Land Reforms in India: An Analysis

Author(s): D. Bandyopadhyay
Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 21, No. 25/26 (Jun. 21-28, 1986), pp. A50-
A51+A53-A56
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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 Land Reforms
The Sixth Five-YearPlan had indicated a time-framefor completing various tasks under land reforms. Legisla-
tion for conferment of ownership rights on tenants was to be enacted by 1981-82. The programme for taking over
possession and distribution of ceiling surplus land was to have been completed by 1982-83. Both these tasks still
remain unachieved.
This paper examines the present status of security of tenure of tenants and implementation of ceiling laws in
different parts of the country and against this background discusses the various administrative steps and other
supporting measures requiredfor implementing land reforms.
I on informal or oral basis, under the guise
THE Sixth-FiveYearPlan of India(1980-85)
stated: "If the progressof land reformshas
been less than satisfactory,it has not been
due to flaws in policy but due to indifferent
implementation.Often, the necessarydeter-
mination has been lacking to effectively
undertakeaction, particularlyin the matter
of implementationof ceiling laws, consoli-
dation of holdings and in not vigorously
pursuing concealed tenancies and having
them vested with tenancy/occupancyrights
as enjoined under the law'
The Plan also indicateda time-framefor
completing different tasks under land
reforms. Legislation for conferment of
ownershiprights on all tenants, except for
specifieddisabledcategories,was to be done
by 1981-82.The programmefor taking over
possession of and distribution of ceiling
surplus lands was to have been completed
by 1982-83. Both these tasks still remain
unachieved.
A short narrationof the presentstatusof
security of tenure of tenants and imple-
mentationof ceiling laws is necessaryfor a
properappreciationof the situation. Secu-
rity of tenure to tenants has been given in
all stateswhich haverecognisedthe tenancy.
Whilethe National Policystipulatesfixation
of rents payable by tenants at the rate of
1/5th to 1/4th of the gross produce,the rent
payable is higher than this in Andhra
Pradesh (Andhra area), Haryana and
Punjab.It may be actuallyso in some other
states also.
Ownershiprights on tenants and share-
croppershavenot been conferredin Andhra
Pradesh (Andhra area), Bihar, Haryana,
Punjab, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal (for
sharecroppers).It is also noticed that while
the 'Operation Barga' in West Bengal has
brought about 1.3 million bargadars
(sharecroppers)on record, similar attempt
has not been made in Bihar or TamilNadu
and the tenanciesin the statesarenot largely
on record.Withoutbringingthe tenantsand
sharecropperson record,securityof tenurial
rights cannot be ensuredand these persons
cannot get even a crop loan from credit
institutions. One of the main reasons for
inadequategrowthin rice productionin the
Eastern Region has been identified as the
prevalence,on a largescale,of sharecroppers
and, hence, inadequate flow of inputs and
credit as well as inadequateexploitationof
ground-wateras the owners are least in-
terestedin investmentin land improvement.
Evenin the states wheretenancyhas been
abolished, concealed tenancy has emerged
Economic and Political Weekly Vol XXI, Nos 25-26
A-50
in India: An
D Bandyopadhyay
of personal cultivation. While the National
Policy permits creation of tenancies or leases
by specified disabled categories only, larger
exemptions have been provided in some
states. For example, in Orissa 'privileged
raiyat' which consists of co-operative societies,
the Lord Jagannath Temple, Public Temples,
and trusts can create tenancies. Similarly, a
raiyat with an extent of land not exceeding
3 standard acres (i e, 3 acres to 13.5 acres
depending upon the class of land) can lease
his land. Extension of time limit to confer
ownership on sub-tenants and under-raiyats
has not yet been done.
Out of the 22 states, the states of Megha-
laya and Nagaland do not have any ceiling
laws. The law does not appear to have been
implemented in Sikkim. Land ceiling laws
were first enacted in the fifties and the
sixties, and later revised after National
Guidelines were issued in 1972.
Since the inception of the land ceiling pro-
gramme, a total of 2.97 million hectares have
been declared surplus under the pre-revised
and revised ceiling laws. Of this, 2.36 million
hectares have been taken possession of and
1.82 million hectares have been distributed
to 3.37 million persons. 79.35 per cent of
area declared surplus has been taken posses-
sion of and 61.29 per cent of the area
declared surplus has been distributed under
the revised and pre-revised laws; 43.61 per
cent of the area distributed has been given
to members of scheduled castes and sche-
duled tribes, who account for 54.63 per cent
of the total number of beneficiaries. Out of
1.15 million hectares declared surplus but not
distributed, 0.66 million hectares is involved
in litigation and 0.35 million hectares are
reported to be unfit for cultivation or
reserved for afforestation or other public
purposes.
According to the agricultural census of
operational holdings, the operational
holdings below 2 ha have gone up over the
years with re-distribution of land as well as
devolution by inheritance, but a skewed
distribution of land among different size
classes of operational holdings still persists.
