problems that he faces. In linguistics [anthropology, MD], it seems
to me that sharpening of the data by more objective tests is a matter
of small importance for the problems at hand. One who disagrees with
this estimate of the present situation in linguistics [anthropology, MD]
can justify his belief in the current importance of more objective
operational tests by showing how they can lead to new and deeper under-
standing of linguistic [cultural, MD] structure. Perhaps the day will
come when the kinds of data that we now can obtain in abundance will
be insufficient to resolve deeper questions concerning the structure
of language [culture, MD]. However, many questions that can
realistically and significantly be formulated today do not demand
evidence of a kind that is unavailable or unattainable without signif-
icant improvements in objectivity of experimental technique.
Although there is no way to avoid the traditional assumption
that the speaker-hearer's linguistic intuition is the ultimate stan-
dard that determines the accuracy of any proposed grammar [cul-
tural anaylsis, MD], linguistic [anthropological, MD] theory, or
operational test, it must be emphasized, once again, that this tacit
knowledge may very well not be immediately available to the user
of the language [culture, MD]."
As Chomsky has pointed out, a native culture-bearer may not always be aware
of the structure of his competence and the foreign anthropologist serving as an
analyst must then rely upon his own intuition.
In the following sections, there are a number of matters which I would
like to pursue in detail. However, here I will only take up two matters, namely,
a review of the literature in a field in which various analysts have set up some
of the requirements which I have listed above and a discussion of rules. Since
the model which is proposed here will be mainly built of rules of various types,
it is first necessary to explicate these rules in detail. Considerations such as
an outright explication of the theory and model will be discussed elsewhere.
2. The goals outlined above are by no means new in the anthropological

literature. In 1932 Ruth Benedict said
"Now the fact that become s increasingly apparent as full-length
accounts of primitive peoples come from the press is that these
cultures, though they are so overwhelmingly made up of dispar-
ate elements fortuitously assembled from all directions by dif-
fusion, are none the less over and over again in different tribes
integrated according to very different and individual patterns.
The order that is achieved is not merely a reflection of the fact
that each trait has a pragmatic function that it performs - which
is much like a great discovery in physiology that the normal eye
sees and the normally muscled hand grasps, or still more ex-
actly, the discovery that nothing exists in human life that mankind
has not espoused and rationalized. The order is due rather to the
circumstances that in these societies a principle has been set up
according to which the assembled cultural material is made over
into consistent patterns in accordance with certain inner necessi-
ties that have developed within the group. These syntheses are of
various sorts. For some of them we have convenient terminology
and for some we have not. But they are in each case the more or
less successful attainment of integrated behavior, an attainment
that is all the more striking for the anthropologist because of his
knowledge of the scattered and hybrid materials out of which the
integration has been achieved" (p. 2).
Benedict best exemplified her ideas in Patterns in Culture in 1934 with her
Appolonian, Dionysian and Paranoid types. Here we are not concerned as to
whether Benedict's data are valid or not or whether the tags which she used
are proper, rather it is her ideas with which we are concerned. Benedict's
idea is similar to the second of our major goals. It is to be noted, however,
that Benedict did not establish an explicit methodology for establishing her
types nor did she seem to be concerned with an explanation of the infinite
varieties of human behavior. Before Benedict we find roughly the same idea
exposed, in the works of Franz Boas, Wilhelm Dilthey and Oswald Spengler and
undoubtedly there were mrrany more prior to this time. Since Benedict, however,
very few anthropologists have followed her proposals and anthropology has
lapsed for the most part into a renewed data-gathering period with an emphasis
on taxonomic 'butterfly-collecting ' as Leach (1961) has called it. Opler (1947)
has suggested 'cultural themes' which in part express the ideas mentioned
above. J.R. Roberts and his associates (1959: 597-605; 1962: 166-85; 1963:
185-99) have made several provocative suggestions in this area as explicated
by Colby (1966: 793-98): "According to Roberts . .., every culture has an
array of models. Folktales and myths constitute only one of many model
types; others are graphic art, sculpture, drama, literature, toys, maps, plans
and games. Roberts views these models as devices, external to the individual,
for storing information." Roberts has called these models templates rather
than pattern for this kind of mental organization. "Pattern implies a total
organization of elements in a fixed relationship to each other. This suggests
a cognitive rigidity which is difficult to reconcile with the infinite number of
behavioral variations that are possible in human action. Template, on the

