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Extend our 1ac. Trump is committed to fighting in Afghanistan and will continue, that’s Baron 18.

Glavin 18 shows that 3 terror groups, Al Qaeda, ISIS-Khorasan, and the Haqqani network, are
functioning and are a threat, and U.S. counter-terrorism is needed. Our Borene and Jaffer 16 cards
show that taking in translators increasing credibility and recruitment. Hsu 7 and Ahmad 12 prove that
the plan increases cultural competency and allows the U.S. to communicate more effectively, and
increases credibility and allows us to make allies bc we kept our promise. Scarborough 9 proves that
translators increase our intelligence processing. Extend Bunn and Roth 17, Al Qaeda is gathering
nukes, and will cause extinction. Allison 18 shows that this is possible due to recent developments.
Dasche and Myers 16 show that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups have increased bioterror.
Farquhar 17 prove it leads to extinction and overcomes natural limitations. CRISPR heightens the risk,
in Wagner 17. Our impact are further magnified in our Byman 17 card. Trump magnifies all the impact
by lashing out irrationally.

Extend Tomlin 17, we need more immigrants, 3500 is good start but hasn’t achieved enough.

Our plan solves this by gaining enough SIV’s immigrants and accessing our 3 internal links.

Trump hasn’t removed afghan troops, just Iraq troops. He has given no indication of a pullout from
AFGHANISTAN.

These internal links aren’t solved by machines because they aren’t taking in translators and fulfilling a
promise for credibility, and the machines only translate, they don’t understand the culture.

Extend Hickey 15, machines are unable to solve. Areas such as dialects, linguistic interpretation, and
slang mislead a.i. and tech far too easily. Humans are the only choice as translators as they
understand the nuances. Are two internal links also go unanswered, cultural competence and regional
credibility.

Translator fail cards are from 2008 and 2010, our Borene and Jaffer 16 cards are more recent and
prove that translators are extensively vetted and the process has been refined.

No double bind. We have a supply of translators, but they are uncertain, because they are risking their
life for us if they join and we haven’t fulfilled our promise. If we do fulfill our promise, then the
uncertainty is gone, and our recruitment goes up. It has nothing to do with structural difficulties.

Bio not too complex, they have an analytic that says they had bioterror in 2008, and with CRISPR, they
have heightened capabilities.

Our Allison 18 says RECENT developments, is more recent than their nuke evidence. Only with U.S. CT
will we solve, the India war doesn’t do anything.

T:
W/M – the plan text says substantially and doesn’t isolate a specific restriction – if
they win their interp then it would obviously manipulate eligibility requirements in
order to allow in as many people as necessary
C/I – substantial means reasonable
King et al 95 – Carolyn D. King, E. Grady Jolly, and Harold R. Demoss, Senior Judges of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1995(“MOAFAK KHAWAM, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent,” United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 3-3-
1995, Available to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)//BM

In immigration cases, we review "only the decision of the BIA, not that of the IJ." Ogbemudia v. INS, 988 F.2d 595, 598 (5th Cir.
1993). We consider the errors of the IJ only to the extent that they affect the decision of the BIA, which itself conducts a de novo review of the administrative
record. See id. The BIA's findings of fact, upon which a deportation order is based, must be supported by "reasonable, substantial, and
probative evidence on the record considered as a whole." 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4). The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as

"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v.
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 522, 101 S. Ct. 2478, 69 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1981) (internal quotation omitted); see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 112 S. Ct. 812, 815,
817, 117 L. Ed. 2d 38 (stating that to reverse the BIA's determination under the substantial evidence test, "a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude [that the
statutory requisites had been met]."). The
Court has also stated that "the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions
from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency's finding from being [*6] supported by
substantial evidence." Donovan, 452 U.S. at 523 (internal quotation omitted).

Reduce means to make smaller


Merriam Webster No Date “reduce”, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reduce
to draw together or cause to converge : consolidate ·reduce
all the questions to one b (1) : to diminish in size, amount,
extent, or number ·reduce taxes ·reduce the likelihood of war (2) : to decrease the volume and concentrate the flavor of
by boiling ·add the wine and reduce the sauce for two minutes c : to narrow down : restrict ·the Indians were reduced to small reservations d :
to make shorter : abridge

