1. TITLE: PEDRO BONGALON now substituted by FILIPINA BONGALON, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF
APPEALS, CECILIO BONGALON and AMPARO BONGALON, respondents.
G.R. No. 142441. November 10, 2004

FACTS: Pedro Bongalon, the late husband of petitioner Filipina Bongalon (“petitioner”), respondents Cecilio
Bongalon (“Cecilio”) and Amparo Bongalon (“Amparo”) and four4 others are the children of the late Cirila Bonga
(“Cirila”) and Bernabe Bongalon (“Bernabe”). Cirila is one of the five children of Rosalia Buenaflor (“Rosalia”) and
Cornelio Bonga (“Cornelio”). The other children of Rosalia and Cornelio are Trinidad Bonga Bobier (“Trinidad”),
Jacoba Bonga Faustino (“Jacoba”), Emilio Bonga (“Emilio”) and Benito Bonga (“Benito”). Jacoba had three
children, namely, Conchita Faustino Base (“Conchita”), Catalina Faustino Conlo (“Catalina”), and Leonardo
Faustino (“Leonardo”). Emilio also had three children, namely, Teodora Bonga Bien (“Teodora”), Francisca Bonga
Camba (“Francisca”), and Maxima Bonga Diaz (“Maxima”). It appears that Jacoba and Emilio predeceased their
children.

Rosalia was the owner of Lot No. 525-A in A. A. Berces St., Tabaco, Albay measuring 149 square meters and
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. RO-17402 (23825) (“OCT No. RO-17402”) issued in her name. OCT
No. RO-17402 was later cancelled and replaced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-67656 (“TCT No. T-67656”)
also issued in Rosalia’s name. Rosalia died intestate in 1940, survived by her husband and five children. Trinidad,
Conchita, and Teodora executed a Deed of Absolute Sale (“Exhibit 2”) conveying to Cirila “apart of” Lot No. 525-A
for P100. On the same day, Cirila, and again Trinidad, Conchita, and Teodora, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
(“Exhibit B”) conveying to Pedro Bongalon “apart of” Lot No. 525-A also for P100. The same notary public
notarized both deeds of sale on that same day. On 22 February 1971, Cirila executed another Deed of Absolute
Sale (“22 February 1971 Deed of Sale”) conveying Lot No. 525-A to Amparo for P4,500. Amparo subsequently
declared Lot No. 525-A in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes in 1977 and 1978. Even before
the execution of the 22 February 1971 Deed of Sale, Amparo and her family were already occupying a 32-square
meter portion of Lot No. 525-A where her house stands.

Meanwhile, on 30 January 1979, Pedro Bongalon executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (“Extrajudicial
Settlement”) declaring that Cirila is the only heir of Rosalia and that he (Pedro Bongalon) is, in turn, the only heir of
Cirila. Based on this Extrajudicial Settlement, Pedro Bongalon secured the cancellation of TCT No. T-67656 and
obtained Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-67780 (“TCT No. T-67780”) issued in his name.

In March 1988, Pedro Bongalon sued respondents in the RTC for “Quieting of Title, Recovery of Portion of
Property and Damages.” Pedro Bongalon alleged in his complaint that: (1) he is the registered owner of Lot No.
525-A under TCT No. T-67780; (2) respondents occupied Lot No. 525-A through his tolerance; (3) he had several
times asked respondents to vacate Lot No. 525-A but they refused to do so; and (4) respondents’ occupancy of
Lot No. 525-A and their claim of ownership over the property cast a cloud over his title. Pedro Bongalon prayed
that the RTC declare his title free of any cloud and order respondents to vacate Lot No. 525-A and pay him
damages and litigation expenses.

Respondents denied Pedro Bongalon’s allegations. Respondents claimed that Pedro Bongalon fraudulently
obtained TCT No. T-67780 by executing the Extrajudicial Settlement. Amparo claimed that on the contrary, she is
the owner of Lot No. 525-A based on the 22 February 1971 Deed of Sale. As counterclaim, respondents sought
the nullification of the Extrajudicial Settlement and of TCT No. T-67780. Respondents also prayed for the award of
damages and attorney’s fees.