other hand, suggests pattern parts, rather than wholes, and allows for flex-
ibility and dynamic relationships" (Colby, 1966: 797). Thus, Roberts is not
in complete agreement with Benedict in that he gives no explanation for the
total integration of culture, although he does seem to be interested in the
infinite varieties of human behavior. Roberts, it seems, is interested in a
group of partial theories rather than an entire theory. Likewise, Roberts
is not in agreement with Levi-Strauss, an analyst who has made considerable
contributions to the particular study of an integrated model of behavior. Levi--
Strauss' model satisfies the second requirement of the theory listed above,
i.e., that the native culture-bearer's intuition that certain elements are related
must be explained. He has stated as a constant theme throughout his extensive
writing in the past twenty years that all aspects (segments) of a culture are
dialectics of one general structure. Perhaps the structure may be modified in
moving from one institution to another, but these modifications can be explained
Furthermore, in comparing, let us say myths, social structure, etc., from
culture to culture we can see one structure occurring over and over again in
different forms. In Structure and Dialectics (1963), he shows that one theme
occurs in the myths of the Pawnee repeatedly. However, when one examines
the myths of the surrounding tribes they appear to contain opposite themes.
Thus, one can observe one structure being transformed into another. He
says, "I attempted to show that the genetic model of the myth-that is, the
model which generates it and simultaneously gives it structure- consists of
the application of four functions to three symbols" . . to
(p.239) ."We hope
have shown that in order to understand this relationship it is indispensable
to compare myth and ritual, not only within the confines of one and the same
society, but also within the beliefs and practices of neighboring societies"
(p. 240). Thus, Levi-Strauss is attempting to demonstrate not only the native
culture-bearer's intuition about certain feelings concerning the integration
of culture, but also to define the universals of a given culture as well as the
universals of all cultures, i.e., a definition of what 'it means to be human'.
"It should be kept in mind that . . . the anthropologist proceeds
from what is known to him to what is unknown: ... The road will
then be open for a comparative structural analysis of customs, in-
stitutions, and accepted patterns of behavior. We shall be in a pos-
ition to understand similarities between forms of social life, such
as language, law, and religion, that on the surface seem to differ
greatly . . . At the same time, we shall have the hope of over-
coming the opposition between the collective nature of culture and
its manifestations in the individual, since the so-called "collective
consciousness" would, in the final analysis, be no more than the
expression on the level of individual thought and behavior, of cer-
tain time and space modalities of the universal laws which make
up the unconscious activity of the mind" (Levi-Strauss, 1963: 64-65).
Levi-Strauss suggests that we carry out his proposal using linguistic nm-ethod-
ology as a tool when he says, "Structural linguistics will certainly play the
same renovating role with respect to the social sciences that nuclear physics,
for example, has played to the physical sciences" (1963: 33). When Levi-Strauss
first wrote this in 1945, he undoubtedly had reference to taxonomic descriptive
linguistics. However, the statement has the same validity today that it had
then. It is precisely at this point, however, that Levi-Strauss fails to give us
further information . We find out from him how to go about a structural des-
cription in a fairly vague sort of way, but we do not find out how we can proceed
to generate in a formal manner further data once a structural description has
been made. That is, if myth and ritual are structurally related in a given
culture, then one structural description should be sufficient to generate both
sets of data. Given a structural description of one or the other, we should
have a mapping procedure wvhich would provide us with a description of the
other.
In a review of literature pertinent to the two major goals which I
have outlined above, considerable space must be devoted to the work of Noam
Chomsky. 4 In this paper, it is very obvious that I am most heavily indebted
to this work. He says
"The central fact to which any significant linguistic theory must
address itself is this: a native speaker can produce a new sentence
of his language on the appropriate occasion, and other speakers can
understand it immediately, though it is equally new to them
On the basis of a limited experience with the data of speech, each
normal human has developed for himself a thorough competence in
his native language. This competence can be represented to an as
yet undetermined extent, as a system of rules that we can call the
grammar of his language . .. grammar, then, is a device
.The sen-
that (in particular) specifies the infinite set of well-formed
tences and assigns to each of these one or more structural des-
criptions. Perhaps we should call such a device a generative
to distinguish it from descriptive statements that merely
gramrnmar the inventory of elements that appear in structural des-
present
criptions, and their contextual variants ... In any event ... it
is clear that a theory of language that neglects this "creative" as-
pect of language is of only marginal interest (1964: 50-51).
It is, of course, perfectly obvious that if one is to account for an infinite set
of sentences, then one must also account for the fact that some sentences are
felt to be related as in, 'I am here'; 'Here I am'; 'Am I Here? ' and 'Here am I'.
The fact that we must rely heavily (though never always) on the native speaker's
intuition does not alarm Chomsky as it should no one else. He says
"In brief, it is unfortunately the case that no adequately formal-

