Jocelyn B. Doles vs. Ma. Aura Tina AngelesG.R. No. 149353. June 26, 2006.

Facts:

Petitioner executed a Deed of Absolute Sale ceding a parcel of land in favor of respondent to satisfy the
alleged indebtedness of the former in the amount of P405,430.00. Since the said land was mortgaged to
the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, they further agreed that respondent assume the
remaining balance of the loan. Learning that the petitioner still has arrearages, respondent demanded that
the arrearages be paid first. Petitioner did not heed, thus a case was filed by the respondent. In answer, the
petitioner alleged that sale was void for lack of consideration and that she was not in debted to the
respondent as she only referred her friends to respondent whom she knew to be engaged in the business
of lending money in exchange for personal checks through her capitalist Arsenio Pua. Further petitioner
contended that since the respondent is also an agent, she does not have the capacity to sue her. It is an
admitted fact by both petitioner and defendant, based on their testimonies, that respondent knew that the
money will be used by the friends of the petitioner; that the respondent was merely representing Arsenio
Pua; and that before the supposed friends of the petitioner defaulted in payment, each issued
their personal checks in the name of Arsenio Pua for the payment of their debt.

Issue/s:

Whether or not petitioner and respondent were acting on their personal capacity or as mere agents.

Ruling:

The question whether an agency has been created is ordinarily a question which may be established in the
same was as any other fact, either by direct or circumstantial evidence. Agency may be implied from the
words and conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the particular case. Though the fact or extent of
authority of the agents may not, as a general rule, be established from the declarations of the agents alone,
if one frofessed to act as agent for another, she may be stopped to deny her agency both as against the
asserted principal and the third persons interested in the transaction in which he or she is engaged.

UMIPIG V PEOPLE

FACTS:
The National Maritime Polytechnic (NMP) is an attached agency of the Department of Labor and
Employment tasked to provide necessary training to seafarers in order to qualify them for employment.

Sometime in 1995, NMP undertook an expansion program. A pre- feasibility study conducted by the
NMP identified Cavite as a possible site for the expansion as Cavite is close to the employment market
for seafarers. Umipig, then NMP Administrative Officer, after receiving the disbursement voucher and its
supporting documents, issued a memorandum on even date to Palomo enumerating the infirmities of the
supporting documents attached. Atty. Felix M. Basallaje Jr., State Auditor III of the COA and Resident
Auditor at the NMP, set forth his findings in his Special Audit Report, to wit:

1. Disbursement in the amount of P8,910,260.00 in favor of Mr. Glenn Solis for the purchase of two lots
covered by TCT No. 16356 and TCT No. 35812 was not supported by a Torrens Title or such other
document that title is vested in the government (NMP) in violation of Sec. 449 of GAAM Vol. I.

2. The contract to sell entered between NMP and Mr. Glenn Solis is tainted with irregularities the parties
to the contract not being authorized as required in Sec. 5 of P.D. 1369 and pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.

In the same report, the following persons were considered responsible for the subject transactions:

1. Mr. Glenn Solis - For acting as vendor of the above subject property (TCT
Nos. 16356 and 35812) without authority from the owner
thereof;

2. Ms. Teresita Jimenez - Trinidad Formis[re]presentation/conspiring with Mr. Glenn Solis by

issuing a Special Power of Attorney to sell the above
property without authority from the owner.

3. Mr. Renato B. Palomo - For entering into a contract to sell without authority from
Executive Director the NMP Board of Directors and by signing Box "C"
approving of the voucher as payment.

4. Benjamin A. Umipig - For signing Box "A" in certifying the payment as lawful.
Administrative Officer

5. Margie C. Mabitad - For signing Box "B" certifying as to availability of funds,

Chief Accountant that expenditure are proper and supported by documents.

6. Carmencita Fontanilla - For signing in the voucher for fund control and in the ROA
Budget Officer for requesting obligation of the above transactions.38

Atty. Basallaje thus made the following recommendations:

1. Disallow in audit all transaction[s] covering payments made to Mr. Glenn Solis under Voucher No.
101-9608-787 and Voucher No. 101-9612-1524 with a total amount of P8,910,260.00.

2. Require Mr. Glenn Solis and his principal, Teresita Jimenez Trinidad to restitute the amount received
plus damages by filing a separate civil suit against the vendor.