During the trial, Pedro Bongalon introduced in evidence other documents to prove his ownership of Lot No. 525-A,
such as (1) Exhibit “B” and (2) Conchita’s Affidavit dated 22 May 1978 (“Exhibit C”)13 confirming the sale under
Exhibit “B”. The RTC admitted these documents in evidence over the objection of respondents. For their part,
respondents also presented in evidence Exhibit “2” to prove that Cirila owned the entire Lot No. 525-A which she
later sold to Amparo in the 22 February 1971 Deed of Sale.

The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants appealed the decision of the trial court before the court
of appeals, the CA affirm the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals is in accord with the facts, evidence and the pertinent
laws, particularly the provisions of the civil code on sale, possession and ownership.

HELD: The Supreme found that the petition is partly meritorious.

The fact that a party did not mention certain exhibits in his complaint is not a reason to rule them inadmissible. It
was error for the Court of Appeals to rule that the RTC should not have admitted in evidence Exhibits “B” and “C”
because Pedro Bongalon failed to allege these documents in his complaint. What was at issue before the RTC, as
raised in the pleadings filed by the parties, was the ownership of Lot No. 525-A. Pedro Bongalon offered the
pieces of evidence in question to support his claim of ownership over Lot No. 525-A. The fact that Pedro Bongalon
did not mention Exhibits “B” and “C” in his complaint is not a reason to rule them inadmissible. While TCT No. T-
67780 was Pedro Bongalon’s principal proof of ownership, it did not preclude him from presenting other pieces of
evidence to prove his claim. This is especially relevant because of his testimony that he executed the Extrajudicial
Settlement only because the Register of Deeds of Albay required it for the issuance of TCT No. T-67780.

There is no dispute that Lot No. 525-A was Rosalia’s paraphernal property. Thus, when Rosalia died intestate, she
passed on this piece of property to her surviving spouse Cornelio and their five children, namely, Cirila, Trinidad,
Jacoba, Emilio, and Benito. These heirs inherited Lot No. 525-A in co-ownership, at 1/6 undivided share each.
After Cornelio died, his 1/6 undivided share passed to his surviving five children per stirpes, thus increasing their
undivided shares to 1/5 each. The 1/5 undivided share of Jacoba, who apparently predeceased her children
Conchita, Catalina, and Leonardo, passed to Jacoba’s children as co-owners in equal shares. Likewise, the
undivided 1/5 share of Emilio, who also apparently predeceased his children Teodora, Francisca, and Maxima,
passed to Emilio’s children as co-owners in equal shares.

Under Exhibit “2”, Trinidad, Teodora, and Conchita sold to Cirila “a part” of Lot No. 525-A on 26 July 1943.23 Since
these co-owners could alienate their undivided shares,24 they sold under Exhibit “2” their undivided shares in Lot
No. 525-A to Cirila. Similarly, on the same day, Cirila (and again Trinidad, Teodora, and Conchita), executed
Exhibit “B” conveying to Pedro Bongalon a “part of” Lot No. 525-A. Thus, Cirila sold to Pedro Bongalon her original
1/5 share and the combined undivided shares of Trinidad, Teodora and Conchita she earlier acquired under
Exhibit “2”.25 The participation of Trinidad, Teodora and Conchita in Exhibit “B”, while superfluous (as they had
earlier sold their undivided shares to Cirila), does not detract from the validity of Exhibit “B”. In sum, Pedro
Bongalon’s interest in Lot No. 525-A covers only the undivided shares of Cirila, Trinidad, Teodora, and Conchita.
Pedro Bongalon did not acquire ownership of the entire Lot No. 525-A under Exhibit “B”. As the other co-owners,
namely, the heirs of Benito Bongalon, and the other children of Jacoba (Catalina and Leonardo) and Emilio
(Francisca and Maxima) did not sign either Exhibit “B” or Exhibit “2”, they remained co-owners of Lot No. 525-A.
While each co-owner has full ownership of his part and may alienate it, the alienation affects only the portion which
pertains to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

2. TITLE: JOSEPH VICTOR G. EJERCITO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL DIVISION)

and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. Nos. 157294-95. November 30, 2006.*

FACTS: Joseph Victor G. Ejercito ( Ejercito ) is the owner of Trust Account No. 858 which was originally
opened at Urban Bank but which is now maintained at Export and Industry Bank (EIB), which is the purchaser and
owner now of the former Urban Bank and Urbancorp Investment, Inc. He is also the owner of Savings Account No.
0116-17345-9 which was originally opened at Urban Bank but which is now maintained at Export and Industry
Bank, the purchaser and owner of the former Urban Bank and Urbancorp Investment, Inc. Ejercito was
subsequently charged with Plunder.