ized techniques are known for obtaining reliable information con-
cerning the facts of linguistic structure (nor is this particularly
surprising). There are, in other words, very few reliable experi-
mental or data-processing procedures for obtaining significant in-
formation concerning the linguistic intuition of the native speaker.
It is important to bear in mind that when an operational procedure
is proposed, it must be tested for adequacy (exactly as a theory of
linguistic intuition -a grammar--must be tested for adequacy) by
measuring it against the standard provided by the tacit knowledge
that it attempts to specify and describe. Thus a proposed opera-

tional test for, say, segmentation into words, must meet the em-
pirical condition of conforming, in a mass of crucial and clear
cases, to the linguistic intuition of the native speaker concerning
such elements" (1965,p. 19).
Thus far no one has proposed how we are to go about testing a linguistic or
anthropological model since most anthropologists are content to test their
models on only one or a few informants at best. Thus, we have no idea as to
what 'a mass of crucial and clear cases' means. Nevertheless, Chomsky
(1965) has provided us with a methodology by which we can map one structure
onto another.
Let us turn now from entire theories to partial theories of human be-
havior. Here we shall examine componential analysis, Leach's approach to
social anthropology and formal analysis. All of these along with a great numbe
of other partial theories such as contrast-level mapping, lexical set studies,
domain and field studies, contextual studies, translation theories, and concept-
ual and cognitive relationships have been called the field of Ethnographic
Semantics by Colby (1966) in his excellent review article.
The first to be considered is Leach. Basically, we can say that Leach
adheres to the ideas put forth by Levi-Strauss, i.e., Leach's work is a dial-
ectic of Levi-Strauss', especially in the former's later publications (Leach,
1965). Leach (1961) states that the only way we can embark upon a general-
ization in anthropology with any hope of arriving at a satisfying conclusion
is" . . . by thinking of the organizational ideas that are preisent n a societa
as constituting a mathematical pattern" (p. 2). He further distinguishes
comparisons of cultures from generalizations about cultures,
"Comparison is a matter of butterfly collecting--of classification,

of the arrangement of things according to their types and subtypes
(p.2) . . . Generalization is inductive, it consists in perceiving
possible general laws in the circumstance of special cases; it is
guesswork [emphasis mine, MD], a gamble, you may be right or you
may be wrong, but if you happen to be right you have learned some-
thing altogether new.
In contrast, arranging butterflies according to their types and
subtypes is tautology. It merely reasserts something you know al-
ready in a slightly different form. But if you are going to start
guessing, you need to know how to guess. And this is what I am
getting at when I say the form of thinking should be mathematical
. . . (p. 5- 6) . . . The relevance of all this to my main theme
is that the same structural pattern may turn up in any kind of so-
ciety . . ." (p.8).
Here we can see some of Leach's affinities to Levi-Strauss; however, Leach

has asked for a formalism which Levi-Strauss has never demanded of his
theory. Leach, like Levi-Strauss, though, has not yet recognized the fact
that if the 'same structural pattern may turn up in any kind of society' (p. 8),
then we will also have to account for the infinite varieties of human behavior
and still employ a finite model.

