To what extent was Nationalism A Driving force of German Politics between

1800 and 1914?

Bismarck , Kaiser Wilhelm and ‘Martial

Nationalism’

Ken Mortimer , ‘Bismarck, Prussia and German nationalism’ History Review 2001

Ben Kaufman

1
 Contents page

1 - Title Page

2 - Contents Page

3 - Essay content

14 - Bibliography

15 - Source Evaluation

2
As Nipperdey1 remarked, “In the beginning there was Napoleon” 2 and one may trace

German nationalism3 to the social and political upheavals of the ‘French Revolutionary

Wars’4, remaining a potent force in German politics between the occupations of Berlin in

1806 and 1945. Yet the extent it was a ‘driving force’ varied throughout the period,

becoming more significant as Germany developed politically and economically.

Nationalism was often exploited by policy makers but never drove politics before the

1900‘s, harnessed in turn to liberal5 and conservative6 agendas yet becoming an

overwhelming populist force by 1914.

“Napoleonic rule encouraged the growth of two ideologies; Nationalism and Liberalism” 7.

This reflects the effect that the ‘Confederation of the Rhine’ (1806-1813), had upon

German Nationalism.The “French draconian measures” 8 acted to strengthen “national-self-

1 German historian best known for his monumental and exhaustive studies of Germany from

1800 to 1918

2Edgar Feuchtwanger ‘Bismarck, Prussia and German nationalism’ History Review 2001

(quoting Nipperdey)

3 Nationalism is a belief system, creed or political ideology that involves a strong identification

of a group of individuals with a nation

4 Were a series of major conflicts fought between the French Revolutionary government and

several European states

5 a kind of nationalism identified by political philosophers who believe in a non-xenophobic

form of nationalism compatible with liberal values of freedom, tolerance, equality, and

individual rights

6 Often right-wing with an outlook accepting or supporting the current social hierachy or

social inequality. Often from the social groups that benefited from this (for obvious reasons)

7 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p11

8 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p14

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consciousness”,9 and sense of unity, between previously independent states. Napoleon’s

influence was visible in the creation of the “middle classes ...new freedom” 10. Under ‘Code

Napoleon’ the “privileges of the landed aristocracy ...ended”, 11 and through governmental

reforms the “absolutist state gave way to bureaucratic governance” 12 and empowerment of

the “growing middle class”13.An indirect effect was The Prussian reform movement, which

responded to the humiliation by France through seeking to “bridge the gap between state

and society”14, ironically, by imitating “French reforms”15. A new system of education “to

encourage Prussian patriotic feeling among students” 16 and new institutions

(Elimentarschule’, ‘Gynasium’ and the University of Berlin) were created to foster a

renaissance of German spirit. Yet, those exposed at the universities to such concepts often

became dissatisfied with their lack of political influence, and gravitated towards ‘ Liberal

Nationalism’. Therefore, directly and through imitation, “Napoleon produced German

liberalism”17. Such developments were viewed as a threat to ‘Germany’ by Conservative

nationalists, for whom French rule was “synonymous with liberal ” 18 tendencies. They “from

the start [took] an anti-liberal character”19, opposing the liberal nationalism amongst the

educated middle classes, viewing it as a foreign, subversive threat. It was, from the start

9 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p14

10 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p29

11 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p29

12 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p15

13 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p10

14 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p21

15 Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p7

16Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p7

17 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p31

18 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p26

19 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p26

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schizophrenic, split between liberal and conservative groups. Scarcely a driving force then,

but rather a tool to both preserve and question the establishment.

Since its creation at the ‘Congress of Vienna’ in 1815 ‘The German Confederation’ was

outwardly conservative, asserting “the rights of the states and their legitimacy against the

demands of liberals and nationalists”20 who wanted a Germany that was unified

constitutionally.The ‘Deutscher Bund’ was a reactionary institution which conflicted with the

ambitions of the liberals through “maintaining the external and internal security and

independence and integrity of the individual states” 21. Despite this, some elements of the

Bund were unconsciously ‘Nationalist’ and ‘Liberal’. “The old hotchpotch of states was

reorganised, small states were amalgamated, and the total number was reduced to 39” 22

from the 400 states of the ‘Holy Roman Empire’. Simplifying the boundaries and

sovereignty “coerced”23 them into national consciousness and, thus, the ‘Confederation’

strengthened Germany’s National identity, by undermining the independence of these

discrete states. A Liberal sentiment pervaded the Federal Act stipulating “that individual

states should establish constitutions with parliaments” 24. The institution of the Bund was

influenced by ‘Liberal Nationalist’ ideas, yet (Württemberg and Hesse-Darmstadt

excepted25) the stipulation that a constitution and parliament should be formed was

“obeyed and ignored at will”26.The majority of rulers “clung obstinately to their virtually

20 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p24

21 Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p8

22 Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p6

23 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p26

24 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p2

25 States of the federation

26 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p2

5
absolute power”27. Nationalism wasn’t a driving force of politics at this time, precisely

because it was a seen as a threat the rulers of the subsidiary states who implemented self-

serving intentionalist28 agendas.