The number of holdings below 2 ha has gone
up from 49.63 million in 1970-71 to 66.6
million in 1980-81. They constituted 74.5 per
cent of the total holdings in 1980-81 but
operated only 42.76 million ha or 26.3 per
cent of total operated area. Against this,
holdings above 10 ha have come down from
2.77 million In 1970-71 to 2.15 million in
1980-81. They constituted 2.4 per cent of the
Review of Agriculture, June 21-28, 1986
Analysis
total holdings in 1980-81 but operated as
much as 37.13 million ha or 22.8 per cent
of total operated area.
A significant feature which is apparent
from Table 1 is the phenomenalincreasein
the number of marginal operational hold-
ings from 36.20 m in 1970-71to 50.52 m in
1980-81.Of course, distribution of ceiling
surplusland to 3.24 millionbeneficiarieshas
to be accounted for in this figure. Even
deductingthe numberof 3.24 m new bene-
ficiary marginallandholdersthe net figure
would be 47.28 m-an increase of 11.08m
over 10 years. It means that on an average
1.1 m marginal holdings are coming into
existence annually. The annual rate of
marginalisationwas 3.98 per cent or 4 per
cent which was significantlyhigherthan the
1.9 per cent annual rate of growth of rural
population between 1971 and 1981. It,
perhaps,indicatesthat marginalisationwas
more due to immiserisation rather than
normal devolution of property.Of course,
another noticeable feature also is the 22.4
per cent reduction in the number of large
holdingswith 25.86percentdecreasein area.
What is puzzling is that while the surplus
area distributed under the revised ceiling
laws of early seventieswas only 0.91 million
hectare,12.93million hectarehad been con-
sciously and wilfully dispersed, obviously
with a view to avoiding the ceiling law.
Devolution would not explain it, because,
had it been so the number of operational
holdings would have gone up instead of
sharply coming down. Thus, the Agri-
culturalCensuseswhich throw up very im-
portant data are unable to capturethe real
picture of the agrarian society. The short
point is that while marginalisationof the
poor peasantryis going on, on a fairly fast
rate,therehas not been any serious dent on
the effective concentrationof land in a few
handsin spite of the revisedland ceilinglaw
of earlyseventiesand notwithstandingsome
visible indication to the contrary.
Landceilinglaws werefirst enactedin 50s
and 60s. These were revised after the
national guidelines were issued in 1972.
Thereareno land ceilinglawsin Meghalaya,
Nagaland, A and N Islands, Arunchal
Pradesh,Goa, DamanandDiu, andMizoram.
There is no implementation in Sikkim.
Accordingto certainestimatesmade on the
basis of data from NationalSampleSurveys
and AgriculturalCensusand certainassum-
ptions on average ceiling limits for each
state, the estimates of surplus were as
follows:

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 (Million hectares) land is also not fully taken possession of due for a large number of rural landless poor for
16throundof NSS (1960-61) 8.87 to litigation. taking up land-based and other supple-
26th roundof NSS (1971-72) 4.80 An estimate made on data from agri- mentary activities. Similarly, consolidation
AgriculturalCensus(1970-71) 12.10 cultural census of 1980-81 with the same of holdings, tenancy regulation and updating
AgriculturalCensus(1976-77) 8.88 assumption about average ceiling limit as of land records, would widen the access of
Estimatesmade by made in the other estimates, but allowing for small and marginal land-holders to improved
state governments 2.35 area under plantations and 6rchards,"gives technology and inputs and thereby directly
Actuallydeclaredsurplusso far 2.94 a figure of 5.95 million hectares as surplus, lead to increase in agricultural production"
if no other concessions were given. Similarly, (Vol 2, page 62, paragragh 2.64).
The declaredsurplusland is far less than
if a ceiling of 12 ha for dry land was Thus, land reform has been brought into
the surplus estimated from agricultural
censuses and other data. Reasons are: assumed, the 1980-81 agricultural census the mainstream of rural development acti-
(a) Provision for holding land upto twice data show an estimate of 9.84 million ha as vity under the Seventh Five-Year Plan. It is
the ceiling limit by families with over surplus after allowing for plantations and no longer a side programme implemented
orchards, but showing no other concessions. by Revenue Departments in total isolation
5 members.
In the Seventh Five-Year Plan there has of other activities in the field of rural
(b) Provision to give separateceiling limit
for major sons of the family. been a conceptual change for the better. The development.