A restriction is a statue that confines within bounds


Erwin 13 – Judge for the Supreme Court of Indiana (Curless et al. v. Watson. No. 22,422. SUPREME
COURT OF INDIANA 180 Ind. 86; 102 N.E. 497; 1913 Ind. LEXIS 99 June 27, 1913, Filed, lexis)
In the section of the Constitution referring to circuit courts, there is this provision, as follows: HN13Go to this Headnote in the case. "The circuit
court shall consist of one judge, and shall have such civil and criminal jurisdiction as may be prescribed by law." § 8, Art. 7, Constitution.
HN14Go to this Headnote in the case.In the section relating to justices of the peace, the Constitution provides, "They shall continue in office
four years and their powers and duties shall be prescribed by law." In these last two sections mentioned, it was intended that the legislature
should fix the jurisdiction of circuit courts and justices of the peace; and if the same provision had been intended, by the framers of the
Constitution, as to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, they would have so expressed it. [**502] It is contended that the power to regulate
and restrict the Supreme Court, in appeals, gives the legislature the right to take away the final jurisdiction of appeals, and bestow it upon
whomsoever it may see fit. "Restriction" as defined [***20] by Webster, is the act of restricting, confining or limiting;
the state of being restricted, limited or confined within bounds. "Regulation" is defined, by the same authority, as the act of
regulating; the act of reducing to order or of disposing in accordance with rule or established custom; a rule, order or direction from a
superior [*99] or competent authority; a governing or prescribing a course of action. And while the legislature may withhold
from this court jurisdiction in certain cases, it cannot confer final jurisdiction upon any other tribunal "To hear and determine the questions of
law arising upon the face of the record without any evidence to substantiate it," and make its actions final. While the legislature may regulate
and restrict the Supreme Court, as to how it may take jurisdiction, it cannot take away from the court the jurisdiction over this particular
subject, granted by the Constitution, and bestow it upon any other tribunal, and a legislative enactment, which seeks to do so is contrary to the
Constitution. The legislature has the undoubted right to regulate appeals, but the power to regulate does not give authority to take away, or
bestow it upon another [***21] tribunal.
Prefer it:
a) Aff predictability - at best their evidence defines a “substantial increase in
immigration” which is not the resolutional standard
b) Overlimiting – they result in a hyper-constrained topic that leads to stale
debate

Functional limits check

Defer aff – good is good enough – substance crowd out is worse than minor unlimiting

We are accepting everyone possible. Our plan is substantial because we are


accepting every single translator from afghan.
2AC

Translators are k2 national security and combatting terrorism


Rowan Scarborough 9, graduated summa cum laude from the School of Journalism at the University
of Maryland, “EXCLUSIVE: Lack of translators hurts U.S. war on terror”,
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/aug/31/lack-of-translators-still-hampers-intelligence/