However, while not an influential force in German politics, ‘Liberal’ and ‘Martial

Nationalism’29 grew increasingly significant in intellectual circles, as evidenced by the

‘Burschenshaften30’ becoming more active in preparing for the “coming radical Germany” 31.

In 1817, 450 students, many belonging to the ‘Burschenshaften’, went to the ‘Wartburg

festival’, protesting against the reactionary politics of the Bund and burnt the conservative

writings of Kotzbue. In 1819 Kotzbue, was murdered by a “romantic student” 32 and radical

member of the ‘Burschenshaft’. ‘Heinrich Gotthard von Treitschke‘33 sees this as evidence

for a “[popular] nationalist movement in Germany” 34, but is contested by A.J.P.Taylor who

believes “Nationalism and liberalism remained largely middle class” 35 preoccupations,

27 Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p8

28 Intentionalist: used in historical debate to argue that an event/ events were purposefully

brought about by individuals (view usage here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_versus_intentionalism#Extreme_intentionalist_interp

retation)

29 Nationalism with strong components of patriotism and the popular desire for military

expansion and conflict

30Burschenschaften were founded in the 19th century as associations of university students

inspired by liberal and nationalistic ideas.

31 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p48

32 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p50

33 A German historian, political writer and National Liberal member of the Reichstag during the

time of the German Empire.

34 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p48

35 Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p11

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reserved for the “educated minority...of the population” 36. The actions of the

‘Burschenshaften’ were, to Taylor, those of the intellectual class who believed “a unified

people of brothers [was] irresistible”.37 It was not yet representative of the majority for

whom such policies were “intense but abstract” 38. Not yet a driving force, Nationalism had

begun germinating.

Metternich39 “feared the development of nationalism as part of a liberal danger” 40 due to

their close association. The ‘Carlsbad Decrees’ of 1819 illustrated “how fiercely he

opposed both liberalism and nationalism”41. “Professors were dismissed from their posts”42

and there was “tighter control on education” 43 and “censorship on publications less than

320 sides long”44. In 1821 “the subjects which [state] assemblies could discuss” were

restricted, and the “Burschenshaften were banned” 45. One might argue that such

reactionary measures were responding to popular Nationalism thereby proving it’s

influence as a driving force. However, “In 8 years of activity...only 107 individuals in the

whole of Germany”46 were convicted by the Metternich’s commissions. The Decrees testify
36 Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p11

37 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p11 (19year old student

1820)

38 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p29

39 A German politician and statesman, serving as the Foreign Minister of the Austrian Empire,

noted for his conservative reactionary politics.

40 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p56

41 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p12

42 Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p10

43 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p11

44 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p11

45 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p50

46 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p51

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that Nationalism was excluded from rather than included in policy formation, and was

therefore not a driving force. Indeed, the sole impact of the ‘Carlsbad Decrees’ were to

give a “halo of martyrdom to a movement which was already practically extinct” 47.

Despite existing in a so-called ‘peaceful dualism’ many independent states were rivals.

Prussia began to outmaneuver Austria, through it’s establishment of the ‘Zollverein’ in

1818, and engaged in “economic conquest” 48 or ‘Prussification’. By 1836 the “Zollverein

included 25 states with a population of 26 million” 49, exemplifying ‘economic nationalism’

through promising “for all member states a common system of customs and tariffs, and the

abolition of all internal customs unions”, 50 reducing the boundaries between states and

acting as a unifying agent, giving the Germans a “stronger sense of unity” 51. Growth of

transport and communications had the same effect and by “1838 Prussia...had built its first

railway line from Berlin to Potsdam”52. A strengthening industry and economy gave Prussia

it a “preponderance of power”53 making it “essential to Germany”54 as a unifying agent and

as the guardian of the German cornucopia. Consequently, the growing dominance of

Prussia, through ‘Prussification’, ran parallel to an “increasing appeal to nationalism” 55. It is

therefore unsurprising that the “Zollverein became a focal point for German nationalism” 56