(c) Provisionfor treatingeveryshareholder approach to the Seventh Five-Year Plan, In view of this renewed emphasis on land
of a joint family, under applicable 1985-90, states: "The core of the anti-poverty reforms as a core activity of anti-poverty
personal law, as a separate unit for programmes lies in the gndowment of programme, the state ministers in charge of
ceiling limits. income-generating assets on those who have Revenue Departments and Land Reforms
(d) Exemption of tea, coffee, rubber, little or none of these. Hence, redistributive were consulted in an All-India Conference
cardamomand cocoa plantationand of land reforms and security of tenure to the in May 1985 and a number of decisions were
lands held by religious and charitable informal tenants have to be directly inte- taken.
institutionsbeyondnormalceilinglimits. grated with the anti-poverty package of pro- States have been requested to take up
(e) Benamitransfersto defeatthe ceilinglaw. grammes" (para 30, page 4). measures for plugging loopholes in the
(f) Mis-use of exemptionsand miscalcula- existing law for expediting decisions in cases
The Seventh Five-YearPlan also reiterates
tion of lands. this position. It observes: "Land Reforms under litigation by creating special benches
(g) Non-applicationof appropriateceilings have been recognised to constitute a vital of High Courts or by constituting Tribunals
of lands newly itrigated by public under Article 323B of the Constitution of
element both in terms of the anti-poverty
investment. strategy and for modernisation and increased India and for vigorous implementation in-
The declaredsurplusis less than 2 percent productivity in agriculture. Redistribution of cluding countering evasion and avoidance of
of the cultivatedarea. The declaredsurplus land could provide a permanent asset base law and bringing areas newly -irrigated by
public investment under appropriate ceilings.
TABLE 1: COMPARATIVE FIGURES OF ORERATIONAL HOLDINGS AND AREA OPERATED AS States have also been requested to consider
REVEALED IN AGRICULTIJRAL CENSUSES inclusion of major sons in the definition of
family with effect from 24.1.1971 to deter-
Category and Size of Number of Operational Area Operated mine family holding ceiling limits, bringing
Operational Holdings Holdings (million) (million hectares) lands with religious and charitable institu-
1970-71 1976-77 1980-81 1970-71 1976;77 1980-81 tions in the purview of land ceiling and to
consider further lowering of ceiling limits to
(1) Marginal (below I ha) 36.20 44.52 50.52 14.56 17.51 19.80 get more land for distribution to the land-
(50.0) (54.5) (56.5) (9.0) (10.7) (12.2) less. They have also been requested to see
(2) Small (1-2 ha) 13.43 14.73 16.08 19.28 20,90 22.96 that when surplus land is allotted, mutations
(18.9) (18.10) (18.0) (11.9) (12.8) (14.1) are affected in land records, land is physically
(3) Semi-medium (3-4 ha) 10.68 11.67 12.51 30.0 32.43 34.56 demarcated and possession given and that
(15.0) (14.3) (14.0) (18.5) (19.9) (21.2) legal provisions are made and enforced to
(4) Medium (4-10 ha) 7.93 8.21 8.09 48.24 49.63 48.34 provide security to such assignees from
(11.2) (10.0) (9.1) (29.7) (30.4) (29.7) eviction and for prompt restoration by
(5) Large (10 ha and above) 2.77 2.44 2.15 50.06 42.87 37.13 evicting encroachers or unlawful possessors,
(3.9) (3.0) (2.4) (30.5) (26.2) (22.8) especially in case of lands belonging to
All categories 71.01 81.57 89.35 162.14 163.34 162.79 Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes.
(100.0) (100.0) (100.00) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) Further, lowering of ceilings suggested was
5 ha for irrigated land with two crops, 7.5 ha
Note: Figures in brackets are percentages of totals in respective columns. The figures for 1980-81 irrigated land with one crop and 12 ha for
are provisional. other lands.
TABLE 2: INTER CENSUS VARIATIONS IN OPERATIONAL HOLDINGS AND AREA OPERATED Decision in respect of redefining 'personal
Category and Size of cultivation' more strictly bringing all tenants
Increase/Decrease in Increase/Decrease in
and sharecroppers on record, withdrawal of
Operational Holdings Number of Operational Operational Area unnecessary exemptions permitting tenancy
Holdings in 1980-81 in 1980-81 over that
or lessees and conferment of ownership
over that in 1970-71 in 1970-71 (million ha)
rights on tenants and sharecroppers require
(million nos)
popular mobilisation and ground swell of
Marginal (below I ha) 14.32 (5.5) 5.24 (3.2) pressure from below. In regard to agricultural
Small (1-2 ha) 2.65 (0.9) 3.68 (2.2) land ceiling laws, while it may not be possi-
Semi-Medium (3-4 ha) 1.83 (-1.0) 4.56 (2.7) ble to remove provisions for holding land
Medium (4-10 ha) 0.16 (-2.1) 0.10 (-) upto twice the ceiling limit by families with
Large (10 ha and above) - 0.62 (-1.5) -12.93(-8.1) over 5 members and giving exemptions for
plantations of tea, coffee, rubber, cardamom
Total 18.34 0.65 and cocoa, it will require considerable
pressure and political action to bring the
Note: Figures in brackets are the difference in percentage of the total number of area in 1980-81 major sons within the definitions of family
over 1970-71. from 24.1.1971, to remove provision for

A-S1

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giving every co-parcenerof a joint family
under apphcable personal law a separate unit
of ceilingwith-notionalpartition,to remove
permission to hold land beyond normal
ceiling limits by religious and charitable
institutionsor publictrustsand endowments
and to lower the ceilings to the level sug-
gested. However,admi'nistrativeand legal
measures for vigorous implementation
should be possible for expeditingdecisions
in cases beforecourts, cunteringbenami(in
someone else's name) andfarzi (fradulent)
transfersto defeat the ceiling law as well as
misuseof exemptionsand mis-classification
of lands, for applying appropriateceilings
for lands newly irrigatedby public invest-
mentand for providingsecurityto assignees
of surplus land as well as help to develop
the land and other assets based on land.
