1.) G.R. No. 161400 September 2, 2005 SECTION 1.
SECTION 1. A parcel of land which may be considered an accretion/excess lot and previously
ZENAIDA ORTEGA, represented by Her Attorney-in Fact OCTAVIO ALVAREZ and/or
ZEMVE ORTEGA ALVAREZ, Petitioners,
vs.
THE QUEZON CITY GOVERNMENT, THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY & THE
NATIONAL HOME MORTGAGE CORP., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner Zenaida Ortega comes directly to this Court assailing the validity of Quezon City
Ordinance No. SP 1304, Series of 2003, and praying that the following agencies, National
Housing Authority (NHA), Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), Department of
Environment and Natural Resources – Bureau of Land Management, National Home
Mortgage Financing Corporation, and Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation, be restrained
from implementing the said ordinance.
Proposed Ordinance No. 2002-07 (PO 2002-07) was filed on January 10, 2002 before the
City Council. PO 2002-07 sought to approve "the Subdivision Plan of Samahang
Kapitbahayan ng Barangay Vasra (Samahang Kapitbahayan), a Socialized Housing Project
(B.P. Blg. 220) with seventeen (17) lots (Community Mortgage Program) containing [a total]
area of Six Hundred Sixty Seven (667) square meters, covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 735, owned by the City Government of Quezon City (Vendor) located at a portion
of [an] easement [in] Barangay Vasra, Quezon City, Metro Manila, as applied for by the
Samahang Kapitbahayan ng Barangay Vasra (Vendee) subject to the conditions prescribed
under Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-56, S-93 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 220."1
Proposed Resolution No. 2003-13 (PR 2003-13) was subsequently filed on January 20, 2002
to complement PO 2002-07. The proposed resolution sought to authorize Quezon City Mayor
Feliciano R. Belmonte to enter into a contract to sell a portion of an easement located at
Barangay Vasra, Quezon City with the SAMAHANG KAPITBAHAYAN to be represented by its
President, through the Community Mortgage Program (CMP) of the National Home Mortgage
Finance Corporation (NHMFC).2
On August 5, 2003, the Quezon City government enacted Ordinance No. SP-1304, Series of
2003 (the ordinance), which is being challenged in the present petition,3 reclassifying "as
residential or converted from its original classification to residential for distribution or for
sale to its informal settlers" a "parcel of land which may be considered an accretion/excess
lot and previously conceived and referred to in Proposed Ordinance No. 2002-07 and
Proposed [Resolution] 2002-13 as portion of [an] easement situated between Block 14, Psd-
39577 of the original subdivision plan and Culiat Creek, Barangay Vasra, Quezon City."4
The provisions of the assailed ordinance read:
1
conceived and referred to in proposed ordinance no. PO 2002-07 and proposed ordinance
no. PO 2002-13 as portion of easement, situated between Block 14. Psd-39577 of the
original subdivision plan and Culiat Creek, Barangay Vasra, Quezon City, is hereby classified
as residential or converted from its original classification to residential for distribution or for
sale to its informal settlers.
SECTION 2. This Ordinance shall take effect immediately upon its approval.5
Petitioner, who claims to be the rightful owner of the land subject of the ordinance, alleges
that in enacting the ordinance, her various letter-protests to the City Council against
proposed Resolutions No. 2002-13, 2002-07 and 2002-2396 were not heeded in the City
Council, thus violating her constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the
law.
Petitioner further claims that the lot referred to in the ordinance overlaps her properties as
their technical descriptions in Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. RT-70472 (296026) and N-
152137 issued in her name show;7 and that assuming that there exists accretion or
easement of the Culiat Creek, she, being the owner of the adjoining land, is the rightful
owner thereof following Articles 4578 and Article 6209 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner likewise claims that the intended beneficiaries under the proposed ordinance and
resolution are not informal settlers as required under City Ordinance No. SP-56, Series of
1993,10 but lessees of her properties who had been ordered ejected after she filed several
unlawful detainer cases against them.11
By Comment12 filed on April 14, 2004, the Quezon City Government, through the Office of
the City Attorney, alleges that the present petition is premature and raises questions of fact
which entail reception of evidence; and that petitioner has not yet established her right of
ownership over the property referred to in the ordinance, whereas its clear right thereover
is evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 735 issued in its name.13
The NHA, by Comment14 filed on May 17, 2004, prayed for the dismissal of the petition,
pointing out that the petition is actually one for declaratory relief under Section 1, Rule 63
of the Rules of Court over which this Court has no original jurisdiction.
The NHMFC, by Comment15 filed on June 17, 2004, alleged that it is not a party to any of
the transactions with any of the parties in the present case. It nevertheless adopted the
comment of the Quezon City government that the petition is premature and alleges facts
which still need to be proven.16
The petition must be dismissed.
Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
This Court can thus only review, revise, reverse, modify on appeal or certiorari final
judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity
of, among other things, an ordinance is in question. Foremost, therefore, is that there must
be first a final judgment rendered by an inferior court 17 before this Court can assume
jurisdiction over a case of this nature.
Verily, this Court does not conduct original and full trial of a main factual issue like what
petitioner is raising in the present petition.18 It does not analyze or weigh evidence brought
before it at the first instance, otherwise, it would preempt the primary function of the lower
court to try the case on the merits, receive evidence, and decide the case definitively.19 Its
jurisdiction in cases which assail the validity of an ordinance is limited to reviewing or
revising final judgments or orders of lower courts and applying the law based on their
findings of facts brought before it.20
In another vein, if this petition was to be considered as one for declaratory relief, as
observed by the OSG, it is not embraced within the original jurisdiction of this Court. 21 Rule
63 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other government regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question
of construction or validity arising from, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, or to quiet title to real property or remove
clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code may be
brought under this Rule.
xxx
2
SEC. 4. Local government ordinances. – In any action involving the validity of a local
government ordinance, the corresponding prosecutor or attorney of the local government
unit involved shall be similarly notified and entitled to be heard. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Respecting petitioner’s contention that since the ordinance violates national laws, the
present petition delves on questions of law over which this Court has original jurisdiction, 22
the same fails.
As reflected above, petitioner’s assertion that the invalidity of the ordinance is premised on
her claim that she has a better right to the parcel of land referred to in the ordinance is a
factual issue.
At all events, even if this petition delves on questions of law, there is no statutory or
jurisprudential basis for according to this Court original and exclusive jurisdiction over
declaratory relief which advances only questions of law.23
Finally, while a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition if it has
far reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved, 24 there is no
allegation of facts by petitioner tending to show that she is entitled to such a writ. The
judicial policy must thus remain that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it, except
when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts or when exceptional and
compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise
of this Court’s primary jurisdiction.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
 2.) G.R. No. 181303 September 17, 2009
CARMEN DANAO MALANA, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, EVELYN DANAO, FERMINA
DANAO, LETICIA DANAO and LEONORA DANAO, the last two are represented
herein by their Attorney-in-Fact, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO TAPPA, JERRY REYNA, SATURNINO CAMBRI and SPOUSES FRANCISCO
AND MARIA LIGUTAN, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Orders 1
dated 4 May 2007, 30 May 2007, and 31 October 2007, rendered by Branch 3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, which dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the Complaint
of petitioners Carmen Danao Malana, Leticia Danao, Maria Danao Accorda, Evelyn Danao,
Fermina Danao, and Leonora Danao, against respondents Benigno Tappa, Jerry Reyna,
Saturnino Cambri, Francisco Ligutan and Maria Ligutan, in Civil Case No. 6868.
Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and
Damages2 against respondents on 27 March 2007, docketed as Civil Case No. 6868.
Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they are the owners of a parcel of land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1279373 situated in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan
(subject property). Petitioners inherited the subject property from Anastacio Danao
(Anastacio), who died intestate.4 During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo
Pauig (Consuelo), who was married to Joaquin Boncad, to build on and occupy the southern
portion of the subject property. Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate
the said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it.5
Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelo’s family members,6 continued to occupy the
subject property even after her death, already building their residences thereon using
permanent materials. Petitioners also learned that respondents were claiming ownership
over the subject property. Averring that they already needed it, petitioners demanded that
respondents vacate the same. Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners’ demand. 7
Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of
Barangay Annafunan West for conciliation. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents
asserted that they owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly
supporting their claim of ownership.
According to petitioners, respondents’ documents were highly dubious, falsified, and
incapable of proving the latter’s claim of ownership over the subject property; nevertheless,
they created a cloud upon petitioners’ title to the property. Thus, petitioners were compelled
to file before the RTC a Complaint to remove such cloud from their title. 8 Petitioners
additionally sought in their Complaint an award against respondents for actual damages, in
3
the amount of ₱50,000.00, resulting from the latter’s baseless claim over the subject
property that did not actually belong to them, in violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code on
Human Relations.9 Petitioners likewise prayed for an award against respondents for
exemplary damages, in the amount of ₱50,000.00, since the latter had acted in bad faith
and resorted to unlawful means to establish their claim over the subject property. Finally,
petitioners asked to recover from respondents ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, because the
latter’s refusal to vacate the property constrained petitioners to engage the services of a
lawyer.10
Before respondents could file their answer, the RTC issued an Order dated 4 May 2007
dismissing petitioners’ Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The RTC referred to
Republic Act No. 7691,11 amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real actions,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds ₱20,000.00. It found that the
subject property had a value of less than ₱20,000.00; hence, petitioners’ action to recover
the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTC decreed in its 4 May 2007 Order
that:
The Court has no jurisdiction over the action, it being a real action involving a real property
with assessed value less than ₱20,000.00 and hereby dismisses the same without
prejudice.12
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC Order dismissing
their Complaint. They argued that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title;
the accion reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek complete relief from
respondents. Petitioner’s Complaint should not have been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule
63 of the Rules of Court13 states that an action to quiet title falls under the jurisdiction of
the RTC.14
In an Order dated 30 May 2007, the RTC denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration. It
reasoned that an action to quiet title is a real action. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it
is the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over real actions
where the assessed value of real property does not exceed ₱20,000.00. Since the assessed
value of subject property per Tax Declaration No, 02-48386 was ₱410.00, the real action
involving the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.15
Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion, in which they prayed that
the RTC Orders dated 4 May 2007 and 30 May 2007, dismissing their Complaint, be set
aside. They reiterated their earlier argument that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court
states that an action to quiet title falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. They also
contended that there was no obstacle to their joining the two causes of action, i.e., quieting
of title and reivindicacion, in a single Complaint, citing Rumarate v. Hernandez.16 And even
if the two causes of action could not be joined, petitioners maintained that the misjoinder
of said causes of action was not a ground for the dismissal of their Complaint.17
The RTC issued an Order dated 31 October 2007 denying petitioners’ Motion. It clarified that
their Complaint was dismissed, not on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action, but for
lack of jurisdiction. The RTC dissected Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof,
bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove
clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be
brought under this Rule.
The RTC differentiated between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63
of the Rules of Court. The first paragraph refers to an action for declaratory relief, which
should be brought before the RTC. The second paragraph, however, refers to a different set
of remedies, which includes an action to quiet title to real property. The second paragraph
must be read in relation to Republic Act No. 7691, which vests the MTC with jurisdiction
over real actions, where the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed
₱50,000.00 in Metro Manila and ₱20,000.00 in all other places.18 The dispositive part of the
31 October 2007 Order of the RTC reads:
This Court maintains that an action to quiet title is a real action. [Herein petitioners] do not
dispute the assessed value of the property at ₱410.00 under Tax Declaration No. 02-48386.
Hence, it has no jurisdiction over the action.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Motion is hereby denied.19
Hence, the present Petition, where petitioners raise the sole issue of:
I in a sale with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar to
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF THE PETITIONERS MOTU PROPRIO.20
Petitioners’ statement of the issue is misleading. It would seem that they are only
challenging the fact that their Complaint was dismissed by the RTC motu proprio. Based on
the facts and arguments set forth in the instant Petition, however, the Court determines
that the fundamental issue for its resolution is whether the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing petitioners’ Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The Court rules in the negative.
4
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an
executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes
the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial
declaration of the parties’ rights or duties thereunder.21
Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC
correctly made a distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule
63 of the Rules of Court.
The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general
circumstances in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit:
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose
rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the
appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising,
and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphasis ours.)
As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph that:
An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove
clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be
brought under this Rule. (Emphasis ours.)
The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1)
an action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of
the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil
Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code
declaratory relief because they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the
litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into effect.22
To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph
of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those
of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.
It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically
require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word
"may" – that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions
for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x
x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a
statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an
opportunity or an option.23
In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as
amended, uses the word "shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where
the assessed value does not exceed ₱20,000.00, thus:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.—Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein
does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value does not exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive
of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: x x x
(Emphasis ours.)
As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration
No. 02-48386 is only ₱410.00; therefore, petitioners’ Complaint involving title to and
possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not
the RTC.
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual
breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.24 Since the purpose of
an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and
obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the
enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an
alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the
statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical
remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is
immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies
at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a
commission of wrongs.25
Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other
words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has
already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.26
In the present case, petitioners’ Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners
already demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said
5
Complaint was filed only subsequent to the latter’s express claim of ownership over the
subject property before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners’ title.
Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the
possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana
or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit
for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or
from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit
that has for its object one’s recovery of possession over the real property as
owner.271avvphi1
Petitioners’ Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria.
Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of the property involved. Given
that the subject property herein is valued only at ₱410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has
jurisdiction over an action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners’ Complaint in Civil Case No.
6868 for lack of jurisdiction.
As for the RTC dismissing petitioners’ Complaint motu proprio, the following
pronouncements of the Court in Laresma v. Abellana28 proves instructive:
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined
by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was
commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is
conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would
have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action. Lack of jurisdiction of
the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence,
acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties. If the court has no jurisdiction over
the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu proprio. x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Since the RTC, in dismissing petitioners’ Complaint, acted in complete accord with law and
jurisprudence, it cannot be said to have done so with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have
been committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious
or whimsical exercise of judgment, which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility.29 No such circumstances exist herein as to justify the issuance of a writ
of certiorari.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated 4 May
2007, 30 May 2007 and 31 October 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City,
Branch 3, dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868, without prejudice, are AFFIRMED.
The Regional Trial Court is ordered to REMAND the records of this case to the Municipal Trial
Court or the court of proper jurisdiction for proper disposition. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