Formal analysis and componential analysis have not been well dif-
ferentiated in the literature yet. Both Colby (1966) and Burling (1964) give
partial reviews of componential analysis. Componential analysis has long
been known in linguistics (Jakobson, 1938). As a matter of fact, it has largely
fallen from use today as a linguistic term, although Chomsky (1965) has
recently employed the technique under the term'subcategorization' in the
area of semantics. In the rest of anthropology the two classics of Lounsbury
and Goodenough which both appeared in Language in 1956 stand as the standard
starting point for analysts today, although as Colby (1966) points out, many
people preceded these two. Perhaps the most complete single (though not
necessarily the clearest) definition of componential analysis has been given
by Colby (1966: 8): "The mapping of a domain in which the conceptual seg-
mentation and hierarchical levels are indicated by lexical units is a pre-
liminary step for another, more detailed, analysis in which the relevant
(i.e., domain-related) signification of each unit on a given level is analyzed
into components or distinctLve features." Suffice to say that there exists no
little confusion as regards the terms component, feature, rules (ordered
and unordered, taxonomies, paradigms, branching trees, matrices and
constituents. In 3 we will attempt to clarify some of these confusions.
It is difficult to distinguish between formal analysis and componential
analysis because as Hammel (1965: 2) has pointed out formal analysis grew
out of componential analysis and the dividing line between the two is difficult
to perceive as exemplified in his Formal Semantic Analysis (1965), where
some articles are formally motivated while others are clearly componential
in character and with still others it is difficult to determine their nature.
Nevertheless, Haxrnmrel (1965: 2) has distinguished the two analyses as follows:
"What distinguishes these analyses [formal, MD] in the methodological sense
is their rigor and insistence on internal form, and in the theoretical sense
their recognition of a superordinate level of determinants in an analytic
domain. " He also points out that concomitant with the development of the
recognition of hierarchies has been a development of sememics (semantics,
semology, semiology, semasiology, etc. ) as an area of investigation.
Lounsbury (1964: 351) the first practitioner of formal analysis defines
it as follows
"We may consider that a "formal account" of a collection of
empirical data has been given when there have been specified (1)
a set of primitive elements, and (2) a set of rules for operating
on these, such that by the application of the latter to the former,
the elements of a "model" are generated; which model in turn
comes satisfactorily close to being a facsimile or exact replica of
the empirical data whose interrelatedness and systemic nature
we are trying to understand. A formal account is thus an apparatus
for predicting back the data at hand, thereby making them "under-
standable, " i.e., showing them to be lawful and expectable conse-
quences of an underlying principle that may be presumed to be at
work at their source.
A formal account should be distinquished both by its sufficiency
and by its parsimony."
Sufficiency here means that it accounts for all the data included in the universe
of discourse and parsimony means an absolute number of assumptions that are
necessary to account for the data. Briefly, we can distinguish a formal account
as presently used as having the feature of ordered rules which it is generally
said that componential analysis does not have. Formal analysis as practiced by
Lounsbury (1965) seems, at first blush, to include all the goals which were out-
Lined in I1. This is misleading, however, because formal analysis in this sense
precisely cannot account for the infinity of human behavior nor does it explain
the relatedness of different cultural segments. Thus, Lounsbury's (1965) analysis
could not account for the fact that in English we can say great-grandfather,
great. .. grandfather, etc. Nor can this analysis account for the fact that the
Trobriand kinship system is closely linked and interwoven with the rest of the
social structure. Lounsbury can recover the data as he sets out to do but he
cannot indicate who calls whom what in the Trobriand system. Nor is it his
goal to do so as he has explicitly stated (1964: 352). In this sense Lounsbury has
been off 'butterfly - collecting' and has established a formal system which only
recovers a set of lexical items and has failed to take into account the infinite
varieties of human behavior as well as the relatedness of cultural systems.
Any theory of human behavior which excludes these two requirements is in-
adequate.
In summary, we can note that all the goals or requirements of a theory
of Ethnoscience which were outlined in I have been proposed by various anth-
ropologists and linguists during the present century. Of the requirements men-
tioned it is to be noted that most of the theories or partial theories listed insist
upon two or more of these requirements; Chomsky (1965) has required them all
in his theory of language. For this reason I have relied heavily upon his analyses.
There is one last goal of a theory of Ethnoscience which I have pur-
posefully left to the last, namely: verification. Verification of theories has not
been seriously considered by the people listed above. Simple verification pro-
cedures can be carried on by the above-mentioned people only as long as they continue
to use themselves as informants or confine themselves to very few informants.
When we look at the entire range of diversity of human behavior--either linguistic
or non-linguistic -we will find that we will have to employ verificational pro-
cedures which will ultimately lead us to sampling procedures and statistical
probability models. Levi-Strauss has dealt with this briefly in his 'mechanical'
vs. 'statistical' model (1963: 283-89). For a further discussion of this, see
Nutini (1965: 707-31).
3. The following is a discussion of rules as presently used in anth-