47 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p51

48 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p61

49 Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p18

50 Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p18

51 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p3

52 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p2

53 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p57

54 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p60

55 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p63

56 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p12

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for if “the states of the Zollverein had prospered - would not the same be true following

political unity?”57.Ironically, despite its “anti-national origins”58, ‘Prussification’ became an

“Instrument of a demagogic German nationalism” 59 as It both encouraged the ‘Liberal

Nationalist’ movement and “made their dreams of a politically united Germany more likely

to be realised”60. ‘Nationalism’ was inherent in the successes of ‘Prussification’ and both

existed in symbiosis. Whether ‘economic nationalism’ drove Prussian growth or vice versa,

‘Nationalism’ evolved with Prussia.

Where dynastic structures were crumbling, nationalism supplied the social cement to hold

society together for a “derancinated people”61.The ‘Zollverein’s’ catalytic effect on the

German Industrial Revolution, while profitable to the minority, was seen to cause

significant social problems. The population of the German Confederation rose by 60%

from 33 million between 1816-1865 62, putting strains upon the economy. Despite coal and

ignite production increasing by 12 million tons between 1850-1860 and the length of

railway lines increasing by 12,000 km between 1850-1870, the economy “did not grow

sufficiently to absorb the mounting pressure of those seeking work” 63. “From the mid

1840‘s unemployment in many industries”64 rose. Workers were, “poorly clothed and

inadequately fed”65 and frequently inhabited “dirty, damp overcrowded accommodation,

57 Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p19

58 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p63

59 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p63

60 Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p19

61 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p39

62 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p28

63 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p40

64 Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p25

65 Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p25

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often [with] 20 to a room”66, living on “wretched wages in squalid conditions” 67. It is

unsurprising therefore, that ”Among workers and peasants, there was growing unrest” 68.

However, there was little sympathy for the working classes (seen as a “rootless immoral

rabble”69) from Germany’s rulers. Yet “Political ideas of liberalism and nationalism...proved

very attractive”70 to the expanding working classes who were denied reform from above

who as a result “gained a greater political awareness” 71 .“It is no surprise, therefore, it is in

these ‘Vormätz years’ between 1815 and 1848 that liberal and nationalist ideas gained a

firm root in Germany”72 as they offered alternative rallying points for popular opposition to

economic failings. However, Nationalism wasn’t a driving force, as even if the ‘silent

majority’ were ‘Liberal Nationalists’, they were disenfranchised and, without effective

unions, or militias could have no significant influence on politics. ‘Liberal Nationalism’

derived it’s support from popular discontent, rather than popular appeal.

Treitschke suggests that, ‘Liberal Nationalism’ became a significant movement due to it’s

popular appeal. In 1848 “Violent protests came from the peasants and workers who

demanded improvements in their daily lives”73. In Berlin, “barricades were erected...the

next day 230 people lay dead,”74 evidencing the mass support the movement harboured.

However, Taylor counters that, “1848 was not the explosion of new forces [ of ‘Liberal

66 Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p25

67 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p43

68 Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p25

69 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p39 (Baron Von Stein)

70 Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p26

71 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p3

72 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p3

73 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p13

74 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p69

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Nationalism’], but the belated triumph of the Burschenschaft” 75. In fact the towns affected

were “dominated by the professional and intellectual middle classes” 76 such as “Andreas

Gottschalk [who, while]cheered on by a crowd of 5,000, called for the establishment of a

revolutionary committee”77. Such men “could hardly claim to represent the protesters” 78,

whose motives were wildly different to theirs. The nature of the protest itself was “far from

a socialist revolution”79, rather an “orgy of Luddism”80 with a “wide divergence over both

aims and methods”81. Consequently, the revolutions were a product of general discontent

exploited by the “professional and intellectual middle classes” 82 for the pursuit ‘Liberal

Nationalist’ ideals. In the Frankfurt Parliament83 “over 80% of the members held university

degrees”. Regardless, we see that discontent placed the ‘Liberal Nationalists’, previously

seen as irrelevant, in a very influential position while not itself being a driving force.

The ‘Frankfurt Parliament’ was the first freely elected parliament for all of Germany.

