ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEWER

From Atty. Elman’s PPT, LA’s transcription and JECYlanan digests

Administrative Law -NTC, LTFRB, Insurance Commission, ERB, HLURB, Bureau of
- is a branch of public law which fixes the organization of Mines and Geo-sciences
government, determines the competence of administrative (4) ) Administrative agencies created to regulate private
authorities who execute the law and indicates to individual businesses and individuals under police power.
the remedies for violation of his rights. -SEC, Dangerous Drug Board, CID, PRC
-is a system of legal principles which settles the conflicting (5) Administrative agencies that adjudicate and decide
claims of the executive and administrative authorities on one industrial controversies.
hand and of the individual or private right on the other. -NLRC, POEA
-it deals which powers and procedures of administrative (6) Administrative agencies that grant privileges.
agencies, including judicial review. -GSIS, SSS, PAO, Phil. Veterans Administration
(7) Administrative agencies making the government a private
Scope of Administrative Law party.
-All portions of public law concerning executive and - COA, SSS adjudication Office
administrative officials.
Republic of the Philippines or GRP
Purpose of administrative Law -refers to the corporate government entity through which the
-The protection of private rights. Its subject matter is the functions of the government are exercised as an attribute of
nature and mode of exercise of administrative power and the sovereignty, and in this are included those arms through
system of relief against administrative actions. which such political authority is made effective whether they
be provincial, municipal or other form local government.
Function of Administrative Law
-To make the government machinery work well and in an National Government
orderly manner. -refers to the central government consisting of the 3 branches
or department of the government.
Origin of Administrative Law -refers to the entire machinery of the central government,
- In legislation and preceds from the increased functions of composed of the executive, legislative and judicial
individuals because of complexities of modern society. Thus, a departments as distinguished from the different forms of local
new venture so called fourth branch of the government. governments.
NOTE: The National Government does not include the
Why is it coined as the fourth branch of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. However, the
government? Government of the Republic of the Philippines includes the
- Basically because there are administrative bodies created by National Government.
statues which are given powers by the Legislature, classified
as quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. Is Central Bank part of the National Government?
The reason for this is the multiplication of the activities of man CENTRAL BANK VS. CA, ABLAZA
in the outset. There were but few activities that have to be (April 22, 1975)
regulated by the State. But subsequently, the State through FACTS: A construction of an office was awarded to Ablaza by
the legislature and the courts found it necessary to create Central Bank. No formal contract was executed but the work
agencies in order to de-clog court dockets. The State found it commenced. However, after one month, Central Bank
unable to keep up with the various activities of individuals. terminated the construction. Trial court ruled in favor of
Thus, there was a so-called venture into the fourth branch of Ablaza.
the government which is actually a delegation of legislative National Government cannot dispense funds without
power to the administrative bodies. the requisite certification of availability. In this case, there
Administrative Body Judicial Body was none. Hence, Central Bank contends that there was no
perfected contract of sale due to the absence of such
General distinction: requisite.
HELD: The Central Bank is an entity separate and distinct
Its function is primarily primary duty is to decide from the National Government. The Central Bank is indeed a
regulatory even if it conducts legal rights between private government instrumentality but it was created as an
hearings and determines parties affecting their autonomous body under RA 265, “ to administer the monetary
controversies to carry out its property or liberty. and banking system of the republic
regulatory power. It does not depend on the National Government for the
As to the nature of the function being performed financing of its operations. It is the national government that
Wide array of activities; It Only one function – judicial occasionally resorts to it for the needed budgetary
embraces all the laws that accommodations.
provides the structure of the The Central Bank is an entity separate and distinct from the
government. National Government. "National Government" refers only to
As to how rules are applied the central government, consisting of the legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the government, as
Wider Discretion in the Utmost observance of the distinguished from local governments and other governmental
exercise of its powers Rules of Court entities and is not synonymous, therefore, with the terms The
Government of the Republic of the Philippines" or "Philippine
Government", which are the expressions broad enough to
include not only the central government but also the
Types of Administrative Bodies provincial and municipal governments, chartered cities and
(1) Administrative agencies created to carry on governmental other government-controlled corporations or agencies, like the
functions. Central Bank.
-BIR, BoC, CSC, LRA Hence, there was a perfected contract of sale in
(2) ) Administrative agencies created to perform business which Central Bank is liable.
services for the public.
-Phil. Postal Authority, PNR, NFA, NHA Is the National Coconut Co within the term GRP?
(3) ) Administrative agencies created to regulate businesses BACANI VS NACOCO
affected with public interest.
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 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEWER
From Atty. Elman’s PPT, LA’s transcription and JECYlanan digests
FACTS: There was a civil case involving NACOCO as
defendant. NACOCO requested for copies of stenographic
notes and there was payment for such notes. The COA
disallowed such payment. So an action was filed by the
stenographers to reimburse them of such fees paid to them.
HELD: NACOCO has a corporate personality separate and
distinct from the GRP. It is not within the scope of GRP. Thus, it
is not exempt from payment for stenographic notes.
GRP do not include government entities which are given
a corporate personality and distinct from the government and
which are governed by the Corporation Law. Their powers,
duties, and liabilities have to be determined by the light of
that law and of their corporate charters. They, like NACOCO,
do not therefore come within the exemption clause in Section
16 of the Rules of Court.
Are GOCCS included in the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines?
-Yes, if such GOCC performs sovereign tasks. The Government
of the Republic of the Philippines refers only to that
government entity through which the functions of the
government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and
in this are included those arms through which political
authority is made effective whether they be provincial ,
municipal, or other form of local government. These are what
we call municipal corporations. They do not include
government entities which are given a corporate personality
separate and distinct from the government and which are
governed by the Corporation Law.
Is the University of the Philippines a part of the GRP?
-The University of the Philippines has a separate identity from
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
Is ARMM a part of the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines?
-Yes, because it becomes a manifestation of political authority
—An instrument where the sovereign powers of the
government are exercised.
Instrumentality as defined in EO 292
-Any agency of the National Government not integrated within
the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
through a charter.
-When the law vests in a government instrumentality
corporate powers, the instrumentality does not become a
corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a
government instrumentality exercising not only governmental
but also corporate powers
MIAA VS CA
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the lands used by the
MIAA are exempt from real estate taxes imposed by the Local
Government Code. The first reason for this is that MIAA is not
a GOCC but rather an instrumentality of the National
Government and therefore exempt from Government taxation
under Section133 of the Local Government Code. MIAA is a
government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to
perform efficiently its governmental functions.
A government instrumentality like MIAA falls under Section
133 (o) of the Local Government Code, which states:
Section 133. Common limitations on the Taxing powers of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not
extend to the levy of the following:XXX
(o) Taxes, fee or charge of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities and local
government units.
REPUBLIC VS RAMBUYONG
FACTS: Alfredo Chu filed a case for collection of sum of
money against NPC. He was represented by Atty. Rambuyong
who is the incumbent vice-mayor of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
NPC files a motion for inhibition of Atty. Rambuyong arguing
that sangunian members are prohibited to appear as counsel
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before any court wherein any office, agency or instrumentality
of the government is an adverse party. NPC contented that
being a government-owned and controlled corporation, it is
embraced within the term instrumentality.
HELD: Yes, Section 2 of the Administrative Code of 1987 is
clear and unambiguous. It categorically provides that the term
“instrumentality” includes GOCCs. NPC is a GOCCS. Thus, NPC
is clearly an instrumentality of the government.
MACEDA VS MACARAIG
HELD: NPC is a government instrumentality tasked to
undertake development of hydroelectric generation of power
and production of electricity from other sources XXX to
improve quality of life of people pursuant to the State policy in
Article 2, Section 9 of the Constitution.
ISA VS CA
FACTS: The Iron and Steel Authority has the basic function of
promoting and developing the iron and steel industries. It was
created for a term of 5 years from 1973 to 1978. Its statutory
term was extended up to 1988. In 1983, it instituted
expropriation proceedings covering the properties of Maria
Kristina Fertilizers but while the case was pending, the
statutory term of ISA expired.
ISSUE: WON there can be substitution by the plaintiff from
ISA to GRP.
HELD: If the authority was incorporated, then it has a
personality separate and distinct from the principal.
Therefore, no substitution. In this case, however, ISA is a non-
incorporated authority. Upon the expiration of its statutory
term, all its functions, responsibilities and duties including
assets and liabilities are reverted back to or reassumed by the
principal which is GRP.
NOTE: For incorporated agencies, GRP will not be able to
substitute them because they have an independent
personality.
Incorporated agencies of the government NOT included
in the term GRP:
(1) National Power Corporation
(2) Philippine Ports Authority
(3) Philippine National Railways
(4) Public Estates Authority
(5) National Housing Authority
(6) Philippine National Oil Company
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
-Courts cannot and will not determine a controversy involving
a question within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal,
especially where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring special knowledge of an
administrative body or officer. Even if such an action is filed in
court, but which would require expertise or skills of an
administrative officer, the courts will defer the matter to the
authority of the administrative agency.
-It applies when enforcement of a claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have
been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body.
Purpose of the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
(1) To give the administrative agency the opportunity to
decide the controversy by itself correctly and so as to enable
the said administrative tribunal to correct its error
(2) To prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts so
as to de-clog court dockets.
SAGIP KALIKASAN VS PADERANGA
FACTS: Allegedly, MV General Ricarte of NMC shipped
container vans containing illegal forest products from
Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. Gen. Dagudag issued a seizure
receipt to NMC container Lines. IN a complaint filed before
Judge Paderanga by a Roger Edma. The judge issued a writ or
replevin ordering the Sherrif to tale possession of the forest
products.
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEWER
From Atty. Elman’s PPT, LA’s transcription and JECYlanan digests
ISSUE: WON Judge Paderanga violated the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.
HELD: Yes. Under the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, courts
cannot take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies of special competence. The DENR is
the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws.
The DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial
intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its
jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of
the replevin suit filed by private respondent constitutes an
unjustified encroachment into the domain of administrative
agency’s prerogative.
GO VS RAMOS
FACTS: Ramos initiated a deportation proceeding against Go
before the Bureau of Deportation and Immigration. In a
resolution, Associate Commissioner dismissed the complaint.
However, the Board of Commissioners reversed said
dismissal. Go filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
application of injunctive reliefs before the RTC. In essence,
they challenged the jurisdiction of the Board to continue with
the deportation proceedings.