The Sandiganbayan a Request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum for the issuance of a subpoena
directing the President of Export and Industry Bank (EIB, formerly Urban Bank) or his/her authorized
representative to produce various document related to the investigation.

The Special Prosecution Panel also filed a Request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad
Testificandum directed to the authorized representative of Equitable-PCI Bank to produce statements of account
pertaining to certain accounts in the name of “Jose Velarde” and to testify thereon.

The Sandiganbayan granted both requests by Resolution and subpoenas were accordingly issued. The
Special Prosecution Panel filed still another Request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum for
the President of EIB or his/her authorized representative to produce the same documents subject of the first
Subpoena Duces Tecum and to testify thereon on the hearings scheduled and subsequent dates until completion
of the testimony. The request was likewise granted by the Sandiganbayan. A Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad
Testificandum was accordingly issued. Ejercito filed various motions to quash the various Subpoenas Duces
Tecum/Ad Testificandum previously issued.

In his Motion to Quash, he claimed that his bank accounts are covered by R.A. No. 1405 (The Secrecy of
Bank Deposits Law) and do not fall under any of the exceptions stated therein. He further claimed that the specific
identification of documents in the questioned subpoenas, including details on dates and amounts, could only have
been made possible by an earlier illegal disclosure thereof by the EIB and the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC) in its capacity as receiver of the then Urban Bank. The disclosure being illegal, he concluded,
the prosecution in the case may not be allowed to make use of the information. Before the motion was resolved by
the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution filed another. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE :

1. Whether or not petitioner's Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 are
excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405; and
 2. Whether or not the “extremely-detailed information contained in the Special Prosecution
Panel's requests for subpoena was obtained through a prior illegal disclosure of
petitioner's bank accounts, in violation of the “fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine”.

HELD:

1. YES. The protection afforded by the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act law is, however, not absolute, there
being recognized exceptions thereto, as provided for in Section 2 of said law.·The protection afforded by the law
is, however, not absolute, there being recognized exceptions thereto, as above-quoted Section 2 provides. In the
present case, two exceptions apply, to wit: (1) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent
court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation.

Estrada contends that since plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of duty, his accounts are not
excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405. He is wrong. Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the
rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the policy as to the other.
This policy expresses the notion that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge
does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny. An
examination of the “overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d)”of R.A. No. 7080 would make the similarity
between plunder and bribery even more pronounced since bribery is essentially included among these criminal
acts. Plunder being thus analogous to bribery, the exception to R.A. 1405 applicable in cases of bribery must also
apply to cases of plunder.

The plunder case now pending with the SB necessarily involves an inquiry into the whereabouts of the
amount purportedly acquired illegally by former President Joseph Estrada. In light then of this Court’s
pronouncement in Union Bank, the subject matter of the litigation cannot be limited to bank accounts under the
name of President Estrada alone, but must include those accounts to which the money purportedly acquired
illegally or a portion thereof was alleged to have been transferred. Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No.
0116-17345-9 in the name of petitioner fall under this description and must thus be part of the subject matter of the
litigation.

In sum, exception (1) applies since the plunder case pending against former President Estrada is
analogous to bribery or dereliction of duty, while exception (2) applies because the money deposited in petitioner’s
bank accounts is said to form part of the subject matter of the same plunder case.

2. NO. The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine presupposes a violation of law. if there is no
violation of R.A. No. 1405, then there would be no “poisonous tree” to begin with, and, thus, no reason
to apply the doctrine. Even assuming arguendo, however, that the exclusionary rule applies in principle to cases
involving R.A. 1405, the Court finds no reason to apply the same in this particular case. Clearly, the „fruit of the
poisonous tree” doctrine presupposes a violation of law. If there was no violation of R.A. 1405 in the instant case,
then there would be no „poisonous tree” to begin with, and, thus, no reason to apply the doctrine.

In other word, The “fruit of the poisonous tree”principle, which states that once the primary source (the
“tree”) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the “fruit”) derived from it
is also inadmissible, does not apply in this case. In the first place, R.A. 1405 does not provide for the application of
this rule. R.A. 1405, it bears noting, nowhere provides that an unlawful examination of bank accounts shall render
the evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible in evidence. Moreover, there is no basis for applying the same in
this case since the primary source for the detailed information regarding petitioner’s bank accounts—the
investigation previously conducted by the Ombudsman—was lawful.