Existing from the 18/5/1848 -31/5/1849 it advocated a German Empire based on principles

of Parliamentary democracy. This objective satisfied the main demands of the Liberal and

National movements, from which the members were derived and, therefore, one might

perceive ‘Liberal Nationalism’ to have been a driving force in politics. However, the

ineffectiveness of the Parliament belies these initial conceptions as “Without the discipline

imposed by well organised political parties and without the dominance provided by

75 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p70

76 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p69

77 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p69

78 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p14

79 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p70

80 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p70

81 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p70

82 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p69

83 Formed In 1948 due to the revolts the same year

11
outstanding leaders, the Frankfurt Parliament became a talking shop” 84. Also, the

Parliament’s liberal outlook was undermined by the fact they were “themselves afraid of

the violence on the streets”85 as well as “of being overtaken by radicals and socialists” 86,

actually welcoming the restitution of state order over the rioters. Consequently, ‘Liberal

Nationalism’ was scarcely a driving force when the ineffective Frankfurt Parliament “Could

not impose a new future on Germany without [relying on] an army or support from the

Princes”87 who were the real driving forces at this time and who were responsible for the

eventual unification.

When unification was accomplished, in 1871, it was partly reliant on Nationalist sentiment.

However, in the new ‘Deutsches Reich’ Nationalism was a secondary force to Prussian

dominance.The constitution was a “fig leaf to cover the nakedness of absolutism” 88 and

despite the fact that “no parliament in the world was elected on a broader franchise” 89 such

liberal ideas were only permitted, by Bismarck, to secure conservative interests, as

“German peasants and workers had traditional views similar to his own” 90. Article II of the

1871 unification constitution symbolically placed the Prussian King as ‘Emperor Of

Germany’ and “Prussian and imperial institutions were so intimately linked that they could

hardly be distinguished”91. Also, the fact that the Empire was founded through ‘blood and

84 Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p29

85 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p14

86 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p70

87 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p3

88 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p14

89 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p110

90 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p17

91 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p109

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iron’ by Prussia, rather than a popular development, supports the view that, ‘Liberal

Nationalism’ was secondary to Prussian influence in the new Reich.

Despite this, the ‘National liberal’ influence in the ‘Reichstag’ government was significant,

winning 155 out of 399 seats in the 1871 election, they established a stranglehold over the

government’s budget, exerting real power. Bismarck oversaw the standardisation of law,

uniform law of commerce and a single currency in 1872, to keep the ‘National Liberals’ on

side, adding to the growing “distinct national identity [that] developed [and] transcended

the member states”92. Therefore, the new Reich both intentionally and unconsciously

undermined the independence of it’s separate member states and Prussian dominance

became indistinguishable from ‘Conservative Nationalism’.

However, despite its influence in the Reichstag, we see that the Prussian elite still

exploited ‘Nationalism’ in order to fortify their own positions.This is seen in ‘Kulturkampf’ 93,

where “by attacking Catholicism, Bismarck hoped to secure stronger support from the

[National Liberals94]...in order to push through a new economic policy” 95 which benefited

the Junkers (realising the liberals despised the Catholics for their lack of enthusiasm for

unification). Bismarck was also “suspicious of minorities which might threaten the

Protestant, Prussianised government”96 and therefore saw Catholics as a “common

92 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p110

93 1871 to 1878

94 Political party in the Reichstag whose members often despised the Catholics for their lack

of enthusiasm for unification and liberal policies

95 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p35

96 Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986, p90

13
enemy”97, who could act as “target for [the] hostility”98 of the Liberals.Therefore, Bismarck

was “playing political games”,99 achieving his objective of the “creation and consolidation of

Germany”100 with Prussia’s influence at its heart.Nationalism powered German policies but

Prussian interests directed and drove them, as Bismarck ensured he was the one ‘in the

drivers seat’. Important also is that Nationalism was seen to begin to express itself

violently, with even the supposedly liberal parties endorsing Bismarck’s actions.This

suggests a tendency for ‘Liberal Nationalism’ and ‘Conservative (Prussian) Nationalism’s

differences to be able to be overcome to pursue a greater cause often violently, a trend

that would be repeated during ‘Weltpolitik’ under ‘Martial nationalism’.

The ‘Martial Nationalism’ that resisted Napoleon 101 and forged with the ‘blood and iron’ of

the 1871 unification became the Emperor Wilhelm II’s ‘new clothes’. Described by some as

a “stereotypical Prussian”102, he was “rarely seen out of military uniform”103 and was

inherently anti-liberal, remarking, “ There will be no talk of democracy when my guards

appear on the scene”104. Although there is debate over whether Wilhelm was in reality a

‘Schattenkaiser’, rather than a ‘Reichkaiser’, power was definitely believed to be “centred

on the Kaiser and his Chancellorship”105. It ‘appeared’ that, “In present day Germany there

97 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p137

98 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p137

99 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p35

100 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p34 (Bismarck)