HELD: There can be no question that the board has the
authority to hear and determine the deportation case against
a deportee and in the process determine also the question of
citizenship raised by him. However, this Court laid down the
exception to the primary jurisdiction enjoyed by the
deportation board. When the evidence submitted by a
deportee is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to
immediate review should also be recognized and the courts
shall promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings.
What is the exception to the primary jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Immigration over deportation cases and
when judicial intervention is allowed?
-When the court itself believes that there is substantial
evidence supporting the deportee’s claim of citizenship; or
when the evidence submitted by the deportee is conclusive of
his citizenship.
NOTE: Citizenship proceedings are sui generis, in that, unlike
other cases, res judicata does not generally obtain.
RULE: The doctrine applies only whenever it is the court and
the administrative agency which have concurrent jurisdiction.
The doctrine is inapplicable where there is concurrence of
jurisdiction between two disciplining authorities over a case,
the regular courts not being involved.
Commision on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP)
-created by EO 561.
-Authority of COSLAP to resolve land disputes is limited only to
those involving public lands or those covered by specific
license from the government, i.e. pasture lease agreements,
timber concessions or reservation grants.
MACHADO VS GATDULA AND COSLAP
FACTS: The dispute involves two adjoining lots of Machado
and Gatdula. Gatdula wrote a leter to COSLAP requesting
assistance because Machado allegedly blocked the right of
way to his property. COSLAP issued a resolution directing
Machado to reopen the right of way in favor of Gatdula.
ISSUE: WON COSLAP has jurisdiction over the dispute.
HELD: No. The terms of the law clearly do not vest on the
COSLAP the general power to assume jurisdiction over any
land dispute or problem. Thus, under EO 561, the instances
when the COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited only
to those involving public lands or those covered by specific
license from the government, such as pasture lease
agreements, timber concessions, or reservation grants.
Moreover, the issues raised in the present case primarily
involve the application of the Civil Code provisions on Property
and Easement of Right of Way. IN this case, COSLAP assumed
jurisdiction and even issued writs of execution and demolition
against the Machados. Its lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured
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by the parties’ participation in the proceedings. The
Machado’s can question its jurisdiction at anytime, even
during appeal or after final judgment.
UST VS SANCHEZ
FACTS: Sanchez filed a complaint for damagesaainst the UST
anf its board of directors before the RTC for their unjustified
refusal to release his transcript of records. Petitioner claims
that the CHED has primary jurisdiction to resolve matters
pertaining to school controversies, and the filing of the instant
case was premature.
HELD: Rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where
administrative agency exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
functions. Thus, an essential requisite for this doctrine to
apply is the actual existence of quasi-judicial power. However,
petitioners have not shown that the CHED possesses any such
power to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions. Indeed,
Section 8 of RA 7722 certainly does not contain any express
grant to the CHED of judicial or quasi-judicial power. Here, RTC
has jurisdiction over Sanchez’ complaint for damages against
UST. He did not violate the rule against Forum Shopping when
he sought recourse with both CHED and RTC.
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board or HLURB (PD
957/PD 1344)
-Section 1, PD 1344: NHA’s exclusive jurisdiction:
(1) Unsound real estate business practices;
(2) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by
subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project
owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
(3) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman.
CT TORRES, INC. vs. HIBIONADA
FACTS: Petitioner sold a subdivision lot on installments to
private respondent. The payment had been completed and as
such he demanded the delivery of the certificate of title to the
subject land. When demand was futile, he filed a complaint
against them for specific performance and damages in the
RTC.
HELD: RTC has no jurisdiction. The complaint for specific
performance with damages filed with the RTC for failure to
deliver the Certificate of Title comes under the jurisdiction of
HLURB. HLURB is competent to award damages although this
is essentially a judicial power exercisable ordinarily only by
the courts. HLURB must interpret and apply contract and
award damages whenever appropriate.
HLC CONST vs. EMILY HOMES
FACTS: Respondent Emily homes Subdivision Homeowners
Association and the 150 individual members filed a civil action
for breach of contract, damages and attorney’s fees with the
RTC because the petitioner used substandard materials in the
construction of their houses.
HELD: It is the HLURB, not the trial court which has
jurisdiction over respondents’ complaint regarding the use of
substandard materials in the construction of their houses.
CHUA VS ANG
FACTS: Petitioner buyers and respondent developers
executed a Contract to Sell a condo unit. Despite the lapse of
3 years, Developers failed to construct and deliver the
contracted condo unit to petitioner. Petitioner filed a
complaint before the Office of the prosecutor of Pasig,
accusing the private respondents, as officers and directors of
violating PD 957.
ISSUE: WON the HLURB has jurisdiction to entertain criminal
complaints lodged with the city prosecutor.
HELD: No. Significantly, nothing in PD 957 vests the HLURB
with jurisdiction to impose the Section 39 criminal penalties.
What the Decree provides is the authority of the HLURB to
impose administrative fines under Section38, as implemented
by the Rules Implementing the Subdivision and Condominium
Buyer’s Protective Decree. The implementing rules, for their
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEWER
From Atty. Elman’s PPT, LA’s transcription and JECYlanan digests
part, clarify that the implementation and payment of
administrative fines shall not preclude criminal prosecution of
the offender under Section39 of the Decree. Thus, the
implementing rules themselves expressly acknowledge that
two separate remedies with differing consequences may be
sought under the decree, specifically, the administrative
remedy and the criminal prosecution.
NOTE: HLURB is competent to award damages.
HOME BANKERS VS CA
HELD: Under Section 18 of PD 957, it is provided that no
mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or
developer without prior written approval of the National
Housing Authority. Such approval shal not e granted unless it
is shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used
for the development of the condominium or subdivision
project and effective measures have been provided to ensure
such utilization.
Notwithstanding that petitioner became the owner of the
subject lots by being the highest bidder in the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, it must be remembered that it was first a
mortgagee of the same. Since the lot was mortgage in
violation of Section 18 of PD 957, HLURB has jurisdiction to
declare the mortgage void insofar as private respondents are
concerned and to annul the foreclosure sale.
CADIMAS VS CARRION
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent entered in a contract to sell
whereby the former sold a townhouse unit to the latter,
According to the petitioner, Respondent had violated par. 8 of
said contract when she transferred ownership of the property
to respondent Hugo. Allegedly, petitioner asked respondent
Carrion in writing to explain the alleged violation but the latter
ignored petitioner’s letter. Respondent Hugo argued that the
HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint because the
ultimately, the sole issue to be resolved was whether
petitioner, as the owner and developer of the subdivision on
which the subject property stood, was guilty of committing
unsound real estate business practice.
HELD: Not every controversy involving a subdivision or
condominium unit falls under the competence of the HLURB.
The mere allegation of relationship between the parties does
not automatically vest jurisdiction in the HLURB. For an action
to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, the
decisive element is the nature of the action as enumerated in
Section 1 of PD 1344. The complaint must sufficiently describe
the lot as a subdivision lot and sold by the defendant in his
capacity as a subdivision developer to fall within the purview
of PD 1344. Here, petitioner sought the cancellation of the
contract and the recovery of the possession and ownership of
the townhouse. Clearly, the complaint is within the jurisdiction
of the RTC.
ARRANZA vs. BF HOMES
HELD: The HLURB and not the SEC has jurisdiction over a
complaint filed by subdivision homeowners against a
subdivision developer under receivership for specific
performance regarding basic homeowners' needs such as
water, security and open spaces.
The fact that respondent is under receivership does not divest
the HLURB of that jurisdiction since a corporation is not
dissolved even if it is under receivership.
HLURB has jurisdiction since the principal action is not
pecuniary in nature. The primary action is the enforcement of
the contract.
NB: This case was prior to RA 8799 (May 30, 2000), which
provides that RTC has jurisdiction over intra-corporate matters
involving the subdivision, homeowners on one hand and the
developer on the other.
MARINA PROPERTIES vs. CA
FACTS: Carlos Construction was the principal contractor as to
the construction of a condo of Marina. He was allowed to buy
one unit as an incentive. Marina refused payment from Carlos
Construction as to the condo it bought. Carlos filed damages
before the RTC and an action for specific performance before
the HLURB.
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HELD: There is no forum shopping since there are two
separate causes of action. Collection for a sum of money is
different from breach of a contract to sell and purchase.
Securities Regulation Code (RA 8799)
-RA 8799 amended PD 902-A and transferred jurisdiction of
SEC over intra-corporate or partnership cases to the courts.
SEC VS INTERPORT RESOURCES
ISSUE: WON SEC has statutory authority to initiate and file a
criminal suit against respondent corporation and its directors.
HELD: Yes, under Section 45 of the Revised Securities Act, the
Securities and Exchange Commission has the authority to
make such investigations as it deem necessary to determine
whether any person has violated or is about to violate or is
about to violate any provisions of this act. After a finding that
a person has violated the Revised Securities Act, the SEC may
refer the case to the DOJ for preliminary investigation and
prosecution.
It is imperative that the criminal prosecution be initiated
before the SEC, the administrative agency with the special
competence. The prosecution of offenses punishable under
the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulation Code
is initiated by the filing of a complaint with the SEC or by an
investigation conducted by the SEC motu proprio. Only after a
finding of probable cause is made by the SEC can the DOJ
instigate a preliminary investigation. Thus, the investigation
that was commenced by the SEC in 1995, soon after it
discovered questionable acts of the respondent, effectively
interrupted the prescriptive period. Given the nature and
purpose of the investigation conducted by the SEC, which is
equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the
DOJ in criminal cases, such investigation would surely
interrupt the prescriptive period.
Toll Regulatory Board (PD 1112)
-Toll regulatory Board (TRB) is with sufficient power to grant a
qualified person or entity with authority to construct, maintain
and operate a toll facility and to issue the corresponding toll
operating permit or Toll Operation Certificate (TOC)
PADUA vs. RANADA (Oct. 14, 2002)
FACTS: The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) issued a resolution
authorizing provisional toll rate adjustments at the Metro
Manila Skyway.
HELD: The TRB may grant and issue ex-parte to any
petitioner, without need of notice, publication or hearing,
provisional authority to collect the increase in rates.
An administrative agency may be empowered to approve
provisionally, when demanded by urgent public need, rates of
public utilities without a hearing. Provisional rates are by their
nature temporary and subject to adjustment in conformity
with the definitive rates approved after final hearing.
The remedy of the petitioner is file a petition for review of the
adjusted toll rates.