ropol6gy, including linguistics. Rules are important because any set of data,
concepts, abstracts, components, etc., which can be illustrated by means of
a branching tree, a matrix, a diagram, or any device can be mapped into rules;
hence, rule behavior. Furthermore, rules are important here because they
form the core of the theory which would be a logical outcome of the goals listed
in l. Although there are undoubtedly a greatnumber of varieties of rules, I
am only going to discuss five types here. These rules have all been noted at
various times in the literature and the material presented here is merely a
synthesis of that material presented elsewhere. The five kinds of rules ex-
plicated here are (1) true paradigmatic, (2) 'true'tree, (3) taxonomic, (4) con-
stituent structure, and (5) transformational. Rules are sometimes presented
in devices such as branching trees, matrices, diagrams, tables, etc. These
illustrative devices usually tend to obscure the differences between varieties
of rule s.
A true paradigmatic rule is one in which a unit is dissolved into smaller
units which occur simultaneously. These smaller units give the gestalt of the
larger unit. It is possible that these units may be sometimes dissolved into
further smaller units. The distinguishing characteristic of a pardigm is that
all the nodes at one level must be expanded or dissolved in the same way as
shown in Figure 1. This implies a lack of ordering as shown in Figure 2.
A A ------> BC
I.
B . (B-----)DE
D E D
F G F G F G F G E)
Behavioral Event: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Figure 1 (A true paradigm) (Rules for a true paradigm)
A 1. A -----> F G
. E
F G G----
)I---- r)3.BC
D E D E E)
B CB CB C
Behavioral Event: 1 5 3 7 2 6 4 8 (Rules for a re-ordered
true paradigm)
Figure 2 (A re-ordering of the true paradigm in Figure 1)
Since there is no requirement on internal ordering within a paradigm, there

are four other possibilities with their accompanying sets of rules other than
those given in Figures 1 and 2. It is possible to order a true paradigm hier-
archically, but the criterion for ordering is always external, never internal
as is the case with taxonomic, constituent structure and 'true' tree rules.
It is to be noted that order is lacking in two ways in a 'true' paradigm,
34 Anthropological Linguistics Vol 8, No. 8
that is, both horizontally and vertically. Thus, there is no requirement

based on serial ordering whatsoever in a 'true' paradigm. We can have any
possible combination of behavioral events occurring. To this must be added,
of course, Burling's (1964) observation that the partitions can be made in a
great number of ways which makes the total number of possible solutions
astronomical. For this reason, paradigmatic rules are the weakest of all
rules. It is to be noted again that paradigmatic rules may be stringently ordered,
i.e., an ordered paradigm, but only by external, never by internal criteria.
The next type of rule to be considered is what Kay (1966) has called
tree rules; here they will be called 'true' tree rules. A 'true' tree requires
that all the nodes on each level be developed or expanded differently as shown
in Figure 3.
A 1. A -----) BC
2. B -----) DE
B C 3. C------ F G
4. D ------ HI
D E F G 5. E-----> J K
S \ 6. F ----- LM
H I J K L M N O 7.G ----->NO
Behavioral Event: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Figure 3 (A 'true' tree) (Rules for Figure 3)

Again, in a 'true' tree the units occur simultaneously, but one restriction
is placed on 'true' tree rules, that is, there is hierarchical ordering because
of the fact that all the nodes at one level must be expanded differently, i.e.,
in Figure 3, D could not be expanded before B. Although there are only three
levels in Figure 3 as in Figures I and 2, seven rules are needed in the 'true'
tree in order to carry out all expansions, thus a 'true' tree is less economical.
Horizontal ordering is still free in a tree, as in a paradigm, as shown in Fig-
ure 4.
A A ----- C B
C ------ GF
C B ------ DE
G ------ ON
G F D E F -----> LM
D -----) HI
O N L M H I K J E ----- K J
Behavioral Event: 8 7 5 6 1 2 4 3 (Rules for Figure 4)
Figure 4 (Example of lack of horizontal ordering in the 'true tree of Figure 3)
Kay (1966) has stated that horizontal ordering is trivial. This seems not to be
the case when we further point out that whether horizontal ordering is free or
fixed is one of the distinguishing characteristics of constitutent structure rules.
As can be seen from Figure 4, a great number of serial orderings