101 Napoleon Bonaparte

102 http://madmonarchist.blogspot.co.uk/2010/04/monarch-profile-kaiser-wilhelm-ii.html

,Thursday, April 29, 2010, posted by ‘site owner’ (anonymous)

103 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p53

104 Wilhelm II

105 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p161

14
[was] no force stronger than the Kaiser”106. The perception that the Kaiser had “absolute

power”107 gave him influence. He became a focal point for Conservatives and was

supported by the Junkers (landowners), the army, industrialists and right wing pressure

groups who arguably manipulated him for their own aims. However, it would be facile to

say he was powerless or a ‘Schattenkaiser’ as he naturally sided with the conservatives

anyway, and was at least an asset and at most an influential ally to them. Consequently,

‘Conservative Nationalism’ became the driving force of the ‘ruling establishment’ 108, but not

necessarily of German politics.

‘Liberal Nationalism’, however, remained influential with “a majority of National Liberals

and Populists”109 in the Reichstag which caused the Kaiser’s ‘Prison Bill’ in 1888 to suffer

an “ignominious defeat, leaving the conservatives isolated in their extreme position” 110

proving the significance of the Liberal Nationalists. Liberals were also unaffected by the

policy of ‘Sammlungspolitik’111, which proved to be counter-productive as “in the elections

of 1898...[Liberal parties] gained more seats” 112 despite these measures. ‘Liberal

Nationalism’ was thus a powerful force in German politics, able to resist and affect the

policies of the Kaiser and his right wing supporters, who were attempting to pursue policies

of ‘Conservative Nationalism’ to create a sense of German unity against the perceived

threat of Socialism (through ‘Sammlungspolitik’). Just as in the early 19th Century, a

106 Friedrich Nuemann

107 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p48

108 The Kaiser, The Junker Class, The Aristocracy, etc...

109 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p164

110 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p165

111 Sammlungspolitik is a domestic policy of Kaiser Wilhelm II during his rule in Germany. It means 

'bringing together policy', it aimed to unite the political parties and groups in favour of Weltpolitik

112 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p59

15
tension between the Nationalism of the ‘Left’ and the ‘Right’ evolved, but power still

resided mainly with the latter.

The ‘Martial Nationalism’, that had been present throughout the era was now

growing evidenced by the burgeoning strength of the ‘Pan German League’ 113 who

“wanted to unite all ethnic Germans around the world” 114 and the ‘Navy League’115 whom

both had 25,000 and “over a million members” 116, respectively. To some they “reflected

rather than formulated policy decisions”117but their very existence “adds weight to the view

that politics in Germany had become strongly nationalist” 118. ‘Martial Nationalism’ was also

prominent in the German populace as a whole and the “glorification of war and conquest

was also a popular theme in German culture”119. For example, “On Sedan day120, captured

French guns were paraded through the streets of Berlin to cheering crowds” 121 and August

Bebel described the nation as “still drunk with military deeds to be done” 122. This ‘Martial

Nationalism’ was visible, also, in the establishment, with the “higher ranks of the army

dominated by the Junker class”123. Consequently, the policy of ‘Weltpolitik’ was “immensely

113 Founded in 1891

114 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p75

115 Founded in 1898

116 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p75

117 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p76

118 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p76

119 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p76

120 The Battle of Sedan was fought during the Franco­Prussian War on 1 September 1870

121 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p76

122 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p77

123 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p77

16
popular”124 and the Tiripitz Plan, involving the “expansion of the navy proved more

popular”125 as it “Symbolised German growth”126.The sway of ‘Martial Nationalism’ over the

majority of the populace could be seen to reveal it to be a driving force of German politics

and perhaps the popular appeal of the policies pushed ‘Weltpolitik’ to achieve more than it

was intended to.

The alternative perspective is to see ‘Weltpolitik’ as an attempt to harness the popular

appeal of ‘Martial Nationalism’ and patriotism that existed in Germany to secure the

positions of those who held the reins. Bebel remarked “Only a successful foreign policy

can help to reconcile, pacify, rally, unite”127,suggesting that, far from the innocuous claim

that they were simply trying to attain Germany’s “place in the sun” 128, Martial Nationalism

was used to “unite peoples of different ...backgrounds and so overcome [growing]

difficulties in the Reichstag”129.That ‘Martial Nationalism’ was exploited to placate

dissenters is evidenced by the policy of ‘Weltpolitik ’ which was seen to be geared towards

subversive working and middle classes and spearheaded by the Kaiser and his allies.