6

3.) G.R. No. 154262 February 11, 2015
HERMINIO M. DE GUZMAN, FOR HIMSELF AND AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF: NILO M.
DE GUZMAN, ANGELINO DE GUZMAN, JOSEFINO M. DE GUZMAN, ESTRELLA M. DE
GUZMAN, TERESITA DE GUZMAN, ELSA MARGARITA M. DE GUZMAN, EVELYN M. DE
GUZMAN, MA. NIMIA M. DE GUZMAN, ANTOLIN M. DE GUZMAN, and FERDINAND
M. DEGUZMAN, Petitioners,
vs.
TABANGAO REALTY INCORPORATED, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
filed by petitioners Herminio M. de Guzman (Herminio), Nilo M. de Guzman, Angelino de
Guzman, Josefino M. de Guzman, Estrella M. de Guzman, Teresita de Guzman, Elsa
Margarita M. de Guzman, Evelyn M. de Guzman, Ma. Nimia M. de Guzman, Antolin M. de
Guzman, and Ferdinand M. de Guzman, challenging, based on pure questions of law, the
(a) Order1 dated March 4, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, of Trece
Martires City, in Civil Case No. TM-1118, which granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by
respondent Tabangao Realty, Inc.; and (b) Order2 dated May 21, 2002 of the same court in
said case, which denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the earlier Order.
The instant Petition arose from the following facts:
Sometime in 1980, Serafin de Guzman (Serafin) and Josefino de Guzman3 (Josefino) applied
for, and were granted, authority to distribute oil and lubricating products manufactured and
marketed by Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (FSPC). In the course of their business,
Serafin and Josefino purchased on credit oil and lubricating products from FSPC, but they
eventually failed to pay for their credit purchases from FSPC. Thus, FSPC filed before the
RTC of Manila a complaint for sum of money against Serafin and Josefino, docketed as Civil
Case No. 120680. After trial, RTC Manila rendered judgment ordering Serafin and Josefino
to pay their outstanding obligations to FSPC. Since Serafin and Josefino no longer appealed,
the judgment of RTC-Manila in Civil Case No. 120680 became final and executory. RTC-
Manila granted the motion of FSPC and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution on May
3, 1983. On June 30, 1983, FSPC levied upon a parcel of land, withan area of 74,415 square
meters, situated in Sta. Cruz de Malabon, Trece Martires City, Cavite Province (subject
property), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 3531 in the name of spouses
Serafin and Amelia de Guzman (spouses De Guzman). According to the Sheriff’s Certificate
of Sale dated February 4, 1988, the subject property was sold, after due publication and
notice, at a public auction, in favor of respondent, which gave the highest bid of ₱70,000.00.
The Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was annotated on TCT No. 3531 on April 13, 1988. The
7
spouses De Guzman did not redeem the subject property within one year from registration
of the Sherifff’s Certificate of Sale on TCT No. 3531.
On October 19, 2001, petitioners filed a Complaint for quieting of title against respondent
before RTC-Trece Martires, docketed as Civil Case No. TM-1118. Petitioners alleged in their
Complaint that:
1. They are of legal age, Filipinos and represented herein by their attorney-in-fact,
[co-petitioner] HERMINIO M. DE GUZMAN x x x.
xxxx
3. [Petitioners] are the children and only heirs of the spouses Serafin and Amelia de
Guzman who died both intestate on April 23, 2001 and January 01, 1997.
4. The spouses were the owners of a parcel of land situated at Sta. Cruz de Malabon,
Trece Martires City, Cavite Province, with area of 74,415 square meters covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-3531 (T-95734), a copy is attached as Annex "A."
5. [Petitioners] inherited the property by intestate succession upon the death of
their parents. They are now therefore its owners and are the ones in possession of
the property.
6. Annotated on [petitioners’] TCT No. 3531 (T-95734) in the name of their deceased
parents are the following entries of encumbrances, to wit:
a. Entry No. 8616-23 (sic) – Execution - Covering the parcel of land
described in the title, as per Execution: entitled FILIPINAS SHELL
PETROLEUM [CORP.], Plaintiff vs. SERAFIN & JOSEFINO DE GUZMAN, ET
AL., Defendants, issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National
Capital Judicial Region, on file in this Registry. Date of Inscription (sic) - May
3, 1983; Date of Inscription - July 01, 1983.
b. Entry No. 8619-23 - Notice of Levy - Covering the parcel of land described
in this title, as per Notice of Levy: entitled FILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORP. vs. SERAFIN & JOSEFINO DE GUZMAN, ET AL., Defendants, under
Civil Case No. 120680 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. XX, copy on
file in this Registry. Date of instrument - June 30, 1983. Date of Inscription
- July 01, 1983.
c. Entry No. 1487 - Certificate of Sale - In favor of TABANGAO REALTY
INCORPORATED - Covering the parcel of land described in this title, by virtue
of the sheriff’s certificate of sale exec. by Jose R. Bawalan, Clerk of Court &
Ex-Officio Sheriff of Cavite and approved by PROCESO P. SILANGCRUZ,
 acting etc. Judge of Branch 23, TMC. Date of instrument - Feb. 4, 1988.
Date of Inscription - April 13, 1988.
d. Entry No. 1488 - BIR certification - In favor of TABANGAO REALTY
INCORPORATED - That SERAFIN DE GUZMAN as per certification issued by
the BIR. Date of instrument - April 13, 1988. Date of Inscription - April 13,
1988.
7. The foregoing entries/encumbrances are apparently valid and subsisting but in
fact and in law, they are void and ineffective or otherwise had been terminated and
extinguished or barred by prescription, estoppel and laches.
8. Specifically, the Certificate of Sale, annotated on TCT No. 3531 (T-95734) as
Entry No. 1487, which supposedly emanated from the Execution (Entry No. 8616-
23 [sic]) and Notice of Levy (Entry No. 8619-23) is void for the following reasons:
a. The Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale dated February 4, 1988 (copy is attached
as Annex "B") recites that "on June 30, 1983 LEVY was made upon the right,
titles, interests and participation of defendants SERAFIN and JOSEFINO DE
GUZMAN and sold at public auction sale in front of the Capitol Building of
Cavite situated at Trece Martires City, after due publication of the Sheriff’s
Sale in the Record Newsweekly, and after the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale was
posted in three (3) conspicuous places and later sold in favor of Tabangao
Realty Incorporated, x x x as the highest bidder for the amount of SEVENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (₱70,000) Philippine Currency, x x x
xxxx
The truth is there was no such Sheriff’s Sale conducted on June 30, 1983
and it was legally impossible to do the levy and execution sale on the same
date.
b. Assuming an execution sale was indeed conducted on any other date the
same was void for lack of the required notice and publication.
At the end of their Complaint, petitioners prayed for judgment:
c. Assuming an execution sale was indeed conducted with due notice and
publication, still [respondent’s] acquisition was void because [respondent]
was not and up to now is not capacitated to own and acquire agricultural
land and its aggregate area of landholding exceeds the retention limit fixed
by law. Being legally incapacitated to own this agricultural land the
execution of the Certificate of Sale in its favor was void and did not create
any legal effect.
9. Assuming there was a valid execution sale conducted, the Sheriff’s Certificate of
Sale has lost its effectivity as it had been terminated and extinguished by
prescription, laches and estoppel, more than 13 years having elapsed from its
8
registration on 13 April 1988 without the buyer, [respondent] herein, taking any
step to consolidate its ownership and/or take possession of the property. In the
meantime [petitioners] and their predecessors have introduced on the land
improvements of considerable value and are the ones paying the real property taxes
and performing all the tasks and paying all the expenses of preserving the land and
protecting it from intruders.
10. Assuming there was a valid execution sale executed, [respondent] is guilty of
fraud and bad faith in suspending indefinitely the consolidation of title in its name.
Its motive is to conceal its acquisition of the land from the public and the
government, particularly the Department of Agrarian Reform, and project in the
public records the [petitioners’] title, who are otherwise qualified under the law to
retain it, and thereby evade its obligation to strip itself of this landholding within the
period required by law and thus indefinitely keep the land away from the coverage
of agrarian reform laws. Being guilty of fraud and bad faith [respondent] cannot
under the principle of "in pari delicto" recover the land from the [petitioners],
especially after the lapse of an unreasonably long period of time. Or at the very
least, because of its guilt, [respondent] should not be allowed to deny the
[petitioners] the right to redeem the land by paying the amount of ₱70,000.00 and
the legal interest from its purchase.
11. No valid execution sale having been conducted within the ten[-]year period from
the finality of the judgment against Serafin and Josefino de Guzman in the case
mentioned being executed, the writ of execution (Entry No. 8618-23) and Notice of
Levy (Entry No. 8619-23) are now ineffective, having been terminated and
extinguished by [the] lapse of more than eighteen (18) years from the date they
were taken or annotated on July 1, 1983. The judgment itself sought to be executed
had prescribed.
12. The existence of the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale and the continued annotation of
the above-cited encumbrances on TCT No. T-3531 (T-95734) cast a cloud on and
are prejudicial to [petitioners’] title and are one of those which the law allows to be
removed in order to quiet [petitioners’] title.4
a. Declaring the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale (Annex "B"), its entry as well as the
entries of execution and notice of levy and BIR Certification on TCT No. T-3531 (T-
95734) and all the claims of the [respondent] against the land by virtueof these
documents void or as already ineffective or terminated and extinguished by
prescription, laches and estoppel;
b. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City to cancel the annotations
of Entries Nos. 8618-28, 8619-23, 1487, and 1488 on TCT No. T-3531 (T-95734).
 c. Or otherwise allowing the [petitioners] to exercise their right of redemption within
a certain period and compelling the [respondent] to accept from the [petitioners]
the amount of ₱70,000.00 and its legal interest since April 1988 as redemption price.
d. Granting the [petitioners] other just and equitable reliefs.5
Respondent filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer, which the RTC granted in
an Order dated January 4, 2002. However, instead of filing an answer, respondent filed a
Motion to Dismiss based on two grounds: (a) the Complaint failed to comply with the
requirements on certification against forum shopping; and (b) the Complaint failed to state
a cause of action.
Respondent averred that the Certification against Forum Shopping attached to the Complaint
did not comply with the mandatory requirements set forth in Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997
Rules of Court. Assuming that all petitioners are indeed the children and only heirs of the
spouses De Guzman who inherited the subject property by intestate succession, as alleged
in the Complaint, then all 11 petitioners should have executed the Certification against
Forum Shopping, but only Herminio signed said Certification. Since it was not indicated in
the Certification that Herminio was authorized by his co-petitioners to execute the same on
their behalf, then the said Certification was Herminio’s sole act.
Respondent also argued that the Complaint did not state any cause of action. Petitioners did
not have any existing right or interest over the subject property as to entitle them to the
relief prayed for in the Complaint. The subject property had long been levied upon and sold
to respondent at an execution sale. The only remaining right of petitioners’ predecessors-
in-interest over the subject property was the right to redeem the same within a period of
one year from the date of registration of the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale with the Registry of
Deeds on April 13, 1988. When petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest failed to redeem the
subject property within the one-year period, they were divested of their rights, title, and
interest over the subject property, which were then acquired by respondent. Respondent
further asserted that its acquisition of the subject property at the execution sale conducted
on June 30,1983 was valid and legal; a civil action to consolidate ownership was not
necessary before title to the subject property completely vested in respondent; the real right
of respondent over the subject property would prescribe only after thirty years; there were
no legal and/or factual bases for petitioners’ contention that respondent was incapacitated
to acquire and own the subject property; and the RTC had no jurisdiction over issues
involving land reform.
In their Opposition (To Motion To Dismiss), petitioners countered that there was no more
need for all of them to execute and sign the Certification against Forum Shopping. The first
paragraph of the Complaint already stated that petitioners were represented by their
attorney-in-fact. Petitioners also attached a Special Power of Attorney in which the other
petitioners gave their co-petitioner Herminio the authority to sue and be sued for the
recovery of and/or protection of their title, rights, and interests over all the properties left
by their deceased parents, the spouses De Guzman. The delegation by the other petitioners
to their co-petitioner Herminio of the authority to sue and be sued necessarily included the
9
authority to sign the Certification against Forum Shopping integrated in the Complaint. In
addition, petitioners contended that instead of taking off from a hypothetical admission of
the basic allegations in their Complaint, the Motion to Dismiss of respondent proceeded from
a refutation of those allegations. Respondent’s arguments had no place in a motion to
dismiss predicated on the supposed failure of the complaint tostate a cause of action, if only
for the simple reason that they controvert rather than admit the basic allegations of the
Complaint and offer new allegations the truth of which could be determined only after the
parties have presented their respective evidence. Lastly, the issue raised in the Complaint
was not the right of retention of respondent, but the validity of the Sheriff’s Certificate of
Sale. There was no tenancy relationship or agrarian dispute between the parties over which
the Department of Agrarian Reform Arbitration Board had jurisdiction.
On March 4, 2002, RTC-Trece Martires issued an Order, ruling in this wise:
It appearing from the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale (Annex "B" of the Complaint) dated
February 4,1988 that proper steps had been undertaken thereto prior to issuance of such
document (Annex "B" of the Complaint), i.e., on June 30, 1983 a levy (Entry No. 8619-23-
Notice of Levy, dorsal portion, Annex "A" of the Complaint) was conducted as a preliminary
step prior to satisfaction of judgment rendered in favor of Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. in
a civil case the latter filed against [petitioners’] predecessors-in-interest; that due
publication of the Sheriff’s Sale was executed in the Record Newsweekly together with the
posting of the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale in 3 conspicuous places. After substantial compliance
with the notice and publication requirements as provided for by law, particularly Rule 39,
Sec. 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, an execution sale was conducted on the subject
property in favor of [respondent] herein Tabangao Realty Incorporated, thenceforth the
questioned Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale (Entry No. 1487, Certificate of Sale, Annex "A," of
the Complaint) dated February 4, 1988 is valid, and its subsequent registration with the
Registry of Deeds on April 13, 1988 and the failure of the [petitioners’] predecessors-in-
interest to redeem the property within the one year period from the date of registration of
the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale, pursuant to Rule 39, Section 33 of the Revised Rules of
Court, purchaser-[respondent] herein, Tabangao Realty shall be substituted to and acquires
all the rights, title, interest and claim over the subject property, regardless of the fact that
[respondent] had not taken any steps to consolidate its ownership and/or take possession
of the property hereof, subject of this litigation, against [petitioners] in this case.
Considering all matters in their respective pleadings, both the Motion to Dismiss as well as
the Opposition thus filed, the Court is of the opinion and so holds that the Certificate of Sale
remains valid and that Tabangao Realty’s right has not yet prescribed as provided for in Art.
1141 of the New Civil Code, thus, the Opposition (To Motion to Dismiss) is hereby denied.
Accordingly, finding merit in the Motion to Dismiss filed by [respondent] Tabangao Realty,
Inc., herein, this case is hereby dismissed. No costs.6
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order, but RTC-Trece Martires
denied the Motion in an Order dated May 21, 2002.
Hence, petitioners directly seek recourse from this Court through the Petition at bar,
assailing the Orders dated March 4, 2002and May 21, 2002 of RTC-Trece Martires in Civil
Case No. TM-1118 on pure questions of law, viz:
4.3. Foremost among the questions of law that this petition raises is what rule governs the
prescriptive period for a buyer in execution sale to demand or compel the Sheriff to execute
and deliver to him the final deed of conveyance in order that it may consolidate its title.
Should it be Article 1141 which provides for thirty (30) years within which to bring real
actions (as the court a quo has concluded), or should it be either Article 1149 (five years in
cases where the Code or the law is silent); or Article 1144 (ten years in obligations created
by law), as suggested by the petitioners.
4.4. Another question to be raise[d]is whether Sec. 33 (par. 2), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure can be given retroactive effect in this case. As can be seen, the rights of
the respondent over the property as buyer in execution sale should not be governed by Sec.
33 (2nd paragraph), Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure but by the old Sec. 35,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which was the law in force at the time of the execution sale
and expiration of the period of redemption. This issue is very pivotal in determining the
conflicting claims of the parties. Because whereas in the 1997 Rules the buyer in execution
sale acquires all the rights of judgment debtor in the property automatically upon the lapse
of the period of redemption under old Rules of Court, the buyer in execution sale acquires
the right of the owner only upon the execution and delivery of the final deed of conveyance.
Hence, if this is the rule applicable – as petitioners will show – then respondent has up to
now not acquired right on the property and could not now assert any right based on the
Certificate of Sale by reason of prescription.
4.5. In effect this petition will also raise the constitutionality of the amendment introduced
[b]y the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to 2nd paragraph of Sec. 35 of Rule 39 of the Old
Rules of Court. To petitioners’ mind the subject of the amendment deals with substantive
rights.
4.6. Finally, this petition shall raise the very basic question of whether or not the allegations
of the petitioners’ complaint in the court below are sufficient to constitute a cause of action.7
Ultimately, at the crux of the present Petition is the question of whether or not RTC-Trece
Martires committed reversible error in dismissing petitioners’ Complaint for Quieting of Title
on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
The Court rules in the negative.
In Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court described the nature of an action for
quieting of title, thus:
Regarding the nature of the action filed before the trial court, quieting of title is a common
law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title
to real property. Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure "x x x an
adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the
10
complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be
forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim." In an action for quieting of title,
the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and
other claimants, "x x x not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who
has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit
of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property
dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvement she may desire,
to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best x x x." (Citation omitted.)"
Under the Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of under the following circumstances:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently
valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable,
and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property
or any interest therein.
Art. 478. There may also be an action to quiet title or remove a cloud therefrom when the
contract, instrument or other obligation has been extinguished or has terminated, or has
been barred by extinctive prescription.
Article 477 of the Civil Code further provides that the plaintiff in an action to quiet title must
have legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property, which is the subject matter
of the action, but need not be in possession of said property.
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject
of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting a
cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.9
Petitioners’ Complaint in Civil Case No. TM-1118 failed to allege these two requisites for an
action to quiet title.
Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they were the children and only heirs of the
deceased spouses De Guzman and that the subject property was still registered in spouses
De Guzman’s names under TCT No. 3531. However, these allegations are insufficient to
establish petitioners’ title to the subject property.
It is worthy to note that petitioners also alleged in their Complaint that TCT No. 3531 bears
the following annotations: (1) the writ of execution dated May 3, 1983 issued by RTC-Manila
in Civil Case No. 120680, inscribed on said certificate of title on July 1, 1983; (2) Notice of
Levy dated June 30, 1983 issued in the same case, inscribed on July 1, 1983; (3) Sheriff’s
Certificate of Sale dated February 4, 1988 in favor of respondent covering the subject
property, inscribed on April 13, 1988; and (4) BIR Certification dated April 13, 1988 stating
that respondent paid taxes on the sale, inscribed on April 13, 1988. Petitioners attached to
the Complaint copies of TCT No. 3531 with the aforementioned annotations; and the
Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale dated February 4, 1988 which stated that the subject property
was levied upon and sold in an execution sale to respondent for ₱70,000.00.
Equally notable is the absence of any allegation in the Complaint that Serafin and/or
Josefino, as the judgment obligors in Civil Case No. 120680, or their successors-in-interest,
redeemed the subject property from respondent within the one-year redemption period,
which, reckoned from the date of registration of the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale on TCT No.
3531 on April 13, 1988, expired on April 13, 1989.
It must be remembered that the period of redemption is not a prescriptive period but a
condition precedent provided by law to restrict the right of the person exercising
redemption.10 If no redemption is made in the manner and within the period prescribed,
Rule 39, Section 33 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom
executed or given. – If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the
registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and
possession of the property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and
no other redemption has expired, the last redemptioner is entitled to the conveyance and
possession; but in all cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire period of one (1) year
from the date of the registration of the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be
executed by the officer making the sale or by his successor in office, and in the latter case
shall have the same validity as though the officer making the sale had continued in office
and executed it.
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be
substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to
the property as of the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the
purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding
the property adversely to the judgment obligor. (Emphasis supplied.)
Based on the allegations in the Complaint and the applicable rules, respondent was already
substituted to and acquired all the rights, title, interest, and claim of the Spouses De Guzman
to the subject property on April 13, 1989, when the one-year redemption period expired.
Upon the deaths of Amelia de Guzman on January 1, 1997 and her husband Serafin de
Guzman on April 23, 2001, they had no more rights, title, interest, and claim to the subject
property to pass on by succession to petitioners as their heirs.
Petitioners, though, insist that Rule39, Section 33 of the 1997 Rules of Court should not be
applied retroactively. According to petitioners, when the execution sale was purportedly
conducted in 1988 and the redemption period expired in 1989, it was Rule 39, Section 35
of the 1964 Rules of Court which was in effect, and it read:
11
Sec. 35. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period. By whom
executed or given.— If no redemption be made within twelve (12) months after the sale,
the purchaser, or his assignee, is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property;
or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other redemption has
been made and notice thereof given, and the time for redemption has expired, the last
redemptioner, or his assignee, is entitled to the conveyance and possession; but in all cases
the judgment debtor shall have the entire period of twelve (12) months from the date of
the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be executed by the officer making the sale
or by his successor in office, and in the latter case shall have the same validity as though
the officer making the sale had continued in office and executed it.
Upon the execution and delivery of said deed the purchaser, or redemptioner, or his
assignee, shall be substituted to and acquire all the right, title, interest and claim of the
judgment debtor to the property as of the time of the levy, except as against the judgment
debtor in possession, in which case the substitution shall be effective as of the date of the
deed. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner
by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the
judgment debtor. (Emphasis supplied.) Under the 1964 Rules of Court, the purchaser, or
redemptioner, or his assignee, shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title,
interest, and claim of the judgment debtor to the property only after execution and delivery
of the deed of conveyance. Petitioners point out that respondent has yet to secure such a
deed.
The issue of the retroactive application of procedural rules is not novel and had been
squarely addressed by the Court in Calacala v. Republic of the Philippines,11 as follows:
To start with, petitioners base their claim of legal title not on the strength of any independent
writing in their favor but simply and solely on respondent Republic’s failure to secure the
Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and obtain a writ
of possession over the property in dispute within ten (10) years from the registration of the
Certificate of Sale.
Petitioners’ reliance on the foregoing shortcomings or in actions of respondent Republic
cannot stand.
For one, it bears stressing that petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest lost whatever right they
had over land in question from the very moment they failed to redeem it during the 1-year
period of redemption. Certainly, the Republic’s failure to execute the acts referred to by the
petitioners within ten (10) years from the registration of the Certificate of Sale cannot, in
any way, operate to restore whatever rights petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest had over
the same. For sure, petitioners have yet to cite any provision of law or rule of jurisprudence,
and we are not aware of any, to the effect that the failure of a buyer in a foreclosure sale
to secure a Certificate of Final Sale, execute an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and
obtain a writ of possession over the property thus acquired, within ten (10) years from the
registration of the Certificate of Sale will operate to bring ownership back to him whose
property has been previously foreclosed and sold. x x x.
Quite the contrary, Section 33, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly
provides that "[u]pon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or
redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of
the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy."
Concededly, the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was yet in existent when the facts of this case
transpired. Even then, the application thereof to this case is justified by our pronouncement
in Lascano vs. Universal Steel Smelting Co., Inc., et al., to wit:
Procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a
general rule, the retroactive application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of
any personal rights because no vested right may attach to nor arise therefrom.
Moreover, with the rule that the expiration of the 1-year redemption period forecloses the
obligor’s right to redeem and that the sale thereby becomes absolute, the issuance
thereafter of a final deed of sale is at best a mere formality and mere confirmation of the
title that is already vested in the purchaser. As this Court has said in Manuel vs. Philippine
National Bank, et al.: Note must be taken of the fact that under the Rules of Court the
expiration of that one-year period forecloses the owner’s right to redeem, thus making the
sheriff’s sale absolute. The issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale becomes a mere
formality, an act merely confirmatory of the title that is already in the purchaser and
constituting official evidence of that fact.
With the reality that petitioners are not holders of any legal title over the property subject
of this case and are bereft of any equitable claim thereon, the very first requisite of an action
to quiet title, i.e., that the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or
interest in the real property subject matter of the action, is miserably wanting in this case.
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
Calacala thus settled that Rule 39, Section 33 of the 1997 Rules of Court can be applied
retroactively to cases still pending and undetermined at the time of its passage,12 such as
the present case. By virtue of said provision, the expiration of the one-year redemption
period foreclosed the right to redeem of the spouses De Guzman (as well as petitioners, as
their successors-in-interest) and the sale of the subject property to respondent became
absolute, so that the issuance thereafter of a final deed of sale and/or conveyance is at best
a mere formality and mere confirmation of the title that was already vested in respondent.
The allegations in petitioners’ Complaint also do not support the second requisite for an
action to quiet title, i.e., that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding alleged to cast
cloud on a plaintiff's title is in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance
of validity or legal efficacy.
Petitioners argue that respondent, in filing a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint based on
failure to state a cause of action, was deemed to have admitted all the allegations in said
Complaint, including those under paragraphs 8 to 11, viz: that no execution sale was
12
actually conducted on June 30, 1983 as it was legally impossible for the levy and execution
sale to have been done on the same day; that an execution sale conducted on any other
date was void for lack of notice and publication; that an execution sale with due notice and
publication was still void because respondent was not capacitated to acquire and own
agricultural land with an area exceeding the retention limits set by law; that assuming there
was a valid execution sale conducted, the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale had lost its effectivity
because of prescription, laches, and estoppel; that assuming there was a valid execution
sale conducted, respondent is guilty of fraud and bad faith in suspending indefinitely the
consolidation of the title in its name for the purpose of concealing the acquisition of the
subject property from the public and the government, more particularly, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR); and that there being no valid execution sale conducted 10 years
from finality of judgment in Civil Case No. 120680, said judgment had already prescribed
and the writ of execution and Notice of Levy issued pursuant to the same had become
ineffective. By these allegations, petitioners posit, the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale annotated
on TCT No. 3531 is either void or ineffective, and constitutes a cloud on their title to the
subject property.
The Court is not persuaded.
While the general rule is that a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause
of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein, there
are exceptions to the general rule as explicated by the Court in Vergel de Dios v. Bristol
Laboratories Phils., Inc.13:
Before discussing whether or not those allegations in the complaint referred to sufficiently
state a cause or causes of action, it may be well to state beforehand the rule, uniformly held
by this Court, that in order to sustain a dismissal on the ground that the complaint states
no cause of action, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the
complaint, and the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute
a cause of action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a
valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the complaint. For the
purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in
the complaint. The admission, however, is limited only to all material and relevant facts
which are well pleaded in the complaint. Thus, it has been ruled that a demurrer admits only
such matters of fact as are sufficiently pleaded; that the demurrer does not admit the truth
of mere epithets charging fraud; nor allegations of legal conclusions; nor an erroneous
statement of law. The admission of the truth of material and relevant facts well pleaded
does not extend to render a demurrer an admission of inferences or conclusions drawn
therefrom, even if alleged in the pleading; nor mere inferences or conclusions from facts
not stated; nor conclusions of law; nor matters of evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant
matter. Examples of allegations considered by this Court as conclusions of law are: that
defendant had incurred damages as a consequence of the "malicious and unjustified"
institution of the action; that "with intent of circumventing the constitutional prohibition that
‘no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause
as provided by law,’ respondents "maliciously and illegally for the purpose of political
persecution and political vengeance, reverted the fund of the salary item x x x and
furthermore eliminated or abolished the said position effective July 1, 1960"; that the
"defendant usurped the office of Senator of the Philippines." From American jurisprudence
come the following examples:
"Bare allegations in employee’s action for breach of employment contract that master had
breached or violated the contract or discharged him in a wrongful, illegal, unlawful, unjust,
arbitrary or fraudulent manner or without authority are compulsory and insufficient in
absence of additional allegations and raise no triable issue." Wise vs. Southern Pacific Co.,
35 Cal. Rptr. 652.
"Allegations that defendants acted maliciously and unreasonably were conclusionary."
Norkin vs. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 47 Cal. Rptr. 15.
"Allegations that acts of defendants are arbitrary, capricious, fraudulent, wrongful, and
unlawful are mere conclusions of law not admitted by demurrer." Burt vs. Irvine Co., 47 Cal.
Rptr. 362.
"A bare characterization in a petition of unlawfulness, is merely a legal conclusion and a
wish of the pleader, and such a legal conclusion unsubstantiated by facts which could give
it life, has no standing in any court where issues must be presented and determined by facts
in ordinary and concise language." Petty vs. Dayton Musicians’ Ass’n., 153 NE2d 218,
affirmed 153 NE2d 223. "Where acts of defendants were described as willful, wanton and
malicious and an abuse of process, such descriptions were mere conclusions of the pleader
and were not admitted by motion to dismiss." Burr vs. State Bank of St. Charles, 100NE2d
773, 344 Ill. App. 332.
xxxx
As quoted above, paragraph 5 of the complaint avers that the "defendants actuated by
ulterior motives, contrary to law and morals, with abuse of their advantageous position as
employers, in gross and evident bad faith and without giving plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios
his due, willfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and in a summary and arbitrary manner, dismissed
said plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios by means of a libelous letter." It further avers that the
"charges and statements mentioned in said letter are not true" and that the "defendants
knowingly made the same in order to justify their dismissal of Alfredo Vergel de Dios." In
the light of the examples cited above, the allegations that the defendants-appellees were
"actuated by ulterior motives, contrary to law and morals, with abuse of their advantageous
position as employers, in gross and evident bad faith and without giving plaintiff Alfredo
Vergel de Dios his due, willfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and in a summary and arbitrary
manner," are conclusions of law, inferences from facts not alleged and expressions of opinion
unsupported by factual premises. For nowhere in the complaint can be found any particular
factual allegations as to the ulterior motives of the defendants-appellees; as to how they
abused their position as employer; as to how or why there was bad faith; and as to how
plaintiff Alfredo Vergel de Dios was deprived of his due. Likewise, the allegation
characterizing the letter of dismissal as a "libelous letter" is a conclusion of law without
factual basis. And the allegations that the "charges and statements mentioned in said letter
13
are not true," and that defendants "knowingly made the same," are legal conclusions or
mere expressions of opinion, there being no factual premises showing why the charges and
statements in the letter are not true; nor is there stated any particular fact or circumstance
upon which the defendants-appellees’ knowledge of the falsity thereof can be predicated.
Pursuant, therefore, to the rule stated above that conclusions of law, inferences or
conclusions from facts not stated, and mere expressions of opinion, are not deemed
admitted by the motion to dismiss, what should be deemed admitted in paragraph 5 of the
complaint would be the bare allegation that Alfredo Vergel de Dios was dismissed from
employment on September 15, 1965, per letter of dismissal of even date, a copy of which
was attached to the complaint and made part thereof as Annex "A". At this juncture, it
should be pointed out that the succeeding allegations of the complaint are anchored on the
allegations in paragraph 5, except the later part of paragraph 9 alleging refusal of the
defendants-appellees to make an accounting of funds which allegation is an inference from
facts not alleged, there being no allegation in the pleading to the effect that any amount is
due the plaintiffs-appellants and that the amount is being withheld by the defendants-
appellees. Since the only fact alleged and deemed admitted by the motion to dismiss is that
Alfredo Vergel de Dios was dismissed from employment on September 15, 1965, the other
allegations premised on the allegations in paragraph 5 must be considered in that light
alone. Applying now the test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged to constitute a cause of
action, can the court render a valid judgment upon the facts alleged and deemed admitted,
in accordance with the prayer of the complaint? Certainly not, there being no alleged and
admitted fact showing that the defendants-appellees have committed acts constituting a
"delict or wrong" by which the defendants-appellees violated the right of the plaintiffs-
appellants causing them loss or injury. Or more specifically, there is no alleged and admitted
fact that defendants-appellees fabricated a false ground to dismiss Alfredo Vergel de Dios
from employment, the admitted fact being that his dismissal was for a just cause, as shown
by the letter of dismissal, Annex "A" of the complaint. In this regard, while the letter of
dismissal is being attached to the complaint to show its existence and character, in the
absence of material facts well pleaded in the complaint and admitted, showing the nature
of the dismissal, the complaint should be read and interpreted with the aid of the exhibit,
Annex "A", which, on its face, shows that the dismissal was for a just cause. (Citations
omitted.)
Upon scrutiny, the allegations in paragraphs 8 to 11 of petitioners’ Complaint consisted of
conclusions of law; inferences or conclusions drawn from facts not alleged in the Complaint;
expressions of opinions unsupported by factual premises; and mere epithets charging fraud,
which respondent was not deemed to have admitted when it filed its Motion to Dismiss on
the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
In particular, petitioners’ allegation that no actual execution sale was conducted on June 30,
1983 or, in the alternative, that the execution sale conducted on another date was void for
not complying with notice and publication requirements, was purely based on the following
sentence in the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale:
[O]n June 30, 1983, LEVY was made upon the right, titles, interests and participation of
defendants SERAFIN & JOSEFINO DE GUZMAN and sold at public auction sale in front of the
Capitol Building of Cavite situated at Trece Martires City, after due publication of the Sheriff’s
Sale in the Record Newsweekly, and after the Notice of Sheriff’s Sale was posted in three
(3) conspicuous places and later sold in favor of Tabangao Realty Incorporated, with address
at 4th Floor, Insular Life Bldg., Ayala Ave., Makati, Metro Manila as the highest bidder for
the amount of SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱70,000.00) Philippine Currency, the properties
of said defendants x x x.14
Concededly, the aforequoted sentence, read as is, imply that the levy and execution sale of
the subject property both took place on June 30, 1983. However, the annotations on TCT
No. 3531, attached to petitioners’ Complaint, show that it was only the Notice of Levy which
was executed on June 30, 1983 and inscribed on the said certificate of title on July 1, 1983;
while the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale, evidencing the execution sale itself, was subsequently
executed almost five years later on February 4, 1988 and inscribed on the certificate of title
on April 13, 1988. In the regular course of executing judgments, the levy upon the real
property precedes the execution sale because the latter can only take place after compliance
with notice and publication requirements. The Court stresses that the Sheriff’s Certificate of
Sale had been executed and signed by Jose R. Bawalan, as Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio
Sheriff of Cavite, and approved by Acting Judge Proceso P. Silangcruz of RTC-Trece Martires,
who are both presumed to have regularly performed their official duties. The validity of such
Certificate cannot be so easily overcome by mere inferences from a lone sentence that,
unfortunately, was vaguely constructed or imprecisely worded, and unsupported by any
factual premise.
Equally unavailing is petitioners’ charge of bad faith and fraud on the part of respondent for
delaying the consolidation of title despite the expiration of the one-year redemption period
in order to conceal its purchase of the subject property from the DAR and evade the
application of agrarian reform laws. Not only was such charge consisted purely of petitioners’
opinions and conclusions of law and devoid of any factual premise, it also pertained to
purported actions of respondent subsequent to the issuance of the Sheriff’s Certificate of
Sale and would have no bearing on the validity or legal efficacy of said Certificate.
Lastly, petitioners assert that because of respondent’s failure to secure a final deed of sale
and/or conveyance 13 years after registration of the Sheriff’s Certificate of Title on TCT No.
3531, the said Certificate had lost its effectivity and was deemed terminated and
extinguished by prescription, laches, and estoppel. They also maintain that there being no
valid execution sale, respondent had likewise lost to prescription its right to have the
judgment in Civil Case No. 120680 executed more than 10 years from finality of the same.
There is no merit in petitioners’ arguments.
The Court reiterates that all rights, title, interest, and claim of the spouses De Guzman to
the subject property was already acquired by respondent upon the expiration of the one-
year redemption period without redemption being made. The execution of the final deed of
sale and/or conveyance to respondent is a mere formality and confirmation of the title
14
already vested in respondent. Rule39, Section 33 of the 1997 Rules of Court states that
"[t]he deed [of conveyance] shall be executed by the officer making the sale or by his
successor in office," who, in the present case, is the Sheriff of RTC-Trece Martires. There is
nothing in the Rules requiring the institution of a separate action for execution of such a
deed, therefore, no prescriptive period for any action has begun to run. Respondent will only
have to seek recourse from the courts if the Sheriff refuses to execute the deed, and only
then will there be a cause of action for respondent to compel the Sheriff to execute the deed
and the prescriptive period for such an action begin to run.
Moreover, the Court, in Ching v. Family Savings Bank,15 granted the "Motion to Retrieve
Records, for Issuance of Final Deed of Conveyance, to Order the Register of Deeds of Makati
City to Transfer Title and For Writ of Possession" filed by Family Savings Bank, the highest
bidder, even after more than two decades since the levy and auction sale. The Court held
that: The arguments and contentions of the Spouses Ching cannot be upheld.
First, the Spouses Ching's reliance on prescription is unavailing in the case at bar. The
Spouses Ching are implying that the RTC violated Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
viz.:
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action.– A final and executory judgment or
order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the
lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be
enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5)
years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of
limitations.
However, it must be noted that contrary to their allegation, the summary judgment of the
RTC in Civil Case No. 142309 had in fact already been enforced. During the pendency of the
case, the subject property was already levied upon. Subsequently, after summary judgment
and while the case was on appeal, the RTC granted the Bank’s motion for execution pending
appeal. Consequently, on October 10, 1983, an auction sale of the subject property was
conducted, with the Bank emerging as the highest bidder. Later, a Certificate of Sale in its
favor was executed by the Sheriff and, thereafter, inscribed as a memorandum of
encumbrance on TCT No. S-3151.
It is settled that execution is enforced by the fact of levy and sale. The result of such
execution was that title over the subject property was vested immediately in the purchaser
subject only to the Spouses Ching’s right to redeem the property within the period provided
for by law. The right acquired by the purchaser at an execution sale is inchoate and does
not become absolute until after the expiration of the redemption period without the right of
redemption having been exercised. But inchoate though it be, it is, like any other right,
entitled to protection and must be respected until extinguished by redemption. Since, the
Spouses Ching failed to redeem the subject property within the period allowed by law, they
have been divested of their rights over the property.
Verily, the Bank's "Motion to Retrieve Records, for Issuance of Final Deed of Conveyance,
to Order the Register of Deeds of Makati City to Transfer Title and for Writ of Possession"
was merely a consequence of the execution of the summary judgment as the judgment in
Civil Case No. 142309 had already been enforced when the lot was levied upon and sold at
public auction, with the Bank as the highest bidder.16