As has alreadybeen mentioned,till today
the area declaredsurplus is less than 2 per
cent of the cultivated area. While the
number of small and marginal holdings
have,no doubt, increasedbetween 1970-71
and 1980-81as a resultof devolutionas well
as distributionof ceiling surplus land, the
numberof largeholdingsof 10hectaresand
aboveis still very large (2.4 per cent of the
total number)and operatea largearea(22.8
percent of the total area).AnnexureI gives
the positionof percentagedistributionstate-
wise from 1970-71to 1980-81of holdings
below2 ha and holdingsof 10ha and above
Annexure II gives the present ceilings,
averageoperationalholdingareain holdings
of 10ha and aboveand estimatesof surplus
based on certain assumptions on average
ceiling limits in each state. An estimatehas
also been made of possible surplus land, if
the ceilinglimit for unirrigatedland wereto
be reducedto 12 ha for a family,afterallow-
ing exemptionsfor plantationsand orchards.
Even if the ceiling were to be 1.5 times or
twicethe normalceilingfor a familyof more
thanfive members(butincludingmajorsons
in the family and not giving a separateunit
of ceilingto a co-parcenerof a joint family)
the estimateof surpluslandwouldbe at least
about 3 to 4 million hectares(i e, as much
as declaredsurplustill now or a little more)
which can be distributed to the landless.
Whatis ratherominousis that in some states
average size of holdings in the highest
brackethas shown a tendency to increase.
II
Thus a lot remainsto be done. It is time
we took a close look at the variousadmini-
strativestepsand other supportivemeasures
requiredfor implementing land reforms.
If the actual steps requiredin detecting
ceiling surplusland wereanalysedschema-
tically one would find that the following
tasks are involvedafter the scrutinyof the
legal declarationmade by the land owners:I
(i) identification of families having and
suspected to have lands above ceiling,
(ii) locatingand identifyingall plots of land
in the effectiveand realpossession of every
such family both according to record of
rights (wherethey exist) or title deeds and
in tracingof lands held clandestinelyor in
somebody else's name (benami) real or
imaginary through fictitious or collusive
transactions, (iii) initiatin,gquasi-judicial
process of vesting of all surplus land in-
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cludini land keptthroughcollusivetransfers implementing authorities did not seek or
and benamiby gathering adequate evidence shunnedthe co-operationof organisationof
which should stand the scrutiny of review/ ruralpoor the resultsarelikelyto be dismal.
appeal at a higher judicial level, (iv) taking But given all the constraints whereverthe
over possession of vested land after com- bureaucracysought and dcependedon the
pleting quasi-judicial and other admini- support of the rural poor the results have
strative processes, (v) assigning such surplus been encouraging.In WestBengal, both fo?
land according to the legally/administrative vestingof land aboveceilingin 1967-70and
prescribed priority among the landless or later on since 1978 for registration of
land poor peasantry, (vi) providing a sharecroppers to give them permanent
minimal self-defence mechanism to prevent occupancyand heritableright, the govern-
illegal physical eviction from the assigned ment which had a bias in favourof the poor
land through violence by the erstwhile allowed and sought direct participationof
owners, and (vii) some provision for con- structuredorganisationof ruralworkersas
sumption and production credit to enable well as informal groups of rural poor in
the new allottee to start cultivation without detectionof ceiling surplusland and identi-
getting into the debt trap of the former fication of sharecroppers.As a resultWest
patron with the eventual possibility of Bengal contributedaround 27 per cent of
alienating the land. total land vested in India and about 60-70
Similarly, for tenancy reform whether for percent of informalsharecroppers havebeen
ultimate conferment of ownership right or registered in record of rights enjoying
heritable occupancy right the steps would be: security of tenrireheritable right of culti-
(i) identification of genuine tenants (either vation and fair rent. Similarly, in the late
the genuine tenants would be browbeaten sixties in the state of Kerala a massive
and evicted or made to surrender 'volun- programmeof confermentof titles to lands
tarily' or fake tenants who are the henchmen of hutmentdwellersand tenancywas under-
of landowners would be set up; (ii) gather taken with the help of rural workers'
evidence- of tenancies as all or most such organisations.The resultwas equally good.
tenancies are oral; (iii) to provide for a In a short time most of the eligible hut-
mutual support system among the genuine ment dwellers and tenants got their legal
tenants to overcome the genuine fear com- documents.
