UNIT-VI

Vaporizers: Submerged combustion vaporizers- Open rack vaporizers – Shell and tube
vaporizers: direct heating with seawater, and indirect heating with seawater.
Ambient air vaporizers: Direct heating with ambient air – Indirect heating with ambient air.
LNG tanks.
Safety, Security and Environmental Issues:
Safety design of LNG facilities – Security issues for the LNG industry – Environmental
issues –
Risk based analysis of an LNG plant.

LNG Vaporizers:

The optimum choice of an LNG vaporization system is determined by the terminal’s

site selection, the environmental conditions, regulatory limitations, and operability
considerations. The selection should be based on an economic analysis in maximizing the
NPV of the project and meeting the emissions requirements.

Today, the base load regasification terminals use two types of proven vaporizers:

1. Open Rack Vaporizer (ORV) at about 70%

2. Submerged Combustion Vaporizer (SCV) at about 20%

In addition to these vaporizers, several other types of vaporizers have been used. These
include

1. Ambient Air Vaporizers (AAV)

2. Shell and Tube Exchange Vaporizers (STV)

1. Open rack vaporizer (ORV) An open rack vaporizer (ORV) is a heat exchanger that
utilizes water as the source of heat. The source of water for these units is dependent on the
location of the terminal and the quantity of water available. LNG receiving terminals
generally are located close to the open sea. Therefore, seawater is the most commonly used
source of heat for open rack vaporizers.

These units generally are constructed from finned aluminum alloy tubes, providing
the mechanical strength for the cold operating temperature of LNG. Corrosion protection
coating is used on surfaces that come into contact with seawater that is sprayed on the outside
of the finned tubes.

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 The mechanical construction of these units is simple. The tubes are arranged in
panels, connected through the LNG inlet and the regasified product outlet piping manifolds
and hung from a rack as shown in figure.

ORVs take seawater from the adjacent body of water and flow it down the outside of
hollow panels, and heating the LNG that is flowing up through the interior of the panels in
the opposite direction to the water flow.

Open rack vaporizers (ORV)

The maintenance of these units is also simple, since there are no moving parts and
very little instrumentation is involved. The unit can be started or stopped from a remote
control station, without physical intervention of an operator. However, maintenance is more
frequent than other types of vaporizers as the tubes should be cleaned regularly.

The operating load on these units can be adjusted by varying the amount of seawater
flow to the spraying system and/or the LNG flow through the tubes. These units are reliable
and have very good safety records. Leakage of gas can be quickly detected and the unit can
be safely shut down. There is no danger of explosion, due to the fact that there is no ignition
source in the system.

2. Submerged combustion vaporizer

The submerged combustion vaporizer (SCV) system requires approximately 1.5% of

the total vaporized LNG as fuel, which adds a significant operating cost to the terminals. For
this reason, SCVs are used only where no other free heat source is available. The SCVs can
also be designed to utilize boil-off gas.

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 In a submerged combustion vaporizer (SCV), LNG flows through a tube coil
fabricated from stainless steel that is submerged in a water bath (Figure).Water in the bath is
heated by direct contact with hot effluent gases that exit a submerged gas burner. One SCV
can be designed to handle a maximum output in the order of 200 MMSCFD.

Submersed combustion vaporizers

Exhaust gases from the burner are sparged into the water through a distributor located
under the heat transfer tubes. This causes rapid circulation of water through the tubes
resulting in a very high thermal efficiency (over 98%) and high heat transfer rate. Agitation
from the sparging action also prevents deposits or scale to be buildup on the heat transfer
surface of the tubes.

Since the water bath is always maintained at a constant temperature, the system copes
well with load fluctuations and can be quickly started up and shut down. The controls for the
submerged combustion vaporizers are more complicated when compared to the open rack
vaporizers. The SCV has more pieces of equipment, such as the air blow, sparging piping,
and the burner management system.