Given that neither of the two requisites for an action to quiet title could be gleaned from the
allegations in petitioners' Complaint, said Complaint was properly dismissed by R TC-Trece
Martires for failure to state a cause of action.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the Orders dated March 4, 2002 and May 21, 2002
of the RTC, Branch 23, Trece Martires City in Civil Case No. TM-1118 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

15
 4.) G.R. No. 185220 July 27, 2009
LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ARIES C. CAALAM and GERALDINE ESGUERRA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This petition arose from a labor case filed by private respondents Aries C. Caalam and
Geraldine Esguerra against petitioner Laguna Metts Corporation (LMC).1 The labor arbiter
decided in favor of private respondents and found that they were illegally dismissed by LMC.
On appeal, however, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision
of the labor arbiter in a decision dated February 21, 2008. Private respondents’ motion for
reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated April 30, 2008.
Counsel for private respondents received the April 30, 2008 resolution of the NLRC on May
26, 2008. On July 25, 2008, he filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.2 The motion alleged that, for reasons3 stated
therein, the petition could not be filed in the Court of Appeals within the prescribed 60-day
period.4 Thus, a 15-day extension period was prayed for.5
In a resolution dated August 7, 2008,6 the Court of Appeals granted the motion and gave
private respondents a non-extendible period of 15 days within which to file their petition for
certiorari. LMC moved for the reconsideration of the said resolution claiming that extensions
of time to file a petition for certiorari are no longer allowed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC dated December 4, 2007.7 This was
denied in a resolution dated October 22, 2008. According to the appellate court, while the
amendment of the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 65 admittedly calls for stricter
application to discourage the filing of unwarranted motions for extension of time, it did not
strip the Court of Appeals of the discretionary power to grant a motion for extension in
exceptional cases to serve the ends of justice.
Aggrieved, LMC now assails the resolutions dated August 7, 2008 and October 22, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It
contends that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted
private respondents’ motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari as the Court
of Appeals had no power to grant something that had already been expressly deleted from
the rules.
We agree.
Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the
mere expediency of claiming substantial merit.8 As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for
doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely
16
indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial
business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.9
In De Los Santos v. Court of Appeals,10 we ruled:
Section 4 of Rule 65 prescribes a period of 60 days within which to file a petition for
certiorari. The 60-day period is deemed reasonable and sufficient time for a party
to mull over and to prepare a petition asserting grave abuse of discretion by a
lower court. The period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that
would violate the constitutional rights of the parties to a speedy disposition of
their case. (emphasis supplied)
While the proper courts previously had discretion to extend the period for filing a petition
for certiorari beyond the 60-day period,11 the amendments to Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-
7-12-SC disallowed extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari with the deletion of the
paragraph that previously permitted such extensions.
Section 4, Rule 65 previously read:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall
be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a
lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed
in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in
the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or
omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these rules,
the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling
reason and in no case exceeding 15 days.12 (emphasis supplied)
With its amendment under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, it now reads:
SEC. 4. When and where to file petition. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall
be counted from the notice of the denial of the motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation,
a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed
in the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the rule of human relations enjoins everyone, regardless of standing in life, to duly observe
court’s appellate jurisdiction.lavvphil If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi- procedural rules as an aspect of acting with justice, giving everyone his due and observing
judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed honesty and good faith.17 For indeed, while technicalities should not unduly hamper our
with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. quest for justice, orderly procedure is essential to the success of that quest to which all
courts are devoted.18
In election cases involving an act or omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the
petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolutions dated August 7, 2008 and
jurisdiction. October 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104510 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the petition in the said case is ordered DISMISSED for having been filed
As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention out of time.
to change its meaning. It is presumed that the deletion would not have been made if there
had been no intention to effect a change in the meaning of the law or rule. The amended SO ORDERED.
law or rule should accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to its
amendment.13lavvph!l RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under
Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such authority would have been preserved.
The removal of the said paragraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section
4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period
within which to file a petition for certiorari.

The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the
use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the
ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on compelling
grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions for
certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order
denying a motion for reconsideration.

In granting the private respondents’ motion for extension of time to file petition for
certiorari, the Court of Appeals disregarded A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. The action amounted to
a modification, if not outright reversal, by the Court of Appeals of A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. In
so doing, the Court of Appeals arrogated to itself a power it did not possess, a power that
only this Court may exercise.14 For this reason, the challenged resolutions dated August 7,
2008 and October 22, 2008 were invalid as they were rendered by the Court of Appeals in
excess of its jurisdiction.

Even assuming that the Court of Appeals retained the discretion to grant extensions of time
to file a petition for certiorari for compelling reasons, the reasons proffered by private
respondents’ counsel did not qualify as compelling. Heavy workload is relative and often
self-serving.15 Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule.16

As to the other ground cited by private respondents’ counsel, suffice it to say that it was a
bare allegation unsubstantiated by any proof or affidavit of merit. Besides, they could have
filed the petition on time with a motion to be allowed to litigate in forma pauperis. While
social justice requires that the law look tenderly on the disadvantaged sectors of society,
neither the rich nor the poor has a license to disregard rules of procedure. The fundamental
17
 5.) G.R. No. 192908 August 22, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), Petitioner,
vs.
ST. VINCENT DE PAUL COLLEGES, INC., Respondent.
LEONARDO DE-CASTRO,*
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
where petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), represented by the Department of
Public Works and Highways through the Office of the Solicitor General, questions the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108499, to wit:
1. Resolution dated October 30, 20092 dismissing petitioner’s petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 for being filed out of time; and
2. Resolution dated July 15, 20103 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Antecedent Facts
The instant case arose from two cases filed by the Republic seeking expropriation of certain
properties in the name of St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc. (St. Vincent). In Civil Case No.
0062-04, the Republic sought to expropriate 1,992 square meters out of a total area of
6,068 square meters of land for the construction of the Manila-Cavite Toll Expressway
Project (MCTEP). Said property belongs to St. Vincent covered by TCT No. T-821169 and
located in Binakayan, Kawit, Cavite. In Civil Case No. 0100-04, on the other hand, the
Republic sought to expropriate 2,450 square meters out of a total area of 9,039 square
meters, also belonging to St. Vincent and covered by TCT No. T-821170. Said property
adjoins the property subject of Civil Case No. 0062-04.
Subsequently, the Republic filed in both cases an amended complaint alleging that the
subject land originated from a free patent title and should be adjudicated to it without
payment of just compensation pursuant to Section 112 of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
On August 9, 2005, the Republic filed in Civil Case No. 0062-04 a motion for the issuance
of an order of expropriation.4 It was granted by the trial court per Order5 dated August 16,
2005, ruling that the Republic has a lawful right to take the 1,992 square meters portion of
the subject property, with "no pronouncement as to just compensation" since the subject
property originated from a free patent.6 A motion for the issuance of an order of
expropriation was likewise filed by the Republic in Civil Case No. 0100-04 but before this
18
could be resolved, the Republic moved to consolidate the two cases, which was granted by
the trial court.7
On November 16, 2006, the trial court denied St. Vincent’s motion for reconsideration of its
Order dated August 16, 2005 granting expropriation.8 As alleged in the petition, no appeal
was taken by St. Vincent from said orders.9
After almost 2 years, or on July 28, 2008, St. Vincent filed a Manifestation with Motion for
Clarification of the Order dated August 16, 2005,10 contending that although it does not
oppose the ruling regarding the determination of public purpose and the Republic’s right to
expropriate the subject land, it, however, claims that it is entitled to just compensation.
Meanwhile, the Republic attempted to implement the Order dated August 16, 2005 by
entering the subject portion of St. Vincent’s property. Aggrieved, the latter demanded upon
the Republic and its agents to immediately vacate, and remove any and all equipment or
structures they introduced on its property in a demand-letter11 dated October 3, 2008.
Due to St. Vincent’s refusal to honor the order of expropriation, the Republic filed an urgent
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, which was denied by the lower court in its
Order12 dated November 25, 2006 2008. The lower court, however, modified its Order dated
August 16, 2005 and required the Republic to immediately pay St. Vincent in an amount
equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property sought to be
expropriated. The Republic moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the lower court
per Order13 dated January 29, 2009 for lack of factual and legal basis.
Seeking to avail the extra ordinary remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
the Republic filed with the CA a motion for additional time of fifteen (15) days within which
to file its petition. The CA granted the motion in its Resolution14 dated April 30, 2009 and
the Republic was given a non-extensible period of fifteen (15) days or until May 4, 2009
within which to file its petition for certiorari.
On April 30, 2009, the Republic filed its petition for certiorari assailing the lower court’s
orders dated November 25, 2008 and January 29, 2009 for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction.
On June 19, 2009, the CA, motu proprio, issued a Resolution15 ordering the Republic to
show cause why its petition for certiorari should not be dismissed for being filed out of time,
pursuant to A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC.
The Republic filed its Compliance with Explanation16 dated July 1, 2009 pleading for the
relaxation of the rules by reason of the transcendental importance of the issues involved in
the case and in consideration of substantial justice. St. Vincent filed its
Comment/Opposition17 dated July 15, 2009 alleging among others that the said explanation
is merely pro forma due to the Republic’s failure to justify its explanation.
On October 30, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed resolution dismissing the Republic’s
petition for certiorari on the ground that the petition was filed out of time inasmuch as
extensions of time are now disallowed by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC18 and as applied in Laguna
Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals.19
On November 26, 2009, the Republic filed its motion for reconsideration alleging that it
merely relied in good faith on the appellate court’s resolution granting the former an
additional period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the subject petition.
On July 15, 2010, the CA rendered the assailed resolution denying the Republic’s motion for
reconsideration, stating that it cannot disobey the ruling in Laguna Metts Corporation.20
Hence, this petition.
The Republic relies on the CA resolution granting its motion for extension of time and upon
the strength of the substantial merits of its petition. The Republic also invokes Domdom v.
Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan,21 where the Court ruled that absent a
prohibition, motions for extensions are allowed, subject to the Court’s sound discretion.
St. Vincent, however, contends that the present petition fails to neither allege any
circumstance nor state any justification for the deliberate disregard of a very elementary
rule of procedure like Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And in the absence of any
such circumstance or justification, the general rule on pro forma motions/pleadings must
apply.
The Issue
The Republic discussed the substantial merits of its case; however, the CA did no more than
include such matters in its narration of facts, and neither did St. Vincent dwell on said issues.
Hence, the only issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the CA committed a reversible
error when it dismissed the Republic’s petition for certiorari for being filed out of time,
pursuant to A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC.
The Court’s Ruling
We GRANT the petition.
The Court notes that the CA Resolution dated April 30, 2009, which initially granted the
Republic’s motion for extension, was premised on the mistaken notion that the petition filed
by the latter was one for petition for review as a mode of appeal. The CA resolution stated,
among others: "Provided that this Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review is
seasonably filed, as prayed for, x x x."22 Thus, the CA granted extension inasmuch as
motions for this purpose are allowed by the rules.23 On this score alone, the CA should have
admitted the petition filed by the Republic since the latter merely relied on its Resolution
dated April 30, 2009 granting the extension prayed for.
19
Nevertheless, the CA subsequently dismissed the petition filed by the Republic on the ground
that the same was filed out of time, following A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. In its Resolution dated
July 15, 2010, which dismissed the Republic’s motion for reconsideration, the CA also relied
on the ruling in Laguna Metts Corporation that the sixty (60)-day period within which to file
a petition for certiorari is non-extendible. The petitioner, however, insists that Domdom
allows extensions of time to file a petition.
In order to resolve the instant controversy, the Court deems it necessary to discuss the
relationship between its respective rulings in Laguna Metts Corporation and Domdom with
respect to the application of the amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC to Section
4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Before said amendment, Section 4 of Rule 65 originally provides:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration
or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period
shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a
lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed
in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in
the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or
omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the
petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and
in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.
As amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, Section 4 of Rule 65 now reads:
Sec. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall
be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a corporation,
a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed
with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of
the court’s appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-
judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed
with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the
petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.
In interpreting said amendment, the Court, in Laguna Metts Corporation, held that:
As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention
to change its meaning. It is presumed that the deletion would not have been made if there
had been no intention to effect a change in the meaning of the law or rule. The amended
law or rule should accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to its
amendment.
If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under
Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such authority would have been preserved.
The removal of the said paragraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section
4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period
within which to file a petition for certiorari.
The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the
use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the
ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on compelling
grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions for
certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order
denying a motion for reconsideration.24 (Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
Nevertheless, Domdom later stated:
On the People’s argument that a motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari
is no longer allowed, the same rests on shaky grounds. Supposedly, the deletion of the
following provision in Section 4 of Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC evinces an intention to
absolutely prohibit motions for extension:
"No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for the most
compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days."
The full text of Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, reads:
xxxx
That no mention is made in the above-quoted amended Section 4 of Rule 65 of a motion for
extension, unlike in the previous for formulation, does not make the filing of such pleading
absolutely prohibited. If such were the intention, the deleted portion could just have simply
been reworded to state that "no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted."
Absent such prohibition, motions for extensions are allowed, subject to the Court’s sound
discretion. The present petition may thus be allowed, having been filed within the extension
20
sought and, at all events, given its merits.25 (Citation omitted and emphasis and
underscoring ours)
What seems to be a "conflict" is actually more apparent than real. A reading of the foregoing
rulings leads to the simple conclusion that Laguna Metts Corporation involves a strict
application of the general rule that petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty
(60) days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.
Domdom, on the other hand, relaxed the rule and allowed an extension of the sixty (60)-
day period subject to the Court’s sound discretion.26
Labao v. Flores27 subsequently laid down some of the exceptions to the strict application of
the rule, viz:
Under Section 4 of Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, certiorari should be
instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought
to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay that would
violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
xxxx
However, there are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most
persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate
with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting
party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the
existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8)
the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable
circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play;
(12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge
guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the part of
the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her
failure to comply with the rules.28 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Note that Labao explicitly recognized the general rule that the sixty (60)-day period within
which to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is non-extendible, only that there are
certain exceptional circumstances, which may call for its non-observance. Even more
recently, in Mid-Islands Power Generation Corporation v. Court of Appeals,29 the Court,
taking into consideration Laguna Metts Corporation and Domdom, "relaxed the procedural
technicalities introduced under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC in order to serve substantial justice
and safeguard strong public interest" and affirmed the extension granted by the CA to the
respondent Power One Corporation due to the exceptional nature of the case and the strong
public interest involved.
In Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the reason behind the
amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC was to prevent the use or abuse of the remedy of
petition for certiorari in order to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. We thus
deleted the clause that allowed an extension of the period to file a Rule 65 petition for
compelling reasons. Instead, we deemed the 60-day period to file as reasonable and
sufficient time for a party to mull over the case and to prepare a petition that asserts grave
abuse of discretion by a lower court. The period was specifically set and limited in order to
avoid any unreasonable delay in the dispensation of justice, a delay that could violate the
constitutional right of the parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
second, because of the public interest involved, i.e., expropriation of private property for
public use (MCTEP); and finally, no undue prejudice or delay will be caused to either party
in admitting the petition.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
October 30, 2009 and July 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 108499 are
NULLIFIED. The Court of Appeals is hereby ORDERED to REINSTATE and ADMIT the
petition for certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines in CA-G.R. SP No. 108499 and
to proceed with the case with dispatch.

x x x. SO ORDERED.

Nevertheless, in the more recent case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled that the BIENVENIDO L. REYES
deletion of the clause in Section 4, Rule 65 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC did not, ipso facto, make Associate Justice
the filing of a motion for extension to file a Rule 65 petition absolutely prohibited. We held
in Domdom that if absolute proscription were intended, the deleted portion could have just
simply been reworded to specifically prohibit an extension of time to file such petition. Thus,
because of the lack of an express prohibition, we held that motions for extension may be
allowed, subject to this Court’s sound discretion, and only under exceptional and meritorious
cases.

Indeed, we have relaxed the procedural technicalities introduced under A.M. No. 07-7-12-
SC in order to serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. x x x:

xxxx

The present Petition involves one of those exceptional cases in which relaxing the procedural
rules would serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. x x x
Consequently, in order to protect strong public interest, this Court deems it appropriate and
justifiable to relax the amendment of Section 4, Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
concerning the reglementary period for the filing of a Rule 65 petition. Considering that the
imminent power crisis is an exceptional and meritorious circumstance, the parties herein
should be allowed to litigate the issues on the merits. Furthermore, we find no significant
prejudice to the substantive rights of the litigants as respondent was able to file the Petition
before the CA within the 15-day extension it asked for. We therefore find no grave abuse of
discretion attributable to the CA when it granted respondent Power One’s Motion for
Extension to file its Petition for Certiorari.30 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

To reiterate, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and as applied in Laguna Metts
Corporation, the general rule is that a petition for certiorari must be filed within sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. Under
exceptional circumstances, however, and subject to the sound discretion of the Court, said
period may be extended pursuant to Domdom, Labao and Mid-Islands Power cases.