U.S. national security agencies remain woefully short of foreign-language speakers and translators nearly
eight years after the Sept. 11 attacks resulted in a war on an enemy that often communicates in relatively obscure dialects, current and former
officials say. The necessary cadre of U.S. intelligence personnel capable of reading and speaking targeted regional languages
such as Pashto, Dari and Urdu “remains essentially nonexistent,” the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence wrote in a rare but
stark warning in its 2010 budget report. The gap has become critical in the war effort, especially in the Afghanistan-
Pakistan theater, where al Qaeda and Taliban operatives text message, e-mail and talk in languages that the intelligence community had
largely ignored before 2001. Intercepting phone and radio calls in the region’s native tongues is critical to
monitoring terrorist camps and movements in Pakistan’s tribal areas, officials said. The National Security Agency (NSA), based at Fort
Meade, Md., channels the calls to translation centers, where linguists are supposed to quickly translate the words into English so that they can
be distributed in reports and raw transcripts to commanders and policymakers. But such quick follow-through does not always
happen. Rep. Peter Hoekstra of Michigan, the senior Republican on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, told The
Washington Times that U.S agencies remain “behind the eight ball” in catching up to dialects not deemed important during the Cold War.
“We’ve been pushing the language issue for an extended period of time. The agencies just didn’t respond,” Mr. Hoekstra said in an interview.
“They’d come in. We’d talk about language capability. We’d beat them up. They’d leave. They’d come back a year later, and it wouldn’t be a lot
better. We’d beat them up again. “I can’t explain it. No. 1, Congress has been pestering them. No. 2, you would think it’s important for them to
do their job. You could understand it immediately after 9/11. This takes a little time to do to get it right. But still talking about it in 2009 makes
no sense at all,” he said. Intelligence officials say they’ve
offered significant sums of money to try to lure more
translators, but recruitment remains slow and some attractive candidates have trouble passing the review for security
clearances. “We’ve made progress on foreign languages — including Pashto, Dari and Urdu — but there’s more to be done,” CIA spokesman
George Little said. “We continue to offer generous financial incentives to individuals with foreign-language skills, including hiring bonuses and
additional pay for current officers.” CIA Director Leon E. Panetta, who has vowed to change the culture at Langley, sent out a message in May to
employees announcing “an aggressive plan to build the truly multilingual work force we need.” He said he wants to double the number of
analysts and clandestine service officers who speak foreign languages and “dramatically transform the way CIA trains in foreign language
capability.” A former intelligence officer who worked on methods to intercept calls while in Afghanistan told The Times that finding or
training people to speak obscure languages is easier said than done. The former officer, who asked not to be named
because the information is classified, said intelligence agency representatives have visited polyglot locations such as Detroit to recruit native
speakers. “They were able to find many recent immigrants and first-generation U.S. citizens with needed language skills,” he said. “But none of
them could pass a background check.” To listen and translate al Qaeda telephone calls, or interrogate a suspect, translators
must
attain a top-secret clearance. But investigators often found that the candidate belonged to a mosque where extremism was
preached, or had relatives back home deemed “not trustworthy,” the former officer said. “They are likely to be swayed by their family,” the
source added. “At least that is the conventional wisdom.” He said he had personal knowledge of tapped phone calls going untranslated for days
because of personnel shortages. There are only a handful of security-cleared Kurdish speakers in the United States, Canada and Britain —
countries that trade in intercepted communications. “Anything that goes on in northern Iraq, where Kurdish is spoken, is really tough for us,”
the former officer said. He recalled an Iraqi bomb maker in the Kurdish north whose calls were intercepted but not translated for days, allowing
him to stay on the move. The source added that inhabitants of the Korengal Valley, in the Taliban-infested Kunar province in Afghanistan, speak
their own little-known dialect. “It is almost impossible
to do anything in a timely manner there,” he said. The Senate
intelligence committee is now applying its own pressure. Its budget report for fiscal 2010 stated, “persistent critical
shortages in some
languages contribute to the loss of intelligence information and affect the ability of the intelligence community to
process and exploit what it does collect.” The report devoted only a few paragraphs to the issue and didn’t spell out in detail why the
CIA, the NSA and the Defense Intelligence Agency are not fully staffed with foreign-language specialists. Without a full cadre of native speakers,
the intelligence community must rely on trained Americans. But Pashto, Dari and other dialects
are difficult to learn and take
years to master. Americans cannot duplicate the intricate knowledge of native speakers. “Once they are
trained that well they can make more money elsewhere,” the former intelligence officer said. Indeed, the NSA relies on private contractors to
do some of the translating, as does the military. The FBI makes up one prong of the U.S. intelligence community cited in the Senate panel
report. The bureau contends that it has assembled a strong cadre of regional language speakers, in-house and with private contractors. Its
role is critical: It translates thousands of al Qaeda documents seized here and abroad, and interrogates terrorism suspects around the
world. The FBI also may have a larger interrogation role now that the Obama White House has taken control of interrogations away from the
CIA. “We have recruited many more language specialists since 9/11 as well as our part in the Virtual Translation Center,” Assistant FBI Director
John Miller said. The center is a multiagency facility intended to pull various language skills into one place. “On the subject of the recently
announced joint interrogation teams, one of the strengths of it is that you are working off a multiagency platform, so between all the
participating agencies, you should be able to find the right speaker with the right dialect for the mission,” Mr. Miller said in an e-mail. But
Stephen Kohn, a Washington lawyer who has represented two FBI whistleblowers who have suspected failings in the bureau’s anti-terrorism
efforts, said the committee’s criticism applies to the bureau, too. “They just don’t have the speakers, especially in any type of
operational capacity,” Mr. Kohn said.
2AC – Success K2 Combat Terrorism

2018 is a deciding year for the success of US intervention in Afghanistan – new


strategies will likely succeed
Paul D. Shinkman 17, Senior National Security Writer, US News, “Victory or Failure in Afghanistan:
2018 Will Be the Deciding Year”, https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2017-11-27/victory-
or-failure-in-afghanistan-2018-will-be-the-deciding-year