Under PD 1112, the decision of TRB is appealable to the Office
of the President within 10 days from date of promulgation of
such order granting this provisional toll rates.
FRANCISCO VS TRB
FACTS: On March 31, 1977, President Marcos issued PD 1112,
authorizing the establishment of toll facilities on public
improvements. The same decree created the Toll Regulatory
Board and invested it under Section 3 (a) (d) and (e) with the
power to enter, for the Republic, into contracts for
construction, maintenance and operation of tollways, grant
authority to operate a toll facility, issue therefore the
necessary Toll Operation Certificate and fix initial toll rates
and from time to time adjust the same after due notice and
hearing.
ISSUE: WON hearing is necessary for initial toll rates.
HELD: No. prefatorily, a clear distinction must be made
between the statutory prescription on the fixing of initial toll
rates, on one hand, and of periodic/interim or subsequent toll
rates, on the other. First, the hearing required under the said
provision refers to notice and hearing for the approval or
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEWER
From Atty. Elman’s PPT, LA’s transcription and JECYlanan digests
denial of petitions for toll rate adjustments—or the
subsequent toll rates, not to the fixing of initial toll rates. By
express legal provision, the TRB is authorized to approve the
initial toll rates without the necessity of a hearing. It is only
when a challenge on the initial toll rates fixed ensues that
public hearings are required.
Administrative Bodies have two kinds of functions:
(1) Quasi-legislative which is really the main power of
administrative tribunal; this is also referred to as the rule-
making power of the administrative bodies.
(2) Quasi-judicial powers which is also known as the power to
adjudicate of the power of the administrative to interpret and
apply not only the law but also the rules and regulations that
the administrative body has promulgated.
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
-refers to the power of the administrative agency or officer to
investigate facts or ascertain existence of facts and to make a
conclusion from such findings of facts. The exercise of this
power is only incidental to its main function which is the
enforcement of the law.
-In the absence of provision giving the quasi-judicial power to
the administrative body, then it is only performing a quasi-
legislative power. But almost all administrative agencies are
clothed with both powers—quasi-legislative and quasi judicial
powers.
Nature of quasi-judicial power
-It empowers the administrative tribunal to gather and
evaluate evidences. But more than that, the administrative
tribunal is given the power or task to apply the law to settle
the controversy conclusively and with finality because in the
absence of this authority, if the power given to the body is
merely to gather and evaluate evidence, then it is not a quasi-
judicial body.
NOTE: NBI and CHR not quasi-judicial entities. They only have
fact finding capacities. Their findings of evidences are merely
referred to some other some other government agency. The
case is different for the LTFRB which has the power to
determine whether an applicant deserves to be given a permit
 grant a provisional authority has long been settled. As the
IMPORTANT NOTE: The grant of quasi-judicial power should
not only be conferred but should instead be only incidental to
the administrative agency’s main task of implementing the
law in the specific fields of its expertise. Otherwise, the
agency becomes a specialized court of justice under the
judicial branch.
Quasi-judicial proceeding involves:
(1) Taking and evaluating evidence
(2) Determining facts based upon the evidence presented
(3) Rendering an order or decision supported by the facts
proved
The proper exercise of the quasi-judicial power
requires compliance of two conditions:
(1) The administrative body must properly acquire jurisdiction.
(2) Due process must be observed in the conduct of the
proceedings.
Jurisprudence
PCGG VS PENA
FACTS: There was a freeze order issued by the PCGG over the
assets and records of two government firms. This freeze order
was contested before the RTC. Based on a complaint, the RTC
issued a restraining order.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that RTC and the CA for that
matter have no jurisdiction over the PCGG. PCGG exercise
quasi-judicial functions, the commission us a co-equal body
with the RTC; and co-equal bodies have no power to control
the other. However, although under BP 129, the CA has
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exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgment of the
RTC and quasi-judicial bodies, EO14 specifically provides in
Section2 that the PCGG shall file all such cases, whether civil
or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan which shall have
exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof. Necessarily, those
who wish to question or challenge the commission’s acts or
orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same court,
the Sandigangbayan, which is vested with exclusive and
original jurisdiction. The SB’s decisions and final orders are in
turn subject to review on certiorari exclusively by this Court.
SANADO vs. CA (April 17, 2001)
FACTS: Sanado was granted a Fishpond Permit was cancelled
thereafter. He elevated the matter to the Office of the
President but his appeal was dismissed.
HELD: The reasons given by the Office of the President in
dismissing petitioner’s appeal are quite clear. Transferring or
subletting the fishpond granted to a licensee without the
consent or approval of the administrative body concerned, as
well as the failure to develop the area required by the
fisheries rules are definitely solid and logical grounds for the
cancellation of one’s license. The action of an administrative
agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or revoking, a
license, permit, franchise, or certificate or public convenience
and necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial. The act is
not purely administrative but quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
since it is dependent upon the ascertainment of facts by the
administrative agency, upon which a decision is to be made
and rights and liabilities determined.
EASTERN TELECOM vs. INT’L COMM (July 23, 2004)
FACTS: Respondent applied for and was given by the NTC a
Provisional Authority (PA) to install, operate and provide local
exchange service. Eastern Telecom was as also granted by
NTC a PA.
Respondent was then given a PA in Manila and Navotas, 2
areas already covered by petitioner. The issue being
contended is whether or not NTC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it grated provisional Authority to respondent
ICC.
HELD: The grant by NTC is not a grave abuse of discretion.
NTC took into account ICC’s technical and financial capabilities
and policy of healthy competition. The power of the NTC to
regulatory agency of the national government with jurisdiction
over all telecommunication entities, it is clothed with authority
and given ample discretion to grant a provisional permit or
authority. The court will not interfere with these findings of the
NTC, as these are matters that are addressed to its sound
discretion, being the government agency entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under its special and technical
forte. Moreover, the exercise of administrative discretion is a
policy decision and a matter that can best be discharged by
the government agency concerned, and not by the courts.
SPOUSES BALANGAUAN VS CA
FACTS:A complaint for Estafa was filed against Balangauan a
premier customer services representative of respondent bank,
HSBC who is in charge of Dwayne York’s account, a premier
client. Assistant prosecutor found no probable cause to hold
the petitioners liable to stand trial for the criminal complaint
of Estafa and/or qualified Estafa. Respondent’s motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied with finality by the DOJ.
The CA however reversed the resolution of the DOJ.
HELD: A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory
functions such that its award, determine the rights of right,
and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a
court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts
a preliminary investigation to determine probable cause to file
an information against the person charged with a criminal
offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the
former’s order or resolutions. In this cases, since the DOJ is
not a quasi-judicial body, Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution finds no application. Be that as it may, the DOJ
rectified the shortness of its first resolution by issuing a
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEWER
From Atty. Elman’s PPT, LA’s transcription and JECYlanan digests
lengthier one when it resolved respondent HSBC’s motion for
reconsideration.
UP Board of Regents vs. CA
FACTS: UP awarded a doctorate degree to an Indian national.
It was later found that she has plagiarized her thesis thus the
Board of Regents withdrew the degree. She contended that
the Board was already estopped.
HELD: Under the UP charter, the Board of Regents is the
highest governing body of the University of the Philippines. It
has the power to confer degrees upon the recommendation of
the University Council. It follows that if the conferment of a
degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of Regents is
also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to
withdraw what was granted without violating a student’s right.
An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if it
discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is not
rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than
bestowing a university’s highest academic degree upon an
individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit.
Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side of a
controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of. A party who has availed of the
opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to
have been denied due process. Due process in an
administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings
similar to those in the courts of justice.
CARIÑO vs. CHR
FACTS: The teachers who participated in a mass action were
either dismissed or suspended. While the appeal is pending
before the Supreme Court, the teachers also filed a case
before the CHR, which issued a subpoena to DECS Sec.
Cariño.
HELD: The Court declares the CHR to have no such power to
try and decide cases; and that it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency
in this country, or duplicate much less take the functions of
the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way
of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive
evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the
judicial function of the court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such,
the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals
or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function,
to repeat, the CHR does not have.
BIRAOGO VS PTC
HELD: The investigative function of the Philippine Truth
Commission will not supplant nor threaten the independence
of the Office of the Ombudsman. If at all, it will complement
the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ. As correctly
pointed out by the OSG, the function of the PTC is merely to
recommend prosecution, which is just a consequence of its
fact-finding investigation. Fact-finding is not adjudication and
it cannot be likened to the judicial function of the court of
justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office.
Forum Shopping
-is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has
been rendered in one forum, of seeking another (other than
by appeal or certiorari), or of instituting two or more actions
or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other would make a favorable
disposition.
“The desire to excel and the courage to pursue it”
 jst  6
-A party is not permitted to pursue simultaneously remedies in
two different forums Where forum-shopping is deemed to
exist, the summary dismissal of both actions is warranted.
Test to determine whether a party has violated the rule
against forum shopping:
(1) Where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or
(2) Where the final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in the other.
NOTE: The requirement to file certificate of non-forum
shopping, although not jurisdictional, is mandatory; if not
complied, summary dismissal is warranted.
Furthermore, a certificate of non-forum shopping signed by
the counsel alone is defective; unless clothed with special
authority.
What instances shall the rules against forum shopping
not apply?
-Forum shopping is not applicable if one case is administrative
and the other case is criminal in nature.
-There is also no violation of the rules against forum shopping
where an administrative case has been filed pertaining to the
administrative liability of a public officer and the same arty
files another for damages arising from the same set of facts
because there are two different causes of action.
-There is also no violation is a case is filed with the court and
another with an administrative tribunal which does not
exercise quasi-judicial power.
HLC CONST vs. EMILY HOMES
FACTS: Respondent Emily homes Subdivision Homeowners
Association and the 150 individual members filed a civil action
for breach of contract, damages and attorney’s fees with the
RTC because the petitioner used substandard materials in the
construction of their houses. The respondents’ defective
certification against forum-shopping which was signed only by
the president of EHSHA and not by all its members.
HELD: The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum
shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs in a case and the
signature of only one of them is insufficient. (The exception) In
cases however where it is highly impractical to require all the
plaintiffs to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping, it is
sufficient, in order nt to defeat the ends of justice, for one of
the plaintiffs, acting as representative, to sign the certificate
provided that the plaintiffs share a common interest in the
subject matter of the case or filed the case collectively raising
only one common cause of action or defense.