Accordingly, the CA should have admitted the Republic’s petition: first, due to its own lapse
when it granted the extension sought by the Republic per Resolution dated April 30, 2009;
21
 6.) G.R. No. 191215 February 3, 2014
THENAMARIS PHILIPPINES, INC. (Formerly INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES,
INC.)/ OCEANIC NAVIGATION LTD. and NICANOR B. ALTARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AMANDA C. MENDIGORIN (In behalf of her deceased
husband GUILLERMO MENDIGORIN), Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the Resolution1
dated November 20, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 110808 for
allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The CA, through the said Resolution, entertained private respondent's Petition
for Certiorari2 despite having been filed 15 days late and allowed her to correct the technical
infirmities therein. Also assailed is the CA's February 10, 2010 Resolution3 denying
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Dismiss4 and giving private
respondent another chance to cure the remaining deficiencies of the petition.
Factual Antecedents
This case stemmed from a complaint for death benefits, unpaid salaries, sickness allowance,
refund of medical expenses, damages and attorney’s fees filed by Amanda C. Mendigorin
(private respondent) against petitioner Thenamaris Philippines, Inc., formerly Intermare
Maritime Agencies, Inc./Oceanic Navigation Ltd., (Thenamaris), represented by its general
manager, Capt. Nicanor B. Altares (petitioner), filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA). Private
respondent is the widow of seafarer Guillermo M. Mendigorin (Guillermo) who was employed
by Thenamaris for 27 years as an oiler and eventually, as second engineer in the latter’s
vessels. Guillermo was diagnosed with and died of colon cancer during the term of the
employment contract between him and Thenamaris.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter
Ultimately, the LA promulgated his Decision5 dated January 29, 2008 in favor of private
respondent. Thus:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
complainant [herein private respondent] and finding respondents [herein petitioners] liable
to pay jointly and severally: (a) death benefits amounting to US $50,000.00 at its peso
equivalent at the time of actual payment; (b) reimbursement of medical expenses
amounting to ₱102,759.74; [(c)] moral and exemplary damages amounting to ₱100,000.00
and ₱50,000.00 respectively; and (d) attorney’s fees in the [amount of] ten percent (10%)
of the total monetary award.
22
All other claims are DENIED.6
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
On appeal, the NLRC reversed7 the LA’s Decision.
Private respondent moved for reconsideration.8 In a Resolution9 dated June 29, 2009,
however, her motion was denied for lack of merit.
Private respondent, through counsel, received the June 29, 2009 Resolution of the NLRC on
July 8, 2009. Sixty-two days thereafter, or on September 8, 2009, she filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari10 before the CA. Private respondent alleged
that she had until September 7, 2009 (as September 6, 2009, the actual last day for filing,
fell on a Sunday) within which to file a petition for certiorari. However, as her counsel was
then saddled and occupied with equally important cases, it would be impossible for him to
file the petition on time, especially since the case involves voluminous documents necessary
in the preparation thereof. Accordingly, private respondent asked for an extension of 15
days from September 7, 2009, or until September 22, 2009, within which to file the petition.
On September 22, 2009, private respondent filed her Petition for Certiorari11 before the CA.
Action of the Court of Appeals
In a Resolution12 dated November 20, 2009, the CA noted that private respondent’s Petition
for Certiorari was filed 15 days late and suffers from procedural infirmities. Nonetheless, in
the interest of substantial justice, the CA entertained the petition and directed private
respondent to cure the technical flaws in her petition. Thus:
The Court, in the interest of justice, resolved to NOTE the petition for certiorari filed on
September 22, 2009, albeit the same was filed fifteen (15) days late.
A perusal of the instant petition reveals the following procedural infirmities, namely:
(1) The attached Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping does not conform
with the requirements under Section 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules of Notarial
Practice, as a Community Tax Certificate is no longer considered competent
evidence of an affiant’s identity; and
(2) Except for the copy of the Motion for Reconsideration filed with the National
Labor Relations Commission, no other copies of pertinent and relevant
pleadings/documents are attached therewith, such as petitioner’s Complaint,
respondent’s Memorandum of Appeal, petitioner’s Opposition to Respondent’s
Appeal, if any, all of which may aid this Court in judiciously resolving the issues
raised in the petition.
ACCORDINGLY, this Court, in line with the rule that cases should be determined on the
merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and defenses have
been given, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections, resolved to
DIRECT petitioner to submit anew a Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping which
complies with the requirements of the rules, and clear and legible copies of the
aforementioned pleadings/documents, within ten (10) days from receipt of notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Prayer to Dismiss,14 strongly opposing
private respondent’s Motion for Extension to File Petition for Certiorari for being an
absolutely prohibited pleading. Citing Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals,15
petitioners argued that A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC16 effectively rendered the 60-day period for
filing a petition for certiorari non-extendible after it deleted portions of Rule 65 pertaining
to extension of time to file petition. Thus, as the rule now stands, petitions for certiorari
must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a
motion for reconsideration.17
Petitioners also contended that even assuming that an extension is still allowable, private
respondent’s motion for extension is nevertheless a useless piece of paper as it was filed
beyond the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari.
Lastly, petitioners asserted that as private respondent’s motion for extension is a prohibited
pleading, as well as one filed outside of the reglementary period, then private respondent’s
Petition for Certiorari is a mere scrap of paper with no remedial value whatsoever.
Consequently, the Decision of the NLRC has become final and executory and is beyond the
ambit of judicial review.
In the meantime, private respondent submitted her Compliance18 with the CA’s Resolution
of November 20, 2009. Nevertheless, she still failed to attach thereto copies of her
Complaint filed before the LA and Memorandum filed with the NLRC.
In a Resolution19 dated February 10, 2010, the CA denied petitioners’ motion and, instead,
gave private respondent one last opportunity to fully comply with its November 20, 2009
Resolution by submitting clear and legible copies of the still lacking pleadings within five
days from notice thereof.
Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari.
Entry of Judgment20 was already issued by the NLRC on August 13, 2009. Per NLRC Rules,
the June 29, 2009 Resolution became final and executory on July 18, 2009 and was recorded
in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
Issues
23
1. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT NOTED THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT INSTEAD OF
DISMISSING IT OUTRIGHT FOR HAVING BEEN FILED BEYOND THE MANDATORY
AND JURISDICTIONAL 60-DAY PERIOD REQUIRED BY SECTION 4, RULE 65 OF THE
RULES OF COURT, AS AMENDED BY A.M. NO. 07-7-12-SC.
2. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN, IN NOTING THE VERY LATE PETITION FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT,
IT GROSSLY IGNORED THIS HONORABLE COURT’S VERY RECENT RULING IN
LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS, ARIES C. CAALAM AND
GERALDINE ESGUERRA (G.R. NO. 185220, JULY 27, 2009), WHICH DISALLOWED
ANY MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
UNDER RULE 65.21 (Underscoring and emphasis in the original)
Our Ruling
There is merit in the petition.
In Republic v. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc.22 we had the occasion to settle the seeming
conflict on various jurisprudence touching upon the issue of whether the period for filing a
petition for certiorari may be extended. In said case we stated that the general rule, as laid
down in Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals,23 is that a petition for certiorari
must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a
motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the amendment introduced by A.M.
No. 07-7-12-SC24 where no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition
for certiorari exists, unlike in the original Section 4 of Rule 6525 which allowed the filing of
such a motion but only for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days.26 Under
exceptional cases, however, and as held in Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the
Sandiganbayan,27 the 60-day period may be extended subject to the court’s sound
discretion. In Domdom, we stated that the deletion of the provisions in Rule 65 pertaining
to extension of time did not make the filing of such pleading absolutely prohibited. "If such
were the intention, the deleted portion could just have simply been reworded to state that
‘no extension of time to file the petition shall be granted.’ Absent such a prohibition, motions
for extension are allowed, subject to the court’s sound discretion."28
Then in Labao v. Flores,29 we laid down some of the exceptions to the strict application of
the 60-day period rule, thus:
[T]here are recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive
and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his
failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by
immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence
of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules;
(7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances
attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance
of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the
attendant circumstances.1âwphi1 Thus, there should be an effort on the part of the party
invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to
comply with the rules.
In this case, counting 60 days from her counsel’s receipt of the June 29, 2009 NLRC
Resolution on July 8, 2009, private respondent had until September 7, 2009 to file her
petition or a motion for extension, as September 6, 2009, the last day for filing such
pleading, fell on a Sunday. However, the motion was filed only on September 8, 2009.30 It
is a fundamental rule of remedial law that a motion for extension of time must be filed before
the expiration of the period sought to be extended; otherwise, the same is of no effect since
there would no longer be any period to extend, and the assailed judgment or order will have
become final and executory.31
Additionally, as cited earlier in Labao, there should be an effort on the part of the litigant
invoking liberality to satisfactorily explain why he or she was unable to abide by the rules.32
Here, the reason offered for availing of the motion for extension is the heavy workload of
private respondent’s counsel, which is hardly a compelling or meritorious reason as
enunciated in Labao. Time and again, we have held that the excuse of "heavy workload is
relative and often self-serving. Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from
the 60-day rule."33
Thus, private respondent’s motion for extension should have been denied outright.
Notably, the CA’s November 20, 2009 Resolution refrained from ruling on the timeliness of
private respondent’s motion for extension. Instead, it directly ruled on the Petition for
Certiorari as seen by its statement "[t]he Court x x x resolved to NOTE the petition for
certiorari x x x, albeit the same was filed fifteen (15) days late." To our mind, the foregoing
pronouncement is an indirect acknowledgment on the part of the CA that the motion for
extension was indeed filed late. Yet it opted to still entertain and "note" the Petition for
Certiorari, justifying its action as being "in the interest of justice."
We do not approve of the CA’s ruling on the matter because, as the motion for extension
should have been denied outright, it necessarily follows that the Petition for Certiorari is, in
the words of petitioners, a "mere scrap of paper with no remedial value whatsoever."
In Negros Slashers, Inc. v. Teng,34 which likewise dealt with the late filing of a petition for
certiorari, we recognized that although procedural rules ought to be strictly enforced by
courts in order to impart stability in the legal system, we have, nonetheless, relaxed the
rigid application of the rules of procedure in several cases to afford the parties the
opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is because the ends of justice
would be better served if the parties were given the chance to argue their causes and
defenses. We are likewise constantly reminded that the general objective of procedure is to
24
facilitate the application of justice to the opposing claims of the competing parties and
always be guided by the principle that procedure must not hinder but, rather, promote the
administration of justice. Concomitant thereto:
Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character,
mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the
parties’ right to due process. In numerous cases, this Court has allowed liberal construction
of the rules when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and equity. x x
x35
Here, even assuming that the late filing of the petition would merit relaxation of the rules,
the CA’s resolution would have only been acceptable had private respondent shown respect
for the rules by submitting a petition for certiorari which is sufficient in form. In contrast,
what private respondent filed was a petition plagued by several infirmities. Worse, when the
CA allowed petitioner to cure the deficiencies, she failed to fully comply such that she had
to be given, albeit undeservingly, one last chance to submit the still lacking copies of the
pertinent pleadings required of her by the CA.
More importantly, the CA should have dismissed the petition outright in view of the fact that
the June 29, 2009 Resolution of the NLRC denying private respondent’s Motion for
Reconsideration had already become final and executory as of July 18, 2009.36 Thus, it has
no jurisdiction to entertain the petition, except to order its dismissal. In Labao, we held that:
The NLRC’s resolution became final ten (10) days after counsel’s receipt, and the
respondent’s failure to file the petition within the required (60)-day period rendered it
impervious to any attack through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. Thus, no court can exercise
jurisdiction to review the resolution.
Needless to stress, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable
and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered
it or by the highest court of the land. All the issues between the parties are deemed resolved
and laid to rest once a judgment becomes final and executory; execution of the decision
proceeds as a matter of right as vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a
losing party has the right to appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision on the case. After all, a denial of a
petition for being time-barred is tantamount to a decision on the merits. Otherwise, there
will be no end to litigation, and this will set to naught the main role of courts of justice to
assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by
settling justiciable controversies with finality.37
In sum, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it extended underserved and
unwarranted liberality to private respondent. "There is grave abuse of discretion when there
is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to
act in contemplation of law as when the judgment rendered is not based on law and evidence
but on caprice, whim and despotism xx x."38 Such is present here as shown by the CA's
obstinate refusal to dismiss the case despite the late filing of the motion for extension and
the flimsy excuse for the extension sought, the late filing of the petition and the numerous
infirmities attending the same, and private respondent's continued defiance of its directive.
These circumstances serve to highlight private respondent's propensity to disregard the very
rules that the courts, the litigants and the lawyers are duty-bound to follow.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Court of Appeals Resolutions
dated November 20, 2009 and February 10, 2010 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
Petition for Certiorari filed by private respondent Amanda C. Mendigorim in CA-G.R. SP No.
110808 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