3. TITLE : PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. COURT

OF APPEALS and CARMELO H. FLORES, respondents.
G.R. No. 116181. April 17, 1996.

FACTS: On 11 July 1989, private respondent Carmelo H. Flores (Flores) purchased from petitioner at its
Manila Pavilion. Hotel unit, two (2) managerÊs checks worth P500,000.00 each, paying a total of P1,000,040.00,
including the service charge.1 A receipt for said amount was issued by the petitioner.
On 12 July 1989, Flores presented these checks at the Baguio Hyatt Casino unit of petitioner. Petitioner
refused to encash the checks but after a lengthy discussion, it agreed to encash one (1) of the checks.3 However,
it deferred the payment of the other check until after Flores agreed that it be broken down to five (5) managerÊs
checks of P100,000.00 each. Furthermore, petitioner refused to encash one of the five checks until after it is
cleared by the Manila Pavilion Hotel unit.
However, upon his return to Manila, he made representations to petitioner through its Malate Branch so
that the check may be encashed but to no avail.5 Flores, thereafter, wrote a letter to his counsel informing the
latter of the aforementioned events.6 A Formal Demand was made by private respondentÊs counsel but petitioner
persisted in its refusal to honor the check.7
Left with no other choice, Flores filed a case with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 100. In
its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, petitioner insisted that only P900,000.00 and P40.00 bank charges
were actually paid by Flores when he purchased the two (2) manager's check worth P1,000,000.00. It alleged that
due to Flores, demanding attitude and temper, petitioner's money counter, Rowena Montes, who, at that time was
still new at her job, made an error in good faith in issuing the receipt for P1,000,040.00.
After trial, the court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Philippine
National Bank. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the respondent court, one of the issue raise was that there is
abject absence of evidence that PNB acted fraudulently or maliciously, even as good faith is presumed. the Court
of Appeals rendered the questioned decision the appealed decision of the lower court in Civil Case No. Q-89-4033
is hereby AFFIRMED by the Court. A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was likewise denied. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN LAW IN HOLDING THAT, THE BEST EVIDENCE TO SHOW
WHETHER MR. FLORES PAID THE PNB CASINO UNIT P900,040 OR P1,000,040 IN PURCHASING
THE TWO MANAGERÊS CHECKS EACH WORTH P500,000 IS THE RECEIPT FOR P1,000,040.
3. WHETHER OR NOT PNB CAN PRESENT COMPETENT AND RELEVANT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
ITS ALLEGATION IN THE ANSWER THAT MR. FLORES ACTUALLY PAID P900,040 AND NOT
P1,000,040 FOR THE SUBJECT MANAGERÊS CHECKS.

HELD: The Supreme Court (SC) found that the contention of the petitioner are unmeritorious.
 The SC deal with the first and second issues raised by petitioner together as they are interrelated.
Although a receipt is not conclusive evidence, in the case at bench, an exhaustive review of the records fails to
disclose any other evidence sufficient and strong enough to overturn the acknowledgment embodied in petitioner's
own receipt (as to the amount of money it actually received).

Petitioner contends that it offered in court evidence of the particulars or the actual denominations of the
money it received from Flores in exchange for its managerial checks. However, aside from the self-serving
testimonies of petitioner's witnesses, we fail to discover any such evidence in the records.

Evidence based solely on the testimonies of bank employees who were the very ones involved
in the fiasco, and not on any other independent evidence, is not sufficient to rebut the contents of the
receipt issued by the bank·the subject receipt remains to be the primary or best evidence or that which
affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question. In the instant case, petitioner's contention that Flores
paid P900,000.00 only instead of P1,000,000.00 (exclusive of bank charges) in the following denominations: a
manager's check worth P450,000.00; P430,000.00 in P100.00 bills; and P20,000.00 in P500.00 bills, was based
solely on the testimonies of petitioner's bank employees – the very ones involved in the fiasco, and not on any
other independent evidence. Hence, having failed to adduce sufficient rebuttal evidence, petitioner is bound by the
contents of the receipt it issued to Flores. The subject receipt remains to be the primary or best evidence or „that
which affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question.