OMB VS VALERA
FACTS: The Special Prosecutor denied Valera’s Motion for
Reconsideration. Even before his Motion for reconsideration
was acted upon, Valera already filed with the CA wherein he
sought to nullify the order of preventive suspension. The CA
ordered to set aside the order of preventive suspension on the
ground that the Special prosecutor is not authorized by law to
sign and issue preventive suspension orders since he is
neither the ombudsman nor one of the Deputy Ombudsman.
HELD: Considering the finding that petitioner Special
Prosecutor had no authority to issue the March 17, 2004
preventive suspension order, the resolution of the issue of
WON the evidence of respondent Valera’s guilt is strong to
warrant his preventive suspension need not be passed upon
this point. Anent respondent’s alleged non-compliance with
the rule on non-forum shopping when he filed the petition for
certiorari with the CA, suffice it to state that the CA correctly
overlooked this procedural lapse. The merits of respondent’s
case are special circumstances or compelling reasons which
justified the CA’s relaxing the rule requiring certification on
non-forum shopping.
MONTEMAYOR vs. BUNDALIAN
FACTS: Bundalian accused Montemayor of accumulating
unexplained wealth. A complaint was indorsed to the
Philippine Commission against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC)
for investigation. A similar case was also filed before the
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEWER
From Atty. Elman’s PPT, LA’s transcription and JECYlanan digests
Ombudsman which was dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.
HELD: The earlier dismissal of the case does not render the
administrative case before the PCAGC as moot and academic.
As long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard
before judgment is rendered, the demands of due process are
sufficiently met. Petitioner voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of PCAGC by participating in the proceedings
before it. The decision of the Ombudsman does not operate
as res judicata in the PCAGC case. The doctrine of res
judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings,
not to the exercise of administrative powers. As the PCAGC’s
investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the
doctrine of res judicata finds no application in this case. The
case before the Ombudsman is criminal in nature while the
case before PCAGC is administrative in nature.
CABARRUS VS BERNAS
FACTS: Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed an administrative
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas for
alleged violations of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and
Code of Professional Responsibility. Jose Antonio Bernas avers
that he has not committed forum shopping because the
criminal action is not an action that involves the same issue
as those in a civil action and both suits can exist without
constituting forum shopping so long as the civil aspect has not
been prosecuted in the criminal case. He emphasized that
forum shopping only exists when identical reliefs are issued
by the same parties in multiple fora.
HELD: Rule is not applicable to agency not exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial function. In this case, there is no forum
shopping to speak of. Atty. Bernas, as counsel of Mr. Pascual,
Jr., merely requested the assistance of the NBI to investigate
the alleged fraud and forgery committed by Mr. Jesus
Cabarrus. The filing of a civil case for reconveyance and
damages before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City does not
preclude respondent to institute a criminal action. The rule
allows the filing of a civil case independently with the criminal
case without violating the circulars on forum shopping.
VELASQUEZ VS HERNANDEZ
FACTS: The assistant Schools Division Superintendent of the
DECS-CAR sent a letter to petitioner Velaszuez, informing him
of the alleged infractions committed by Respondent
Hernandez, such as solociting, acceptin, and receiving sums
of money, in exchange for transfer or promotion of
complainant teachers.
The committee issued an investigation Report recommending
the filing of administrative and criminal complaints against
respondents.
HELD: The rule on forum shopping would find no proper
application since the two cases although based on the same
essential facts and circumstances do not raise identical
causes of action and issues.
OMBUDSMAN VS RODRIGUEZ
HELD: In administrative cases involving the concurrent
jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body in
which the complaint is filed first, and which takes cognizance
of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other
tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. When
complainants first filed the complaint in the ombudsman,
jurisdiction was already vested on the ombudsman and could
no longer be transferred to the SB by virtue of a subsequent
complaint by the same complainants.
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER
-There must be a law creating this administrative tribunal and
granting it with the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations, this is the principal power of administrative
tribunal in order for it to be effective in performing their duties
it cannot be said that if they will be able to perform effectively
its authority under the law it is not given the power to
promulgate rules and regulations precisely because it is quite
improbable if not impossible for legislature to anticipate any
kind of concern which is administrative in nature. So the
“The desire to excel and the courage to pursue it”
 jst  7
matter of filling in the details of legislation may be delegated
to the administrative tribunal because of the complexity of the
world, the legislature cannot be expected to anticipate all of
the demands created by the multifarious and expanded
activity of individuals and enterprises.
Requirements for the administrative bodies’
promulgation of rules and regulations to be valid:
(1)The rules must be germane to the objects and purposes of
the law;
(2)The rules and regulations must conform to the general
standards that the law has prescribed; and
(3)The rules must relate solely to carrying out in effect the
general provisions of law
3 Kinds of laws which may be promulgated by the
administrative tribunal in the exercise of their quasi-
legislative power:
(1)Rules and regulations in order to fill in the details of the
law, which must not be contrary to the law itself.
(2)Rules in order to interpret the law
(3)Rules promulgated in order to determine a state of facts
upon which the enforcement of a law is made to depend
Requisites for valid delegation
(1) Completeness test – the law is complete in itself; must set
forth a policy to be executed
(2) Sufficient Standard test – the must fix a standard, the
limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable, to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions
Completeness test
-To avoid an undue delegation of legislative power to
administrative authorities, the law itself authorizing the
promulgation of the rules and regulation must be complete in
all its terms and provisions so as not to leave the judgment or
discretion to determine what the law shall be to the
administrative bodies.
-A law is stated to be complete when the (1) subject, (2)
manner, and (3) extent of its operation are stated in it.
-TEST: Whether its provisions are sufficiently definite and
certain to enable one to know his rights and obligations under
the law.
Sufficient Standard Test
-If the law is incomplete, the law must offer a sufficient
standard to specify the limits of the delegate’s authority,
announce the legislative policy, and specify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented.
-The standard is usually embodied in the law itself and this
serves as a guide to indicate the extent and the limit of the
discretion of the administrative authorities that they may
exercise under the statute.
Requisites for the validity of an administrative
regulation:
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature
(2) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the
legislature
(3) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed
procedure
(4) It must be reasonable
(5) It must be applicable to all
(6)It must be published (except for matters which are in
nature)
NOTE: If issued in excess of the rule making authority, no
binding effect upon the courts; treated as a mere
administrative interpretation of the law.
NOTE FUTHER: Mere absence of implementing rules cannot
effectively invalidate provisions of law, where reasonable
construction may be given.
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEWER
From Atty. Elman’s PPT, LA’s transcription and JECYlanan digests
NOTE EVEN FURTHER  A law authorizing the President to
suspend the effects of a certain law upon the happening of an
act and the ascertainment of the same be invested in the
President is valid. The President is merely complying with
what the law provides.
PBCOM vs. CIR
FACTS: BIR changed the prescriptive period from 2 years to
10 years in the matter of filing a claim for refund on excess of
income tax payment.
HELD: The rule issued by the BIR Commissioner violates the
law. It arrogates unto itself the power to legislate. The rule
must be germane to the object and purposes of the law and
must at all times be in conformity and within the scope and
powers as provided by the statute to the administrative
agency.
In this case, there can be no estoppel on the part of
the State where the administrative agency acting on behalf of
the State has made an error.
OPLE vs. TORRES
FACTS: Administrative Order 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" was
issued by President Ramos.
HELD: A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate
to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative
order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to
specific aspects in the administrative operation of
government. It must be in harmony with the law and should
be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying
out the legislative policy.
The SC rejects the argument that A.O. No. 308
implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code
of 1987. The Code is a general law and incorporates in a
unified document the major structural, functional and
procedural principles of governance. The establishment of a
national computerized identification reference system
requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state
policies, the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy
against dossier-gathering by the government, and choices of
policies. It deals with a subject that should be covered by a
law.
This calls for the adoption, implementation of
national state policies which should be thoroughly discussed
in the legislature. So this is unconstitutional. There must be a
law before the same is adopted.
DADOLE vs. COA
FACTS: Monthly allowances of RTC and MTC judges of
Mandaue City were increased. Mandaue City Auditor
disallowed such increase since DBM issued a circular wherein
monthly allowances of judges should not exceed P 1,000 in
cities and provinces and P 700 in municipalities.
HELD: Section 458 of RA 7160 allows the grant of additional
allowances to judges when the finances of the city
government allow. The said provision does not authorize
setting a maximum limit to the additional allowances granted
to judges.
Said circular is already amending the law, which is RA
7160. DBM has no authority to issue this order.
LUPANGCO vs. CA
FACTS: PRC ordered that candidates for the CPA board
exams are not allowed to participate in any review classes or
receive materials within 3 days prior to the examination day.
HELD: The order of PRC violated the rights of the students as
wells as the right to academic freedom of the school. The
issuance of a quasi-legislative rule must be reasonable.
FEDERACION vs. QUISUMBING
FACTS: Education Secretary Quisimbing issued an order
phasing out Spanish subject as part of the curriculum and
imposing the Arabic subject in an optional basis. The
Federacion contended that the order is arbitrary and violative
of due process.
HELD: The issuance of the order is a valid exercise of a
quasi-legislative power. It was made applicable to all similarly
situated. There was no violation of due process.
“The desire to excel and the courage to pursue it”
 jst  8
SANZ vs. ABAD SANTOS
FACTS: The board of examiners for nursing issued an order
requiring a periodic inspection of nursing schools and
prohibits the graduates of those schools which do not comply
with the minimum standards to take the board exams.
HELD: This is an exercise of a quasi-legislative power. Such
order applies to all enterprises similarly situated. This is a
reasonable exercise. There was no violation of due process.
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO VS CAMACHO
FACTS: Revenue issuance empowering the BIR to reclassify
cigarette brands.
HELD: It is clear that the revenue regulations unjustifiably
emasculate the operation of Section 145 of the National
Internal Revenue Commission (NIRC) because they authorize
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to update tax
classification of new brands every two years or earlier subject
only to its issuance of the appropriate revenue regulations,
when nowhere in Section 145 is such authority granted to the
Bureau.
Unless expressly granted to the BIR, the power to reclassify
cigarette brands remains a prerogative of the legislature
which cannot be usurped by the former.
ROMULO vs. HDMF
FACTS: A plan which provides for both provident/retirement
and housing benefits is exempted from the PAG-IBIG Fund
Coverage. In 1995, petitioner law firm was exempted.
