PADLAN, SHAUNNA MAE SIMPAO 2016-0136 ATTY.

JOSE PARUNGO

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONARDO FABRE y VICENTE

G.R. No. 146697. July 23, 2002


FACTS: Leonardo Fabre was adjudged guilty by the Regional Trial Court of raping his own daughter Marilou
Fabre. At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of Marilou, that of Adela Fabre, her mother and
the wife of the accused, and that of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon, the doctor who examined Marilou, along with the
medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Jalalon, the sworn statement of Adela, and the criminal complaint
signed by both Marilou and Adela. The defense, during its turn in the presentation of evidence, countered
with the testimony of the accused himself. On appeal, the defense argues, that the testimony of appellant
should acquire added strength for the failure of the prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him and to
present any rebuttal evidence.

ISSUE: Whether cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is
called.

HELD: Yes. The cross-examination of a witness is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is
called. The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or accuracy of the statements of a witness made
on direct examination. The party against whom the witness testifies may deem any further examination
unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence theretofore adduced or thereafter to be adduced or on
what would be believed is the perception of the court thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound to give
full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because he is not cross- examined by
the other party.

In any event, in order that alibi might prosper, it would not be enough for an accused to prove that he was
somewhere else when the crime was committed; he would have to demonstrate likewise that he could not have
been physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
Clearly, in the instant case, it was not at all impossible nor even improbable for appellant to have been at the
crime scene.

These qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority are twin requirements that should be both alleged
in the information and established beyond reasonable doubt during trial in order to sustain an imposition of
the death penalty. Neither an obvious minority of the victim nor the failure of the defense to contest her real
age always excuse the prosecution from the desired proof required by law. Judicial notice of the issue of age
without the requisite hearing conducted under Section 3, Rule 129, of the Rules of Court, would not be
considered sufficient compliance with the law. The birth certificate of the victim or, in lieu thereof, any other
documentary evidence, like a baptismal certificate, school records and documents of similar nature, or
credible testimonial evidence, that can help establish the age of the victim should be presented. While the
declaration of a victim as to her age, being an exception to the hearsay proscription, would be admissible
under the rule on pedigree, the question on the relative weight that may be accorded to it is a totally
different matter.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS PEREZ y SEBUNGA
G.R. No. 142556. February 5, 2003

FACTS: For automatic review is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court finding appellant Jesus S. Perez
guilty of raping Mayia P. Ponseca and imposing on appellant the death penalty. On appeal, Appellant
contends that his identification in open court by Mayia was highly irregular. Appellant points out that the
prosecutor had already identified him as the man wearing an orange t-shirt when the prosecutor asked
Mayia to identify her alleged rapist. Appellant stresses that when Mayia identified him in open court, she
referred to him as a man named "Johnny" and did not give any description or any identifying mark.
Moreover, appellant claims he was alone in the cell when Mayia identified him after the police arrested him.
Appellant bewails that the identification was not done with the usual police line-up.

ISSUE: Whether leading questions are allowed.

HELD: No. As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when the
witness is a child of tender years as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without prompting or
suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips.

“The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the questioning
of a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a Child Witness, which took
effect on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure that
questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, (3) to protect children
from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time. Leading questions in all stages of
examination of a child are allowed if the same will further the interests of justice.”
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME CASTILLANO, SR., alias “Talino,” RONALD CASTILLANO
alias “Nono” and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. alias “Junjun,” accused. RONALD CASTILLANO alias “Nono” and
JAIME CASTILLANO, JR., alias “Junjun”
G.R. No. 139412. April 2, 2003

FACTS: This is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting appellants Ronald
Castillano alias "Nono" and Jaime Castillano, Jr. of murder of the Diosdado Volante.
On appeal, Appellant Jaime, Jr. avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged. He asserts that the testimony of Luz Volante, the widow of Diosdado, was inconsistent
with her testimony during the preliminary examination in the municipal trial court and her sworn statement
before the police investigators as well as the testimonies of SPO1 Fornillos and SPO4 Jaime Favier, and the
physical evidence on record.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the credibility of the testimony of Luz, the
prosecution’s principal witness, cannot be impeached via her testimony during the preliminary examination
before the municipal trial court nor by her sworn statement given to the police investigators for the reason
that the transcripts and sworn statement were neither marked and offered in evidence by the appellants nor
admitted in evidence by the trial court. Moreover, the appellants did not confront Luz with her testimony
during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement to the police investigators. Luz was not,
therefore, accorded a chance to explain the purported inconsistencies, as mandated by Section 13, Rule 132
of the Revised Rules of Evidence

ISSUE: Whether or not a testimony made in open court may be impeached by asserting that the said
testimony is inconsistent with those made by the witness in the preliminary examination.