plex of retaliation of the landowners; However,desirable and necessary orga-
(iv) initiation of legal process to establish nisation of rural workers might be for
tenancy right and to register name in the furthering and protecting the interest of
record of rights; (v) if the procedure involves different segments of rural poor, the fact
buying of otcupancy or ownership right remainsthat in most of the states these are
financial arrangements for making such ratherweak and undeveloped.Their spread
payment; (vi) meeting immediate need for and growth had been unevenand shaky. A
consumption and production loan as credit report of 1974 showed that the claimed
of the landowner would be withdrawn; memlbershipof all the peasants and rural
(vii) support system to prevent illegal and labour organisationswas not more than 5
physical eviction from land by violence; and per cent of poor peasantryand agricultural
(vii) legal and physical support from being labourers.2There might be some change at
evicted from the homestead as most of the presentbut one cannotexpecta fundamental
tenants in a number of areas live on the land- changein the intervening years.It is common
owner's land as mere permissive possessors knowledgethat in India such organisations
Thus from the scheme of tasks involved havestrengthin certainpartsof the country
both in the implementation of ceiling on and that therearevast tractswhereorganisa-
surplus land and security of tenancy, it is tions do not exist evenin rudimentaryform.
evident that the best of bureaucracy unaided It is also well known that in some of the
by the organisations of rural workers cannot areassuch organisationsof ruralmassesare
achieve any significant success. Good looked upon with grave suspicion and are
evidence in respect of both the major items thought as coterminus with incipient in-
of action can come from the sharecroppers, surgencymovement.In such an atmosphere
tenants and agricultural workers who work of distrustof the statepowerit is difficultto
form and operate such organisation.
on the landowners' land. It is they who can
prove the fact of effective possession, enjoy- There are certain inherent difficulties
ment of usufruct of land, and the type of regarding formation and development of
crops grown to establish both the identity genuine organisations of rural poor to
of tenants and tenancy. They are basic espouse, promote and protect the interests
materials upon which depend findings of different sections of rural workers.The
regarding ceiling surplus land and actual fact that these organisations have not
tenancy. But no sharecropper or agricultural developedto any significantextentindicates
worker would dare come forward indi- that there are numerous factors-some of
vidually and separately to give evidence which are internal and others external-
because of fear of immediate and severe which inhibit their growth and spread.
retaliation. It is only when organisations of Among the factorsexternalto the systemare
rural poor come forward to give such infor- the coercive power of the propertiedclass,
mation collectively that the bureaucracy can economic dependence of the poor, the
function effectively. In the absence of such inbuiltbias of the law and ordermachinery
organisational support the implementing to maintainthe status quo, lack of suppor-
authorities even if they are not biased in tive legislation and non-implementationof
favour of landowners, have to depend on the existing laws enacted in their favour.3
evidencewhich the landownerswould pro- Other factorshinderingthe developmentof
duce and obviously the decisions in most such organisations come out of hetero-
cases would go in their favour. Where the geneity of poverty itself. The poor are
A-53
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differentiatedand dividedby such factorsas economic existenceof the vast massesof the of destitutionare so cleverlyplayeduponthat
conflicting economic interests, caste and rural poor makes them easy victims of poor tend to look upon their exploitersfor
community differences,sex discrimination manipulation by the landed class and not supportand deliveranceratherthan on their
and other division which compel the poor infrequentlyseeds of dissensionare skilfully own organisational strengththroughunity.
to compete among themselves for limnited and deliberately planted among them to Lack of adequate legal support has a
opportunities and resources. Precarious make the poor fight the poor. Disabilities dampening effect on efforts to organise.
ANNEXURE
1: AGRICULTURAL
CENSUS-OPERATIONAL
HOLDINGS
DISTRIBUTION
States Operational Holdings Less Than 2 ha and Operated Operational Holdings over 10 ha and Operated
Area as Per Cent of Total Area as Per Cent of Total