25
 7.) G.R. No. 118861 April 27, 1995
EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS, petitioner,
vs.
ROSITA C. CUMBA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
This special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court revives the issue of
whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for,
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction In the split decision of 4 March 1992 in the consolidated cases of Garcia vs. De
Jesus and Uy vs. Commission on Elections,1 this Court ruled in the negative because of the
absence of any specific conferment upon the COMELEC, either by the constitution or by
legislative fiat, of jurisdiction to issue such extraordinary writs. It held that jurisdiction or
the legal power to hear and determine a cause or causes of action, must exist as a matter
of law, whether the jurisdiction is original or appellate, and since these two classes of
jursdiction are exclusive of each other, each must expressly conferred by law. One does not
flow, nor is inferred, from the other. This Court proceeded to state that in the Philippine
setting, the authority to issue the aforesaid writs involves the exercise of original jurisdiction
which has always been expressly conferred either by Constitution or by law. It is never
derived by implication. Although the Constitution grants the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction,
it does not grant it any power to exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus unlike the case of this Court which is specifically conferred with
such authority in Section 5(1) of Article VIII. It also pointed out that the doctrines laid down
in Pimentel vs. COMELEC2 — that neither the Constitution nor any law has conferred
jurisdiction on the COMELEC to issue such writs — still finds application under the 1987
Constitution.
In the decision of 29 July 1992 in Veloria vs. Commission on Elections, 3 this Court reiterated
the Garcia and Uy doctrine.
In the challenged resolution at bench, the respondent COMELEC adhered to the affirmative
view of the issue, citing as authority therefore its own decision of 29 July 1993 in Dictado
vs. Cosico and the last paragraph of Section 50 of B. P. Blg. 697, which reads:
Sec. 50. Definition. —
xxx xxx xxx
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for
certiorari prohibition, and mandamus involving election cases.
The petitioner herein pleads that this resolution be set aside and nullified for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He
contends that while the COMELEC's position is inherently compelling, it deserves scant
26
consideration in view of Garcia and Uy and Veloria and the nature and purpose of B. P. Blg.
697 which was to govern solely the Batasang Pambansa election of 14 May 1984; hence, it
was a temporary statute which self-destructed after such election.
The antecedent facts that led to the filing of this action are uncomplicated and undisputed.
In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner and private respondent Rosita
Cumba were candidates for the position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan
del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of only twenty-
two votes over the former.
Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Agusan del Norte, which was assigned to Branch 2 thereof in Butuan City.
On 29 June 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the petitioner to have
won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent and rendered judgement in favor
of the petitioner as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing results, the court hereby declares the protestant as
having won the mayoralty election and as duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of
Magallanes, Agusan del Norte in the local election held on May 11, 1992, the protestant
having obtained six (6) votes more than that of the protestee's votes.
Copies of the decision were sent to and received by the petitioner and the private respondent
on 1 July 1994.
On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC by filing her
notice of appeal and paying the appellate docket fees.
On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal.
On 12 July 1994, the petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending
appeal, which the private respondent opposed on 22 July 1994.
On 3 August 1994, the trial court granted the petitioner's motion for execution pending
appeal. The corresponding writ of execution was forthwith issued. Thereafter, the private
respondent filed a motion for a reconsideration of the order of execution and the sheriff held
in abeyance the implementation of the writ. This motion was denied on 5 August 1994.
The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to
annul the aforesaid other of the trial court granting the motion for execution pending appeal
and the writ of execution. The petition was docketed as SPR No. 1-94.
On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the petition.4 The
dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVES that is [sic] has exclusive
authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election
cases as authorized by law, and therefore, assumes jurisdiction of the instant petition for
certiorari which is hereby GRANTED. The Order of the court a quo of August 3, 1994 is
hereby declared NULL and VOID and the Writ of Execution issued on August 4, 1994 LIFTED.
Accordingly, petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to her position .as Municipality
Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, pending resolution of the appeal before this
Commission in the case of Relampagos vs. Cumba in EAC No. 108-94.
In upholding its jurisdiction in certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus cases, the respondent
COMELEC maintains that there is a special law granting it such jurisdiction, viz., Section 50
of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full force as it was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881),and that it is not exactly correct that this law self-destructed
after the May 1984 election. It further reasoned out that in the performance of its judicial
functions, the COMELEC, is the most logical body to issue the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases where it has appellate jurisdiction. It
ratiocinated as follows:
It is therefore clear that if there is a law which specifically confers jurisdiction to issue the
prerogative Writs, then the Commission has jurisdiction.
Such a law exists. Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697 is that law.
B.P. Blg. 697, approved on March 14, 1984, is entitled "AN ACT TO GOVERN THE ELECTION
OF MEMBERS OF THE BATASANG PAMBANSA ON MAY 14, 1984 AND THE SELECTION OF
SECTORAL REPRESENTATIVES THEREAFTER, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES. Section 50 provides:
Sec. 50. Definition.— Pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or
affecting the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers which may be raised by any candidate,
political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission.
The Commission Elections shall be the sole judge and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
all pre-proclamation controversies.
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.(Emphasis supplied).
We have debated among ourselves whether Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697, has been repealed.
We have come to the conclusion that it has not been repealed. The repealing provision in
the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985), provides:
27
Sec. 282. Repealing Clause. — Presidential Decree No. 1296 otherwise known as the The
1978 Election Code, as amended, is hereby repealed. All other election Laws, decrees,
executive orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of
this Code is hereby repealed, except Presidential Decree No. 1618 and Batas Pambansa Blg.
20 governing the election of the members of the Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and
XII. (Emphasis supplied).
B.P. Blg. 697 has not been expressly repealed, and Section 50 thereof is not inconsistent
with the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Besides, in the cited Garcia/Uy cases, as
reiterated in the Veloria case, the Supreme Court itself said, reiterating previous cases, that
implied repeal of statutes is frowned upon, thus:
Just as implied repeal of statutes frowned upon, so also should the grant of original
jurisdiction by mere implication to a quasi-judicial body be tabooed. (Garcia/Uy/Veloria
Cases: Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
It is equally clear that Executive Order No. 90 . . . did not modify or repeal, whether
expressly or impliedly, Section 23 of P.D. No. 1752. It is common place Learning that implied
repeal are not favored in Law and are not casually to be assumed. The first effort of a court
must always be to reconcile or adjust the provisions of one statute with those of another so
as to give sensible effect to both provisions (Jalandoni vs. Andaya, 55 SCRA 261 (1974);
Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190, 196-197 (1971); National Power Corporation vs. ARCA,
25 SCRA 931 (1968); U.S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil. 208 (1916); and Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377·(1965). Only when there is clear
inconsistency and conflict between the provisions of two (2) statutes, may a court hold that
the provisions later in point of time have impliedly repealed the earlier ones" that (Philippine
American Management Co., Inc., vs. Philippine American Management Employees
Association, 49 SCRA 194 (1973); and Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190 (1971) (Larga vs.
Ranada, Jr., No. L-7976, August 3, 1984, 164 SCRA 25).
It was even suggested that Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 self-destructed after the Batasang
Pambansa elections of 1984; because of the provisions of Section 1 (Title and Applicability)
which provides: "This act shall be known and cited as "The Law on the 1984 Batasang
Pambansa Election." It shall govern the election for the regular Batasang Pambansa which
shall be held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of sectoral representatives thereafter as
provided by the Constitution.
While that may be true with most of its provisions which were applicable only for the
particular election (like election and campaign periods, voting constituency, etc.) most if not
all of the remaining provisions could be applicable to future elections. It is not lost to the
Commission that B.P. Blg. 697 was passed also "for other purposes."
But the important consideration is that the authority granted to the Commission under B.P.
Blg. 697 is not inconsistent with our election laws. It should be mentioned that the provisions
of Republic Act No. 6638 which governed the local elections of January 18, 1988, as to the
number of councilors in specified cities (Sec. 3) and the number of Sangguniang members
in different provinces and cities (Sec. 4) are still applicable up to this day. In fact, it became
one of the important controlling provision which governed the May 11, 1992 elections. If
provisions of Republic Act No. 6636 which are not inconsistent with the present election laws
did not self-destruct, why should Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697?
Another provision which did not self-destruct is that which provides that "any city or
municipal judge, who includes or excludes any voter without any legal basis in inclusion and
exclusion proceedings, shall be guilty of an election offense," although this provision is found
in Section 10 of Executive Order No. 134 supposedly with limited application as the enabling
act for the elections for Members of Congress on May 11, 1987 and for other purposes.
Clearly the intent of the law, was to give certiorari, jurisdiction to the Commission on
Elections because the Pimentel case said there was none, to fill a void in the law, and avoid
an incongruous situation.
A statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken separately but in its relation to the
statute's totality. Each statute must, in fact, be construed as to "harmonized it with the pre-
existing body of laws." Unless clearly repugnant, provisions of statutes must be reconciled.
. . . (Commissioner of Customs vs. ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. L-28329, August 7, 1975,
66 SCRA 113).
xxx xxx xxx
The statutory construction rule is: "When the Legislature enacts provision, it is understood
that it is aware of previous statutes relating to the same subject matter and that in the
absence of any express repeal or amendment therein, the new provision should be deemed
enacted pursuant to the legislative policy embodied in the prior statutes." (Legaspi vs.
Executive Secretary, L-36153, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 253).
The Commission is the most logical body whenever it performs judicial functions to take
jurisdiction of petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus because it has appellate
jurisdiction in election cases granted by the Constitution itself. The Court of Appeals has no
more appellate jurisdiction over such cases And in the case of the Supreme Court, Justice
de Castro in the Pimentel case pointed out, in his dissenting opinion that under the
Constitution the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in election cases should properly
be limited to decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission on Elections, not from lower
courts.
It was of course different under the Election Code of 1971 (R.A. No. 6388, September 2,
1971) because the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals then had appellate jurisdiction
in election case decided by the lower courts.
28
In the Veloria case, it now appears that only the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
have certiorari jurisdiction over election cases from the lower courts because after
reiterating the ruling in the Garcia and Uy cases, the Supreme Court said:
In view of this pronouncement, an original civil action of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus
against a regional trial court in an election contest may be filed only in the Court of Appeals
or in this Court being the only courts given such original jurisdiction under the Constitution
and the Law. (Emphasis supplied).
While these two appellate Courts do have the jurisdiction under the Constitution and the
law, it is most logical for the Commission whenever it performs judicial functions to have
the authority to issue these prerogative writs. . . .
...
In traversing the first issue, we are citing our decision laid down in the case of Antonio
Dictado vs. Hon. Rodrigo N. Cosico and Emilio Tiongco promulgated on July 29, 1993. In
this case, the Commission en banc had occasion to rule on the question of whether or not
the Commission has the authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari in election cases.
The Commission En Banc, speaking through Hon. Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong,
ruled that there is [a] law which grants the Commission, the exclusive authority to issue
special writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases, and there are also
Supreme Court decisions, recent in fact, which declare that the Commission has no such
authority precisely because; according to the decisions, there is no law granting such
authority, and without any hint whatsoever of the existence of Sec. 50 of Batas vs.
Pambansa Blg. 697.
As gleaned from the case of Dictado, respondents were arguing that Sec. 50 of BP Blg. 697
was repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881, December 3, 1985). Furthermore,
in their answer, respondents cited Supreme Court decisions where it was declared that,
indeed, the Commission has no jurisdiction to issue special writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
It is still the position of this Commission that Sec. 50, BP Blg. 697 has not been repealed.
As defined in the Constitution, "Judicial power" includes the duty of the Courts of Justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess, of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government
(Sec. 1, par. 2, Art. VII).
Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 2 (2), Art. IX-
C, acts as a court of justice performing judicial power and said power includes the
determination of whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that the Comelec, by constitutional mandate,
is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 5
It set aside, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, the trial court's order of
execution pending appeal and the writ of execution because
[a]t the time the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was filed on July 12, 1994 the court
a quo had already lost jurisdiction over the case for as early as July 8, 1994, it had already
acknowledged through its order issued on that date, the perfection of the appeal of petitioner
as in fact it ordered the elevation of the records of the case to this Honorable Commission.
6 by the COMELEC in its resolution now in question paves the way for a re-examination of this
Aggrieved by the resolution, the petitioner filed the instant special civil action.
In the resolution of 21 February 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on
the petition and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent COMELEC to
cease and desist from enforcing is challenged resolution.
As naturally expected, the private respondent, in her Comment, opposed the petition by
invoking the very arguments adduced by the respondent COMELEC in its challenged the
resolution and the dissenting opinion in the Garcia and Uy cases.
In its comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the respondent COMELEC
postulates that it issued the said resolution after it had taken cognizance of the appeal
interposed by the private respondent from the RTC decision, unlike in the Garcia and Uy
cases, and therefore, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, thus:
it cannot be gainsaid that [it] possesses inherent powers to employ means necessary to
carry into effect the powers conferred upon it by law (Sec. 6, Rule 135 of the Revised Rules
of Court) and verily, there was no need for any statutory grant for that purpose. Indeed, in
annulling the Order of Execution of the Regional Trial Court, public respondent did not
exceed its jurisdiction since its action in this regard was necessary to preserve the subject
of the appeal and to maintain the status quo of the parties pending the final outcome of its
review of the correctness of the appealed decision. 7
It tried to show that in Pimentel and Garcia, the trial courts still had jurisdiction over the
cases unlike in the instant case where the trial court had already given due course to the
appeal and elevated the records of the case to the COMELEC which had taken cognizance of
the appeal.
This Court resolved to give due course to this petition and to decide it on its merits.
The contention of the respondent COMELEC as advanced by the Office of the Solicitor
General is unacceptable. It goes against its theory in the assailed resolution and is not
supported by the facts. The challenged resolution involves a case which the COMELEC
29
docketed as a special relief case (SPR. No. 1-94). Under Rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure,
the special relief cases are petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and contempt
proceedings. The ordinary appeal from the RTC decision was, as disclosed in the challenged
resolution; docketed as EAC No. 108-94.8 Clearly then, the COMELEC had recognized and
taken cognizance of two cases: one, the ordinary appeal from the RTC decision (EAC No.
108-94), and two, the special civil action for certiorari docketed as SPR No. 1-94. The two
cases were not consolidated. The dissimilarities between them need no further elaboration.
Since it issued the challenged resolution under the latter case, it cannot now be heard to
state that it issued it as an incident in the former, the ordinary appeal. This erroneous
contention of the Office of the of the Solicitor General notwithstanding, the position taken
Court's pronouncement in the Garcia and Uy cases.
As earlier stated, in Garcia and Uy, 9 and later, in Veloria, 10 this Court ruled that the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus because there is no specific constitutional or statutory conferment to it of such
jurisdiction.
The respondent COMELEC, however, points out that Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 expressly
granted it such jurisdiction. Indeed, it did. Nevertheless, considering that the said law was,
per Section 1 thereof, "to govern the election for the regular Batasang Pambansa which shall
be held on May 14, 1984, and the selection of sectoral representatives thereafter as provided
by the Constitution," and in view of the passage of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg.
881) by the regular Batasang Pambansa, 11 this Court is then confronted with the twin
issues of whether said B.P. Blg. 697 became functus officio after the 14 May 1984 election
of members of the regular Batasang Pambansa or the selection thereafter of the sectoral
representatives at the latest, and whether it was repealed by the Omnibus Election Code.
The Court agrees with the respondent COMELEC that there are provisions in B.P. Blg. 697
whose lifetime go beyond the 14 May 1984 election or the subsequent selection of sectoral
representatives. In fact, by the very wording of the last paragraph of its Section 50, to: wit:
Sec. 50. Definition. —
xxx xxx xxx
The Commission is hereby vested with the exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases. (Emphasis supplied).
it is quite clear that the exercise of the power was not restricted within a specific period of
time. Taken in the context of the conspicuous absence of such jurisdiction as ruled in
Pimentel vs. Commission on Elections, 12 it seems quite obvious that the grant was intended
as a remedial legislation to eliminate the seeming incongruity or irrationality resulting in a
splitting of jurisdiction pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Justice De Castro in the said
case.
But did not the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) repeal B.P. Blg. 697? The repealing
clause of the latter reads as follows:
Sec. 282. Repealing clause. — Presidential decree No. 1296, otherwise known as The 1978
Election Code, as amended, is hereby repealed. All other election laws, decrees, executive
orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Code
are hereby repealed, except Presidential Decree No. 1618 .and Batas Pambansa Blg. 20
governing the election of the members of the Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and XII.
The second sentence is in the nature of a general repealing clause. It has been said:
An express general repealing clause to the effect that. all inconsistent enactments are
repealed; is in legal contemplation a nullity. Repeals must either be expressed or result by
implication. Although it has in some instances been held to be an express recognition that
there are acts in conflict with the act in which it is included and as indicative of the legislative
intent to repeal such acts, a general repealing clause cannot be deemed an express repeal
because it fails to identify or designate any act to be repealed. It cannot be determinative
of an implied repeal for if does not declare any inconsistency but conversely, merely
predicates a repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict is found under application
of the rules of implied repeals. If its inclusion is more than mere mechahical verbiage, it is
more often a detriment than an aid to the establishment of a repeal, for such clause is
construed as an express limitation of the repeal to inconsistent acts.13
This Court is not unaware of the equally settled rule in statutory construction that in the
revision or codification of laws, all parts and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in
the revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or code provides
otherwise expressly or impliedly. 14
By the tenor of its aforequoted Repealing Clause, it does not evidently appear that the
Batasang Pambansa had intended to codify all prior election statutes and to replace them
with the new Code. It made, in fact, by the second sentence, a reservation that all prior
election statutes or parts thereof not inconsistent with any provisions of the Code shall
remain in force. That sentence
predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found
on existing and prior acts of the same subject matter. Such being the case, the presumption
against implied repeals and the rule on strict construction regarding implied repeals apply
ex proprio vigore. For the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws so that, if repeal
of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper step is to express it. The failure
to add a specific repealing clause particularly mentioning the statute to be repealed indicates
that the intent was not to repeal any existing law on the matter, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and the old laws.15
This being the case, the Court painstakingly examined the aforesaid last paragraph of
Section 50 of the Omnibus Election Code to determine if the former is inconsistent with any
of the provisions of the latter, It found none.
30
In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court must, as it now does, abandon the ruling
in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases, We now hold that the last paragraph of Section 50
of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:
The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.
remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2), Section
1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the
COMELEC has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC having been settled, we now proceed to review the
substance of the challenged resolution.
That the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in granting the
petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of execution is all
too obvious. Since both the petitioner and the private respondent received copies of the
decision on 1 July 1994, an appeal therefrom may be filed within five days 16 from 1 July
1994, or on or before 6 July 1994. Any motion for execution pending appeal must be filed
before the period for the perfection of the appeal. Pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim
Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, which is deemed to have supplementary effect to the
COMELEC Rules of Procedures pursuant to Rule 43 of the latter, an appeal would be deemed
perfected on the last day for any of the parties to appeal,17 or on 6 July 1994. On 4 July
1994, the private respondent filed her notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee. On 8 July
1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal and ordered the elevation of the records
of the case to the COMELEC. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court was divested
of its jurisdiction over the case. 18 Since the motion for execution pending appeal was filed
only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no longer
validly act thereon. It could have been otherwise if the motion was filed before the perfection
of the appeal. 19 Accordingly, since the respondent COMELEC has the jurisdiction to issue
the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, then it correctly set aside
the challenged order granting the motion for execution pending appeal and writ of execution
issued by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged resolution of 9 February
1995 of the Commission on Elections in SPR No. 1-94 entitled "Rosita Cumba vs. Manuel M.
Relampagos, et al. " is AFFIRMED.
The temporary restraining order issued on 21 February 1995 is hereby LIFTED.
No pronouncemnt as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 8.) G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014
THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., and MS.
LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in her capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City; SM MART, INC.; SM PRIME
HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR APPLIANCES CENTER; SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE HARDWARE
PHILIPPINES, INC.; WATSON PERSONAL CARE STORES, PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART
PHILS., CORP.; SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION and SIGNATURE LINES,
Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions1 dated April 6, 2006 and November 29,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87948.
The antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty
Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable period from January to December 2002 against
private respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center,
Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc.,
Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. In addition to the
taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the
Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes
petitioners were authorized to collect under Section 21 of the same Code. Because payment
of the taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance of their business permits, private
respondents were constrained to pay the ₱19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City]
the complaint denominated as one for "Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-
Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction"
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0019-CFM before public respondent's sala [at
Branch 112]. In the amended complaint they filed on February 16, 2004, private
respondents alleged that, in relation to Section 21 thereof, Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19
and 20 of the RRCM were violative of the limitations and guidelines under Section 143 (h)
of Republic Act. No. 7160 [Local Government Code] on double taxation. They further averred
that petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011 which amended pertinent portions of the RRCM
had already been declared to be illegal and unconstitutional by the Department of Justice.2
31
In its Order3 dated July 9, 2004, the RTC granted private respondents' application for a writ
of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 but the RTC denied it in its Order5 dated