4. TITLE : SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents. G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995.*

FACTS: The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Voltaire Garcia for petitioner. Cesar V. Chavez for
private respondent. A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office,
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a „hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to
petitionerÊs dignity and personality contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.1

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages,
attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and
other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled
from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner. As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and
alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled „An Act to prohibit and
penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.The trial court granted the
Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200;
and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to the taping of a communication by a person other than a
participant to the communication. From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals, respondent Court of Appeals
promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:
 “[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus
quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an
offense, the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion 5 correctible by certiorari.”

Consequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its
Resolution. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not evidence obtained in violation of RA 4200 shall be admissible in evidence.

HELD:
The Supreme Court answered is Negative.

The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by
means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200 .—the
nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting
or recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before
the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the
nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed.” In addition, the
unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the
Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to
penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.

Further, The contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does
not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a
point of absurdity.—Finally, petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A.
4200 does not include “private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a
point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to
impart.” In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation,
or signifies the “process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common
system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)” These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-
verbal, written or expressive communications of “meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally
—charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication” are,
furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were interchangeably used
by Senator Tanada in his Explanatory Note to the bill.

5. TITLE: JOSELITA SALITA, petitioner, vs. HON. DELILAH MAGTOLIS, in her capacity as Judge of the
RTC, Quezon City, Br. 107, and ERWIN ESPINOSA, respondents.
G.R. No. 106429. June 13, 1994
FACTS: Erwin Espinosa, 32, and Joselita Salita, 22, were married at the Roman Catholic Church in Ermita,
Manila, on 25 January 1986. A year later, their union turned sour. They separated in fact in 1988. Subsequently,
Erwin sued for annulment on the ground of Joselita’s psychological incapacity. The petition for annulment was
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on 7 January 1992. Therein it is alleged that “sometime in
1987, petitioner came to realize that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of their marriage, which incapacity existed at the time of the marriage although the same
became manifest only thereafter. Dissatisfied with the allegation in the petition, Joselita moved for a bill of
particulars which the trial, which the trial court granted it.

Edwin filed his Bill of Particulars and specified that—

x x x at the time of their marriage, respondent (Joselita) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of their marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands
made by his profession—that of a newly qualified Doctor of Medicine—upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that
she frequently complained of his lack of attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner
to lose his job.

Still his wife was not contented with the Bill of Particulars. She argued that the “assertion " is a statement
of legal conclusion made by petitioner’s counsel and not an averment of ‘ultimate facts,’ as required by the Rules
of Court, from which such a conclusion may properly be inferred x x x x”. But finding the questioned Bill of
Particulars adequate, the trial court issued an order upholding its sufficiency and directing Joselita to file her
responsive pleading. She was not convinced on the decision of the trial court, then she filed a petition for certiorari
with us. However, the Supreme Court referred her petition to the Court of Appeals for resolution. The Court of
Appeals denied due course to her petition.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari filed by Joselita questioning the Resolution of the Court
of Appeals denying due course to her petition.

Petitioner insists that the allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute a legal conclusion, not an averment
of facts, and fail to point out the specific essential marital obligations she allegedly was not able to perform, and
thus render the Bill of Particulars insufficient if not irrelevant to her husband’s cause of action. She rationalizes that
her insistence on the specification of her particular conduct or behavior with the corresponding circumstances of
time, place and person does not call for information on evidentiary matters because without these details she
cannot adequately and intelligently prepare her answer to the petition.
Private respondent on the other hand believes that his allegations in the Bill of Particulars constitute the ultimate
facts which the Rules of Court requires at this point. He defines ultimate facts as—

x x x important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the primary right and duty, or
which directly make upon the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. The term does not refer to the details of
probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established. It refers to
principetal, derminate facts upon the existence of which the entire cause of action rests.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Bill of Particulars submitted by herein respondent is of sufficient definiteness or
particularity as to enable herein petitioner to properly prepare her responsive pleading or for trial.
HELD: The Supreme Court sustain the view of respondent Court of Appeals that the Bill of Particulars filed by
private respondent is sufficient to state a cause of action, and to require more details from private respondent
would be to ask for information on evidentiary matters. Indeed, petitioner has already been adequately apprised of
private respondent’s cause of action against her thus—

x x x x (she) was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of their
marriage in that she was unable to understand and accept the demands made by his profession—that of a newly
qualified Doctor of Medicine—upon petitioner’s time and efforts so that she frequently complained of his lack of
attention to her even to her mother, whose intervention caused petitioner to lose his job.