HELD: Before the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by
evidence consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-
examiner must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the
witness being cross-examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to explain the apparent
inconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances under which they were made.

If the witness admits the making of such contradictory statement, the accused has the benefit of the
admission, while the witness has the opportunity to explain the discrepancy, if he can. On the other hand, if
the witness denies making any such contradictory statement, the accused has the right to prove that the
witness did make such statement; and if the fiscal should refuse upon due notice to produce the document,
secondary evidence of the contents thereof would be admissible. This process of cross-examining a witness
upon the point of prior contradictory statements is called in the practice of the American courts “laying a
predicate” for the introduction of contradictory statements. It is almost universally accepted that unless a
ground is thus laid upon cross-examination, evidence of contradictory statements are not admissible to
impeach a witness; though undoubtedly the matter is to a large extent in the discretion of the court.

It bears stressing that even the most truthful witness can make mistakes but such innocent lapses do not
necessarily affect his credibility. The testimonies of witnesses must be considered and calibrated in their
entirety and not by their truncated portions or isolated passages. And then again, minor contradictions
among several witnesses of a particular incident and aspect thereof which do not relate to the gravamen of the
crime charged are to be expected in view of their differences in impressions, memory, vantage points and other
related factors.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.ANTONIO PLASENCIA y DESAMPARADO alias “Tonying,” ROBERTO
DESCARTIN y PASICARAN alias “Ruby” and JOELITO (JULITO) DESCARTIN y PASICARAN
G.R. No. 90198. November 7, 1995

FACTS: Antonio Plasencia, Roberto Descartin and Joelito (Julito) Descartin were accused of robbery with
homicide. The Regional Trial Court did not give credence to the defense of alibi. It convicted the three
accused of murder.
The instant appeal was interposed by the three convicted appellants. Appellants attack the credibility of the
prosecution's lone eyewitness. It is asserted that the testimony of Francisca Espina should not be given
worth since, while testifying, she would at times be seen reading some notes written on her left palm.

ISSUE: Whether or not testimony of a witness, who during her testimony was seen looking at some notes
written on her palm, should be given credence.

HELD: The focus of this appeal is clearly one of credibility. The initial assessment on the testimony of a
witness is done by the trial court, and its findings still deserve due regard notwithstanding that the presiding
judge who pens the decision is not the one who personally may have heard the testimony. The reliance on the
transcript of stenographic notes should not, for that reason alone, render the judgment subject to challenge.
The continuity of the court and the efficacy of its decision are not affected by the cessation from the service
of the judge presiding it or by the fact that its writer merely took over from a colleague who presided at the
trial.

The use of memory aids during an examination of a witness is not altogether proscribed. Section 16, Rule
132, of the Rules of Court states: “Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum—A witness may be
allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written or recorded by himself or under his
direction at the time when the fact occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact
was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded; but in such case the
writing or record must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, cross-
examine the witness upon it and may read it in evidence. So, also, a witness may testify from such a writing or
record, though he retain no recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing or
record correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence must be received with caution.”
(Italics supplied.) Allowing a witness to refer to her notes rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. In this
case, the exercise of that discretion has not been abused; the witness herself has explained that she merely
wanted to be accurate on dates and like details.
ROSELLA D. CANQUE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SOCOR CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
G.R. No. 96202. April 13, 1999