These units are reliable and have very good safety records. Gas leaks can be quickly
detected and the unit can be safely shut down. There is no danger of explosion, due to the fact
that the temperature of the water bath stays below the ignition point of natural gas.

The bath water is acidic as the acid gas content in the exhaust gas is condensed.
Caustic is added to the bath water to control the pH value to protect the tubes against

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corrosion. The excess combustion water must be neutralized before being discharged to the
open water system.

To minimize the NOx emissions, low NOx burners can be used to meet the 40 ppm
NOx limit. The NOx level can be further reduced by using a selective catalytic reduction
(SCR) system in the flue gas stack to meet the 5 ppm specification.

3. Ambient Air Vaporizers (AAV)

An ambient air vaporizer (AAV) extracts heat from the ambient air for heating, hence
avoiding the use of seawater or fuel gas. AAVs are considered the more environmentally
friendly solution than ORVs and SCVs, and hence are much easier to permit. The AAV heat
exchangers are cost competitive since they can operate on a standalone basis without support
of the seawater system, intermediate fluid, and fuel gas system. However, the number of
vaporizer units is much higher than other options, which would require a larger plot space.

Two types of ambient air vaporizers can be considered for the LNG terminals: direct
air/LNG vaporizers and indirect air vaporizers using an intermediate fluid. The air exchanger
can be operated on a natural draft or a forced draft mode.

a. Direct heating with ambient air:

Ambient air vaporization (AAV) technology uses ambient air as the thermal energy
source to vaporize the liquefied natural gas. The LNG is distributed through a series of
surface heat exchangers warm ambient air enters from the top of the exchanger, exchanges
heat directly to the cold LNG flowing in the specialized finned tubes to vaporize LNG. The
air is cooled and flows downward along the outside of the finned tubes and leaves from the
bottom of the exchanger.

The air flow is controlled on the outside of the exchanger through natural buoyancy of
the cooled, dense air, or by installing forced-draft air fans.

Frost forming on the vaporizer is an issue because the LNG is vaporized directly
against the air (direct heat system) and it cools air reaches its dew point and starts to
condense water s. Frost build-up reduces performance and heat transfer. Deicing or
Defrosting is necessary to avoid dense ice buildup on the surface of the heat exchanger tubes.
In order to maintain the overall availability of the LNG vaporizer capacity, additional units

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are installed to overcome vaporizer regeneration activity The use of force draft fans can
reduce the defrosting time but would require additional fan horsepower.

The performance of ambient air vaporizers depends on the LNG inlet and outlet
conditions and more importantly the site conditions and environment factors, such ambient
temperature, relative humidity, altitude, wind, solar radiation, and proximity to adjacent
structures.

Direct heating ambient air vaporizer

b. Indirect heating with ambient air:

The intermediate fluid vaporizer (IFV) uses an intermediate heat transfer fluid (HTF)
in a closed loop to transfer heat from a heat source to the LNG vaporizers. The intermediate
fluid can be ethylene glycol or propylene glycol; other low-freezing heat transfer fluids are
suitable for the operating temperatures.

The intermediate fluid is circulated in a closed loop system which flows inside the
finned tubes of the exchanger. The warm air is forced outside the tubes using fans allowing
heat transfer from the warm ambient air to the intermediate fluid as shown in (figure). The
cold air as well as the condensed water outside the tubes flows in a top to bottom down flow
direction perpendicular to the tubes. The warm intermediate fluid flows to the LNG

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vaporizers, which are specialized low temperature differential shell and tube exchangers, to
regasify LNG. The cold intermediate fluid flows back to the Air-Fin Exchangers for
reheating. The process generally is provided with a supplemental heating system to provide
heat during low ambient temperature conditions where the available ambient heat supply is
not adequate to vaporize the design throughput.