of the behavioral events is still possible and,therefore, the rules lack com-
plete ordering. As might be expected, there is a continuum of sets of rules
between a set of true paradigm and a set of true tree rules. The number of
sets depends upon the number of lexical items involved. Thus in Figure 1, E
might be expanded into H I instead of F G. We call this a false paradigm.
In Figure 3, G might be expanded into L M instead of N O. This is called a
false tree. Obviously, there can be a mid-point at which it is impossible to
distinguish a tree from a paradigm. The paradigm and trees presented so far
have been perfect in that all branches have been equally expanded, however,
imperfect paradigms and trees can also occur as shown in Figure 5.
A
. A ---) BC
B C 2. B --- DE
3. D --- F G
D E 4. E ---- FG
F GF G
Behavioral Event: 1 2 3 4 5
(Imperfect paradigm) (Rules for imperfect paradigm)
A
1. A--> BC
B C 2. B -- DE
3. D - F G
D E 4. E --> HI
(Rules for imperfect tree)
F G H I
Behavioral Event: 1 2 3 4 5
tree)
(Imperfect
Figure 5
In Figure 5 we observe a true imperfect paradigm and a true imperfect tree.
However, false imperfect paradigms and false imperfect trees may also
exist. In addition to the above possibilities, a paradigm (perfect or imperfect,
but usually true) and a tree (perfect or imperfect, but usually true) may merge
hierarchically as shown in Figure 6.
In cases where paradigmatic and tree rules are merged, they may
alternate evenly for as many hierarchies as exist or they may occur unevenly
as in Figure 6. There is one last consideration which should be noted as
regards tree rules. Units which occur at one hierarchical level on one branch
may occur at a lower or higher level on another branch as shown in Figure
7.
B C
A
..L
D F
H I J K L M N O
Behavioral P Q P Q P Q P Q P Q P Q P Q P Q
Event: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Figure 6 (A merged true perfect paradigm and a true perfect tree)
. A ----- BC 8. H
2. B ------ DE I
3. C ------ FG J
4. D ----- HI K- PQ
5. E ------ J K L
6. F ----- L M M
7. G ------) NO N
O
(Rules for Figure 6)
B C
D E G
F G H I J L
Behavioral J K L M J KF G L M N O P Q R S
Event: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Figure 7 (Mixed hierarchy for a false perfect tree)
1. A ----- BC 6. LM
2. B----- DE .
3. E ----- HI 7. K-----# NO
8. L ------ PQ
CD---+ F G 9. M ------ RS
5.
T
. ..
(Rules for Figure 7)
A Turkish Vowel Alternation 37
I think it unlikely, however, that there would be this sort of prejudice

in the ear of a Turkish linguist causing him to hear the palatal assimilations
which Kumbaraci describes. And even if she is herself the only living speaker
of Turkish who conforms to these contraints, it is till of importance and interest
to linguistics to give an exact and general description of them. We must remember
that a linguistic description provides scientific information not only about a
speaking community but also about the linguistic competence of its individual
members; the former is minimal when the community consists of only one person,
but the latter is not thereby diminished. Readers of this journal can be expected
to take greater interest in social facts, but anthropology has never pretended
that it could overlook entirely the obvious relationship between a cultural fact
and the way in which every participating individual conceptualizes his world.
In the case of language that would be what Chomsky has called the individual's
linguistic competence, and it is reasonable to view a grammar as a formal
description of that aspect of a person's beliefs, namely, his beliefs about how
a sentence is correctly constructed, pronounced, and interpreted ideally in
his language.
In conclusion I note that Pierce admonishes Kumbaraci for her use of
the term 'conditioned variant'; he interprets 'conditioned' to imply a causal
relation between the conditioning environment and the assimilating vowels but
recognizes no such connection in a synchronic description as he might have in
a diachronic one. First, Kumbaraci's usage is surely well supported by
precedent, and the term 'conditioned' can plausibly be understood to refer just
to the relation between, on the one hand, the segments the pronunciation of
which is to be specified in part by a rule, and, on the other, the environment
within the domain of which the rule is designated to operate. Second, even in
a diachronic description it is very doubtful that any more substantial evidence
can be offered for a causal relation than the plausibility and generality of the
resulting account of the facts, and there is therefore no better reason to recognize
such a causal relation in that case than there is for recognizing one in the case
of a synchronic description. Unless one can successfully impugn the notion of
causation in general I can see no reason to avoid the traditional usage of 'con-
ditioned variant'.
NOTES
1. AL 8:1. 11-24 and 25-9 (1966),respectively. I am led to respond to
these contributions also because my name is cited casually in Pierce's article
in connection with the notion of linguistic 'regularity' and linguistic 'data'.
2. Note, e.g., to choose from the most recent publication, K Zimmer's

review (Word 21.123-36 (1965) ) of my monograph The Phonology of Modern
Standard Turkish (No. 6 of the Indiana University Uralic and Altaic pieces
(1961) in which the reviewer proposes a revision of my '/y/ -umlaut' rule.
Even Jean Deny notes an assimilation 'par le contact de la semi-voyelle y'.
be perfect, imperfect; merged; mixed, true, false; and incomplete, complete.

The fourth type of rule is a constituent structure rule. These have
been discussed in great detail in the linguistic literature (Postal, 1964) . A
constituent structure rule (hereafter called CS rule) is as in S -* NP + VP.
A CS rule differs from a taxonomic rule in that the ,ianalytic
expansions of a node of a
CS rule are not kinds of the higher node. Thus, a NP is not a kind of S. Fur-
thermore, CS rules differ from all other rules in that the former are the most
stringently ordered. They are ordered both horizontally and vertically. There
is only one set of rules which may accompany a consLituent structure as shown
in Figure 9.
A I. A --) BC (not permitted)

2. B--DE
S 3. C -- FG C B
(Rules for Figure 9) FD
D E F G F G D E
Behavioral Event: 1 2 3 4 (impossible sequence)
(Constituent Structure Rule)
Figure 9
CS rules are analytic in that all A's are composed of a B and a C.