FACTS: Canque entered into two contracts with Socor Construction Corp. Socor Construction Corporation.
Due to Canque’s refusal to pay the amount billed by the Socor Construction Corp., the latter brought a suit to
recover from the former the sum of P299,717.75, plus interest at the rate of 3% a month.
To prove the unpaid bills of the Canque, Socor Construction Corp. presented its Book of Collectible Accounts
and their bookkeeper, Dolores Aday to testify on the entries of the said book. During the trial, Aday admitted
that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entry. She said she made the entries based
on the bills given to her. But she has no knowledge of the truth or falsity of the facts stated in the bills. The
deliveries of the materials stated in the bills were supervised by "an engineer for such functions.
The trial court, giving due weight to the plaintiff’s Book of Collectible Accounts, as well as Aday’s testimony,
ruled in favor of Socor Construction Corp.. On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the CA. Canque contends
that Aday’s testimony is considered a hearsay for lack of personal knowledge of the entries made as the
information entered was merely provided to her by the engineers of the Socor Construction Corp..
It is nonetheless argued by Socor Construction Corp. that although the entries cannot be considered an
exception to the hearsay rule, they may be admitted under Rule 132, Section 10 of the Rules of Court. On the
other hand, Canque contends that evidence which is inadmissible for the purpose for which it was offered
cannot be admitted for another purpose.

ISSUE: Whether or not the person who may be called to court to testify on these entries being dead, arises
the necessity of their admission without the one who made them being called to court be sworn and
subjected to cross-examination is permissible.

HELD: The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the following
conditions: 1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to testify; 2. The
entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer; 3. The entrant was in a
position to know the facts stated in the entries; 4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in
the performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and 5. The entries were made in
the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.

As petitioner points out, the business entries in question (Exh. K) do not meet the first and third requisites.
Dolores Aday, who made the entries, was presented by private respondent to testify on the account of RDC
Construction. It was in the course of her testimony that the entries were presented and marked in evidence.
There was, therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the presentation of the entries as the person who
made them was available to testify in court. Necessity is given as a ground for admitting entries, in that they
are the best available evidence. Said a learned judge: “What a man has actually done and committed to
writing when under obligation to do the act, it being in the course of the business he has undertaken, and he
being dead, there seems to be no danger in submitting to the consideration of the court.” The person who
may be called to court to testify on these entries being dead, there arises the necessity of their admission
without the one who made them being called to court be sworn and subjected to cross-examination. And this
is permissible in order to prevent a failure of justice.
YASUO IWASAWA vs. FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN (a.k.a FELISA GANGAN ARAMBULO, and FELISA
GANGAN IWASAWA) and the LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY
G.R. No. 204169. September 11, 2013


FACTS: Iwasawa, a Japanese national married Custodio in 2002. In July 2009, Iwasawa noticed his wife
become depressed. Suspecting that something might have happened in the Philippines, he confronted his
wife about it. To his shock, Custodio confessed to him that she received news that her previous husband
passed away. This prompted Iwasawa to file a petition for the declaration of his marriage to Custodio as null
and void on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one
During trial, aside from his testimony, Iwasawa also offered the following pieces of documentary evidence
issued by the NSO: (1) Certificate of Marriage between Iwasawa and Custodio to prove the fact of marriage
between the parties on November 28, 2002; (2) Certificate of Marriage between Custodio and Raymond
Maglonzo Arambulo to prove the fact of marriage between the parties on June 20, 1994
Certificate of Death of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo; (3) Certification from the NSO to the effect that there
are two entries of marriage recorded by the office pertaining to Custodio
RTC rendered the assailed decision. It ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove Custodio’s prior
existing valid marriage to another man. It held that while Iwasawa offered the certificate of marriage of
Custodio to Arambulo, it was only Iwasawa who testified about said marriage.
The RTC ruled that Iwasawa’s testimony is unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of Custodio’s
prior marriage nor of Arambulo’s death which makes him a complete stranger to the marriage certificate
between Custodio and Arambulo and the latter’s death certificate. It further ruled that Iwasawa’s testimony
about the NSO certification is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the preparation of said document.

ISSUE: Whether or not public documents are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due
execution and genuineness

HELD: As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution
and genuineness; Not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because
they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.—There is no question that the documentary
evidence submitted by petitioner are all public documents. As provided in the Civil Code: ART. 410. The
books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents
and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. As public documents, they are admissible in
evidence even without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it
disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of
the NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and
due execution was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to
be given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in
the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the
public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.
ASIAN TERMINALS, INC., petitioner, vs. PHILAM INSURANCE CO., INC. (now Chartis Philippines
Insurance, Inc.)
G.R. No. 181163. July 24, 2013


FACTS: Nichimen Corporation shipped to Universal Motors 219 packages containing 120 units of brand new
Nissan Pickup Truck on board the vessel S/S "Calayan Iris" from Japan to Manila. The shipment was insured
with Philam against all risks. When the package arrived and was unloaded by ATI, it was found that the
package marked as 03-245-42K/1 was in bad order. The shipment was withdrawn by R.F. Revilla Customs
Brokerage, Inc., the authorized broker of Universal Motors, and delivered to the latter’s warehouse. Owing to
the extent of the damage to said cargoes, Universal Motors declared them a total loss.