Tiripitz, for example, contented many of the middle class industrialists and businessmen

with “the promise of new markets for their goods and new sources of raw materials” 130 and

provided a “boost to content heavy industry”131 in the building of a colossal navy. The

working classes, whose growing discontent manifested in the growth of trade unions from

124 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p58

125 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p58

126 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p58

127 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p55

128 Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012, p166 (Bulow)

129 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p64

130 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p58

131 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p170

17
165,000 to 245,000 (1905-1910) and increasing support for the SDP, would be assuaged

by this policy. Consequently. “Weltpolitik [was] a red herring of the ruling classes to distract

the middle and working classes from social and political problems at home” 132.‘Martial

Nationalism’ was channeled through the policies attached to ‘WeltPolitik‘ and was

propounded to strengthen and fortify the position of the elite against the growing political

discontent of the working and middle classes, acting as an ersatz for political change in

order to “satisfy Germany [and its populace] without injuring the Emperor [and his

conservative allies]”133‘’ . Hence, nationalism was not the driving force of German politics at

this point more the driven force, as it was still firmly under the directorship of the ruling

elite. However, there were signs that this Imperial authority would soon not be able to “ride

above the storm”134 of popular Nationalism as it had done throughout the century.

AJP Taylor states the effects that the attempted exploitation of ‘Martial Nationalism’ had

upon the country in describing, “A runaway horse or, more truly, an overpowered engine

out of control, such was Germany in the last years of peace” 135.Martial Nationalism

overflowed the country, the cries of “the fatherland in danger” 136 were once again heard

and that, Industry, just keeping ahead, “would be ruined by anything less than conquest of

all Europe”137 supports Taylor’s notion of a country driven irrevocably to war both

economically and sentimentally.The “German working class were willing to become

instruments of this”138 as their, ”German pride and German power [, engendered by

132 Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001, p65

133 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p166 (Eulenberg)

134 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p166

135 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p182

136 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p189

137 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p190

138 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p190

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‘Martial Nationalism’,] demanded”139 it, and It was “unconsciously assumed [, by them, that

there would be] a repetition of the successes of 1866 and 1870” 140.This thoughtlessness

was seen even in the elite, who were “soaked in the ethos of the barrack square” 141 and

their consequent ‘Martial Nationalism’ became a driving force German politics as they were

increasingly involved in “crucial decisions about the direction of policy” 142.Despite what one

would expect, the Reichstag’s liberal intellectuals were similarly overtaken by the ‘spirit of

1914’. Conservatives and liberals and their divergent strains of Nationalism coalesced

under the banner of ‘Martial Nationalism’ , symbolised by the calling of ‘Burgfrieden’ 143, and

without this key division in the aims of ‘German Nationalism’, it proved an irresistible

structuralist force, leading to the outbreak of war in 1914 and “peace ‘exploding’ into

cheers and music”144

Therefore, ‘Martial Nationalism’, with it’s ‘demagogic appeal’ became the structuralist

driving force in German politics, exceeding the intentions of its conservative instigators.

The senseless hubris that accompanied Germany’s engagement in ‘The First World War’

in 1914 and it’s foreseeable disastrous consequences, was driven by ‘Martial Nationalism’.

Those that had used nationalism to further their own ends had lost the reins steering it.

Bismarck had said, “Let us put Germany in the saddle, she will ride” 145 now the

139 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p183

140 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p190

141 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p79 (Wolfson)

142 Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009, p79

143 “Castle-peace’, all parties united in support of the war and granted ‘War Credits’,

including the supposedly ‘pacifist’ social democrats.

144 The Great War - We Must Hack Our Way Through (Episode Three) Part 1/4 (documentary

British Broadcasting Corporation 1964)

145 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p182 (Bismarck)

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consequences of the pursuit of nationalistic policies such as ‘Weltpolitik’ had thrown “the

reins on the horses back”146 which then loosed itself from both the sense and intentions it

had previously been guided by. Nationalism had become an end in itself, visible in the

effects of ‘Martial Nationalism’, whereas previously it had merely been the means of

achieving ends, visible in pursuit of ‘Prussification’. Few, in the 1800s, could have

imagined that Nationalism would have become the driving force of policy that it did, as it

had always been exploited by policy makers to garner popular support for their own

agendas. However, as Germany developed, the centrifugal stresses caused by

industrialism, social and political fragmentation, and cultural and religious diversity

required, more and more, the centripetal force of nationalism to hold Germany together. As

such all were eventually dragged ineluctably along in its slipstream, including those who

had tried to control it. Ironically what had started as a reaction to French imperialism

evolved throughout a century, from an ineffectual and often exploited sentiment into the

“driving force” of German imperialism under the unifying guise of ‘Martial Nationalism’.