October 15, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA assailing the July 9, 2004
and October 15, 2004 Orders of the RTC.6
In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioners' petition for
certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since
appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund, which was filed
with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded
jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari
seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be
filed with the CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated
November 29, 2006.
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:
I- Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction.
II- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in enjoining by issuing a Writ of Injunction
the petitioners, their agents and/or authorized representatives from implementing
Section 21 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila, as amended, against private
respondents.
III- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction
despite failure of private respondents to make a written claim for tax credit or refund
with the City Treasurer of Manila.
IV- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that under Section 21 of the
Manila Revenue Code, as amended, they are mere collecting agents of the City
Government.
V- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction because
petitioner City of Manila and its constituents would result to greater damage and
prejudice thereof. (sic)8
Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that the instant petition should be SO ORDERED.10
denied for being moot and academic.
The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records, the above Decision had
Upon perusal of the original records of the instant case, this Court discovered that a already become final and executory per the Certificate of Finality11 issued by the same trial
Decision9 in the main case had already been rendered by the RTC on August 13, 2007, the court on October 20, 2008. In fact, a Writ of Execution12 was issued by the RTC on
dispositive portion of which reads as follows: November 25, 2009. In view of the foregoing, it clearly appears that the issues raised in the
present petition, which merely involve the incident on the preliminary injunction issued by
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby renders JUDGMENT in favor of the the RTC, have already become moot and academic considering that the trial court, in its
plaintiff and against the defendant to grant a tax refund or credit for taxes paid pursuant to decision on the merits in the main case, has already ruled in favor of respondents and that
Section 21 of the Revenue Code of the City of Manila as amended for the year 2002 in the the same decision is now final and executory. Well entrenched is the rule that where the
following amounts: issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby
rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value.13
To plaintiff SM Mart, Inc. - P 11,462,525.02
In any case, the Court finds it necessary to resolve the issue on jurisdiction raised by
petitioners owing to its significance and for future guidance of both bench and bar. It is a
To plaintiff SM Prime Holdings, Inc. - 3,118,104.63 settled principle that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is
capable of repetition, yet evading review.14

To plaintiff Star Appliances Center - 2,152,316.54 However, before proceeding, to resolve the question on jurisdiction, the Court deems it
proper to likewise address a procedural error which petitioners committed.

To plaintiff Supervalue, Inc.
To plaintiff Ace Hardware Phils., Inc.
To plaintiff Watsons Personal Care Health - 231,453.62
Stores Phils., Inc.
To plaintiff Jollimart Phils., Corp.
To plaintiff Surplus Marketing Corp.
To plaintiff Signature Mktg. Corp.
TOTAL:
Defendants are further enjoined from collecting taxes under Section 21, Revenue Code of
Manila from herein plaintiff.
- 1,362,750.34 Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in assailing the Resolutions of the CA which
dismissed their petition filed with the said court and their motion for reconsideration of such
- 419,689.04
dismissal. There is no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a
final order as they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases where an
assailed judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal.
Hence, in the instant case, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, which is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.15
Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or independent action based on grave abuse of
- 140,908.54 discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.16 As such,
it cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.17
- 220,204.70
Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the
- 94,906.34 interest of substantial justice, this Court has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a
petition for review on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within
the reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when
- P 19,316,458.77 errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the
relaxation of the rules.18 Considering that the present petition was filed within the 15-day
reglementary period for filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that an error
of judgment is averred, and because of the significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court
deems it proper and justified to relax the rules and, thus, treat the instant petition for
certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari.
32
Having disposed of the procedural aspect, we now turn to the central issue in this case. The
basic question posed before this Court is whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a
special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local
tax case.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
On June 16, 1954, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1125 (RA 1125) creating the CTA and
giving to the said court jurisdiction over the following:
(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed
assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties
imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal
Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue;
(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs
duties, fees or other money charges; seizure, detention or release of property
affected fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed in relation thereto; or other
matters arising under the Customs Law or other law or part of law administered by
the Bureau of Customs; and
(3) Decisions of provincial or City Boards of Assessment Appeals in cases involving
the assessment and taxation of real property or other matters arising under the
Assessment Law, including rules and regulations relative thereto.
On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282)
amending RA 1125 by expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and
elevating its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction. Pertinent portions
of the amendatory act provides thus:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:
a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:
1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving
disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue;
2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving
disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau
33
of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a
specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a denial;
3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax
cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original
or appellate jurisdiction;
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for
customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release
of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto,
or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered
by the Bureau of Customs;
5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation
of real property originally decided by the provincial or city board of
assessment appeals;
6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him
automatically for review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs
which are adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and
Customs Code;
7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of
nonagricultural product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of
Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article,
involving dumping and countervailing duties under Section 301 and 302,
respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard measures under
Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to
impose or not to impose said duties.
b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from
violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code
and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the
Bureau of Customs: Provided, however, That offenses or felonies mentioned
in this paragraph where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of
charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos
(₱1,000,000.00) or where there is no specified amount claimed shall be tried
by the regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall be appellate. Any
provision of law or the Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the
criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil
liability for taxes and penalties shall at all times be simultaneously instituted
with, and jointly determined in the same proceeding by the CTA, the filing
of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of
 the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action
separately from the criminal action will be recognized.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal offenses:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in
tax cases originally decided by them, in their respected territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial
Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their
respective jurisdiction.
c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and
executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties: Provides,
however, that collection cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees,
exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos
(₱1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the proper Municipal Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection cases:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in
tax collection cases originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial
Courts in the Exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally
decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, in their respective jurisdiction.19
A perusal of the above provisions would show that, while it is clearly stated that the CTA
has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local
tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA
9282, which provides that th e CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing
interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed before it.
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise
of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and
cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.20 Thus, in the cases of
Pimentel v. COMELEC,21 Garcia v. De Jesus,22 Veloria v. COMELEC,23 Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Lubrica,24 and Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,25 this
Court has ruled against the jurisdiction of courts or tribunals over petitions for certiorari on
34
the ground that there is no law which expressly gives these tribunals such power.26 It must
be observed, however, that with the exception of Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,27 these rulings
pertain not to regular courts but to tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers. With respect
to the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 824928 now provides that the special criminal court
has exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes
in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the
Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129) gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari,whether or not in aid of
its appellate jurisdiction. As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari,
in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect
to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the
power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an
interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court.
It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari in these cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it
must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive
jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law
intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of
such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be
considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held as early as the case of J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al.29 that "if a case may be appealed to a particular court
or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to
issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."30 This principle
was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,31 where the Court stated that "a court may
issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to
review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court."32 The
rulings in J.M. Tuason and De Jesus were reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr.
v. Geronimo33 and Bulilis v. Nuez.34
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when by law,
jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.
If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari
petition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies,
the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter – precisely the
split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice.35 The
Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering that the law
expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and
tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other
court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that
since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund is vested in
the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order
issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule otherwise
would lead to an absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case while
another court rules on an incident in the very same case.
Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced judicial
abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the law is to divide the
authority over a local tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction
to issue a writ of certiorari against interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the
jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same case. It is more
in consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate
jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries with it the
power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The
supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review,
by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision
over the acts of the latter.36
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to
exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to
give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect
that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters
necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction.1âwphi1 For this purpose,
it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might
interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it.37
Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with a particular
jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within
such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction
35
and the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress
any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same level as the
CA and shall possess all the inherent powers of a court of justice.
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a
general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These
inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of
jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as
to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to
the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's
jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.38
Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers
necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive
legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and,
subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has
power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within
the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates."39
Hence, demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main
action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court
and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter,
even though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as
original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.40
Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the authority of
the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued
by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the powers granted by the Constitution as well
as inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not abandoning the rule that, insofar as
quasi-judicial tribunals are concerned, the authority to issue writs of certiorari must still be
expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere
existence of their appellate jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to quasi-
judicial bodies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
 9.) G.R. No. 193253
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE AGNES VST DEVANADERA, ACTING SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE; HONORABLE JOVENCITO R. ZUNO, PEDRITO L. RANCES, ARMAN A. DE
ANDRES, PAUL CHI TING CO, KENNETH PUNDANERA, MANUEL T. CO, SALLY L. CO,,
STANLEY L. TAN, ROCHELLE E. VICENCIO, LIZA R. MAGAWAY, JANICE L. CO,
VIVENCIO ABANO, GREG YU, EDWIN AGUSTIN, VICTOR D. PIAMONTE, UNIOIL
PETROLEUM PHILIPPINES, INC., and OILINK, INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions dated March 26,
20101 and August 4, 2010,2 and to reinstate the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
113069, or in the alternative, to issue a decision finding probable cause to prosecute the
private respondents for violation of Sections 3601 and 3602, in relation to Sections 2503
and 2530, paragraphs f and l (3), (4) and (5) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines (TCCP), as amended.
The antecedents are as follows:
Private respondent UNIOIL Petroleum Philippines, Inc. is engaged in marketing, distribution,
and sale of petroleum, oil and other products, while its co-respondent OILINK International,
Inc. is engaged in manufacturing, importing, exporting, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing
in at wholesale and retails of petroleum, oil, gas and of any and all refinements and
byproducts thereof. Except for respondent Victor D. Piamonte who is a Licensed Customs
Broker, the following private respondents are either officers or directors of UNIOIL or
OILINK:
1. Paul Chi Ting Co – Chairman of UNIOIL and OILINK
2. Kenneth Pundanera – President/Director of UNIOIL
3. Manuel T. Co – Officer/Director of UNIOIL
4. Sally L. Co – Officer/Director of UNIOIL
5. Stanley L. Tan – Officer/Director of UNIOIL
6. Rochelle E. Vicencio – Corporate Administrative Supervisor of UNIOIL
36
7. Liza R. Magaway – President of OILINK
8. Janice L. Co – Director of OILINK
9. Vivencio Abaño – Director of OILINK
10. Greg Yu – Director of OILINK
11. Edwin Agustin – Corporate Secretary of OILINK
On January 30, 2007, Commissioner Napoleon L. Morales of petitioner Bureau of Customs
(BOC) issued Audit Notification Letter (ANL) No. 0701246,3 informing the President of
OILINK that the Post Entry Audit Group (PEAG) of the BOC will be conducting a compliance
audit, including the examination, inspection, verification and/or investigation of all pertinent
records of OILINK's import transactions for the past three (3)-year period counted from the
said date.
On March 2, 2007, a pre-audit conference was held between the BOC Audit Team4 and the
representatives of OILINK.5 During the conference, the Audit Team explained to OILINK
representatives the purpose of the postentry audit and the manner by which it would be
conducted, and advised it as to the import documents required for such audit.
On March 14, 2007, OILINK submitted to the Audit Team the following documents: Post-
Entry Audit Group General Customs Questionnaire, General Information Sheet for the year
2006, SEC Registration, Articles of Incorporation, Company By-laws, and Audited Financial
Report for the year 2005.
On April 20, 2007, the Audit Team requested OILINK to submit the other documents stated
in the List of Initial Requirements for Submission, namely: 2004 Audited Financial Report,
2004-2006 Quarterly VAT Returns with the accompanying schedule of importations,
Organizational chart/structure, and List of foreign suppliers with details on the products
imported and the total amount, on a yearly basis.
On May 7, 2007, OILINK expressed its willingness to comply with the request for the
production of the said documents, but claimed that it was hampered by the resignation of
its employees from the Accounting and Supply Department. OILINK also averred that it
would refer the matter to the Commissioner of Customs in view of the independent
investigation being conducted by the latter.
On June 4, 2007, OILINK sent a letter stating that the documents which the Audit Team
previously requested were available with the Special Committee of the BOC, and that it
could not open in the meantime its Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) – registered books of
accounts for validation and review purposes.
In a letter dated July 11, 2007, the Audit Team informed OILINK of the adverse effects of
its request for the postponement of the exit conference and its continuous refusal to furnish
it the required documents. It advised OILINK that such acts constitute as waiver on its part
to be informed of the audit findings and an administrative case would be filed against it,
without prejudice to the filing of a criminal action.
On July 24, 2007, Commissioner Morales approved the filing of an administrative case
against OILINK for failure to comply with the requirements of Customs Administrative Order
(CAO) No. 4-2004.6 Such case was filed on July 30, 2007.
On September 20, 2007, an Order was issued by the Legal Service of the BOC, submitting
the case for resolution in view of OILINK's failure to file its Answer within the prescribed
period.
On December 14, 2007, the Legal Service of the BOC rendered a Decision finding that
OILINK violated Section IV.A.2(c) and (e) of CAO 4- 20047 when it refused to furnish the
Audit Team copies of the required documents, despite repeated demands. The dispositive
portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office finds herein respondent liable for violating
Sections IV.A.2 (c) and (e) of Customs Administrative Order No. 4-2004, and a DECISION
is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering OILINK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION to pay the equivalent of twenty
percent (20%) ad valorem on the article/s subject of the Importation for which no
records were kept and maintained as prescribed in Section 2504 of the Customs
Code in the amount of Pesos: Two Billion Seven Hundred Sixty-Four Million
Eight Hundred Fifty-Nine Thousand Three Hundred Four and 80/100 (Php
2,764,859,304.80);
2. Ordering the Bureau of Customs to hold the delivery or release of subsequent
imported articles to answer for the fine, any revised assessment, and/or as a penalty
for failure to keep records.
This is without prejudice to the filing of a criminal case or any appropriate legal action against
the importer in order to protect the interest of the government and deter other importers
from committing the same offense.
SO ORDERED.8
Pursuant to the Decision dated December 14, 2007, Commissioner Morales, in a letter9 of
even date, directed the President of OILINK to pay the BOC the administrative fine of
_2,764,859,304.80 for violation of CAO No. 4-2004, in relation to Section 2504 of the TCCP.
Copy of the said Decision and letter were served to OILINK through personal service on
December 28, 2007.10
37
On March 13, 2008, Atty. Noemi B. Alcala, Officer-in-Charge, Collection Service, Revenue
and Monitoring Group, sent a final demand letter for OILINK to settle the administrative
fine, otherwise, the BOC will be compelled to file the necessary legal action and put in force
Section 150811 of the TCCP against its succeeding shipments to protect the government's
interest.12
On April 23, 2008, a Hold Order13 was issued by Horacio P. Suansing, Jr., District Collector,
Port of Manila, against all shipments of OILINK for failure to settle its outstanding account
with the BOC and to protect the interest of the government pursuant to Section 1508 of the
TCCP.
On May 2, 2008, Rochelle E. Vicencio, Corporate Administrative Supervisor of UNIOIL, citing
the existing Terminalling Agreement dated January 2, 2008 with OILINK for the Storage of
UNIOIL's aromatic process oil and industrial lubricating oils (collectively, "base oils"),
requested District Collector Suansing Jr. to allow it to withdraw base oils from OILINK's
temporarily closed Terminal.
On May 6, 2008, Commissioner Morales granted the request of UNIOIL to withdraw its base
oils stored at OILINK's terminal/depot based on the Terminalling Agreement between the
two companies, subject to the following conditions:
1. Only Unioil products shall be withdrawn subject to proper inventory by the BIR
and BOC.
2. Appropriate duties and taxes due on the products to be withdrawn are fully paid
or settled.
3. The company should allow the operation/withdrawal to be closely monitored and
continuously underguarded by assigned Customs personnel.14
On May 9, 2008, a Warrant of Seizure and Detention (WSD), docketed as Seizure
Identification (S.I.) No. 2008-082, was issued by District Collector Suansing Jr., directing
the BOC officials to seal and padlock the oil tanks/depots of OILINK located in Bataan.
On May 12, 2008, Kenneth C. Pundanera, Operations Manager of UNIOIL, requested Zaldy
E. Almoradie, District Collector of Mariveles, Bataan, for permission to release UNIOIL-
owned products from OILINK's storage terminal. Pertinent portion of the request letter
reads:
Unioil is a licensed importer of various Petroleum Products by virtue of its import license
LTAD-0-021-2002 issued on March 26, 2002 which was revised to include all other
petroleum products in 2007 through LTAMII (P) 001-10-07-13639. To pursue its line of
business, Unioil has an existing Terminalling Agreement with Oilink for the storage of various
Unioil products at the Oilink terminal located at Lucanin Pt., Mariveles, Bataan.
In view of the said temporary closure of Oilink's terminal, Unioil is currently unable to fully
utilize its leased tanks as well as make use of the products contained therein. We understand
that there is still an unresolved issue between Oilink and the Bureau of Customs. However,
with all due respect, said issue should not affect Unioil because it is not a party to the same,
furthermore there is a legal and binding terminalling agreement between Oilink and Unioil
which should be honored.
Last May 8, 2008, an asphalt importation for Unioil Petroleum Philippines, Inc. arrived in
Mariveles, Bataan. This was issued the corresponding discharging permit by the Bureau of
Customs. All duties, excise taxes and value added taxes for this product have already been
settled. However, we are still unable to withdraw these products in order to serve our
customers who are using the product to supply major government infrastructure projects in
the country.
In line with the endorsement coming from the Bureau of Customs Commissioner Napoleon
D. Morales issued last May 6, 2008, Unioil has complied with the conditions stipulated therein
which are:
1. Only Unioil products shall be withdrawn subject to proper inventory by the BIR
and BOC.
2. Appropriate duties and taxes due on the products to be withdrawn are fully paid
or settled.
3. The company (Unioil) should allow the operation/withdrawal to be closely
monitored and continuously underguarded by assigned Customs personnel.
In this regard, may we respectfully request your good office to please allow Unioil to
withdraw from Oilink's terminal its products which are stored in the following tanks[:]15
17 diesel 360,097.00
19 sn 500 203,659.00
20 sn 500 643,236.00
In the same request letter, District Collector Almoradie approved the release of the above
petroleum products through a handwritten note dated May 12, 2008: "All concerned: Pls.
allow the release of the Unioil-owned products from the Oilink Storage Terminal per this
request. Thanks."16
On May 15, 2008, Pundanera wrote a clarificatory letter pursuant to the verbal instruction
of District Collector Almoradie to explain the withdrawal of products from the Terminal of
OILINK, to wit:
As far as Unioil is concerned, we affirm to your good office that the products
withdrawn/loaded at the Terminal are entirely Unioil products. Unioil owns these products
pursuant to its supply and terminalling agreements with Oilink. (We shall be submitting to
you copies of these documents as soon as they arrive from our office in Manila.) In addition,
due to the issue involving Oilink and the Bureau of Customs, Unioil was forced to secure its
petroleum products from local sources in order to comply with its valid contractual
commitments.
Unioil intended to withdraw these products because it believed in good faith and based on
documents in its possession that it is allowed to do so. Unioil based its intention pursuant
to the Indorsements of the Collector of the Port of Manila as well as the Office of the
Commissioner that allowed the withdrawal of Unioil products subject to compliance with the
three (3) conditions specified in the abovementioned Indorsements.

