Spinoza’s Definition of Attribute Francis S. Haserot The scHisM that cuts deepest into the interpretation of Spi- noza is that concerned with the status of the attributes. Are the at- tributes subjective and hence essentially forms of cognition, or are they objective and inherent characters of substance? No exposition is needed to show that these views are opposite and give fundamen- tally different conceptions of Spinoza’s meaning. The preponder- ance of opinion among commentators, I believe, is on the side of the objective interpretation. But whatever the truth with regard to this may be, it is evident that the question itself is primary. I here pro- pose to treat this question by a direct examination of the definition of attribute. Spinoza defines attribute as follows: “Per attributum intelligo id, quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam ejusdem essentia constituens” (E, I, Def. 4).! In this definition lie three ambiguities, ambiguities that have aroused essential difficulties for the interpretation of Spinoza. They have, together, thrown discord into the whole interpretation of natura naturata, or things that follow from God, and they have raised the dispute as to whether Spinoza is a mystic on the order of Maimonides or a rationalist after the general manner of Descartes. By an analysis of these ambiguities we may discover the possible ver- sions that can be assigned to the definition. The first ambiguity attaches to the word intellectus. Spinoza em- ploys this term with two references. First, he refers to the “infinite intellect of God” (intellectus infinitus Dei); second, to the finite in- tellect, the intellect of such finite beings as men. The infinite intel- lect of God is the infinite range of adequate ideas compresent within + References to the Ethics will be made as in the following example: E, UL, 7, tefers to Ethics, Pt. 1, Prop. 7. Latin quotations are from the text of Carl Geb- hardt; English quotations are from the translation of W. H. White. 28SPINOZA’S DEFINITION OF ATTRIBUTE 29 the attribute of thought. Every idea in God's intellect, moreover, is rationally co-ordinated with the whole system of adequate ideas. In contrast to the infinite intellect, the finite intellect is limited in scope. Like the infinite intellect it is constituted of adequate ideas, but it does not contain the entire nexus of these ideas, and hence is not cognizant of the total range of attributes and their respective modes. Its extent is restricted, whereas that of the infinite intellect is unlimited; its cognition is partial, that of the infinite intellect complete. The second indeterminancy of reference pertains to the relation between the phrase tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens and the three elements: intellectus, id quod, and the term percipit in the clause quod intellectus de substantia percipit. Grammatically the phrase may modify any one of them. But, though this is true gram- matically, evidence from the text indicates that the phrase contain- ing constituens cannot intelligibly be taken to modify intellectus. For if it did, the intellect would then be identified with the essence of substance, as may be seen by the substitution of this relation in the definition. The definition would then read: “By attribute I understand that which the intellect, as constituting the essence of substance, perceives of substance.” But the intellect, whether finite or infinite, is a mode (E, I, 31, Dem.), and it is clear that a mode cannot constitute the essence of substance. This follows from the definition of mode: “By mode, I understand the affections of sub- stance, or that which is in another thing through which it is con- ceived.” No version therefore that identifies the intellect with the essence of substance is acceptable, and this circumstance reduces the ambiguity in the present case to that which joins the phrase tan- quam ejusdem essentiam constituens either with id quod or with percipit. In the one case the definition tells what the intellect per- ceives as the attribute; in the other, the way in which the attribute is perceived. The readings for these different assignments will be given below. Last, there remains the ambiguity attaching to the adverb tan- quam. Tanquam may mean either “as if,” suggesting apparency as compared with fact, or “‘as,” suggesting a real state.2 Tanquam has *It is to be noted that “as if” is itself ambiguous. It may mean (1) “as if, and maybe in fact,” or (2) “as if, though not in fact.” If I say, “I perceive this line as if constituting the diameter of a circle,” the “as if” can mean “as if, and maybe in fact” or “as if, and also in fact.” If I say, “I perceive this polygon as30 FRANCIS S$. HASEROT this dual use in Latin, and some writers contend that the proper translation, with corresponding meaning, is “‘as if.” $ But if “as if” means “as if and also in fact,” then this translation would be mis- leading as compared with the simple “as,” and would obviously imply not the subjective, but the objective interpretation. Aside from his use of tanquam in the definition, Spinoza employs the word twenty-nine times in the Ethics. In twenty-six of these the word clearly means “‘as.” With respect to three—namely, E, I, 33, Schol. 2; E, II, 49, Schol. (Sec. 1 of last paragraph); and E, V, 31, Schol., the contention might be raised (though with some question) that Spinoza employs the term with counterfactual reference. Hence, though the weight of usage favors ‘‘as,” the argument will not here be invoked that, on purely grammatical grounds, the counterfactual usage is excluded. In any case however it is evident that the transla- tion of tanquam as “as if” conforms to the subjective interpretation of the attributes; the translation of it as ‘‘as” to the realistic interpre- tation. Spinoza's meaning, it appears, attained ample clarity in his own mind, and he saw no reasonable probability that readers would dis- cover an equivocality in the definition. That he left these ambi- guities intentionally is scarcely to be supposed. We come now to the possible versions which, through transla- tion, can be given to the definition. I shall indicate these first in symbols, to show their relations, and thereafter give them in verbal translations, and in that form discuss them. Let the letters from a to f represent the indicated meanings: a, intellectus finitus; b, intellectus infinitus; c, tanquam ejusdem essen- tiam constituens as referring to id quod; d, tanquam ejusdem essen- tiam constituens as referring to the verb percipit in the clause quod intellectus de substantia percipit; e, tanquam translated “as if"; f, tanquam translated “as.” Now the following combinations—all pos- if constituting a circle,” the “as if” means “as if, though not in fact.” According to the context, the “if” in the term “as if” implies either uncertainty as to the factual character of the predication or certainty as to its counterfactual charac- ter. But the term “as if,” in the manner here uscd, must mean the latter, i.e., “as if, though not in fact.” Otherwise the conditional “if” would have no determi- nant bearing on the interpretations of the definition, and the expression “as if” would be indistinguishable in meaning from “as. *Harry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of Spinoza (Cambridge, Mass.: Har- vard University Press, 1934), I, 146, 153.