3. Institute the filing of appropriate case against parties involved, if evidence warrants.

After preliminary investigation, the Tacloban City Prosecutor’s Office issued a Resolution dated January
25, 2001 finding a prima facie case of malversation of public funds committed in conspiracy by Solis,
Jimenez-Trinidad, Palomo, Fontanilla-Payabyab, Umipig and Mabitad. Upon review, the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas approved with modification the resolution of the Tacloban City Prosecutor’s
Office and recommended instead the prosecution of petitioners for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the filing of a separate Information for
Falsification against Solis.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the act of accused Executive Director Renato Palomo y Bermes in entering, in behalf of
the NMP, into a Contract to Sell with accused Glenn Solis required prior authority and/or approval from
the Board of Trustees of NMP

RULING:

Yes, The essential elements of Section 3(e) of R.A.No. 3019, as amended, are as follows:

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;

2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and

3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.

Palomo acted with evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence; Umipig and Mabitad were grossly
negligent in the performance of their duties

The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be committed, that is, through
"manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or "gross inexcusable negligence." There is "manifest partiality"
when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than
another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent
and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill
will. "Evident bad faith" contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with
some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes."Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to
negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference
to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.These three modes are distinct and different
from each other. Proof of the existence of any of these modes would suffice. Umipig said that he made
objections, as evidenced by a memorandum,to the payments made for the first purchase but did not
anymore object on the payments pertaining to the second purchase because the Board of Trustees already
gave a go signal for their purchase. He also cited an alleged COA regulation stating that if the subordinate
objects in writing, he will be exonerated if he is later proven correct.

Soriamont Steamship Agencies vs Sprint Transport Services

FACTS:

Sprint filed a complaint for sum of money against Soriamont and Ronas contending that they have an
ongoing dispute pertaining to their Equipment Lease Agreement. Sprint agreed to lease chassis units for
the transport of container vans. Thru authorization letters, Ronas on behalf of Soriamont and PAPA
Trucking Services were able to withdraw two (2) chassis units from the container yard of Sprint.

Soriamont and Ronas failed to pay their rental fees on the lease agreement and inform Sprint that the
equipment that was rented to them were lost. Sprint made several demands but despite such, Soriamont
and Ronas failed to pay the rental fees and failed to replace the equipment. Soriamont alleges that it was
PTS who withdrew the equipment.

Issue: Whether or not PTS is an agent of Soriamont

Held:

NO

Art. 1897. The agent who acts as such is not personally liable to the party with whom he contracts, unless
he expressly binds himself or exceeds the limits of his authority without giving such party sufficient
notice of his powers.

The burden falls upon Soriamont to prove its affirmative allegation that PTS acted in any manner in
excess of its authority as agent, thus, resulting in the loss of the subject equipment. To recall, the subject
equipment was withdrawn and used by PTS with the authority of Soriamont. And for PTS to be
personally liable, as agent, it is vital that Soriamont be able to prove that PTS damaged or lost the said
equipment because it acted contrary to or in excess of the authority granted to it by Soriamont.

Given the lack of evidence that PTS was in any way responsible for the loss of the subject equipment,
then, it cannot be held liable to Sprint, or even to Soriamont as its agent. In the absence of evidence
showing that PTS acted contrary to or in excess of the authority granted to it by its principal, Soriamont,
this Court cannot merely presume PTS liable to Soriamont as its agent. The only thing proven was that
Soriamont, through PTS, withdrew the two chassis units from Sprint, and that these have never been
returned to Sprint.
LOPEZ V CA