Thereafter, HDMF issued a resolution providing that for a
company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund
Coverage, it must have a plan providing for both
retirement/provident and housing benefits superior to those
provided under the PAG-IBIG Fund. Waiver filed by petitioner
was disapproved by HDMF.
HELD: The HDMF Board Resolution is not valid. Said
resolution effectively amended Section 19 of PD 1752 which
merely requires as a pre-condition for exemption from
coverage the existence of either a superior
provident/retirement plan or a superior housing plan, and not
the concurrence of both plans. Administrative issuances must
not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain
consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Only
Congress can repeal or amend the law.
REPUBLIC VS MIGRINO
FACTS: The PCGG created The New Armed Forces of the
Philippines Anti-Graft Board to investigate the unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices of the AFP personnel both retires
and in active service.
HELD: The PCGG cannot do more than what it was
empowered to do. Its powers are limited. Its task is limited to
the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their
relatives and cronies. The PCGG cannot, though an order of its
chairman, grant itself additional powers which are not
contemplated in its enabling law, such are the formation of
the New Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft Boards.
CONTE vs. CA
FACTS: SSS retirees availed of RA 660 and SSS Resolution
No. 56. The SSS board promulgated said resolution providing
for a supplementary retirement pension plan for a retiring
employee. COA disallowed said claims, saying it violates RA
4968 (Teves Retirement Law) which bars the creation of
insurance or retirement plan other than the GSIS government
law.
HELD: It is doctrinal that in case of conflict between a statute
and an administrative order, the former must prevail. A rule
or regulation must conform to and be consistent with the
provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or
regulation to be valid. The rule-making power of a public
administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it
may not use either to abridge the authority given it by the
Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond
the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions
control with respect to what rules and regulations may be
promulgated by such a body, as well as with respect to what
fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEWER
From Atty. Elman’s PPT, LA’s transcription and JECYlanan digests
and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of
the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is
administering or which created it, or which are in derogation
of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. Though well-settled is
the rule that retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor
of the retiree, nevertheless, there is really nothing to interpret
in either RA 4968 or Res. 56, and correspondingly, the
absence of any doubt as to the ultra-vires nature and illegality
of the disputed resolution constrains us to rule against
petitioners. Resolution 56 contravenes the Teves Retirement
Law. This is an act arrogating unto itself the power belonging
solely to Congress. SSS had no authority to maintain and
implement such retirement plan, particularly in the face
statutory prohibition.
NOTE: The Teves Retirement Law (RA 4968) bars the creation
of any insurance or retirement plan—other than the GSIS—for
government employees to prevent the undue and iniquitous
proliferation of such plans.
GSIS VS COA
FACTS: RA No. 8291 otherwise known as “ The Government
Service Insurance System Act of 1997” was enacted and
approved. The GSIS Board of Trustees, upon recommendation
of the Management-Employee Relations Committee
(MERCOM) approved Board Resolution No. 326 wherein they
adopted the GSIS Employees Loyalty Incentive Plan (ELIP).
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners/appellants GSIS and GSIS
Board of Trustees have the power and authority to design and
adopt the questioned GSIS Retirement Financial Plan.
HELD: While GSIS has authority to create a financial scheme,
it is limited only to those availing of early retirement due to
reorganization in GSIS but are not yet qualified for either
optional or compulsory retirement. The retirement Financial
Plan adopted by the GSIS board is void as it is not an early
retirement scheme but is a form of reward for an employee’s
loyalty and lengthy service in order to help him enjoy the
remaining years of his life. The RFP is a supplementary
retirement plan prohibited by the Teves Retirement Law.
SEC VS INTERPORT CORP
FACTS: Board of Directors of IRC approved a Memorandum of
Agreement with Ganda Holdings Berhad (GHB). Under the
Memorandum of Agreement, IRC acquired 100% or the entire
capital stock of Ganda Energy Holdings, Inc. (GEHI), which
would own and operate a 102 megawatt (MW) gas turbine
power-generating barge. The SEC averred that it received
reports that IRC failed to make timely public disclosures of its
negotiations with GHB and that some of its directors,
respondents herein, heavily traded IRC shares utilizing this
material insider information. SEC Chairman issued an Order
finding that IRC violated the Rules on Disclosure of Material
Facts, in connection with the Old Securities Act of 1936, when
it failed to make timely disclosure of its negotiations with
GHB. In addition, the SEC pronounced that some of the
officers and directors of IRC entered into transactions
involving IRC shares in violation of Section 30, in relation to
Section 36, of the Revised Securities Act.
ISSUE: Sec. 8, 30 and 36 of the Revised Securities Act do not
require the enactment of implementing rules to them binding
and effective.
HELD: In the absence of any constitutional or statutory
infirmity, which may concern Sections 30 and 36 of the
Revised Securities Act, this Court upholds these provisions as
legal and binding. It is well settled that every law has in its
favor the presumption of validity. Unless and until a specific
provision of the law is declared invalid and unconstitutional,
the same is valid and binding for all intents and purposes. The
mere absence of implementing rules cannot effectively
invalidate provisions of law, where a reasonable construction
that will support the law may be given. That Full disclosure
Rules was promulgated by SEC only on July 24, 1996 while
Revised Securities Act was approved on February 23, 1982
does not render ineffective the law where a reasonable
construction may be given.
KMU VS DIRECTOR GENERAL
“The desire to excel and the courage to pursue it”
 jst  9
FACTS: EO 420 was issued by President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo which requires all government agencies and GOCC’s to
streamline and harmonize their Identification Systems,a nd
authorizing for such purpose the Director-General, National
Economic and Development Authority to implement the same,
and for other purposes.
HELD: There is also no dispute that these government
entities can individually adopt the ID format as specified in
Section 3 of EO 420. Such an act is certainly within the
authority of the heads or governing boards of the government
entities that are already authorized under existing laws to
issue IDs. A unified ID system for all these government
entities can be achieved in either of two ways. First, the heads
of these existing government entities can enter into a
memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform. If
the government entities can individually adopt a format for
their own ID pursuant to their regular functions under existing
laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID
format, especially if the uniform format will result in
substantial savings, greater efficiency, and optimum
compatibility. This is purely an administrative matter, and
does not involve the exercise of legislative power. Second, the
President may by executive or administrative order direct the
government entities under the Executive department to adopt
a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution provides that the "President shall
have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices." The same Section also mandates the President to
"ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
REVIEW CENTER VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS: President GMA ordered for a re-examination and
issued EO 566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the
establishment and operation of all review centers and similar
entities in the Philippines. CHED Chairman Puno approved
CHED Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006
(Implementing Rules and Regulations)
HELD: Said EO is invalid and a usurpation of legislative
function. The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR clearly expand
the CHED’s coverage under RA 7722. The CHED’s coverage
under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of
higher education and degree-granting programs in all public
and private post-secondary educational institutions.
FISCAL AUTONOMY
-Entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other
than those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and
utilize funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and
pursuant to the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require
from time to time.
-Recognizes the power the levy, assess and collect fees, fix
compensation rates not exceeding the highest rates
authorized by law and allocate and disburse such sums as
may be provided by law or prescribe by them in the discharge
of their functions.
-Formulate and implement their organizational structure and
compensation of their personnel.
-It’s a constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by
membership.
Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG)
-Agencies of government that had been given authority under
the Constitution or by law to have full freedom in the matter
of the allocation and utilization of their sources, including the
authority to make a reclassification or abrogating and creation
of positions
But this must be consistent or within the parameters of the
guidelines imposed under the Unified Position Classification
and Compensation System (UCCS) as administered by DBM
Budgets of these agencies cannot be reduced
Who are the members of CFAG
(1) COMELEC
(2) COA
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEWER
From Atty. Elman’s PPT, LA’s transcription and JECYlanan digests
(3) CSC
(4) The Judiciary
(5) Office of the Ombudsman
CHREA VS CHR (2004)
FACTS: CHR is a member of CFAG. CHR adopted a
reclassification scheme wherein it collapsed vacant positions
to provide additional funds. DBM denied the request.
HELD: Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not
vest the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and
create positions without approval of the DBM. While the
members of the Group are authorized to formulate and
implement the organizational structures of their respective
offices and determine the compensation of their personnel,
such authority is not absolute and must be exercised within
the parameters of the Unified Position Classification and
Compensation System established under RA 6758 more
popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law.
Thus, CHR cannot lawfully implement an upgrading and
reclassification of positions without DBM’s imprimatur. The
upgrading of FMO and PAO in CHR was not authorized by any
law.
CHREA VS CHR
HELD: As already settled in the assailed Decision of this
Court, the creation of respondent may be constitutionally
mandated, but it is not, in the strict sense, a constitutional
commission. Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, plainly
entitled "Constitutional Commissions," identifies only the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit. The mandate for the creation of the
respondent is found in Section 17 of Article XIII of the 1987
Constitution on Human Rights, which reads that –
Sec. 17. (1) There is hereby created an independent office
called the Commission on Human Rights. Thus, the
respondent cannot invoke provisions under Article IX of the
1987 Constitution on constitutional commissions for its
benefit. It must be able to present constitutional and/or
statutory basis particularly pertaining to it to support its claim
of fiscal autonomy.
NOTE: CHR has a certain degree of fiscal autonomy thru the
privilege of having it approved annual appropriations released
automatically and regularly, but not fiscal autonomy in its
extensive sense like using their appropriations to effect
changes in their organizational structure and their savings for
certain official purposes.
CSC vs. DBM
FACTS: In the General Appropriations Act of 2002, the DBM
was supposed to release P 285 M, the budget allotted by the
law to the CSC for that year. There was still a balance of P
5.8M which DBM refused to release to CSC since there was
revenue shortfall.
HELD: Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy
only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions of which
petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that petitioner
may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the
event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place
petitioner and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy
on equal footing with all others which are not granted the
same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction
established by the Constitution. The agencies which the
Constitution has vested with fiscal autonomy should thus be
given priority in the release of their approved appropriations
over all other agencies not similarly vested when there is a
revenue shortfall.
RE: CLARIFYING AND STRENGTHENING THE
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
SET UP OF PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADEMY
HELD: The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility
needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the
independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the
funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
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 jst  10
autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of
the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court,
of the independence and separation of powers upon which the
entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the
interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court,
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far
limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree
with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease
to be a meaningless provision. Clearly then, in downgrading
the positions and salary grades of SC Chief Judicial Staff
Officer and SC Supervising Judicial Staff Officer in the PHILJA,
the DBM overstepped its authority and encroached upon the
Court’s fiscal autonomy and supervision of court personnel as
enshrined in the Constitution; in fine, a violation of the
Constitution itself.