Bibliography

• Andrina Stiles, ‘The Unification of Germany’ 1986

• Alison Kitson,‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ 2001

• AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985

• Martin Kitchen,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012

• Sally Waller, ‘The Development of Germany,1871-1925’ 2009

146 AJP Taylor,‘The Course of German History’ 1985, p182

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 • Edgar Feuchtwanger ‘Bismarck, Prussia and German nationalism’ History Review

2001

• The Great War - We Must Hack Our Way Through (Episode Three) Part 1/4

(documentary British Broadcasting Corporation 1964)

• http://madmonarchist.blogspot.co.uk/2010/04/monarch-profile-kaiser-wilhelm-

ii.html ,Thursday, April 29, 2010

Source Evaluation

Nationalism, was a subject that seemed to span the entirety of the course.It linked in with

the syllabus I was studying in my English Literature course as both ‘Nationalism’ and the

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‘Gothic’ had their roots in ‘Romanticism’.The Initial link between both my History and

Literature studies made me consciously track it’s trajectory through the period, while it was

being outlined to us.Consequently, when it came to picking a title, ‘Nationalism’ was the

one that seemed to be, for me, the most appealing.It was chosen partly because It would

comfortably span the ‘100’ year requirement of the study and also due to its involvement

in conflicts and ‘the like’ being far more appealing to me than ‘the role of women’

throughout this period.Following my troubling fascination with major conflicts, I framed my

study between two violent periods in the following initial question, which was “to what

extent was German Nationalism the Driving Force of German Politics between 1815 and

1939?”.Also, regarding the dates, It seemed to me logical to span the question from when

this feeling of unity was instilled, arguably by Napoleon, to when Germany was once more

divided (literally by the Berlin Wall) and this feeling of euphoric purpose was replaced by

desolation.How ever it is important to recognise that my initial question did change in both

wording and time frame, for reasons that shall be explained below.

It was recommended, by the examiner, that I use a “wide range of sources”, this has been

achieved.I ensured that all of my paragraphs, each with a particular point, was referenced

using five or six different sources. Also, I ensured my sources were not all of one opinion

and this is shown by essays ability to debate on how far Nationalism was or was not a

driving force with references from numerous historians.I also ensured I used at least one

article, documentary and web reference, to add to the diversity of the sources, often they

enabled me to see simplified frameworks of particular topics, which I could build my study

upon.

In trying to answer the question I focused in on ‘politics’ as my ‘keystone’ word. I made a

general list of areas to cover which were relevant to ‘German Politics’.I interpreted this as

relating to the German government, and therefore often excluded areas which did not

22
involve Germany as a country or were not related to the government.Consequently,

Napoleon’s effect on German government, growth of nationalism in the middle classes, the

birth and effects of the Frankfurt parliament, the institution of German Reich at unification,

kulturkampf, how far politics was influenced by the Kaiser and ‘Weltpolitic’, were areas

which seemed to be most significant in relation to the wording of the question.Areas of

debate were to be found in; how far ‘Liberal Nationalism’ and ‘Nationalism’ before

unification was a driving force and whether nationalism was a driving force or steered and

manipulated intentionally by the ruling classes.There is also debate over how much the

elite of the Reich were actually able to control ‘Nationalism’ and at what point it became

and overwhelming driving force.

Over the course of the study I realised , nationalism wasn’t as simple a concept as it

looked , and I had to approach it by dividing it between Liberal and Conservative

nationalists147, both of whom understood and desired different things through and by

Nationalism. Also, I realised that the nationalism of minority groups, such as the poles was

not relevant as these were groups who did not consider themselves German and therefore

cant be seen to be in the same category as German Nationalists who desired unification

rather than independence.Also, it became apparent that it would be impossible to

construct an argument, in depth, that would cover until the 1930’s which would fit under

the word limit.Consequently I shifted my focus back to end in 1914.This was effective as it

allowed me to depict nationalism as a tidal wave, a destructive force, manifesting itself in

the ‘First World War’.thereby, giving a strong, dramatic resolution to the essay.Also, the

question changed from “the” to “a driving force”, this was because the latter allowed me to

focus on the idea of ‘Nationalism’ in conflict with those in control of politics, while “the”

would suggest to the reader an intent and need to evaluate ideas such as foreign affairs,

other movements, independent figures and the economy.One who has read the essay will

147
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note that some of the things listed are contained in the essay.However, their significance is

always in relation to ‘nationalism’, rather than being seen as separate from it and

competing with it to effect German politics.We see therefore that there were two particular

ways to pursue the essay, the way I chose was the one that would readily read

synoptically and chronologically.Also, the wording limits prevented me from choosing the

alternative approach, which would be far more extensive.