1970-71 1976-77 1980-81 1970-71 1976-77 1980-81
Number Area Number Area Number Area Number Area Number Area Number Area
Andhra Pradesh 65.5 19.3 66.9 22.1 72.7 29.3 4.3 30.7 3.4 24.8 2.1 18.8
. Assam 80.8 40.6 82.2 42.6 82.2 42.7 0.4 15.1 0.3 14.0 0.2 14:2
. Bihar 79.0 29.7 84.6 37.7 86.7 41.6 1.8 20.6 0.8 13.2 0.6 10.5
. Gujarat 42.9 9.8 44.1 11.1 45.9 12.9 9.6 36.5 7.2 29.1 5.9 24.8
. Haryana 46.3 10.7 49.5 11.4 51.4 13.4 8.1 34.2 7.2 33.6 6.4 31.3
. Himachal Pradesh 78.5 33.5 76.7 33.6 77.2 35.3 1.1 17.1 1.2 12.8 1.1 12.7
. Jammu and Kashmir 88.6 56.7 86.7 52.0 87.2 53.6 0.1 2.5 0.2 6.6 0.2 4.3
. Karnataka 54.1 15.6 56.7 17.2 59.0 19.4 6.2 31.7 5.2 28.7 4.3 24.5
Kerala 93.2 56.7 95.7 62.3 96.1 63.6 0.2 12.6 0.1 8.9 0.1 7.2
0 Madhya Pradesh 48.6 9.6 50.7 11.4 51.9 12.4 9.3 41.2 7.5 35.9 6.8 34.0
1 Maharashtra 42.8 8.8 45.9 11.2 52.0 15.8 10.4 40.0 7.4 31.1 4.4 21.6
2 Manipur 83.8 62.9 84A 62.6 82.8 59.4 0.03 0.4 Neg 0.3 Neg 0.2
3 Orissa 76.2 38.5 75.7 40.3 73.6 37.9 1.4 12.5 1.0 9.2 0.9 7.4
4 Punjab 56.5 15.0 60.6 15.9 38.6 10.2 5.0 26.9 4.1 26.2 7.2 29.2
5 Rajasthan 43.8 7.2 48.5 8.5 49.0 9.6 14.0 57.1 11.6 52.2 10.9 49.6
6 Sikkim - - 59.5 21.0 68.7 28.2 - - 2.9 20.9 1.6 13.1
7 Tamil Nadu 79.7 37.6 83.0 41.9 86.0 47.1 1.1 13.0 0.8 10.4 0.5 8.7
8 Tripura 88.3 53.7 83.2 49.2 88.6 59.1 0.2 8.7 0.2 8.2 0.1 6.4
9 Uttar Pradesh 84.0 41.9 85.8 45.4 86.9 48.3 0.7 9.9 0.5 7.4 0.4 6.2
0 West Bengal 82.3 47.2 87.1 55.6 89.3 60.4 0.0 8 4.6 0.04 4.0 0.02 3.7
All India 69.6 20.9 72.7 23.5 74.5 26.3 3.9 30.9 3.0 26.2 2.4 22.8
Notes: (1) Percentage of marginal (below 1 ha) and small (I to 2 ha) holdings has increased between 1970-71 and 1980-81 in all states except
Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, Orissa and Punjab.
(2) Percentage of large holdings (10 ha and above) has increased in the states of Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab.
(3) Information is given above for only those states with land ceiling legislation.
(4) In regard to the change in the average size of operational holdings in different size classes between 1970-71 and 1980-81 (for Sikkim
between 1976-77and 1980-81, the position is as follows:

Size Class Constant Marginal Decrease Large Decrease Marginal Increase Large Increase
(less than 10 (over 10 per (less than 10 (over 10 per cent)
per cent) cent) per cent)
Marginal (below I ha) UP Assam, Bihar, Kerala AP, Gujarat, Punjab, Tripura
Karnataka, Orissa, Haryana, HP,
Rajasthan, Sikkim Jammu and
Tamil Nadu, Kashmir, MP,
West Bengal Maharashtra,
Manipur
Small (I to 2 ha) Gujarat, Himachal Bihar, Jammu and Orissa AP, Assam, Haryana, Manipur
Pradesh, Rajasthan, Kashmir, MP, Karnataka, Kerala,
UP Maharashtra, Tripura, WB
Punjab, Sikkim, TN
Semi-medium (2 to 4 ha) Karnataka AP, Assam, Bihar, Orissa Haryana, Manipur,
Gujarat, HP, Tripura, WB
J and K, Kerala,
MP, Maharashtra,
Punjab, Rajasthan,
Sikkim, TN, UP
Mediuim (4 to 10 ha) J and K AP, Assam, Bihar, - Haryana, HP, Manipur
Gujarat, Karnataka, Tripura, WB
Kerala, MP,
Maharashtra,
Orissa, Punjab,
Rajasthan, Sikkim,
TN, UP
Large (over 10 ha) J and K AP, Bihar, HP, Kerala, Haryana, TN Assam, J and K,
Gujarat, Maharashtra, Manipur, Tripura,
Karnataka, MP, Orissa, Sikkim West Bengal
Punjab,
Rajasthan, UP

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 ANNEXURE II: PRESENT CEILINGS, INTENSITY IN LARGE HOLDINGS OF 10 HECTARES AND ABOVE, ESTIMATES OF SURPLUS LAND, ACTUAL DECLARED SURPLUS
HOLDINGS PATTERN WITH PRESENT CEILINGS AND A CEILING OF 12 HECATRES

Thousa
Present Ceiling (ha) Average of Operational Holding Estimated Surplus Declar
Irrigated Non-irrigated Area (ha) in Large Holdings of 1970-71 1976-77 Pre- R
State 10 ha and above revised
1970-71 1976-77 1980-81 Laws

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

(1) Andhra Pradesh 4.05-10.93 14.16-21.85 17.87 17.06 16.49 1149 620 10
(2) Assam 6.74 6.74 57.31 55.28 77.60 383 380 46
(3) Bihar 6.07-10.12 12.14-18.21 17.47 17.62 17.11 720 457 4
(4) Gujarat 4.05-10.93 8.09-21.85 15.56 15.09 14.60 611 414 19
(5) Haryana 7.25-10.9 21.8 15.87 16.64 17.20 101 154 51
(6) Himachal Pradesh 4.05-6.07 12.14-28.33 23.67 20.71 18.06 51 35 -
(7) Jammu and Kashmir 3.61-5.06 5.95-9.20 19.17 27.40 24.67 15 15 182
(8) Karnataka 4.05-12.14 21.85 16.43 16.35 15.69 703 677 -
(9) Kerala 4.86-6.07 4.86-6.07 47.04 37.22 35.14 180 133 -
(10) Madhya Pradesh 7.28-10.93 21.85 17.74 17.09 17.15 1558 1148 30
(11) Maharashtra 7.28-14.57 21.85 16.47 15.40 14.56 979 353 126
(12) Manipur 5 6 17.18 - - - - -
(13) Orissa 4.05-6.07 12.14-18.21 16.37 14.64 13.78 260 123 -
(14) Punjab 7-11 20.5 15.50 17.62 15.35 75 198 48
(15) Rajasthan 7.28-10.93 21.85-70.82 22.31 20.95 20.18 4031 3225 141
(16) Sikkim 5.06-20.23 5.06-20.23 - 18.44 15.89 - 5 -