THE WAR IN Afghanistan will be decided in 2018, when a new military-heavy U.S. administration in Washington will prove
whether its plan will be enough to overcome entrenched battlefield obstacles and convince skeptics that it is capable of putting an end to
America's longest conflict. Armed with a new strategy and renewed support from old allies, the Trump
administration now believes it has everything it needs to win the war in Afghanistan. Top military advisers all the way
up to Defense Secretary Jim Mattis say they can accomplish what two previous administrations and multiple troop surges could not:
the defeat of the Taliban by Western-backed local forces, a negotiated peace and the establishment of a
popularly supported government in Kabul capable of keeping the country from once again becoming a haven to any terrorist
group. But they face sharp criticism from politicians and populists at home and from some of America's staunchest allies abroad, who believe
the U.S. is sinking into a "forever war" based around a strategy that is too military-focused and ill-prepared to overturn endemic systems of
corruption and patriarchy in Afghanistan. And what limited patience the Trump administration has secured will only see it through next year,
when it will have to prove that this new strategy is working and that a plan that has satisfied U.S. and allied defense chiefs
– for now – is anything more than misguided delusion. "There is a thread of branding every year as crucially important. 2018 will be
different from others," Czech Army Gen. Petr Pavel, the top military officer for NATO policy and strategy, told U.S. News on the
sidelines of an international security conference in Halifax, Nova Scotia, earlier this month. The Trump administration released a new strategy
for all of South Asia in August, which Mattis explained to eagerly awaiting NATO partners at a gathering of allied defense chiefs here earlier in
November. It accounts for a surge of almost 4,000 more American forces and new rules of engagement that allow them to more aggressively
attack the Taliban and other extremists, as well as go after their sources of revenue and previously inaccessible hideouts in places like
neighboring Pakistan. In addition to this plan, Pavel, chairman of the NATO Military Committee, is focused on the 2018 Afghan parliamentary
elections – the next demonstration of whether democracy is beginning to take root in the developing country, as well as the 2019 presidential
elections, where top Afghan leaders hope to avoid a repeat of the awkward power-sharing arrangement that resulted from the last nationwide
vote. And he stressed the importance of a new narrative for defeating the Taliban, one of forcing them through a surge in NATO troops to
return to the negotiating table, rather than trying to turn over responsibility to fledgling Afghan forces to defeat the insurgent network
militarily. This new approach by the U.S. was greeted warmly by its allies in NATO, who pledged 3,000 more troops at their summit
here to add to the 13,500 allied forces in Afghanistan for the train, advise and assist mission. Half of those are Americans, part of another 7,000
troops that also conduct and support counterterrorism operations . The full complement of forces the U.S. requested from NATO has not yet
been met, though officials say they expect contributing countries to finalize their commitments by early next year. "We'll stay there as long as
we deem it necessary to stay there," NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said at the Brussels summit. "We have been there for 16 years
and NATO allies and partners continue to provide troops and funding to the Afghan forces. They do this because they see that stability in
Afghanistan is important for their own security." Some also see contributing
to Afghanistan as integral for ensuring
domestic security. Latvia for example, the former Soviet nation now one of the newest members of NATO, is sending one new special
forces group to help with the Afghan training mission. "We have to contribute in order to receive when we need support for us," Latvian
Secretary of State for Defence Janis Garisons says, citing the potential need for alliance support were Russia or another adversary to attack
Latvia and trigger NATO's collective-defense agreement. So far, Latvia has provided 100 percent of what the U.S. has asked of it, Garisons says.

Trump is increasing US war efforts in Afghanistan now, BUT ambiguity leaves room for
significant changes to the scale of intervention.
Davis and Landler 17(Julie and Mark, New York Times journalists, 8-21-2017, "Trump Outlines New
Afghanistan War Strategy With Few Details," New York Times,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/21/world/asia/afghanistan-troops-
trump.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=CC1E2CAF8EDA21E49AFB9737D93007D9&gwt=p
ay, MSCOTT)

declined to specify
WASHINGTON — President Trump put forward on Monday a long-awaited strategy for resolving the nearly 16-year-old conflict in Afghanistan, but he

either the number of troops that would be committed, or the conditions by which he would judge the
success of their mission there. In a nationally televised prime-time speech to troops at Fort Myer, Va., Mr. Trump said there would be no “blank check” for the
American engagement in Afghanistan. But in announcing his plan, Mr. Trump deepened American involvement in a military mission that has bedeviled
his predecessors and that he once called futile. “My original instinct was to pull out, and historically I like following my instincts,” Mr. Trump said. “But all my life, I’ve heard that decisions are
much different when you sit behind the desk in the Oval Office.” After what he described as a lengthy and exhaustive deliberation culminating in a meeting with his war cabinet at Camp David,