POWER TO SUBPOENA
-Basic principle is that administrative agencies do not have
the inherent power to require the attendance of witnesses,
unlike the court. There must be a law granting this power to
subpoena
-Executive Order 292, Book 7, Chapter 3, Section 13 grants
such power for agencies performing quasi-judicial functions
-Where the law gives authority to receive evidence, this
necessarily includes the authority to summon witnesses to
testify before the agency. The power to issue subpoena
necessarily follows from the authority given under the law to
gather evidence or take in testimony, otherwise the power
would be a futile exercise.
Where there is authority under the law for the receipt of
evidence, this includes the authority to require the production
of records and other relevant documents.
Administrative subpoena vs. Judicial Subpoena
(1) Administrative subpoena is issued if the purpose is to
gather or discover evidence on the basis of which there will be
an institution of the appropriate case before the appropriate
body
(2) Judicial subpoena is issued if the purpose is to prove in
evidence the charge
EVANGELISTA VS JARENCIO
ISSUE: Whether or not the Agency, acting thru its officials,
enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-
finding investigations.
HELD: Investigations are useful for all administrative
functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and
licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and
directing, for determining general policy, for recommending,
legislation, and for purposes no more specific than
illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should
be done. An administrative agency may be authorized to
make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or
judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is
to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative
or judicial nature may be taken 9 and may require the
attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely
investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into
evils calling for correction, and to report findings to
appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions.
administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the
course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is
involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and
even before the issuance of a complaint. It is not necessary,
as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint
of violation of law be pending or that the order be made
pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a
lawfully authorized purpose. The purpose of the subpoena is
to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon
which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. Its
obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony
sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a
lawfully authorized purpose, and that the proposed witness be
claimed to have information that might shed some helpful
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From Atty. Elman’s PPT, LA’s transcription and JECYlanan digests
light. Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to
summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on
litigations it does not follow that an administrative agency
charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have
and exercise powers of original inquiry. The administrative
agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent
upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can
investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated
or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When
investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute
to an administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform
itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law. In
sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the
requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the
authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite;
and (3) the information is reasonably relevant.
CONTEMPT
-It should be clearly defines and granted by law and its
penalty determined.
-EO 292 states that unless otherwise provided by law, the
agency may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid of RTC to
punish contumacy or refusal as contempt.
-It is limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony
and it cannot be exercised in furtherance of administrative
functions; this limitation derives from its nature being
inherently judicial and the need to preserve order in judicial
proceedings.
LASTIMOSA VS VASQUEZ
FACTS: Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. Because she and the Provincial
Prosecutor refused, or at any rate failed, to file a criminal
charge as ordered by the Ombudsman, an administrative
complaint for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross
neglect of duty and maliciously refraining from prosecuting
crime was filed against her and the Provincial Prosecutor and
a charge for indirect contempt was brought against them,
both in the Office of the Ombudsman. In the meantime the
two were placed under preventive suspension.
HELD: Section 15 (g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office
of the Ombudsman the power to punish for contempt, in
accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same
procedure and with the same penalties provided therein.
There is no merit in the argument that petitioner and
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for
contempt because their refusal arose out of an administrative,
rather than judicial proceeding, proceeding before the Office
of the Ombudsman. As petitioner herself says in another
context, the preliminary investigation of a case, of which the
filing of an information is quasi-judicial in character.
Implementing Rules or Interpretative Policies
-Administrative bodies have authority to interpret at first
instance the laws they are to execute.
-Interpretations are not binding upon courts but to have
force/effect of law and entitled to great respect.
-General policy is to sustain the decision of administrative
bodies on basis of separation of powers and their presumed
knowledgeability and expertise.
-Abrogation of previous acts or ruling of predecessor in office.
Requisites for validity of administrative rules and
regulations
(1) AUTHORIZED—its promulgation must be authorized by the
legislature. It is usually conferred by the charter itself of the
administrative body or by the law it is supposed to enforce.
(2) SCOPE OF AUTHORITY—it must be within the scope of the
authority given by the legislature. The regulation promulgated
must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority
conferred.
(3) ACCORDING TO THE PRESCRIBED PROCEDURE—it must be
promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
Promulgation of administrative regulations of general
“The desire to excel and the courage to pursue it”
 jst  11
application does not require previous notice and hearing. The
only exception is, where the legislature itself requires it and
mandates that the regulation be based on certain facts as
determined at an appropriate investigation.
(4) REASONABLE—it must not be unreasonable and arbitrary
as to violate due process. They must show a reasonable
relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be
issued.
(5) PUBLICATION—it must be published in full or it is no
publication at all.
Article 2 - New Civil Code of the Philippines
Laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion
of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided.
TAÑADA vs. TUVERA
HELD: The publication of presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound
by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of
its contents. But if the rule is simply for the internal guidance
of public officers and employees not of general application,
then even if such rule is not published, these are binding on
the public officers and employees.
Purpose of Publication
-To inform the public of the contents of the rules and
regulations so issued before their substantive rights are
affected.
-Publication requirement applies only where the issuance is of
general application and thus, intended for the public at large
-An administrative circular issued by POEA, in the absence of
such compliance with the requirement, cannot be given
effectivity.
When publication not required
(1) Interpretative rules and regulations
(2) Where the rules and regulations regulate only the staff or
the personnel of the administrative office
(3) Rules and regulations which are in the nature of letters of
instructions (LOI), which means they are merely guidelines to
be followed by the personnel
SEC VS PICOP
FACTS: PICOP filed an application before SEC for the
extension of its corporate existence for another fifty years.
The SEC, however, informed PICOP of the appropriate filing
fee of 12 million. PICOP posited that the 1986 circular should
prevail.
HELD: There is an evident violation of the due process
requirement. It is admitted that the SEC failed to satisfy the
requirements for promulgation when it filed the required
copies of the said regulation at the UP Law Center only 14
years after it was supposed to have taken effect.
The SEC violated the due process clause in so far as it denied
the public prior notice of the regulations that were supposed
to govern them. The SEC cannot wield the provisions of the
1990 Circular against PICOP and expect its outright
compliance. The circular was not yet effective during the time
PICOP filed its request to extend its corporate existence in
2002. In fact, it was only discovered in 2004.
GSIS vs. COA
FACTS: Executive Order 79 providing for reversion of inactive
status of a reserve officer was enacted on December 2, 1986.
Brig. Asuncion died on November 16, 1987. EO 79 was
implemented by the Board of Trustees of GSIS on December
11, 1987. GSIS approved his compulsory insurance coverage
but was disallowed by COA.
HELD: EO 79 was effective at the time of death of Brig.
Asuncion. Such EO was published on December 22, 1986 and
thus, effective 15 days thereafter, which is January 7, 1987.
Brig. Asuncion was already compulsorily covered as a member
of GSIS at the time of his death.
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEWER
From Atty. Elman’s PPT, LA’s transcription and JECYlanan digests
PITC vs. COA
FACTS: The PITC Board approved a car plan program for its
qualified officers. On July 1, 1989, RA 6758 took effect which
provided that other additional compensation being received
by incumbents as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the
standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized. To
implement RA 6758, DBM issued DBM-CCC No. 10. The
payment for expenses for such car plan was disallowed by
COA.
HELD: DBM-CCC No. 10 has no force and effect due to the
absence of publication. Subsequent publication thereof would
not cure the defect. Publication is required as a condition
precedent to the effectivity of a law.
PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT CORPORATION VS
LABOR SECRETARY
FACTS: Petitioner insists that it cannot be held liable for
illegal exaction as POEA Memo Circular No. 11 Series of 1983,
which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected
from applicants, is void for lack of publication.
HELD: POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983
must likewise be declared ineffective as the same was never
published or filed with the National Administrative Register.
POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for
the applicable schedule of placement and documentation fees
for private employment agencies or authority holders. Under
the said Order, the maximum amount which may be collected
from prospective Filipino overseas workers is P2,500.00. It is
thus clear that the administrative circular under consideration
is one of those issuances which should be published for its
effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Considering that
POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as
yet been published or filed with the National Administrative
Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced.
The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified
group, namely private employment agencies or authority
holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling in
Tañada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association of Service
Exporters vs. Torres, the administrative circulars questioned
therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namely
Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the
recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled
therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars
may not be enforced or implemented.
Section 3 and 4, book VII of EO 292
-Rules and regulation imposing a penalty as authorized by the
law itself must be filed and registered with the UP Law Center.
HONASAN VS DOJ PANEL
FACTS: The lower court finds the petition of Honasan II
without merit as regards to the jurisdiction of the said case. It
was provide that the authority of respondent DOJ Panel is
based not on the assailed OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001 but on
the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter
I, Title III, Book IV, governing the DOJ. Petitioner claims that it
is the Ombudsman, not the DOJ, that has the jurisdiction to
conduct the preliminary investigation under paragraph (1),
Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which confers
upon the Office of the Ombudsman the power to investigate
on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.
HELD: Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called
letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal
circular between the DOJ and the Office of the Ombudsman,
outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of
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 jst  12
the DOJ and of the Office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of
preliminary investigation. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001
DOES NOT regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in
general.
REPUBLIC vs. EXPRESS TELECOM
FACTS: In 1993, there were no more available frequencies
and thus, Bayantel’s application to operate a Cellular Mobile
Telephone System was archived. In 2000, NTC revived
Bayantel’s application and granted provisional authority to
operate applying its 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure.
Extelcom contends that NTC should have applied its Revised
Rules filed the National Administrative Register on February
1993.
HELD: The 1993 Rules have not yet been published, and
thus, the 1978 Rules were applied by NTC. The 1993 Revised
Rules have not taken effect at the time of the grant of the
provisional authority. There is nothing in the Administrative
Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the
UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force
and effect.
SEC VS GMA NETWORK
FACTS: The SEC issued Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of
1994, imposing new fees and charges and deleting the
maximum filing fee set forth in SEC Circular No. 1, Series of
1986, such that the fee for the filing of articles of
incorporation became 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital
stock plus 20% thereof but not less than P500.00.
HELD: The questioned memorandum circular is invalid as it
does not appear from the records that it has been published in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Art. 2 of the Civil
Code, provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided." No. 3531 and
indubitably regulates and affects the public at large. It cannot,
therefore, be considered a mere internal rule or regulation,
nor an interpretation of the law, but a rule which must be
declared ineffective as it was neither published nor filed with
the Office of the National Administrative Register.