Indirect heating ambient air vaporizer

4. Shell and tube vaporizers:

Shell and tube vaporizers (STV) can be operated in an open-loop or closed-loop.

a. Direct heating with sea water:

In the open-loop configuration, seawater is pumped from the seawater intake to the
STVs to vaporize the LNG. The liquefied natural gas passes through multiple tubes while
seawater enters a shell surrounding the tubes. The STV operates in a similar fashion as ORV
except that seawater is pumped through the shell and tube exchangers instead (Figure). The
exchanger shell is constructed of high pressure stainless steel material for the LNG operation
and the exchanger tube is constructed of titanium or other suitable materials for seawater
operation. The material cost of STV is expensive, but the size is relatively compact, which
may be justified in offshore operation.

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 Direct heating with sea water STV

b. Indirect heating with sea water:

In indirect heating intermediate heat transfer fluid is used to vaporize the LNG. Propane
or butane can be used as the Intermediate heat transfer fluid, as shown in (Figure).

In this scheme, propane or butane is vaporized on the shell side of a shell and tube
exchanger using seawater as the heat source. The vaporized fluid then condenses on the STV
that supplies heat to the LNG. The use of a hydrocarbon would avoid the freezing problems
encountered with other intermediate fluid.

Indirect heating with sea water

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 5. Safety design of LNG facilities

The safety guidelines that govern the operation of LNG import terminals are very
important.

The design of the terminal, the equipment and materials used, and the operational
procedures are geared towards risk reduction. This is achieved through prevention of spills of
LNG and leaks of regasified LNG and, in the unlikely event that they would occur, through
the management of the consequences (i.e., ensuring that any spills are contained and
dispersed safely).

Safety systems are designed to be both active and passive. Examples of active systems
include gas, fire, and smoke detectors, shut-down systems, and firefighting systems. Passive
systems include the installation of spill control channels leading to sumps, where LNG can be
contained and its boil-off rate (and resulting vapor production) can be reduced to low levels.

The locations of and distances between the tanks, vaporizers, liquid and vapor lines,
and other facilities are determined by local regulations and/ or by recognized international
codes of practice. Distances to the nearest property lines and to populations off site are also
assessed and controlled.

In the event of a spill or fire at the terminal, having an adequate distance between the
terminal and the surrounding area ensures that the gas vapour will have dispersed to below
flammable limits before it leaves the facility property; it also ensures that any fire will be far
enough away so that the public would have time to move to a safe distance and avoid the risk
of being burned in such an incident. In the U.S. regulatory system, the safety of the terminal
is managed by the imposition of exclusion zones for vapour and thermal risks that are
calculated on the basis of the specific design of the terminal and its site and within which
certain activities are prohibited. In Europe, regulatory authorities generally require that each
facility be subject to a specific hazard analysis developed just for that facility, and there are
fewer prescribed standards.

6. Security issues for the LNG industry

By their nature, LNG import terminals are likely to be near centers of population, and
issues of public protection and public acceptance of new terminal proposals have high
community profiles. How much LNG could conceivably be released in a major incident?
How quickly and how far might the pool spread? How fast does it vaporize to gaseous

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methane? And, what is the maximum size and intensity of any resulting fire? These are the
questions typically addressed in accessing the potential impact of terrorist attacks. These are
questions typically addressed in the planning, siting and design of modern LNG import
terminals.

All LNG terminals have security systems to ensure that unauthorized people do not
have access to the facility or the LNG tankers berthed there. The arrival, departure, and
berthing of LNG tankers will normally be controlled by the local harbor authority or by the
operating company, as appropriate, and each port will impose differing levels of safety and
security for the LNG tankers. Since terrorist attacks of september 11, 2001, there has been
increased public and political attention focused on the safety and security of LNG terminals
and the associated shipping, and regulators have responded by increasing safety and security
assessments and requirements.