Mr. Trump said that he had been convinced that “a hasty withdrawal would create a vacuum for
terrorists, including ISIS and Al Qaeda.” Speaking to a military audience at a base outside Washington, Mr. Trump declared, “In the end, we will
win.” But he did not define what victory would look like, nor did he explain how his path would be different
from what he labeled the failed strategies of previous presidents. Mr. Trump campaigned for the White House promising to extricate the
United States from foreign conflicts, and many of the steps that he announced Monday have been proposed by previous administrations. He portrayed the strategy as a stark break with the

his strategy would be a


Obama administration, arguing that while his predecessor set artificial timetables for American involvement in Afghanistan,

comprehensive, conditions-based regional approach that would aim for a political solution there. Part of
the plan is to deploy more American troops to Afghanistan to continue to train Afghan forces there,
with the goal of convincing the Taliban — which has recently gained substantial ground in the war —
that they could not win on the battlefield. Mr. Trump said that the United States would put significant new pressure on Pakistan to crack down on the
terrorist sanctuaries that line its border with Afghanistan. His comments could open a turbulent new chapter in relations with Pakistan, which has veered since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks from

refusing to place a number on troops


being an ally in the fight against terrorism to a haven in which Osama bin Laden hid out until he was killed in 2011. By

or to specify benchmarks for success, Mr. Trump was in essence shielding himself against potential
backlash from his political base and from the American public, which has grown weary of the war.

Successful commitment to intervention under Trump solves


VANCE SERCHUK 17, executive director of the KKR Global Institute, “America Needs to Stay in
Afghanistan”, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/afghanistan-trump-surge-
obama-taliban/537291/

What Washington has never attempted in Afghanistan, over the course of more than 15 years there, is the one policy that has been
necessary from the outset: an explicit commitment to a sustainable, sustained U.S. military presence in the
country. Making such a commitment would send the unequivocal message to the Taliban that it cannot hope to
prevail on the battlefield and must therefore pursue political reconciliation seriously. It would also position America for the
tough diplomacy to convince Afghanistan's neighbors, foremost Pakistan, to stop backing insurgent groups in
preparation for an American exit. The strategic paradox of Afghanistan is that the more the United States has sought to leave,
the more it has fostered the conditions that have forced it to stay. By contrast, the sooner Washington can convince
all parties to the conflict of its long-term intent to remain, the sooner it can set the conditions to drive the conflict towards an end game. To be
clear, a sustained U.S. military presence in Afghanistan alone is no guarantee of success. But repeating the mistakes of the past by trying to
withdraw troops from the country is a surefire recipe for more failure. Can Americans stomach an open-ended military commitment to
Afghanistan? Didn’t they, after all, elect Trump—and for that matter, Obama—in part because they promised to diminish America’s overseas
burdens? Won’t they demand a date by which all of U.S. forces come home? This is, in some respects, a strange argument. More than 60 years
after the end of the Korean War, tens of thousands of American troops are still deployed there—in the shadow of Kim Jong Un’s arsenal—
without any hint of domestic controversy, because Americans long ago accepted that this was in the national interest. So too with the enduring
U.S. military presence in Europe and Japan after World War II, and across the Middle East since the early 1990s. In truth, the foremost
responsibility of any president is to keep Americans safe. Preventing Afghanistan from once again becoming a terrorist sanctuary from which
attacks on America can be launched is as clear-cut a vital national interest as any in the world. If the price for this is a sustained military
presence there—and the alternative, withdrawal, is more likely to result in a terrorist victory along the lines of what happened in Iraq after
America left—that is not seemingly a prohibitively difficult case to make to the American people. On the contrary, it is telling that, almost 16
years after 9/11, there is no great groundswell of public protest or opposition to America’s current operations in Afghanistan. In a perfect
world, of course, U.S. forces wouldn’t be required to stay in Afghanistan—or anywhere else for that matter—but as Americans long ago
internalized, that is not the world they live in. To his admirers and detractors alike, Donald Trump
has promised to be a
revolutionary force in U.S. foreign policy, prepared to overturn longstanding practices if they do not advance America’s interests,
and to deliver tough truths to the American people. That is precisely the opportunity, and the imperative, that now exists in
Afghanistan. Rather than following the example of his predecessors in searching for an exit from the outset of his
presidency, he can learn from their experience and commit to stay. In addition to being the only plausible path to a decent outcome in
Afghanistan, it also has the virtue of never before having been tried.
Impact