Procedural Due Process vs. Substantial Due Process
(1) Procedural Due Process pertains to the method, the
manner by which the law is enforced or implemented
(2) Substantive Due Process refers to the law itself and not
merely to the procedures to how the law is implemented. This
means that the law itself must be fair, reasonable and just.
Due process in administrative adjudication
-Does not mean that there must be a formal trial type
investigation as that conducted in the courts of justice. In fact,
the administrative agencies are not strictly bound to observe
the rigid technicalities as applied in courts. Trial adjudication
may be dispensed with. Administrative bodies are given a
wide range of discretion so as long as there is observance of
the fundamental procedural and substantive due process.
-Essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard or seek
a reconsideration of the ruling complained of.
Requirements of due process in administrative
proceedings:
(1) There must be an impartial tribunal;
(2) Due notice and hearing must be complied with
(opportunity to be heard);
(3) Procedure must be consistent with fair play
(4)There must be opportunity for the court to determine
whether or not the applicable rules on evidence were
observed by the administrative tribunal.
Impartial tribunal
-Under Section 9 of the Magna Carta Law, there must be an
investigating committee composed of the Division School
Superintendent as the chair, and the supervisor of the division
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEWER
From Atty. Elman’s PPT, LA’s transcription and JECYlanan digests
as member together with a representative of the teachers
association, whether local, provincial or national.
-If there is no representative from the public school teacher’s
association, proceedings are nullified.
Q: What if the complainant is the Division School
Superintendent?
A: Members composing the committee should be left to the
Secretary of Education
-Exception to the Magna Carta Law: estoppel by laches
FABELLA VS TRIBUNAL
HELD: The various committees formed by DECS to hear the
administrative charges did not include a representative of the
local or, in its absence, any existing provincial and national
teacher’s organization. These committees were deemed to
have no competent jurisdiction and all proceedings
undertaken were necessarily void. None of the teachers
appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating
committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers’
organization as its representative in the said committee.
EMIN vs. DE LEON
FACTS: In 1991, certificates of eligibility of teachers were
doubtful of authenticity as signatures were clearly forged.
Petitioner was the one who gave the certificates for a fee. He
was found guilty of grave misconduct by the CSC.
HELD: Magna Carta Law is applicable to this case. However,
at this late hour, the proceedings conducted by the CSC can
no longer be nullified. Under the principle of estoppel by
laches, petitioner is now barred from impugning the CSC’s
jurisdiction over his case since he participated actively in the
proceedings. Due process was nevertheless observed in this
case.
ALCALA vs. VILLAR
FACTS: Ombudsman issued a resolution finding respondent,
who is a public school teacher, guilty of dishonesty and
dismissing him from service.
HELD: Respondent was afforded due process. Respondent in
this case should be barred under the principle of estoppel by
laches.
OMB VS MEDRANO
HELD: When an administrative charge is initiated against a
public school teacher, however, Section 9 of the Magna Carta
for Public School Teachers specifically provides that the same
shall be heard initially by an investigating committee
composed of the school superintendent of the division, as
chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any
existing provincial or national teachers’ organization, and a
supervisor of the division, as members. Significantly, The
Ombudsman Act of 1989 recognizes the existence of some
"proper disciplinary authorit[ies]," such as the investigating
committee of the DepEd mentioned in Section 9 of the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers. Thus, Section 23 of The
Ombudsman Act of 1989 directs that the petitioner "may refer
certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority for the
institution of appropriate administrative proceedings against
erring public officers or employees." In light of this, the Court
holds that the administrative disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman over a public school teacher is not an exclusive
power but is concurrent with the proper committee of the
DepEd. While petitioner should have desisted from hearing
the administrative complaint against respondent and referred
it to the proper DepEd committee, given that it had already
concluded the proceedings and had rendered a decision
thereon, respondent is now barred from assailing petitioner’s
acts under the principle of estoppel.
OMB VS DELIJERO
FACTS: Respondent Pedro Delijero, Jr., was a public school
teacher at the Burauen Comprehensive National High School,
Burauen, Leyte and was administratively charged for Grave
Misconduct. The complainant, Cleofas P. dela Cruz, was the
mother of the alleged victim Myra dela Cruz (Myra). At the
time of the incident, Myra was only 12 years old and a first
year high school student at the Burauen Comprehensive
“The desire to excel and the courage to pursue it”
 jst  13
National High School. Respondent, on the other hand, was
Myra's 52-year-old Mathematics teacher.
HELD: While the OMB has concurrent administrative
disciplinary authority with the DECS over public school
teachers, Section 23 of RA 6770 provides that the OMB may
refer a complaint to the proper disciplinary authority. Under
the circumstances obtained therein, it is more prudent for the
petitioner to have referred the complaint to DECS as it is in a
better position to serve the interest of justice. Respondent is a
public school teacher and covered by RA 4670.
OMB VS MASING
HELD: The SC ruled that Fabella, however, does not apply to
the cases at bar. The public schoolteachers in Fabella were
charged with violations of civil service laws, rules and
regulations in administrative proceedings initiated by the
DECS Secretary. In the case at bar, respondents Masing and
Tayactac were administratively charged in letter-complaints
duly filed before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao.
The charges were for violations of R.A. No. 6713, otherwise
known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, collecting unauthorized fees,
failure to remit authorized fees, failure to account for public
funds, oppression, serious misconduct, discourtesy in the
conduct of official duties, and physical or mental incapacity or
disability due to immoral or vicious habits. In short, the acts
and omissions complained of relate to respondents’ conduct
as public official and employee, if not to outright graft and
corruption.
Further, the SC ruled that the authority of the Office of the
Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is
beyond cavil. As the principal and primary complaints and
action center against erring public officers and employees, it
is mandated by no less than Section 13(1), Article XI of the
Constitution. In conjunction therewith, Section 19 of R.A. No.
6770 grants to the Ombudsman the authority to act on all
administrative complaints It is erroneous, therefore, for
respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an
exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS over public
school teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in
administrative investigations involving them.
PADUA VS RANADA
HELD: We have ruled in a number of cases that an
administrative agency may be empowered to approve
provisionally, when demanded by urgent public need, rates of
public utilities without a hearing. The reason is easily
discerned from the fact that provisional rates are by their
nature temporary and subject to adjustment in conformity
with the definitive rates approved after final hearing.
Furthermore, even if the directors who signed the resolution
were not present during the public hearing, there was no
violation of due process. The conduct of public hearings may
be delegated to subordinate officers.
DOH SECRETARY VS CAMPOSANO
FACTS: A complaint was filed before the DOH resident
Ombudsman against the respondents arising out of an alleged
anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of 1,500 bottles of Ferrous
Sulfate 250 mg. with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid
capsules. The Secretary of Health filed a formal charge
against the respondents and their co-respondents for Grave
Misconduct, Dishonesty, and Violation of RA 3019 as
recommended by the Ombudsman. An ad-hoc committee to
investigate the case was created through an Administrative
Order issued by then Executive Secretary Torres. The said AO
was indorsed to the Presidential Commission Against Graft
and Corruption. After the investigation, the PCAGC it issued a
resolution finding the respondents guilty as charged. The
resolution further recommended to the President that the
penalty of dismissal from the government service be imposed.
President Ramos also found the respondents guilty and
recommended the case to the DOH Secretary for appropriate
action. The DOH Secretary subsequently ordered the dismissal
of the respondents.
 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEWER
From Atty. Elman’s PPT, LA’s transcription and JECYlanan digests
HELD: The SC held that, the Chief Executive’s power to create
the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. With
AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the
investigating team and the PCAGC had the same composition,
or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in
conducting the inquiry.
On the matter of administrative procedure, the SC held that
the department secretary may utilize other officials to
investigate and report the facts from which a decision may be
based. In the case at bar, the secretary effectively delegated
the power to investigate to the PCAGC.
Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating
Committee created under AO 298 had the power to impose
any administrative sanctions directly. The power to impose
sanctions belonged to the disciplining authority, who had to
observe due process prior to imposing penalties.
MALINAO vs. REYES
FACTS: The administrative investigation against the
municipal mayor was delegated to a committee by the
Sanggunian. The report was signed only by the chairman of
the committee. The Sanggunian voted to suspend the
municipal mayor.
HELD: Suspension was not valid. There was no decision
signed by the members of the Sanggunian. Section 66 of the
LGC requires that the decision be made in writing, stating
clearly and distinctly the factual findings and the reasons for
such conclusion reached.
GARCIA VS MOLINA
HELD: President and General Manager of GSIS, is vested the
authority and responsibility to remove, suspend or otherwise
discipline GSIS personnel for cause.
However, despite the authority conferred on him by law, such
power is not without limitations for it must be exercised in
accordance with Civil Service rules.
We, therefore, conclude that respondents were denied due
process of law. Not even the fact that the charges against
them are serious and evidence of their guilt is – in the opinion
of their superior – strong can compensate for the procedural
shortcut undertaken by petitioner which is evident in the
record of this case. The filing by petitioner of formal charges
against the respondents without complying with the
mandated preliminary investigation or at least give the
respondents the opportunity to comment violated the latter's
right to due process. Hence, the formal charges are void ab
initio and may be assailed directly or indirectly at anytime.
CRUZ, PAITIM vs. CSC
FACTS: Paitim took the CSC exam in behalf of Cruz. They
were found guilty of dishonesty. They argued that they were
deprived of their right to due process because the CSC was
the complainant, the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same
time.
HELD: They were not denied due process. The fact that the
complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it
could not be an impartial judge. As an administrative body,
its decision was based on substantial findings. So long as
there is impartiality in the conduct of proceedings, even if the
matter of gathering evidence and becoming the complainant
is given to the same division, it does not follow that there is
already a violation of due process.
CSC VS ALBAO
ISSUE: Whether the CSC has original jurisdiction to institute
the administrative case against respondent.
HELD: The Commission shall have power to hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly
or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review
decisions and actions of its offices and of the agencies
attached to it. . . .
This is an integral part of its duty, authority and power to
administer the civil service system and protect its integrity, as
provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of the Constitution, by
removing from its list of eligible those who falsified their
qualifications. This is to be distinguished from ordinary
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proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide member of the
system, for acts or omissions that constitute violations of the
law or the rules of the service.
