Victorias Planters Association Inc., et al._ petitioners- appellees vs. Victorias Milling Corp.

_respondent appellant
Ponente: Padilla, J.:

Facts: Several sugarcane farmers in Negros Occidental entered into a contract with the North Negros Sugar Co. In. and Victorias
Milling Co. Inc. wherein said corporation will construct a sugar central or mill with the capacity of milling 300 tons of sugar
every 24 hours. In the said contract it is stipulated that the sugar cane planter’s produce will be milled by the said corporation for
the period of 30 years. During the World War II comprising of 4 years and the post war period comprising of 2 years the
petitioners was not able to produce sugarcane and the sugar central is destroyed. The North Central Sugar Co. Inc. did not
reconstruct its destroyed mill but rather made an arrangement with the planters that their produce will be milled by Victorias
Milling Co. Inc. herein respondent. In view of the 30-year period of the milling contract the petitioner contended that the contract
is deemed terminated. On the other hand the respondent stated that the contract speaks of “30 years milling period” not “30 years
in time” and in view of the failure of the petitioners to produce sugarcane during the war and post war they still have 6 years
milling period. The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioners

Issue: Is the occurrence of war (fortuitous event ) relieved the petitioners from their obligation?

Held: Yes, considering that war is a force majeure or a fortuitous event, the obligee has no legal right compel the obligor to
perform his obligation. Furthermore it is impossible in this case for the petitioner to produce crops (Nemo tenetor ad
impossibilia) and the fulfillment of that impossible, if granted will amount to the extension of the contract. Therefore the
judgment appealed is affirmed.

Angeles v. Calasanz

G.R. No. L-42283, March 18, 1985, 135 SCRA 323

FACTS:

Ursula and Tomas Calasanz sold a piece of land to Buenaventura Angeles and Teofila Juani covered by a contract to sell.
Angeles paid a down payment upon the execution of the contract and started paying the balance in monthly installments for nine
years with only a few remaining installments left to pay. Although Calasanz accepted late payments before, Angeles was now
five months late. Calasanz demanded payment of past due accounts, but did not receive any. Eventually, Calansanz canceled the
said contract and Angeles asked for reconsideration, but was denied. A provision in the contract to sell gave Calasanz the right to
cancel the contract and consider the amounts paid as rent for the property. However, the lower court ruled that the contract was
not validly canceled and ordered Calasanz to execute a final Deed of Sale in favor of Angeles.

ISSUE:

Was the contract to sell validly canceled?

RULING:

No. The act of a party in treating a contract as canceled or resolved on account of infractions by the other must be made known to
the other and is always provisional, being ever subject to scrutiny and review by the proper court. If the other party denies that
rescission is justified, it is free to bring the matter to court. Then, should the court decide that the resolution of the contract was
not warranted, the responsible party will be sentenced to damages; in the contrary case, the resolution will be affirmed and
indemnity awarded to the party prejudiced. The right to rescind the contract for non-performance of one of its stipulations is not
absolute. The general rule is that rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only for such
substantial and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the parties in making the agreement. The question of
whether a breach of a contract is substantial depends upon the attendant circumstances.

The breach of the contract alleged by Calasanz is so slight considering that Angeles had already paid monthly installments for
almost nine years. In only a short time, the entire obligation would have been paid.

ART 1191 NCC states that the law does not prohibit the injured partyform cancelling a contract due to non-compliance of the other party, the case doesnot apply
that.
ROQUE VS. LAPUS

FACTS:

Sometime in 1964, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement of sale covering Lots 1, 2 and 9, Block 1, of said property,
payable in 120 equal monthly installments at the rate of P16.00, P15.00 per square meter, respectively. In accordance with said
agreement, defendant paid to plaintiff the sum of P150.00 as deposit and the further sum of P740.56 to complete the payment of
four monthly installments covering the months of July, August, September, and October, 1954.

On January 24, 1955, defendant requested plaintiff that he be allowed to abandon and substitute Lots 1, 2 and 9, the subject with
Lots 4 and 12, Block 2 of the Rockville Subdivision, which are corner lots, to which request plaintiff graciously acceded. The
evidence discloses that defendant proposed to plaintiff modification of their previous contract to sell because he found it quite
difficult to pay the monthly installments on the three lots, and besides the two lots he had chosen were better lots, being corner
lots. In addition, it was agreed that the purchase price of these two lots would be at the uniform rate of P17.00 per square meter
payable in 120 equal monthly installments, with interest at 8% annually on the balance unpaid. Pursuant to this new agreement,
defendant occupied and possessed Lots 4 and 12, and enclosed them, including the portion where his house now stands, with
barbed wires and adobe walls. However, aside from the deposit of P150.00 and the amount of P740.56, which were paid under
their previous agreement, defendant failed to make any further payment on account of the agreed monthly installments for the
two lots in dispute, under the new contract to sell. Plaintiff demanded upon defendant not only to pay the stipulated monthly
installments in arrears, but also to make up-to-date his payments, but defendant refused to comply with plaintiff's demands.

On or about November 3, 1957, plaintiff demanded upon defendant to vacate the lots in question and to pay the reasonable
rentals thereon at the rate of P60.00 per month from August, 1955. On January 22, 1960, petitioner Felipe C, Roque filed the
complaint against defendant Nicanor Lapuz for rescission and cancellation of the agreement of sale between them involving the
two lots in question and prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the rescission and cancellation of the agreement of sale, the
defendant to vacate the two parcels of land and remove his house therefrom and to pay to the plaintiff the reasonable rental
thereof at the rate of P60.00 a month from August 1955 until such time as he shall have vacated the premises, and to pay the sum
of P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, costs of the suit and award such other relief or remedy as may be deemed just and equitable in the
premises.

The Court of Appeals rendered its decision that the defendant Nicanor Lapuz is granted a period of ninety (90) days from entry
hereof within which to pay the balance. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:

Can private respondent be entitled to the Benefits of the third paragraph of Article 1191, New Civil Code, for the fixing of period
RULING:

No. Respondent as obligor is not entitled to the benefits of paragraph 3 of Art. 1191, NCC Having been in default and acted in
bad faith, he is not entitled to the new period of 90 days from entry of judgment within which to pay petitioner the balance of
P11,434.44 with interest due on the purchase price of P12,325.00 for the two lots. To allow and grant respondent an additional
period for him to pay the balance of the purchase price, which balance is about 92% of the agreed price, would be tantamount to
excusing his bad faith and sanctioning the deliberate infringement of a contractual obligation that is repugnant and contrary to the
stability, security and obligatory force of contracts. Moreover, respondent's failure to pay the succeeding 116 monthly
installments after paying only 4 monthly installments is a substantial and material breach on his part, not merely casual, which
takes the case out of the application of the benefits of pa paragraph 3, Art. 1191, N.C.C.

Pursuant to Art. 1191, New Civil Code, petitioner is entitled to rescission with payment of damages which the trial court and the
appellate court, in the latter's original decision, granted in the form of rental at the rate of P60.00 per month from August, 1955
until respondent shall have actually vacated the premises, plus P2,000.00 as attorney's fees. The Court affirmed the same to be
fair and reasonable. The Court also sustained the right of the petitioner to the possession of the land, ordering thereby respondent
to vacate the same and remove his house therefrom.