A complaint only needs to state the “ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause or causes of action.”
Ultimate facts have been defined as “those facts which the expected evidence will support.” As stated by
private respondent, “[t]he term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of
evidence by which these material elements are to be established.” It refers to “the facts which the
evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of
those facts.” And a motion for bill of particulars will not be granted if the complaint, while not very definite,
nonetheless already states a sufficient cause of action. A motion for bill of particulars may not call for matters
which should form part of the proof of the complaint upon trial. Such information may be obtained by other means.

The Supreme Court stated that base on the aforequoted allegations, it is evident that petitioner can
already prepare her responsive pleading or for trial. To demand for more details would indeed be asking for
information on evidentiary facts—facts necessary to prove essential or ultimate facts. For sure, the additional facts
called for by petitioner regarding her particular acts or omissions would be evidentiary, and to obtain evidentiary
matters is not the function of a motion for bill of particulars. Therefore, the petition is denied.

6. TITLE : FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 89114, December 2, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioner Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. was included as defendant in civil case entitled "Republic of the
Philippines vs. Benjamin Romualdez, et al." for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages on
the theory that: (1) he acted in unlawful concert with the principal defendants in the misappropriation and theft of
public funds, plunder of the nation's wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts of
corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power; (2) he acted as dummy, nominee or agent, by
allowing himself to be incorporator, director, board member and/or stockholder of corporations beneficially held
and/or controlled by the principal defendants; (3) he acted singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one
another, in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as public officers, with gross and
scandalous abuse of right and power and in brazen violation of the Constitution and laws of the Philippines,
embarked upon a systematic plan to accumulate ill-gotten wealth ; (4) he (petitioner) taking undue advantage of
his position as Chairman of the Commission on Audit and with grave failure to perform his constitutional duties as
such Chairman, acting in concert with defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, facilitated and
made possible the withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of government funds; and (5) he acted as
dummy, nominee and/or agent by allowing himself to be used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth
through government concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff, or to be incorporator, director, or
member of corporations beneficially held and/or controlled by defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
Benjamin Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez in order to conceal and prevent recovery of assets illegally
obtained.

On 11 April 1988, after his motion for production and inspection of documents was denied by respondent
court in its resolution dated 9 March 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars, alleging inter alia that he
is sued for acts allegedly committed by him as (a) a public officer-Chairman of the Commission on Audit, (b) as a
private individual, and (c) in both capacities, in a complaint couched in too general terms and shorn of particulars
that would inform him of the factual and legal basis thereof, and that to enable him to understand and know with
certainty the particular acts allegedly committed by him and which he is now charged with culpability, it is
necessary that plaintiff furnish him the particulars sought therein.

In his petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order, the petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, dated 21 April 1989, denying his motion for a bill of particulars as well as its resolution, dated 29
May 1989, which denied his motion for reconsideration; to compel the respondent PCGG to prepare and file a bill
of particulars, or that said respondent be ordered to exclude petitioner as defendant in Civil Case No. 0035 should
they fail to submit the said bill of particulars; and to enjoin the respondent Sandiganbayan from further proceeding
against petitioner until the bill of particulars is submitted, claiming that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in promulgating the aforesaid resolutions and that there
is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy for him in the ordinary course of law other than the
present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
disputed resolutions.

HELD:

Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from intermediate and evidentiary facts, or allegations of
mixed law and fact; they are conclusions from reflection and natural reasoning on evidentiary fact. The
ultimate facts which are to be pleaded are the issuable, constitutive, or traversable facts essential to the statement
of the cause of action; the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be
required to prove the existence of those facts.

The complaint does not contain any allegation as to how petitioner became, or why he is perceived to be,
a dummy, nominee or agent. There is no averment in the complaint how petitioner allowed himself to be used as
instrument in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, what the concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to
plaintiff are, why they are prejudicial, and what petitioner had to do with the granting, issuance, and or formulation
of such concessions, orders, and/or policies. Moreover, the complaint does not state which corporations petitioner
is supposed to be a stockholder, director, member, dummy, nominee and/or agent. More significantly, the
petitioner's name does not even appear in annex of the complaint, which is a listing of the alleged "Positions and
Participations of Some Defendants". Further, the allegations in the complaint, above-referred to, pertaining to
petitioner are, therefore, deficient in that they merely articulate conclusions of law and presumptions unsupported
by factual premises. Hence, without the particulars prayed for in petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars, it can be
said the petitioner can not intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and for trial.

Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as names of persons, names of corporations, dates,
amounts involved, a specification of property for identification purposes, the particular transactions
involving withdrawals and disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would support the
conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature. On the contrary, those
particulars are material facts that should be clearly and definitely averred in the complaint in order that the
defendant may, in fairness, be informed of the claims made against him to the end that he may be prepared to
meet the issues at the trial.

The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the questioned resolutions. The petition is granted and the resolutions in
question are annulled and set aside. The respondents are ordered to prepare and file a Bill of Particulars
containing the facts prayed for by petitioner, or otherwise, respondent Sandiganbayan is ordered to exclude the
herein petitioner as defendant in the above-mentioned civil case.

7. TITLE: W-RED CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT

OF APPEALS and ASIA INDUSTRIES, INC., respondents. G.R. No. 122648. August
17, 2000

FACTS: On several occasions between May 28, 1980 and May 23, 1981, petitioner W-Red Construction and
Development Corporation purchased from respondent Asia Industries, Inc. various electrical equipment worth
P976,487.18, covered by a total of eighteen sales invoices.1 Petitioner was able to pay the sum of P701,877.93,
leaving a balance of P298,183.05, inclusive of interest at the rate of 14% per annum computed as of January 20,
1982.2 For petitioner’s failure to settle its remaining obligation despite demands, respondent instituted on
November 8, 1982 an action for sum of money and damages, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
Petitioner denying the receipt of some of the items stated in the sales invoices and alleging that certain electrical
equipment delivered to it were defective or faulty, for which proper demands for replacement were ignored by
respondent. Petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence which, however, was denied by the trial court. Then the
petitioner was given opportunity to adduce evidence but it failed to appear at the several hearings scheduled
therefor. The trial court, thus, declared petitioner as having waived its right to present evidence. The trial court
rendered judgment for respondent ordering petitioner to pay the sum of P298,163.05 plus 14% interest from the
date of filing of the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in a
decision. Hence, this petition for review.

Respondent failed to file its comment on the petition for review despite the Resolution of Supreme Court, for which
reason the SC required it to show cause why it should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt. The
Resolution requiring respondent to comment was sent to its office address. Respondent, still, failed to file its
comment and, according to information furnished by its former counsel, it was in the process of winding up its
business. The Supreme Court dispensed with respondent’s comment.

Petitioner maintains that the sales invoices presented by respondent during the trial were inadmissible for being
mere photocopies which, moreover, were not authenticated by respondent’s lone witness. Likewise, the Statement
of Account showing petitioner’s unpaid obligation to respondent was not identified and authenticated by the person
who prepared it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals as well as the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion when they admitted and considered private document as evidence when said documents were not
authenticated nor identified.

HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals as well as the trial court did not committee grave
abuse of discretion when they admitted and considered private document as evidence when said documents were
not authenticated nor identified. Even if only photocopies of the documents are submitted to the court, the record
shows that the originals of these documents were presented during the trial. Hence, it is not accurate to say that
the original exhibits were not presented before the trial court. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals,
respondent’s only witness, Alma Ramas, was not entirely incompetent to testify on petitioner’s obligation. It was
sufficiently established that Ms. Ramas, who was connected with the credit and collection department, was in
charge of monitoring the credit purchases of customers, including petitioner.

Having ruled on the admissibility of respondent’s documentary evidence, the next issue to be resolved is the
weight of said exhibits, for admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. On this score,
the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, which are not shown to be manifestly erroneous or
unsupported by the record, deserve great respect. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. The Supreme Court
affirm the appealed decision.

8. TITLE : CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN,
respondents. G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.*

FACTS:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private
respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents
consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled
checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs.

The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband in a case for legal
separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner.
The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for
private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring... him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering
Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay
him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of
the suit.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the papers and other materials obtained from forcible intrusion and from unlawful means
are admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation and disqualification from medical practice.

HELD:

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply
because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the constitution is if there is a
"lawful order from the court or which public safety or order require otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation
of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify anyone of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection
is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in
confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has
nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

San Pedro, Dem – Roger C.

JD 3B, Student No. 14-120050