Security for LNG facilities and ships

Each country has its own regulations and agencies responsible for marine vessel
security. For example, in the United States FERC (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission)
is among several federal agencies overseeing the security of LNG terminals and peak shaving
plants. The Coast Guard has responsibility for LNG shipping and marine terminal security
(FERC, 2005). DOT’s (Department of Transportation) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration (PHMSA) and the Department of Homeland Security’s Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) have security authority for LNG peak shaving facilities. In
addition to federal agencies, state and local authorities provide security assistance at LNG
facilities.

7. Environmental issues:

The environmental impacts associated with LNG facilities are project specific. On the
liquefaction side, it depends on the feed gas compositions and acid gas contents. High acid
gas content feed gas would generate higher sulfur oxides and carbon dioxide emissions. On
the regasification side, the location of the terminal determines the source of heating used for
LNG vaporization. A cold climate regasification terminal would require submerged
combustion vaporizers, which would generate more emissions than a warm climate location
where seawater is available. However, there are impacts on marine life from the cold water

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discharge from an LNG plant. There are other impacts and risks that must be assessed for the
LNG facilities in determining its overall environmental impact.

Waste water streams

Nonhazardous and hazardous wastes include general wastes such as waste oils,
hydraulic fluids, waste chemicals, filter elements, solvent wastes, spent molecular sieves, and
spent catalysts and chemicals. These chemicals and solid waste must be properly disposed of
or recycled. Efforts should be made to recycle and reclaim the waste materials where
possible. If recycling is not practical, wastes must be disposed of in an environmentally safe
manner using the best technologies and practices, which must also comply with local laws
and regulations.

Air emissions

Air emissions in LNG facilities are mainly from the exhaust stacks from the gas
turbines in refrigeration units, utility steam boilers, and gas turbines in power plants.
Maximum emissions from the equipment must be specified in the duty specifications of the
rotating equipment.

In the regasification terminals, the selection of LNG heaters must consider the
difference in emissions and flexibility among a variety of heat exchange equipment. If waste
heat is available nearby, such as hot water discharge from a power plant, they should be
considered as a heat source for LNG regasification to reduce the overall environmental
impact.

Venting and flaring

Flaring or venting is necessary to avoid build-up of excess gas in the system and to
safely dispose of the excess gas in the event of an emergency, such as system shutdown, or
other plant upset conditions. Every effort should be made to avoid venting and flaring during
normal operation by recovering the excess gas as fuel gas.

Boil-off gas management

In the liquefaction plant, boil-off from storage tanks is compressed to the gas turbines
inlet, to be used as fuel gas or reliquefied in the process. In the regasification terminal, BOG
from storage tanks is compressed by a BOG compressor and recondensed in a BOG

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recondenser using a portion of the cold LNG sendout. No BOG venting is allowed during
normal operation.

Fugitive emissions

Fugitive emissions generally originate from vents, leakage from instruments, valve
packing, seals, and pressure relief valves. Equipment and instruments should be designed to
meet the emission requirements according to local industrial standards

Noises

The main noise generation sources in LNG facilities are pumps, compressors, generators,
drivers, fin fan air coolers, LNG vaporizers, and heaters. Installation of noise-dampening
devices should be used where necessary.

8. Risk based analysis of LNG plants:

The safe processing, storage, and transportation of LNG is an essential condition for
the continued existence, growth, and sustenance of the entire industry. Both marine transport
and onshore LNG plants and transportation follow two basic paths for safe operations:

• All applicable codes and standards should be met with rigor (even voluntary ones).

• Each operation must establish their own Process Safety Management (PSM) system. The
objectives are usually to establish and follow best industry practices, to use innovative
measures, and to obtain the best risk/reward ratio for their safety budgets.

Risk analysis tools:

At the heart of a good risk management system is a systematic method to identify

hazards, assess their likelihood and consequences, control the process effectively, shut down
safely in an emergency, and recover from any loss of containment with minimum
consequences.