Therefore petitioner is vested with the power to institute motu
proprio the administrative proceedings against respondent for
alleged falsification of eligibility committed by respondent in
connection with his appointment to a permanent position in
the Office of the Vice President.
ZAMBALES MINIG VS CA
HELD: We hold that Secretary Gozon acted with grave abuse
of discretion in reviewing his decision as Director of Mines.
The palpably flagrant anomaly of a Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources reviewing his own decision as Director
of Mines is a mockery of administrative justice. In order that
the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not
turn out to be a farce the reviewing officer must perforce be
other than the officer whose decision is under review;
otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be
no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing
officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the
same view since being human, he would not admit that he
was mistaken in his first view of the case.
SINGSON vs. NLRC, PAL
FACTS: Singson filed a complaint against PAL for illegal
dismissal. Labor Arbiter Aquino declared the dismissal as
illegal. The 2nd Division of NLRC, with Aquino as presiding
commissioner, reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
HELD: The officer who reviews a case on appeal should not
be the same person whose decision is subject of review.
Resolution of NLRC is void for the Division that handed it down
was not composed of 3 impartial commissioners.
TEJANO VS DESIERTO
HELD: Ombudsman Desierto, in this case, committed grave
abuse of discretion. Petitioner attributes partiality on the part
of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the
reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact that he
earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of
the same when he was a Special Prosecutor by concurring in
the recommendation for the filing of the information before
the Sandiganbayan. Having participated in the initial
preliminary investigation of the instant case and having
recommended the filing of an appropriate information, it
behooved Ombudsman Desierto to recuse himself from
participating in the review of the same during the
reinvestigation. He should have delegated the review to his
Deputies pursuant to Section 15 of Rep. Act No. 6770.
REPUBLIC VS EXPRESS TELECOM
HELD: There was no violation of due process because the
opposing party will be given all the opportunity to oppose the
application on the merits in the course of the proceedings and
not simply on the basis of such a motion for revival. Notice to
the opposing party as to the motion of revival is not required
since the filing of the motion for the revival is not already a
decision on the merits.
CSC vs. LUCAS
FACTS: The Board of Personnel Inquiry found Lucas guilty of
simple misconduct. However, CSC found him guilty of grave
misconduct. Lucas came to know of the modification of the
charge when he received the resolution dismissing him from
service.
HELD: A basic requirement of due process is that a person
must be duly informed of the charges against him and that a
person cannot be convicted of a crime with which he was not
charged. A person can only be sanctioned of the charge filed.
He cannot be penalized of a charge for which he was not duly
informed.
LACSON VS PAGC
HELD: Petitioners argue that they were denied due process
because their order of dismissal was not accompanied by any
justification from the PEA Board of Directors who merely relied
on the findings of PAGC. Petitioners cannot claim that their
dismissal was unattended by the requisite due process
because they were given the opportunity to be heard in the
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From Atty. Elman’s PPT, LA’s transcription and JECYlanan digests
course of PAGC’s investigation. The tenurial protection
accorded to a civil servant is a guaranty of both procedural
and substantive due process. Procedural due process requires
that the dismissal, when warranted, be effected only after
notice and hearing. On the other hand, substantive due
process requires, among others, that the dismissal be for legal
cause, which must relate to and effect the administration of
the office of which the concerned employee is a member of
and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature
directly affecting the rights and interests of the public.
Petitioners actively participated in the proceedings before
PAGC where they were afforded the opportunity to explain
their actions through their memoranda. The essence of due
process is the right to be heard and this evidently was
afforded to them. Thus, petitioners’ assertion that their
dismissal was unattended by the requisite due process cannot
be sustained
RUIVIVAR VS OMB
HELD:Petitioner was given the opportunity by public
respondent to rebut the affidavits submitted by private
respondent. . . and had a speedy and adequate administrative
remedy but she failed to avail thereof for reasons only known
to her. Undoubtedly, the respondent herein has been
furnished by this Office with copies of the affidavits, which she
claims she has not received. Furthermore, the respondent has
been given the opportunity to present her side relative
thereto, however, she chose not to submit countervailing
evidence or argument. The respondent, therefore (sic), cannot
claim denial of due process for purposes of assailing the
Decision issued in the present case.
GAOIRAN vs. ALCALA
FACTS: Gaoiran contended that the letter-complaint was not
under oath and that he was not informed of the complaint
before, during and after the preliminary fact-finding
investigation.
HELD: While the letter-complaint was not concededly
verified, appended thereto were the verified criminal
complaints that he filed against the petitioner, as well as the
sworn statements of his witnesses. These documents could
very well be considered as constituting the complaint against
the petitioner. The letter-complaint did not, by itself,
commence the administrative proceedings but merely
triggered a fact-finding investigation by the CHED.
NOTE: Unverified complaint filed with CHED is not the
compliant with the purview of EO 292. It merely commences
Fact-finding investigation. The formal charge of the CHED
Legal Office against Gaoiran constituted the complaint.
CONCERNED MWSS OFFICIALS VS VASQUEZ
HELD: The absence of due process is an opportunity to be
heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation
but also, and perhaps even many times more creditably and
practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In
administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due
process in its strict judicial sense
UP BOARD OF REGENTS VS CA
HELD: Due process in administrative context does not require
trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts.
NPC vs. NLRC
FACTS: The Solicitor General was NAPOCOR’s lawyer. NLRC’s
decision was sent to the special attorney designated by the
Office of the Solicitor General.
HELD: The lawyer designated as "special attorney-OSG" is a
mere representative of the OSG. The OSG continues to be the
principal counsel for the NAPOCOR, and as such, the Solicitor
General is the party entitled to be furnished copies of orders,
notices and decisions. Since service of said decision was
never made on the OSG, the period to appeal the decision to
the NLRC did not commence to run.
LINCOLN GERALD, INC. vs. NLRC
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 jst  15
HELD: There was no denial of due process; notices are sent
to counsel of record, not to the client. Where a party appears
by counsel in an action in a court or administrative body, all
notices required to be given must be served to the counsel,
not the client. Notice to the counsel is notice to the client.
Petitioner’s former counsel did not withdraw its appearance.
Negligence of its counsel does not constitute a denial of due
process.
PHIL PORTS vs. SARGASSO
FACTS: Petitioner averred that the decision of the trial court
was served on its Legal Services Department and not on the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) as its
lead counsel. The petitioner argued that since the OGCC was
not served with a copy of the trial court’s decision, the period
to perfect its appeal therefrom never commenced.
HELD: Petitioner was represented in the trial court by the
OGCC in collaboration with its Legal Services Department. An
SPA was executed appointing the OGCC and its Legal Services
Department, through any of their lawyers, as its counsel.
Hence, the copies of the orders and decision of the trial court
may be served on the petitioner, either through its Legal
Services Department or through the OGCC. Nevertheless, the
Court gave due course to the said petition as it decided to
relax the strict application of the rules of procedure in the
exercise of its legal jurisdiction.
NOTE: Notice to any one of the several counsels on record is
notice to all and such notice starts at the time running for
appeal despite that the other counsel on record has not
received a copy of the decision.
ALBA vs. NITORREDA
FACTS: There was an allegation that Asst. Regional Director
Alba was partial to an owner of a school, of which a complaint
was filed against. He was suspended for 30 days but
contended that he was denied due process because his right
to appeal was denied.
HELD: Under the OMB Act, where the penalty imposed is
suspension not exceeding 30 days or a fine not to exceed 1
month salary, the decision shall become final and executory.
There is no violation of due process because the law has
made such imposition of penalty as final and executory. Right
to appeal is granted by law and thus, may be withdrawn by
the law itself.
NOTE: The right to appeal is not a natural right nor part of due
process; it is merely a statutory privilege, exercisable only in
the manner and in accordance with law.
AMPONG VS CSC
HELD: In police custodial investigations, the assistance of
counsel is necessary in order for an extra-judicial confession
to be made admissible in evidence against the accused in a
criminal complaint. If assistance was waived, the waiver
should have been made with the assistance of counsel.
But while a party’s right to the assistance of counsel is sacred
in proceedings criminal in nature, there is no such
requirement in administrative proceedings. In Lumiqued v.
Exevea, this Court ruled that a party in an administrative
inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel. Moreover, the
administrative body is under no duty to provide the person
with counsel because assistance of counsel is not an absolute
requirement.
Petitioner’s admission was given freely. There was no
compulsion, threat or intimidation. As found by the CSC,
petitioner’s admission was substantial enough to support a
finding of guilt.
IMPORTANT NOTE: A party in an administrative inquiry may or
may not be assisted by counsel, regardless of nature or
charges and of respondent’s capacity to represent himself,
and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person
investigated with counse.
LUMIQUED vs. EXEVEA
FACTS: DAR Regional Director Lumiqued was found guilty of
Malversation. On his 2nd MFR, he argued that he was denied
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From Atty. Elman’s PPT, LA’s transcription and JECYlanan digests
due process since he was not represented by counsel during
the hearing.
HELD: There was no denial of due process. The due process
clause does not encompass the right to be assisted by counsel
during an administrative investigation. Respondent has option
of engaging the services of counsel or not. Right to counsel is
not imperative because administrative inquiry is conducted
merely to determine whether the facts merit disciplinary
measures against erring public officers, with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of the government service.

Negligence of counsel
-Negligence of counsel binds the client. The only exception is
when negligence of counsel is gross, reckless and inexcusable
that the client is deprived of his day in court.

PEREZ VS ABIERA
HELD: Jurisdiction acquired at the time of filing is not lost be
cessation in office of respondent during pendency of his
administrative case. The body retains its jurisdiction either to
pronounce him innocent of the charges or declare him guilty
thereof.

Cardinal Primary rights in Administrative Proceedings

(1) The right to a hearing
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented
(3) There must be something to support its decision
(4) Such evidence must be substantial
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The tribunal must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy
(7) The tribunal must render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.

Instances of administrative determination where notice

and hearing are not necessary
(1) Summary abatement of nuisance per se
(2) Cancellation of passport by DFA
(3) Summary proceedings of distraint and levy of property of
delinquent taxpayer
(4) Preventive suspension
(5) Grant of provisional authority for increased rates, ot to
engage in particular line of business.
PADUA vs. RANADA
HELD: Even if the directors who signed the resolution were
not present during the public hearing, there was no violation
of due process. The conduct of public hearings may be
delegated to subordinate officers.

“The desire to excel and the courage to pursue it”

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