Each symbol is expanded until no further expansions are possible. CS rules
as outlined here are not to be confused with Phrase Structure rules as used in
linguistics (Bach, 1964). Some phrase structure rules are CS rules, while others at
paradigmatic and tree rules. A phrase structure grammar in that sense em-
ploys rules of at least three types. The main definition of a CS rule is that
it is ordered rigorously, i.e., horizontally and vertically and its final output
represents a sequential arrangement which is mean ingful whereas 'he sequential
arrangement of a paradigmatic rule is totally meaningless and the output of a
tree rule or a taxonomic rule only sligI.tly less so.
A CS Rules: i. A --- BC
2. --k DE
B
B C 3. C -- FG
D E F G Transformational Rule:
BC ---) CB
Resultant Rules:
1. A -- CB
2. C --) FG
3. B---) DE
Figure 10 (Example of a Transformational Rule ope rating upon . set of CS Rulesl
The last kind of rules are transformational rules which is a misnomer

perhaps. Transformation rules are distinguished by the fact that they operate
(thus perhaps better called operatives or processes) upon nodes and change
the relationships of nodes. Upon completion of the operation, a new structure
will have been derived. Sometimes the output alone is meaningful without an
attendant structure since the old structure plus the transformation rule struct-
urally describes the output. Cf. Figure 10.
Transformational rules are applied to paradigmatic, constituent
structure, tree, and taxonomic rules in order to overcome particular re-
strictions which are naturally inherent in all these rules. Inherent restrictions
which all these rules possess are as follows:
(1) No deletions are possible as in A --~
(2) No rules of the form A --4 AB (or A ---) BA) are permitted.
(3) No reduction rules of the form AB ---) A are permitted.
(4) No permutation rules of the form AB --) BA are permitted
(applies to CS Rules only) (Bach, 1964: 35-6).
It can be seen then that there are some restrictions on these rules
which they hold in common as well as various other restrictions which apply
to different rules as outlined above. Transformational rules serve to alleviate
these restrictions in such a way that transformational rules can delete elements,
replace elements, expand elements, reduce structures, induce permutations,
and supply recursiveness whenever it is needed (Bach, 1964: 70).
Above, we have briefly outlined five different types of rules although
undoubtedly many more types exist.
The purpose of this presention of various types of rules has been to
bring to the foreground the fact that there exists a wide range of types of
riiles and that in the examination of human behavior preparatory to a theory
of Ethnoscience, to esqt;aliqsh
it will he necessfry which types oi r ile q are
most appropriate to liumnanbe:Lavior data or to particular segments of human
behavior data. That is, unless we have a spectrum of models before us, we,
in reality, have nothing with which to compare human behavior. The present-
ation of the various types of rules in this paper has been an attempt to bring
this spectrumn into focus.
REFERENCES CITED
Bach, Emmon
1964 An Introduction to Transfornational Grammars, Holt Rinehart
and Winston.
Benedict, Ruth
1932 Configurations of Culture in North America, AA 34. 1-27.
1934 Patterns of Culture, Houghton Mifflin Co. , Boston.
Burling, Robbins
1964 Cognition and Componential Analysis: God's Truth or Hocus-Pocus?,
AA 66.20-8.
Chomsky, Noam
1964 Current Issues in Linguistic Theory in Jerry A. Fodor and
Jerrold J. Katz (eds.), The Structure of Language: Readings
in the Philosophy of Language, Prentice Hall, pp. 50-118.
1965 Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, M.I.T. Press.
Colby, B.N.
1966a Ethnographic Semantics: A Preliminary Survey, Current
Anthropology 7. 3- 32.
1966b Cultural Patterns in Narrative, Science 151.793-8.
Goodenough, W. H.
1956 Componential Analys is and the Study of Meaning, Lg 32.195 - 216.
Hammel, E. A.
1965 Introduction in E.A. Hammel (ed.), Formal Semantic Analysis,
AA 67: 5, Pt 2.1-8.
Hempel, Carl G.
1965 Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy
of Science, The Free Press.
Jakobson, Roman
1938 Observations sur le classement phonologique des Consonnes,
Proceedings of the Third International Congress of Phonetic
Sciences, Ghent.
Kay, Paul
1966 Comment on B.N. Colby, Ethnographic Semantics: A Preliminary
Survey, Current Anthropology 7.20-3.
Leach, Edmund R.
1961 Rethinking Anthropology, The Athlone Press.
1964 Anthropological Aspects of Language: Animal Categories and
Verbal Abuse in Eric Lenneberg (ed.), New Directions in the
Study of Language, M.I.T. Press, pp. 23-64.
Levi-Strauss, Claude
1963 Structural Anthropology, Basic Books, Inc., New York.
Lounsbury, F. G.
1956 A Semantic Analysis of the Pawnee Kinship Usage, Lg 32, 158-94.
1964 The Formal Analysis of Crow- and Omaha-Type Kinship Termi-
nologies in Ward H. Goodenough (ed.), Explorations in Anthro-
pology, pp. 351-94.
1965 Another View of the Trobriand Kinship Categories in E.A. Hammel
(ed.), Formal Semantic Analysis, AA 67:5, Pt. 2. 142-85.
Merton, Robert K.
1957 Social Theory and Social Structure, Rev. Ed., The Free Press.
Nutini, Hugo G.
1965 Some Considerations on the Nature of Social Structure and Model
Building: A Critique of Claude Levi-Strauss and Edmund Leach,
AA 67.707-31.
Opler, M.E.
1947 Rule and Practice in the Behavior Pattern Between Jicarilla
Apache Affinal Relatives, AA 49A453- 62.
Postal, Paul
1964 Constituent Structure: A Study of Contemporary Models of
Syntactic Description, RCPAFL 30, supplement to IJAL 30:1.
Roberts, J.M., M.J. Arth, and R.R. Bush