Qualitative Methodologies

a. Preliminary Risk Analysis

b. What-if Analysis
c. Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP)
d. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA/FMECA)

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Tree-Based Techniques

a. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

b. Event Tree Analysis (ETA)

Qualitative risk analysis methodologies

a. Preliminary risk analysis

Preliminary Risk Analysis or hazard analysis is a qualitative technique that involves a

disciplined analysis of the event sequences that could transform a potential hazard into an
accident. In this technique, the possible undesirable events are identified first and then
analyzed separately. For each undesirable event or hazard, possible improvements or
preventive measures are then formulated.

b. What-if analysis

What-if studies are qualitative, postulating a deviation and asking what would be the
consequences of this deviation.

c. Hazard and operability studies (HAZOP)

The HAZOP technique was developed in the early 1970s by Imperial Chemical
Industries Ltd. HAZOP can be defined as the application of a formal systematic examination
of the hazard potential from deviations in designed operations and the consequential effects
on the facilities.

This technique is usually performed using a set of guidewords: NO/NOT,

MORE/LESS OF, AS WELL AS, PART OF, REVERSE, and OTHER THAN. From these
guidewords, scenarios are identified that may result in a hazard or an operational problem.

d. Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA/FMECA)

This method was developed in the 1950s by reliability engineers to determine

problems that could arise from malfunctions of military system. Failure mode and effects
analysis is a procedure by which each potential failure mode in a system is analyzed to
determine its effect and to classify it according to its severity.

When the FMEA is extended by a criticality analysis, the technique is then called
failure modes and effects criticality analysis (FMECA).

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Tree-based techniques

a. Fault tree analysis

A fault tree is a logical diagram that shows the relation between system failure; that is,
a specific undesirable event in the system, and failures of the components of the system. An
undesirable event is first defined and causal relationships of the failures leading to that event
are then identified as related through “AND” and “OR” gates as illustrated in Figure. In
Figure the top event, "Fire breaks out" is above an AND gate, and “Ignition source is near
flammable fluid” is above an OR gate.

b. Event tree analysis (ETA)

ETA diagrams the branches of consecutive events (fail or no-fail). Each branch point
has a probability, pi for yes, and (1–pi) for no. For events that occur in series each probability
along the path is multiplied to give the final probability for that path.

Individual and societal risk analysis

Quantitative risk analysis (QRA) methods are applied widely to petrochemical plants,
including LNG plants. QRA provides highly transparent and readily understandable results.
Frequencies and modelled consequences are explicit inputs.

Quantitative risk analysis (QRA)

Quantitative risk analysis solves the problem of defining credible breaks by

considering all possible break sizes and linking these to their estimated frequencies. Since the
line break probability decreases with increasing break size as shown in Table large events
(holes) are weighted with a low probability.

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 In addition, an adequate risk analysis method must account for the fact that some
facilities in the general class of petrochemical plants are huge with large numbers of possible
leak sources. Applying the qualitative methods (What-If, HAZOP) leaves the issue of
selecting between a large body of conceivable mitigation measures.

Acceptable risk criteria

Commonly, companies define a risk matrix that quantifies company policy on two
axes; likelihood (probability or frequency) versus severity (consequence or cost). If there are
five levels for each of these variables, the resulting matrix is like Figure

Typical risk matrix

a. < 0.0001, less than once in 10,000 years

b. to 0.001, once in 1,000 to 10,000 years

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 c. to 0.01, once in 100 to 1,000 years
d. to 0.1, once in 10 to 100 years
e. to 1, averages once a year.

The action levels are:

 Red =Corrections required to reduce risk to yellow area

 Yellow =Cost-effective measures should be used to reduce risk
 Green =No further mitigation required.

Societal risk is defined as the relation between the occurrence frequency of each
accident and the number of people that could be affected by the impact of each accident. The
calculation of societal risk considers the population density around a plant and accounts for
movement patterns of the exposed population from night to day, weekdays to weekends.
AQRA typically provides societal risk around a plant in the form of FN curves.

FN curve with risk acceptance criteria

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