(17) Tamil Nadu 4.86 24.28 16.94 17.30 17.98 644 522 28
(18) Tripura 4-12 4-12 35.53 41.82 50.26 - - -
(19) Uttar Pradesh 7.30 10.95-18.25 16.08 15.43 15.41 371 227 80
(20) West Bengal 5 7 64.20 109.16 145.36* 214 198 404
All India 18.10 17.58 17.24 12105 8884 1170
Notes: (1) Column 4 to 8 are based on agricultural census data. Columns 7 and 8 are based on an assumption on average ceilings.
(2) Columns 12 and 13 are based on agricultural census data. Column 12 is based on an assumption on average ceilings. Columns 8 and 13 a
the state has a lower ceiling) but both make allowances for area under plantations and orchards (totalling to about 13.2 lakh hectares) b
(3) Intensity in large holdings of 10 ha and above (that is average holding area in such holdings) has increased in 80-81 over 70-71 in the stat
Tamil Nadu, Tripura and West Bengal.
* Figures include plantation holdings. The increase in the average size may be due to amalgamation or merger of corporate plantation ho

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 e orgriculiure- June o ECONOMIC
Even in countries with old trade union
history, trade union laws have not been
suitably modified to cover organisation of
rural workers. National Legislation relating
to the trade union rights of workers is often
silent on these rights as they apply to self-
employed rural workers, the sharecroppers,
tenants, and marginal farmers. In some cases
an examination of the labour Legislation
reveals that it applies to wage earners only,
and therefore, unless (as is infrequently the
case) the rights of association of self-
employed rural workers are covered by
separate legislation, self-employed rural
workers are precluded from organisation.4
ILO Convention 141 defined rural workers
to include this category to facilitate amend-
ments to national legislation. Absence of a
protective legal cover exposes the organisers
and members to civil action and charge of
criminal conspiracy. A concerted move to
withhold delivery of produce in excess of the
legal dues or to cultivate land when illegally
prevented by landowners or to occupy vested
land are often treated as breach of peace and
are dealt with accordingly under ordinary
criminal laws of the country.
The attitude and behaviour of the bureau-
cracy as contra distinguished from the
political government have a serious impact
on the growth of such organisations. India
has inherited as a legacy of British colonial
rule a very strong and well developed
bureaucracy. We have retained the basic
structure of administration even after inde-
pendence. To maintain 'Pax Britannica' the
bureaucracy developed the tradition of main-
taining order with or without law. The
tradition continues,
not withstanding
changes that have taken place meanwhile. It
is well known that significant segments of
bureaucracy have a class bias as they have
direct linkage with the rural elite. Though
undesirable, it is understandable, that such
a bureaucracy would have an additional
block against any radical land reform. But
even where the bulk of the bureaucracy
comes from the urban middle class with no
land-linkage, it behaves the same way. A
bureaucracy imbibes the dominant ethos of
the state. In the market economies where the
propertied classes had been controlling the
state.apparatus, it was natural that the basic
laws, administrative and judicial traditions
would be heavily weighted in favour of the
existing social order. In such a situation the
bureaucracy would develop a bias against
any movement or concerted action or even
against an isolated law which aims at the
alternation of the existing social arrange-
ments. Any organisational effort demanding
change of the existing system is looked upon
as a threat to the established order and
retaliatory action is set in motion almost
automatically. That apart, a strong bureau-
cracy considers itself as the custodian of
public interest as perceived by itself.' It,
therefore, abhors or at least resents associa-
tion of organisations of rural poor as inter-
ference in the legitimate discharge of these
basic functioiis.
The anti-rural poor attitude which arises
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from the class linkageswould be difficult to
counter but when it comes out of the long-
standingadministrativetraditionit might be
curedto some extentprovidedthereis some
pressurefromthe top with a deliberatepolicy
to reorientit. Facedwith the same problem
while launching the 'OperationBarga'the
WestBengal governmentstarteda series of
reorientation camps where 30 to 40 agri-
cultural workers and sharecroppersand a
dozen and a half officersof land reformiand
other relateddepartmentsweremade to stay
together,eat together and discuss together
in the same premisesin distant ruralareas.