The main skeleton of my essay was built upon synoptic Historical books.For example, AJP

Taylor’s ‘The Course Of German History’ was useful as the historian was well known and

credible.This was because Taylor has built up a life long reputation for striking analysis of

history, and is even used by other historians to fill out their work (the ultimate seal of

credibility).He expressed his viewpoints in a way which was resounding and well

expressed.Also, he addressed nationalism, directly and frequently.However, there were

occasions where AJP Taylor made statements which were controversial and needed to be

balanced out by other sources.For example “would be ruined by anything less than

conquest of all Europe”, stood out as particularly contentious.Therefore, Martin

Kitchen’s,‘A History of Modern Germany’ 2012 was useful as it complemented, and

sometimes moderated AJP Taylor’s analysis, covering the same areas but with revealing

differences in perspectives that added to the richness of the study.For example, Martin

Kitchen revealed much more about the details of ‘Kulturkampf’. However, Kitchen could be

brief in key areas, such as in 1848 and often did not focus as heavily on nationalism

asTaylor.

Alison Kitson’s ‘Germany,1858-1990 Hope, Terror, Revival’ was useful as it contained

numerous key quotes and revealed much about the complexities of Weltpolitik that more

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narrative driven texts missed. It spanned a large range and was precise in detail, making it

a useful tool for filling out particular areas of the study with evidence.However, nationalism

wasn’t always mentioned when it was relevant to key events and therefore had to be

analysed in combination with other sources, particularly Taylor's. Andrina Stiles, ‘The

Unification of Germany’ 1986, was also useful for providing statistics to support the

essay.The concise nature of the study made it easier to scour the text for relevant

information.Also, the strong focus on alternate perspectives made it easier to bring debate

in to areas such as the effectiveness of the 1848 revolts.However, the text was of limited

use, as it did not provide information for the latter part of the study.This was overcome

through the use of ‘The development of Germany’ by Sally Waller, which covered the

period from unification until 1914 with similar usefulness, detail and clarity of the Stiles

text.

The online source I used was limited by the fact that the writer was anonymous,

consequently it was with some trepidation that I used it, out of fear of inaccuracy or

bias.However, this was overcome due to the fact that other sources agreed with this

source.For example he was described as “stereotypically Prussian”, which complemented

Queen Victoria’s opinion of him as “ultra Prussian to a degree which is painful to

me”.Therefore, websites often could be used to obtain initial perceptions, but it was

important to see them verified by other sources before they were used.

The article I used was useful as it provided me with an opening quote from an established

historian.While I didn’t use it in order to provide statistics or other such quotes, it allowed

me to engage with the reader with this strong statement, “In the beginning there was

Napoleon”, describing how Napoleon was responsible for the creation of nationalism.This

was even more poignant if you pick up on the fact that it is suggesting Nationalism to be a

25
deterministic and, therefore, driving force through the allegory to bible and therefore god.It

seemed to perfectly outline my essay through the inference of ‘determinism vs free will (or

intention)’.It is unfortunate I did not use more articles, but It is due to the fact that I found

ample material in the other sources and therefore the articles seemed unnecessary.

Consequently, the article was useful to both stylise the essay as well as effectively outline

the argument to the reader from the start.

An area of difficulty was to be found in the fact that not all historians had distinguished

between the different types of nationalism, for example AJP Taylor viewed nationalism as

‘imperial nationalism’ solely and not different.This is likely due to other historians viewing

Germany’s development by splitting it up in to different areas, such as industry or society,

rather than looking at nationalism predominantly.This was overcome by comparing

different sources and devising appropriate terminology to obtain a synoptic view of

Nationalism over the period.For example, In the essay it was necessary to distinguish

between liberal, conservative, economic and martial nationalism.Also, it was difficult to find

detailed information about the early 19th century due to the lack of covering this area in

comparison to the rest of the century, likely due to the genesis of Germany being far more

appealing to historians who are drawn to the dramatic.This limitation was overcome

through the utilisation of spanning texts such as AJP Taylor’s and Martin Kitchen’s, both of

which dealt with the period in relation to the birth of Ideas such as nationalism. Both were

used in combination to provide the essay with the information regarding the origins of

Nationalism, in it’s numerous forms.

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