FACTS:
On 23 March 1968, Juliana executed a notarial will,whereby she expressed that she wished to constitute a
trust fund for her paraphernal properties, denominated as Fideicomiso de Juliana Lopez Manzano
(Fideicomiso), to be administered by her husband. If her husband were to die or renounce the obligation,
her nephew, Enrique Lopez, was to become administrator and executor of the Fideicomiso. Two-thirds
(2/3) of the income from rentals over these properties were to answer for the education of deserving but
needy honor students, while one-third 1/3 was to shoulder the expenses and fees of the administrator. As
to her conjugal properties, Juliana bequeathed the portion that she could legally dispose to her husband,
and after his death, said properties were to pass to her biznietos or great grandchildren. Juliana initiated
the probate of her will five (5) days after its execution, but she died on 12 August 1968, before the
petition for probate could be heard. The petition was pursued instead in Special Proceedings (S.P.) No.
706 by her husband, Jose, who was the designated executor in the will. On 7 October 1968, the Court of
First Instance, Branch 3, Balayan,Batangas, acting as probate court, admitted the will to probate and
issued the letters testamentary to Jose. Jose then submitted an inventory of Juliana’s real and personal
properties with their appraised values, which was approved by the probate court. Thereafter, Jose filed a
Report dated 16 August 1969, which included a proposed project of partition. Jose proceeded to offer a
project of partition.Then, Jose listed those properties which he alleged were registered in both his and
Juliana’s names, totaling 13 parcels in all. The disputed properties consisting of six (6) parcels, all located
in Balayan, Batangas, were included in said list. On 25 August 1969, the probate court issued an order
approving the project of partition. As to the properties to be constituted into the Fideicomiso, the probate
court ordered that the certificates of title thereto be cancelled, and, in lieu thereof, new certificates be
issued in favor of Jose as trustee of the Fideicomiso covering one-half (1/2) of the properties listed under
paragraph 14 of the project of partition; and regarding the other half, to be registered in the name of Jose
as heir of Juliana. The properties which Jose had alleged as registered in his and Juliana’s names,
including the disputed lots, were adjudicated to Jose as heir, subject to the condition that Jose would settle
the obligations charged on these properties. The probate court, thus, directed that new certificates of title
be issued in favor of Jose as the registered owner thereof in its Order dated 15 September 1969. On even
date, the certificates of title of the disputed properties were issued in the name of Jose. The Fideicomiso
was constituted in S.P No. 706 encompassing one-half (1/2) of the Abra de Ilog lot on Mindoro, the 1/6
portion of the lot in Antorcha St. in Balayan, Batangas and all other properties inherited ab intestato by
Juliana from her sister, Clemencia, in accordance with the order of the probate court in S.P. No. 706. The
disputed lands were excluded from the trust. Jose died on 22 July 1980, leaving a holographic will
disposing of the disputed properties to respondents. The will was allowed probate on 20 December 1983
in S.P. No. 2675 before the RTC of Pasay City. Pursuant to Jose’s will, the RTC ordered on 20 December
1983 the transfer of the disputed properties to the respondents as the heirs of Jose. Consequently, the
certificates of title of the disputed properties were cancelled and new ones issued in the names of
respondents. Petitioner’s father, Enrique Lopez, also assumed the trusteeship of Juliana’s estate. On 30
August 1984, the RTC of Batangas, Branch 9 appointed petitioner as trustee of Juliana’s estate in S.P. No.
706. On 11 December 1984, petitioner instituted an action for reconveyance of parcels of land with sum
of money before the RTC of Balayan, Batangas against respondents. The complaint essentially alleged
that Jose was able to register in his name the disputed properties, which were the paraphernal properties
of Juliana, either during their conjugal union or in the course of the performance of his duties as executor
of the testate estate of Juliana and that upon the death of Jose, the disputed properties were included in the
inventory as if they formed part of Jose’s estate when in fact Jose was holding them only in trust for the
trust estate of Juliana. The RCT dismissed the petition on the ground of prescription. The CA denied the
appeals filed by both parties. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether an implied trust was constituted over the disputed properties when Jose, the trustee,
registered them in his name.
HELD:

The disputed properties were excluded from the Fideicomiso at the outset. Jose registered the disputed
properties in his name partly as his conjugal share and partly as his inheritance from his wife Juliana,
which is the complete reverse of the claim of the petitioner, as the new trustee, that the properties are
intended for the beneficiaries of the Fideicomiso. Furthermore, the exclusion of the disputed properties
from the Fideicomiso was approved by the probate court and, subsequently, by the trial court having
jurisdiction over the Fideicomiso. The registration of the disputed properties in the name of Jose was
actually pursuant to a court order. The apparent mistake in the adjudication of the disputed properties to
Jose created a mere implied trust of the constructive variety in favor of the beneficiaries of the
Fideicomiso.