The main purpose of these camps was to
make the poor think about their basic
problemsof poverty and to come out with
their own perception about its cause and
possiblesolution.The officersweregiventhe
role of observersor scribes as most of the
participants frorn the non-official groups
were illiterate.These camps had a solutory
effect on the mind and attitude of official
participants. "Their smugness, arrogance,
superciliousnessget a terriblejolt and they
think afresh of their own role as change
agents."5 But in the entire arena it was a
uniqueexampleof a governmentattempting
to changethe attitude of its bureaucracyby
exposingthem to the controlledwrathof the
ruralpoor. Everywhereelse, the bureaucracy
rules the roast.
The burdenof crushingpovertyitself acts
as a deterrentto the growthof organisation.
Povertyleading to utter dependencybreeds
a strangestateof fatalismand the poor tend
to think and are made to think that men are
born unequaland thereis no wayout of the
povertytrap. It is betterto accept the situa-
tion without rrmurmur
and try to get the best
throughthe munificenceof the patron.The
illusory security of bondage appears to be
preferableto the uncertainty and trouble
associatedwith any organisationaleffort to
change the situation. They neitherhave the
financial support to build an organisation
nor the staying power to withstand the
economic blacklash from the landowners.
They get submergedin what Paulo Freire
described as the "cultureof silence of the
dispossessed".
Rural workers are not a homogeneous
category-but consists of different groups
like marginal owner cultivators, tenant
farmers,sharecroppers,landlessagricultural
workers,off farmwageworkersand the like,
with diverse and often with conflicting
interests.Hence, the problemariseswhether
thereshouldbe commonorganisationfor all
or separateorganisationfor each sub-group.
This is a matterwhichhas to be solvedby the
rural workers themselves. But it may be
pointedout that too manyfragmentedorga-
nisationswould reducethe bargainingpower
of each and in the totality each may tend
to lose. Further,the contradictionsamong
the sub-groupsnot being of antagonisticin
nature,these could be resolvedin a partici-
patoryorganisationthroughmutualdiscus-
sion and occasional accommodation on
tactical and strategic consideration.
Another point to consideris that because
of special disadvantagesof rural workers,
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OL A W LY
externalagency's role as catalytic assumes
great importance. Lack of finance, lack of
organisationalskill, lack of staying power,
lackof cadreall tendto indicatethat external
supportat the initialstagesof formationand
growthof indigenous organisation of rural
poor mightbe a criticalfactor.Whethersuch
.xternal support would be forthcomingand
even if they were available how far they
would act as authentic catalytic agents
withoutcreatinga new dependencyrelation-
ship is a matter on which nothing much
could be said in terms of generality.Each
situationwould revealits own contradiction
and produce its solution.
The Governmetof India recognised the
need for the beneficiaries of anti-poverty
programmesto organiseto derivethe maxi-
mum benefit from the variety of schemes.
It was felt that the activeinvolvementof the
beneficiaries was necessary to ensure that
benefit reachesthem. Hence, it launched a
scheme recently called "Organisation of
Beneficiariesof Anti-PovertyProgrammes".
The schemeproposesto sharpenthe aware-
ness and responseof the ruralpoor through
awarenessgeneration camps. These camps
would be organised with the assistance of
voluntary agencies, Nehru Yuvak Kendra
and National Service Camps. The scheme
is not peculiar to the beneficiariesof land
reform. But to the extent the scheme
succeeds it would help in increasing the
bargainingpower of the poor and to that
extentit would help in effectiveimplementa-
tion of land reformand other programmes.
III
The TaskForceon AgrarianRelationsset
up by the Planning Commission of India
while reviewingthe failure of land reform
laws in the early seventiesobserved:"With
resoluteand unambiguouspolitical will all
othershortcomingsand difficultiescouldhave
been overcome;in the absenceof such a will
even minor obstacles become formidable
road blocks in the path of Indian Land
Reforms"That was in the summerof 1973.
The statementremainssubstantiallyvalid
in the spring of 1986.
Notes
[Viewsexpressed in this paper are those of the
author. The author is indebted to G Aswatha-
narayan for all the statistical Tables.]
1 D Bandyopadhyay, 'Land Reforms in West
Bengal' IFDA DOSSIER, 24, July/August
1981, Nyon, Switzerland, pp 8(48)-9(49).
2 D Bandyopadhyay, 'External Impediments
to the Growth of Organisation of Poor in
Asia' Freidrich-Ebert-Stifting Workshop
Series Report V, Bangkok, 1974.
3 UN/ESCAP, "Rural Development Admini-
stration in India: Some Emerging Power
Issues", Bangkok, 1979.
4 ILO, "Structure and Functions of Rural
Workers'Organisations",Geneva, 1978,p 26.
5 D Bandyopadhyay, 'Rural Workers' Camps
Show the Way,Mainstream,Vol XIX, No 44,
July 4, 1981.