TANK PROD CONTENTS (Liters) This being the precedent, we believe in good faith that, since Unioil owns the products, and
it is considered a stranger to the issue between Oilink and the Bureau, then Unioil is allowed
2 diesel 2,171,670.00 to withdraw the products it owns subject to the compliance with the three (3) stated
conditions. Besides, any withdrawal is covered by an appropriate delivery receipt, which
would clearly indicate that Unioil owns the products being withdrawn.17
6 rexo 1,862,846.00
In a complaint-affidavit dated December 15, 2008, Atty. Balmyrson M. Valdez, a member
of the petitioner BOC's Anti-Oil Smuggling Coordinating Committee that investigated the
10 asphalt 4,573.14
illegal withdrawal by UNIOIL of oil products consigned to OILINK, valued at _181,988,627.00
with corresponding duties and taxes in the amount of _35,507,597.00, accused the private
13 gasoline 809,345.00 respondents of violation of Sections 360118 and 3602,19 in relation to Sections 250320 and
2530,21 paragraphs f and l (3), (4) and (5), of the TCCP.

14 gasoline 746,629.00 In a letter22 dated December 15, 2008, Commissioner Morales referred to the Office of
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño the said complaintaffidavit, together with its
38
annexes, for preliminary investigation. During the said investigation, BOC's counsel
appeared and all of the private respondents submitted their respective counter-affidavits.
In a Resolution23 dated May 29, 2009, public respondent Arman A. De Andres, State
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ), recommended the dismissal of the
complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause. The Resolution was approved by public
respondents Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Pedrito L. Rances and Chief State Prosecutor
Zuño. On automatic review, the Resolution was affirmed by then Secretary of Justice Raul
M. Gonzales.24
Dissatisfied, the BOC filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the public
respondent, the Acting Secretary of Justice Agnes VST Devanadera, in a Resolution25 dated
December 28, 2009.
On March 11, 2010, the BOC filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
In the Resolution dated March 26, 2010, the CA dismissed outright the petition due to
procedural defects:
The instant petition (i) contains no explanation why service thereof was not done personally
(Sec. 11, Rule 13, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure); (ii) shows that it has no proper verification
and certification against forum shopping and (iii) the docket and other lawful fees payment
is short by P1,530.00.26
In the Resolution dated August 4, 2010, the CA denied the private respondents' motion for
reconsideration of the March 26, 2010 Resolution, as follows:
We made a cursory examination of the petition filed in this case as well as the whole rollo
of the case. It is our finding that, up to the date hereof, the petitioner has not duly submitted
to this Court another set of petition with a certification against forum shopping embodied
therein or appended thereto. Thus, the petition really suffers from a fatal defect until now,
and so, the petitioner has to bear the consequence thereof.27
The CA stressed that procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because
their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all
rules, they are required to be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of reasons,
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree
of thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed. While it is true that
litigation is not a game of technicalities, this does not mean that Rules of Court may be
ignored at will and at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment
of the issues and their just resolution.
Aggrieved, the BOC filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the following
issues:
39
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT
DENIED PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SOLELY ON THE GROUND
THAT, ALLEGEDLY, IT DID NOT RECEIVE THE SECOND AND COMPLETE COPY OF
THE PETITION, CONTAINING THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST
FORUM SHOPPING.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT AFFIRMED ITS 26 MARCH 2010 RESOLUTION,
DISMISSING THE PETITION ON ACCOUNT OF MERE TECHNICALITIES.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR
WHEN IT DID NOT LOOK INTO THE MERITS OF THE CASE, WHERE IT WAS CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED THAT THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE TO INDICT RESPONDENTS FOR
TRIAL FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 3601 AND 3602 IN RELATION TO SECTION
2530, PARAGRAPHS (E), AND SECTION 3604 (D), (E), (F), AND (H) OF THE TCCP,
AS AMENDED.28
The petition is partly meritorious.
Although the question of jurisdiction over the subject matter was not raised at bench by
either of the parties, the Court will first address such question before delving into the
procedural and substantive issues of the instant petition. After all, it is the duty of the courts
to consider the question of jurisdiction before they look into other matters involved in the
case, even though such question is not raised by any of the parties.29 Courts are bound to
take notice of the limits of their authority and, even if such question is neither raised by the
pleadings nor suggested by counsel, they may recognize the want of jurisdiction and act
accordingly by staying pleadings, dismissing the action, or otherwise noticing the defect, at
any stage of the proceedings.30 Besides, issues or errors not raised by the parties may be
resolved by the Court where, as in this case, the issue is one of jurisdiction; it is necessary
in arriving at a just decision; and the resolution of the issues raised by the parties depend
upon the determination of the unassigned issue or error, or is necessary to give justice to
the parties.31
On the issue of whether or not the CA has certiorari jurisdiction over the resolution of the
Acting Secretary of Justice, affirming the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for violation of
provisions of the TCCP due to lackof probable cause, the Court rules in negative.
The elementary rule is that the CA has jurisdiction to review the resolution of the DOJ
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground that the
Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.32 However, with the enactment33 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9282, amending
R.A. No. 112534 by expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and
elevating its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction, it is no longer
clear which between the CA and the CTA has jurisdiction to review through a petition for
certiorari the DOJ resolution in preliminary investigations involving tax and tariff offenses.
Apropos is City of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo35 where the Court en banc declared that
the CTA has appellate jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case, despite the fact that there is no
categorical statement to that effect under R.A. No. 1125, as well as the amendatory R.A.
No. 9282. Thus:
x x x Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court,
in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus. With respect to the Court of Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
(BP 129) gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, the power
to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
As to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari, in the exercise of their
original jurisdiction, is provided under Section 21 of BP 129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant of such power, with respect
to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law and that judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the
power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an
interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court.
It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari in these cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it
must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive
jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law
intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of
such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be
considered as partial, not total.
xxxx
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court provides that when by law,
jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other
means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer.
If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that jurisdiction over their certiorari
petition lies with the CA, this Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies,
the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter – precisely the
40
split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice. The
Court cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially considering that the law
expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and
tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other
court that may exercise such power. Thus, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that
since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund is vested in
the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order
issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule otherwise
would lead to an absurd situation where one court decides an appeal in the main case while
another court rules on an incident in the very same case.
Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced judicial
abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the law is to divide the
authority over a local tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court jurisdiction
to issue a writ of certiorari against interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the
jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same case. It is more
in consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate
jurisdiction to the CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries with it the
power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The
supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review,
by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision
over the acts of the latter.
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to
exercise it effectively, to make all orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to
give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it the power to protect
that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective.
The court, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and
incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction. For this
purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which
might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it.
Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is endowed with a particular
jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within
such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction
and the court must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress
any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such process.
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the same level as the
CA and shall possess all the inherent powers of a court of justice.
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a
general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. These
inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of
jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as
to the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to
the execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the court's
jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.
Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers
necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive
legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and,
subject to existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has
power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within
the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates." Hence,
demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action,
and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and
determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even
though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original
causes of action, would not be within its cognizance.
Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the authority of
the CTA to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued
by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the powers granted by the Constitution as well
as inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.36
Since the Court ruled in City of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo37 that the CTA has jurisdiction
over a special civil action for certiorari questioning an interlocutory order of the RTC in a
local tax case via express constitutional mandate and for being inherent in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction, it can also be reasonably concluded based on the same premise
that the CTA has original jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution
in a preliminary investigation involving tax and tariff offenses.
If the Court were to rule that jurisdiction over a petition for certiorari assailing such DOJ
resolution lies with the CA, it would be confirming theexercise by two judicial bodies, the CA
and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same subject matter – precisely the split-
jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice. The Court
cannot accept that such was the legislative intent, especially considering that R.A. No. 9282
expressly confers on the CTA, the tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and
tariff matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without mention of any other
court that may exercise such power.38
Concededly, there is no clear statement under R.A. No. 1125, the amendatory R.A. No.
9282, let alone in the Constitution, that the CTA has original jurisdiction over a petition for
certiorari. By virtue of Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, vesting judicial power in the Supreme Court and such
lower courts as may be established by law, to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government,
in relation to Section 5(5), Article VIII thereof, vesting upon it the power to promulgate
41
rules concerning practice and procedure in all courts, the Court thus declares that the CA's
original jurisdiction39 over a petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution in a
preliminary investigation involving tax and tariff offenses was necessarily transferred to the
CTA pursuant to Section 7 of R.A. No. 9282,40 and that such petition shall be governed by
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Accordingly, it is the CTA, not the CA, which has
jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari assailing the DOJ resolution of dismissal of the
BOC's complaint-affidavit against private respondents for violation of the TCCP.
On the procedural issue of whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on
the sole ground of lack of verification and certification against forum shopping, the Court
rules in the affirmative, despite the above discussion that such petition should have been
filed with the CTA.
In Traveño, et al. v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, et al.,41 the
Court restated the jurisprudence on non-compliancewith the requirements on, or submission
of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective verification, and noncompliance with the requirement on or
submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission
or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that
strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of
justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs
the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good
faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect
therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission
or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of
"substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling
reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties
to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the
plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of
action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
 6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-
pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the
party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney
designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.42
While it admittedly filed a petition for certiorari without a certification against forum
shopping on March 11, 2010, the BOC claimed to have subsequently complied with such
requirement by filing through registered mail a complete set of such petition, the following
day which was also the last day of the reglementary period. The problem arose when the
CA failed to receive such complete set of the petition for certiorari with the verification and
certification against forum shopping. In support of the motion for reconsideration of the CA's
March 26, 2010 resolution which dismissed outright the petition, the BOC asserted that it
filed a complete set of petition by registered mail. It also submitted an affidavit of the person
who did the mailing as required by Section 12,43 Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, including
the registry receipt numbers, but not the receipts themselves which were allegedly attached
to the original copy mailed to the CA. Instead of ordering the BOC to secure a certification
from the postmaster to verify if a complete set of the petition was indeed filed by registered
mail, the CA – after examining the whole case rollo and finding that no other set of petition
with a certification against forum shopping was duly submitted – denied the motion for
reconsideration.
Faced with the issue of whether or not there is a need to relax the strict compliance with
procedural rules in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby and whether
"special circumstances or compelling reasons" are present to warrant a liberal interpretation
of such rules, the Court rules – after a careful review of the merits of the case – in the
affirmative.
Despite the BOC's failed attempt to comply with the requirement of verification and
certification against forum shopping, the Court cannot simply ignore the CA's perfunctory
dismissal of the petition on such sole procedural ground vis-à-vis the paramount public
interest in the subject matter and the substantial amount involved, i.e., the alleged illegal
withdrawal of oil products worth _181,988,627.00 with corresponding duties and taxes
worth _35,507,597.00. Due to the presence of such special circumstances and in the interest
of justice, the CA should have at least passed upon the substantive issue raised in the
petition, instead of dismissing it on such procedural ground. Although it does not condone
the failure of BOC to comply with the said basic requirement, the Court is constrained to
exercise the inherent power to suspend its own rules in order to do justice in this particular
case.
Given that the petition for certiorari should have been filed with the CTA, the mistake
committed by the BOC in filing such petition before the CA may be excused. In this regard,
Court takes note that nothing in R.A. No. 1125, as amended by R.A. No. 9282, indicates
that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 may be filed with the CTA. Despite the enactment
of R.A. No. 9282 on March 30, 2004, it was only about ten (10) years later in the case of
City of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo44 that the Court ruled that the authority of the CTA to
take cognizance of such petitions is included in the powers granted by the Constitution, as
42
well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. While the rule on perfection of
appeals cannot be classified as a difficult question of law,45 mistake in the construction or
application of a doubtful question of law, as in this case, may be considered as a mistake of
fact, excusing the BOC from the consequences of the erroneous filing of its petition with the
CA.
As the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari solely due to a procedural defect without
resolving the issue of whether or not the Acting Secretary of Justice gravely abused her
discretion in affirming the dismissal of the BOC's complaint-affidavit for lack of probable
cause, the Court ought to reinstate the petition and refer it to the CTA for proper disposition.
For one, as a highly specialized court specifically created for the purpose of reviewing tax
and customs cases,46 the CTA is dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of
revenue-related problems, and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject.47
For another, the referral of the petition to the CTA is in line with the policy of hierarchy of
courts in order to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention which
are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
overcrowding of its docket.48
Be that as it may, the Court stressed in The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections49
that the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule, and that it has full
discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction over special civil actions for
certiorari filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the
nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition. Recognized exceptions to
the said doctrine are as follows: (a) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that
must be addressed at the most immediate time; (b) when the issues involved are of
transcendental importance; (c) cases of first impression where no jurisprudence yet exists
that will guide the lower courts on the matter; (d) the constitutional issues raised are better
decided by the Court; (e) where exigency in certain situations necessitate urgency in the
resolution of the cases; (f) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; (g)
when petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents’
acts in violation of their right to freedom of expression; and (h) the petition includes
questions that are dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be
patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy.50 Since
the present case includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the advancement
of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, as well as to avoid
multiplicity of suits and further delay in its disposition, the Court shall directly resolve the
petition for certiorari, instead of referring it to the CTA.
On the substantive issue of whether the Acting Secretary of Justice gravely abused her
discretion in affirming the dismissal of the BOC's complaint-affidavit for lack of probable
cause, the settled policy of noninterference in the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion requires
the courts to leave to the prosecutor and to the DOJ the determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. As the Court explained in Unilever
Philippines, Inc. v. Tan:51
The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing of information in court is
essentially an executive function that is lodged, at the first instance, with the public
prosecutor and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Justice. The prosecutor and the Secretary of
Justice have wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of preliminary investigation; and their
findings with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable cause are generally not
subject to review by the Court.
Consistent with this rule, the settled policy of non-interference in the prosecutor’s exercise
of discretion requires the courts to leave to the prosecutor and to the DOJ the determination
of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. Courts can neither
override their determination nor substitute their own judgment for that of the latter. They
cannot likewise order the prosecution of the accused when the prosecutor has not found a
prima facie case.
Nevertheless, this policy of non-interference is not without exception. The Constitution itself
allows (and even directs) court action where executive discretion has been gravely abused.
In other words, the court may intervene in the executive determination of probable cause,
review the findings and conclusions, and ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence
of probable cause by examining the records of the preliminary investigation when necessary
for the orderly administration of justice.52
Probable cause for purposes of filing a criminal information is defined as such facts as are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.53 As explained in Sy v.
Secretary of Justice,54 citing Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice:55
x x x [Probable cause] is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a
person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong
suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual or positive cause"; nor does it
import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a
finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence
to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the
reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.56
To find out if there is a reasonable ground to believe that acts or ommissions complained of
constitute the offenses charged, the Court must first examine whether or not the allegations
against private respondents in the BOC's complaint-affidavit constitute the offenses of
unlawful importation under Section 3601 and various fraudulent practices against customs
revenue under Section 3602 of the TCCP.
In Jardeleza v. People,57 the Court discussed the concepts of unlawful importation under
Section 3601 of the TCCP, and various fraudulent practices against customs revenue under
Section 3602 thereof, thus:
43
Section 3601 of the TCC was designed to supplement the existing provisions of the TCC
against the means leading up to smuggling, which might render it beneficial by a substantive
and criminal statement separately providing for the punishment of smuggling. The law was
intended not to merge into one and the same offense all the many acts which are classified
and punished by different penalties, penal or administrative, but to legislate against the
overt act of smuggling itself. This is manifested by the use of the words "fraudulently" and
"contrary to law" in the law.
Smuggling is committed by any person who: (1) fraudulently imports or brings into the
Philippines any article contrary to law; (2) assists in so doing any article contrary to law; or
(3) receives, conceals, buys, sells or in any manner facilitate the transportation,
concealment or sale of such goods after importation, knowing the same to have been
imported contrary to law.
The phrase "contrary to law" in Section 3601 qualifies the phrases "imports or brings into
the Philippines" and "assists in so doing," and not the word "article." The law penalizes the
importation of any merchandise in any manner contrary to law.
The word "law" includes regulations having the force and effect of law, meaning substantive
or legislative type rules as opposed to general statements of policy or rules of agency,
organization, procedures or positions. An inherent characteristic of a substantive rule is one
affecting individual rights and obligations; the regulation must have been promulgated
pursuant to a congressional grant of quasi-legislative authority; the regulation must have
been promulgated in conformity to with congressionally-imposed procedural requisites.
xxxx
Section 3602 of the TCC, on the other hand, provides:
Sec. 3602. Various Fraudulent Practices Against Customs Revenue. – Any person who makes
or attempts to make any entry of imported or exported article by means of any false or
fraudulent invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper or by any means of any false
statement, written or verbal, or by any means of any false or fraudulent practice
whatsoever, or knowingly effects any entry of goods, wares or merchandise, at less than
the true weight or measures thereof or upon a false classification as to quality or value, or
by the payment of less than the amount legally due, or knowingly and wilfully files any false
or fraudulent entry or claim for the payment of drawback or refund of duties upon the
exportation of merchandise, or makes or files any affidavit, abstract, record, certificate or
other document, with a view to securing the payment to himself or others of any drawback,
allowance or refund of duties on the exportation of merchandise, greater than that legally
due thereon, or who shall be guilty of any wilful act or omission shall, for each offense, be
punished in accordance with the penalties prescribed in the preceding section.
The provision enumerates the various fraudulent practices against customs revenue, such
as the entry of imported or exported articles by means of any false or fraudulent invoice,
statement or practice; the entry of goods at less than the true weight or measure; or the
filing of any false or fraudulent entry for the payment of drawback or refund of duties.
The fraud contemplated by law must be intentional fraud, consisting of deception, willfully
and deliberately dared or resorted to in order to give up some right. The offender must have
acted knowingly and with the specific intent to deceive for the purpose of causing financial
loss to another; even false representations or statements or omissions of material facts
come within fraudulent intent. The fraud envisaged in the law includes the suppression of a
material fact which a party is bound in good faith to disclose. Fraudulent nondisclosure and
fraudulent concealment are of the same genre.
Fraudulent concealment presupposes a duty to disclose the truth and that disclosure was
not made when opportunity to speak and inform was present, and that the party to whom
the duty of disclosure as to a material fact was due was thereby induced to act to his
injury.1âwphi1 Fraud is not confined to words or positive assertions; it may consist as well
of deeds, acts or artifice of a nature calculated to mislead another and thus allow one to
obtain an undue advantage.58
In unlawful importation, also known as outright smuggling, goods and articles of commerce
are brought into the country without the required importation documents, or are disposed
of in the local market without having been cleared by the BOC or other authorized
government agencies, to evade the payment of correct taxes, duties and other charges.
Such goods and articles do not undergo the processing and clearing procedures at the BOC,
and are not declared through submission of import documents, such as the import entry
and internal revenue declaration.
In various fraudulent practices against customs revenue, also known as technical smuggling,
on the other hand, the goods and articles are brought into the country through fraudulent,
falsified or erroneous declarations, to substantially reduce, if not totally avoid, the payment
of correct taxes, duties and other charges. Such goods and articles pass through the BOC,
but the processing and clearing procedures are attended by fraudulent acts in order to evade
the payment of correct taxes, duties, and other charges. Often committed by means of
misclassification of the nature, quality or value of goods and articles, undervaluation in
terms of their price, quality or weight, and misdeclaration of their kind, such form of
smuggling is made possible through the involvement of the importers, the brokers and even
some customs officials and personnel.
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court holds that private respondents cannot be
charged with unlawful importation under Section 3601 of the TCCP because there is no
allegation in the BOC's complaint-affidavit to the effect that they committed any of the
following acts: (1) fraudulently imported or brought into the Philippines the subject
petroleum products, contrary to law; (2) assisted in so doing; or (3) received, concealed,
bought, sold or in any manner facilitated the transportation, concealment or sale of such
goods after importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law.
44
The said acts constituting unlawful importation under Section 3601 of the TCCP can hardly
be gathered from the following allegations in the BOC's complaint-affidavit:
19.1 From May 23, 2007 to February 10, 2008, UNIOIL is not an accredited importer of the
BOC;
19.2 From the time UNIOIL was accredited on February 11, 2008 until the time of its request
to withdraw its oil products on 02 May 2008, they did not import Gasoil (diesel) and Mogas
Gasoline;
19.3 The Terminalling Agreement allegedly executed between OILINK and UNIOIL was
obviously for the purpose of circumventing the Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued
against the shipments of OILINK aside from the fact that it was only executed on 02 January
2008 after the decision of the Commissioner finding OILINK liable to pay an administrative
fine of Two Billion Seven Hundred Sixty-Four Million Eight Hundred Fifty-Nine Thousand
Three Hundred Four Pesos and 80/100 (Php2,764,859,304.80);
19.4 Only base oil should have been withdrawn by UNIOIL since it is the only product subject
of its request and approved by the Commissioner;
19.5 UNIOIL withdrew Gasoil (Diesel) and Mogas which were not covered by importations;
19.6 Finally, the illegal release/withdrawal of the oil products deprived the government of
the supposed partial payment on the Php2.7 billion liability of OILINK in the approximate
amount of Php181,988,627 representing the customs value of the released/withdrawn oil
products and estimated duties and taxes of Php35,507,597 due thereon or the total amount
of Php217,496,224.00.59
xxxx
21.1 When UNIOIL withdrew Gasoil (Diesel) and Mogas without filing the corresponding
Import Entry, the shipment becomes unlawful per se and thus falls under unlawful
importation under Section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as
amended;
21.2 The fact that UNIOIL and OILINK executed a belated Terminalling Agreement after the
issuance of the Warrant of Seizure and Detention showed the fraudulent intent of the
respondents whereby UNIOIL can still withdraw the oil products stored at OILINK's depot
likewise in clear violation of section 3601 and 3602 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines, as amended;
21.3 The fact that the UNIOIL make [sic] it appear that they are the owner of Gasoil (Diesel)
and Mogas when in truth and in fact they did not import said products make them liable for
[violation of] Section 3602 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended
and falsification;60
Since the foregoing allegations do not constitute the crime of unlawful importation under
Section 3601 of the TCCP, the Acting Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when she affirmed the State Prosecutor's dismissal the BOC's complaint-affidavit
for lack of probable cause.
Neither could private respondents be charged with various fraudulent practices against
customs revenue under Section 3602 of the TCCP as the above allegations do not fall under
any of the following acts or omissions constituting such crime/s: (1) making or attempting
to make any entry of imported or exported article: (a) by means of any false or fraudulent
invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper or by any means of any false statement, written
or verbal; or (b) by any means of any false or fraudulent practice whatsoever; or (2)
knowingly effecting any entry of goods, wares or merchandise, at less than the true weight
or measures thereof or upon a false classification as to quality or value, or by the payment
of less than the amount legally due; or (3) knowingly and wilfully filing any false or
fraudulent entry or claim for the payment of drawback or refund of duties upon the
exportation of merchandise; or (4) making or filing any affidavit, abstract, record, certificate
or other document, with a view to securing the payment to himself or others of any
drawback, allowance or refund of duties on the exportation of merchandise, greater than
that legally due thereon.
Related to various fraudulent practices against customs revenue by means of
undervaluation, misclassification and misdeclaration in the import entry is the following
provision of R.A. No. 7651 - An Act to Revitalize and Strengthen the Bureau of Customs,
Amending for the Purpose Certain Sections of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines,
as amended:61
Sec. 2503. Undervaluation, Misclassification and Misdeclaration in Entry. – When the
dutiable value of the imported articles shall be so declared and entered that the duties,
based on the declaration of the importer on the face of the entry, would be less by ten
percent (10%) than should be legally collected, or when the imported articles shall be so
described and entered that the duties based on the importer's description on the face of the
entry would be less by ten percent (10%) than should be legally collected based on the tariff
classification, or when the dutiable weight, measurement or quantity of imported articles is
found upon examination to exceed by ten percent (10%) or more than the entered weight,
measurement or quantity, a surcharge shall be collected from the importer in an amount of
not less than the difference between the full duty and the estimated duty based upon the
declaration of the importer, nor more than twice of such difference: Provided, that an
undervaluation, misdeclaration in weight, measurement or quantity of more than
thirty percent (30%) between the value, weight, measurement, or quantity
declared in the entry, and the actual value, weight, quantity, or measurement shall
constitute a prima facie evidence of fraud penalized under Sec. 2530 of this Code:
Provided, further, that any misdeclared or undeclared imported articles/items found upon
examination shall ipso facto be forfeited in favor of the Government to be disposed of
pursuant to the provisions of this Code.
45
When the undervaluation, misdescription, misclassification or misdeclaration in
the import entry is intentional, the importer shall be subject to the penal provision
under Sec. 3602 of this Code.62
A careful reading of the BOC's complaint-affidavit would show that there is no allegation to
the effect that private respondents committed undervaluation, misdeclaration in weight,
measurement or quantity of more than thirty percent (30%) between the value, weight,
measurement, or quantity declared in the entry, and the actual value, weight, quantity, or
measurement which constitute prima facie evidence of fraud. Nor is there an allegation that
they intentionally committed undervaluation, misdescription, misclassification or
misdeclaration in the import entry. Since the allegations in the BOC's complaint-affidavit fall
short of the acts or omissions constituting the various fraudulent acts against customs
revenue under Section 3602 of the TCCP, the Acting Secretary of Justice correctly ruled that
there was no probable cause to believe that they committed such crime/s.
While it is true that the sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, and does not include a correction of the public respondents' evaluation of the
evidence and factual findings thereon, it is sometimes necessary to delve into factual issues
in order to resolve the allegations of grave abuse of discretion as a ground for the special
civil action of certiorari.63 In light of this principle, the Court reviews the following findings
of the Acting Secretary of Justice in affirming the State Prosecutor's dismissal of the BOC's
complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause:
Respondents are being charged for unlawful importation under Section 3601, and fraudulent
practices against customs revenues under Section 3602, of the TCCP, as amended. For these
charges to prosper, complainant must prove, first and foremost, that the subject articles
were imported. On this score alone, complainant has miserably failed.
Indeed, except for complainant's sweeping allegation, no clear and convincing proof was
presented to show that the subject petroleum products (gasoil and mogas) withdrawn by
Unioil from the oil depot/terminal of Oilink were imported. For, only when the articles are
imported that the importer/consignee is required to file an import entry declaration and pay
the corresponding customs duties and taxes. The fact that complainant's record fails to show
that an import entry was filed for the subject articles does not altogether make out a case
of unlawful importation under Section 3601, or fraudulent practices against customs revenue
under Section 3602, of the TCCP, without having first determined whether the subject
articles are indeed imported. Thus, in this case, complainant still bears the burden of proof
to show that the subject petroleum products are imported, by means of documents other
than the import entry declaration, such as but not limited to, the transport documents
consisting of the inward foreign manifest, bill of lading, commercial invoice and packing list,
all indicating that the goods were bought from a supplier/seller in a foreign country and
imported or transported to the Philippines. Instead[,] complainant merely surmised that
since the subject products were placed under warrant of seizure and detention[,] they must
necessarily be imported. Regrettably, speculation and surmises do not constitute evidence
and should not, therefore, be taken against the respondents. x x x Taken in this light, we
find more weight and credence in respondent Unioil's claim that the subject petroleum
products were not imported by them, but were locally purchased, more so since it was able
to present local sales invoices covering the same.
Even assuming gratia argumenti that the subject petroleum products were imported, it still
behooves the complainant to present clear and convincing proof that the importation was
unlawful or that it was carried out through any fraudulent means, practice or device to
prejudice the government. But again, complainant failed to discharge this burden.
As can be culled from the records, the warrant of seizure and detention docketed as Seizure
Identification No. 2008-082, which covers various gas tanks already stored at Oilink's
depot/terminal located at Lucanin Pt., Mariveles, Bataan, was issued pursuant to Section
2536, in relation to Section 1508, of the TCCP because of Oilink's failure to pay the
administrative fine of P2,764,859,304.80 that was previously meted against the company
for its failure/refusal to submit to a post entry audit. In fact, the delivery of all shipments
consigned to or handled directly or indirectly by Oilink was put on hold as per order of the
Customs Commissioner dated April 23, 2008 pursuant to Section 1508 of the TCCP, also for
the same reason. There was nothing on record which shows, or from which it could be
inferred, that the warrant of seizure and detention or hold order were imposed pursuant to
Section 2530 of the same Code which relates, among others, to unlawfully imported articles
or those imported through any fraudulent practice or device to prejudice the government,
much less due to non-payment of the corresponding customs duties and taxes due on the
shipments/articles covered by the warrant of seizure and detention. Again, what
complainant's evidence clearly shows is that Oilink's failure to pay the administrative fine
precipitated the issuance of the warrant of seizure and detention and hold order.64
After a careful review of records, the Court affirms the dismissal of the BOC's complaint-
affidavit for lack of probable cause, but partly digresses from the reasoning of the Acting
Secretary of Justice in arriving at such conclusion. While the Acting Secretary of Justice
correctly stated that the act of fraudulent importation of articles must be first proven in
order to be charged for violation of Section 3601 of the TCCP, the Court disagrees that proof
of such importation is also required for various fraudulent practices against customs revenue
under Section 3602 thereof.
As held in Jardeleza v. People,65 the crime of unlawful importation under Section 3601 of
the TCCP is complete, in the absence of a bona fide intent to make entry and pay duties
when the prohibited article enters Philippine territory. Importation, which consists of
bringing an article into the country from the outside, is complete when the taxable, dutiable
commodity is brought within the limits of the port of entry.66 Entry through a customs
house is not the essence of the act.67 On the other hand, as regards Section 3602 of the
TCCP which particularly deals with the making or attempting to make a fraudulent entry of
imported or exported articles, the term "entry" in customs law has a triple meaning, namely:
(1) the documents filed at the customs house; (2) the submission and acceptance of the
documents; and (3) the procedure of passing goods through the customs house.68 In view
thereof, it is only for charges for unlawful importation under Section 3601 that the BOC
must first prove that the subject articles were imported. For violation of Section 3602, in
46
contrast, what must be proved is the act of making or attempting to make such entry of
articles.
The Court likewise disagrees with the finding of the Acting Secretary of Justice that the BOC
failed to prove that the products subject of the WSD were imported. No such proof was
necessary because private respondents themselves presented in support of their counter-
affidavits copies of import entries69 which can be considered as prima facie evidence that
OILINK imported the subject petroleum products. At any rate, the Acting Secretary of Justice
aptly gave credence to their twenty (20) sales invoices70 covering the dates October 1,
2007 until April 30, 2008 which tend to prove that UNIOIL locally purchased such products
from OILINK even before the BOC rendered the Decision dated December 14, 2007 imposing
a _2,764,859,304.80 administrative fine, and holding the delivery or release of its
subsequently imported articles to answer for the fine, any revised assessment and/or
penalty for failure to keep records.
The Court also finds as misplaced the BOC's reliance on the Terminalling Agreement dated
January 2, 2008 and the Certification71 that UNIOIL made no importation of Gasoil (diesel)
and Mogas gasoline from January 2007 up to June 2008 in order to prove that it illegally
imported the said products. Such documentary evidence tend to prove only that UNIOIL was
engaged in the importation of petroleum products and that it did not import the said
products during the said period. Such documents, however, do not negate the evidence on
record which tend to show that OILINK was the one that filed the import entries,72 and that
UNIOIL locally purchased from OILINK such products as indicated in the sales invoices.73
Not being the importer of such products, UNIOIL, its directors and officers, are not required
to file their corresponding import entries. Hence, contrary to the BOC's allegation, UNIOIL's
withdrawal of the Gasoil (Diesel) and Mogas gasoline without filing the corresponding import
entries can neither be considered as unlawful importation under Section 3601 of the TCCP
nor as a fraudulent practice against customs revenue under Section 3602 thereof.
Moreover, the fact that private respondent Paul Chi Ting Co is both the Chairman of UNIOIL
and OILINK is not enough to justify the application of the doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil. In fact, mere ownership by a single stockholder or by another corporation of a
substantial block of shares of a corporation does not, standing alone, provide sufficient
justification for disregarding the separate corporate personality.74 In Kukan International
Corporation v. Hon. Judge Reyes, et al.75 the Court explained the application of the said
doctrine in this wise:
In fine, to justify the piercing of the veil of corporate fiction, it must be shown by clear and
convincing proof that the separate and distinct personality of the corporation was
purposefully employed to evade a legitimate and binding commitment and perpetuate a
fraud or like wrongdoings. To be sure, the Court has, on numerous occasions, applied the
principle where a corporation is dissolved and its assets are transferred to another to avoid
a financial liability of the first corporation with the result that the second corporation should
be considered a continuation and successor of the first entity.
In those instances when the Court pierced the veil of corporate fiction of two corporations,
there was a confluence of the following factors:
1. A first corporation is dissolved;
2. The assets of the first corporation is transferred to a second corporation to avoid
a financial liability of the first corporation; and
3. Both corporations are owned and controlled by the same persons such that the
second corporation should be considered as a continuation and successor of the first
corporation.76
Granted that the principle of piercing the veil of corporate entity comes into play only during
the trial of the case for the purpose of determining liability,77 it is noteworthy that even the
BOC itself virtually recognized that OILINK and UNIOIL are separate and distinct entities
when it alleged that only the base oil products should have been withdrawn by UNIOIL, since
they were the only products subject of its request and approved by the Customs
Commissioner. As discussed above, however, private respondents were able to present sales
invoices which tend to show that UNIOIL locally purchased Gasoil (diesel) and Mogas
gasoline products from OILINK. Hence, the BOC cannot invoke the doctrine of piercing the
veil of corporate entity in this case.
On a final note, the Court stresses that OILINK, its directors or officers, and Victor D.
Piamonte, the Licensed Customs Broker, may still be held liable for various fraudulent
practices against customs revenue under
Section 3602 of the TCCP, if the final results of the post-entry audit and examination would
show that they committed any of the following acts or omissions: (1) making or attempting
to make any entry of imported or exported article: (a) by means of any false or fraudulent
invoice, declaration, affidavit, letter, paper or by any means of any false statement, written
or verbal; or (b) by any means of any false or fraudulent practice; or (2) intentional
undervaluation, misdescription, misclassification or misdeclaration in the import entries; or
(3) undervaluation, misdeclaration in weight, measurement or quantity of more than thirty
percent (30%) between the value, weight, measurement, or quantity declared in the entries,
and the actual value, weight, quantity, or measurement. This is consistent with Section
230178 (Warrant for Detention of Property-Cash Bond) of the TCCP which states that
nothing therein shall be construed as relieving the owner or importer from any criminal
liability which may arise from any violation of law committed in connection with the
importation of articles, which in this case were placed under a WSD for failure of the
importer, OILINK, to submit the required post-entry audit documents under CAO No. 4-
2004.
In addition, OILINK and its directors or officers may be held liable under Section 16 of R.A.
No. 9135:79
47
SEC. 16. A new section to be known as Section 3611 is hereby inserted in Part 3, Title VII
of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended, which shall read as follows:
SEC. 3611. Failure to Pay Correct Duties and Taxes on Imported Goods. - Any person who,
after being subjected to post-entry audit and examination as provided in Section
3515 of Part 2, Title VII hereof, is found to have incurred deficiencies in duties and
taxes paid for imported goods, shall be penalized according to three (3) degrees
of culpability subject to any mitigating, aggravating or extraordinary factors that
are clearly established by the available evidence:
(a) Negligence - When the deficiency results from an offender’s failure, through an
act or acts of omission or commission, to exercise reasonable care and competence
to ensure that a statement made is correct, it shall be determined to be negligent
and punishable by a fine equivalent to not less than one-half (1/2) but not more
than two (2) times the revenue loss.
(b) Gross Negligence - When a deficiency results from an act or acts of omission or
commission done with actual knowledge or wanton disregard for the relevant facts
and with indifference to or disregard for the offender’s obligation under the statute,
it shall be determined to be grossly negligent and punishable by a fine equivalent to
not less than two and a half (2 ½) but not more than four (4) times the revenue
loss.
(c) Fraud - When the material false statement or act in connection with the
transaction was committed or omitted knowingly, voluntarily and intentionally, as
established by clear and convincing evidence, it shall be determined to be fraudulent
and be punishable by a fine equivalent to not less than five (5) times but not more
than eight (8) times the revenue loss and imprisonment of not less than two (2)
years but not more than eight (8) years.
The decision of the Commissioner of Customs, upon proper hearing, to impose penalties as
prescribed in this Section may be appealed in accordance with Section 2402 hereof.80
With respect to the directors or officers of OILINK, they may further be held liable jointly
and severally for all damages suffered by the government on account of such violation of
Sections 3602 and 3611 of the TCCP, upon clear and convincing proof that they willfully and
knowingly voted for or assented to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or was guilty of
gross negligence or bad faith in directing its corporate affairs.81
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions dated
March 26, 2010 and August 4, 2010, in CA-G.R. SP No. 113069, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Resolution dated December 28, 2009 of the ·Acting Secretary of Justice Agnes
VST Devanedera, which upheld the State Prosecutor's dismissal of the complaintaffidavit
filed by the Bureau of Customs for lack of probable cause, is AFFIRMED. This is without
prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal and administrative charges under Sections
3602 and 3611 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended, against
private respondents OILINK, its officers and directors, and Victor D. Piamonte, if the final
results of the post-entry audit and examination would show that they violated the said
provisions.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