1959 Games in Culture, AA 61.597- 605.
and B. Sutton-Smith
1962 Child Training and Game Involvement, Ethnology 1.166-85.
, B. Sutton-Smith, and A. Kendon
1963 Strategy in Games and Folktales, Journal of Social Psychology
63.185-99.
Zetterberg, Hans
1963 On Theory and Verification in Sociology, The Bedminster Press.
NOTES
I. I am grateful to M. Micklin, M. Adenwala for reading various versions

of this paper. However, I take full responsibility for the material contained
the re in.
2. This paper is programmatic only and therefore, as has been pointed

out, has no substantive content.
3. Needless to say, we do not have definitions and descriptions of per-
formances yet. Likewise, we lack symbols such as vocabulary syinbols,
operators, etc.
4. See Chomsky (1965) and the bibliography contained therein.

5. Items in parentheses are components; the other items are lexical.

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The Goals of Ethnoscience

1. In this paper I am going to discuss recent developments in anthro-

in a play-acting or role-playing context would be affirmative permissible and

The answer to this essentially terminological question seems to

2. The goals outlined above are by no means new in the anthropological

behavioral variations that are possible in human action. Template, on the

"In brief, it is unfortunately the case that no adequately formal-

that it attempts to specify and describe. Thus a proposed opera-

"Comparison is a matter of butterfly collecting--of classification,

Here we can see some of Leach's affinities to Levi-Strauss; however, Leach

and still employ a finite model.

3. The following is a discussion of rules as presently used in anth-

Figure 1 (A true paradigm) (Rules for a true paradigm)

Since there is no requirement on internal ordering within a paradigm, there

that is, both horizontally and vertically. Thus, there is no requirement

Figure 3 (A 'true' tree) (Rules for Figure 3)

Figure 4 (Example of lack of horizontal ordering in the 'true tree of Figure 3)

As can be seen from Figure 4, a great number of serial orderings

(Imperfect paradigm) (Rules for imperfect paradigm)

Figure 6 (A merged true perfect paradigm and a true perfect tree)

(Rules for Figure 6)

Figure 7 (Mixed hierarchy for a false perfect tree)

(Rules for Figure 7)

I think it unlikely, however, that there would be this sort of prejudice

2. Note, e.g., to choose from the most recent publication, K Zimmer's

be perfect, imperfect; merged; mixed, true, false; and incomplete, complete.

A I. A --) BC (not permitted)

CS rules are analytic in that all A's are composed of a B and a C.

Figure 10 (Example of a Transformational Rule ope rating upon . set of CS Rulesl

The last kind of rules are transformational rules which is a misnomer

Roberts, J.M., M.J. Arth, and R.R. Bush

I. I am grateful to M. Micklin, M. Adenwala for reading various versions

2. This paper is programmatic only and therefore, as has been pointed

4. See Chomsky (1965) and the bibliography contained therein.

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