Al Qaeda bioterror is feasible


Daniel M. Gerstein 16, Senior Policy Researcher @ Rand, “Countering Bioterror”,
https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/01/countering-bioterror.html
The deliberate use of biological pathogens to attack a major population center could kill or infect hundreds of thousands of people, yet report
after report shows the United States to be ill prepared to address a threat that is
only increasing as technology marches
forward. Most recently, the 2015 Blue Ribbon Panel on Biodefense, co-chaired by former Sen. Joe Lieberman and former Department of
Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge, warned that “the United States is underprepared for biological threats.” The panel's report states that
scientific advances have “expanded the number and types of potential biological weapons and made
it more difficult to fully comprehend the enormity of the threat.” An earlier report, issued in 2008 by the Commission
on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism—also known as the Graham-Talent report—warned (PDF) that
the “U.S. government needs to move more aggressively to limit the proliferation of biological weapons and reduce the prospect of a bioterror
attack.” For the past 40 years, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has served as an international norm against the use of such weapons.
Later this year, the Eighth Review Conference or BWC RevCon will be convened, offering the United States an opportunity to exercise new
leadership on the issue. Since 2001, when the anthrax attacks brought the threat of biological terrorism to the headlines with the delivery of
mail containing the deadly white powder, attention to the threat posed by biological weapons has tended to drift away from concerns about
the deliberate use of biological pathogens and toward public health efforts directed mostly at naturally-occurring disease threats—such as
pandemic influenza H1N1, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome and Ebola. But properly prepared biological weapons do not act as naturally
occurring disease; what may have worked in the fight against Ebola, for example, may have little effect against a weaponized, aerosol delivered
variant of the disease. In fact, the history of the dismantled offensive U.S. biological weapons program demonstrates pathogens could be
prepared and deployed so that resulting infections had barely any resemblance to the natural forms of the unmodified disease. Overwhelming
doses at the point of attack, and even at long distances downwind, as in the case of an aerosol delivery, could be thousands of times the "lethal
dose." In such cases, the resulting disease could be so severe that even medical countermeasures
such as vaccines,
antibiotics and antivirals could be rendered ineffective. The BWC is designed to address such deliberate use of pathogens,
but global compliance has been lacking. Little consensus was gained during the Seventh RevCon in 2011. Only one-third of the nations party to
the BWC even submit annual “voluntary” reports on biological activities, and in one analysis only about one-third of member countries had
enacted laws on biological warfare issues. Verification of the convention also remains a vexing issue. All of this comes at a time when advances
in biotechnological sciences could mean that a single rogue microbiologist could mount a potentially devastating biological attack. This
democratization of biotechnology may already have brought biological attacks within the reach of terror
groups like al Qaeda and ISIS.

Al Qaeda nuclear terrorism is feasible – they have the motivation and capabilities
Robert S. Litwak 16, vice president for scholars and director of international security studies at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. He is also a consultant to the Los Alamos National
Laboratory. Dr. Litwak served on the National Security Council staff as director for nonproliferation in
the first Clinton administration. He was an adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at
Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and has held visiting fellowships at Harvard
University’s Center for International Affairs, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Russian
Academy of Sciences, and Oxford University. Dr. Litwak is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations,
and received a doctorate in international relations from the London School of Economics., “Deterring
Nuclear Terrorism”,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/deterring_nuclear_terrorism_robert_litwak.pdf

Even more ominous than the evidence of technology transfers to states were contacts with widely viewed
“undeterrable” non- state actors—specifically, the report that two Pakistani nuclear scientists had met with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in
August 2001. With the 9/11 attacks planned and only weeks away, the Al Qaeda leader was already exploring ways to obtain

nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to mount still deadlier attacks. These scientists, who supported the
Taliban’s ultra- orthodox version of Islamic rule and jihadist causes, expressed the belief that Pakistan’s nuclear capability is “the
property of the whole Muslim community.”188 The ostensibly humanitarian non-governmental organization that was the umbrella for this
contact included a former commander of Pakistan’s notorious Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy agency.189 Although the Musharraf regime subsequently placed
the scientists under house arrest, this pre-9/11 episode underscored the profound
danger posed by the potential “leakage” of
Pakistani nuclear know-how or weapons-related technology to Al Qaeda or another Islamic extremist group through the
action of rogue elements within its nuclear establishment. In 2013, a U.S. State Department report described the Khan network as “defunct” and that “[t]here is no
indication” that the Pakistani government “has supplied nuclear weapons-related materials to other countries or non-state actors” since the network was “exposed
and shut down in 2004.”190