48
 10.) G.R. No. 163980 August 3, 2006
HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and NESTORIO F. APOLINARIO,
in his personal capacity and as President of Holy Spirit Homeowners Association,
Inc., Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR, in his capacity as Chairman of the Housing and
Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), ATTY. EDGARDO PAMINTUAN,
in his capacity as General Manager of the National Housing Authority (NHA), MR.
PERCIVAL CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Chairman of the Presidential Commission for
the Urban Poor (PCUP), MAYOR FELICIANO BELMONTE, in his capacity as Mayor of
Quezon City, SECRETARY ELISEA GOZUN, in her capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and SECRETARY
FLORENTE SORIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) as ex-officio members of the NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT CENTER ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the "National Government
Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003."
Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners
association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its president, Nestorio F.
Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal capacity and on behalf of the
association.
Named respondents are the ex-officio members of the National Government Center
Administration Committee (Committee). At the filing of the instant petition, the Committee
was composed of Secretary Michael Defensor, Chairman of the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), Atty. Edgardo Pamintuan, General Manager of
the National Housing Authority (NHA), Mr. Percival Chavez, Chairman of the Presidential
Commission for Urban Poor (PCUP), Mayor Feliciano Belmonte of Quezon City, Secretary
Elisea Gozun of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and
Secretary Florante Soriquez of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of presidential issuances authorized the
creation and development of what is now known as the National Government Center (NGC).
49
On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826,
reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440
hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC. 1
On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding
150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826
and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona
fide residents therein. 2
In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation
No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued
Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of the
excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively become
beneficiaries of the government’s socialized housing program. 3
On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Among
the salient provisions of the law are the following:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure the
land tenure of the urban poor. Toward this end, lands located in the NGC, Quezon City shall
be utilized for housing, socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other purposes.
Sec. 3. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site to Bona Fide
Residents. – Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is hereby amended by excluding from
the coverage thereof, 184 hectares on the west side and 238 hectares on the east side of
Commonwealth Avenue, and declaring the same open for disposition to bona fide residents
therein: Provided, That the determination of the bona fide residents on the west side shall
be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and the determination of the bona fide
residents on the east side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and
occupancy verification survey conducted in 2000: Provided, further, That all existing legal
agreements, programs and plans signed, drawn up or implemented and actions taken,
consistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby adopted.
Sec. 4. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site for Local
Government or Community Facilities, Socioeconomic, Charitable, Educational and Religious
Purposes. – Certain portions of land within the aforesaid area for local government or
community facilities, socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious institutions are
hereby reserved for disposition for such purposes: Provided, That only those institutions
already operating and with existing facilities or structures, or those occupying the land may
avail of the disposition program established under the provisions this Act; Provided, further,
That in ascertaining the specific areas that may be disposed of in favor of these institutions,
the existing site allocation shall be used as basis therefore: Provided, finally. That in
determining the reasonable lot allocation of such institutions without specific lot
allocations, the land area that may be allocated to them shall be based on the area actually
used by said institutions at the time of effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.)
In accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, 4 the Committee formulated the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9207 on June 29, 2004. Petitioners
subsequently filed the instant petition, raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1) OF THE RULES
AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003" SHOULD
BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR BEING INCONSISTENT WITH THE LAW IT SEEKS TO
IMPLEMENT.
WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1) OF THE RULES
AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003" SHOULD
BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND WHIMSICAL. 5
First, the procedural matters.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that petitioner Association cannot question
the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2) and Section 3.2 (c.1) since it does not claim any
right over the NGC East Side. Section 3.1 (b.2) provides for the maximum lot area that may
be awarded to a resident-beneficiary of the NGC East Side, while Section 3.2 (c.1) imposes
a lot price escalation penalty to a qualified beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell
within the prescribed period. 6 Also, the OSG contends that since petitioner association is
not the duly recognized people’s organization in the NGC and since petitioners not qualify
as beneficiaries, they cannot question the manner of disposition of lots in the NGC. 7
"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged…. The gist of the question of standing is whether
a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 8
Petitioner association has the legal standing to institute the instant petition, whether or not
it is the duly recognized association of homeowners in the NGC. There is no dispute that the
individual members of petitioner association are residents of the NGC. As such they are
covered and stand to be either benefited or injured by the enforcement of the IRR,
particularly as regards the selection process of beneficiaries and lot allocation to qualified
beneficiaries. Thus, petitioner association may assail those provisions in the IRR which it
believes to be unfavorable to the rights of its members. Contrary to the OSG’s allegation
that the failure of petitioner association and its members to qualify as beneficiaries
effectively bars them from questioning the provisions of the IRR, such circumstance
precisely operates to confer on them the legal personality to assail the IRR. Certainly,
petitioner and its members have sustained direct injury arising from the enforcement of the
IRR in that they have been disqualified and eliminated from the selection process. While it
is true that petitioners claim rights over the NGC West Side only and thus cannot be affected
50
by the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2), which refers to the NGC East Side, the rest of
the assailed provisions of the IRR, namely, Sections 3.1 (a.4), 3.2 (a.1) and 3.2 (c.1),
govern the disposition of lots in the West Side itself or all the lots in the NGC.
We cannot, therefore, agree with the OSG on the issue of locus standi. The petition does
not merit dismissal on that ground.
There are, however, other procedural impediments to the granting of the instant petition.
The OSG claims that the instant petition for prohibition is an improper remedy because the
writ of prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. 9 Since in
issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial function, which is the scope of a petition for prohibition under
Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the instant prohibition should be
dismissed outright, the OSG contends. For their part, respondent Mayor of Quezon City 10
and respondent NHA 11 contend that petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
in filing the instant petition with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals, which has
concurrent jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition.
The cited breaches are mortal. The petition deserves to be spurned as a consequence.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial
or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power
to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the
confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers. 12
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an
administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to
court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency
concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed
act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. 13
The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee
expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the
assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the
object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the
validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass
upon the same. 14
Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued
by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail
its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. 15
True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed
directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so
warrant. 16 A direct invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should
be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. 17
In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, 18 the Court said that it will not entertain direct resort
to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional
and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications,
justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise
of its primary jurisdiction. 19 A perusal, however, of the petition for prohibition shows no
compelling, special or important reasons to warrant the Court’s taking cognizance of the
petition in the first instance. Petitioner also failed to state any reason that precludes the
lower courts from passing upon the validity of the questioned IRR. Moreover, as provided in
Section 5, Article VIII of the
Constitution, 20 the Court’s power to evaluate the validity of an implementing rule or
regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus, following the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts, the instant petition should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court.
may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice. And the power of the
Court to except a particular case from its rules whenever the purposes of justice require it
cannot be questioned. 25
Now, we turn to the substantive aspects of the petition. The outcome, however, is just as
dismal for petitioners.
Petitioners assail the following provisions of the IRR:
Section 3. Disposition of Certain portions of the NGC Site to the bonafide residents
3.1. Period for Qualification of Beneficiaries
xxxx
(a.4) Processing and evaluation of qualifications shall be based on the Code of Policies and
subject to the condition that a beneficiary is qualified to acquire only one (1) lot with a
minimum of 36 sq. m. and maximum of 54 sq. m. and subject further to the availability of
lots.

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise xxxx
of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
(b.2) Applications for qualification as beneficiary shall be processed and evaluated based on
ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when
the Code of Policies including the minimum and maximum lot allocation of 35 sq. m. and 60
said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are
sq. m.
accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 21 Prohibition lies against judicial
xxxx
or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally,
the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction
in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. 22 Prohibition is the 3.2. Execution of the Contract to Sell
proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court,
or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the (a) Westside
inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no
adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be (a.1) All qualified beneficiaries shall execute Contract to Sell (CTS) within sixty (60) days
obtained. 23 Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is from the effectivity of the IRR in order to avail of the lot at P700.00 per sq. m.
an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that "respondents are xxxx
performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction"
may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary (c) for both eastside and westside
restraining order.
(c.1) Qualified beneficiaries who failed to execute CTS on the deadline set in item a.1 above
In a number of petitions, 24 the Court adequately resolved them on other grounds without in case of westside and in case of eastside six (6) months after approval of the subdivision
adjudicating on the constitutionality issue when there were no compelling reasons to pass plan shall be subjected to lot price escalation.
upon the same. In like manner, the instant petition may be dismissed based on the foregoing
procedural grounds. Yet, the Court will not shirk from its duty to rule on the merits of this
petition to facilitate the speedy resolution of this case. In proper cases, procedural rules
51
The rate shall be based on the formula to be set by the National Housing Authority factoring
therein the affordability criteria. The new rate shall be approved by the NGC-Administration
Committee (NGC-AC).
Petitioners contend that the aforequoted provisions of the IRR are constitutionally infirm as
they are not germane to and/or are in conflict with the object and purpose of the law sought
to be implemented.
First. According to petitioners, the limitation on the areas to be awarded to qualified
beneficiaries under Sec. 3.1 (a.4) and (b.2) of the IRR is not in harmony with the provisions
of R.A. No. 9207, which mandates that the lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries shall be
based on the area actually used or occupied by bona fide residents without limitation to
area. The argument is utterly baseless.
The beneficiaries of lot allocations in the NGC may be classified into two groups, namely,
the urban poor or the bona fide residents within the NGC site and certain government
institutions including the local government. Section 3, R.A. No. 9207 mandates the allocation
of additional property within the NGC for disposition to its bona fide residents and the
manner by which this area may be distributed to qualified beneficiaries. Section 4, R.A. No.
9207, on the other hand, governs the lot disposition to government institutions. While it is
true that Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207 has a proviso mandating that the lot allocation shall be
based on the land area actually used or occupied at the time of the law’s effectivity, this
proviso applies only to institutional beneficiaries consisting of the local government,
socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious institutions which do not have specific
lot allocations, and not to the bona fide residents of NGC. There is no proviso which even
hints that a bona fide resident of the NGC is likewise entitled to the lot area actually occupied
by him.
Petitioners’ interpretation is also not supported by the policy of R.A. No. 9207 and the prior
proclamations establishing the NGC. The government’s policy to set aside public property
aims to benefit not only the urban poor but also the local government and various
government institutions devoted to socioeconomic, charitable, educational and
religious purposes. 26 Thus, although Proclamation No. 137 authorized the sale of lots to
bona fide residents in the NGC, only a third of the entire area of the NGC was declared open
for disposition subject to the condition that those portions being used or earmarked for
public or quasi-public purposes would be excluded from the housing program for NGC
residents. The same policy of rational and optimal land use can be read in Proclamation
No. 248 issued by then President Ramos. Although the proclamation recognized the rapid
increase in the population density in the NGC, it did not allocate additional property within
the NGC for urban poor housing but instead authorized the vertical development of the same
150 hectares identified previously by Proclamation No. 137 since the distribution of
individual lots would not adequately provide for the housing needs of all the bona fide
residents in the NGC.
52
In addition, as provided in Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207, the institutional beneficiaries shall be
allocated the areas actually occupied by them; hence, the portions intended for the
institutional beneficiaries is fixed and cannot be allocated for other non-institutional
beneficiaries. Thus, the areas not intended for institutional beneficiaries would have to be
equitably distributed among the bona fide residents of the NGC. In order to accommodate
all qualified residents, a limitation on the area to be awarded to each beneficiary must be
fixed as a necessary consequence.
Second. Petitioners note that while Sec. 3.2 (a.1) of the IRR fixes the selling rate of a lot at
P700.00 per sq. m., R.A. No. 9207 does not provide for the price. They add Sec. 3.2 (c.1)
penalizes a beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within six (6) months from the
approval of the subdivision plan by imposing a price escalation, while there is no such
penalty imposed by R.A. No. 9207. Thus, they conclude that the assailed provisions conflict
with R.A. No. 9207 and should be nullified. The argument deserves scant consideration.
Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute
being implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative
rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation
by providing the details thereof. 27 All that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction
to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. 28
In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee is granted the power to administer, formulate
guidelines and policies, and implement the disposition of the areas covered by the law.
Implicit in this authority and the statute’s objective of urban poor housing is the power of
the Committee to formulate the manner by which the reserved property may be allocated
to the beneficiaries. Under this broad power, the Committee is mandated to fill in the details
such as the qualifications of beneficiaries, the selling price of the lots, the terms and
conditions governing the sale and other key particulars necessary to implement the objective
of the law. These details are purposely omitted from the statute and their determination is
left to the discretion of the Committee because the latter possesses special knowledge and
technical expertise over these matters.
The Committee’s authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened to the rate-
fixing power of administrative agencies. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the
only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the
administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held
that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may
be implied. 29 In this regard, petitioners do not even claim that the selling price of the lots
is unreasonable.
The provision on the price escalation clause as a penalty imposed to a beneficiary who fails
to execute a contract to sell within the prescribed period is also within the Committee’s
authority to formulate guidelines and policies to implement R.A. No. 9207. The Committee
has the power to lay down the terms and conditions governing the disposition of said lots,
provided that these are reasonable and just. There is nothing objectionable about
prescribing a period within which the parties must execute the contract to sell. This condition
can ordinarily be found in a contract to sell and is not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy.

Third. Petitioners also suggest that the adoption of the assailed IRR suffers from a procedural
flaw. According to them the IRR was adopted and concurred in by several representatives
of people’s organizations contrary to the express mandate of R.A. No. 9207 that only two
representatives from duly recognized peoples’ organizations must compose the NGCAC
which promulgated the assailed IRR. It is worth noting that petitioner association is not a
duly recognized people’s organization.

In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule or regulation had the benefit
of a hearing, the procedural due process requirement is deemed complied with. That there
is observance of more than the minimum requirements of due process in the adoption of
the questioned IRR is not a ground to invalidate the same.

In sum, the petition lacks merit and suffers from procedural deficiencies.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

53
 11.) G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006
HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L. HENARES, DANIEL
L. HENARES, ENRIQUE BELO HENARES, and CRISTINA BELO HENARES, petitioners,
vs.
LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD and
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use
compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic Situation Study of 1996, 1
the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the National Capital Region,2 a study of
the Asian Development Bank,3 the Manila Observatory4 and the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources5 (DENR) on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership
in the Philippines, including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine powered
motorcycles and their concomitant emission of air pollutants, petitioners attempt to present
a compelling case for judicial action against the bane of air pollution and related
environmental hazards.
Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke,
and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various
engine combustions – have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure
and the overall quality of life. Petitioners particularly cite the effects of certain fuel emissions
from engine combustion when these react to other pollutants. For instance, petitioners aver,
with hydrocarbons, oxide of nitrogen (NOx) creates smog; with sulfur dioxide, it creates acid
rain; and with ammonia, moisture and other compounds, it reacts to form nitric acid and
harmful nitrates. Fuel emissions also cause retardation and leaf bleaching in plants.
According to petitioner, another emission, carbon monoxide (CO), when not completely
burned but emitted into the atmosphere and then inhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen
in blood. With prolonged exposure, CO affects the nervous system and can be lethal to
people with weak hearts.6
Petitioners add that although much of the new power generated in the country will use
natural gas while a number of oil and coal-fired fuel stations are being phased-out, still with
the projected doubling of power generation over the next 10 years, and with the continuing
54
high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the
major sources of harmful emissions. Petitioners refer us to the study of the Philippine
Environment Monitor 20027, stating that in four of the country's major cities, Metro Manila,
Davao, Cebu and Baguio, the exposure to PM10, a finer PM which can penetrate deep into
the lungs causing serious health problems, is estimated at over US$430 million.8 The study
also reports that the emissions of PMs have caused the following:
· Over 2,000 people die prematurely. This loss is valued at about US$140 million.
· Over 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis, which is valued at about US$120
million.
· Nearly 51 million cases of respiratory symptom days in Metro Manila (averaging
twice a year in Davao and Cebu, and five to six times in Metro Manila and Baguio),
costs about US$170 million. This is a 70 percent increase, over a decade, when
compared with the findings of a similar study done in 1992 for Metro Manila, which
reported 33 million cases.9
Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines' studies in 1990-91 and 1994
showing that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic
obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among
jeepney drivers; and there is a 4.8 to 27.5 percent prevalence of respiratory symptoms
among school children and 15.8 to 40.6 percent among child vendors. The studies also
revealed that the children in Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary function
than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly due to the emissions of
PUVs.
To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs, petitioners
propose the use of CNG. According to petitioners, CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of
methane which although containing small amounts of propane and butane,10 is colorless and
odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel because it produces much less pollutants
than coal and petroleum; produces up to 90 percent less CO compared to gasoline and diesel
fuel; reduces NOx emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half; emits
60 percent less PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur dioxide. Although, according to
petitioners, the only drawback of CNG is that it produces more methane, one of the gases
blamed for global warming.11
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a
writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie
in Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13
and Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act
of 1999."
Meantime, following a subsequent motion, the Court granted petitioners' motion to implead
the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) as additional respondent.
In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor General, cites Section 3,
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and explains that the writ of mandamus is not the
correct remedy since the writ may be issued only to command a tribunal, corporation, board
or person to do an act that is required to be done, when he or it unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.15 Further citing existing jurisprudence, the Solicitor
General explains that in contrast to a discretionary act, a ministerial act, which a mandamus
is, is one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of
his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an act done.
The Solicitor General also notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that petitioners invoke,
prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by owners of motor vehicles. Sadly too, according
to the Solicitor General, Rep. Act No. 8749 does not even mention the existence of CNG as
alternative fuel and avers that unless this law is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel
for PUVs, the respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as alternative fuel.
The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to implement Rep. Act No.
8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC. Moreover, he says, it is the Department of Energy
(DOE), under Section 2616 of Rep. Act No. 8749, that is required to set the specifications for
all types of fuel and fuel-related products to improve fuel compositions for improved
efficiency and reduced emissions. He adds that under Section 2117 of the cited Republic Act,
the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards for motor vehicles, and the
herein respondents cannot alter, change or modify the emission standards. The Solicitor
General opines that the Court should declare the instant petition for mandamus without
merit.
Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess the administrative and
regulatory powers to implement measures in accordance with the policies and principles
mandated by Rep. Act No. 8749, specifically Section 2 18 and Section 21.19 Petitioners state
that under these laws and with all the available information provided by the DOE on the
benefits of CNG, respondents cannot ignore the existence of CNG, and their failure to
recognize CNG and compel its use by PUVs as alternative fuel while air pollution brought
about by the emissions of gasoline and diesel endanger the environment and the people, is
tantamount to neglect in the performance of a duty which the law enjoins.
Lastly, petitioners aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners insist that the writ in fact
should be issued pursuant to the very same Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
that the Solicitor General invokes.
In their Memorandum, petitioners phrase the issues before us as follows:
55
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE PERSONALITY TO BRING THE
PRESENT ACTION
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS SUPPORTED BY LAW
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS THE AGENCY RESPONSIBLE TO
IMPLEMENT THE SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE OF REQUIRING PUBLIC UTILITY
VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS (CNG)
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CAN BE COMPELLED TO REQUIRE PUBLIC
UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS THROUGH A WRIT OF
MANDAMUS20
Briefly put, the issues are two-fold. First, Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this
petition before us? Second, Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to
use CNG as alternative fuel?
According to petitioners, Section 16,21 Article II of the 1987 Constitution is the policy
statement that bestows on the people the right to breathe clean air in a healthy
environment. This policy is enunciated in Oposa.22 The implementation of this policy is
articulated in Rep. Act No. 8749. These, according to petitioners, are the bases for their
standing to file the instant petition. They aver that when there is an omission by the
government to safeguard a right, in this case their right to clean air, then, the citizens can
resort to and exhaust all remedies to challenge this omission by the government. This, they
say, is embodied in Section 423 of Rep. Act No. 8749.
Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the government agencies
clothed with power to regulate and control motor vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the
same agencies' awareness and knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air
pollutants, then, the responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under respondents'
functions and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.
The Solicitor General, for his part, reiterates his position that the respondent government
agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as
alternative fuel. The Solicitor General explains that the function of the DOTC is limited to
implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law only
goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does not
recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel. The Solicitor General avers that the petition should
be addressed to Congress for it to come up with a policy that would compel the use of CNG
as alternative fuel.
Patently, this Court is being asked to resolve issues that are not only procedural. Petitioners
challenge this Court to decide if what petitioners propose could be done through a less
circuitous, speedy and unchartered course in an issue that Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. in his ponencia in the Oposa case,24 describes as "inter-generational responsibility" and
"inter-generational justice."
Now, as to petitioners' standing. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring
their case before this Court. Even respondents do not question their standing. This petition
focuses on one fundamental legal right of petitioners, their right to clean air. Moreover, as
held previously, a party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may,
in the exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue
raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the transcendental
importance to the public, especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.
Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount importance to petitioners
for it concerns the air they breathe, but it is also impressed with public interest. The
consequences of the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of a neglected
environment due to emissions of motor vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being of
petitioners. On these considerations, the legal standing of the petitioners deserves
recognition.
Our next concern is whether the writ of mandamus is the proper remedy, and if the writ
could issue against respondents.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following
cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,25 we said,
…It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie
to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of
conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion. On the part of
the petitioner, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he
should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the
imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never
issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be
absolutely expressed, it must however, be clear. The writ will not issue to
compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his
duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled
by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a
command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty
already imposed. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this petition the legal right which is sought to be recognized and enforced hinges on a
constitutional and a statutory policy already articulated in operational terms, e.g. in Rep.
56
Act No. 8749, the Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999. Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act
specifically provides that when PUVs are concerned, the responsibility of implementing the
policy falls on respondent DOTC. It provides as follows:
SEC 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall implement the emission
standards for motor vehicles set pursuant to and as provided in this Act. To further
improve the emission standards, the Department [DENR] shall review, revise and
publish the standards every two (2) years, or as the need arises. It shall consider
the maximum limits for all major pollutants to ensure substantial improvement in
air quality for the health, safety and welfare of the general public.
Paragraph (b) states:
b) The Department [DENR] in collaboration with the DOTC, DTI and LGUs, shall
develop an action plan for the control and management of air pollution from
motor vehicles consistent with the Integrated Air Quality Framework . . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is tasked to set the
emission standards for fuel use and the task of developing an action plan. As far as motor
vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is
to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the emission standards
for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB.
In Oposa26 we said, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. We also said, it is clearly the
duty of the responsible government agencies to advance the said right.
Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their prayer for
issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG
as an alternative fuel. Although both are general mandates that do not specifically enjoin
the use of any kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order
implementing a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. Executive Order No. 290,
entitled Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for Public Transport (NGVPPT), took
effect on February 24, 2004. The program recognized, among others, natural gas as a clean
burning alternative fuel for vehicle which has the potential to produce substantially lower
pollutants; and the Malampaya Gas-to-Power Project as representing the beginning of the
natural gas industry of the Philippines. Paragraph 1.2, Section 1 of E.O. No. 290 cites as
one of its objectives, the use of CNG as a clean alternative fuel for transport. Furthermore,
one of the components of the program is the development of CNG refueling stations and all
related facilities in strategic locations in the country to serve the needs of CNG-powered
PUVs. Section 3 of E.O. No. 290, consistent with E.O. No. 66, series of 2002, designated the
DOE as the lead agency (a) in developing the natural gas industry of the country with the
DENR, through the EMB and (b) in formulating emission standards for CNG. Most
significantly, par. 4.5, Section 4 tasks the DOTC, working with the DOE, to develop an
implementation plan for "a gradual shift to CNG fuel utilization in PUVs and promote NGVs
[natural gas vehicles] in Metro Manila and Luzon through the issuance of directives/orders WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is DISMISSED for lack
providing preferential franchises in present day major routes and exclusive franchises to of merit.
NGVs in newly opened routes…" A thorough reading of the executive order assures us that
implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed. To a certain extent, the SO ORDERED.
instant petition had been mooted by the issuance of E.O. No. 290.
Carpio, Morales, Tinga, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners,
i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is
unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined
by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC
to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O.
No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 "to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public
Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC
surveys."

Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate
branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. 27 The need for future
changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this
Court, especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and
courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal
branches to address by themselves the environmental problems raised in this petition.

In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a balanced and
healthful ecology with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-
generational justice" in Oposa,28 where we upheld the right of future Filipinos to prevent the
destruction of the rainforests, so do we recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners
and the future generation to clean air. In Oposa we said that if the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is now explicitly found in the Constitution even if the right is "assumed to
exist from the inception of humankind,… it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers
[of the Constitution] that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health
are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first
and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be
lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come. . ."29

It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we
have placed on the protection of the environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as
serious as the statistics are on air pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are
to the environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently
requiring resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we
must admit in particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an
indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus
compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It appears to us that more properly,
the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex
environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by
mandamus is taken.
57