Universal Motors filed a formal claim for damages against Westwind, ATI10 and R.F. Revilla Customs
Brokerage, Inc. When Universal Motors’ demands remained unheeded, it sought reparation from and was
compensated by Philam. Accordingly, Universal Motors issued a Subrogation Receipt in favor of Philam.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Philam and ordered Westwind and ATI to pay Philam. On appeal, the CA
affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. When the case was elevated to the SC, Asian Terminal
objected to the admission of Marine Certificate and the Subrogation Receipt for being hearsay as they were
not authenticated by the persons who executed them.

ISSUE: Whether or not certificates and/or receipts offered as evidence required authentication.

HELD: The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented as
evidence in court. Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, are self-
authenticating and require no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In contrast,
a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument executed by a private person without the
intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some disposition or agreement is proved
or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public document, or the solemnities prescribed
by law, a private document requires authentication in the manner prescribed under Section 20, Rule 132 of
the Rules: SEC. 20. Proof of private document—Before any private document offered as authentic is received
in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. Any
other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be. The requirement of
authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document
is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the Rules; (b) when the genuineness and
authenticity of the actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party;
(c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or (d) when the document
is not being offered as genuine.
LOMISES ALUDOS, deceased, substituted by FLORA ALUDOS vs. JOHNNY M. SUERTE
G.R. No. 165285. June 18, 2012


FACTS: Lomises acquired from the Baguio City Government the right to occupy two stalls in the Hangar
Market in Baguio City. Lomises entered into an agreement with respondent Johnny M. Suerte for the transfer
of all improvements and rights over the two market stalls. Before full payment could be made, however,
Lomises backed out of the agreement and returned the P68,000.00.Thus, Johnny filed a complaint against
Lomises for specific performance with damages.
RTC nullified the agreement between Johnny and Lomises for failure to secure the consent of the Baguio City
Government to the agreement. The RTC found that Lomises was a mere lessee of the market stalls, and the
Baguio City Government was the owner-lessor of the stalls. On appeal, CA agreed with the RTC that the
assignment of the leasehold rights was void for lack of consent of the lessor, the Baguio City Government.
The sale of the improvements, however, was valid because these were Lomises’ private properties.
Lomises, however, objects to the CA ruling upholding the validity of the agreement insofar as it involved the
sale of improvements on the stalls. Lomises alleges that the sale of the improvements should similarly be
voided because it was made without the consent of the Baguio City Government, the owner of the
improvements, pursuant to the May 1, 1985 lease contract.

ISSUE: Whether the court shall consider evidence which has not been formally offered.

HELD: The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The offer of evidence is
necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon
the evidence offered by the parties.—Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. “The offer of evidence is necessary because it is
the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered
by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which
such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight.”
WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORPORATION vs. AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR. , CECILIA ZAMORA, BENJAMIN
FRANCIA, and PEARLBANK SECURITIES, INC.
G.R. No. 194128. December 7, 2011

FACTS: Respondents filed a Complaint for Collection of Sum of Money and Damages arising from their
investments against Westmont Investment Corporation (Wincorp) and respondent Pearlbank Securities Inc.
the case was set for the presentation of the defense evidence of Wincorp.

On March 7, 2003, three (3) days before the scheduled hearing, Wincorp filed a written motion to postpone
the hearing. The RTC denied Wincorp’s Motion to Postpone and considered it to have waived its right to
present evidence. The Motion for Reconsideration of Wincorp was likewise denied.

On September 27, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the Francias and held Wincorp solely liable
to them. The CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. Wincorp filed an MR with the CA attaching
to the said motion evidentiary evidence which it was not able to present during trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not objection to evidence must be made after evidence is formally offered.

HELD: It bears stressing too that all the documents attached by Wincorp to its pleadings before the CA
cannot be given any weight or evidentiary value for the sole reason that, as correctly observed by the CA,
these documents were not formally offered as evidence in the trial court. To consider them now would deny
the other parties the right to examine and rebut them. “The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty
of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the
parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such
document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight.”

The Court cannot, likewise, disturb the findings of the RTC and the CA as to the evidence presented by the
Francias. It is elementary that objection to evidence must be made after evidence is formally offered. It appears
that Wincorp was given ample opportunity to file its Comment/Objection to the formal offer of evidence of
the Francias but it chose not to file any.
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION vs. COM MISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 192024. July 1, 2015


FACTS: Fortune Tobacco Corp. is the manufacturer and producer of its cigarette brands and prior to 1997
were subject to ad valorem tax. However on Jan. 1, 1997 R.A. 8240 took effect and caused a shift from ad
valorem tax to specific tax. As a result of such shift, the aforesaid cigarette brands were subjected to specific
tax. Fortune Tobacco Corp. later on filed a claim for tax credit or refund under Sec. 229 of the NIRC for
illegally collected specific taxes. After trial on the merits the Court ruled that it was contrary to law and that
there is insufficiency of evidence on the claim for refund. Fortune Tobacco Corp. elevated the case to the CTA
but the latter found no cause to reverse the decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not documents forming no part of proofs before the appellate court cannot be considered
in disposing the case.

HELD: It has been repeatedly ruled that where documentary evidence was rejected by the lower court and the
offeror did not move that the same be attached to the record, the same cannot be considered by the appellate
court, as documents forming no part of proofs before the appellate court cannot be considered in disposing the
case. For the appellate court to consider as evidence, which was not offered by one party at all during the
proceedings below, would infringe the constitutional right of the adverse party · in this case, the CIR, to due
process of law. It also bears pointing out that at no point during the proceedings before the CTA En Banc and
before this Court has petitioner offered any plausible explanation as to why it failed to properly make an
offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence. Instead, petitioner harps on the fact that respondent CIR
simply refused its claim for refund on the ground that RR 17-99 was a valid issuance. Thus, for its failure to
seasonably avail of the proper remedy provided under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
is precluded from doing so at this late stage of the case. Clearly, estoppel has already stepped in.
Offer of Evidence

LOMISES ALUDOS, deceased, substituted by FLORA ALUDOS vs.

JOHNNY M. SUERTE
G.R. No. 165285, June 18, 2012

FACTS:
Lomises acquired from the Baguio City Government the right to occupy two stalls in the Hangar Market in
Baguio City. Lomises entered into an agreement with respondent Johnny M. Suerte for the transfer of all
improvements and rights over the two market stalls. Before full payment could be made, however, Lomises
backed out of the agreement and returned the P68,000.00.Thus, Johnny filed a complaint against Lomises for
specific performance with damages. RTC nullified the agreement between Johnny and Lomises for failure to
secure the consent of the Baguio City Government to the agreement. The RTC found that Lomises was a mere
lessee of the market stalls, and the Baguio City Government was the owner-lessor of the stalls. On appeal, CA
agreed with the RTC that the assignment of the leasehold rights was void for lack of consent of the lessor, the
Baguio City Government. The sale of the improvements, however, was valid because these were Lomises’ private
properties. Lomises, however, objects to the CA ruling upholding the validity of the agreement insofar as it
involved the sale of improvements on the stalls. Lomises alleges that the sale of the improvements should similarly
be voided because it was made without the consent of the Baguio City Government, the owner of the
improvements, pursuant to the May 1, 1985 lease contract.

ISSUE: Whether or not a document repeatedly mentioned in the pleadings of the parties which was presented only
on appeal may be considered for purposes of adjudicating the case.

HELD:
The answer is in the negative. The CA has already rejected the evidentiary value of the May 1, 1985 lease
contract between the Baguio City Government and Lomises, as it was not formally offered in evidence before the
RTC; in fact, the CA admonished Lomises’ lawyer, Atty. Lockey, for making it appear that it was part of the
records of the case. Under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. "The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the court to rest its
findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until
admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is
merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight." Although the contract was referred to in
Lomises’ answer to Johnny’s complaint and marked as Exhibit "2" in his pretrial
brief, a copy of it was never attached. In fact, a copy of the May 1, 1985
lease contract "surfaced" only after Lomises filed a motion for reconsideration
of the CA decision.